





LIFE
OF
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

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Maximilian

Imperial Signature



Carlota

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THE
LIFE
OF
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE,
EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH.

WITH A
PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
BY SIR WALTER SCOTT.

———Sed non in Cesare tantum
Nomen erat, nec fama ducis; sed nescia virtus
Stare loco; solusque pudor non vincere bello.
Acer et indomitus, quo spes, quoque ira vocasset,
Ferre manum, et nunquam temerando parcere ferro:
Successus urgere suos: instare favori
Numinia, impellens quidquid sibi summa petenti
Obstaret, gaudensque viam fecisse ruina.

LUCANI *Pharsalia*, Lib. I.

IN ONE VOLUME.



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Contents.

ADVERTISEMENT.

Pag. 1

CHAPTER I.

Review of the state of Europe after the peace of Versailles.—England—France—Spain—Prussia.—Imprudent innovations of the Emperor Joseph.—Disturbances in his dominions.—Russia.—France—Her ancient system of monarchy—how organized.—Causes of its decay.—Decay of the nobility as a body.—The new nobles.—The country nobles.—The nobles of the highest order.—The church.—The higher orders of the clergy.—The lower orders.—The commons.—Their increase in power and importance.—Their claims opposed to those of the privileged classes.

3

CHAPTER II.

State of France continued.—State of public opinion.—Men of letters encouraged by the great.—Disadvantages attending this patronage.—Licentious tendency of the French literature.—Their irreligious and infidel opinions.—Free opinions on politics permitted to be expressed in an abstract and speculative, but not in a practical form.—Disadvantages arising from the suppression of free discussion.—Anglomania.—Share of France in the American war.—Disposition of the troops who returned from America.

11

CHAPTER III.

Proximate cause of the Revolution.—Deranged state of the finances.—Reforms in the royal household.—System of Turgot and Necker.—Necker's exposition of the state of the public revenue.—The Red-book.—Necker displaced.—Succeeded by Calonne.—General state of the revenue.—Assembly of the Notables.—Calonne dismissed.—Archbishop of Sens administrator of the finances.—The king's contest with the parliament.—Bed of Justice.—Resistance of the parliament, and general disorder in the kingdom.—Vacillating policy of the minister.—Royal Sitting.—Scheme of forming a Cour Plénière.—It proves ineffectual.—Archbishop of Sens retires, and is succeeded by Necker.—He resolves to convocate the States-general.—Second Assembly of Notables previous to convocation of the States.—Questions as to the numbers of which the tiers état should consist, and the mode in which the Estates should deliberate.

18

CHAPTER IV.

Meeting of the States-general.—Predominant Influence of the tiers état.—Property not represented sufficiently in that body.—General character of the members.—Disposition of the estate of the nobles—and of the clergy.—Plan of forming the three estates into two houses.—Its advantages.—It fails.—The clergy unite with the tiers état, which assumes the title of the National Assembly.—They assume the task of legislation, and declare all former fiscal regulations illegal.—They assert their determination to continue their sessions.—Royal Sitting.—Terminates in the triumph of the Assembly.—Parties in that body.—Mountain.—Constitutionalists.—Republicans.—Jacobins.—Duke of Orleans.

27

CHAPTER V.

Plan of the democrats to bring the king and assembly to Paris.—Banquet of the Gardes du Corps.—Riot at Paris.—A formidable mob of women assemble to march to Versailles.—The National Guard refuse to act against the insurgents, and demand also to be led to Versailles.—The female mob arrive.—Their behaviour to the assembly.—to the king.—Alarming disorders at night.—La Fayette arrives with the National Guard.—Mob force the palace

—Murder the Body Guards.—The queen's safety endangered.—La Fayette's arrival with his force restores order.—King and royal family obliged to go to reside at Paris.—Description of the procession.—This step agreeable to the views of the constitutionalists, and of the republicans, and of the anarchists.—Duke of Orleans sent to England.

Pag. 40

CHAPTER VI.

La Fayette resolves to enforce order.—A higher is murdered by the rabble.—One of his murderers executed.—Decree imposing martial law in case of insurrection.—Democrats supported by the audience in the gallery of the assembly.—Introduction of the doctrines of equality.—They are in their exaggerated sense inconsistent with human nature and the progress of society.—The assembly abolish titles of nobility, armorial bearings, and phrases of courtesy.—Reasoning on these innovations.—Disorder of finance.—Necker becomes unpopular.—Seizure of church-lands.—Issue of assignats.—Necker leaves France in unpopularity.—New religious institution.—Oath imposed on the clergy.—Resisted by the greater part of the order.—Bad effects of the innovation.—General view of the operations of the Constituent Assembly.—Enthusiasm of the people for their new privileges.—Limited privileges of the crown.—King is obliged to dissemble.—His negotiations with Mirabeau.—With Bouillé.—Attack on the palace of the king.—Prevented by La Fayette.—Royalists expelled from the palace of the Tuilleries.—Escape of Louis.—He is captured at Varennes.—Brought back to Paris.—Riot in the Champ de Mars.—Put down by military force.—Louis accepts the constitution.

46

CHAPTER VII.

Legislative Assembly.—Its composition.—Constitutionalists.—Girondists or brissotins.—Jacobins.—Views and sentiments of foreign nations.—England.—Views of the Tories and Whigs.—Anacharistis Klotz.—Austria.—Prussia.—Russia.—Sweden.—Emigration of the French princes and clergy.—Increasing unpopularity of Louis from this cause.—Death of the Emperor Leopold, and its effects.—France declares war.—Views and interests of the different parties in France at this period.—Decree against Monsieur.—Louis interposes his veto.—Decree against the priests who should refuse the constitutional oath.—Louis again interposes his veto.—Consequences of these refusals.—Fall of De Lessart.—Ministers now chosen from the brissotins.—All parties favourable to war.

58

CHAPTER VIII.

Defeats of the French on the frontier.—Decay of the party of constitutionalists.—They form the club of Feuillants, and are dispersed by the Jacobins forcibly.—The ministry.—Dumouriez.—Versatility of his character.—Breach of confidence betwixt the king and his ministers.—Dissolution of the king's constitutional guard.—Extravagant measures of the Jacobins.—Alarms of the girondists.—Departmental army proposed.—King puts his veto on the decree, against Dumouriez's representations.—Decree against the recalcitrant priests.—King refuses it.—Letter of the ministers to the king.—He dismisses Roland, Clavière, and Servan.—Dumouriez, Duranton, and Lacoste, appointed in their stead.—King ratifies the decree concerning the departmental army.—Dumouriez retorts against the late ministers in the assembly.—Resigns, and departs for the frontiers.—New ministers named from the constitutionalists.—Insurrection of the 20th of June.—Armed mob intrude into the assembly.—Thence into the Tuilleries.—Assembly send a deputation to the palace.—And the mob disperse.—La Fayette repairs to Paris—

a

Remonstrates in favour of the king—But is compelled to return to the frontiers, and leave him to his fate.—Marceillais appear in Paris.—Duke of Brunswick's manifesto—Its operation against the king. Pag. 68

CHAPTER IX.

The day of the 10th of August—Tocain sounded early in the morning.—Swiss Guards, and relics of the royal party, repair to the Tuileries.—Mandat assassinated.—Dejection of Louis, and energy of the queen.—King's ministers appear at the bar of the assembly, stating the peril of the royal family, and requesting a deputation might be sent to the palace.—Assembly pass to the order of the day.—Louis and his family repair to the assembly.—Conflict at the Tuileries.—Swiss ordered to repair to the king's person—and are many of them shot and dispersed on their way to the assembly.—At the close of the day almost all of them are massacred.—Royal family spend the night in the neighbouring Convent of the Feuillans. 75

CHAPTER X.

La Fayette compelled to escape from France.—Is made prisoner by the Prussians, with three companions.—Reflections.—The triumvirate, Danton, Robespierre, and Marat.—Revolutionary tribunal appointed.—Stupor of the Legislative Assembly.—Longuey, Stenay, and Verdun, taken by the Prussians.—Mob of Paris enraged.—Great massacre of prisoners in Paris, commencing on the 2d, and ending 6th September.—Apathy of the assembly during and after these events.—Review of its causes. 80

CHAPTER XI.

Election of representatives for the National Convention.—Jacobins are very active.—Right hand party.—Left hand side.—Neutral members.—The girondists are in possession of the ostensible power.—They denounce the jacobin chiefs, but in an irregular and feeble manner.—Marat, Robespierre, and Danton, supported by the Community and populace of Paris.—France declared a Republic.—Duke of Brunswick's campaign.—Neglects the French emigrants.—Is tardy in his operations.—Occupies the poorest part of Champagne.—His army becomes sickly.—Prospects of a battle.—Dumourier's army recruited with Carmagnoles.—The duke resolves to retreat.—Thoughts on the consequences of that measure.—The retreat disastrous.—The emigrants disbanded in a great measure.—Reflections on their fate.—The Prince of Condé's army. 87

CHAPTER XII.

Jacobins determine upon the execution of Louis.—Progress and reasons of the king's unpopularity.—Girondists taken by surprise, by a proposal for the abolition of royalty made by the jacobins.—Proposal carried.—Thoughts on the new system of government.—Compared with that of Rome, Greece, America, and other republican states.—Enthusiasm throughout France at the change.—Follies it gave birth to.—And crimes.—Monuments of art destroyed.—Madame Roland interposes to save the life of the king.—Barrière.—Girondists move for a departmental legion.—Carried.—Revoked.—And girondists defeated.—The authority of the Community of Paris paramount even over the Convention.—Documents of the Iron Chest.—Parallel betwixt Charles I. and Louis XVI.—Motion by Pétion, that the king should be tried before the Convention. 92

CHAPTER XIII.

Indecision of the girondists and its effects.—The royal family in the Temple.—Insulted by the agents of the community, both within and without the prison.—Their ex-

plary patience.—The king deprived of his son's society.—Buzot's admission of the general dislike of France to a republican form of government.—The king brought to trial before the Convention.—His first examination.—Carried back to prison amidst insult and abuse.—Tumult in the assembly.—The king deprived of intercourse with his family.—Malesherbes appointed as counsel to defend the king and Desèze.—Louis again brought before the Convention.—Opening speech of Desèze.—King remanded to the Temple.—Stormy debate in the Convention.—Eloquent attack of Vergniaud on the jacobins.—Sentence of death pronounced against the king.—General sympathy for his fate.—Dumourier arrives in Paris.—Vainly tries to avert the king's fate.—Louis XVI. beheaded on 21st January, 1793.—Marie Antoinette on the 16th October thereafter.—The Princess Elisabeth in May, 1794.—The dauphin perishes, by cruelty, June 8th, 1795.—The princess royal exchanged for Beurnonville and others, 10th December, 1795. Pag. 104

CHAPTER XIV.

Dumourier.—His displeasure at the treatment of the Flemish provinces by the Convention.—His projects in consequence.—Gains the ill-will of his army—and is forced to fly to the Austrian camp.—Lives many years in retreat, and finally dies in England.—Struggles betwixt the girondists and jacobins in the Convention.—Robespierre impeaches the leaders of the girondists—and is denounced by them.—Decree of accusation passed against Marat, who conceals himself.—Commission of Twelve appointed.—Marat acquitted, and sent back to the Convention with a civic crown.—Terror and indecision of the girondists.—Jacobins prepare to attack the Palais Royal, but are repulsed.—Repair to the Convention, who recall the Commission of Twelve.—Louvett and other girondist leaders fly from Paris.—Convention go forth in procession to expostulate with the people.—Forced back to their hall, and compelled to decree the accusation of thirty of their body.—Girondists finally ruined, and their principal leaders perish in prison, by the guillotine, and by famine.—Close of their history. 112

CHAPTER XV.

Views of parties in Britain relative to the Revolution.—Affiliated Societies.—Counterpoised by Aristocratic Associations.—Aristocratic party eager for war with France.—The French proclaim the navigation of the Scheldt.—British ambassador recalled from Paris, and French envoy no longer accredited in London.—France declares war against England.—British army sent to Holland, under the Duke of York.—State of the army.—View of the military positions of France—in Flanders—on the Rhine—in Piedmont—Savoy—on the Pyrenees.—State of the war in La Vendée.—Description of the country.—Le Bocage.—Le Lousrou.—Close union betwixt the nobles and peasantry.—Both strongly attached to royalty, and abhorrent of the Revolution.—The priests.—The religion of the Vendéans outraged by the Convention.—A general insurrection takes place in 1793.—Military organization and habits of the Vendéans.—Division in the British Cabinet on the mode of conducting the war.—Pitt.—Windham.—Reasoning upon the subject.—Capitulation of Mentz enables 15,000 veterans to act in La Vendée.—Vendéans defeated, and pass the Loire.—They defeat, in their turn, the French troops at Laval.—But are ultimately destroyed and dispersed.—Unfortunate expedition to Quiberon.—Charlotte defeated and executed, and the war of La Vendée finally terminated.—Return to the state of France in spring 1793.—Unsuccessful resistance of Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Lyons, to the Convention.—Siege of Lyons.—Its surrender and dreadful punishment.—Siege of Toulon. 120

CHAPTER XVI.

Views of the British cabinet regarding the French Revolution.—Extraordinary situation of France.—Explanation of the anomaly which it exhibited.—System of terror.—Committee of Public Safety.—Of Public Security.—David the painter.—Law against suspected persons.—Revolutionary Tribunal.—Effects of the emigration of the princes and nobles.—Causes of the passiveness of the French people under the tyranny of the Jacobins.—Singular address of the Committee of Public Safety.—General reflections. Pag. 134

CHAPTER XVII.

Marat, Danton, Robespierre.—Marat poniarded.—Danton and Robespierre become rivals.—Commune of Paris.—Their gross irreligion.—Gobet.—Goddess of Reason.—Marriage reduced to a civil contract.—Views of Danton—and of Robespierre.—Principal leaders of the commune arrested—and nineteen of them executed.—Danton arrested by the influence of Robespierre.—and, along with Camille Desmoutins, Westermann, and Lacroix, taken before the Revolutionary Tribunal, condemned, and executed.—Decree issued, on the motion of Robespierre, acknowledging a Supreme Being.—Cécile Regnaud.—Gradual change in the public mind.—Robespierre becomes unpopular.—Makes every effort to retrieve his power.—Stormy debate in the Convention.—Collot d'Herbois, Tallien, etc., expelled from the Jacobin Club at the instigation of Robespierre.—Robespierre denounced in the Convention on the 9th Thermidor (27th July), and after furious struggles, arrested, along with his brother, Couthon, and St-Just.—Henriot, Commandant of the National Guard, arrested.—Terrorists take refuge in the Hôtel de Ville.—Attempt their own lives.—Robespierre wounds himself—but lives, along with most of the others, long enough to be carried to the guillotine, and executed.—His character.—Struggles that followed his fate.—Final destruction of the Jacobinical system.—and return of tranquillity.—Singular colour given to society in Paris.—Ball of the Victims. 40

CHAPTER XVIII.

Retrospective view of the external relations of France.—Her great military successes.—Whence they arose.—Effect of the compulsory levies.—Military genius and character of the French generals.—New mode of training the troops.—Light troops.—Successive attacks in column.—Attachment of the soldiers to the Revolution.—Also of the generals.—Carnot.—Effect of the French principles preached to the countries invaded by their arms.—Close of the Revolution with the fall of Robespierre.—Reflections upon what was to succeed. 107

CHAPTER XIX.

Cornica.—Family of Bonaparte.—Napoleon born 15th August, 1769.—His early habits.—Sent to the Royal Military School at Brienne.—His great progress in mathematical science.—Deficiency in classical literature.—Anecdotes of him while at school.—Removed to the general school of Paris.—When seventeen years old, appointed 2d lieutenant of artillery.—His early politics.—Promoted to a captaincy.—Pascal Paoli.—Napoleon sides with the French government against Paoli.—Along with his brother Lucien, he is banished from Corsica.—Never revisits it.—Always unpopular there. 162

CHAPTER XX.

Siege of Toulon.—Recapitulation.—Bonaparte appointed brigadier-general of artillery, with the command of the artillery at Toulon.—Finds everything in disorder.—His plan for obtaining the surrender of the place—

Adopted.—Anecdotes during the siege.—Allied Troops resolve to evacuate Toulon.—Dreadful particulars of the evacuation.—England censured on this occasion.—Lord Lynedoch.—Fame of Bonaparte increases, and he is appointed Chief of Battalion in the Army of Italy.—Joins headquarters at Nice.—On the fall of Robespierre, Bonaparte supercedes in command.—Arrives in Paris in May, 1796, to solicit employment.—He is unsuccessful.—Taima.—Retrospect of the Proceedings of the National Assembly.—Difficulties in forming a new Constitution.—Appointment of the Directory—of the Two Councils of Elders and of Five Hundred.—Nation at large, and Paris in particular, disgusted with their pretensions.—Paris assembles in sections.—General Danican appointed their Commander-in-chief.—Menon appointed by the Directory to disarm the National Guards—but suspended for incapacity.—Bonaparte appointed in his room.—The Day of the Sections.—Conflict betwixt the Troops of the Convention under Bonaparte, and those of the Sections of Paris under Danican.—The latter defeated with much slaughter.—Bonaparte appointed second in command of the Army of the Interior—then General-in-chief.—Marries Madame Beauharnais.—Her character.—Bonaparte immediately afterwards joins the Army of Italy. Pag. 167

CHAPTER XXI.

The Alps.—Feelings and views of Bonaparte on being appointed to the command of the Army of Italy.—General account of his new principles of warfare.—Mountains countries peculiarly favourable to them.—Retrospect of military proceedings since October, 1795.—Hostility of the French government to the pope.—Massacre of the French envoy Basseville, at Rome.—Austrian army under Beaulieu.—Napoleon's plan for entering Italy.—Battle of Monte Notte, and Bonaparte's first victory.—Again defeats the Austrians at Millesimo—and again under Colli.—Takes possession of Cerasco.—King of Sardinia requests an armistice, which leads to a peace, concluded on very severe terms.—Close of the Piedmontese campaign.—Napoleon's character at this period. 180

CHAPTER XXII.

Further progress of the French army under Bonaparte.—He crosses the Po, at Piacenza, on 7th May.—Battle of Lodi takes place on the 10th, in which the French are victorious.—Remarks on Napoleon's tactics in this celebrated action.—French take possession of Cremona and Pizzighettone.—Milan deserted by the Archduke Ferdinand and his duchess.—Bonaparte enters Milan on the 14th May.—General situation of the Italian States at this period.—Napoleon inflicts fines upon the neutral and unoffending States of Parma and Modena, and extorts the surrender of some of their finest pictures.—Remarks upon this novel procedure. 186

CHAPTER XXIII.

Directory propose to divide the Army of Italy betwixt Bonaparte and Kellermann.—Bonaparte resigns, and the Directory give up the point.—Insurrection against the French at Pavia—crushed—and the leaders shot.—Also at the Imperial Fiefs and Lugio, quelled and punished in the same way.—Reflections.—Austrians defeated at Borghetto, and retreat behind the Adige.—Bonaparte narrowly escapes being made prisoner at Valleggio.—Mantua blockaded.—Verona occupied by the French.—King of Naples secedes from Austria.—Armistice purchased by the pope.—The neutrality of Tuscany violated, and Leghorn occupied by the French troops.—Views of Bonaparte respecting the revolutionizing of Italy.—He temporizes.—Conduct of the Austrian govern-

ment at this crisis.—*Beaulieu displaced, and succeeded by Wurmser.—Bonaparte sits down before Mantua, P. 195*

CHAPTER XXIV.

Campaign on the Rhine—General plan.—Wartensleben and the Archduke Charles retire before Jourdan and Moreau.—The Archduke forms a junction with Wartensleben, and defeats Jourdan, who retires.—Moreau, also, makes his celebrated retreat through the Black Forest.—Bonaparte raises the siege of Mantua, and defeats the Austrians at Salo and Lonato.—Misbehaviour of the French General, Valette, at Castiglione.—Lonato taken, with the French artillery, on 3d August.—Retaken by Masséna and Augereau.—Singular escape of Bonaparte from being captured at Lonato.—Wurmser defeated between Lonato and Castiglione, and retreats on Trent and Rovereto.—Bonaparte resumes his position before Mantua.—Effects of the French victories on the different Italian States.—Inflexibility of Austria.—Wurmser recruited.—Battle of Rovereto.—French victorious, and Masséna occupies Trent.—Bonaparte defeats Wurmser at Primolano—and at Bassano, 8th September.—Wurmser flies to Vicenza.—Battle of Arcola.—Wurmser finally shut up within the walls of Mantua. 201

CHAPTER XXV.

Corsica re-united with France.—Critical situation of Bonaparte in Italy at this period.—The Austrian general Alvinci placed at the head of a new army.—Various contests, attended with no decisive result.—Want of concert among the Austrian generals.—French army begin to murmur.—First battle of Arcola.—Napoleon in personal danger.—No decisive result.—Second battle of Arcola.—The French victorious.—Fresh want of concert among the Austrian generals.—General views of military and political affairs, after the conclusion of the fourth Italian campaign.—Austria commences a fifth campaign—but has not profited by experience.—Battle of Rivoli, and victory of the French.—Further successful at La Favorita.—French regain their lost ground in Italy.—Surrender of Mantua.—Instances of Napoleon's generosity. 208

CHAPTER XXVI.

Situation and views of Bonaparte at this period of the campaign.—His politic conduct towards the Italians.—Popularity.—Severe terms of peace proposed to the pope—rejected.—Napoleon differs from the Directory, and negotiations are renewed—but again rejected.—The pope raises his army to 40,000 men.—Napoleon invades the Papal Territories.—The papal troops defeated near Imola—and at Ancona—which is captured.—Loreto taken.—Clemency of Bonaparte to the French recusant clergy.—Pence of Tolentino.—Napoleon's letter to the pope.—San Marino.—View of the situation of the different Italian States.—Rome.—Naples.—Tuscany.—Venice. 216

CHAPTER XXVII.

Archduke Charles—Compared with Napoleon.—Fettered by the Aulic Council.—Napoleon, by a stratagem, passes the Tagliamento, and compels the archduke to retreat.—Gradiaca carried by storm.—Chiusa-Veneta taken by Masséna, with the loss of 5000 Austrians, baggage, cannon, etc.—The seaports of Trieste and Fiume occupied by the French.—Venice breaks the neutrality, and commences hostilities by a massacre of 100 Frenchmen at Verona.—Terrified on learning that an armistice had taken place between France and Austria.—Circumstances which led to this.—The archduke retreats by hasty marches on Vienna.—His prospects of success in defending it.—The government and people irresolute, and the treaty of Leoben signed.—Venice now makes

the most humiliating submissions.—Napoleon's speech to the Venetian envoys.—He declares war against Venice, and roades obeying the orders of the Directory to spare it.—The Great Council, on 31st May, concede everything to Bonaparte, and disperse in terror.—Terms granted by the French general. 224

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Napoleon's amatory correspondence with Josephine.—His court at Montebello.—Negotiations and pleasure mingled there.—Genoa—Revolutionary spirit of the Genoese.—They rise in insurrection, but are quelled by the government, and the French plundered and imprisoned.—Bonaparte interferes, and appoints the outlines of a new government.—Sardinia.—Naples.—The Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian Republics, united under the name of the Cisalpine Republic.—The Valteline.—The Grisons.—The Valteline united to Lombardy.—Great improvement of Italy, and the Italian character, from these changes.—Difficulties in the way of pacification between France and Austria.—The Directory and Napoleon take different views.—Treaty of Campo Formio.—Bonaparte takes leave of the army of Italy, to act as French plenipotentiary at Rastadt. 232

CHAPTER XXIX.

Retrospect.—The Directory—they become unpopular.—Causes of their unpopularity.—Also at enmity among themselves.—State of public feeling in France.—In point of numbers, favourable to the Bourbons; but the army and mounted interest against them.—Pichegru, head of the royalists, appointed President of the Council of Five Hundred.—Barbè Marbois, another royalist, President of the Council of Ancients.—Directory throw themselves upon the support of Hoche and Bonaparte.—Bonaparte's personal politics discussed.—Pichegru's correspondence with the Bourbons—known to Bonaparte.—He dispatches Augereau to Paris.—Directory arrest their principal opponents in the councils on the 18th Fructidor, and banish them to Guiana.—Narrow and impolitic conduct of the Directory to Bonaparte.—Projected invasion of England. 237

CHAPTER XXX.

View of the respective situations of Great Britain and France, at the period of Napoleon's return from Italy.—Negotiations at Lille—Broken off, and Lord Malmesbury ordered to quit the Republic.—Army of England decreed, and Bonaparte named to the command.—He takes up his residence in Paris.—Description of his personal character and manners.—Madame de Staël.—Public honours paid to Napoleon.—Project of invasion terminated, and the real views of the Directory discovered to be the expedition to Egypt.—Armies of Italy and the Rhine, compared and contrasted.—Napoleon's views and notions in heading the Egyptian expedition—those of the Directory regarding it.—Its actual impolicy.—Curious statement regarding Bonaparte, previous to his departure, given by Miot.—The armament sails from Toulon, on 19th May, 1798.—Napoleon arrives before Malta on the 10th of June.—Proceeds on his course, and, escaping the British squadron, lands at Alexandria on the 1st of July.—Description of the various classes of nations who inhabit Egypt:—1. The Fellahs and Bedouins.—2. The Copts.—3. The Mamelukes.—Napoleon issues a proclamation from Alexandria, against the Mamelukes.—Marches against them on the 7th July.—Mameluke mode of fighting.—Discontent and disappointment of the French troops and their commanders.—Arrive at Cairo.—Battle of the Pyramids on 21st of July, in which the Mamelukes were completely defeated and dispersed.—Cairo surrenders. 243

CHAPTER XXXI.

French naval squadron.—Conflicting statements of Bonaparte and Admiral Gantheaume in regard to it.—Battle of Aboukir on 1st August, 1798.—Number and position of the enemy, and of the English.—Particulars of the action.—The French admiral, Brueis, killed, and his ship, l'Orion, blown up.—The victory complete, two only of the French fleet, and two frigates, escaping on the morning of the 2d.—Effects of this disaster on the French army.—Means by which Napoleon proposed to establish himself in Egypt.—His administration in many respects useful and praiseworthy.—In others, his conduct impolitic and absurd.—He desires to be regarded an envoy of the Deity, but without success.—His endeavours equally unsuccessful to propitiate the Porte.—The Fort of El Ariah falls into his hands.—Massacre of Jaffa.—Admitted by Bonaparte himself.—His arguments in its defence.—Replies to them.—General conclusions.—Plague breaks out in the French army.—Napoleon's humanity and courage upon this occasion.—Proceeds against Acre to attack Djezzar Pacha.—Sir Sydney Smith.—His character.—Captures a French convoy, and throws himself into Acre.—French arrive before Acre on 17th March, 1799, and effect a breach on the 28th, but are driven back.—Assaulted by an Army of Moslems of various nations assembled without the walls of Acre, whom they defeat and disperse.—Interesting particulars of the siege.—Personal misunderstanding and hostility between Napoleon and Sir Sydney Smith—explained and accounted for.—Bonaparte is finally compelled to raise the siege and retreat. Pag. 253

CHAPTER XXXII.

Discussion concerning the alleged poisoning of the sick in the hospitals at Jaffa.—Napoleon acquitted of the charge.—French army re-enter Cairo on the 14th June.—Retrospect of what had taken place in Upper and Lower Egypt during his absence.—Incursion of Murad Bey.—18,000 Turks occupy Aboukir.—Attacked and defeated by Bonaparte.—This victory terminates Napoleon's career in Egypt.—Views of his situation there after that battle.—Admiral Gantheaume receives orders to make ready for sea.—On the 23d August, Napoleon embarks for France, leaving Kitcher and Menon first and second in command of the army.—Arrives in Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 20th September, and lands at Fréjus, in France, on the 9th October. 261

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Retrospect of public events since the departure of Napoleon for Egypt.—Invasion and conquest of Switzerland.—Seizure of Turin.—Expulsion of the pope.—The Neapolitans declare war against France—are defeated—and the French enter Naples.—Disgraceful avarice exhibited by the Directory—particularly in their negotiations with the United States of America.—Are unsuccessful, and their shame made public.—Russia comes forward in the general cause.—Her strength and resources.—Reverses of the French in Italy, and on the Rhine.—Insurrections in Belgium and Holland against the French.—Anglo-Russian expedition sent to Holland.—The Chouans again in the field.—Great and universal unpopularity of the Directory.—State of parties in France.—Law of Hostages.—Abbi Sieyès becomes one of the Directory.—His character and genius.—Description of the constitution proposed by him for the Year Three.—Ducos, Gohier, and Moutins, also introduced into the Directory.—Family of Napoleon strive to keep him in the recollection of the people.—Favourable change in the French affairs.—Holland evacuated by the Anglo-Russian army.—Korsakow defeated by Masséna—and Smaragow retreats before Lecourbe. 265

CHAPTER XXXIV.

General rejoicing on the return of Bonaparte.—He, meanwhile, secludes himself in retirement and literature.—Advances made to him on all sides.—Napoleon coalesces with the Abbi Sieyès.—Revolution of the 18th Brumaire.—Particulars of that event.—Clashing views of the Councils of Ancients, and the Five Hundred.—Barras and his colleagues resign, leaving the whole power in the hands of Napoleon.—Proceedings of the councils on the 18th and 19th.—Sittings removed from Paris to St. Cloud.—Bonaparte visits both on the latter day.—Violent commotion in the Council of Five Hundred.—Napoleon received with great hostility, menaced and assaulted, and, finally, extricated by his grenadiers, breathless and exhausted.—Lucien Bonaparte, the president, retires from the hall with a similar escort.—Declares the Council of Five Hundred dissolved.—They are then dispersed by military force.—Various rumours stated and discussed.—Both councils adjourn to the 19th February, 1800, after appointing a Provisional Consular Government, of Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Ducos. Pag. 271

CHAPTER XXXV.

Effects of the victory of the 18th and 19th Brumaire.—Clemency of the new Consulate.—Beneficial change in the finances.—Law of Hostages repealed.—Religious liberty allowed.—Improvements in the war department.—Submission of the Chouans, and pacification of La Vendée.—Ascendancy of Napoleon in the Consulate.—Disappointment of the Abbi Sieyès.—Committee formed to consider Sieyès' plan of a constitution.—Adopted in part—but rejected in essentials.—A new one adopted, monarchical in everything but form.—Sieyès retires from public life on a pension.—General view of the new consular form of government.—Despotic power of the first consul.—Reflections on Bonaparte's conduct upon this occasion. 278

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Proceedings of Bonaparte in order to consolidate his power.—His great success.—Causes that led to it.—Cambacérès and Lebrun chosen second and third consuls.—Talleyrand appointed minister for foreign affairs, and Fouché minister of police.—Their characters.—Other ministers nominated.—Various changes made, in order to mark the commencement of a new era.—Napoleon addresses a letter personally to the King of England.—Answered by Lord Grenville.—Negotiation for peace, that followed, speedily broken off.—Campaigns in Italy, and on the Rhine.—Successes of Moreau.—Censured by Napoleon for over-caution.—The charge considered.—The chief consul resolves to bring back, in person, victory to the French standards in Italy.—His measures for that purpose. 284

CHAPTER XXXVII.

The chief consul leaves Paris on 6th May, 1800.—Has an interview with Necker at Geneva on 8th.—Arrives at Lausanne on the 13th.—Various corps put in motion to cross the Alps.—Napoleon, at the head of the main army, marches on the 15th, and ascends Mont St Bernard.—Difficulties of the march surmounted.—On the 16th, the van-guard takes possession of Aosta.—Fortress and town of Bard threaten to baffle the whole plan.—The town is captured—and Napoleon contrives to send his artillery through it, under the fire of the fort, his infantry and cavalry passing over the Albarredo.—Lannes carries Ivrea.—Recapitulation.—Operations of the Austrian general Melas.—At the commencement of the campaign Melas advances towards Genoa.—Many actions between him and Masséna.—In March Lord Keith blockades Genoa.—Melas compelled to retreat

from Genoa—Enters Nice—Recalled from thence by the news of Napoleon's having crossed Mont St Bernard—Genoa surrenders—Bonaparte enters Milan—Battle of Montebello, and victory of the French—The chief consul is joined by Desaix during the battle.—Great Battle of Marengo on the 14th June, and complete victory of the French—Death of Desaix—Capitulation on the 15th, by which Genoa, etc., are yielded to the French.—Napoleon returns to Paris on the 2d July, and is received with all the acclamations due to a great conqueror. Pag. 290

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Napoleon offers, and the Austrian envoy accepts, a new treaty.—The emperor refuses it, unless England is included.—Negotiations then attempted with England.—They fail, and Austria is encouraged to a renewal of the war.—Reasoning on the policy of this conclusion.—An armistice of forty-five days is followed by the resumption of hostilities.—Battle of Hohenlinden gained by Moreau on the 3d December, 1800.—Other battles take place, by which the Austrian affairs are made desperate and they agree to a separate peace.—An armistice takes place, which is followed by the treaty of Lunéville.—Convention between France and the United States.—Explanatory recapitulation.—The Queen of Naples repairs to Petersburg to intercede with the Emperor Paul.—His capricious character: originally a violent anti-Gallican, he grows cold and hostile to the Austrians, and attached to the same 'and character of the chief consul.—Receives the Queen of Naples with cordiality, and applies in her behalf to Bonaparte.—His envoy received at Paris with the utmost distinction, and the Royal Family of Naples saved for the present, though on severe conditions.—The Neapolitan general compelled to evacuate the Roman territories.—Rome restored to the authority of the pope.—Napoleon demands of the King of Spain to declare war against Portugal.—Olivenza and Almeida taken.—Bonaparte's conduct towards the Peninsular powers overbearing and peremptory.—The British alone active in opposing the French.—Malta, after a blockade of two years, obliged to submit to the English. 297

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Internal government of France.—General attachment to the chief consul, though the two factions of republicans and royalists are hostile to him.—Plot of the former to remove him by assassination.—Defeated.—Vain hopes of the royalists, that Napoleon would be the instrument of restoring the Bourbons.—Applications to him for that effect disappointed.—Royalists methodize the plot of the Infernal Machine.—Description of it.—It fails.—Suspicion first falls on the republicans, and a decree of transportation is passed against a great number of their chiefs—but is not carried into execution.—The actual conspirators tried and executed.—Use made by Bonaparte of the conspiracy to consolidate despotism.—Various measures devised for that purpose.—System of the police.—Fouché.—His skill, influence, and power.—Napoleon becomes jealous of him, and organizes measures of precaution against him.—Apprehension entertained by the chief consul of the effects of literature, and his efforts against it.—Persecution of Madame de Staël.—The Concordat.—Various views taken of that measure.—Plan for a general system of Jurisprudence.—Amnesty granted to the emigrants.—Plans of public education.—Other plans of improvement.—Hopes of a general peace. 303

CHAPTER XL.

Return to the external relations of France.—Her universal ascendancy.—Napoleon's advances to the Emperor Paul.—Plan of destroying the British power in India.—Right of search at sea.—Death of Paul.—Its effects on

Bonaparte.—Affairs of Egypt—Assassination of Kléber.—Menou appointed to succeed him.—British army lands in Egypt.—Battle and victory of Alexandria.—Death of Sir Ralph Abercrombie.—General Hutchinson succeeds him.—The French general Belliard, capitulates.—as does Menou.—War in Egypt brought to a victorious conclusion. 311

CHAPTER XLII.

Preparations made for the Invasion of Britain.—Nelson put in command of the sea.—Attack of the Boulogne Flotilla.—Pitt leaves the ministry.—succeeded by Mr Addington.—Negotiations for peace.—Just punishment of England, in regard to the conquered settlements of the enemy.—Forced to restore them all, save Ceylon and Trinidad.—Malta is placed under the guarantee of a neutral power.—Preliminaries of peace signed.—Joy of the English populace, and doubts of the better classes.—Treaty of Amiens signed.—The ambitious projects of Napoleon, nevertheless, proceed without interruption.—Extension of his power in Italy.—He is appointed consul for life, with the power of naming his successor.—His situation at this period. 314

CHAPTER XLIII.

Different views entertained by the English ministers and the chief consul of the effects of the treaty of Amiens.—Napoleon, misled by the shouts of a London mob, misunderstands the feelings of the people of Great Britain.—His continued encroachments on the independence of Europe.—His conduct to Switzerland.—Interferes in their politics, and sets himself up, unwitting, as mediator in their concerns.—His extraordinary manifesto addressed to them.—Ney enters Switzerland at the head of 40,000 men.—The patriot, Reding, disbands his forces, and is imprisoned.—Switzerland is compelled to furnish France with a subsidiary army of 16,000 troops.—The chief consul adopts the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic. 318

CHAPTER XLIV.

Increasing jealousies betwixt France and England.—Additional encroachments and offences on the part of the former.—Singular instructions given by the first consul to his commercial agents in British ports.—Orders issued by the English ministers, for the expulsion of all persons acting under them.—Violence of the press on both sides of the Channel.—Feltier's celebrated royalist publication, l'Ambigu.—Bonaparte answers through the Monitor.—Monsieur Otto's note of remonstrance.—Lord Hawkesbury's reply.—Feltier tried for a libel against the first consul—found guilty—but not brought up for sentence.—Napoleon's continued displeasure.—Angry discussions respecting the treaty of Amiens.—Malta.—Offensive report of General Sebastiani.—Resolution of the British government in consequence.—Conferences betwixt Bonaparte and Lord Whitworth.—The King sends a message to parliament, demanding additional aid.—Bonaparte quarrels with Lord Whitworth at a levee.—Particulars.—Resentment of England upon this occasion.—Farther discussions concerning Malta.—Reasons why Bonaparte might desire to break off negotiations.—Britain declares war against France on 18th May, 1803. 321

CHAPTER XLV.

Retrospect.—St Domingo.—The Negroes, victorious over the Whites and Mulattoes, split into parties under different chiefs.—Toussaint Louverture the most distinguished of these.—His plans for the amelioration of his subjects.—Appoints, in imitation of France, a consular government.—France sends an expedition against St Domingo, under General Leclerc, in December, 1801, which is successful, and Toussaint submits.—After a

brief interval, he is sent to France, where he dies under the hardships of confinement.—The French, visited by yellow fever, are assailed by the Negroes, and war is carried on of new with dreadful fury.—Leclerc is cut off by the distemper, and is succeeded by Rochambeau.—The French finally obliged to capitulate to an English squadron, on 1st December, 1803.—Bonaparte's scheme to consolidate his power at home.—The Consular Guard augmented to 6,800 men—Description of it.—Legion of Honour—Account of it.—Opposition formed, on the principle of the English one, against the consular government.—They oppose the establishment of the Legion of Honour, which, however, is carried.—Application to the Comte de Provence (Louis XVIII.) to resign the crown.—Rejected. Pag. 328

CHAPTER XLV.

Mutual feelings of Napoleon and the British nation, on the renewal of the war.—First hostile measures on both sides.—England lays an embargo on French vessels in her ports.—Napoleon retaliates by detaining British subjects in France.—Effects of this unprecedented measure.—Hanover and other places occupied by the French.—Scheme of invasion renewed.—Nature and extent of Napoleon's preparations.—Defensive measures of England.—Reflections. 330

CHAPTER XLVI.

Disaffection begins to arise against Napoleon among the soldiery.—Purpose of setting up Moreau against him.—Character of Moreau—Causes of his estrangement from Bonaparte.—Pichegru.—The Duke d'Enghien.—Georges Cadoudal, Pichegru, and other royalists, landed in France.—Desperate enterprise of Georges.—Defeated.—Arrest of Moreau—of Pichegru—and Georges.—Captain Wright.—Duke d'Enghien seized at Ettenheim—hurried to Paris—transferred to Vincennes—Tried by a Military Commission—Condemned—and executed.—Universal horror of France and Europe.—Bonaparte's vindication of his conduct.—His defence considered.—Pichegru found dead in his prison.—Attempt to explain his death by charging him with suicide.—Captain Wright found with his throat cut.—A similar attempt made.—Georges and other conspirators tried—Condemned—and executed.—Royalists silenced.—Moreau sent into exile. 339

CHAPTER XLVII.

General indignation of Europe in consequence of the murder of the Duke d'Enghien.—Russia complains to Talleyrand of the violation of Baden; and, along with Sweden, remonstrates in a note laid before the German Diet—but without effect.—Charges brought by Bonaparte against Mr Drake, and Mr Spencer Smith—who are accordingly dismissed from the courts of Munich and Stuttgart.—Seizure—imprisonment—and dismissal of Sir George Rumbold, the British envoy at Lower Saxony.—Treachery attempted against Lord Elgin, by the agents of Bonaparte.—Details.—Defeated by the exemplary prudence of that nobleman.—These charges brought before the House of Commons, and peremptorily denied by the chancellor of the exchequer. 345

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Napoleon meditates a change of title from chief consul to emperor.—A motion to this purpose brought forward in the Tribunate—Opposed by Carnot—Adopted by the Tribunate and Senate.—Outline of the new system.—Coldly received by the people.—Napoleon visits Boulogne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Frontiers of Germany, where he is received with respect.—The coronation.—Pius VII. is summoned from Rome to the ceremony at Paris.—Details.—Reflections.—Changes that took place in Italy.—Napoleon appointed Sovereign of Italy, and crowned at Milan.—Genoa annexed to France. 348

CHAPTER XLIX.

Napoleon addresses a second letter to the King of England personally.—The folly and inconvenience of this innovation discussed.—Answered by the British secretary of state to Talleyrand.—Alliance formed betwixt Russia and England.—Prussia keeps aloof, and the Emperor Alexander visits Berlin.—Austria prepares for war, and marches an army into Bavaria.—Her in-policy in prematurely commencing hostilities, and in her conduct to Bavaria.—Unsoldierlike conduct of the Austrian general, Mack.—Bonaparte is joined by the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the Duke of Baden.—Skillful manœuvres of the French generals, and successive losses of the Austrians.—Napoleon violates the neutrality of Prussia, by marching through Anspach and Bareuth.—Further losses of the Austrian leaders, and consequent disunion among them.—Mack is cooped up in Ulm—Issues a formidable declaration on the 16th October—and surrenders on the following day.—Fatal results of this man's poltroonery, want of skill, and probable treachery. Pag. 354

CHAPTER L.

Position of the French armies.—Napoleon advances towards Vienna.—The Emperor Francis leaves his capital.—French enter Vienna on the 13th November.—Review of the French successes in Italy and the Tyrol.—Schemes of Napoleon to force on a general battle.—He succeeds.—Battle of Austerlitz is fought on the 2d December, and the combined Austro-Russian armies completely defeated.—Interview betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon.—The Emperor Alexander retreats towards Russia.—Treaty of Presburg signed on the 27th December.—Its conditions.—Fate of the King of Sweden—and of the Two Sicilies. 358

CHAPTER LI.

Relative situations of France and England.—Hostilities commenced with Spain, by the stoppage, by Commodore Moore, of four Spanish galleons, when three of their escort were taken, and one blew up.—Napoleon's plan of invasion stated and discussed.—John Clerk of Eldin's great system of breaking the line, explained.—Whether it could have been advantageously used by France?—The French admiral, Villeneuve, forms a junction with the Spanish fleet under Gravina.—Attacked and defeated by Sir Robert Calder, with the loss of two ships of the line.—Nelson appointed to the command in the Mediterranean.—Battle of Trafalgar fought on the 21st October, 1805.—Particulars of the force on each side, and details of the battle.—Death of Nelson.—Behaviour of Napoleon on learning the intelligence of this signal defeat.—Villeneuve commits suicide.—Address of Bonaparte to the Legislative Body.—Statement of Monsieur de Champagny on the internal improvements of France.—Elevation of Napoleon's brothers, Louis and Joseph, to the thrones of Holland and Naples.—Principality of Lucca conferred on Elisa, the eldest sister of Bonaparte, and that of Guastalla on Pauline, the youngest.—Other alliances made by his family.—Reflections.—Napoleon appoints a new hereditary nobility.—The policy of this measure considered.—Converts from the old noblesse anxiously sought for and liberally rewarded.—Confederation of the Rhine established, and Napoleon appointed Protector.—The Emperor Francis lays aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, retaining only the title of Emperor of Austria.—Vacillating and impolitic conduct of Prussia. 366

CHAPTER LII.

Death of Pitt.—He is succeeded by Fox as prime minister.—Circumstances which led to Negotiation with France.

—*The Earl of Lauderdale is sent to Paris as the British negotiator.*—*Negotiation is broken off in consequence of the refusal of England to cede Sicily to France, and Lord Lauderdale leaves Paris.*—*Reasonings on the stability of peace, had peace been obtained.*—*Prussia—her temporizing policy.*—*She takes alarm.*—*An attempt made by her to form a confederacy, in opposition to that of the Rhine, is defeated by the machinations of Napoleon.*—*Strong and general disposition of the Prussians to war.*—*Legal murder of Palm, a bookseller, by authority of Bonaparte, aggravates this feeling.*—*The Emperor Alexander again visits Berlin.*—*Prussia begins to arm in August, 1806, and, after some negotiation, takes the field in October, under the Duke of Brunswick.*—*Impolicy of the plans of the campaign.*—*Details.*—*Action fought, and lost by the Prussians, at Saalfeld.*—*Followed by the decisive defeat of Auerstadt, or Jena, on the 14th October.*—*Particulars of the battle.*—*Duke of Brunswick mortally wounded.*—*Consequences of this total defeat.*—*All the strong places in Prussia given up without resistance.*—*Bonaparte takes possession of Berlin on the 25th.*—*Explanation of the different situations of Austria and Prussia after their several defeats.*—*Reflections on the fall of Prussia.* Pag. 36

CHAPTER LIII.

Ungenerous conduct of Bonaparte to the Duke of Brunswick.—*The approach of the French troops to Brunswick compels the dying prince to cause himself to be carried to Altona, where he expires.*—*Oath of revenge taken by his son.*—*At Potsdam and Berlin, the proceedings of Napoleon are equally cruel and vindictive.*—*His clemency towards the Prince of Hatzfeld.*—*His treatment of the lesser powers.*—*Jérôme Bonaparte.*—*Seizure of Hamburg.*—*Celebrated Berlin Decrees against British commerce.*—*Reasoning as to their justice.*—*Napoleon rejects all application from the continental commercial towns to relax or repeal them.*—*Commerce, nevertheless, flourishes in spite of them.*—*Second anticipation called for of the conscription for 1807.*—*The King of Prussia applies for an armistice, which is clogged with such harsh terms that he refuses them.* 367

CHAPTER LIV.

Retrospect of the partition of Poland.—*Napoleon receives addresses from Poland, which he evades.*—*He advances into Poland, Bennigsen retreating before him.*—*Character of the Russian soldiery.*—*The Cossacks.*—*Engagement at Pultusk, on 26th December, terminating to the disadvantage of the French.*—*Bennigsen continues his retreat.*—*The French go into winter quarters.*—*Bennigsen appointed Commander-in-chief in the place of Kaminisky, who shows symptoms of insanity.*—*He resumes offensive operations.*—*Battle of Eylau, fought on 8th February, 1807.*—*Claimed as a victory by both parties.*—*The loss on both sides amounts to 50,000 men killed, the greater part Frenchmen.*—*Bennigsen retreats upon Königsberg.*—*Napoleon offers favourable terms for an armistice to the King of Prussia, who refuses to treat, save for a general peace.*—*Napoleon falls back to the line of the Vistula.*—*Danzic is besieged, and surrenders.*—*Russian army is poorly recruited.*—*The French powerfully.*—*Actions during the summer.*—*Battle of Heilsberg, and retreat of the Russians.*—*Battle of Friedland on 14th June, and defeat of the Russians, after a hard-fought day.*—*An armistice takes place on the 23d.* . . . 361

CHAPTER LV.

British expedition to Calabria, under Sir John Stuart.—*Character of the people.*—*Opposed by General Rignier.*—*Battle of Maida, 4th July, 1806.*—*Defeat of the French.*—*Calabria evacuated by the British.*—*Erroneous com-*

mercial views, and military plans, of the British ministry.—*Unsuccessful attack on Buenos Ayres.*—*General Whitelocke—is cashiered.*—*Expedition against Turkey, and its dependencies.*—*Admiral Duckworth's squadron sent against Constantinople.*—*Passes and repasses the Dardanelles, without accomplishing anything.*—*Expedition against Alexandria.*—*It is occupied by General Fraser.*—*Rosetta attacked.*—*British troops defeated, and withdrawn from Egypt, September, 1807.*—*Curaçoa and Cape of Good Hope taken by England.*—*Assumption of more energetic measures on the part of the British government.*—*Expedition against Copenhagen—its causes and objects.*—*Its citadel, forts, and fleet, surrendered to the British.*—*Effects of this proceeding upon France—and Russia.*—*Coalition of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, against British commerce.* Pag. 405

CHAPTER LVI.

View of the internal government of Napoleon at the period of the peace of Tilsit.—*The Tribunate abolished.*—*Council of State.*—*Prefectures.*—*Their nature and objects described.*—*The Code Napoleon.*—*Its provisions.*—*Its merits and defects.*—*Comparison betwixt that code and the jurisprudence of England.*—*Laudable efforts of Napoleon to carry it into effect.* 410

CHAPTER LVII.

System of education introduced into France by Napoleon.—*National University—its nature and objects.*—*Lyceums.*—*Proposed establishment at Meudon.* 424

CHAPTER LVIII.

Military details.—*Plan of the conscription.*—*Its nature—and effects.*—*Enforced with unsparing rigour.*—*Its influence upon the general character of the French soldiery.*—*New mode of conducting hostilities introduced by the Revolution.*—*Constitution of the French armies.*—*Forced marches.*—*La marche.*—*Its nature—and effects.*—*on the enemy's country, and on the French soldiers themselves.*—*Policy of Napoleon, in his personal conduct to his officers and soldiers.*—*Altered character of the French soldiery during, and after, the Revolution.*—*Explained.* 426

CHAPTER LIX.

Effects of the peace of Tilsit.—*Napoleon's views of a state of peace.*—*Contrasted with those of England.*—*The Continental System.*—*Its nature—and effects.*—*Berlin and Milan Decrees.*—*British Orders in Council.*—*Spain.*—*Retrospect of the relations of that country with France since the Revolution.*—*Godoy.*—*His influence.*—*Character—and political views.*—*Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, applies to Napoleon for aid.*—*Affairs of Portugal.*—*Treaty of Fontainebleau.*—*Departure of the Prince Regent for Brazil.*—*Entrance of Junot into Lisbon.*—*His unbounded rapacity.*—*Disturbances at Madrid.*—*Ferdinand detected in a plot against his father, and imprisoned.*—*King Charles applies to Napoleon.*—*Wily policy of Bonaparte.*—*Orders the French army to enter Spain.* 429

CHAPTER LX.

Pamphona, Barcelona, Montjoy, and St Sebastian's, are fraudulently seized by the French.—*King Charles proposes to sail for South America.*—*Insurrection at Aranjuez in consequence.*—*Charles resigns the crown in favour of Ferdinand.*—*Murat enters Madrid.*—*Charles disavows his resignation.*—*General Savary arrives at Madrid.*—*Napoleon's letter to Murat, touching the invasion of Spain.*—*Ferdinand is instigated to set out to meet Napoleon.*—*Halts at Vittoria, and learns too late Napoleon's designs against him.*—*Joins Bonaparte at Bayonne.*—*Napoleon opens his designs to Escobiquiz and*

Crales, both of whom he finds intractable.—He sends for Charles, his queen, and Godoy, to Bayonne.—Shocking scene with Ferdinand, who is induced to abdicate the crown in favour of his father, who resigns it next day to Napoleon.—This transfer is reluctantly conformed by Ferdinand, who, with his brothers, is sent to splendid imprisonment at Valency.—Joseph Bonaparte is appointed to the throne of Spain, and joins Napoleon at Bayonne.—Assembly of Notables convened.

Pag. 434

CHAPTER LXI.

State of morals and manners in Spain.—The nobility—the middle classes—the lower ranks.—The indignation of the people strongly excited against the French.—Insurrection at Madrid on the 2d May, in which many of the French troops fell.—Murat proclaims an amnesty, notwithstanding which, upwards of 300 Spanish prisoners are put to death.—King Charles appoints Murat Lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and Ferdinand's resignation of the throne is announced.—Murat unfolds the plan of government to the Council of Castile, and addresses of submission are sent to Bonaparte from various quarters.—Notables appointed to meet at Bayonne on 15th June.—The flame of resistance becomes universal throughout Spain.

441

CHAPTER LXII.

Plans of defence of the Spanish Juntas—defeated by the order of the insurrectionary armies.—Cruelty of the French troops, and inveteracy of the Spaniards.—Successes of the invaders.—Defeat of Rio Seco.—Exultation of Napoleon.—Joseph enters Madrid.—His reception.—Duhesme compelled to retreat to Barcelona, and Monecy from before Valencia.—Defeat of Dupont by Castanos at Baylen.—His army surrenders prisoners of war.—Effects of this victory and capitulation.—Unreasonable expectations of the British public.—Joseph leaves Madrid, and retires to Vittoria.—Defence of Zaragoza.

445

CHAPTER LXIII.

Zeal of Britain with regard to the Spanish struggle.—It is resolved to send an expedition to Portugal.—Retrospect of what had passed in that country.—Portuguese Assembly of Notables summoned to Bayonne.—Their singular audience of Bonaparte.—Effects of the Spanish success on Portugal.—Sir Arthur Wellesley.—His character as a general.—Dispatched at the head of the expedition to Portugal.—Attacks and defeats the French at Roleia.—The insurrection becomes wide and general.—Battle and victory of Vimeira.—Sir Harry Burrard Neale assumes the command, and frustrates the results proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley from the battle.—Sir Harry Burrard is superseded by Sir Hew Dalrymple; so that the British army has three generals within twenty-four hours.—Convention of Cintra.—Its unpopularity in England.—A Court of Inquiry is held.

449

CHAPTER LXIV.

*Duplicity of Bonaparte on his return to Paris.—Official statements in the Moniteur—poor and humiliating.—Two reports issued by Champagny, minister of the foreign department.—Difference betwixt them;—the second demanding another conscription of 80,000 men.—Agreed to by the Senate.—Review of the French relations with the different powers of Europe.—Universal spirit of resistance throughout Germany.—Russia.—Napoleon and Alexander meet at Erfurt on 27th September, and separate in apparent friendship on 14th October.—Actual feelings of the autocrats.—Their joint letter to the King of Great Britain, proposing a general peace on the principle of *ut possidetis*.—Why rejected.—Procedure*

in Spain.—Catalonia.—Return of La Romana to Spain. Armies of Blake, Castanos, and Palafox.—Expedition of General Moore.—His desponding views of the Spanish cause.—His plans.—Defeat of Blake—and Castanos.—Treachery of Morla.—Sir John Moore retreats to Corunna.—Disasters on the march.—Battle of Corunna, and death of Sir John Moore.

Pag. 454

CHAPTER LXV.

General Belliard occupies Madrid on 4th December, 1808.—Napoleon returns to France.—Singular conversation at Valladolid, betwixt him and the Abbé de Pradt.—Cause of his hurried return.—View of the circumstances leading to a rupture with Austria.—Feelings of Russia upon this occasion.—Secret intrigues of Talleyrand to preserve peace.—Immense exertions made by Austria.—Distribution of her armies.—Counter efforts of Bonaparte.—The Austrian army enters Bavaria, 9th April, 1809.—Napoleon hastens to meet them.—Austrians defeated at Abensberg on the 20th—and at Eckmühl on the 22d, with great loss.—They are driven out of Ratisbon on the 23d.—The Archduke Charles retreats into Bohemia.—Napoleon pushes forward to Vienna, which, after a brief defence, is occupied by the French on the 12th of May.—Retrospect of the events of the war in Poland, Italy, the North of Germany, and the Tyrol.—Enterprizes of Schill—of the Duke of Brunswick Oels.—Movements in the Tyrol—Character and manners of the Tyrolese.—Retreat of the Archduke John into Hungary.

463

CHAPTER LXVI.

Positions of the French and Austrian armies after the battle of Eckmühl.—Napoleon crosses the Danube on 20th May.—Great conflict at Aspern on the 21st and 22d, when victory was claimed by both parties.—Both armies are strongly reinforced.—Battle of Wagram fought on the 6th July, in which the Austrians are completely defeated, with the loss of 20,000 prisoners.—Armistice concluded at Znaim.—Close of the career of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick Oels.—Defence of the Tyrol.—Its final unfortunate result.—Growing resistance becomes manifest throughout Germany.—Its effects on Bonaparte.—He publishes a singular manifesto in the Moniteur.—This manifesto examined.

470

CHAPTER LXVII.

Conduct of Russia and England during the war with Austria.—Meditated expedition of British troops to the Continent.—Considerations respecting it.—Sent to Walscheren.—Its calamitous details and result.—Proceedings of Napoleon with regard to the pope—injudicious and inconsistent.—Explained and accounted for.—General Miollis enters Rome.—Napoleon publishes a decree, uniting the States of the Church to the French empire.—Is excommunicated.—Pius VII. is banished from Rome, and sent to Grenoble—afterwards brought back to Savona.—Reflections upon this procedure.—Bonaparte is attacked by an assassin.—Views and object of the criminal.—Definitive treaty of peace signed at Schœnbrunn.—Its provisions.—Napoleon returns to France on the 14th November, 1809.

477

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Change which took place in Napoleon's domestic life, after the Peace of Vienna.—Causes which led to it.—His anxiety for an heir.—A son of his brother Louis is fixed upon, but dies in childhood.—Character and influence of Josephine.—Strong mutual attachment betwixt her and Napoleon.—Fouché opens to Josephine the plan of a divorce—her extreme distress.—On 6th December, Napoleon announces her fate to Josephine.—On 16th they are formally separated before the Imperial Council.—Jose-

phine retaining the rank of empress for life.—Espousals of Bonaparte and Maria Louisa of Austria take place at Vienna, 11th March, 1810.—Comparison, and contrast, betwixt Josephine and her successor.—The results of this union different from what was expected.—Foreseen by the Emperor Alexander. Pag. 484

CHAPTER LXIX.

Almost all the foreign French settlements fall into the hands of the British.—French squadron destroyed at the Isle of Aix, by Lord Cochrane—and in the bay of Rosas, by Lord Collingwood.—Return to the proceedings in Spain.—Soult takes Oporto.—Attacked and defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and compelled to a disastrous retreat.—Ferrol and Corunna retaken by the patriots.—Battle of Talavera, gained by Sir Arthur Wellesley—who, nevertheless, in consequence of the obstinacy and bigotry of Cuesta, is compelled to retreat upon Portugal.—Created Lord Wellington.—The French armies take many towns and strong places.—Supreme Junta retreat to Cadiz.—Unsubdued spirit of the Spanish people.—The Guerrilla system.—Mutual cruelties of the Guerrillas and the French troops.—Growing disappointment of Bonaparte.—His immense exertions.—A large army raised, under the name of the army of Portugal, commanded by Masséna.—Lord Wellington compelled to remain inactive, from his inferiority of force.—Battle of Busaco, in which the French are defeated with great loss.—Lord Wellington's famous retreat on Torres Vedras. 480

CHAPTER LXX.

Change in Napoleon's principles of government.—Causes leading to this.—Becomes suspicious of Talleyrand and Fouché.—Remonstrates with the latter, who satisfies him for the time.—Fouché endeavours, without the knowledge of Napoleon, to ascertain the views of England with respect to peace.—His plan is defeated by a singular collision with a similar one of Napoleon, brought forward without the knowledge of his minister—and Fouché is sent away as Governor-general of Rome.—His moral and political character.—His dismissal regretted.—Murmurings of the people against the Austrian alliance, and its supposed effects.—Continental system.—Its object.—Ignorance of Napoleon of the actual political feelings of Great Britain.—License system.—Its nature and effects.—Louis Bonaparte.—Endeavours in vain to defend Holland from the effects of the continental system.—He abdicates the throne, and retires to Grotz in Styria.—Holland is annexed to the French empire.—This step renders Napoleon extremely unpopular. 404

CHAPTER LXXI.

Constantine IV. of Sweden is dethroned and succeeded by his uncle.—The Crown Prince killed by a fall from his horse.—Candidates proposed for the succession.—The Swedes, thinking to conciliate Napoleon, meditate going on Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo.—Reasons for supposing that the choice was not altogether agreeable to Bonaparte—who reluctantly acquiesces in the choice.—Parting interview between Bernadotte and Napoleon.—Subsequent attempts of the latter to bind Sweden to the policy of France.—The Crown Prince unwillingly accedes to the continental system.—Napoleon makes a tour through Flanders and Holland—returns to Paris, and takes measures for extending the continental system.—Seizure of the Vainin.—Coast along the German Ocean annexed to France.—Protest by the czar against the appropriation of Oldenburg.—Russia allows the importation, at certain seaports, of various articles of British commerce.—Negotiations for exchange of prisoners between France and England and for a general

peace, broken off by Bonaparte's unreasonable demands. Pag. 502

CHAPTER LXXII.

View of Napoleon's gigantic power at the present period.—The Empress Maria Louisa delivered of a son.—Criticism on the title given him, of King of Rome.—Speculations in regard to the advantages or disadvantages arising from this event.—Retrospect.—Ex-Queen of Etruria.—Her severe and unjustifiable treatment by Napoleon.—Lucien Bonaparte is invited to England, where he writes epic poetry.—Attempt to deliver Ferdinand, defeated.—His pusillanimity.—Operations in Portugal.—Retreat of Masséna.—View of his conduct as a man and as a general.—Skill displayed on both sides.—Battles of Fuentes d'Onoro fought by Lord Wellington—on the south frontier of Portugal, by Lord Beresford—of Barossa, by General Graham.—In all of which the English are victorious.—Enterprise of Arroyo-Molinos.—Spaniards defeated under Blake.—Valencia captured by the French, and he and his army made prisoners of war.—Disunion among the French generals.—Joseph writes to Napoleon, wishing to abdicate the throne of Spain. 503

CHAPTER LXXIII.

Retrospect of the causes leading to the rupture with Russia.—Originate in the treaty of Tilsit.—Russia's alleged reasons of complaint.—Arguments of Napoleon's counsellors against war with Russia.—Fouché is against the war.—Presents a memorial to Napoleon upon the subject.—His answer.—Napoleon's views in favour of the war, as urged to his various advisers. 513

CHAPTER LXXIV.

Allies on whose assistance Bonaparte might count.—Causes which alienated from him the Prince Royal of Sweden—who signs a Treaty with Russia.—Delicate situation of the King of Prussia, whose alliance the Emperor Alexander on that account declines.—A Treaty with France dictated to Prussia.—Relations between Austria and France—in order to preserve them, Bonaparte is obliged to come under an engagement not to revolutionize Poland.—His error of policy in neglecting to cultivate the alliance of the Porte.—Amount of Bonaparte's army.—Lewies of the Ban, the Second Ban, and Arrière-Ban, for the protection of France in the emperor's absence.—Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, by Lord Wellington.—Bonaparte makes overtures of peace to Lord Castlereagh.—The correspondence broken off.—Ultimatum of Russia rejected, and made the direct cause of hostilities by Napoleon—who sets out from Paris, 9th May, 1812—and meets the sovereigns his allies at Dresden, where a variety of royal festivities are held.—A last attempt of Napoleon to negotiate with Alexander proves unsuccessful. 518

CHAPTER LXXV.

Napoleon's plan of the campaign against Russia.—Understood and provided against by Barclay de Tolly, the Russian generalissimo.—Statement of the grand French army.—Of the grand Russian army.—Disaster on the river Wita.—Difficulties of the campaign, on the part of the French, stated and explained.—Their defective commissariat and hospital department.—Great consequent losses.—Cause of Bonaparte's determination to advance.—His forced marches occasion actual delay.—Napoleon remains for some days at Wilna.—Abbé de Pradt.—His intrigues to excite the Poles.—Neutralized by Napoleon's engagements with Austria.—An attempt to excite insurrection in Lithuania also fails. 526

CHAPTER LXXVI.

Proceedings of the army under Prince Bagration.—Napoleon's manoeuvres against him.—King Jérôme of Westphalia is disgraced for alleged inactivity.—Bagration is defeated by Davoust, but succeeds in gaining the interior of Russia, and re-establishing his communication with the grand army—which retreats to Drissa.—Barclay de Tolly and Bagration meet at Smolensk on the 26th July.—The French generals become anxious that Napoleon should close the campaign, at Vitepsk for the season.—He persists in proceeding.—Manœuvres of both armies in regard to Smolensk.—It is evacuated by Barclay de Tolly, after setting fire to the place.—Reduced condition of the French, and growing strength of the Russian armies.—Peace effected between Russia, and England, Sweden, and Turkey.—Napoleon resolves to advance upon Moscow. Pag. 532

CHAPTER LXXVII.

Napoleon detaches Murat and other generals in pursuit of the Russians.—Bloody, but indecisive action, at Valonina.—Barclay de Tolly's defensive system relinquished, and Koutousoff appointed to the chief command of the Russian army.—Napoleon advances from Smolensk.—Battle of Borodino fought, on 6th September.—Victory remains with the French, but without affording them any essential service.—Prince Bagration among the slain.—Koutousoff retreats upon Mojaïsk, and thence upon Moscow.—Napoleon continues his advance on the 12th.—Count Rostopchin, governor of Moscow.—His character.—The Russians abandon Moscow, which is evacuated by the inhabitants, after the removal of the archives and public treasures, and the emptying of the magazines.—On the 14th September, the grand Russian army marches through Moscow.—Last public court of justice held there by Rostopchin, after which he follows the march of the army. 538

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

On 14th September, Napoleon reaches Moscow, which he finds deserted by the inhabitants.—The city is discovered to be on fire about midnight.—Napoleon takes up his quarters in the Kremlin.—The fire is stopt next day, but restarts again at night.—Believed to be wilful, and several Russians apprehended and shot.—On the third night, the Kremlin is discovered to be on fire.—Bonaparte leaves it, and takes his abode at Petrowsky.—The fire rages till the 19th, when four-fifths of the city are burnt down.—On the 20th, Bonaparte returns to the Kremlin.—Discussion as to the origin of this great conflagration.—Disorganization and indiscipline of the French army.—Difficulty as to the route on leaving Moscow.—Lauriston sent with a letter to the Emperor Alexander.—Retrospect of the march of the Russian army, after leaving Moscow.—Lauriston has an interview with Koutousoff on 5th October.—The result.—Armistice made by Murat.—Preparations for retreat.—The Emperor Alexander refuses to treat. 542

CHAPTER LXXIX.

Murat's armistice broken off.—He is attacked and defeated.—Napoleon leaves Moscow on 19th October.—Bloody skirmish at Mala-Yarowslawets.—Napoleon in great danger while reconnoitring.—He retreats to Verela, where he meets Mortier and the Young Guard.—Winzengerode made prisoner, and insulted by Bonaparte.—The Kremlin is blown up by the French.—Napoleon continues his retreat towards Poland.—Its horrors.—Conflict near Wiazma, on 24 November, where the French lose 4000 men.—Cross the river Wiazma during the night.—Proceedings of the Viceroy of Italy.—He reaches Smolensk, in great distress, on the 13th.—Bonaparte

arrives at Smolensk, with the headmost division of the grand army.—Sketch of the calamitous retreat of Ney's division.—The whole French army now collected at Smolensk.—Retrospect of proceedings on the extreme flanks of Napoleon's line of advance.—Cautious conduct of Prince Schwartzenberg.—Winzengerode freed on his road to Paris, by a body of Cossacks.—Tchitchagoff occupies Minsk on 14th November, and Lambert, one of his generals, captures Borisoff, after severe fighting.—Perilous situation of Napoleon. Pag. 548

CHAPTER LXXX.

Napoleon divides his army into four corps, which leave Smolensk on their retreat towards Poland.—Cautious proceedings of Koutousoff.—The viceroy's division is attacked by Miloradovitch, and effects a junction with Napoleon at Krasnoi, after severe loss.—Koutousoff attacks the French at Krasnoi, but only by a distant cannonade.—The division under Davoust is sent to Napoleon, but in a miserable state.—Napoleon marches to Liady, and Mortier and Davoust are attacked, and suffer heavy loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and artillery.—Details of the retreat of Ney.—He crosses the Losmina, with great loss of men and baggage, and joins Napoleon at Orsha, with his division reduced to 1500 men.—The whole grand army is now reduced to 12,000 effective men, besides 30,000 stragglers.—Dreadful distress and difficulties of Bonaparte and his army.—Singular scene betwixt Napoleon, and Duroc, and Darn.—Napoleon moves towards Borisoff, and falls in with the corps of Victor and Oudinot.—Koutousoff halts at Kopyn, without attacking Bonaparte.—Napoleon crosses the Beresina at Studzianka.—Partoureaux's division cut off by Wittgenstein.—Severe fighting on both sides of the river.—Dreadful losses of the French in crossing it.—According to the Russian official account, 30,000 bodies were found in the Beresina after the chase. 558

CHAPTER LXXXI.

Napoleon determines to return to Paris.—He leaves Smorgoni on 5th December.—reaches Warsaw on the 10th.—Curious interview with the Abbé de Pradi.—Arrives at Dresden on the 14th—and at Paris on the 18th; at midnight.—Dreadful state of the grand army, when left by Napoleon.—Arrive at Wilna, whence they are driven by Cossacks, directing their flight upon Kowno.—Discussions among the French generals.—Cautious policy of the Austrians under Schwartzenberg.—Precarious state of Macdonald.—He retreats upon Tilsit.—D'York separates his troops from the French.—Macdonald effects his retreat to Königsberg.—Close of the Russian expedition, with a loss on the part of the French of 450,000 men in killed and prisoners.—Discussion of the causes which led to this ruinous catastrophe. 564

CHAPTER LXXXII.

Effects of Napoleon's return upon the Parisians.—Congratulations and addresses by all the public functionaries.—Conspiracy of Malet—very nearly successful.—How at last defeated.—The impression made by this event upon Bonaparte, both while in Russia, and on his return.—Discussions with the pope, who is brought to France, but remains inflexible.—State of affairs in Spain.—Napoleon's great and successful exertions to recruit his army.—Guards of Honour.—In the month of April, the army is raised to 350,000 men, independently of the troops left in garrison in Germany, and in Spain and Italy. 573

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

Murat leaves the grand army abruptly.—Fugine appointed in his place.—Measures taken by the King of Prussia for his disenfranchisement.—Arguments in his favour, op-

posed to those of the French historians.—He leaves Berlin for Breslau.—Treaty signed between Russia and Prussia early in March.—Alexander arrives at Breslau on 15th.—On the 16th Prussia declares war against France.—Warlike preparations of Prussia.—Universal enthusiasm throughout all the land.—Blücher appointed generalissimo.—Vindication of the Crown Prince of Sweden for joining the confederacy against France.—Proceedings of Austria.—Unabated spirit and pretensions of Napoleon.—A regency is appointed in France during his absence, and Maria Louisa appointed regent, with nominal powers. Pag. 578

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

State of the French grand army.—The Russians advance, and show themselves on the Elbe, joined everywhere by the inhabitants.—The French evacuate Berlin, and retreat on the Elbe.—The Crown Prince of Sweden joins the Allies, with 35,000 men.—Dresden is occupied by the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia.—Marshal Bessières killed on 1st May.—Battle of Lützen fought on the 2d.—The Allies lose 20,000 men in killed and wounded, and the French keep the field, after very dreadful loss.—The Allies retire to Bautzen.—Hamburg taken possession of by the Danes and French.—Battle of Bautzen fought on the 20th and 31st May, with great loss on both sides, the French remaining masters of the field.—The allies retire in good order.—The French generals, Bragères and Duroc, killed on the 22d.—Grief of Napoleon for the death of the latter.—An armistice signed on 4th June. 583

CHAPTER LXXXV.

Change in the results formerly produced by the French victories.—Despondency of the generals.—Decay in the discipline of the troops.—Views of Austria.—Arguments in favour of peace stated and discussed.—Pertinacity of Napoleon.—State of the French interior.—Aid from him by the slavery of the press.—Interview between Napoleon and the Austrian minister, Metternich.—Delays in the negotiations.—Plan of pacification proposed by Austria, on 7th August.—The armistice broken off on the 10th, when Austria joins the allies.—Sudden placability of Napoleon at this period.—Ascribed to the news of the battle of Vittoria. 587

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

Amount and distribution of the French army at the resumption of hostilities.—Of the armies of the allies.—Plan of the campaign on both sides.—Return of Moreau from America, to join the allies.—Attack on Dresden by the allies, on 26th August.—Napoleon arrives to its succour.—Battle continued on the 27th.—Death of General Moreau.—Defeat and retreat of the allies, with great loss.—Napoleon returns from the pursuit to Dresden, indisposed.—Vandamme attacks the allies at Culm.—Is opposed, and driven back towards Peterswald.—Singular conflict between the French and Prussians on the heights of Peterswald.—Vandamme is defeated and made prisoner, with great loss.—Effects of the victory of Culm on the allies—and on Napoleon. 593

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

Military proceedings in the north of Germany, in which the French were generally unsuccessful.—Luckau submits to the Crown Prince of Sweden.—Battles of Gross-Beeren and the Kutzbach, where the French suffer heavy loss in men and guns.—Operations of Ney upon Berlin.—He is defeated at Dennewitz on the 6th September.—Difficult and embarrassing situation of Napoleon.—He abandons all the right side of the Elbe to the allies.—Operations of the allies in order to effect a junction.—Counter-exertions of Napoleon.—The French generals averse to continuing the war in Germany.—

Disensions between them and the emperor.—Napoleon at length resolves to retreat upon Leipzig. Pag. 598

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

Napoleon reaches Leipzig on 15th of October.—Description of that town.—Statement of the French and allied forces.—Battle of Leipzig, commenced on 16th, and terminates with disadvantage to the French at nightfall.—Napoleon dispatches General Merfeldt (his prisoner) to the Emperor of Austria, with proposals for an armistice.—No answer is returned.—The battle is renewed on the morning of the 18th, and lasts till night, when the French are compelled to retreat, after immense loss on both sides.—They evacuate Leipzig on the 19th, the allies in full pursuit.—The retreat rendered more Moody by the blowing up of one of the bridges.—Prince Poniatowski drowned in the Elster.—25,000 French are made prisoners.—The allied sovereigns meet in triumph, at noon, in the great square at Leipzig.—King of Saxony sent under a guard to Berlin.—Reflections. 603

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

Details of the retreat of the French from Germany.—General defection of Napoleon's partisans.—Battle of Hanau fought on 30th and 31st October—in which the French are successful.—They prosecute their retreat.—Napoleon arrives at Paris on 9th November.—State in which he finds the public mind in the capital.—Fate of the French garrisons left in Germany.—Arrival of the allied armies on the banks of the Rhine.—Their exultation, which is universal throughout Germany.—The allies halt on the Rhine.—General view of Napoleon's political relations at the present period.—Italy.—Spain.—Restoration of Ferdinand.—Liberation of the pope, who returns to Rome.—Emancipation of Holland. 609

CHAPTER XC.

Preparations of Napoleon against the invasion of France.—Terms of peace offered by the allies, through the Baro de St-Aignan.—Bases of the treaty.—Congress held at Manheim.—Lord Castlereagh.—Manifesto of the allies.—Bonaparte's reply.—Its insincerity.—State of parties in France.—1. The adherents of the Bourbons—their chief partisans.—2. The old republicans.—The population of France, in general, wearied of the war, and desirous of the deposition of Bonaparte.—His unsuccessful attempts to arouse the national spirit.—Council of state extraordinary held, on November 11th, when new taxes are imposed, and a new conscription of 300,000 men decreed.—Gloom of the council, and violence of Bonaparte.—Report of the state of the nation presented to Napoleon by the Legislative Body.—His indignation on receiving it.—The Legislative Body is prorogued.—Commissioners sent to the departments to rouse the people—but in vain.—Unceasing activity of the emperor.—National Guard called out.—Napoleon, presenting to them his empress and child, takes leave of the people.—He leaves Paris for the armies on 25th January, 1811, full of melancholy presages. 616

CHAPTER XCI.

Declaration of the views of the allies in entering France.—They enter Switzerland, and take possession of Geneva.—Prince Schwarzenberg crosses the Rhine.—Apathy of the French.—Junction of Blücher with the grand army.—Proceedings of the Crown Prince of Sweden.—Tardiness of the allies.—Inferiority of Napoleon's numerical force.—Battles of Brienne—and La Rothière.—Difficulties of Bonaparte, during which he meditates to resign the crown.—He makes a successful attack on the Silesian army at Champaubert.—Blücher is compelled to retreat.—The grand army of the allies carries Nogent and Montreuil—attacked by Napoleon.

and Schwartzberg sends him a letter of remonstrance.—*Montereau is taken by storm.—Bonaparte's violence to his generals.—The Austrians resolve on a general retreat, as far as Nancy and Langres.—Their motives.—Consequent indignation and excesses of the Austrian troops.—Answer of Napoleon to the letter of Prince Schwartzberg.—Prince Wenceslaus sent to Bonaparte's head-quarters, to treat for an armistice.—The French bombard and enter Troyes on 2d February.—Barricade of Gouvault, a royalist.—A decree of death is denounced against all wearing the Bourbon emblems and all emigrants who should join the allies.—Retrospect of movements upon the frontiers.* Pag. 623

CHAPTER XCII.

Retrospect of military events on the French frontiers.—Defection of Murat, who declares in favour of the allies.—His consequences.—Angereau is compelled to abandon Gex and Franche-Comté.—The north of Germany and Flanders lost to France.—Carnot intrusted with the command of Antwerp.—Bergen-op-Zoom nearly taken by Sir Thomas Graham, but lost by the disorder of the troops in the moment of success.—The allies take, and evacuate Soissons.—Bulow and Winzengerode unite with Blücher.—The Duke of Wellington forces his way through the Pays des Caves.—State of the royalists in the west of France.—Discontent of the old republicans with Napoleon's government.—Views of the different members of the alliance as to the dynasties of the Bourbons and of Napoleon.—Proceedings of the Dukes of Berri and Angoulême, and Monsieur, the two latter of whom enter France.—The French defeated by Wellington at Orthez.—Bordaux is voluntarily surrendered to Marshal Beresford by the inhabitants, who mount the white cockade.—Details of the Negotiations of Châtillon.—Treaty of Chaumont, by which the allies bind themselves of new to carry on the war with vigour.—Napoleon presents a singularly unreasonable counterproject at Châtillon.—Congress at Châtillon broken up. 631

CHAPTER XCIII.

Difficulties of Bonaparte.—He marches upon Blücher; who is in possession of Soissons.—Attacks the place without success.—Battle of Craonne, on 7th March, attended by no decisive result.—Blücher retreats on Laon.—Battle of Laon on the 9th.—Napoleon is compelled to withdraw on the 11th, with great loss.—He attacks Rheims, which is evacuated by the Russians.—Defeat at Bar-sur-Aube of the French divisions under Oudinot and Gérard, who, with Macdonald, are forced to retreat upon the great road to Paris.—Schwartzberg wishes to retreat behind the Aube—but the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh opposing the measure, it is determined to proceed upon Paris.—Napoleon occupies Arcis.—Battle of Arcis on the 20th.—Napoleon is joined, in the night after the battle, by Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard.—Nevertheless he retreats along both sides of the Aube, with little loss. 639

CHAPTER XCIV.

Plans of Bonaparte in his present difficulties considered.—Military and political questions regarding Paris.—Napoleon determines to pass to the rear of the eastern frontier, and crosses the Marne on 2d March.—Retrospect of events in the vicinity of Lyons, &c.—The allies advance upon Paris.—Defeats of the French in various quarters.—Marmont and Mortier, with their discouraged and broken forces, retreat under the walls of Paris.—Paris, how far defensible.—Exertions of Joseph Bonaparte.—The Empress Maria Louisa, with the civil authorities of government, leave the city.—Attack of Paris on the 30th, when the French are defeated on

all sides.—A truce is applied for, and accorded.—Joseph Bonaparte flies, with all his attendants. Pag. 645

CHAPTER XCV.

State of parties in Paris.—Royalists—Revolutionists.—Bonapartists.—Talleyrand—His plans and views.—Châteaubriand—Influence of his eloquence in favour of the royalists.—Mission to the allied sovereigns from the royalists.—Their answer.—Efforts of the Bonapartists.—Feelings of the lowest classes in Paris of the middling ranks.—Neutrality of the National Guard.—Growing strength and confidence of the royalists.—They issue proclamations, and white cockades.—Crowds assemble at the Boulevards to witness the entrance of the allies.—Mutability of the French character.—The allies are received with shouts of welcome.—Their army retires to quarters, and the Cossacks bivouac in the Champs Elysées. 651

CHAPTER XCVI.

Fears of the Parisians.—Proceedings of Napoleon.—He is informed of the dissolution of the congress at Châtillon.—Operations of the French cavalry in rear of the allies.—Capture of the Austrian baron Weissenberg.—The Emperor Francis is nearly surprised.—Napoleon hastens on to Paris, and reaches Troyes on the night of the 29th March.—Opinion of Macdonald as to the possibility of relieving Paris.—Napoleon leaves Troyes on the 30th, and meets Belliard, a few miles from Paris, in full retreat.—Conversation betwixt them.—He determines to proceed to Paris, but is at length dissuaded—and dispatches Caulaincourt to the metropolis, to receive terms from the allied sovereigns.—He himself returns to Fontainebleau. 654

CHAPTER XCVII.

The allied sovereigns issue a proclamation that they will not treat with Bonaparte.—A Provisional Government is named by the Conservative Senate, who also decree the forfeitures of Napoleon.—This decree is sanctioned by declarations from all the public bodies in Paris.—The legality of these proceedings discussed.—Feelings towards Napoleon, of the lower classes, and of the military.—On 4th April, Bonaparte issues a document, abdicating the throne of France.—His subsequent agitation, and wish to continue the war.—The deed is finally dispatched. 657

CHAPTER XCVIII.

Victor, and others of the French marshals, give in their adhesion to the Provisional Government.—Marmont enters into a separate convention, but assists at the conferences held at Paris, leaving Souham second in command of his army.—The commanders have an interview with the Emperor Alexander.—Souham enters, with his army, into the lines of the allies: in consequence, the allied sovereigns insist upon the unconditional submission of Napoleon.—His behaviour on learning this result—and reluctant acquiescence.—The terms granted to him.—Considerations as to their policy.—Disapprobation of Lord Castlereagh.—General desertion of Napoleon.—The Empress Maria Louisa returns to her father's protection.—Death of Josephine.—Singular statement made by Baron Fain, Napoleon's secretary, of the emperor's attempt to commit suicide.—After this he becomes more resigned.—His views respecting the best policy of the Bourbons, as his successors.—Leaves Fontainebleau, on his journey to Elba, on 20th April. 662

CHAPTER XCIX.

Commissioners appointed to escort Napoleon.—He leaves Fontainebleau on the 20th April.—His interview with

Angereau at Valence.—Expressions of popular dislike towards Napoleon in the south of France.—Fears for his personal safety.—His own alarm, agitation, and precautions.—He arrives at Friens—and embarks on board the Undawnted, with the British and Austrian commissioners.—Arrives at Elba on 4th May—and lands at Porto Ferrajo. Pag. 608

CHAPTER C.

Elba.—Napoleon's mode of life and occupation there.—Effects produced by his residence at Elba upon the adjoining Kingdom of Italy.—He is visited by his mother and the Princess Pauline—and by a Polish lady.—Sir Niel Campbell the only commissioner left at Elba.—Napoleon's conversations on the state of Europe.—His pecuniary difficulties—and fears of assassination.—His impatience under these causes of complaint.—Moilely nature of his court.—He withdraws himself within court-forms from intercourse with Sir Niel Campbell.—Symptoms of some approaching crisis.—A part of the Old Guard disbanded, who return to France.—Napoleon escapes from Elba.—Fruitless pursuit by Sir Niel Campbell. 611

CHAPTER CI.

Retrospect.—Restoration of the Bourbons displeasing to the soldiery, but satisfactory to the people.—Terms favourable to France granted by the allies.—Discontents about the manner of conceding the charter.—Other grounds of dissatisfaction.—Apprehensions lest the church and crown lands should be resumed.—Resuscitation of the Jacobin faction.—Increased dissatisfactions in the army.—The claims of the emigrants mooted in the Chamber of Delegates.—Marshal MacDonald's proposal.—Financial difficulties.—Restrictions on the press.—Reflections on this subject. 617

CHAPTER CII.

Carnot's memorial on public affairs.—Fouché fails to obtain the favour of the king, and joins the Jacobins.—Various projects of that party; which finally joins the Bonapartists.—Active intrigues commenced.—Congress of Vienna.—Murat, alarmed at its proceedings, opens an intercourse with Napoleon.—Plans of the conspirators.—Bonaparte's escape from Elba.—He lands at Cannes, and advances through France.—Is joined, at Grenoble, by 3000 troops.—Halls at Lyons, appoints a ministry, and issues several decrees.—Dismay of the royal government.—Intrigues of Fouché.—Treachery of Ney.—Revolt of the Bourbon army at Melun.—The king leaves Paris, and Bonaparte arrives there.—His reception. 623

CHAPTER CIII.

Various attempts to organize a defence for the Bourbons fail.—Bonaparte, again reinstated on the throne of France, is desirous of continuing the peace with the allies—but no answer is returned to his letters.—Treaty of Vienna.—Grievances alleged by Bonaparte in justification of the step he had taken.—Debates in the British House of Commons, on the renewal of war.—Murat occupies Rome with 50,000 men—his proclamation summoning all Italians to arms.—He advances against the Austrians.—is repulsed at Occhio-Bello—defeated at Tolentino—flies to Naples, and thence, in disguise, to France—where Napoleon refuses to receive him. 630

CHAPTER CIV.

Bonaparte's attempts to conciliate Britain.—Plot to carry off Maria Louisa fails.—State of feeling in France with regard to Bonaparte's return—the army—the Jacobins—the constitutionalists.—Fouché and Stuyvesant peers.

—Freedom of the press granted, and outraged.—Independent conduct of Comte, editor of le Censeur.—Disaffections among the lower orders.—Part of them attached to Bonaparte.—These assemble before the Tuileries, and applaud the emperor.—Festival of the Federates.—New constitution.—It is received with dissatisfaction.—Meeting of the Champ-de-Mai to ratify it.—Bonaparte's address to the Chambers of Peers and Representatives.—The spirit of Jacobinism predominant in the latter. Pag. 703

CHAPTER CV.

Preparations to renew the war.—Positions of the allied forces, amounting in the whole to one million of men.—Bonaparte's force not more than 200,000.—Conscription not ventured upon.—National Guard—their reluctance to serve.—Many provinces hostile to Napoleon's cause.—Fouché's report makes known the wide-spread disaffection.—Insurrection in La Vendée quelled.—Military resources of France.—Napoleon's plan of campaign.—Paris placed in a complete state of defence.—The frontier-passes and towns fortified also.—Generals who accept command under Napoleon.—He announces his purpose to measure himself with Wellington. 709

CHAPTER CVI.

Army of Wellington covers Brussels—that of Blücher concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse.—Napoleon reviews his grand army on 14th June.—Advances upon Charleroi.—His plan to separate the armies of the two opposing generals fails.—Interview of Wellington and Blücher at Bric.—British army concentrated at Quatre-Bras.—Napoleon's plan of attack.—Battle of Ligny, and defeat of Blücher on 16th June.—Action at Quatre-Bras on the same day.—The British retain possession of the field.—Blücher eludes the French pursuit.—Napoleon joins Ney.—Retreat of the British upon Waterloo, where the Duke of Wellington resolves to make a stand.—Localities of that celebrated field. 713

CHAPTER CVII.

Napoleon's expectation that the alliance would be broken up in case of his defeating the English in Belgium.—The English army take up their ground on 17th June, and the French next morning.—Strength of the two armies.—Plans of their generals.—The Battle of Waterloo commenced on the forenoon of the 18th June.—French attack directed against the British centre—shifted to their right—charges of the cuirassiers—and their reception.—Advance of the Prussians.—Ney's charge at the head of the Guards.—His repulse—and Napoleon's orders for retreat.—The victorious generals meet at La Belle Alliance.—Behaviour of Napoleon during the engagement.—Blücher's pursuit of the French.—Loss of the British—of the French.—Napoleon's subsequent attempts to undervalue the military skill of the Duke of Wellington answered.—His unjust censures of Grouchy.—The notion that the British were on the point of losing the battle when the Prussians came up shown to be erroneous. 717

CHAPTER CVIII.

Bonaparte's arrival at Paris.—The two Chambers assemble, and adopt resolutions, indicating a wish for Napoleon's abdication.—Bonaparte holds a general council.—Fouché presents to the representatives Napoleon's abdication, which stipulates that his son shall succeed him.—Carnot's exaggerated report to the Peers, of the means of defence—contradicted by Ney.—Stormy debate in the Peers on the abdication act.—Both Chambers

was formally recognising Napoleon II.—Provisional Government appointed.—Napoleon required to retire to Malmaison.—His offer of his services in the defence of Paris rejected.—He is placed under the surveillance of General Becker.—Means provided at Rochefort for his departure to the United States.—He arrives at Rochefort on 3d July.—The Provisional Government attempt in vain to treat with the allies, or to excite the French to resistance.—The allies advance to Paris, and, an armistice being concluded, enter it on 7th July.—Chamber of Peers disperse, and the members of the other Chamber are excluded from the place of meeting.—Louis XVIII. re-enters Paris on 8th July.—Reflections upon this second restoration of the Bourbons. P. 726

CHAPTER CIX.

Disposition of the British fleet along the western coast of France, in order to prevent Bonaparte's escape.—The Bellerophon appointed to the station off Rochefort.—Orders under which Captain Maitland acted.—Plans agitated for Napoleon's escape.—Circumstances which show that his surrender, if made, could not be a matter of choice.—Savary and Las Cases open a negotiation with Captain Maitland.—Captain Maitland's Account of what passed at their interviews.—Las Cases' account.—The two statements compared, and preference given to Captain Maitland's.—Napoleon's letter to the Prince Regent.—He surrenders himself on board the Bellerophon, on 15th July.—His behaviour during the passage.—His arrival off Torbay.—Off Plymouth.—Great curiosity prevails among the English people to see him.—All approach to the ship prohibited.—Final determination of the English government that Bonaparte shall be sent to St Helena, communicated to him.—His protest and remonstrances against it. 737

CHAPTER CX.

Napoleon's real view of the measure of sending him to St Helena.—Allegation that Captain Maitland made terms with him.—disproved.—Probability that the insinuation arose with Las Cases, who was disappointed that a negotiation which he had conducted was not successful.—Scheme of removing Napoleon from the Bellerophon, by citing him as witness in a case of libel.—Threats of self-destruction by Napoleon.—by his followers that they would put him to death—only made to intimidate the government.—Napoleon goes on board the Northumberland, which sails for St Helena.—His behaviour on the voyage.—Manner in which he was treated by Sir George Cockburn.—He arrives at St Helena, and lands on 16th October. 744

CHAPTER CXI.

Causes which justify the English government in the measure of Napoleon's banishment.—He was a prisoner of war, and had already shown, by breach of the treaty of Fontainebleau, that no confidence could be reposed in him.—The government was even censured for not taking stronger precautions to prevent his escape from Elba.—Napoleon's wish to retire to England, in order that being near France, he might again interfere in her affairs.—Reasons for withholding from him the title of emperor.—Advantages of St Helena, as a place of banishment.—Sir George Cockburn's instructions for the treatment of Napoleon.—Longwood fixed on as the place of residence of the ex-emperor.—Temporary accommodation prepared for him at Briars.—He removes to Longwood.—Precautions taken for the safe custody of the prisoner.—Regulations concerning the vessels permitted to enter the harbour. 749

CHAPTER CXII.

Bonaparte's alleged grievances considered.—Right of Great Britain to restrict his liberty.—Propriety of withholding the title of emperor.—The right of inspecting his correspondence might have been dispensed with.—Regulation that a British orderly officer should see Napoleon at certain times in the day—its importance.—Limits allowed Napoleon for his walks and rides.—Complaints urged by Las Cases against Sir George Cockburn.—Measures adopted by the European powers to secure Napoleon's safe custody.—Sir Hudson Lowe appointed Governor of St Helena—his qualifications for the office considered.—Information given by General Gourgaud to government.—Agitation of various plans for Bonaparte's escape.—Writers on the subject of Napoleon's residence at St Helena.—Napoleon's irritating treatment of Sir Hudson Lowe.—Interviews between them. Page 753

CHAPTER CXIII.

Instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe for his treatment of Napoleon.—Sum allowed by the British government for the ex-emperor's expenses.—The allegations that his table was not sufficiently supplied, considered.—Napoleon's proposal to defray his own expenses.—Sale of his plate—made in order to produce a false impression of the state to which he was reduced.—The fact, that he had at that time a large sum of money in his strong-box, stated.—Wooden house constructed in London for Bonaparte, and transported to St Helena.—Interview between Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon on its arrival.—Delays in the erection of it.—When finished, Bonaparte's ill-health prevented his being removed to it.—The regulation that a British officer should attend Napoleon in his rides, a subject of much displeasure to him.—Free communication with Europe carried on by the inmates of Longwood, without the knowledge of the governor.—Regulation respecting Napoleon's intercourse with the inhabitants of St Helena.—General reflections on the dispute between him and Sir Hudson Lowe. 765

CHAPTER CXIV.

Napoleon's domestic habits.—Manner in which he spent the day.—his dress.—Nature of the fragments of Memoirs he dictated to Messrs Gourgaud and Montholon.—His particular taste in belles lettres led him to admire Ossian.—His attachment to the drama—prefers Racine and Corneille to Voltaire.—Dislike of Tacitus.—His vindication of the character of Caesar.—His behaviour towards the persons of his household—amusements and exercises.—His character of Sir Pulteney Malcolm.—Degree of his intercourse with the islanders, and with visitors to the island.—Interview with Captain Basil Hall—with Lord Amherst and the gentlemen attached to the Chinese embassy. 774

CHAPTER CXV.

Napoleon's illness—viz. Cancer in the stomach.—Dr Arnott's opinion that it was not the effect of climate, but had been growing upon him since 1817.—The disposition which might have obtained a relaxation of the restrictions by which Napoleon was guarded, not manifested by him.—Removal of Las Cases from his household.—Montholon's various complaints brought forward by Lord Holland in the House of Lords, and replied to by Lord Bathurst.—Effect of the failure of Lord Holland's motion upon Bonaparte.—Symptoms of his illness increase—his refusal to take exercise or medicine.—Removal of Dr O'Meara from his attendance

on Bonaparte— who refuses to permit the visits of any other English physician.—Two Roman Catholic priests sent to St Helena at his desire.—Napoleon's opinions on the subject of religion.—Dr Antommarchi arrives to supply the place of O'Meara.—Continued disputes between Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe.—Plans for effecting Bonaparte's escape.—Scheme of Johnstone, a daring smuggler, to approach St Helena in a submarine vessel, and receive the prisoner on board.—Frustrated by the seizure of the vessel.—The disturbed state of Italy and other causes render fresh vigilance in the custody of Napoleon's person necessary.—His disease increases.—Letter expressing his majesty's interest in the illness of Napoleon.—Consent of the latter to admit the visits of Dr Arnott.—Napoleon employs himself in making his will—and gives other directions connected with his decease.—Extreme unction administered to him.—His Death, on 5th May, 1821.—Anatomization of the body.—His funeral. Pag. 781

CONCLUSION.

APPENDIX.

- No. 1.—Additional notices on Napoleon's early career. 800
 No. 2.—Descent of the French in South Wales, under Colonel Tate. 896
 No. 3.—Historical notes on the 18th Brumaire. 807

- No. 4.—Instructions by Napoleon to Talleyrand, Prince of Beneventum. Pag. 813
 No. 5.—Further particulars concerning the arrest, trial, and death of the Duke d'Enghien. 814
 No. 6.—Reflections on the conduct of Napoleon towards the Prince Royal of Sweden. 823
 No. 7.—Extract from manuscript observations on Napoleon's Russian campaign, by an English officer of rank. 827
 No. 8.—Remarks on the Campaign of 1815, by Capt. John W. Pringle, of the Royal Engineers. 829
 No. 9.—Bonaparte's protest. 844
 No. 10.—States of thermometer, as taken at Deadwood, Island of St Helena, during 12 calendar months, viz. from 1st Sept. 1820, to 31st Aug. 1821, inclusive. 847
 No. 11.—Memorandum of the Establishment at Longwood. ib.
 No. 12.—Interview between Napoleon Bonaparte and Henry Ellis, Esq., third commissioner of Lord Amherst's Embassy to China. 848
 No. 13.—Bonaparte's last will and testament. 861
 No. 14.—Interview between Bonaparte and the widow of Theobald Wolfe Tone. 867

PROSE WORKS

OF

SIR WALTER SCOTT.

The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte;

WITH A PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

Sed non in Cassare tantum
 Nomen erat, nec fama ducis; sed nescia virtus
 Stare loco; solusque pudor non vincere bello.
 Acer et indomitus, quo spes, quoque ira vocasset,
 Ferre manum, et nunquam temerando parere ferro:
 Successus urgere suos: instare favori
 Numinis, impellens quidquid sibi summa petenti
 Obstaret, gaudensque viam fecisse ruina.

LUCANI *Pharsalia*, Lib. I.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE extent and purpose of this work have, in the course of its progress, gradually but essentially changed from what the author originally proposed. It was at first intended merely as a brief and popular abstract of the most wonderful man and the most extraordinary events of the last thirty years; in short, to emulate the concise yet most interesting history of the great British admiral by the Poet Laureate of Britain. The author was partly induced to undertake the task by having formerly drawn up for a periodical work (the *Edinburgh Annual Register*) the history of the two great campaigns of 1814 and 1815,* and three volumes were the compass assigned to the proposed work. An introductory volume, giving a general account of the rise and progress of the French Revolution, was thought necessary; and the single volume, on a theme of such extent, soon swelled into two.

As the author composed under an anonymous title, he could neither seek nor expect information from those who had been actively engaged in the changeful scenes which he was attempting to record; nor was his object more ambitious than that of compressing and arranging such information as the ordinary authorities afforded. Circumstances, however, unconnected with the undertaking, induced him to lay aside an *incognito*, farther attempt to preserve which must have been considered as affectation; and since his having done so he has been favoured with access to some valuable materials, most of which have now, for the first time, seen the light. For these he refers to the appendix at the close of the work, where the reader will find

several articles of novelty and interest. Though not at liberty in every case to mention the quarter from which his information has been derived, the author has been careful not to rely upon any which did not come from sufficient authority. He has neither grubbed for anecdotes in the libels and private scandal of the time, nor has he solicited information from individuals who could not be impartial witnesses in the facts to which they gave evidence. Yet the various public documents and private information which he has received have materially enlarged his stock of materials, and increased the whole work to more than twice the size originally intended.

On the execution of his task, it becomes the author to be silent: he is aware it must exhibit many faults; but he claims credit for having brought to the undertaking a mind disposed to do his subject as impartial justice as his judgment could supply. He will be found no enemy to the person of Napoleon; the term of hostility is ended when the battle has been won and the foe exists no longer. His splendid personal qualities—his great military actions and political services to France, will not, it is hoped, be found depreciated in the narrative. Unhappily, the author's task involved a duty of another kind, the discharge of which is due to France, to Britain, to Europe, and to the world. If the general system of Napoleon has rested upon force or fraud, it is neither the greatness of his talents nor the success of his undertakings that ought to stifle the voice or dazzle the eyes of him who adventures to be his historian. The reasons, however, are carefully summed up where the author has presumed to express a favourable or unfavourable opinion of the distinguished person of whom these pages treat; so that each reader may judge of their validity for himself.

Edinburgh, 7th June, 1827.

* Several extracts from these annals have been blended with the present account of the same events.

CHAPTER I.

Review of the state of Europe after the peace of Versailles.—England—France—Spain—Prussia.—Imprudent innovations of the Emperor Joseph.—Disturbances in his dominions.—Russia.—France—Her ancient system of monarchy—how organized—Causes of its decay.—Decay of the nobility as a body—The new nobles—The country nobles—The nobles of the highest order.—The church—The higher orders of the clergy—The lower orders.—The commons—Their increase in power and importance—Their claims opposed to those of the privileged classes.

WHEN we look back on past events, however important, it is difficult to recal the precise sensations with which we viewed them in their progress, and to recollect the fears, hopes, doubts, and difficulties, for which Time and the course of Fortune have formed a termination, so different probably from that which we had anticipated. When the rush of the inundation was before our eyes, and in our ears, we were scarce able to remember the state of things before its rage commenced, and when, subsequently, the deluge has subsided within the natural limits of the stream, it is still more difficult to recollect with precision the terrors it inspired when at its height. That which is present possesses such power over our senses and our imagination, that it requires no common effort to recal those sensations which expired with preceding events. Yet, to do this is the peculiar province of history, which will be written and read in vain, unless it can connect with its details an accurate idea of the impression which these produced on men's minds while they were yet in their transit. It is with this view that we attempt to resume the history of France and of Europe, at the conclusion of the American war, a period now only remembered by the more advanced part of the present generation.

The peace concluded at Versailles in 1783, was reasonably supposed to augur a long repose to Europe. The high and emulous tone, assumed in former times by the rival nations, had been lowered and tamed by recent circumstances. England, under the guidance of a weak, at least a most unlucky administration, had purchased peace at the expense of her North American Empire, and the resignation of supremacy over her colonies; a loss great in itself, but exaggerated in the eyes of the nation, by the rending asunder of the ties of common descent, and exclusive commercial intercourse, and by a series of the wars waged, and expenses encountered for the protection and advancement of the fair empire which England found herself obliged to surrender. The lustre of the British arms, so brilliant at the peace of Fontenoy, had been tarnished, if not extinguished. In spite of the gallant defence of Gibraltar, the general result of the war on land had been unfavourable to her military reputation; and, notwithstanding the opportune and splendid victories of Rodney, the coasts of Britain had been insulted, and her fleets compelled to retire into port, while those of her combined enemies rode masters of the Channel. The spirit of the country also had been lowered, by the unequal contest which had been

sustained, and by the sense that her naval superiority was an object of invidious hatred to united Europe. This had been lately made manifest, by the armed alliance of the northern nations, which, though termed a neutrality, was, in fact, a league made to abate the pretensions of England to maritime supremacy. There are to be added, to these disheartening and depressing circumstances, the decay of commerce during the long course of hostilities, with the want of credit and depression of the price of land, which are the usual consequences of a transition from war to peace, ere capital has regained its natural channel. All these things being considered, it appeared the manifest interest of England to husband her exhausted resources, and recruit her diminished wealth, by cultivating peace and tranquillity for a long course of time. William Pitt, never more distinguished than in his financial operations, was engaged in new-modeling the revenue of the country, and adding to the return of the taxes, while he diminished their pressure. It could scarcely be supposed that any object of national ambition would have been permitted to disturb him in a task so necessary.

Neither had France, the natural rival of England, come off from the contest in such circumstances of triumph and advantage, as were likely to encourage her to a speedy renewal of the struggle. It is true, she had seen and contributed to the humiliation of her ancient enemy, but she had paid dearly for the gratification of her revenge, as nations and individuals are wont to do. Her finances, tampered with by successive sets of ministers, who looked no farther than to temporary expedients for carrying on the necessary expenses of government, now presented an alarming prospect; and it seemed as if the wildest and most enterprising ministers would hardly have dared, in their most sanguine moments, to have recommended either war itself, or any measures of which war might be the consequence.

Spain was in a like state of exhaustion. She had been hurried into the alliance against England, partly by the consequences of the family alliance betwixt her Bourbons and those of France, but still more by the eager and engrossing desire to possess herself once more of Gibraltar. The Castilian pride, long galled by beholding this important fortress in the hands of heretics and foreigners, highly applauded the war, which gave a chance of its recovery, and seconded, with all the power of the kingdom, the gigantic efforts made for that purpose. All these immense preparations, with the most formidable means of attack ever used on such an occasion, had totally failed, and the kingdom of Spain remained at once stunned and mortified by the failure, and broken down by the expenses of so huge an undertaking. An attack upon Algiers, in 1784-5, tended to exhaust the remains of her military ardour. Spain, therefore, relapsed into inactivity and repose, dispirited by the miscarriage of her favourite scheme, and possessing neither the means nor the audacity necessary to meditate its speedy renewal.

Neither were the sovereigns of the late belligerent powers of that ambitious and active character which was likely to drag the kingdoms which they swayed into the renewal of hostilities. The classic eye of the

historian Gibbon saw Arcadius and Honorius, the weakest and most indolent of the Roman Emperors, slumbering upon the thrones of the house of Bourbon; and the just and loyal character of George III. precluded any effort on his part to undermine the peace which he signed unwillingly, or to attempt the resumption of those rights which he had formally, though reluctantly, surrendered. His expression to the ambassador of the United States was a trait of character never to be omitted or forgotten;—"I have been the last man in my dominions to accede to this peace, which separates America from my kingdoms—I will be the first man, now it is made, to resist any attempt to infringe it."

The acute historian whom we have already quoted seems to have apprehended, in the character and ambition of the northern potentates, those causes of disturbance which were not to be found in the western part of the European republic. But Catherine, the Semiramis of the north, had her views of extensive dominion chiefly turned towards her eastern and southern frontier; and the finances of her immense, but comparatively poor and unpeopled empire, were burthened with the expenses of a luxurious court, requiring at once to be gratified with the splendour of Asia and the refinements of Europe. The strength of her empire also, though immense, was unwieldy, and the empire had not been uniformly fortunate in its wars with the more prompt, though less numerous armies of the king of Prussia, her neighbour. Thus Russia, no less than other powers in Europe, seemed more desirous of reposing her gigantic strength, than of adventuring upon new and hazardous conquests. Even her views upon Turkey, which circumstances seemed to render more flattering than ever, she was contented to resign, in 1784, when only half accomplished; a pledge, not only that her thoughts were sincerely bent upon peace, but that she felt the necessity of resisting even the most tempting opportunities for resuming the course of victory which she had, four years before, pursued so successfully.

Frederick of Prussia himself, who had been so long, by dint of genius and talent, the animating soul of the political intrigues in Europe, had run too many risks, in the course of his adventurous and eventful reign, to be desirous of encountering new hazards in the extremity of life. His empire, extended as it was, from the shores of the Baltic to the frontiers of Holland, consisted of various detached portions, which it required the aid of time to consolidate into a single kingdom. And, accustomed to study the signs of the times, it could not have escaped Frederick, that sentiments and feelings were afloat, connected with, and fostered by, the spirit of unlimited investigation, which he himself had termed *philosophy*, such as might soon call upon the sovereigns to arm in a common cause, and ought to prevent them, in the meanwhile from wasting their strength in mutual struggles, and giving advantage to a common enemy.

If such anticipations occupied and agitated the last years of Frederick's life, they had not the same effect upon the Emperor Joseph II., who, without the same clear-eyed precision of judgment, endeavoured to tread in the steps of the King of Prus-

sia, as a reformer, and as a conqueror. It would be unjust to deny to this prince the praise of considerable talents, and inclination to employ them for the good of the country which he ruled. But it frequently happens, that the talents, and even the virtues of sovereigns, exercised without respect to time and circumstances, become the misfortune of their government. It is particularly the lot of princes, endowed with such personal advantages, to be confident in their own abilities, and, unless educated in the severe school of adversity, to prefer favourites, who assent to and repeat their opinions, to independent counsellors, whose experience might correct their own hasty conclusions. And thus, although the personal merits of Joseph II. were in every respect acknowledged, his talents in a great measure recognized, and his patriotic intentions scarcely disputable, it fell to his lot, during the period we treat of, to excite more apprehension and discontent among his subjects, than had been a prince content to rule by a minister, and wear out an indolent life in the forms and pleasures of a court. Accordingly, the emperor, in many of his schemes of reform, too hastily adopted, or at least too incautiously and peremptorily executed, had the misfortune to introduce fearful commotions among the people, whose situation he meant to ameliorate, while in his external relations he rendered Austria the quarter from which a breach of European peace was most to be apprehended. It seemed, indeed, as if the emperor had contrived to reconcile his philosophical professions with the exercise of the most selfish policy towards the United Provinces, both in opening the Scheldt, and in dismantling the barrier towns, which had been placed in their hands as a defence against the power of France. By the first of these measures the emperor gained nothing but the paltry sum of money for which he sold his pretensions, and the shame of having shown himself ungrateful for the important services which the United Provinces had rendered to his ancestors. But the dismantling of the Dutch barrier was subsequently attended by circumstances alike calamitous to Austria, and to the whole continent of Europe.

In another respect, the reforms carried through by Joseph II. tended to prepare the public mind for future innovations, made with a ruder hand, and upon a much larger scale. The suppression of the religious orders, and the appropriation of their revenues to the general purposes of government, had in it something to flatter the feelings of those of the reformed religion; but, in a moral point of view, the seizing upon the property of any private individual, or public body, is an invasion of the most sacred principles of public justice; and such spoliation cannot be vindicated by urgent circumstances of state-necessity, or any plausible pretext of state-advantage whatsoever, since no necessity can vindicate what is in itself unjust, and no public advantage can compensate a breach of public faith. Joseph was also the first catholic sovereign who broke through the solemn degree of reverence attached by that religion to the person of the sovereign pontiff. The pope's fruitless and humiliating visit to Vienna furnished the shadow of a precedent for the conduct of Napoleon to Pius VII.

Another and yet less justifiable cause of innovation, placed in peril, and left in doubt and discontent, some of the fairest provinces of the Austrian dominions, and those which the wisest of their princes had governed with peculiar tenderness and moderation. The Austrian Netherlands had been in a literal sense dismantled and left open to the first invader, by the demolition of the barrier fortresses; and it seems to have been the systematic purpose of the emperor to eradicate and destroy that love and regard for their prince and his government, which in time of need proves the most effectual moral substitute for moats and ramparts. The history of the house of Burgundy bore witness on every page to the love of the Flemings for liberty, and the jealousy with which they have from the earliest ages watched the privileges they had obtained from their princes. Yet in that country, and amongst these people, Joseph carried on his measures of innovation with a hand so unsparing, as if he meant to bring the question of liberty or arbitrary power to a very brief and military decision betwixt him and his subjects.

His alterations were not in Flanders, as elsewhere, confined to the ecclesiastical state alone, although such innovations were peculiarly offensive to a people rigidly catholic, but were extended through the most important parts of the civil government. Changes in the courts of justice were threatened—the great seal, which had hitherto remained with the chancellor of the states, was transferred to the imperial minister—a council of state, composed of commissioners nominated by the emperor, was appointed to discharge the duties, hitherto intrusted to a Standing Committee of the States of Brabant—their universities were altered and new-modelled—and their magistrates subjected to arbitrary arrests and sent to Vienna, instead of being tried in their own country and by their own laws. The Flemish people beheld these innovations with the sentiments natural to freemen, and not a little stimulated certainly by the scenes which had lately passed in North America, where, under circumstances of far less provocation, a large empire had emancipated itself from the mother country. The states remonstrated loudly, and refused submission to the decrees which encroached on their constitutional liberties, and at length arrayed a military force in support of their patriotic opposition.

Joseph, who, at the same time he thus wantonly provoked the states and people of Flanders, had been seduced by Russia to join her ambitious plan upon Turkey, bent apparently before the storm he had excited, and for a time yielded to accommodation with his subjects of Flanders, renounced the most obnoxious of his new measures, and confirmed the privileges of the nation at what was called the joyous entry. But this spirit of conciliation was only assumed for the purpose of deception; for so soon as he had assembled in Flanders what was deemed a sufficient armed force to sustain his despotic purposes, the emperor threw off the mask, and, by the most violent acts of military force, endeavoured to overthrow the constitution he had agreed to observe, and to enforce the arbitrary measures which he had pretended to abandon. For

a brief period of two years, Flanders remained in a state of suppressed, but deeply-founded and wide, extended discontent, watching for a moment favourable to freedom and to vengeance. It proved an ample storehouse of combustibles, prompt to catch fire, as the flame now arising in France began to expand itself; nor can it be doubted, that the condition of the Flemish provinces, whether considered in a military or in a political light, was one of the principal causes of the subsequent success of the French republican arms. Joseph himself, broken-hearted and dispirited, died in the very beginning of the troubles he had wantonly provoked. Desirous of fame as a legislator and a warrior, and certainly born with talents to acquire it, he left his arms dishonoured by the successes of the despised Turks, and his fair dominions of the Netherlands and of Hungary upon the very eve of insurrection. A lampoon, written upon the hospital for lunatics at Vienna, might be said to be no unjust epitaph for a monarch, once so hopeful and so beloved—*Josephus ubique Secundus—hic Primus*.

These Flemish disturbances might be regarded as symptoms of the new opinions which were tacitly gaining ground in Europe, and which preceded the grand explosion, as light shocks of an earthquake usually announce the approach of its general convulsion. The like may be said of the short-lived Dutch Revolution of 1787, in which the ancient faction of Louvestein, under the encouragement of France, for a time completely triumphed over that of the stadtholder, deposed him from his hereditary command of Captain-general of the Army of the States, and reduced, or endeavoured to reduce, the Confederation of the United Provinces to a pure democracy. This was also a strong sign of the times; for although totally opposite to the inclination of the majority of the states-general, of the equestrian body, of the landed proprietors, nay, of the very populace, most of whom were from habit and principle attached to the house of Orange, the burghers of the large towns drove on the work of revolution with such warmth of zeal and promptitude of action, as showed a great part of the middling classes to be deeply tainted with the desire of gaining further liberty, and a larger share in the legislation and administration of the country, than pertained to them under the old oligarchical constitution.

The revolutionary government, in the Dutch provinces, did not, however, conduct their affairs with prudence. Without waiting to organize their own force, or weaken that of the enemy—without obtaining the necessary countenance and protection of France, or co-operating with the malcontents in the Austrian Netherlands, they gave, by arresting the Princess of Orange (sister of the King of Prussia), an opportunity of foreign interference, of which that prince failed not to avail himself. His armies, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, poured into the United Provinces, and with little difficulty possessed themselves of Utrecht, Amsterdam, and the other cities which constituted the strength of the Louvestein or republican faction. The king then replaced the house of Orange in all its power, privileges, and functions. The conduct of the Dutch

republicans, during their brief hour of authority, had been neither so moderate nor so popular as to make their sudden and almost unresisting fall a matter of general regret. On the contrary, it was considered as a probable pledge of the continuance of peace in Europe, especially as France, busied with her own affairs, declined interference in those of the United Provinces.

The intrigues of Russia had, in accomplishment of the ambitious schemes of Catherine, lighted up war with Sweden, as well as with Turkey; but in both cases hostilities were commenced upon the old plan of fighting one or two battles, and wresting a fortress or a province from a neighbouring state; and it seems likely, that the intervention of France and England, equally interested in preserving the balance of power, might have ended these troubles, but for the progress of that great and hitherto unheeded course of events which prepared, carried on, and matured, the FRENCH REVOLUTION.

It is necessary, for the execution of our plan, that we should review this period of history, the most important, perhaps, during its currency, and in its consequences, which the annals of mankind afford; and although the very title is sufficient to awaken in most bosoms either horror or admiration, yet, neither insensible of the blessing of national liberty, nor of those which flow from the protection of just laws, and a moderate but firm executive government, we may perhaps be enabled to trace its events with the candour of one, who, looking back on past scenes, feels divested of the keen and angry spirit with which, in common with his contemporaries, he may have judged them while they were yet in progress.

We have shortly reviewed the state of Europe in general, which we have seen to be either pacific, or disturbed by troubles of no long duration; but it was in France that a thousand circumstances, some arising out of the general history of the world, some peculiar to that country herself, mingled, like the ingredients in the witches' cauldron, to produce in succession many a formidable but passing apparition, until concluded by the stern vision of absolute and military power, as those in the drama are introduced by that of the Armed Head.

The first and most effective cause of the Revolution was the change which had taken place in the feelings of the French towards their government, and the monarch who was its head. The devoted loyalty of the people to their king had been for several ages the most marked characteristic of the nation; it was their honour in their own eyes, and matter of contempt and ridicule in those of the English, because it seemed in its excess to swallow up all ideas of patriotism. That very excess of loyalty, however, was founded not on a servile, but on a generous principle. France is ambitious, fond of military glory, and willingly identifies herself with the fame acquired by her soldiers. Down to the reign of Louis XV., the French monarch was, in the eyes of his subjects, a general, and the whole people an army. An army must be under severe discipline, and a general must possess absolute power; but the soldier feels no degradation from the restraint which is necessary to his profession,

and without which he cannot be led to conquest.

Every true Frenchman, therefore, submitted, without scruple, to that abridgement of personal liberty which appeared necessary to render the monarch great, and France victorious. The king, according to this system, was regarded less as an individual than as the representative of the concentrated honour of the kingdom; and in this sentiment, however extravagant and Quixotic, there mingled much that was generous, patriotic, and disinterested. The same feeling was awakened, after all the changes of the Revolution, by the wonderful successes of the individual of whom our future pages are to treat, and who transferred in many instances to his own person, by deeds almost exceeding credibility, the species of devoted attachment with which France formerly regarded the ancient line of her kings.

The nobility shared with the king in the advantages which this predilection spread around him. If the monarch was regarded as the chief ornament of the community, they were the minor gems by whose lustre that of the crown was relieved or adorned. If he was the supreme general of the state, they were the officers attached to his person, and necessary to the execution of his commands, each in his degree bound to advance the honour and glory of the common country. When such sentiments were at their height, there could be no murmuring against the peculiar privileges of the nobility, any more than against the almost absolute authority of the monarch. Each had that rank in the state which was regarded as their birthright, and for one of the lower orders to repine that he enjoyed not the immunities peculiar to the noblesse, would have been as unavailing, and as foolish, as to lament that he was not born to an independent estate. Thus, the Frenchman, contented, though with an illusion, laughed, danced, and indulged all the gaiety of his national character, in circumstances under which his insular neighbours would have thought the slightest token of patience dishonourable and degrading. The distress or privation which the French plebeian suffered in his own person, was made up to him in imagination by his interest in the national glory.

Was a citizen of Paris postponed in rank to the lowest military officer, he consoled himself by reading the victories of the French arms in the gazette; and was he unduly and unequally taxed to support the expense of the crown, still the public feasts which were given, and the palaces which were built, were to him a source of compensation. He looked on at the Carrousel, he admired the splendour of Versailles, and enjoyed a reflected share of their splendour, in recollecting that they displayed the magnificence of his country. This state of things, however illusory, seemed, while the illusion lasted, to realize the wish of those legislators, who have endeavoured to form a general fund of national happiness, from which each individual is to draw his personal share of enjoyment. If the monarch enjoyed the display of his own grace and agility; while he hunted, or rode at the ring, the spectators had their share of pleasure in witnessing it: if Louis had the satisfaction of beholding the splendid piles

of Versailles and the Louvre arise at his command, the subject admired them when raised, and his real portion of pleasure was not, perhaps, inferior to that of the founder. The people were like men inconveniently placed in a crowded theatre, who think little of the personal inconveniences they are subjected to by the heat and pressure, while their mind is engrossed by the splendours of the representation. In short, not only the political opinions of Frenchmen, but their actual feelings, were, in the earlier days of the eighteenth century, expressed in the motto which they chose for their national palace—"Earth hath no nation like the French—no nation a city like Paris, or a king like Louis."

The French enjoyed this assumed superiority with the less chance of being undeceived, that they listened not to any voice from other lands, which pointed out the deficiencies in the frame of government under which they lived, or which hinted the superior privileges enjoyed by the subjects of a more free state. The intense love of our own country, and admiration of its constitution, is usually accompanied with a contempt or dislike of foreign states, and their modes of government. The French, in the reign of Louis XIV., enamoured of their own institutions, regarded those of other nations as unworthy of their consideration; and if they paused for a moment to gaze on the complicated constitution of their great rival, it was soon dismissed as a subject totally unintelligible, with some expression of pity, perhaps, for the poor sovereign who had the ill luck to preside over a government embarrassed by so many restraints and limitations.* Yet, into whatever political errors the French people were led by the excess of their loyalty, it would be unjust to brand them as a nation of a mean and slavish spirit. Servitude infers dishonour, and dishonour to a Frenchman is the last of evils. Burke more justly regarded them as a people misled to their disadvantage, by high and romantic ideas of honour and fidelity, and who, actuated by a principle of public spirit in their submission to their monarch, worshipped, in his person, the Fortune of France, their common country.

During the reign of Louis XIV., everything tended to support the sentiment which connected the national honour with the wars and undertakings of the king. His success, in the earlier years of his reign, was splendid, and he might be regarded, for many years as the dictator of Europe. During this period, the universal opinion of his talents, together with his successes abroad, and his magnificence at home, fostered the idea that the Grand Monarque was in himself the tutelar deity, and only representative, of the great nation whose powers he wielded. Sorrow and desolation came on his latter years; but be it said, to the honour of the French people, that the devoted allegiance they had paid to Louis in prosperity was not withdrawn when fortune seemed to have turned her back upon her original favourite. France poured her youth forth as readily, if not so gaily, to repair the defeats of her mo-

narch's old age, as she had previously yielded them to secure and extend the victories of his early reign. Louis had perfectly succeeded in establishing the crown as the sole pivot upon which public affairs turned, and in attaching to his person, as the representative of France, all the importance which in other countries is given to the great body of the nation.

Nor had the spirit of the French monarchy, its surrounding itself with all the dignity of absolute power, failed to secure the support of those auxiliaries which have the most extended influence upon the public mind, by engaging at once religion and literature in defence of its authority. The Gallican Church, more dependent upon the monarch, and less so upon the pope, than is usual in catholic countries, gave to the power of the crown all the mysterious and supernatural terrors annexed to an origin in divine right, and directed against those who encroached on the limits of the royal prerogative, or even ventured to scrutinize too minutely the foundation of its authority, the penalties annexed to a breach of the divine law. Louis XIV. repaid this important service by a constant, and even scrupulous attention to observances prescribed by the church, which strengthened, in the eyes of the public, the alliance so strictly formed betwixt the altar and the throne. Those who look to the private morals of the monarch may indeed form some doubt of the sincerity of his religious professions, considering how little they influenced his practice; and yet, when we reflect upon the frequent inconsistencies of mankind in this particular, we may hesitate to charge with hypocrisy a conduct, which was dictated perhaps as much by conscience as by political convenience. Even judging more severely, it must be allowed that hypocrisy, though so different from religion, indicates its existence, as smoke points out that of fire. Hypocrisy cannot exist unless religion be to a certain extent held in esteem, because no one would be at the trouble to assume a mask which was not respectable, and, so far, compliance with the external forms of religion is a tribute paid to the doctrines which it teaches. The hypocrite assumes a virtue if he has it not, and the example of his conduct may be salutary to others, though his pretensions to piety are wickedness to Him, who trieth the heart and reins.

On the other hand, the Academy formed by the wily Richelieu served to unite the literature of France into one focus, under the immediate patronage of the crown, to whose bounty its professors were taught to look even for the very means of subsistence. The greater nobles caught this ardour of patronage from the sovereign, and as the latter pensioned and supported the principal literary characters of his reign, the former granted shelter and support to others of the same rank, who were lodged at their hotels, fed at their tables, and were admitted to their society upon terms somewhat less degrading than those which were granted to artists and musicians, and who gave to the great, knowledge or amusement in exchange for the hospitality they received. Men in a situation so subordinate, could only at first accommodate their compositions to the taste and interest of their protectors. They height-

* The old French proverb bore,
Le roi d'Angleterre
Est le roi d'Enfer.

ened by adulation and flattery the claims of the king and the nobles upon the community; and the nation, indifferent at that time to all literature which was not of native growth, felt their respect for their own government enhanced and extended by the works of those men of genius who flourished under its protection.

Such was the system of French monarchy, and such it remained, in outward show at least, until the peace of Fontainebleau. But its foundation had been gradually undermined; public opinion had undergone a silent but almost a total change, and it might be compared to some ancient tower swayed from its base by the lapse of time, and waiting the first blast of a hurricane, or shock of an earthquake, to be prostrated in the dust. How the lapse of half a century, or little more, could have produced a change so total, must next be considered; and this can only be done by viewing separately the various changes which the lapse of years had produced on the various orders of the state.

First, then, it is to be observed, that in these latter times the wasting effects of luxury and vanity had totally ruined a great part of the French nobility, a word which, in respect of that country, comprehended what is called in Britain the nobility and gentry, or natural aristocracy of the kingdom. This body, during the reign of Louis XIV., though far even then from supporting the part which their fathers had acted in history, yet existed, as it were, through their remembrances, and disguised their dependence upon the throne by the outward show of fortune, as well as by the consequence attached to hereditary right. They were one step nearer the days, not then totally forgotten, when the nobles of France, with their retainers, actually formed the army of the kingdom; and they still presented, to the imagination at least, the descendants of a body of chivalrous heroes, ready to tread in the path of their ancestors, should the times ever render necessary the calling forth the Ban, or Arrière-Ban—the feudal array of the Gallic chivalry. But this delusion had passed away; the defence of states was entrusted in France, as in other countries, to the exertions of a standing army; and, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the nobles of France presented a melancholy contrast to their predecessors.

The number of the order was of itself sufficient to diminish its consequence. It had been imprudently increased by new creations. There were in the kingdom about eighty thousand families enjoying the privileges of nobility; and the order was divided into different classes, which looked on each other with mutual jealousy and contempt.

The first general distinction was betwixt the ancient, modern, or new noblesse. The former were nobles of old creation, whose ancestors had obtained their rank from real or supposed services rendered to the nation in her councils or her battles. The new nobles had found an easier access to the same elevation, by the purchase of territories, or of offices, or of letters of nobility, any of which easy modes invested the owners with titles and rank, often held by men whose wealth had been accumulated in mean and sordid occupations, or by farmers-general, and financiers, whom the people considered

as acquiring their fortunes at the expense of the state. These numerous additions to the privileged body of nobles accorded ill with its original composition, and introduced schism and disunion into the body itself. The descendants of the ancient chivalry of France looked with scorn and contempt upon the new men, who, rising perhaps from the very lees of the people, claimed from superior wealth a share in the privileges of the aristocracy.

Again, secondly, there was, amongst the ancient nobles themselves, but too ample room for division, between the upper and wealthier class of nobility, who had fortunes adequate to maintain their rank, and the much more numerous body, whose poverty rendered them pensioners upon the state for the means of supporting their dignity. Of about one thousand houses, of which the ancient noblesse is computed to have consisted, there were not above two or three hundred families who had retained the means of maintaining their rank without the assistance of the crown. Their claims to monopolize commissions in the army, and situations in the government, together with their exemption from taxes, were their sole resources; resources burdensome to the state, and odious to the people, without being in the same degree beneficial to those who enjoyed them. Even in military service, which was considered as their birthright, the nobility of the second class were seldom permitted to rise above a certain limited rank. Long service might exalt one of them to the *grade* of lieutenant-colonel, or the government of some small town, but all the better rewards of a life spent in the army were reserved for nobles of the highest order. It followed as a matter of course, that amidst so many of this privileged body who languished in poverty, and could not rise from it by the ordinary paths of industry, some must have had recourse to loose and dishonourable practices; and that gambling-houses and places of debauchery should have been frequented and patronized by individuals, whose ancient descent, titles, and emblems of nobility, did not save them from the suspicion of very dishonourable conduct, the disgrace of which affected the character of the whole body.

There must be noticed a third classification of the order, into the *haute noblesse*, or men of the highest rank, most of whom spent their lives at court, and in discharge of the great offices of the crown and state, and the *noblesse campagnarde*, who continued to reside upon their patrimonial estates in the provinces.

The noblesse of the latter class had fallen gradually into a state of general contempt, which was deeply to be regretted. They were ridiculed and scorned by the courtiers, who despised the rusticity of their manners, and by the nobles of newer creation, who, conscious of their own wealth, contemned the poverty of these ancient but decayed families. The "bold peasant" himself, is not more a kingdom's pride than is the plain country gentleman, who, living on his own means, and amongst his own people, becomes the natural protector and referee of the farmer and the peasant, and, in case of need, either the firmest assertor of their rights and his own against the aggressions of the crown, or the independent and undaunted defender of the crown's rights, against

the innovations of political fanaticism. In La Vendée alone, the nobles had united their interest and their fortune with those of the peasants who cultivated their estates, and there alone were they found in their proper and honourable character of proprietors residing on their own domains, and discharging the duties which are inalienably attached to the owner of landed property. And—mark-worthy circumstance!—in La Vendée alone was any stand made in behalf of the ancient proprietors, constitution, or religion of France; for there alone the nobles and the cultivators of the soil held towards each other their natural and proper relations of patron and client, faithful dependents, and generous and affectionate superiors. In the other provinces of France, the nobility, speaking generally, possessed neither power nor influence among the peasantry, while the population around them was guided and influenced by men belonging to the church, to the law, or to business; classes which were in general better educated, better informed, and possessed of more talent and knowledge of the world, than the poor *noblesse campagnarde*, who seemed as much limited, caged, and imprisoned, as if they had been shut up within the dungeons of their ruinous châteaux; and who had only their titles and dusty parchments to oppose to the real superiority of wealth and information so generally to be found in the class which they affected to despise. Hence, Ségur describes the country gentlemen of his younger days as punctilious, ignorant, and quarrelsome, shunned by the better informed of the middle classes, idle and dissipated, and wasting their leisure hours in coffee-houses, theatres, and billiard-rooms.

The more wealthy families, and the high noblesse, as they were called, saw this degradation of the inferior part of their order without pity, or rather with pleasure. These last had risen as much above their natural duties, as the rural nobility had sunk beneath them. They had too well followed the course which Richelieu had contrived to recommend to their fathers, and, instead of acting as the natural chiefs and leaders of the nobility and gentry of the provinces, they were continually engaged in intriguing for charges round the king's person, for posts in the administration, for additional titles and decorations—for all and everything which could make the successful courtier, and distinguish him from the independent noble. Their education and habits also were totally unfavourable to grave or serious thought and exertion. If the trumpet had sounded, it would have found a ready echo in their bosoms; but light literature at best, and much more frequently silly and frivolous amusements, a constant pursuit of pleasure, and a perpetual succession of intrigues, either of love or petty politics, made their character, in time of peace, approach in insignificance to that of the women of the court, whom it was the business of their lives to captivate and amuse.*

* See, for a curious picture of the life of the French nobles of fifty years since, the first volume of Madame de Genlis' *Memoirs*. Had there been any more solid pursuits in society than the gay trifles she so pleasantly describes, they could not have escaped so intelligent an observer.

There were noble exceptions, but in general the order, in everything but military courage, had assumed a trivial and effeminate character, from which patriotic sacrifices, or masculine wisdom, were scarcely to be expected.

While the nobles of France were engaged in these frivolous pursuits, their procureurs, bailiffs, stewards, intendants, or by whatsoever name their agents and managers were designated, enjoyed the real influence which their constituents rejected as beneath them, rose into a degree of authority and credit, which eclipsed recollection of the distant and regardless proprietor, and formed a rank in the state not very different from that of the middle-men in Ireland.* These agents were necessarily of plebeian birth, and their profession required that they should be familiar with the details of public business, which they administered in the name of their seigneurs. Many of this condition gained power and wealth in the course of the Revolution, thus succeeding, like an able and intelligent vizier, to the power which was forfeited by the idle and voluptuous sultan. Of the high noblesse it might with truth be said, that they still formed the grace of the court of France, though they had ceased to be its defence. They were accomplished, brave, full of honour, and in many instances endowed with talent. But the communication was broken off betwixt them and the subordinate orders, over whom, in just degree, they ought to have possessed a natural influence. The chain of gradual and insensible connexion was rusted by time, in almost all its dependencies; forcibly distorted, and contemptuously wrenched asunder, in many. The noble had neglected and flung from him the most precious jewel in his coronet—the love and respect of the country gentleman, the farmer, and the peasant, an advantage so natural to his condition in a well-constituted society, and founded upon principles so estimable, that he who contemns or destroys it is guilty of little less than high treason, both to his own rank, and to the community in general. Such a change, however, had taken place in France, so that the noblesse might be compared to a court-sword, the hilt carved, ornamented and gilded, such as might grace a day of parade, but the blade gone, or composed of the most worthless materials.

It only remains to be mentioned, that these subsisted, besides all the distinctions we have noticed, an essential difference in political opinions among the noblesse themselves considered as a body. There were many of the order, who, looking to the exigencies of the kingdom, were patriotically disposed to sacrifice their own exclusive privileges, in order to afford a chance of its regeneration. These of course were disposed to favour an alteration or reform in the original constitution of France; but besides these enlightened individuals, the nobility had the misfortune to include many disappointed and desperate men, gratified by many of the advantages which their rank made them capable of receiving, and whose advantages of birth and education only rendered them more deeply dangerous, or

* A class of persons in Ireland who have obtained the name of Middle-men from their holding an interest in lands between the proprietor and the *tenant*.

more daringly profligate. A plebeian, dishonoured by his vices, or depressed by the poverty which is their consequence, sinks easily into the insignificance from which wealth or character alone raised him; but the noble often retains the means, as well as the desire, to avenge himself on society, for an expulsion which he feels not the less because he is conscious of deserving it. Such were the debauched Roman youth, among whom were found Catiline, and associates equal in talents and in depravity to their leader; and such was the celebrated Mirabeau, who, almost expelled from his own class, as an irreclaimable profligate, entered the arena of the Revolution as a first-rate reformer, and a popular advocate of the lower orders.

The state of the church, that second pillar of the throne, was scarce more solid than that of the nobility. Generally speaking, it might be said, that, for a long time, the higher orders of the clergy had ceased to take a vital concern in their profession, or to exercise its functions in a manner which interested the feelings and affections of men.

The catholic church had grown old, and unfortunately did not possess the means of renovating her doctrines, or improving her constitution, so as to keep pace with the enlargement of the human understanding. The lofty claims of infallibility which she had set up and maintained during the middle ages, claims which she could neither renounce nor modify, now threatened, in more enlightened times, like battlements too heavy for the foundation, to be the means of ruining the edifice they were designed to defend. *Vestigia nulla retrorsum*, continued to be the motto of the Church of Rome. She could explain nothing, soften nothing, renounce nothing, consistently with her assertion of impeccability. The whole trash which had been accumulated for ages of darkness and ignorance, whether consisting of extravagant pretensions, incredible assertions, absurd doctrines which confounded the understanding, or puerile ceremonies which revolted the taste, were alike incapable of being explained away or abandoned. It would certainly have been (humanly speaking) advantageous, alike for the Church of Rome, and for christianity in general, that the former had possessed the means of relinquishing her extravagant claims, modifying her more obnoxious doctrines, and retrenching her superstitious ceremonial, as increasing knowledge showed the injustice of the one, and the absurdity of the other. But this power she dared not assume; and hence, perhaps, the great schism which divides the christian world, which might otherwise never have existed, or at least not in its present extended and embittered state. But, in all events, the Church of Rome, retaining the spiritual empire over so large and fair a portion of the christian world, would not have been reduced to the alternative of either defending propositions, which, in the eyes of all enlightened men, are altogether untenable, or of beholding the most essential and vital doctrines of christianity confounded with them, and the whole system exposed to the scorn of the infidel. The more enlightened and better informed part of the French nation had fallen very generally into the latter extreme.

Infidelity, in attacking the absurd claims and

extravagant doctrines of the Church of Rome, had artfully availed herself of those abuses, as if they had been really a part of the christian religion; and they, whose credulity could not digest the grossest articles of the papist creed, thought themselves entitled to conclude, in general, against religion itself, from the abuses engrafted upon it by ignorance and priestcraft. The same circumstances which favoured the assault, tended to weaken the defence. Embarrassed by the necessity of defending the mass of human inventions with which their church had obscured and deformed christianity, the catholic clergy were not the best advocates even in the best of causes; and though there were many brilliant exceptions, yet it must be owned that a great part of the higher orders of the priesthood gave themselves little trouble about maintaining the doctrines, or extending the influence of the church, considering it only in the light of an asylum, where, under the condition of certain renunciations, they enjoyed, in indolent tranquillity, a state of ease and luxury. Those who thought on the subject more deeply were contented quietly to repose the safety of the church upon the restrictions on the press, which prevented the possibility of free discussion. The usual effect followed; and many who, if manly and open debate upon theological subjects had been allowed, would doubtless have been enabled to winnow the wheat from the chaff, were, in the state of darkness to which they were reduced, led to reject christianity itself, along with the corruptions of the Romish Church, and to become absolute infidels, instead of reformed christians.

The long and violent dispute also betwixt the jesuits and the jansenists had for many years tended to lessen the general consideration for the church at large, and especially for the higher orders of the clergy. In that quarrel much had taken place that was disgraceful. The mask of religion has been often used to cover more savage and extensive persecutions; but at no time did the spirit of intrigue, of personal malice, of slander and circumvention, appear more disgustingly from under the sacred disguise; and in the eyes of the thoughtless and the vulgar the general cause of religion suffered in proportion.

The number of the clergy who were thus indifferent to doctrine or duty was greatly increased, since the promotion to the great benefices had ceased to be distributed with regard to the morals, piety, talents, and erudition of the candidates, but was bestowed among the younger branches of the noblesse, upon men who were at little pains to reconcile the looseness of their former habits and opinions with the sanctity of their new profession, and who, embracing the church solely as a means of maintenance, were little calculated by their lives or learning to extend its consideration. Among other vile innovations of the celebrated regent Duke of Orleans, he set the most barefaced example of such dishonourable preferment, and had increased in proportion the contempt entertained for the hierarchy, even in its highest dignities, since how was it possible to respect the purple itself, after it had covered the shoulders of the infamous Dubois?

It might have been expected, and it was doubt-

less in a great measure the case, that the respect paid to the characters and efficient utility of the curates, upon whom, generally speaking, the charge of souls actually devolved, might have made up for the want of consideration withheld from the higher orders of the church. There can be no doubt that this respectable body of churchmen possessed great and deserved influence over their parishioners; but then they were themselves languishing under poverty and neglect, and, as human beings, cannot be supposed to have viewed with indifference their superiors enjoying wealth and ease, while in some cases they dishonoured the robe they wore, and in others disowned the doctrines they were appointed to teach. Alive to feelings so natural, and mingling with the middling classes, of which they formed a most respectable portion, they must necessarily have become imbued with their principles and opinions, and a very obvious train of reasoning would extend the consequences to their own condition. If the state was encumbered rather than benefited by the privileges of the higher order, was not the church in the same condition? And if secular rank was to be thrown open as a general object of ambition to the able and the worthy, ought not the dignities of the church to be rendered more accessible to those who, in humility and truth, discharged the toilsome duties of its inferior offices, and who might therefore claim, in due degree of succession, to attain higher preferment? There can be no injustice in ascribing to this body sentiments which might have been no less just regarding the church than advantageous to themselves; and, accordingly, it was not long before this body of churchmen showed distinctly that their political views were the same with those of the third estate, to which they solemnly united themselves, strengthening thereby greatly the first revolutionary movements. But their conduct, when they beheld the whole system of their religion aimed at, should acquit the French clergy of the charge of self-interest, since no body, considered as such, ever showed itself more willing to encounter persecution and submit to privation for conscience' sake.

While the noblesse and the church, considered as branches of the state, were thus divided amongst themselves, and fallen into discredit with the nation at large; while they were envied for their ancient immunities, without being any longer feared for their power; while they were ridiculed at once and hated for the assumption of a superiority which their personal qualities did not always vindicate, the lowest order, the commons, or, as they were at that time termed, the third estate, had gradually acquired an extent and importance unknown to the feudal ages, in which originated the ancient division of the estates of the kingdom. The third estate no longer, as in the days of Henry IV., consisted merely of the burghers and petty traders in the small towns of a feudal kingdom, bred up almost as the vassals of the nobles and clergy, by whose expenditure they acquired their living. Commerce and colonies had introduced wealth, from sources to which the nobles and the churchmen had no access. Not only a very great proportion of the disposable capital was in the hands of the third estate, who thus formed the bulk

of the moneyed interest of France, but a large share of the landed property was also in their possession.

There was, moreover, the influence which many plebeians possessed, as creditors, over those needy nobles whom they had supplied with money, while another portion of the same class rose into wealth and consideration, at the expense of the more opulent patricians who were ruining themselves. Paris had increased to a tremendous extent, and her citizens had risen to a corresponding degree of consideration; and, while they profited by the luxury and dissipation both of the court and courtiers, had become rich in proportion as the government and privileged classes grew poor. Those citizens who were thus enriched, endeavoured, by bestowing on their families all the advantages of good education, to counterbalance their inferiority of birth, and to qualify their children to support their part in the scenes to which their altered fortunes, and the prospects of the country, appeared to call them. In short, it is not too much to say, that the middling classes acquired the advantages of wealth, consequence, and effective power, in a proportion more than equal to that in which the nobility had lost these attributes. Thus, the third estate seemed to increase in extent, number, and strength, like a waxing inundation, threatening with every increasing wave to overwhelm the ancient and decayed barriers of exclusions and immunities, behind which the privileged ranks still fortified themselves.

It was not in the nature of man, that the bold, the talented, the ambitious, of a rank which felt its own power and consequence, should be long contented to remain acquiescent in political regulations, which depressed them in the state of society beneath men to whom they felt themselves equal in all respects, excepting the fictitious circumstances of birth or of church orders. It was no less impossible that they should long continue satisfied with the feudal dogma, which exempted the noblesse from taxes, because they served the nation with their sword, and the clergy, because they propitiated Heaven in its favour with their prayers. The maxim, however true in the feudal ages when it originated, had become an extravagant legal fiction in the eighteenth century, when all the world knew that both the noble soldier and the priest were paid for the services they no longer rendered to the state, while the *roturier* had both valour and learning to fight his own battles and perform his own devotions; and when, in fact, it was their arms which combated, and their learning which enlightened the state, rather than those of the privileged orders.

Thus, a body, opulent and important, and carrying along with their claims the sympathy of the whole people, were arranged in formidable array against the privileges of the nobles and clergy, and bound to further the approaching changes by the strongest of human ties, emulation and self-interest.

The point was stated with unusual frankness by Emery, a distinguished member of the National Assembly, and a man of honour and talent. In the course of a confidential communication with the celebrated Marquis de Bouillé, the latter had avowed

his principles of royalty, and his detestation of the new constitution, to which he said he only rendered obedience because the king had sworn to maintain it. "You are right, being yourself a nobleman," replied Emery, with equal candour; "and, had I been born noble, such would have been my principles; but I, a plebeian *avocat*, will adhere to that constitution which has called me, and those of my rank, out of the state of incapacity and degradation in which the Revolution found us."

Considering the situation, therefore, of the three separate bodies, which, before the revolutionary impulse commenced, were the constituent parts of the kingdom of France, it was evident, that in case of a collision, the nobles and clergy might esteem themselves fortunate, if, divided as they were among themselves, they could maintain an effectual defence of the whole or a portion of their privileges, while the third estate, confident in their numbers and in their unanimity, were ready to assail and carry by storm the whole system, over the least breach which might be effected in the ancient constitution. Lally Tolendal gave a comprehensive view of the state of parties in these words:—"The commons desired to conquer, the nobles to preserve what they already possessed. The clergy stood inactive, resolved to join the victorious party. If there was a man in France who wished for concord and peace, it was the king."

CHAPTER III.

State of France continued.—State of public opinion.—Men of letters encouraged by the great—Disadvantages attending this patronage.—Licentious tendency of the French literature—Their irreligious and infidel opinions.—Free opinions on politics permitted to be expressed in an abstract and speculative, but not in a practical form.—Disadvantages arising from the suppression of free discussion.—Anglomania.—Share of France in the American war.—Disposition of the troops who returned from America.

WE have viewed France as it stood in its grand political divisions previous to the Revolution, and we have seen that there existed strong motives for change, and that a great force was prepared to level institutions which were crumbling to pieces of themselves. It is now necessary to review the state of the popular mind, and consider upon what principles, and to what extent, the approaching changes were likely to operate, and at what point they might be expected to stop. Here, as with respect to the ranks of society, a tacit but almost total change had been operated in the feelings and sentiments of the public, principally occasioned, doubtless, by the great ascendancy acquired by literature—that tree of knowledge of good and evil, which, amidst the richest and most wholesome fruit, bears others, fair in show, and sweet to the taste, but having the properties of the most deadly poison.

The French, the most ingenious people in Europe, and the most susceptible of those pleasures which arise from conversation and literary discussion, had early called in the assistance of men of genius to enhance their relish for society. The nobles, without

renouncing their aristocratic superiority,—which, on the contrary, was rendered more striking by the contrast,—permitted literary talents to be a passport into their saloons. The wealthy financier, and opulent merchant, emulated the nobility in this as in other articles of taste and splendour; and their coteries, as well as those of the aristocracy, were open to men of letters, who were in many cases contented to enjoy luxury at the expense of independence. Assuredly this species of patronage, while it often flowed from the vanity or egotism of the patrons, was not much calculated to enhance the character of those who were protected. Professors of literature, thus mingling in the society of the noble and the wealthy upon sufferance, held a rank scarce more high than that of musicians or actors, from amongst whom individuals have often, by their talents and character, become members of the best society, while the castes, to which such individuals belong, remain in general exposed to the most humiliating contempt. The lady of quality, who smiled on the man of letters, and the man of rank, who admitted him to his intimacy, still retained their consciousness that he was not, like themselves, formed out of the "porcelain clay of the earth," and even while receiving their bounties, or participating in their pleasures, the favourite *savant* must often have been disturbed by the reflection, that he was only considered as a creature of sufferance, whom the caprice of faction, or a sudden reaction of the ancient etiquette, might fling out of the society where he was at present tolerated. Under this disheartening, and even degrading inferiority, the man of letters might be tempted invidiously to compare the luxurious style of living at which he sat a permitted guest, with his own paltry hired apartment, and scanty and uncertain chance of support. And even those of a nobler mood, when they had conceded to their benefactors all the gratitude they could justly demand, must sometimes have regretted their own situation,

Condemn'd as needy supplicants to wait,
While ladies interpose and slaves debate.

It followed, that many of the men of letters, thus protected, became enemies of the persons as well as the rank of their patrons; as, for example, no one in the course of the Revolution expressed greater hatred to the nobility than Champfort, the favourite and favoured secretary of the Prince of Condé. Occasions, too, must frequently have occurred, in which the protected person was almost inevitably forced upon comparing his own natural and acquired talents with those of his aristocratic patron, and the result could not be other than a dislike of the institutions which placed him so far behind persons whom, but for those prescribed limits, he must have passed in the career of honour and distinction.

Hence arose that frequent and close inquiry into the origin of ranks, that general system of impugning the existing regulations, and appealing to the original states of society in vindication of the original equality of mankind—hence those ingenious arguments and eloquent tirades in favour of primitive and even savage independence, which the patricians of the day read and applauded with such a smile of

mixed applause and pity, as they would have given to the reveries of a crazed poet, while the inferior ranks, participating the feelings under which they were written, caught the ardour of the eloquent authors, and rose from the perusal with minds prepared to act, whenever action should be necessary to realize a vision so flattering.

It might have been expected that those belonging to the privileged classes, at least, would have caught the alarm, from hearing doctrines so fatal to their own interests avowed so boldly, and maintained with so much talent. It might have been thought that they would have started, when Raynal proclaimed to the nations of the earth that they could only be free and happy when they had overthrown every throne and every altar; but no such alarm was taken. Men of rank considered liberal principles as the fashion of the day, and embraced them as the readiest mode of showing that they were above vulgar prejudices. In short, they adopted political opinions, as they put on round hats and jockey coats, merely because they were current in good society. They assumed the tone of philosophers, as they would have done that of Arcadian shepherds at a masquerade, but without any more thought of sacrificing their own rank and immunities in the one case, than of actually driving their flocks a-field in the other. Count Ségur gives a most interesting account of the opinions of the young French nobles, in which he himself partook at this eventful period.

"Impeded in this light career by the antiquated pride of the old court, the irksome etiquette of the old order of things, the severity of the old clergy, the aversion of our parents to our new fashions and our costumes, which were favourable to the principles of equality, we felt disposed to adopt with enthusiasm the philosophical doctrines professed by literary men, remarkable for their boldness and their wit. Voltaire seduced our imagination; Rousseau touched our hearts; we felt a secret pleasure in seeing that their attacks were directed against an old fabric, which presented to us a Gothic and ridiculous appearance.

"We were thus pleased at this petty war, although it was undermining our own ranks and privileges, and the remains of our ancient power; but we felt not these attacks personally; we merely witnessed them. It was as yet but a war of words and paper, which did not appear to us to threaten the superiority of existence we enjoyed, consolidated, as we thought it, by a possession of many centuries.

"We were pleased with the courage of liberty, whatever language it assumed, and with the convenience of equality. There is a satisfaction in descending from a high rank, as long as the resumption of it is thought to be free and unobstructed; and regardless, therefore, of consequences, we enjoyed our patrician advantages, together with the sweets of a plebeian philosophy."

We anxiously desire not to be mistaken. It is

* *Mémoires et Souvenirs de M. de Ségur*, vol. I, p. 41: 8vo, Paris, 1824.

not the purport of these remarks to blame the French aristocracy for extending their patronage to learning and to genius. The purpose was honourable to themselves, and fraught with high advantages to the progress of society. The favour of the great supplied the want of public encouragement, and fostered talent which otherwise might never have produced its important and inappreciable fruits. But it had been better for France, her nobility, and her literature, had the patronage been extended in some manner which did not intimately associate the two classes of men. The want of independence of circumstances is a severe if not an absolute check to independence of spirit; and thus it often happened, that, to gratify the passions of their protectors, or to advance their interest, the men of letters were involved in the worst and most scandalous labyrinths of *tracasserie*, slander, and malignity; that they were divided into desperate factions against each other, and reduced to practise all those arts of dissimulation, flattery, and intrigue, which are the greatest shame of the literary profession.

As the eighteenth century advanced, the men of literature rose in importance, and, aware of their own increasing power in a society which was dependent on them for intellectual gratification, they supported each other in their claims to what began to be considered the dignity of a man of letters. This was soon carried into extremes, and assumed, even in the halls of their protectors, a fanatical violence of opinion, and a dogmatical mode of expression, which made the veteran Fontenelle declare himself terrified for the frightful degree of *certainly* that folks met with everywhere in society. The truth is, that men of letters, being usually men of mere theory, have no opportunity of measuring the opinions which they have adopted upon hypothetical reasoning, by the standard of practical experiment. They feel their mental superiority to those whom they live with, and become habitual believers in, and assertors of, their own infallibility. If moderation, command of passions and of temper, be part of philosophy, we seldom find less philosophy actually displayed, than by a philosopher in defence of a favourite theory. Nor have we found that churchmen are so desirous of forming proselytes, or soldiers of extending conquests, as philosophers of making converts to their own opinions.

In France they had discovered the command which they had acquired over the public mind, and united as they were (and more especially the Encyclopedists), they augmented and secured that impression, by never permitting the doctrines which they wished to propagate to die away upon the public ear. For this purpose, they took care their doctrines should be echoed, like thunder amongst hills, from a hundred different points, presented in a hundred new lights, illustrated by a hundred various methods, until the public could no longer help receiving that as undeniable which they heard from so many different quarters. They could also direct every weapon of satirical hostility against those who ventured to combat their doctrines, and as their wrath was neither easily endured nor pacified, they drove from the field most of those authors, who, in opposition to their opinions, might have exerted

themselves as champions of the church and monarchy.

We have already hinted at the disadvantages under which literature labours, when it is under the protection of private individuals of opulence, rather than of the public. But in yet another important respect, the air of *salons*, *ruelles*, and *boudoirs*, is fatal, in many cases, to the masculine spirit of philosophical self-denial which gives dignity to literary society. They who make part of the gay society of a corrupted metropolis must lend their countenance to follies and vices, if they do not themselves practise them; and hence, perhaps, French literature, more than any other in Europe, has been liable to the reproach of lending its powerful arm to undermine whatever was serious in morals, or hitherto considered as fixed in principle. Some of their greatest authors, even Montesquieu himself, have varied their deep reasonings on the origin of government, and the most profound problems of philosophy, with licentious tales tending to inflame the passions. Hence, partaking of the license of its professors, the degraded literature of modern times called in to its alliance that immorality, which not only christian, but even heathen philosophy had considered as the greatest obstacle to a pure, wise, and happy state of existence. The licentiousness which walked abroad in such disgusting and undisguised nakedness was a part of the unhappy bequest left by the regent Duke of Orleans to the country which he governed. The decorum of the court during the times of Louis XIV. had prevented such excesses; if there was enough of vice, it was at least decently veiled. But the conduct of Orleans and his minions was marked with open infamy, deep enough to have called down, in the age of miracles, an immediate judgment from Heaven; and crimes which the worst of the Roman emperors would have at least hidden in his solitary Isle of Caprea, were acted as publicly as if men had no eyes, or God no thunderbolts.

From this filthy Cocytus flowed those streams of impurity which disgraced France during the reign of Louis XV., and which, notwithstanding the example of a prince who was himself a model of domestic virtue, continued in that of Louis XVI. to infect society, morals, and, above all, literature. We do not here allude merely to those lighter pieces of indecency in which humour and fancy outrun the bounds of delicacy. These are to be found in the literature of most nations, and are generally in the hands of mere libertines and men of pleasure, so well acquainted with the practice of vice, that the theory cannot make them worse than they are. But there was a strain of voluptuous and seducing immorality which pervaded not only the lighter and gayer compositions of the French, but tinged the writings of those who called the world to admire them as poets of the highest mood, or to listen as to philosophers of the most lofty pretensions. Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot, Montesquieu — names which France must always esteem her highest honour — were so guilty in this particular, that the young and virtuous must either altogether abstain from works which are everywhere the topic of ordinary discussion and admiration, or must peruse much that is

hurtful to delicacy and dangerous to morals, in the formation of their future character. The latter alternative was universally adopted; for the curious will read as the thirsty will drink, though the cup and page be polluted.

So far had an indifference to delicacy influenced the society of France, and so widely spread was this habitual impurity of language and ideas, especially among those who pretended to philosophy, that Madame Roland, a woman admirable for courage and talents, and not, so far as appears, vicious in her private morals, not only mentions the profligate novels of Louvet as replete with the graces of imagination, the salt of criticism, and the tone of philosophy, but affords the public, in her own person, details with which a courtesan of the higher class should be unwilling to season her private conversation.*

This license, with the corruption of morals, of which it is both the sign and the cause, leads directly to feelings the most inconsistent with manly and virtuous patriotism. Voluptuousness, and its consequences, render the libertine incapable of relish for what is simply and abstractedly beautiful or sublime, whether in literature or in the arts, and destroy the taste, while they degrade and blunt the understanding. But, above all, such libertinism leads to the exclusive pursuit of selfish gratification, for egotism is its foundation and its essence. Egotism is necessarily the very reverse of patriotism, since the one principle is founded exclusively upon the individual's pursuit of his own peculiar objects of pleasure or advantage, while the other demands a sacrifice, not only of these individual pursuits, but of fortune and life itself, to the cause of the public weal. Patriotism has, accordingly, always been found to flourish in that state of society which is most favourable to the stern and manly virtues of self-denial, temperance, chastity, contempt of luxury, patient exertion, and elevated contemplation; and the public spirit of a nation has invariably borne a just proportion to its private morals.

Religion cannot exist where immorality generally prevails, any more than a light can burn where the air is corrupted; and, accordingly, infidelity was so general in France, as to predominate in almost every rank of society. The errors of the Church of Rome, as we have already noticed, connected as they are with her ambitious attempts towards dominion over men, in their temporal as well as spiritual capacity, had long become the argument of the philosopher, and the jest of the satirist; but in exploding these pretensions, and holding them up to ridicule, the philosophers of the age involved with them the general doctrines of christianity itself; nay, some went so far as not only to deny inspiration, but, to extinguish, by their sophistry, the lights of natural religion, implanted in our bosoms as a part of our birth-right. Like the disorderly rabble at the time of the

* The particulars we allude to, though suppressed in the second edition of Madame Roland's *Mémoires*, are restored in the collection of *Mémoires* respecting the Revolution, now publishing at Paris. This is fair play; for if the details be disgusting, the light which they cast upon the character of the author is too valuable to be lost.

Reformation (but with infinitely deeper guilt), they not only pulled down the symbols of idolatry, which ignorance or priestcraft had introduced into the christian church, but sacrilegiously defaced and desecrated the altar itself. This work the philosophers, as they termed themselves, carried on with such an unlimited and eager zeal, as plainly to show that infidelity, as well as divinity, hath its fanaticism. An envenomed fury against religion and all its doctrines; a promptitude to avail themselves of every circumstance by which christianity could be misrepresented; an ingenuity in mixing up their opinions in works which seemed the least fitting to involve such discussions; above all, a pertinacity in slandering, ridiculing, and vilifying all who ventured to oppose their principles, distinguished the correspondents in this celebrated conspiracy against a religion, which, however it may be defaced by human inventions, breathes only that peace on earth, and good-will to the children of men, which was proclaimed by Heaven at its divine origin.

If these prejudiced and envenomed opponents had possessed half the desire of truth, or half the benevolence towards mankind, which were eternally on their lips, they would have formed the true estimate of the spirit of christianity; not from the use which had been made of the mere name by ambitious priests or enthusiastic fools, but by its vital effects upon mankind at large. They would have seen, that under its influence a thousand brutal and sanguinary superstitions had died away; that polygamy had been abolished, and with polygamy all the obstacles which it offers to domestic happiness, as well as to the due education of youth, and the natural and gradual civilization of society. They must then have owned, that slavery, which they regarded or affected to regard with such horror, had first been gradually ameliorated, and finally abolished by the influence of the christian doctrines—that there was no one virtue tending to elevate mankind or benefit society, which was not enjoined by the precepts they endeavoured to misrepresent and weaken—no one vice by which humanity is degraded and society endangered, upon which christianity hath not imposed a solemn anathema. They might also, in their capacity of philosophers, have considered the peculiar aptitude of the christian religion, not only to all ranks and conditions of mankind, but to all climates and to all stages of society. Nor ought it to have escaped them, that the system contains within itself a key to those difficulties, doubts, and mysteries, by which the human mind is agitated, so soon as it is raised beyond the mere objects which interest the senses. Milton has made the maze of metaphysics, and the bewildering state of mind which they engender, a part of the employment, and perhaps of the punishment, of the lower regions. Christianity alone offers a clew to this labyrinth, a solution to these melancholy and discouraging doubts; and however its doctrines may be hard to unaided flesh and blood, yet explaining as they do the system of the universe, which without them is so incomprehensible, and through their practical influence rendering men in all ages more worthy to act their part in the general plan, it seems wonderful how those, whose professed pursuit was wisdom,

should have looked on religion not alone with that indifference, which was the only feeling evinced by the heathen philosophers towards the gross mythology of their time, but with hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness. One would rather have expected, that after such a review, men professing the real spirit which searches after truth and wisdom, if unhappily they were still unable to persuade themselves that a religion so worthy of the Deity (if such an expression may be used) had emanated directly from revelation, might have had the modesty to lay their finger on their lip, and distrust their own judgment, instead of disturbing the faith of others; or, if confirmed in their incredulity, might have taken the leisure to compute at least what was to be gained by rooting up a tree which bore such goodly fruits, without having the means of replacing it by aught which could produce the same advantage to the commonwealth.

Unhappily blinded by self-conceit, heated with the ardour of controversy, gratifying their literary pride by becoming members of a league, in which kings and princes were included, and procuring followers by flattering the vanity of some, and stimulating the capidity of others, the men of the most distinguished parts in France became allied in a sort of anticrusade against christianity, and indeed against religious principles of every kind. How they succeeded is too universally known; and when it is considered that these men of letters, who ended by degrading the morals, and destroying the religion of so many of the citizens of France, had been first called into public estimation by the patronage of the higher orders, it is impossible not to think of the Israelitish champion, who, brought into the house of Dagon to make sport for the festive assembly, ended by pulling it down upon the heads of the guests—and upon his own.

We do not tax the whole nation of France with being infirm in religious faith, and relaxed in morals; still less do we aver that the Revolution, which broke forth in that country, owed its rise exclusively to the license and infidelity which were but too current there. The necessity of a great change in the principles of the ancient French monarchy had its source in the usurpations of preceding kings over the liberties of the subject; and the opportunity for effecting this change was afforded by the weakness and pecuniary distresses of the present government. These would have existed had the French court, and her higher orders, retained the simple and virtuous manners of Sparta, united with the strong and pure faith of primitive christians. The difference lay in this, that a simple, virtuous, and religious people would have rested content with such changes and alterations in the constitution of their government, as might remove the evils of which they had just and pressing reason to complain. They would have endeavoured to redress obvious and practical errors in the body politic, without being led into extremes either by the love of realizing visionary theories, the vanity of enforcing their own particular philosophical or political doctrines, or the selfish arguments of demagogues, who, in the prospect of bettering their own situation by wealth, or obtaining scope for their ambition, aspired, in the words of the dramatic poet,

to throw the elements of society into confusion, and thus

— disturb the peace of all the world,
To rule it when 't was wildest.

It was to such men as these last that Heaven, in punishment of the sins of France and of Europe, and perhaps to teach mankind a dreadful lesson, abandoned the management of the French Revolution, the original movements of which, so far as they went to secure to the people the restoration of their natural liberty, and the abolition of the usurpations of the crown, had become not only desirable through the change of times, and by the influence of public opinion, but peremptorily necessary and inevitable.

The feudal system of France, like that of the rest of Europe, had, in its original composition, all the germs of national freedom. The great peers, in whose hands the common defence was reposed, acknowledged the king's power as *suzerain*, obeyed his commands as their military leader, and attended his courts as their supreme judge; but recognized no despotic authority in the crown, and were prompt to defend the slightest encroachment upon their own rights. If they themselves were not equally tender of the rights and liberties of their own vassals, their acts of encroachment flowed not from the feudal system, but from its imperfections. The tendency and spirit of these singular institutions were to preserve to each individual his just and natural rights; but a system, almost purely military, was liable to be frequently abused by the most formidable soldier, and was, besides, otherwise ill fitted to preserve rights which were purely civil. It is not necessary to trace the progress from the days of Louis XIII. downwards, by which ambitious monarchs, seconded by able and subtle ministers, contrived to emancipate themselves from the restraints of their powerful vassals, or by which the descendants of these high feudatories, who had been the controllers of the prince so soon as he outstepped the bounds of legitimate authority, were now ranked around the throne in the capacity of mere courtiers or satellites, who derived their lustre solely from the favour of royalty. This unhappy and short-sighted policy had, however, accomplished its end, and the crown had concentrated within its prerogative almost the entire liberties of the French nation; and now, like an overgorged animal of prey, had reason to repent its fatal voracity, while it lay almost helpless, exposed to the assaults of those whom it had despoiled.

We have already observed, that for a considerable time the Frenchman's love of his country had been transferred to the crown—that his national delight in martial glory fixed his attachment upon the monarch as the leader of his armies—and that this feeling had supported the devotion of the nation to Louis XIV., not only during his victories, but even amid his reverses. But the succeeding reign had less to impose on the imagination. The erection of a palace obtains for the nation the praise of magnificence, and the celebration of public and splendid festivals gives the people at least the pleasure of a holiday; the pensioning artists and men of letters, again, is honourable to the country which fosters the arts; but the court of Louis XV., undiminished in

expense, was also selfish in its expenditure. The enriching of needy favourites, their relations, and their parasites, had none of the dazzling munificence of the Grand Monarque; and while the taxes became daily more oppressive on the subjects, the mode in which the revenue was employed not only became less honourable to the court and less creditable to the country, but lost the dazzle and show which gives the lower orders pleasure as the holders of a pageant.

The consolation which the imagination of the French had found in the military honour of their nation seemed also about to fail them. The bravery of the troops remained the same, but the genius of the commanders, and the fortune of the monarch under whose auspices they fought, had in a great measure abandoned them, and the destiny of France seemed to be on the wane. The victory of Fontenoy was all that was to be placed in opposition to the numerous disasters of the Seven Years' War, in which France was almost every where else defeated; and it was little wonder that, in a reign attended with so many subjects of mortification, the enthusiastic devotion of the people to the sovereign should begin to give way. The king had engrossed so much power in his own person that he had become, as it were, personally responsible for every miscarriage and defeat which the country underwent. Such is the risk incurred by absolute monarchs, who are exposed to all the popular obloquy for mal-administration, from which, in limited governments, kings are in a great measure screened by the intervention of the other powers of the constitution, or by the responsibility of ministers for the measures which they advise; while he that has ascended to the actual peak and extreme summit of power has no barrier left to secure him from the tempest.

Another and most powerful cause fanned the rising discontent with which the French of the eighteenth century began to regard the government under which they lived. Like men awaking from a flattering dream, they compared their own condition with that of the subjects of free states, and perceived that they had either never enjoyed, or had been gradually robbed of, the chief part of the most valuable privileges and immunities to which man may claim a natural right. They had no national representation of any kind, and but for the slender barrier offered by the courts of justice, or parliaments, as they were called, were subject to unlimited exactions on the sole authority of the sovereign.—The property of the nation was therefore at the disposal of the crown, which might increase taxes to any amount, and cause them to be levied by force, if force was necessary. The personal freedom of the citizen was equally exposed to aggressions by *lettres de cachet*. The French people, in short, had neither, in the strict sense, liberty nor property, and if they did not suffer all the inconveniences in practice which so evil a government announces, it was because public opinion, the softened temper of the age, and the good disposition of the kings themselves, did not permit the scenes of cruelty and despotism to be revived in the eighteenth century which Louis XI. had practised three ages before.

These abuses, and others arising out of the disproportionate privileges of the noblesse and the clergy, who were exempted from contributing to the necessities of the state—the unequal mode of levying the taxes, and other great errors of the constitution—above all, the total absorption of every right and authority in the person of the sovereign—these were too gross in their nature, and too destructive in their consequences, to have escaped deep thought on the part of reflecting persons, and hatred and dislike from those who suffered more or less under the practical evils.

They had not, in particular, eluded the observation and censure of the acute reasoners and deep thinkers, who had already become the guiding spirits of the age; but the despotism under which they lived prevented those speculations from assuming a practical and useful character. In a free country, the wise and the learned are not only permitted, but invited, to examine the institutions under which they live, to defend them against the suggestions of rash innovators, or to propose such alterations as the lapse of time and change of manners may render necessary. Their disquisitions are, therefore, usefully and beneficially directed to the repair of the existing government, not to its demolition, and if they propose alteration in parts, it is only for the purpose of securing the rest of the fabric. But in France, no opportunity was permitted of free discussion on politics, any more than on matters of religion.

An essay upon the French monarchy, showing by what means the existing institutions might have been brought more into union with the wishes and wants of the people, must have procured for its author a place in the Bastille; and yet subsequent events have shown, that a system, which might have introduced prudently and gradually into the decayed frame of the French government the spirit of liberty, which was originally inherent in every feudal monarchy, would have been the most valuable present which political wisdom could have rendered to the country. The bonds which pressed so heavily on the subject might thus have been gradually slackened, and at length totally removed, without the perilous expedient of casting them all loose at once. But the philosophers, who had certainly talents sufficient for the purpose, were not permitted to apply to the state of the French government the original principles on which it was founded, or to trace the manner in which usurpations and abuses had taken place, and propose a mode by which, without varying its form, those encroachments might be restrained, and those abuses corrected. An author was indeed at liberty to speculate at any length upon general doctrines of government; he might imagine to himself an Utopia or Atalantis, and argue upon abstract ideas of the rights in which government originates; but on no account was he permitted to render any of his lucubrations practically useful, by adapting them to the municipal regulations of France. The political sage was placed, with regard to his country, in the condition of a physician prescribing for the favourite sultana of some jealous despot, whom he is required to cure without seeing his patient, and without obtaining any

accurate knowledge of her malady, its symptoms, and its progress. In this manner the theory of government was kept studiously separated from the practice. The political philosopher might, if he pleased, speculate upon the former, but he was prohibited, under severe personal penalties, to illustrate the subject by any allusion to the latter. Thus, the eloquent and profound work of Montesquieu professed, indeed, to explain the general rights of the people, and the principles upon which government itself rested; but his pages show no mode by which these could be resorted to for the reformation of the constitution of his country. He laid before the patient a medical treatise on disease in general, instead of a special prescription, applying to his peculiar habits and distemper.

In consequence of these unhappy restrictions upon open and manly political discussion, the French government, in its actual state, was never represented as capable of either improvement or regeneration; and while general and abstract doctrines of original freedom were everywhere the subject of eulogy, it was never considered for a moment in what manner these new and more liberal principles could be applied to the improvement of the existing system. The natural conclusion must have been, that the monarchical government in France was either perfection in itself, and consequently stood in need of no reformation, or that it was so utterly inconsistent with the liberties of the people as to be susceptible of none. No one was hardy enough to claim for it the former character, and, least of all, those who presided in its councils, and seemed to acknowledge the imperfection of the system, by prohibiting all discussion on the subject. It seemed, therefore, to follow, as no unfair inference, that to obtain the advantages which the new elementary doctrines held forth, and which were so desirable and so much desired, a total abolition of the existing government to its very foundation was an indispensable preliminary; and there is little doubt that this opinion prevailed so generally at the time of the Revolution, as to prevent any firm or resolute stand being made in defence even of such of the actual institutions of France, as might have been amalgamated with the proposed reform.

While all practical discussion of the constitution of France, as a subject either above or beneath philosophical inquiry, was thus cautiously omitted in those works which pretended to treat of civil rights, that of England, with its counterpoises and checks, its liberal principle of equality of rights, the security which it affords for personal liberty and individual property, and the free opportunities of discussion upon every subject, became naturally the subject of eulogy amongst those who were awakening their countrymen to a sense of the benefits of national freedom. The time was past, when, as in the days of Louis XIV., the French regarded the institutions of the English with contempt, as fit only for merchants and shopkeepers, but unworthy of a nation of warriors, whose pride was in their subordination to their nobles, as that of the nobles consisted in obedience to their king. That prejudice had long passed away, and Frenchmen now admired, not without envy, the noble system of masculine freedom

which had been consolidated by the successive efforts of so many patriots in so many ages. A sudden revulsion seemed to take place in their general feelings towards their neighbours, and France, who had so long dictated to all Europe in matters of fashion, seemed now herself disposed to borrow the more simple forms and fashions of her ancient rival. The spirit of imitating the English was carried even to the verge of absurdity. Not only did Frenchmen of quality adopt the round hat and frock coat, which set etiquette at defiance—not only had they English carriages, dogs, and horses, but even English butlers were hired, that the wine, which was the growth of France, might be placed on the table with the grace peculiar to England. These were, indeed, the mere ebullitions of fashion carried to excess, but, like the foam on the crest of the billow, they argued the depth and strength of the wave beneath, and, insignificant in themselves, were formidable as evincing the contempt with which the French now regarded all those forms and usages which had hitherto been thought peculiar to their own country. This principle of imitation rose to such extravagance, that it was happily termed the *Anglomania*.*

While the young French gallants were emulously employed in this mimicry of the English fashions, relinquishing the external signs of rank which always produce some effect on the vulgar, men of thought and reflection were engaged in analysing those principles of the British government, on which the national character has been formed, and which have afforded her the means of rising from so many reverses, and maintaining a sway among the kingdoms of Europe, so disproportioned to her population and extent.

To complete the conquest of English opinions, even in France herself, over those of French origin, came the consequences of the American war. Those true Frenchmen who disdained to borrow the sentiments of political freedom from England, might now derive them from a country with whom France could have no rivalry, but in whom, on the contrary, she recognized the enemy of the island, in policy or prejudice termed her own natural foe. The deep sympathy manifested by the French in the success of the American insurgents, though diametrically opposite to the interests of their government, or perhaps of the nation at large, was compounded of too many ingredients, influencing all ranks, to be overcome or silenced by cold considerations of political prudence. The nobility, always eager of mar-

tial distinction, were in general desirous of war, and most of them, the pupils of the celebrated *Encyclopédie*, were doubly delighted to lend their swords to the cause of freedom. The statesmen imagined that they saw, in the success of the American insurgents, the total downfall of the English empire, or at least a far descent from that pinnacle of dignity which she had attained at the peace of 1763, and they eagerly urged Louis XVI. to profit by the opportunity, hitherto sought in vain, of humbling a rival so formidable. In the courtly circles, and particularly in that which surrounded Marie Antoinette, the American deputation had the address or good fortune to become popular, by mingling in them with manners and sentiments entirely opposite to those of courts and courtiers, and exhibiting, amid the extremity of refinement, in dress, speech, and manners, a republican simplicity, rendered interesting both by the contrast, and by the talents which Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane evinced, not only in the business of diplomacy, but in the intercourse of society. Impelled by these and other combining causes, a despotic government, whose subjects were already thoroughly imbued with opinions hostile to its constitution in church and state, with a discontented people, and a revenue well nigh bankrupt, was thrust, as if by fatality, into a contest conducted upon principles most adverse to its own existence.

The king, almost alone, whether dreading the expense of a ruinous war, whether alarmed already at the progress of democratic principles, or whether desirous of observing good faith with England, considered that there ought to be a stronger motive for war, than barely the opportunity of waging it with success; the king, therefore, almost alone, opposed this great political error. It was not the only occasion in which, wiser than his counsellors, he nevertheless yielded up to their urgency opinions founded in unbiassed morality, and unpretending common sense. A good judgment, and a sound moral sense, were the principal attributes of this excellent prince, and happy it would have been had they been mingled with more confidence in himself, and a deeper distrust of others.

Other counsels prevailed over the private opinion of Louis—the war was commenced—successfully carried on, and victoriously concluded. We have seen that the French auxiliaries brought with them to America minds apt to receive, if not already imbued with, those principles of freedom for which the colonies had taken up arms against the mother country, and it is not to be wondered if they returned to France strongly prepossessed in favour of a cause, for which they had encountered danger, and in which they had reaped honour.

The inferior officers of the French auxiliary army, chiefly men of birth, agreeably to the existing rules of the French service, belonged, most of them, to

* An instance is given, ludicrous in itself, but almost prophetic, when connected with subsequent events. A courtier, deeply infected with the fashion of the time, was riding beside the king's carriage at a full trot, without observing that his horse's heels threw the mud into the royal vehicle. "*Vous me crottez, monsieur,*" said the king. The horseman, considering the words were "*Vous trottez,*" and that the prince complimented his equestrian performance, answered, "*Oui, sire, à l'anglaise.*" The good-humoured monarch drew up the glass, and only said to the gentleman in the carriage, "*Voilà une anglomanie bien forte!*" Alas! the unhappy prince lived to see the example of England, in her most dismal period, followed to a much more formidable extent.

* By some young enthusiasts, the assumption of republican habits was carried to all the heights of revolutionary affectation and extravagance. Ségur mentions a young coxcomb named Mauduit, who already distinguished himself by renouncing the ordinary courtesies of life, and insisted on being called by his christian and surname, without the usual addition of Monsieur.



the class of country nobles, who, from causes already noticed, were far from being satisfied with the system which rendered their rise difficult, in the only profession which their prejudices, and those of France, permitted them to assume. The proportion of plebeians who had intruded themselves, by connivance and indirect means, into the military ranks, looked with eagerness to some change which should give a free and open career to their courage and their ambition, and were proportionally discontented with regulations which were recently adopted, calculated to render their rise in the army more difficult than before.* In these sentiments were united the whole of the non-commissioned officers, and the ranks of the common soldiery, all of whom, confiding in their own courage and fortune, now became indignant at those barriers which closed against them the road to military advancement, and to superior command. The officers of superior rank, who derived their descent from the high noblesse, were chiefly young men of ambitious enterprise and warm imaginations, whom not only a love of honour, but an enthusiastic feeling of devotion to the new philosophy, and the political principles which it inculcated, had called to arms. Amongst these were Rochambeau, La Fayette, the Lameths, Chastellux, Ségur, and others of exalted rank, but of no less exalted feelings for the popular cause. They readily forgot, in the full current of their enthusiasm, that their own rank in society was endangered by the progress of popular opinions, or if they at all remembered that their interest was thus implicated, it was with the generous disinterestedness of youth, prompt to sacrifice to the public advantage whatever of selfish immunities was attached to their own condition.

The return of the French army from America thus brought a strong body of auxiliaries to the popular and now prevalent opinions; and the French love of military glory, which had so long been the safeguard of the throne, became now intimately identified with that distinguished portion of the army which had been so lately and so successfully engaged in defending the claims of the people against the rights of an established government. Their laurels were green and newly gathered, while those which had been obtained in the cause of monarchy were of an ancient date, and tarnished by the reverses of the Seven Years' War. The reception of the returned soldiery and their leaders was proportionally enthusiastic; and it became soon evident, that when the eventful struggle betwixt the existing monarchy and its adversaries should commence, the latter were to have the support in sentiment, and probably in action, of that distinguished part of the army, which had of late maintained and recovered the military character of France. It was, accordingly, from its ranks that

* Plebeians formerly got into the army by obtaining the subscription of four men of noble birth, attesting their patrician descent; and such certificates, however false, could always be obtained for a small sum. But by a regulation of the Count Ségur, after the American war, candidates for the military profession were obliged to produce a certificate of noble birth from the king's genealogist, in addition to the attestations which were formerly held sufficient.

the Revolution derived many of its most formidable champions, and it was their example which detached a great proportion of the French soldiers from their natural allegiance to their sovereign, which had been for so many ages expressed in their war-cry of *Vive le roi!* and which was revived, though with an altered object, in that of *Vive l'empereur!*

There remains but to notice the other proximate cause of the Revolution, but which is so intimately connected with its rise and progress, that we cannot disjoin it from our brief review of the revolutionary movement to which it gave the first decisive impulse.

CHAPTER III.

Proximate cause of the Revolution.—Deranged state of the finances.—Reforms in the royal household.—System of Turgot and Necker—Necker's exposition of the state of the public revenue.—The Red book.—Necker displaced.—Succeeded by Calonne.—General state of the revenue.—Assembly of the Notables.—Calonne dismissed.—Archbishop of Sens administrator of the finances.—The king's contest with the parliament.—Bed of Justice.—Resistance of the parliament, and general disorder in the kingdom.—Vacillating policy of the minister.—Royal Sitting—Scheme of forming a Cour Plénière—It proves ineffectual.—Archbishop of Sens retires, and is succeeded by Necker.—He resolves to convocate the States general.—Second Assembly of Notables previous to convocation of the States.—Questions as to the numbers of which the Tiers Etat should consist, and the mode in which the Estates should deliberate.

WE have already compared the monarchy of France to an ancient building, which, however decayed by the wasting injuries of time, may long remain standing, from the mere adhesion of its parts, unless it is assailed by some sudden and unexpected shock, the immediate violence of which completes the ruin which the lapse of ages had only prepared. Or if its materials have become dry and combustible, still they may long wait for the spark which is to awake a general conflagration. Thus, the monarchical government of France, notwithstanding the unsoundness of all its parts, might have for some time continued standing and unconsumed, nay, with timely and judicious repairs, might have been entire at this moment, had the state of the finances of the kingdom permitted the monarch to temporize with the existing discontents and the progress of new opinions, without increasing the taxes of a people already greatly overburthened, and now become fully sensible that these burthens were unequally imposed, and sometimes prodigally dispensed.

A government, like an individual, may be guilty of many acts, both of injustice and folly, with some chance of impunity, provided it possess wealth enough to command partisans and to silence opposition; and history shows us, that as, on the one hand, wealthy and money-saving monarchs have usually been able to render themselves most independent of their subjects, so, on the other, it is from needy princes, and when exchequers are empty, that the people have obtained grants favourable to freedom in exchange for their supplies. The period of pecuniary distress in a government, if it be that

when the subjects are most exposed to oppression, is also the crisis in which they have the best chance of recovering their political rights.

It is in vain that the constitution of a despotic government endeavours, in its forms, to guard against the dangers of such conjunctures, by vesting in the sovereign the most complete and unbounded right to the property of his subjects. This doctrine, however ample in theory, cannot in practice be carried beyond certain bounds, without producing either privy conspiracy or open insurrection, being the violent symptoms of the outraged feelings and exhausted patience of the subject, which in absolute monarchies supply the want of all regular political checks upon the power of the crown. Whenever the point of human sufferance is exceeded, the despot must propitiate the wrath of an insurgent people with the head of his minister, or he may tremble for his own.*

In constitutions of a less determined despotical character, there almost always arises some power of check or control, however anomalous, which balances or counteracts the arbitrary exactions of the sovereign, instead of the actual resistance of the subjects, as at Fez or Constantinople. This was the case in France.

No constitution could have been more absolute in theory than that of France, for two hundred years past, in the matter of finance; but yet in practice there existed a power of control in the parliaments, and particularly in that of Paris. These courts, though strictly speaking they were constituted only for the administration of justice, had forced themselves, or been forced by circumstances, into a certain degree of political power, which they exercised in control of the crown, in the imposition of new taxes. It was agreed on all hands, that the royal edicts, enforcing such new impositions, must be registered by the parliaments; but while the ministers held the act of registering such edicts to be a deed purely ministerial, and the discharge of a function imposed by their official duty, the magistrates insisted, on the other hand, that they possessed the power of deliberating and remonstrating, nay, of refusing to register the royal edicts, and that, unless so registered, these warrants had no force or effect. The parliaments exercised this power of control on various occasions; and as their interference was always on behalf of the subject, the practice, however anomalous, was sanctioned by public opinion; and, in the absence of all other representatives of the people, France naturally looked up to the magistrates as the protectors of her rights, and as the only power which could offer even the semblance of resistance to the arbitrary increase of the burthens of the state. These functionaries cannot be charged with carelessness or cowardice in the discharge of their duty; and as taxes increased and became at the same time less productive, the opposition of the parliaments became more formidable. Louis XV. endeavoured to break their spirit by suppression of their court, and

banishment of its members from Paris; but notwithstanding this temporary victory, he is said to have predicted that his successor might not come off from the renewed contest so successfully.

Louis XVI., with the plain well-meaning honesty which marked his character, restored the parliaments to their constitutional powers immediately on his accession to the throne, having the generosity to regard their resistance to his grandfather as a merit rather than an offence. In the meanwhile, the revenue of the kingdom had fallen into a most disastrous condition. The continued and renewed expense of unsuccessful wars, the supplying the demands of a luxurious court, the gratifying hungry courtiers, and enriching needy favourites, had occasioned large deficits upon the public income of each successive year. The ministers, meanwhile, anxious to provide for the passing moment of their own administration, were satisfied to put off the evil day by borrowing money at heavy interest, and leasing out, in security of these loans, the various sources of revenue to the farmers-general. On their part, these financiers used the government as bankrupt prodigals are treated by usurious money-brokers, who, feeding their extravagance with the one hand, with the other wring out of their ruined fortunes the most unreasonable recompense for their advances. By a long succession of these ruinous loans, and the various rights granted to guarantee them, the whole finances of France appear to have fallen into total confusion, and presented an inextricable chaos to those who endeavoured to bring them into order. The farmers-general, therefore, however obnoxious to the people, who considered with justice that their overgrown fortunes were nourished by the life-blood of the community, continued to be essentially necessary to the state, the expenses of which they alone could find means of defraying;—thus supporting the government, although Mirabeau said with truth, it was only in the sense in which a rope supports a hanged man.

Louis XVI., fully sensible of the disastrous state of the public revenue, did all he could to contrive a remedy. He limited his personal expenses, and those of his household, with a rigour which approached to parsimony, and dimmed the necessary splendour of the throne. He abolished many pensions, and by doing so not only disobliged those who were deprived of the instant enjoyment of those gratuities, but lost the attachment of the much more numerous class of expectants, who served the court in the hope of obtaining similar gratifications in their turn.*

* Louis XV. had the arts if not the virtues of a monarch. He asked one of his ministers what he supposed might be the price of the carriage in which they were sitting. The minister, making a great allowance for the monarch's paying *en prince*, yet guessed within two-thirds less than the real sum. When the king named the actual price, the statesman exclaimed, but the monarch cut him short. "Do not attempt," he said, "to reform the expenses of my household. There are too many, and too great men, who have their share in that extortion, and to make a reformation would give too much discontent. No minister can attempt it with success or with safety." This is the picture of the waste attending a despotic government—the cup which is filled to the very brim cannot be lifted to the lips without wasting the contents.

* When Bonaparte expressed much regret and anxiety on account of the assassination of the Emperor Paul, he was comforted by Fouché with words to the following effect:—*« Qui voulez-vous ? c'est un mode de destitution propre à ce pays-là ! »*

Lastly, he dismissed a very large proportion of his household troops and body-guards, affording another subject of discontent to the nobles, out of whose families these corps were recruited, and destroying with his own hand a force devotedly attached to the royal person, and which, in the hour of popular fury, would have been a barrier of inappreciable value. Thus, it was the misfortune of this well-meaning prince, only to weaken his own cause and endanger his safety, by those sacrifices, intended to relieve the burthens of the people, and supply the wants of the state.

The king adopted a broader and more effectual course of reform, by using the advice of upright and skilful ministers, to introduce, as far as possible, some degree of order into the French finances. Turgot, Malesherbes, and Necker, were persons of unquestionable skill, of sound views, and undisputed integrity; and although the last-named minister finally sunk in public esteem, it was only because circumstances had excited such an extravagant opinion of his powers, as could not have been met and realized by those of the first financier who ever lived. These virtuous and patriotic statesmen did all in their power to keep afloat the vessel of the state, and prevent at least the increase of the deficit, which now arose yearly on the public accounts. They, and Necker in particular, introduced economy and retrenchment into all departments of the revenue, restored the public credit without increasing the national burthens, and, by obtaining loans on reasonable terms, were fortunate enough to find funds for the immediate support of the American war, expensive as it was, without pressing on the patience of the people by new impositions. Could this state of matters have been supported for some years, opportunities might in that time have occurred for adapting the French mode of government to the new lights which the age afforded. Public opinion, joined to the beneficence of the sovereign, had already wrought several important and desirable changes. Many obnoxious and oppressive laws had been expressly abrogated, or tacitly suffered to become obsolete, and there never sat a king upon the French or any other throne, more willing than Louis XVI. to sacrifice his own personal interest and prerogative to whatever seemed to be the benefit of the state. Even at the very commencement of his reign, and when obeying only the dictates of his own beneficence, he reformed the penal code of France, which then savoured of the barbarous times in which it had originated—he abolished the use of torture—he restored to freedom those prisoners of state, the mournful inhabitants of the Bastille and other fortresses, who had been the victims of his grandfather's jealousy—the compulsory labour called the *corvée*, levied from the peasantry, and one principal source of popular discontent, had been abolished in some provinces and modified in others—and while the police was under the regulation of the sage and virtuous Malesherbes, its arbitrary powers had been seldom so exercised as to become the subject of complaint. In short, the monarch partook of the influence of public opinion along with his subjects, and there seemed just reason to hope, that, had times remained moderate, the monarchy of France

might have been reformed instead of being destroyed.

Unhappily, convulsions of the state became from day to day more violent, and Louis XVI., who possessed the benevolence and good intentions of his ancestor, Henry IV., wanted his military talents, and his political firmness. In consequence of this deficiency, the king suffered himself to be distracted by a variety of counsels; and vacillating, as all must who act more from a general desire to do that which is right, than upon any determined and well-considered system, he placed his power and his character at the mercy of the changeful course of events which firmness might have at least combated, if it could not control. But it is remarkable, that Louis resembled Charles I. of England more than any of his own ancestors in a want of self-confidence, which led to frequent alterations of mind and changes of measures, as well as in a tendency to uxoriousness, which enabled both Henrietta Maria, and Marie Antoinette, to use a fatal influence upon their counsels. Both sovereigns fell under the same suspicion of being deceitful and insincere, when perhaps both, but certainly Louis, only changed his course of conduct from a change of his own opinion, or from suffering himself to be over-persuaded, and deferring to the sentiments of others.

Few monarchs of any country, certainly, have changed their ministry, and with their ministry their councils and measures, so often as Louis XVI.; and with this unhappy consequence, that he neither persevered in a firm and severe course of government long enough to inspire respect, nor in a conciliatory and yielding policy for a sufficient time to propitiate regard and inspire confidence. It is with regret we notice this imperfection in a character otherwise so excellent; but it was one of the leading causes of the Revolution, that a prince, possessed of power too great to be either kept or resigned with safety, hesitated between the natural resolution to defend his hereditary prerogative, and the sense of justice which induced him to restore such part of it as had been usurped from the people by his ancestors. By adhering to the one course, he might have been the conqueror of the Revolution; by adopting the other, he had a chance to be its guide and governor; by hesitating between them, he became its victim.

It was in consequence of this vacillation of purpose that Louis, in 1781, sacrificed Turgot and Necker to the intrigues of the court. These statesmen had formed a plan for new-modeling the financial part of the French monarchy, which, while it should gratify the people by admitting representatives on their part to some influence in the imposition of new taxes, might have released the king from the interference of the parliaments (whose office of remonstrance, although valuable as a shelter from despotism, was often arbitrarily, and even factiously exercised), and have transferred to the direct representatives of the people that superintendence, which ought never to have been in other hands.

For this purpose the ministers proposed to institute, in the several provinces of France, convocations of a representative nature, one half of whom

was to be chosen from the commons, or third estate, and the other named by the nobles and clergy in equal proportions, and which assemblies, without having the right of rejecting the edicts imposing new taxes, were to apportion them amongst the subjects of their several provinces. This system contained in it much that was excellent, and might have opened the road for further improvements on the constitution; while, at the same time, it would probably, so early as 1781, have been received as a boon, by which the subjects were called to participate in the royal councils, rather than as a concession extracted from the weakness of the sovereign, or from his despair of his own resources. It afforded, also, an opportunity peculiarly desirable in France, of forming the minds of the people to the discharge of public duty. The British nation owe much of the practical benefits of their constitution to the habits with which almost all men are trained to exercise some public right in head-courts, vestries, and other deliberative bodies, where their minds are habituated to the course of business, and accustomed to the manner in which it can be most regularly dispatched. This advantage would have been supplied to the French by Necker's scheme.

But with all the advantages which it promised, this plan of provincial assemblies miscarried, owing to the emulous opposition of the Parliament of Paris, who did not chuse that any other body than their own should be considered as the guardians of what remained in France of popular rights.

Another measure of Necker was of more dubious policy. This was the printing and publishing of his Report to the Sovereign of the state of the revenues of France. The minister probably thought this display of candour, which, however proper in itself, was hitherto unknown in the French administration, might be useful to the king, whom it represented as acquiescing in public opinion, and appearing not only ready, but solicitous to collect the sentiments of his subjects on the business of the state. Necker might also deem the *Compte Rendu* a prudent measure on his own account, to secure the popular favour, and maintain himself by the public esteem against the influence of court intrigue. Or lastly, both these motives might be mingled with the natural vanity of showing the world that France enjoyed, in the person of Necker, a minister bold enough to penetrate into the labyrinth of confusion and obscurity which had been thought inextricable by all his predecessors, and was at length enabled to render to the sovereign and people of France a detailed and balanced account of the state of their finances.

Neither did the result of the national balance-sheet appear so astounding as to require its being concealed as a state mystery. The deficit, or the balance, by which the expenses of government exceeded the revenue of the country, by no means indicated a desperate state of finance, or one which must either demand immense sacrifices, or otherwise lead to national bankruptcy. It did not greatly exceed the annual defalcation of two millions, a sum which, to a country so fertile as France, might even be termed trifling. At the same time, Necker brought forward a variety of reductions and econo-

mical arrangements, by which he proposed to provide for this deficiency, without either incurring debt or burthening the subject with additional taxes.

But although this general exposure of the expenses of the state, this appeal from the government to the people, had the air of a frank and generous proceeding, and was, in fact, a step to the great constitutional point of establishing in the nation and its representatives the sole power of granting supplies, there may be doubt whether it was not rather too hastily resorted to. Those from whose eyes the cataract has been removed, are for some time deprived of light, and, in the end, it is supplied to them by limited degrees; but that glare which was at once poured upon the nation of France served to dazzle as many as it illuminated. The *Compte Rendu* was the general subject of conversation, not only in coffee-houses and public promenades, but in saloons and ladies' boudoirs, and amongst society better qualified to discuss the merits of the last comedy, or any other frivolity of the day. The very array of figures had something ominous and terrible in it, and the word *deficit* was used, like the name of Marlborough of old, to frighten children with.

To most it indicated the total bankruptcy of the nation, and prepared many to act with the selfish and short-sighted policy of sailors, who plunder the cargo of their own vessel in the act of shipwreck.

Others saw, in the account of expenses attached to the person and dignity of the prince, a wasteful expenditure, which in that hour of avowed necessity a nation might well dispense with. Men began to number the guards and household pomp of the sovereign and his court, as the daughters of Lear did the train of their father. The reduction already commenced might be carried, thought these provident persons, yet farther:—

What needs he five-and-twenty, ten, or five?

And no doubt some, even at this early period, arrived at the ultimate conclusion,

What needs ONE?

Besides the domestic and household expenses of the sovereign, which, so far as personal, were on the most moderate scale, the public mind was much more justly revolted at the large sum yearly squandered among needy courtiers and their dependents, or even less justifiably lavished upon those whose rank and fortune ought to have placed them far above adding to the burthens of the subjects. The king had endeavoured to abridge this list of gratuities and pensions, but the system of corruption which had prevailed for two centuries was not to be abolished in an instant; the throne, already tottering, could not immediately be deprived of the band of stipendiary grandees whom it had so long maintained, and who afforded it their countenance in return, and it was perhaps impolitic to fix the attention of the public on a disclosure so peculiarly invidious, until the opportunity of correcting it should arrive;—it was like the disclosure of a wasting sore, useless and disgusting unless when shown to a surgeon, and for the purpose of cure. Yet, though the account rendered by the minister of the finances, while it passed from the hand of one idler to another, and

occupied on sofas and toilets the place of the latest novel, did doubtless engage giddy heads in vain and dangerous speculation, something was to be risked in order to pave the way of regaining for the French subjects the right most essential to freemen, that of granting or refusing their own supplies. The publicity of the distressed state of the finances induced a general conviction that the oppressive system of taxation, and that of approaching bankruptcy, which was a still greater evil, could only be removed or avoided by resorting to the nation itself, convoked in their ancient form of representation, which was called the States-general.

It was true that, through length of time, the nature and powers of this body were forgotten, if indeed they had ever been very thoroughly fixed: and it was also true that the constitution of the States-general of 1614, which was the last date of their being assembled, was not likely to suit a period when the country was so much changed, both in character and circumstances. The doubts concerning the composition of the medicine, and its probable effects, seldom abate the patient's confidence. All joined in desiring the convocation of this representative body, and all expected that such an assembly would be able to find some satisfactory remedy for the pressing evils of the state. The cry was general, and, as usual in such cases, few who joined in it knew exactly what it was they wanted.

Looking back on the period of 1780, with the advantage of our own experience, it is possible to see a chance, though perhaps a doubtful one, of avoiding the universal shipwreck which was fated to ensue. If the royal government, determining to gratify the general wish, had taken the initiative in conceding the great national measure as a boon flowing from the prince's pure good-will and love of his subjects, and if measures had been taken rapidly and decisively to secure seats in these bodies, but particularly in the tiers état, to men known for their moderation and adherence to the monarchy, it seems probable that the crown might have secured such an interest in a body of its own creation, as would have silenced the attempts of any heated spirits to hurry the kingdom into absolute revolution. The reverence paid to the throne for so many centuries had yet all the influence of unassailed sanctity; the king was still the master of an army, commanded under him by his nobles, and as yet animated by the spirit of loyalty, which is the natural attribute of the military profession; the minds of men were not warmed at once, and wearied, by a fruitless and chicaning delay, which only showed the extreme indisposition of the court to grant what they had no means of ultimately refusing; nor had public opinion yet been agitated by the bold discussions of a thousand pamphleteers, who, under pretence of enlightening the people, prepossessed their minds with the most extreme ideas of the popular character of the representation, of the tiers état, and its superiority over every other power of the state. Ambitious and unscrupulous men would then hardly have had the time or boldness to form those audacious pretensions which their ancestors dreamed not of, and which the course of six or seven years of protracted expectation, and successive renewals of hope, suc-

ceeded by disappointment, enabled them to mature.

Such a fatal interval, however, was suffered to intervene between the first idea of convoking the States-general, and the period when that measure became inevitable. Without this delay, the king, invested with all his royal prerogatives, and at the head of the military force, might have surrendered with a good grace such parts of his power as were inconsistent with the liberal opinions of the time, and such surrender must have been received as a grace, since it could not have been exacted as a sacrifice. The conduct of the government, in the interim, towards the nation whose representatives it was shortly to meet, resembled that of an insane person, who should by a hundred teasing and vexatious insults irritate into frenzy the lion, whose cage he was about to open, and to whose fury he must necessarily be exposed.

Necker, whose undoubted honesty, as well as his republican candour, had rendered him highly popular, had, under the influence of the old intriguer Maurepas, been dismissed from his office as minister of finance, in 1781. The witty, versatile, selfish, and cunning Maurepas had the art to hold his power till the last moment of his long life, and died at the moment when the knell of death was a summons to call him from impending ruin. He made, according to an expressive northern proverb, the "day and way alike long;" and died just about the period when the system of evasion and palliation, of ruinous loans and lavish bounties, could scarce have served longer to save him from disgrace. Vergennes, who succeeded him, was, like himself, a courtier rather than a statesman; more studious to preserve his own power by continuing the same system of partial expedients and temporary shifts, than willing to hazard the king's favour, or the popularity of his administration, by attempting any scheme of permanent utility or general reformation. Calonne, the minister of finance, who had succeeded to that office after the brief administrations of Fleury and d'Ormesson, called on by his duty to the most difficult and embarrassing branch of government, was possessed of a more comprehensive genius, and more determined courage, than his principal, Vergennes. So early as the year 1784, the deficiency betwixt the receipts of the whole revenues of the state, and the expenditure, extended to six hundred and eighty-four millions of livres, in British money about equal to twenty-eight millions four hundred thousand pounds sterling; but then a certain large portion of this debt consisted in annuities granted by government, which were annually in the train of being extinguished by the death of the holders; and there was ample room for saving, in the mode of collecting the various taxes. So that, large as the sum of deficit appeared, it could not have been very formidable, considering the resources of so rich a country; but it was necessary, that the pressure of new burdens, to be imposed at this exigence, should be equally divided amongst the orders of the state. The third estate, or commons, had been exhausted under the weight of taxes, which fell upon them alone, and Calonne formed the bold and laudable design of compelling the clergy and nobles, hitherto exempted

from taxation, to contribute their share to the revenues of the state.

This, however, was, in the present state of the public, too bold a scheme to be carried into execution without the support of something resembling a popular representation. At this crisis, again might Louis have summoned the States-general, with some chance of uniting their suffrages with the wishes of the crown. The king would have found himself in a natural alliance with the commons, in a plan to abridge those immunities, which the clergy and nobles possessed, to the prejudice of the third estate. He would thus, in the outset at least, have united the influence and interests of the crown with those of the popular party, and established something like a balance in the representative body, in which the throne must have had considerable weight.

Apparently, Calonne and his principal, Vergennes, were afraid to take this manly and direct course, as indeed the ministers of an arbitrary monarch can rarely be supposed willing to call in the aid of a body of popular representatives. The ministers endeavoured, therefore, to supply the want of a body like the States-general, by summoning together an assembly of what was termed the notables, or principal persons in the kingdom. This was in every sense an unadvised measure.* With something resembling the form of a great national council, the notables had no right to represent the nation, neither did it come within their province to pass any resolution whatever. Their post was merely that of an extraordinary body of counsellors, who deliberated on any subject which the king might submit to their consideration, and were to express their opinion in answer to the sovereign's interrogatories; but an assembly, which could only start opinions and debate upon them, without coming to any effective or potential decision was a fatal resource at a crisis when decision was preëminently necessary, and when all vague and irrelevant discussion was, as at a moment of national fermentation, to be cautiously avoided. Above all, there was this great error in having recourse to the assembly of the notables, that, consisting entirely of the privileged orders, the council was composed of the individuals most inimical to the equality of taxes, and most tenacious of those very immunities which were struck at by the scheme of the minister of finance.

Calonne found himself opposed at every point, and received from the notables remonstrances instead of support and countenance. That assembly censuring all his plans, and rejecting his proposals, he was in their presence like a rash necromancer, who has been indeed able to raise a demon, but is unequal to the task of guiding him when evoked. He was further weakened by the death of Vergennes, and finally obliged to resign his place and his country, a sacrifice at once to court intrigue and popular odium. Had this able but rash minister convoked the States-general instead of the notables, he would have been at least sure of the support of the third estate, or commons; and, allied with them, might have carried through so popular a scheme, as that

which went to establish taxation upon a just and equal principle, affecting the rich as well as the poor, the proud prelate and wealthy noble, as well as the industrious cultivator of the soil.

Calonne having retired to England from popular hatred, his perilous office devolved upon the Archbishop of Sens, afterwards the Cardinal de Loménie, who was raised to the painful pre-eminence* by the interest of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, whose excellent qualities were connected with a spirit of state-intrigue proper to the sex in such elevated situations, which but too frequently thwarted or bore down the more candid intentions of her husband, and tended, though on her part unwittingly, to give his public measures, sometimes adopted on his own principles, and sometimes influenced by her intrigues and solicitations, an appearance of vacillation, and even of duplicity, which greatly injured them both in the public opinion. The new minister finding it as difficult to deal with the assembly of notables as his predecessor, the king finally dissolved that body, without having received from them either the countenance or good counsel which had been expected, thus realizing the opinion expressed by Voltaire concerning such convocations :

De tous ces états, l'effet le plus commun

Est de voir tous nos maux sans en soulager un.

After dismissal of the notables, the minister adopted or recommended a line of conduct so fluctuating and indecisive, so violent at one time in support of the royal prerogative, and so pusillanimous when he encountered resistance from the newly-awakened spirit of liberty, that had he been bribed to render the crown at once odious and contemptible, or to engage his master in a line of conduct which should irritate the courageous, and encourage the timid, among his dissatisfied subjects, the Archbishop of Sens could hardly, after the deepest thought, have adopted measures better adapted for such a purpose. As if determined to bring matters to an issue betwixt the king and the Parliament of Paris, he laid before the latter two new edicts for taxes, similar in most respects to those which had been recommended by his predecessor Calonne to the notables. The parliament refused to register these edicts, being the course which the minister ought to have expected. He then resolved upon a display of the royal prerogative in its most arbitrary and obnoxious form. A Bed of Justice, as it was termed, was held,† where the king, presiding in person over the court of parliament, commanded the edicts imposing certain new taxes to be registered in his own presence; thus, by an act of authority emanating directly from the sovereign, beating down the only species of opposition which the subjects, through any organ whatsoever, could offer to the increase of taxation.

The parliament yielded the semblance of a momentary obedience, but protested solemnly, that the edict, having been registered solely by the royal command, and against their unanimous opinion, should not have the force of a law. They remon-

* They were summoned on 29th December, 1786, and met on 22d February of the subsequent year.

* May, 1787.

† 6th August, 1787.

strated also to the throne in terms of great freedom and energy, distinctly intimating, that they could not and would not be the passive instruments, through the medium of whom the public was to be loaded with new impositions; and they expressed, for the first time, in direct terms, the proposition, fraught with the fate of France, that neither the edicts of the king, nor the registration of those edicts by the parliament, were sufficient to impose permanent burthens on the people; but that such taxation was competent to the States-general only.

In punishment of their undaunted defence of the popular cause, the parliament was banished to Troyes; the government thus increasing the national discontent by the removal of the principal court of the kingdom, and by all the evils incident to a delay of public justice. The provincial parliaments supported the principles adopted by their brethren of Paris. The Chamber of Accounts, and the Court of Aids, the judicial establishments next in rank to that of the parliament, also remonstrated against the taxes, and refused to enforce them. They were not enforced accordingly; and thus, for the first time, during two centuries at least, the royal authority of France, being brought into direct collision with public opinion and resistance, was, by the energy of the subject, compelled to retrograde and yield ground. This was the first direct and immediate movement of that mighty Revolution, which afterwards rushed to its crisis like a rock rolling down a mountain. This was the first torch which was actually applied to the various combustibles which lay scattered through France, and which we have endeavoured to analyze. The flame soon spread into the provinces. The nobles of Brittany broke out into a kind of insurrection; the Parliament of Grenoble impugned by a solemn decree the legality of *lettres de cachet*. Strange and alarming fears,—wild and boundless hopes,—inconsistent rumours,—a vague expectation of impending events,—all contributed to agitate the public mind. The quick and mercurial tempers which chiefly distinguish the nation, were half maddened with suspense, while even the dull nature of the lowest and most degraded of the community felt the coming impulse of extraordinary changes, as cattle are observed to be disturbed before an approaching thunder-storm.

The minister could not sustain his courage in such a menacing conjuncture, yet unhappily attempted a show of resistance, instead of leaving the king to the influence of his own sound sense and excellent disposition, which also induced him to chuse the means of conciliation. There was indeed but one choice, and it lay betwixt civil war or concession. A despot would have adopted the former course, and, withdrawing from Paris, would have gathered around him the army still his own. A patriotic monarch (and such was Louis XVI. when exercising his own judgment) would have chosen the road of concession; yet his steps, even in retreating, would have been so firm, and his attitude so manly, that the people would not have ventured to ascribe to fear what flowed solely from a spirit of conciliation. But the conduct of the minister, or of those who directed his motions, was an alternation of irritating opposition to the public

voice, and of ill-timed concession to its demands, which implied an understanding impaired by the perils of the conjuncture, and unequal alike to the task of avoiding them by concession, or resisting them with courage.

The king, indeed, recalled the Parliament of Paris from their exile, coming, at the same time, under an express engagement to convoke the States-general, and leading the subjects, of course, to suppose that the new imposts were to be left to their consideration. But, as if to irritate men's minds, by showing a desire to elude the execution of what had been promised, the minister ventured, in an evil hour, to hazard another experiment upon the firmness of their nerves, and again to commit the dignity of the sovereign by bringing him personally to issue a command, which experience had shown the parliament were previously resolved to disobey. By this new proceeding, the king was induced to hold what was called a Royal Sitting of the Parliament, which resembled in all its forms a Bed of Justice, except that it seems as if the commands of the monarch were esteemed less authoritative when so issued, than when they were, as on the former occasion, delivered in this last obnoxious assembly.

Thus, at less advantage than before, and, at all events, after the total failure of a former experiment, the king, arrayed in all the forms of his royalty, once more, and for the last time, convoked his parliament in person; and again with his own voice commanded the court to register a royal edict for a loan of four hundred and twenty millions of francs, to be raised in the course of five years.* This demand gave occasion to a debate which lasted nine hours, and was only closed by the king rising up, and issuing at length his positive and imperative orders that the loan should be registered. To the astonishment of the meeting, the first prince of the blood, the Duke of Orleans, arose, as if in reply, and demanded to know if they were assembled in a Bed of Justice or a Royal Sitting; and receiving for answer that the latter was the quality of the meeting, he entered a solemn protest against the proceedings.† Thus was the authority of the king once more brought in direct opposition to the assertors of the rights of the people, as if on purpose to show, in the face of the whole nation, that its terrors were only those of a phantom, whose shadowy bulk might overawe the timid, but could offer no real cause of fear when courageously opposed.

The minister did not, however, give way without such an ineffectual struggle, as at once showed the weakness of the royal authority, and the willingness to wield it with the despotic sway of former times. Two members of the Parliament of Paris, d'Éprémont and Gaislard, were imprisoned in remote fortresses, and the Duke of Orleans was sent in exile to his estate.

A long and animated exchange of remonstrances followed betwixt the king and the parliament, in which the former acknowledged his weakness, even

* M. Ch. Lacretelle says four years.—See *Histoire de France pendant le 18e siècle*, vol. VI, p. 230: 6 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1819.

† These memorable events took place on 19th November, 1789.

by entering into the discussion of his prerogative, as well as by the concessions he found himself obliged to tender. Meantime, the Archbishop of Sens nourished the romantic idea of getting rid of these refractory courts entirely, and at the same time to evade the convocation of the States-general, substituting in their place the erection of a *Cour Plénière*, or ancient feudal court, composed of princes, peers, marshals of France, deputies from the provinces, and other distinguished persons, who should in future exercise all the higher and nobler duties of the parliaments, thus reduced to their original and proper duties as courts of justice. But a court, or council of the ancient feudal times, with so slight an infusion of popular representation, could in no shape have accorded with the ideas which now generally prevailed; and so much was this felt to be the case, that many of the peers, and other persons nominated members of the *Cour Plénière*, declined the seats proposed to them, and the whole plan fell to the ground.

Meantime, violence succeeded to violence, and remonstrance to remonstrance. The Parliament of Paris, and all the provincial bodies of the same description, being suspended from their functions, and the course of regular justice interrupted, the spirit of revolt became general through the realm, and broke out in riots and insurrections of a formidable description; while, at the same time, the inhabitants of the capital were observed to become dreadfully agitated.

There wanted not writers to fan the rising discontent; and, what seems more singular, they were permitted to do so without interruption, notwithstanding the deepened jealousy with which free discussion was now regarded in France. Libels and satires of every description were publicly circulated, without an attempt on the part of the government to suppress the publications, or to punish their authors, although the most scandalous attacks on the royal family, and on the queen in particular, were dispersed along with these political effusions. It seemed as if the arm of power was paralyzed, and the bonds of authority which had so long fettered the French people were falling asunder of themselves; for the liberty of the press, so long unknown, was now openly assumed and exercised, without the government daring to interfere.

To conclude the picture, as if God and man had alike determined the fall of this ancient monarchy, a hurricane of most portentous and unusual character burst on the kingdom, and laying waste the promised harvest far and wide, showed to the terrified inhabitants the prospect at once of poverty and famine, added to those of national bankruptcy and a distracted government.

The latter evils seemed fast advancing; for the state of the finances became so utterly desperate, that Louis was under the necessity of stopping a large proportion of the treasury payments, and issuing bills for the deficiency. At this awful crisis, fearing for the king, and more for himself, the Archbishop of Sens retired from administration.*

* 25th August, 1788. The archbishop fled to Italy with great expedition, after he had given in his resignation to his unfortunate sovereign.

and left the monarch, while bankruptcy and famine threatened the kingdom, to manage as he might, amid the storms which the measures of the minister himself had provoked to the uttermost.

A new premier, and a total alteration of measures, were to be resorted to, while Necker, the popular favourite, called to the helm of the state, regretted, with bitter anticipation of misfortune, the time which had been worse than wasted under the rule of the archbishop, who had employed it in augmenting the enemies and diminishing the resources of the crown, and forcing the king on such measures as caused the royal authority to be generally regarded as the common enemy of all ranks of the kingdom. To redeem the royal pledge by convoking the States-general, seemed to Necker the most fair as well as most politic proceeding; and indeed this afforded the only chance of once more reconciling the prince with the people, though it was now yielding that to a demand, which two years before would have been received as a boon.

We have already observed that the constitution of this assembly of national representatives was little understood, though the phrase was in the mouth of every one. It was to be the panacea to the disorders of the nation, yet men knew imperfectly the mode of composing this universal medicine, or the manner of its operation. Or rather, the people of France invoked the assistance of this national council, as they would have done that of a tutelary angel, with full confidence in his power and benevolence, though they neither knew the form in which he might appear, nor the nature of the miracles which he was to perform in their behalf. It has been strongly objected to Necker, that he neglected, on the part of the crown, to take the initiative line of conduct on this important occasion, and it has been urged that it was the minister's duty, without making any question, or permitting any doubt, to assume that mode of convening the states, and regulating them when assembled, which should best tend to secure the tottering influence of his master. But Necker probably thought the time was past in which this power might have been assumed by the crown without exciting jealousy or opposition. The royal authority, he might recollect, had been of late years repeatedly strained, until it had repeatedly given way, and the issue, first of the Bed of Justice, and then of the Royal Sitting, was sufficient to show that words of authority would be wasted in vain upon disobedient ears, and might only excite a resistance which would prove its own lack of power. It was, therefore, advisable not to trust to the unaided exercise of prerogative, but to strengthen instead the regulations which might be adopted for the constitution of the States-general, by the approbation of some public body independent of the king and his ministers. And with this purpose, Necker convened a second meeting of the notables,* and laid before them, for their consideration, his plan for the constitution of the States-general.

There were two great points submitted to this body, concerning the constitution of the States-general. 1. In what proportion the deputies of the

* November, 1788.

three estates should be represented? 2. Whether, when assembled, the nobles, clergy, and third estate, or commons, should act separately as distinct chambers, or sit and vote as one united body?

Necker, a minister of an honest and candid disposition, a republican also, and therefore on principle a respecter of public opinion, unhappily did not recollect, that to be well-formed and accurate, public opinion should be founded on the authority of men of talents and integrity; and that the popular mind must be pre-occupied by arguments of a sound and virtuous tendency, else the enemy will sow tares, and the public will receive it in the absence of more wholesome grain. Perhaps also, this minister found himself less in his element when treating of state affairs, than while acting in his proper capacity as a financier. However that may be, Necker's conduct resembled that of an unresolved general, who directs his movements by the report of a council of war. He did not sufficiently perceive the necessity that the measures to be taken should originate with himself rather than arise from the suggestion of others, and did not, therefore, avail himself of his situation and high popularity, to recommend such general preliminary arrangements as might preserve the influence of the crown in the States-general, without encroaching on the rights of the subject. The silence of Necker leaving all in doubt, and open to discussion, those arguments had most weight with the public which ascribed most importance to the third estate. The talents of the nobles and clergy might be considered as having been already in vain appealed to in the two sessions of the notables, an assembly composed chiefly out of the privileged classes, and whose advice and opinion had been given without producing any corresponding good effect. The parliament had declared themselves incompetent to the measures necessary for the exigencies of the kingdom. The course adopted by the king indicated doubt and uncertainty, if not incapacity. The *tiers état*, therefore, was the body of counsellors to whom the nation looked at this critical conjuncture.

"What is the *Tiers État*?" formed the title of a pamphlet by the Abbé Siéyes; and the answer returned by the author was such as augmented all the magnificent ideas already floating in men's minds concerning the importance of this order. "The *tiers état*," said he, "comprehends the whole nation of France, excepting only the nobles and clergy." This view of the matter was so far successful, that the notables recommended that the commons, or third estate, should have a body of representatives equal to those of the nobles and the clergy united, and should thus form, in point of relative numbers, the moiety of the whole delegates.*

This, however, would have been comparatively of small importance, had it been determined that the three estates were to sit, deliberate, and vote, not as a united body, but in three several chambers.

Necker conceded to the *tiers état* the right of double representation, but seemed prepared to maintain the ancient order of debating and voting by separate chambers. The crown had been already

worsted by the rising spirit of the country in every attempt which it had made to stand through its own unassisted strength; and torn as the bodies of the clergy and nobles were by internal dissensions, and weakened by the degree of popular odium with which they were loaded, it would have required an artful consolidation of their force, and an intimate union betwixt them and the crown, to maintain a balance against the popular claims of the commons, likely to be at once so boldly urged by themselves and so favourably viewed by the nation. All this was, however, left, in a great measure, to accident, while every chance was against its being arranged in the way most advantageous to the monarchy.

The minister ought also in policy to have paved the way for securing a party in the third estate itself, which should bear some character of royalism. This might doubtless have been done by the usual ministerial arts of influencing elections, or gaining over to the crown interest some of the many men of talent who, determined to raise themselves in this new world, had not yet settled to which side they were to give their support. But Necker, less acquainted with men than with mathematics, imagined that every member had intelligence enough to see the measures best calculated for the public good, and virtue enough to follow them faithfully and exclusively. It was in vain that the Marquis de Bouillé pointed out the dangers arising from the constitution assigned to the States-general, and insisted that the minister was arming the popular part of the nation against the two privileged orders, and that the latter would soon experience the effects of their hatred, animated by self-interest and vanity, the most active passions of mankind. Necker calmly replied, that there was a necessary reliance to be placed on the virtues of the human heart;—the maxim of a worthy man, but not of an enlightened statesman,* who has but too much reason to know how often both the virtues and the prudence of human nature are surmounted by its prejudices and passions.

It was in this state of doubt and total want of preparation that the king was to meet the representatives of the people, whose elections had been trusted entirely to chance, without even an attempt to influence them in favour of the most eligible persons. Yet surely the crown, hitherto almost the sole acknowledged authority in France, should have been provided with supporters in the new authority which was to be assembled. At least, the minister might have been prepared with some system or plan of proceeding, upon which this most important convention was to conduct its deliberations: but there was not even an attempt to take up the reins which were floating on the necks of those who were for the first time harnessed to the chariot of the state. All was expectation, mere vague and unauthorized hope, that in this multitude of counsellors there would be found safety.†

* See *Mémoires de Bouillé*. Madame de Staël herself admits this deficiency in the character of a father, of whom she was justly proud:—"Se faut trop, il faut l'avouer, à l'empire de la raison."—*Considérations sur la Révolution Française*, vol. I, p. 171: 3 vols 8vo, Paris, 1818.

† A calambourg of the period presaged a different result.

* See *Histoire de France pendant le 18e siècle*, par Ch. Lacretelle, vol. VI, p. 280: 6 vols 8vo, Paris, 1819.

Hitherto we have described the silent and smooth, but swift and powerful, stream of innovation, as it rolled on to the edge of the sheer precipice. We are now to view the precipitate tumult and terrors of the cataract.

CHAPTER IV.

Meeting of the States-general.—Predominant Influence of the tiers état.—Property not represented sufficiently in that body.—General character of the members.—Disposition of the estate of the nobles—and of the clergy.—Plan of forming the three estates into two houses.—Its advantages.—It fails.—The clergy unite with the tiers état, which assumes the title of the National Assembly.—They assume the task of legislation, and declare all former fiscal regulations illegal.—They assert their determination to continue their sessions.—Royal Sitting.—Terminates in the triumph of the Assembly.—Parties in that body.—Moulinier.—Constitutionalists.—Republicans.—Jacobins.—Duke of Orleans.

THE Estates-general of France met at Versailles on the 5th May, 1789, and that was indisputably the first day of the Revolution. The Abbé Siéyes, in a pamphlet which we have mentioned, had already asked, "What was the Third Estate?—It was the whole nation. What had it been hitherto in a political light?—Nothing. What was it about to become presently?—Something." Had the last answer been *Everything*, it would have been nearer the truth, for it soon appeared that this third estate, which, in the year 1614, the nobles had refused to acknowledge even as a younger brother^a of their order, was now, like the rod of the prophet, to swallow up all those who affected to share its power. Even amid the pageantry with which the ceremonial of the first sitting abounded, it was clearly visible that the wishes, hopes, and interest of the public, were exclusively fixed upon the representatives of the commons. The rich garments and floating plumes of the nobility, and the reverend robes of the clergy, had nothing to fix the public eye; their sounding and emphatic titles had nothing to win the ear; the recollection of the high feats of the one, and long-sanctified characters of the other order, had nothing to influence the mind of the spectators. All eyes were turned on the members of the third estate, in a plebeian and humble costume, corresponding to their lowly birth and occupation, as the only portion of the assembly from whom they looked for the lights and the counsels which the time demanded.

It would be absurd to assert, that the body which thus engrossed the national attention was devoid of talents to deserve it. On the contrary, the tiers état contained a large proportion of the learning, the intelligence, and the eloquence of the kingdom; but

^a "So numerous a concourse of state-physicians assembled to consult for the weal of the nation, argued," it was said, "the imminent danger and approaching death of the patient."

^b The Baron de Senneci, when the Estates of the Kingdom were compared to three brethren, of which the tiers état was youngest, declared that the Commons of France had no title to arrogate such a relationship with the nobles, to whom they were so far inferior in blood and in estimation.

unhappily it was composed of men of theory rather than of practice, men more prepared to change than to preserve or repair; and, above all, of men, who, generally speaking, were not directly concerned in the preservation of peace and order, by possessing a large property in the country.

The due proportion in which talents and property are represented in the British House of Commons, is perhaps the best assurance for the stability of the constitution. Men of talents, bold, enterprising, eager for distinction, and ambitious of power, suffer no opportunity to escape of recommending such measures as may improve the general system, and raise to distinction those by whom they are proposed; while men of substance, desirous of preserving the property which they possess, are scrupulous in scrutinizing every new measure, and steady in rejecting such as are not accompanied with the most certain prospect of advantage to the state. Talented, eager and active, desires the means of employment; Property, cautious, doubtful, jealous of innovation, acts as a regulator rather than an impulse on the machine, by preventing its moving either too rapidly, or changing too suddenly. The over-caution of those by whom property is represented may sometimes, indeed, delay a projected improvement, but much more frequently impedes a rash and hazardous experiment. Looking back on the parliamentary history of two centuries, it is easy to see how much practical wisdom has been derived from the influence exercised by those members called country gentlemen, who, unambitious of distinguishing themselves by their eloquence, and undesirous of mingling in the ordinary debates of the house, make their sound and unsophisticated good sense heard and understood upon every crisis of importance, in a manner alike respected by the ministry and the opposition of the day,—by the professed statesmen of the house, whose daily business is legislation, and whose thoughts, in some instances, are devoted to public affairs, because they have none of their own much worth looking after. In this great and most important characteristic of representation, the tiers état of France was necessarily deficient; in fact, the part of the French constitution, which, without exactly corresponding to the country gentlemen of England, most nearly resembled them, was a proportion of the rural noblesse of France, who were represented amongst the estate of the nobility. An edict, detaching these rural proprietors, and perhaps the inferior clergy, from their proper orders, and including their representatives in that of the tiers état, would have infused into the latter assembly a proportional regard for the rights of landholders, whether lay or clerical; and as they must have had a voice in those anatomical experiments, of which their property was about to become the subject, it may be supposed they would have resisted the application of the scalpel, excepting when it was unavoidably necessary. Instead of which, both the nobles and clergy came soon to be placed on the anatomical table at the mercy of each state-quack, who, having no interest in their sufferings, thought them excellent subjects on which to exemplify some favourite hypothesis.

While owners of extensive landed property were

in a great measure excluded from the representation of the third estate, its ranks were filled from those classes which seek novelties in theory, and which are in the habit of profiting by them in practice. There were professed men of letters called thither, as they hoped and expected, to realize theories, for the greater part inconsistent with the present state of things, in which, to use one of their own choicest common-places,—“Mind had not yet acquired its due rank.” There were many of the inferior ranks of the law; for, unhappily, in this profession also the graver and more enlightened members were called by their rank to the estate of the noblesse. To these were united churchmen without livings, and physicians without patients; men, whose education generally makes them important in the humble society in which they move, and who are proportionally presumptuous and conceited of their own powers, when advanced into that which is superior to their usual walk. There were many bankers also, speculators in politics, as in their natural employment of stock-jobbing; and there were intermingled with the classes we have noticed some individual nobles, expelled from their own ranks for want of character, who, like the dissolute Mirabeau, a moral monster for talents and want of principle, menaced, from the station which they had assumed, the rights of the class from which they had been expelled, and, like deserters, of every kind, were willing to guide the foes, to whom they had fled, into the entrenchments of the friends whom they had forsaken, or by whom they had been exiled. There were also mixed with these perilous elements many individuals, not only endowed with talents and integrity, but possessing a respectable proportion of sound sense and judgment; but who unfortunately aided less to counteract the revolutionary tendency, than to justify it by argument, or dignify it by example. From the very beginning, the tiers état evinced a determined purpose to annihilate in consequence, if not in rank, the other two orders of the state, and to engross the whole power into their own hands.

It must be allowed to the commons, that the noblesse had possessed themselves of a paramount superiority over the middle class, totally inconsistent with the just degree of consideration due to their fellow-subjects, and irreconcilable with the spirit of enlightened times. They enjoyed many privileges which were humiliating to the rest of the nation, and others that were grossly unjust, among which must be reckoned their immunities from taxation. Assembled as an Estate of the Kingdom, they felt the *esprit-de-corps*, and, attached to the privileges of their order, showed little readiness to make the sacrifices which the times demanded, though at the risk of having what they refused to grant forcibly wrested from them. They were publicly and imprudently tenacious, when, both on principle and in policy, they should have been compliant and accommodating—for their own sake, as well as that of the sovereign. Yet let us be just to that gallant and unfortunate body of men. They possessed the courage, if not the skill or strength of their ancestors, and while we blame the violence with which they clung to useless and antiquated privileges, let

us remember that these were a part of their inheritance, which no man renounces willingly, and no man of spirit yields up to threats. If they erred in not adopting from the beginning a spirit of conciliation and concession, no body of men ever suffered so cruelly for hesitating to obey a summons, which called them to acts of such unusual self-denial.

The clergy were no less tenacious of the privileges of the church, than the noblesse of their peculiar feudal immunities. It had been already plainly intimated, that the property of the clerical orders ought to be subject, as well as all other species of property, to the exigencies of the state; and the philosophical opinions which had impugned their principles of faith, and rendered their persons ridiculous instead of reverend, would, it was to be feared, induce those by whom they were entertained, to extend their views to a general seizure of the whole, instead of a part, of the church's wealth.

Both the first and second estates, therefore, kept aloof, moved by the manner in which the private interests of each stood committed, and both endeavoured to avert the coming storm, by retarding the deliberations of the States-general. They were particularly desirous to secure their individual importance as distinct orders, and appealed to ancient practice and the usage of the year 1614, by which the three several estates sat and voted in three separate bodies. But the tiers état, who, from the beginning, felt their own strength, were determined to chuse that mode of procedure by which their force should be augmented and consolidated. The double representation had rendered them equal in numbers to both the other bodies, and as they were sore of some interest among the inferior noblesse, and a very considerable party amongst the lower clergy, the assistance of these two minorities, added to their own numbers, must necessarily give them the superiority in every vote, providing the three chambers could be united into one.

On the other hand, the clergy and nobles saw that an union of this nature would place all their privileges and property at the mercy of the commons, whom the union of the chambers in one assembly would invest with an overwhelming majority in that convocation. They had no reason to expect that this power, if once acquired, would be used with moderation; for not only had their actually obnoxious privileges been assailed by every battery of reason and of ridicule, but the records of former ages had been ransacked for ridiculous absurdities and detestable cruelties of the possessors of feudal power, all which were imputed to the present privileged classes, and mingled with many fictions of unutterable horror, devised on purpose to give a yet darker colouring to the system which it was their object to destroy.* Every motive, therefore, of self-interest and self-preservation, induced the two first chambers, aware of the possession which the third had obtained over the public mind, to main-

* It was, for example, gravely stated, that a seigneur of a certain province possessed a feudal right to put two of his vassals to death upon his return from hunting, and to rip their bellies open, and plunge his feet into their entrails to warm them!

tain, if possible, the specific individuality of their separate classes, and use the right hitherto supposed to be vested in them, of protecting their own interests by their own separate votes, as distinct bodies.

Others, with a deeper view, and on less selfish reasoning, saw much hazard in amalgamating the whole force of the state, saving that which remained in the crown, into one powerful body, subject to all the hasty impulses to which popular assemblies be exposed, as lakes to the wind, and in placing the person and authority of the king in solitary and diametrical opposition to what must necessarily, in moments of enthusiasm, appear to be the will of the whole people. Such statesmen would have preferred retaining an intermediate check upon the popular counsels of the *tiers état* by the other two chambers, which might, as in England, have been united into one, and would have presented an imposing front, both in point of wealth and property, and through the respect which, excepting under the influence of popular emotion, the people, in spite of themselves, cannot help entertaining for birth and rank. Such a body, providing the stormy temper of the times had admitted of its foundations being laid sufficiently strong, would have served as a break-water betwixt the throne and the stream-tide of popular opinion; and the monarch would have been spared the painful and perilous task of opposing himself personally, directly, and without screen or protection of any kind, to the democratical part of the constitution. Above all, by means of such an Upper House, time would have been obtained for reviewing more coolly those measures, which might have passed hastily through the assembly of popular representatives. It is observed in the history of innovation, that the indirect and unforeseen consequences of every great change of an existing system, are more numerous and extensive than those which had been foreseen and calculated upon, whether by those who advocated, or those who opposed the alteration. The advantages of a constitution, in which each measure of legislation must necessarily be twice deliberately argued by separate senates, acting under different impressions, and interposing, at the same time, a salutary delay, during which heats may subside, and erroneous views be corrected, requires no further illustration.

It must be owned, nevertheless, that there existed the greatest difficulty in any attempt which might have been made, to give weight to the nobles as a separate chamber. The community at large looked to reforms deeply affecting the immunities of the privileged classes, as the most obvious means for the regeneration of the kingdom, and must have seen with jealousy an institution like an Upper House, which placed the parties who were principally to suffer these changes in a condition to impede, or altogether prevent them. It was naturally to be expected, that the clergy and nobles, united in an Upper House, must have become somewhat partial judges in the question of retrenching and limiting their own exclusive privileges; and, besides the ill-will which the commons bore them as the possessors and assertors of rights infringing on the liberties of the people, it might be justly apprehend-

ed that, if the scourge destined for them were placed in their own hand, they might use it with the chary moderation of the squire in the romance of Cervantes. There would also have been reason to doubt that, when the nation was so much divided by factions, two houses, so different in character and composition, could hardly have been brought to act with firmness and liberality towards each other—that the one would have been ever scheming for the recovery of their full privileges, supposing they had been obliged to surrender a part of them, while the other would still look forward to the accomplishment of an entirely democratical revolution. In this way, the checks which ought to have acted merely to restrain the violence of either party, might operate as the means of overthrowing the constitution which they were intended to preserve.

Still, it must be observed, that while the king retained any portion of authority, he might with the countenance of the supposed Upper Chamber, or Senate, have balanced the progress of democracy. Difficult as the task might be, an attempt towards it ought to have been made. But, unhappily, the king's ear was successively occupied by two sets of advisers, one of whom counselled him to surrender every thing to the humour of the reformers of the state, while the other urged him to resist their most reasonable wishes;—without considering that he had to deal with those who had the power to take by force what was refused to petition. Mounier and Malouet advocated the establishment of two chambers in the *tiers état*, and Necker was certainly favourable to some plan of the kind; but the noblesse thought it called upon them for too great a sacrifice of their privileges, though it promised to ensure what remained, while the democratical part of the *tiers état* opposed it obstinately, as tending to arrest the march of the revolutionary impulse.

Five or six weeks elapsed in useless debates concerning the form in which the estates should vote; during which period the *tiers état* showed, by their boldness and decision, that they knew the advantage which they held, and were sensible that the other bodies, if they meant to retain the influence of their situation in any shape, must unite with them, on the principle according to which smaller drops of water are attracted by the larger. This came to pass accordingly. The *tiers état* were joined by the whole body of inferior clergy, and by some of the nobles, and on 17th June, 1789, proceeded to constitute themselves a legislative body, exclusively competent in itself to the entire province of legislation; and, renouncing the name of the third estate, which reminded men they were only one out of three bodies, they adopted that of the National Assembly, and avowed themselves, not merely the third branch of the representative body, but the sole representatives of the people of France, nay, the people themselves, wielding in person the whole gigantic powers of the realm. They now claimed the character of a constituent body, no longer limited to the task of merely requiring a redress of grievances, for which they had been originally appointed, but warranted to destroy and rebuild whatever they thought proper in the constitution of the state. It is not easy, on any ordinary principle, to see how

a representation, convoked for a certain purpose, and with certain limited powers, should thus essentially alter their own character, and set themselves in such a different relation to the crown and nation, from that to which their commissions restricted them; but the National Assembly were well aware, that, in extending their powers far beyond the terms of these commissions, they only fulfilled the wishes of their constituents, and that in assuming to themselves so ample an authority, they would be supported by the whole nation, excepting the privileged orders.

The National Assembly proceeded to exercise their power with the same audacity which they had shown in assuming it. They passed a sweeping decree, by which they declared all the existing taxes to be illegal impositions, the collection of which they sanctioned only for the present, and as an interim arrangement, until they should have time to establish the financial regulations of the state upon an equal and permanent footing.

The king, acting under the advice of Necker, and fulfilling the promise made on his part by the Archbishop of Sens, his former minister, had, as we have seen, assembled the States-general; but he was not prepared for the change of the third estate into the National Assembly, and for the pretensions which it asserted in the latter character. Terrified, and it was little wonder, at the sudden rise of this gigantic and all-overshadowing fabric, Louis became inclined to listen to those who counselled him to combat this new and formidable authority, by opposing to it the weight of royal power; to be exercised, however, with such attention to the newly-asserted popular opinions, and with such ample surrender of the obnoxious part of the royal prerogative, as might gratify the rising spirit of freedom. For this purpose a Royal Sitting was appointed, at which the king in person was to meet the three estates of his kingdom, and propose a scheme which, it was hoped, might unite all parties, and tranquillize all minds. The name and form of this *séance royale* was perhaps not well chosen, as being too nearly allied to those of a Bed of Justice, in which the king was accustomed to exercise imperative authority over the parliament; and the proceeding was calculated to awaken recollection of the highly unpopular Royal Sitting of the 19th November, 1787, the displacing of Necker, and the banishment of the Duke of Orleans.

But, as if this had not been sufficient, an unhappy accident, which almost resembled a fatality, deranged this project, destroyed all the grace which might, on the king's part, have attended the measure, and, in place of it, threw the odium upon the court of having indirectly attempted the forcible dissolution of the assembly, while it invested the members of that body with the popular character of steady patriots, whose union, courage, and presence of mind, had foiled the stroke of authority which had been aimed at their existence.

The Hall of the Commons was fixed upon for the purposes of the Royal Sitting, as the largest of the three which were occupied by the three estates, and workmen were employed in making the necessary arrangements and alterations. These altera-

tions were imprudently commenced* before holding any communication on the subject with the National Assembly; and it was simply notified to their president Bailly, by the master of the royal ceremonies, that the king had suspended the meeting of the assembly until the Royal Sitting should have taken place. Bailly, the president, well known afterwards by his tragical fate, refused to attend to an order so intimated, and the members of assembly, upon resorting to their ordinary place of meeting, found it full of workmen, and guarded by soldiers. This led to one of the most extraordinary scenes of the Revolution.

The representatives of the nation, thus expelled by armed guards from their proper place of assembly, found refuge in a common tennis-court, while a thunder-storm, emblem of the moral tempest which raged on the earth, poured down its terrors from the heavens. It was thus that, exposed to the inclemency of the weather, and with the wretched accommodations which such a place afforded, the members of the assembly took, and attested by their respective signatures, a solemn oath, to continue their sittings until the constitution of the country should be fixed on a solid basis. The scene was of a kind to make the deepest impression both on the actors and the spectators; although, looking back at the distance of so many years, we are tempted to ask at what period the National Assembly would have been dissolved, had they adhered literally to their celebrated oath? But the conduct of the government was in every respect worthy of censure. The probability of this extraordinary occurrence might easily have been foreseen. If mere want of consideration gave rise to it, the king's ministers were most culpably careless; if the closing of the hall, and suspending of the sittings of the assembly, was intended by way of experiment upon its temper and patience, it was an act of madness, equal to that of irritating an already exasperated lion. Be this, however, as it may, the conduct of the court had the worst possible effect on the public mind, and prepared them to view with dislike and suspicion all propositions emanating from the throne; while the magnanimous firmness and unanimity of the assembly seemed that of men determined to undergo martyrdom, rather than desert the assertion of their own rights, and those of the people.

At the Royal Sitting, which took place three days after the vow of the tennis-court, a plan was proposed by the king, offering such security for the liberty of the subject, as would a year before have been received with grateful rapture; but it was the unhappy fate of Louis XVI. neither to recede nor advance at the fortunate moment. Happy would it have been for him, for France, and for Europe, if the science of astrology, once so much respected, had in reality afforded the means of selecting lucky days. Few of his were marked with a white stone.

By the scheme which he proposed, the king renounced the power of taxation, and the right of borrowing money, except to a trifling extent, without assent of the States-general; he invited the assembly to form a plan for regulating *lettres de*

* 20th June, 1789.

cachet, and acknowledged the personal freedom of the subject; he provided for the liberty of the press, but not without a recommendation that some check should be placed upon its license; and he remitted to the states, as the proper authority, the abolition of the *gabelle*, and other unequal or oppressive taxes.

But all these boons availed nothing, and seemed to the people and their representatives, but a tardy and ungracious mode of resigning rights which the crown had long usurped, and only now restored when they were on the point of being wrested from its gripe. In addition to this, offence was taken at the tone and terms adopted in the royal address. The members of the assembly conceived, that the expression of the royal will was brought forward in too imperative a form. They were offended that the king should have recommended the exclusion of spectators from the sittings of the assembly; and much displeasure was occasioned by his declaring, thus late, their deliberations and decrees on the subject of taxes illegal. But the discontent was summed up and raked to the height by the concluding article of the royal address, in which, notwithstanding their late declarations, and oath not to break up their sittings until they had completed a constitution for France, the king presumed, by his own sole authority, to dissolve the estates. To conclude, Necker, upon whom alone among the ministers the popular party reposed confidence, had absented himself from the Royal Sitting, and thereby intimated his discontent with the scheme proposed.

This plan of a constitutional reformation was received with great applause by the clergy and the nobles, while the third estate listened in sullen silence. They knew little of the human mind, who supposed that the display of prerogative which had been so often successfully resisted, could influence such a body, or induce them to descend from the stations of power which they had gained, and to render themselves ridiculous by rescinding the vow which they had so lately taken.

The king having, by his own proper authority, dissolved the assembly, left the hall, followed by the nobles and part of the clergy; but the remaining members, who had remained silent and sullen, immediately resumed their sitting. The king, supposing him resolute to assert the prerogative which his own voice had but just claimed, had no alternative but that of expelling them by force, and thus supporting his order for dissolution of the assembly; but, always halting between two opinions, Louis employed no rougher means of removing them than a gentle summons to disperse, intimated by the royal master of ceremonies. To this officer, not certainly the most formidable satellite of arbitrary power, Mirabeau replied with energetic determination—"Slave! return to thy master, and tell him, that his bayonets alone can drive from their post the representatives of the people."

The assembly then proceeded to pass a decree, that they adhered to their oath taken in the tennis-court, while by another they declared that their own persons were inviolable; and that whosoever should attempt to execute any restraint or violence

upon a representative of the people, should be thereby guilty of the crime of high treason against the nation.

Their firmness, joined to the inviolability with which they had invested themselves, and the commotions which had broken out at Paris, compelled the king to give way, and renounce his purpose of dissolving the states, which continued their sittings under their new title of the National Assembly; while at different intervals, and by different manoeuvres, the chambers of the clergy and nobles were united with them, or, more properly, were merged and absorbed in one general body. Had that assembly been universally as pure in its intentions as we verily believe to have been the case with many or most of its members, the French government, now lying dead at their feet, might, like the clay of Prometheus, have received new animation from their hand.

But the National Assembly, though almost unanimous in resisting the authority of the crown, and in opposing the claims of the privileged classes, was much divided respecting ulterior views, and carried in its bosom the seeds of internal dissension, and the jarring elements of at least four parties, which had afterwards their successive entrance and exit on the revolutionary stage; or rather one followed the other like successive billows, each obliterating and destroying the marks its predecessor had left on the beach.

The FIRST, and most practical division of these legislators, was the class headed by Mounier (one of the wisest, as well as one of the best and worthiest men in France), by Malouet, and others. They were patrons of a scheme at which we have already hinted, and thought France ought to look, for some of the institutions favourable to freedom, to England, whose freedom had flourished so long. To transplant the British oak, with all its contorted branches and extended roots, would have been a fruitless attempt, but the infant tree of liberty might have been taught to grow after the same fashion. Modern France, like England of old, might have retained such of her own ancient laws, forms, or regulations, as still were regarded by the nation with any portion of respect, intermingling them with such additions and alterations as were required by the liberal spirit of modern times, and the whole might have been formed on the principles of British freedom. The nation might thus, in building its own bulwarks, have profited by the plan of those which had so long resisted the tempest. It is true, the French legislature could not have promised themselves, by the adoption of this course, to form at once a perfect and entire system; but they might have secured the personal freedom of the subject, the trial by jury, the liberty of the press, and the right of granting or withholding the supplies necessary for conducting the state,—of itself the strongest of all guarantees for national freedom, and that of which, when once vested in their own representatives, the people will never permit them to be deprived. They might have adopted also other checks, balances, and controls, essential to the permanence of a free country; and having laid so strong a foundation, there would have been time to experience their use as well as their

stability, and to introduce gradually such further improvements, additions, or alterations, as the state of France should appear to require, after experience of those which they had adopted.

But besides that the national spirit might be revolted (not unnaturally, however unwisely), at borrowing the essential peculiarities of their new constitution from a country which they were accustomed to consider as the natural rival of their own, there existed among the French a jealousy of the crown, and especially of the privileged classes, with whom they had been so lately engaged in political hostility, which disinclined the greater part of the assembly to trust the king with much authority, or the nobles with that influence which any imitation of the English constitution must have assigned to them. A fear prevailed, that whatever privileges should be left to the king or nobles, would be so many means of attack furnished to them against the new system. Joined to this was the ambition of creating at once, and by their own united wisdom, a constitution as perfect as the armed personification of Wisdom in the heathen mythology. England had worked her way, from practical reformation of abuses, into the adoption of general maxims of government. It was reserved, thought most of the National Assembly, for France, to adopt a nobler and more intellectual course, and, by laying down abstract doctrines of public right, to deduce from these their rules of practical legislation;—just as it is said, that in the French naval yards their vessels are constructed upon the principles of abstract mathematics, while those in England are, and were, chiefly built upon the more technical or mechanical rules. But it seems on this and other occasions to have escaped these acute reasoners, that beams and planks are subject to certain unalterable natural laws, while man is, by the various passions acting in his nature, in contradiction often to the suggestions of his understanding, as well as by the various modifications of society, liable to a thousand variations, all of which call for limitations and exceptions qualifying whatever general maxims may be adopted concerning his duties and his rights.

All such considerations were spurned by the numerous body of the new French legislature, who resolved, in imitation of Medea, to fling into their renovating kettle every existing joint and member of their old constitution, in order to its perfect and entire renovation. This mode of proceeding was liable to three great objections. *First*, that the practical inferences deduced from the abstract principle were always liable to challenge by those, who, in logical language, denied the minor of the proposition, or asserted that the conclusion was irregularly deduced from the premises. *Secondly*, that the legislators, thus grounding the whole basis of their intended constitution upon speculative political opinions, strongly resembled the tailors of Laputa, who, without condescending to take measure of their customers, like brethren of the trade elsewhere, took the girth and altitude of the person by mathematical calculation, and if the clothes did not fit, as was almost always the case, thought it ample consolation for the party concerned to be assured, that, as they worked from infallible rules of art, the

error could only be occasioned by his own faulty and irregular conformation of figure. *Thirdly*, a legislature which contents itself with such a constitution as is adapted to the existing state of things, may hope to attain their end, and in presenting it to the people may be entitled to say, that, although the plan is not perfect, it partakes in that but of the nature of all earthly institutions, while it comprehends the elements of as much good as the actual state of society permits; but from the law-makers, who begin by destroying all existing enactments, and assume it as their duty entirely to renovate the constitution of a country, nothing short of absolute perfection can be accepted. They can shelter themselves under no respect to ancient prejudices which they have contradicted, or to circumstances of society which they have thrown out of consideration. They must follow up to the uttermost the principle they have adopted, and their institutions can never be fixed or secure from the encroachments of succeeding innovators, while they retain any taint of that fallibility to which all human inventions are necessarily subject.

The majority of the French Assembly entertained, nevertheless, the ambitious view of making a constitution, corresponding in every respect to those propositions they had laid down as embracing the rights of man, which, if it should not happen to suit the condition of their country, would nevertheless be such as *ought* to have suited it, but for the irregular play of human passions, and the artificial habits acquired in an artificial state of society. But this majority differed among themselves in this essential particular, that the *SECOND* division of the legislature, holding that of Mounier for the first, was disposed to place at the head of their newly-manufactured government the reigning king, Louis XVI. This resolution in his favour might be partly out of regard to the long partiality of the nation to the house of Bourbon, partly out of respect for the philanthropical and accommodating character of Louis. We may conceive also, that La Fayette, bred a soldier, and Bailly, educated a magistrate, had still, notwithstanding their political creed, a natural, though unphilosophical partiality to their well-meaning and ill-fated sovereign, and a conscientious desire to relax, so far as his particular interest was concerned, their general rule of reversing all that had previously had a political existence in France.

A *THIRD* faction, entertaining the same articles of political creed with La Fayette, Bailly, and others, carried them much further, and set at defiance the scruples which limited the two first parties in their career of reformation. These last agreed with La Fayette on the necessity of reconstructing the whole government upon a new basis, without which entire innovation, they further agreed with him that it must have been perpetually liable to the chance of a counter-revolution. But carrying their arguments farther than the constitutional party, as the followers of La Fayette, these bolder theorists pleaded the inconsistency and danger of placing at the head of their new system of reformed and regenerated government, a prince accustomed to consider himself, as by inheritance, the legitimate possessor of absolute power. They urged that, like the snake and pea-

sant in the fable, it was impossible that the monarch and his demagogical counsellors could forget, the one the loss of his power, the other the constant temptation which must beset the king to attempt its recovery. With more consistency, therefore, than the constitutionalists, this third party of politicians became decided republicans, determined upon obliterating from the new constitution every name and vestige of monarchy.

The men of letters in the assembly were, many of them, attached to this faction. They had originally been kept in the back-ground by the lawyers and mercantile part of the assembly. Many of them possessed great talents, and were by nature men of honour and of virtue. But in great revolutions, it is impossible to resist the dizzying effect of enthusiastic feeling and excited passion. In the violence of their zeal for the liberty of France, they too frequently adopted the maxim, that so glorious an object sanctioned almost any means which could be used to attain it. Under the exaggerated influence of a mistaken patriotism, they were too apt to forget that a crime remains the same in character even when perpetrated in a public cause.*

It was among these ardent men that first arose the idea of forming a club, or society, to serve as a point of union for those who entertained the same political sentiments. Once united, they rendered their sittings public, combined them with affiliated societies in all parts of France, and could thus, as from one common centre, agitate the most remote frontiers with the passionate feelings which electrified the metropolis. This formidable weapon was, in process of time, wrested out of the hands of the federalists, as the original republicans were indignantly called, by the faction who were generally termed jacobins, from their influence in that society, and whose existence and peculiarities as a party we have now to notice.

As yet this FOURTH, and, as it afterwards proved, most formidable party, lurked in secret among the republicans of a higher order and purer sentiments, as they, on their part, had not yet raised the mask, or ventured to declare openly against the plan of a constitutional monarchy. The jacobins were

* A singular instance of this overstrained and dangerous enthusiasm is given by Madame Roland. It being the purpose to rouse the fears and spirit of the people, and direct their animosity against the court party, Grangeneuve agreed that he himself should be murdered, by persons chosen for the purpose, in such a manner that the suspicion of the crime should attach itself to the aristocrats. He went to the place appointed, but Chabot, who was to have shared his fate, neither appeared himself, nor had made the necessary preparations for the assassination of his friend, for which Madame Roland, that high-spirited republican, dilates upon his politeness. Yet, what was this patriotic devotion, save a plan to support a false accusation against the innocent, by an act of murder and suicide, which, if the scheme succeeded, was to lead to massacre and proscription? The same false, exaggerated, and distorted views of the public good centring, as it seemed to them, in the establishment of a pure republic, led Barnave and others to palliate the massacres of September. Most of them might have said of the Liberty which they had worshipped that at their death they found it an empty name.

termed, in ridicule, *Les Enragés*, by the republicans, who, seeing in them only men of a fiery disposition, and violence of deportment and declamation, vainly thought they could halloo them on, and call them off, at their pleasure. They were yet to learn, that when force is solemnly appealed to, the strongest and most ferocious, as they must be foremost in the battle, will not lose their share of the spoil, and are more likely to make the lion's partition. These jacobins affected to carry the ideas of liberty and equality to the most extravagant lengths, and were laughed at and ridiculed in the assembly as a sort of fanatics, too absurd to be dreaded. Their character, indeed, was too exaggerated, their habits too openly profligate, their manners too abominably coarse, their schemes too extravagantly violent, to be produced to open day, while yet the decent forms of society were observed. But they were not the less successful in gaining the lower classes, whose cause they pretended peculiarly to espouse, whose passions they inflamed by an eloquence suited to such hearers, and whose tastes, they flattered by affectation of brutal manners and vulgar dress. They soon, by these arts, attached to themselves a large body of followers, violently inflamed with the prejudices which had been infused into their minds, and too boldly desperate to hesitate at any measures which should be recommended by their demagogues. What might be the ultimate object of these men cannot be known. We can hardly give any of their credit for being mad enough to have any real patriotic feeling, however extravagantly distorted. Most probably, each had formed some vague prospect of terminating the affair to his own advantage; but in the meantime, all agreed in the necessity of sustaining the revolutionary impulse, of deferring the return of order and quiet, and of resisting and deranging any description of orderly and peaceful government. They were sensible that the return of law, under any established and regular form whatsoever, must render them as contemptible as odious, and were determined to avail themselves of the disorder while it lasted, and to snatch at and enjoy such portions of the national wreck as the tempest might throw within their individual reach.

This foul and desperate fiction could not, by all the activity it used, have attained the sway which it exerted amongst the leers of the people, without possessing and exercising extensively the power of suborning inferior leaders among the populace. It has been generally asserted, that means for attaining this important object were supplied by the immense wealth of the nearest prince of the blood royal, that Duke of Orleans, whose name is so unhappily mixed with the history of this period. By his largesses, according to the general report of historians, a number of the most violent writers of pamphlets and newspapers were pensioned, who deluged the public with false news and violent abuse. This prince, it is said, recompensed those popular and ferocious orators, who nightly harangued the people in the Palais Royal, and openly stimulated them to the most violent aggressions upon the persons and property of obnoxious individuals. From the same unhappy man's coffers were paid numbers of those who regularly attended on the debates of the

assembly, crowded the galleries to the exclusion of the public at large, applauded, hissed, exercised an almost domineering influence in the national councils, and were sometimes addressed by the representatives of the people, as if they had themselves been the people of whom they were the scum and the refuse.

Fouler accusations even than these charges were brought forward. Bands of strangers, men of wild, haggard, and ferocious appearance, whose persons the still watchful police of Paris were unacquainted with, began to be seen in the metropolis, like those obscene and ill-omened birds which are seldom visible except before a storm. All these were understood to be suborned by the Duke of Orleans and his agents, to unite with the ignorant, violent, corrupted populace of the great metropolis of France, for the purpose of urging and guiding them to actions of terror and cruelty. The ultimate object of these manoeuvres is supposed to have been a change of dynasty, which should gratify the Duke of Orleans' revenge by the deposition of his cousin, and his ambition by enthroning himself in his stead, or at least by nominating him Lieutenant of France, with all the royal powers. The most daring and unscrupulous amongst the jacobins are said originally to have belonged to the faction of Orleans; but as he manifested a want of decision, and did not avail himself of opportunities of pushing his fortune, they abandoned their leader (whom they continued, however, to flatter and deceive), and, at the head of the partisans collected for his service, and paid from his finances, they pursued the path of their individual fortunes.

Besides the various parties which we have detailed, and which gradually developed their discordant sentiments as the Revolution proceeded, the assembly contained the usual proportion of that prudent class of politicians who are guided by events, and who, in the days of Cromwell, called themselves "Waiters upon Providence;"—men who might boast, with the miller in the tale, that though they could not direct the course of the wind, they could adjust their sails so as to profit by it, blow from what quarter it would.

All the various parties in the assembly, by whose division the king might, by temporizing measures, have surely profited, were united in a determined course of hostility to the crown and its pretensions, by the course which Louis XVI. was unfortunately advised to pursue. It had been resolved to assume a menacing attitude, and to place the king at the head of a strong force. Orders were given accordingly.

Necker, though approving of many parts of the proposal made to the assembly at the Royal Sitting, had strongly dissented from others, and had opposed the measure of marching troops towards Versailles and Paris to overawe the capital, and, if necessary, the National assembly. Necker received his dismissal, and thus a second time the king and the people seemed to be prepared for open war. The force at first glance seemed entirely on the royal side. Thirty regiments were drawn around Paris and Versailles, commanded by Marshal Broglie, an officer of eminence, and believed to be a zealous anti-revolutionist, and a large camp formed under the walls of the metropolis. The town was

open on all sides, and the only persons by whom defence could be offered were an unarmed mob; but this superiority existed only in appearance. The French Guards had already united themselves, or, as the phrase then went, fraternized with the people, yielding to the various modes employed to dispose them to the popular cause; and, little attached to their officers, most of whom only saw their companies upon the days of parade or duty, an apparent accident, which probably had its origin in an experiment upon the feelings of these regiments, brought the matter to a crisis. The soldiers had been supplied secretly with means of unusual dissipation, and consequently a laxity of discipline was daily gaining ground among them. To correct this license, eleven of the guards had been committed to prison for military offences; the Parisian mob delivered them by violence and took them under the protection of the inhabitants, a conduct which made the natural impression on their comrades. Their numbers were three thousand six hundred of the best soldiers in France, accustomed to military discipline, occupying every strong point in the city, and supported by its immense though disorderly populace.

The gaining these regiments gave the revolutionists the command of Paris, from which the army assembled under Broglie might have found it hard to dislodge them; but these last were more willing to aid than to quell any insurrection which might take place. The modes of seduction which had succeeded with the French Guards were sedulously addressed to other corps. The regiments which lay nearest to Paris were not forgotten. They were plied with those temptations which are most powerful with soldiers—wine, women, and money, were supplied in abundance—and it was amidst debauchery and indiscipline that the French army renounced their loyalty, which used to be even too much the god of their idolatry, and which was now destroyed like the temple of Persepolis, amidst the vapours of wine, and at the instigation of courtezans. There remained the foreign troops, of which there were several regiments, but their disposition was doubtful; and to use them against the citizens of Paris, might have been to confirm the soldiers of the soil in their indisposition to the royal cause, supported as it must then have been by foreigners exclusively.

Meanwhile, the dark intrigues which had been long formed for accomplishing a general insurrection in Paris, were now ready to be brought into action. The populace had been encouraged by success in one or two skirmishes with the gendarmes and foreign soldiery. They had stood a skirmish with a regiment of German horse, and had been successful. The number of desperate characters who were to lead the van in these violences, was now greatly increased. Deep had called to deep, and the revolutionary clubs of Paris had summoned their confederates from among the most fiery and forward of every province. Besides troops of galley-slaves and deserters, vagabonds of every order flocked to Paris, like ravens to the spoil. To these were joined the lowest inhabitants of a populous city, always ready for riot and rapine; and they were led on and encouraged by men who were in many instances sincere enthusiasts in the cause of liberty, and thought

it could only be victorious by the destruction of the present government. The republican and jacobin party were open in sentiment and in action, encouraging the insurrection by every means in their power. The constitutionalists, more passive, were still rejoiced to see the storm arise, conceiving such a crisis was necessary to compel the king to place the helm of the state in their hands. It might have been expected, that the assembled force of the crown would be employed to preserve the peace at least, and prevent the general system of robbery and plunder which seemed about to ensue. They appeared not, and the citizens themselves took arms by thousands, and tens of thousands, forming the burgher militia, which was afterwards called the National Guard. The royal arsenals were plundered to obtain arms, and La Fayette was adopted the commander-in-chief of this new army, a sufficient sign that they were to embrace what was called the constitutional party. Another large proportion of the population was hastily armed with pikes, a weapon which was thence termed revolutionary. The Baron de Besenval, at the head of the Swiss Guards, two foreign regiments, and eight hundred horse, after an idle demonstration which only served to encourage the insurgents, retired from Paris without firing a shot, having, he says in his Memoirs, no orders how to act, and being desirous to avoid precipitating a civil war. His retreat was the signal for a general insurrection, in which the French Guard, the National Guard, and the armed mob of Paris, took the Bastille, and massacred a part of the garrison.

We are not tracing minutely the events of the revolution, but only attempting to describe their spirit and tendency; and we may here notice two changes, which for the first time were observed to have taken place in the character of the Parisian populace.

The *Badards de Paris*, as they were called in derision, had been hitherto viewed as a light, laughing, thoughtless race, passionately fond of news, though not very acutely distinguishing betwixt truth and falsehood, quick in adopting impressions, but incapable of forming firm and concerted resolutions, still more incapable of executing them, and so easily overawed by an armed force, that about twelve hundred police-soldiers had been hitherto sufficient to keep all Paris in subjection. But, in the attack of the Bastille, they showed themselves daring, resolute, and unyielding, as well as prompt and headlong. These new qualities were in some degree owing to the support which they received from the French Guards; but are still more to be attributed to the loftier and more decided character belonging to the revolutionary spirit, and the mixture of the men of better classes, and of the high tone which belongs to them, among the mere rabble of the city. The garrison of this too famous castle was indeed very weak, but its deep moats, and insurmountable bulwarks, presented the most imposing show of resistance; and the triumph which the popular cause obtained in an exploit seemingly so desperate, infused a general consternation into the king and the royalists.

The second remarkable particular was that, from being one of the most light-hearted and kind-tem-

pered of nations, the French seemed upon the Revolution to have been animated not merely with the courage, but with the rabid fury of unchained wild beasts. Fonlon and Berthier, two individuals whom they considered as enemies of the people, were put to death, with circumstances of cruelty and insult fitting only at the death-stake of a Cherokee encampment; and, in emulation of literal cannibals, there were men, or rather monsters, found, not only to tear asunder the limbs of their victims, but to eat their hearts, and drink their blood. The intensity of the new doctrines of freedom, the animosity occasioned by civil commotion, cannot account for these atrocities, even in the lowest and most ignorant of the populace. Those who led the way in such unheard-of enormities, must have been practised murderers and assassins, mixed with the insurgents, like old hounds in a young pack, to lead them on, flesh them with slaughter, and teach an example of cruelty too easily learned, but hard to be ever forgotten. The metropolis was entirely in the hands of the insurgents, and civil war or submission was the only resource left to the sovereign. For the former course sufficient reasons might be urged. The whole proceedings in the metropolis had been entirely insurrectionary, without the least pretence of authority from the National Assembly, which continued sitting at Versailles, discussing the order of the day, while the citizens of Paris were storming castles, and tearing to pieces their prisoners, without authority from the national representatives, and even without the consent of their own civic rulers. The provost of the merchants was assassinated at the commencement of the disturbance, and a terrified committee of electors were the only persons who preserved the least semblance of authority, which they were obliged to exercise under the control and at the pleasure of the infuriated multitude. A large proportion of the citizens, though assuming arms for the protection of themselves and their families, had no desire of employing them against the royal authority; a much larger only united themselves with the insurgents, because, in a moment of universal agitation, they were the active and predominant party. Of these the former desired peace and protection; the latter, from habit and shame, must have soon deserted the side which was ostensibly conducted by ruffians and common stabbers, and drawn themselves to that which protected peace and good order. We have too good an opinion of a people so enlightened as those of France, too good an opinion of human nature in any country, to believe that men will persist in evil, if defended in their honest and legal rights.

What, in this case, was the duty of Louis XVI.? We answer without hesitation, that which George III. of Britain proposed to himself, when, in the name of the protestant religion, a violent and disorderly mob opened prisons, destroyed property, burned houses, and committed, though with far fewer symptoms of atrocity, the same course of disorder which now laid waste Paris. It is known that when his ministers hesitated to give an opinion in point of law concerning the employment of military force, for the protection of life and property against a disorderly banditti, the king, as chief magistrate, declared

his own purpose to march into the blazing city at the head of his guards, and with the strong hand of war to subdue the insurgents, and restore peace to the affrighted capital.* The same call now sounded loudly in the ear of Louis. He was still the chief magistrate of the people, whose duty it was to protect their lives and property—still commander of that army levied and paid for protecting the law of the country, and the lives and property of the subjects. The king ought to have proceeded to the National Assembly without an instant's delay, cleared himself before that body of the suspicions with which calumny had loaded him, and required and commanded the assistance of the representatives of the people, to quell the frightful excesses of murder and rapine which dishonoured the capital. It is almost certain that the whole moderate party, as they were called, would have united with the nobles and the clergy. The throne was not yet empty, nor the sword unswayed. Louis had surrendered much, and might, in the course of the change impending, have been obliged to surrender more; but he was still King of France, still bound by his coronation oath to prevent murder and put down insurrection. He could not be considered as crushing the cause of freedom, in answering a call to discharge his kingly duty; for what had the cause of reformation, proceeding as it was by the peaceful discussion of an unarmed convention, to do with the open war waged by the insurgents of Paris upon the king's troops, or with the gratuitous murders and atrocities with which the capital had been polluted? With such members as shame and fear might have brought over from the opposite side, the king, exerting himself as a prince, would have formed a majority strong enough to show the union which subsisted betwixt the crown and the assembly, when the protection of the laws was the point in question. With such a support—or without it—for it is the duty of the prince, in a crisis of such emergency, to serve the people, and save the country, by the exercise of his royal prerogative, whether with or without the concurrence of the other branches of the legislature,—the king, at the head of his *Gardes du Corps*, of the regiments which might have been found faithful, of the nobles and gentry, whose principles of chivalry devoted them to the service of their sovereign, ought to have marched into Paris, and put down the insurrection by the armed hand of authority, or fallen in the attempt, like the representative of Henry IV. His duty called upon him, and the authority with which he was invested enabled him, to act this part; which, in all probability, would have disarmed the factions, encouraged the timid, decided the wavering, and, by obtaining a conquest over lawless and brute violence, would have paved the way for a moderate and secure reformation in the state.

* In the year 1790, from a cause apparently harmless (a petition to parliament from the protestant association), a riotous mob, composed chiefly of the lowest orders of the people, headed by Lord George Gordon, during a week kept London in the utmost alarm. The prisons of Newgate, the King's Bench, and the Fleet, were burnt, several Roman Catholic chapels, and a great number of private houses belonging to catholics, destroyed, etc. etc. Lord George Gordon was afterwards tried for this offence.

But, having obtained this victory, in the name of the law of the realm, the king could only be vindicated in having resorted to arms, by using his conquest with such moderation, as to show that he threw his sword into the one scale, solely in order to balance the clubs and poniards of popular insurrection, with which the other was loaded. He must then have evinced that he did not mean to obstruct the quiet course of moderation and constitutional reform, in stemming that of headlong and violent innovation. Many disputes would have remained to be settled between him and his subjects; but the process of improving the constitution, though less rapid, would have been more safe and certain, and the kingdom of France might have attained a degree of freedom equal to that which she now possesses, without passing through a brief but dreadful anarchy to long years of military despotism, without the loss of mines of treasure, and without the expenditure of oceans of blood. To those who object the peril of this course, and the risk to the person of the sovereign from the fury of the insurgents, we can only answer, in the words of the elder Horatius, *Qu'il mourût*. Prince or peasant have alike lived long enough, when the choice comes to be betwixt loss of life and an important duty undischarged. Death, at the head of his troops, would have saved Louis more cruel humiliation, his subjects a deeper crime.

We do not affect to deny, that in this course there was considerable risk of another kind, and that it is very possible that the king, susceptible as he was to the influence of those around him, might have lain under strong temptation to have resumed the despotic authority, of which he had in a great measure divested himself, and have thus abused a victory gained over insurrection into a weapon of tyranny. But the spirit of liberty was so strong in France, the principles of leniency and moderation so natural to the king, his own late hazards so great, and the future, considering the general disposition of his subjects, so doubtful, that we are inclined to think a victory by the sovereign at that moment would have been followed by temperate measures. How the people used theirs is but too well known. At any rate, we have strongly stated our opinion, that Louis would at this crisis have been justified in employing force to compel order, but that the crime would have been deep and inexpiable had he abused a victory to restore despotism.

It may be said, indeed, that the preceding statement takes too much for granted, and that the violence employed on the 14th July was probably only an anticipation of the forcible measures which might have been expected from the king against the Assembly. The answer to this is, that the successful party may always cast on the loser the blame of commencing the brawl, as the wolf punished the lamb for troubling the course of the water, though he drank lowest down the stream. But when we find one party completely prepared and ready for action, forming plans boldly, and executing them skillfully, and observe the other uncertain and unprovided, betraying all the imbecility of surprise and indecision, we must necessarily believe the attack was premeditated on the one side, and unexpected on the other.

The abandonment of thirty thousand stand of arms at the Hôtel des Invalides, which were surrendered without the slightest resistance, though three Swiss regiments lay encamped in the Champs Élysées; the totally unprovided state of the Bastille, garrisoned by about one hundred Swiss and Invalids, and without provisions even for that small number; the absolute inaction of the Baron de Besenval, who, without entangling his troops in the narrow streets, which was pleaded as his excuse,—might, by marching along the Boulevards, a passage so well calculated for the manoeuvres of regular troops, have relieved the siege of that fortress; * and, finally, that general's bloodless retreat from Paris,—show that the king had, under all these circumstances, not only adopted no measures of a hostile character, but must, on the contrary, have issued such orders as prevented his officers from repelling force by force.

We are led, therefore, to believe, that the scheme of assembling the troops round Paris was one of those half-measures, to which, with great political weakness, Louis resorted more than once—an attempt to intimidate by the demonstration of force, which he was previously resolved not to use. Had his purposes of aggression been serious, five thousand troops of loyal principles—and such might surely have been selected—would, acting suddenly and energetically, have better assured him of the city of Paris, than six times that number brought to waste themselves in debauch around its walls, and to be withdrawn without the discharge of a musket. Indeed, the courage of Louis was of a passive, not an active nature, conspicuous in enduring adversity, but not of that energetic and decisive character which turns dubious affairs into prosperity, and achieves by its own exertions the success which Fortune denies.

The insurrection of Paris being acquiesced in by the sovereign, was recognized by the nation as a legitimate conquest, instead of a state crime; and the tameness of the king in enduring its violence, was assumed as a proof that the citizens had but anticipated his intended forcible measures against the assembly, and prevented the military occupation of the city. In the debates of the assembly itself, the insurrection was vindicated; the fears and suspicions alleged as its motives were justified as well-founded; the passions of the citizens were sympathized with, and their worst excesses palliated and excused. When the horrors accompanying the murder of Berthier and Foulon were dilated

upon by Lally Tolendal in the Assembly, he was heard and answered as if he had made mountains of molehills. Mirabeau said, that "it was a time to think, and not to feel." Barnave asked, with a sneer, "If the blood which had been shed was so pure?" Robespierre, rising into animation with acts of cruelty fitted to call forth the interest of such a mind, observed, that "the people, oppressed for ages, had a right to the revenge of a day."

But how long did that day last, or what was the fate of those who justified its enormities? From that hour the mob of Paris, or rather the suborned agitators by whom the actions of that blind multitude were dictated, became masters of the destiny of France. An insurrection was organized whenever there was any purpose to be carried, and the Assembly might be said to work under the impulse of the popular current, as mechanically as the wheel of a water engine is driven by a cascade.

The victory of the Bastille was extended in its consequences to the cabinet and to the legislative body. In the former, those ministers who had counselled the king to stand on the defensive against the Assembly, or rather to assume a threatening attitude, suddenly lost courage when they heard the fate of Foulon and Berthier. The Baron de Breteuil, the unpopular successor of Necker, was deprived of his office, and driven into exile; and, to complete the triumph of the people, Necker himself was recalled by their unanimous voice.

The king came, or was conducted to, the Hôtel de Ville of Paris, in what, compared to the triumph of the minister, was a sort of ovation, in which he appeared rather as a captive than otherwise. He entered into the edifice under a vault of steel, formed by the crossed sabres and pikes of those who had been lately engaged in combating his soldiers and murdering his subjects. He adopted the cockade of the insurrection; and, in doing so, ratified and approved of the acts done expressly against his command, acquiesced in the victory obtained over his own authority, and completed that conquest by laying down his arms.

The conquest of the Bastille was the first, almost the only, appeal to arms during the earlier part of the Revolution; and the popular success, afterwards sanctioned by the monarch, showed that nothing remained save the name of the ancient government. The king's younger brother, the Count d'Artois, now reigning King of France, had been distinguished as the leader and rallying point of the royalists. He left the kingdom with his children, and took refuge in Turin. Other distinguished princes, and many of the inferior nobility, adopted the same course, and their departure seemed to announce to the public that the royal cause was indeed desperate, since it was deserted by those most interested in its defence. This was the first act of general emigration, and although, in the circumstances, it may be excused, yet it must still be termed a great political error. For though, on the one hand, it is to be considered that these princes and their followers had been educated in the belief that the government of France rested in the king's person, and was identified with him; and that when the king was displaced from his permanent situation of power, the

* We have heard from a spectator who could be trusted, that, during the course of the attack on the Bastille, a cry arose among the crowd that the regiment of Royal Allemand were coming upon them. There was at that moment such a disposition to fly, as plainly showed what would have been the effect had a body of troops appeared in reality. The Baron de Besenval had commanded a body of the guards, when some weeks previously, they subdued an insurrection in the Faubourg St. Antoine. On that occasion many of the mob were killed; and he observes in his Memoirs, that, while the citizens of Paris termed him their preserver, he was very coldly received at court. He might be, therefore, unwilling to commit himself, by acting decidedly on the 14th July.

whole social system of France was totally ruined, and nothing remained which could legally govern or be governed; yet, on the other hand, it must be remembered that the instant the emigrants crossed the frontier, they at once lost all the natural advantages of birth and education, and separated themselves from the country which it was their duty to defend.

To draw to a head, and raise an insurrection for the purpose of achieving a counter-revolution, would have been the ready and natural resource. But the influence of the privileged classes was so totally destroyed, that the scheme seemed to have been considered as hopeless, even if the king's consent could have been obtained. To remain in France, whether in Paris or the departments, must have exposed them, in their avowed character of aristocrats, to absolute assassination. It has been therefore urged, that emigration was their only resource.

But there remained for these princes, nobles, and cavaliers, a more noble task, could they but have united themselves cordially to that portion of the assembly, originally a strong one, which professed, without destroying the existing state of monarchy in France, to wish to infuse into it the spirit of rational liberty, and to place Louis in such a situation as should have insured him the safe and honourable station of a limited monarch, though it deprived him of the powers of a despot. It is in politics, however, as in religion—the slighter in itself the difference between two parties, the more tenacious is each of the propositions in which they disagree.—The pure royalists were so far from being disposed to coalesce with those who blended an attachment to monarchy with a love of liberty, that they scarce accounted them fit to share the dangers and distresses to which all were alike reduced.

This first emigration proceeded not a little perhaps on the feeling of self-consequence among those by whom it was adopted. The high-born nobles of which it was chiefly composed had been long the world, as it is termed, to Paris and to each other, and it was a natural conclusion, that their withdrawing themselves from the sphere which they adorned must have been felt as an irremediable deprivation. They were not aware how easily, in the hour of need, perfumed lamps are, to all purposes of utility, replaced by ordinary candles, and that, carrying away with them much of dignity, gallantry, and grace, they left behind an ample stock of wisdom and valour, and all the other essential qualities by which nations are governed and defended.

The situation and negotiations of the emigrants in the courts to which they fled, were also prejudicial to their own reputation, and consequently to the royal cause, to which they had sacrificed their country. Reduced "to show their misery in foreign lands," they were naturally desirous of obtaining foreign aid to return to their own, and laid themselves under the heavy accusation of instigating a civil war, while Louis was yet the resigned, if not the contented, sovereign of the newly-modified empire. To this subject we must afterwards return.

The conviction that the ancient monarchy of France had fallen for ever, gave encouragement to

the numerous parties which united in desiring a new constitution, although they differed on the principles on which it was to be founded. But all agreed that it was necessary, in the first place, to clear away the remains of the ancient state of things. They resolved upon the abolition of all feudal rights and managed the matter with so much address that it was made to appear on the part of those who held them a voluntary surrender. The debate in the National Assembly* was turned by the popular leaders upon the odious character of the feudal rights and privileges, as being the chief cause of the general depression and discontent in which the kingdom was involved. The nobles understood the hint which was thus given them, and answered it with the ready courage and generosity which has been at all times the attribute of their order, though sometimes these noble qualities have been indiscreetly exercised. "Is it from us personally that the nation expects sacrifices?" said the Marquis de Foucault; "be assured that you shall not appeal in vain to our generosity. We are desirous to defend to the last the rights of the monarchy, but we can be lavish of our peculiar and personal interests."

The same general sentiment pervaded at once the clergy and nobles, who, sufficiently sensible that what they resigned could not operate essentially to the quiet of the state, were yet too proud to have even the appearance of placing their own selfish interests in competition with the public welfare. The whole privileged classes seemed at once seized with a spirit of the most lavish generosity, and hastened to despoil themselves of all their peculiar immunities and feudal rights. Clergy and laymen vied with each other in the nature and extent of their sacrifices. Privileges, whether prejudicial or harmless, rational or ridiculous, were renounced in the mass. A sort of delirium pervaded the assembly; each member strove to distinguish the sacrifice of his personal claims by something more remarkable than had yet attended any of the previous renunciations. They who had no rights of their own to resign, had the easier and more pleasant task of surrendering those of their constituents: the privileges of corporations, the monopolies of crafts, the rights of cities, were heaped on the national altar; and the members of the National Assembly seemed to look about in ecstasy, to consider of what else they could despoil themselves and others, as if, like the silly old earl in the civil dissensions of England, there had been an actual pleasure in the act of renouncing.† The feudal rights were in many instances odious, in

* 4th August, 1789.

† "Is there nothing else we can renounce?" said the old Earl of Pembroke and Montgomery, in the time of the Commonwealth, after he had joined in renouncing church and king, crown and law. "Can no one think of anything else? I love renouncing." The hasty renunciations of the French nobles and churchmen were brought about in the manner practised of yore in convivial parties, when he who gave a toast burned his wig, had a loose tooth drawn off, made some other sacrifice, which, according to the laws of composition, was an example necessary to be imitated by all the rest of the company, with whatever prejudice to their wardrobe or their persons.

others oppressive, and in others ridiculous; but it was ominous to see the institutions of ages overthrown at random, by a set of men talking and raving all at once, so as to verify the observation of the Englishman, Williams, one of their own members, "The fools! they would be thought to deliberate, when they cannot even listen." The singular occasion on which enthusiasm, false shame, and mutual emulation, thus induced the nobles and clergy to despoil themselves of all their seigniorial rights, was called by some the *day of the sacrifices*, by others, more truly, the *day of the dupes*.

During the currency of this legislative frenzy, as it might be termed, the popular party, with countenances affecting humility and shame at having nothing themselves to surrender, sat praising each new sacrifice, as the wily companions of a thoughtless and generous young man applaud the lavish expense by which they themselves profit, while their seeming admiration is an incentive to new acts of extravagance.

At length, when the sacrifice seemed complete, they began to pause and look around them. Some one thought of the separate distinctions of the provinces of France, as Normandy, Languedoc, and so forth. Most of these provinces possessed rights and privileges acquired by victory or treaty, which even Richelieu had not dared to violate. As soon as mentioned, they were at once thrown into the revolutionary smelting-pot, to be re-modeled after the universal equality which was the fashion of the day. It was not urged, and would not have been listened to, that these rights had been bought with blood, and sanctioned by public faith; that the legislature, though it had a right to extend them to others, could not take them from the possessors without compensation; and it escaped the assembly no less, how many honest and generous sentiments are connected with such provincial distinctions, which form, as it were, a second and inner fence around the love of a common country; or how much harmless enjoyment the poor man derives from the consciousness that he shares the privileges of some peculiar district. Such considerations might have induced the legislature to pause at least, after they had removed such marks of distinction as tended to engender jealousy betwixt inhabitants of the same kingdom. But the revolutionary level was to be passed over all that tended to distinguish one district, or one individual from another.

There was one order in the kingdom which, although it had joined largely and readily in the sacrifices of the *day of dupes*, was still considered as indebted to the state, and was doomed to undergo an act of total spoliation. The clergy had agreed, and the assembly had decreed, on 4th August, that the tithes should be declared redeemable, at a moderate price, by the proprietors subject to pay them. This regulation ratified, at least, the legality of the clergy's title. Nevertheless, in violation of the public faith thus pledged, the assembly, three days afterwards, pretended that the surrender of tithes had been absolute, and that, in lieu of that supposed revenue, the nation was only bound to provide decently for the administration of divine worship. Even the Abbé Siéyes on this occasion

deserted the revolutionary party, and made an admirable speech against this iniquitous measure. "You would be free," he exclaimed, with vehemence, "and you know not how to be just!" A curate in the assembly, recalling to mind the solemn invocation by which the tiers état had called upon the clergy to unite with them, asked with similar energy, "Was it to rob us, that you invited us to join with you in the name of the God of Peace?" Mirabeau, on the other hand, forgot the vehemence with which he had pleaded the right of property inherent in religious bodies, and lent his sophistry to defend what his own reasoning had proved in a similar case to be indefensible. The complaints of the clergy were listened to in contemptuous silence, or replied to with bitter irony, by those who were conscious how little sympathy that body were likely to meet from the nation in general, and who therefore spoke "as having power to do wrong."

We must now revert to the condition of the kingdom of France at large, while her ancient institutions were crumbling to pieces of themselves, or were forcibly pulled down by state innovators. That fine country was ravaged by a civil war of aggravated horrors, waged betwixt the rich and poor, and marked by every species of brutal violence. The peasants, their minds filled with a thousand wild suppositions, and incensed by the general scarcity of provisions, were everywhere in arms, and everywhere attacked the châteaux of their seigneurs, whom they were incited to look upon as enemies of the Revolution, and particularly of the commons. In most instances they were successful, and burnt the dwellings of the nobility, practising all the circumstances of rage and cruelty to which the minds of barbarians are influenced. Men were murdered in presence of their wives; wives and daughters violated before the eyes of their husbands and parents; some were put to death by lingering tortures; others by sudden and general massacre. Against some of these unhappy gentlemen, doubtless, the peasants might have wrongs to remember and to avenge; many of them, however, had borne their faculties so meekly that they did not even suspect the ill intentions of these peasants, until their castles and country-seats kindled with the general conflagration, and made part of the devouring element which raged through the whole kingdom.

What were the National Assembly doing at this dreadful crisis? They were discussing the abstract doctrines of the rights of man, instead of exacting from the subject the respect due to his social duties.

Yet a large party in the convention, and who had hitherto led the way in the paths of the Revolution, now conceived that the goal was attained, and that it was time to use the curb and forbear the spur. Such was the opinion of La Fayette and his followers, who considered the victory over the royalists as complete, and were desirous to declare the Revolution ended, and erect a substantial form of government on the ruins of monarchy, which lay prostrate at their feet.

They had influence enough in the assembly to procure a set of resolutions, declaring the monarchy hereditary in the person of the king and present family, on which basis they proceeded to erect what

might be termed a royal democracy, or, in plainer terms, a republic, governed, in truth, by a popular assembly, but encumbered with the expense of a king, to whom they desired to leave no real power, or free will to exercise it, although his name was to remain in the front of edicts, and although he was still to be considered entitled to command their armies, as the executive authority of the state.

A struggle was made to extend the royal authority to an absolute negative upon the decrees of the representative body; and though it was limited by the jealousy of the popular party to a suspensive veto only, yet even this degree of influence was supposed too dangerous in the hands of a monarch who had but lately been absolute. There is indeed an evident dilemma in the formation of a democracy, with a king for its ostensible head. Either the monarch will remain contented with his daily parade and daily food, and thus play the part of a mere pageant, in which case he is a burthensome expense to the state, which a popular government, in prudent economy, as well as from the severity of principle assumed by republicans, are particularly bound to avoid; or else he will naturally endeavour to improve the shadow and outward form of power into something like sinew and substance, and the democracy will be unexpectedly assailed with the spear which they desired should be used only as their standard-pole.

To these reasonings many of the deputies would perhaps have answered, had they spoken their real sentiments, that it was yet too early to propose to the French a pure republic, and that it was necessary to render the power of the king insignificant, before abolishing a title to which the public ear had been so long accustomed. In the meantime they took care to divest the monarch of whatever protection he might have received from an intermediate senate, or chamber, placed betwixt the king and the National Assembly. "One God," exclaimed Rabaud St-Étienne, "one nation, one king, and one chamber." This advocate for unity at once and uniformity, would scarce have been listened to if he had added, "one nose, one tongue, one arm, and one eye;" but his first concatenation of unities formed a phrase; and an imposing phrase, which sounds well, and can easily be repeated, has immense force in a revolution. The proposal for a Second or Upper Chamber, whether hereditary like that of England, or conservative like that of America, was rejected as aristocratical. Thus the King of France was placed in respect to the populace, as Canute of old to the advancing tide—he was entitled to sit on his throne and command the waves to respect him, and take the chance of their obeying his commands, or of being overwhelmed by them. If he was designed to be an integral part of the constitution, this should not have been—if he was considered as something that it was more seemly to abandon to his fate than to destroy by violence, the plan was not ill concerted.

CHAPTER V.

Plan of the democrats to bring the king and assembly to Paris.—Banquet of the Gardes du Corps.—Riot at Paris.—A formidable mob of women assemble to march to Versailles.—The National Guard refuse to act against the insurgents, and demand also to be led to Versailles.—The female mob arrive—Their behaviour to the assembly—to the king—Alarming disorders at night—La Fayette arrives with the National Guard—Mob force the palace—Murder the Body Guards—The queen's safety endangered—La Fayette's arrival with his force restores order.—King and royal family obliged to go to reside at Paris—Description of the procession—This step agreeable to the views of the constitutionalists, and of the republicans, and of the anarchists.—Duke of Orleans sent to England.

WE have mentioned the various restrictions upon the royal authority, which had been successively sanctioned by the National Assembly. But the various factions, all of which tended to democracy, were determined upon manœuvres for abating the royal authority, more actively powerful than those which the assembly dared yet to venture upon. For this purpose, all those who desired to carry the Revolution to extremity, became desirous to bring the sittings of the National Assembly and the residence of the king within the precincts of Paris, and to place them under the influence of that popular frenzy which they had so many ways of exciting, and which might exercise the authority of terror over the body of representatives, fill their galleries with a wild and tumultuous band of partisans, surround their gates with an infuriated populace, and thus dictate the issue of each deliberation. What fate was reserved for the king, after incidents will sufficiently show. To effect an object so important, the republican party strained every effort, and succeeded in raising the popular ferment to the highest pitch.

Their first efforts were unsuccessful. A deputa-tion, formidable from their numbers and clamorous violence, was about to sally from Paris to petition, as they called it, for the removal of the royal family and National Assembly to Paris, but was dispersed by the address of La Fayette and Bailly. Nevertheless it seemed decreed that the republicans should carry their favourite measures, less through their own proper strength, great as that was, than by the advantage afforded by the blunders of the royalists. An imprudence—it seems to deserve no harsher name—which occurred within the precincts of the royal palace at Versailles, gave the demagogues an opportunity, sooner probably than they expected, of carrying their point by a repetition of the violences which had already occurred.

The town of Versailles owed its splendour and wealth entirely to its being the royal residence, yet abounded with a population singularly ill-disposed towards the king and royal family. The National Guard of the place, amounting to some thousands, were animated by the same feelings. There were only about four hundred *Gardes du Corps*, or Life Guards, upon whom reliance could be placed for the defence of the royal family, in case of any popular

tumult either in Versailles itself, or directed thither from Paris. These troops consisted of gentlemen of trust and confidence, but their numbers were few in proportion to the extent of the palace, and their very quality rendered them obnoxious to the people as armed aristocrats.

About two-thirds of their number, to avoid suspicion and gain confidence, had been removed to Rambouillet. In these circumstances, the grenadiers of the French Guards, so lately in arms against the royal authority, with an inconsistency not unnatural to men of their profession, took it into their heads to become zealous for recovery of the posts which they had formerly occupied around the king's person, and threatened openly to march to Versailles to take possession of the routine of duty at the palace, a privilege which they considered as their due, notwithstanding that they had deserted their posts against the king's command, and were now about to resume them contrary to his consent. The regiment of Flanders was brought up to Versailles, to prevent a movement fraught with so much danger to the royal family. The presence of this corps had been required by the municipality, and the measure had been acquiesced in by the assembly, though not without some expressive indications of suspicion.

The regiment of Flanders arrived accordingly, and the *Cardes du Corps*, according to a custom universal in the French garrisons, invited the officers to an entertainment, at which the officers of the Swiss Guards, and those of the National Guard of Versailles, were also guests. This ill-omened feast was given in the Opera Hall of the palace, almost within hearing of the sovereigns; * the healths of the royal family were drank with the enthusiasm naturally inspired by the situation. The king and queen imprudently agreed to visit the scene of festivity, carrying with them the dauphin. Their presence raised the spirits of the company, already excited by wine and music to the highest pitch; royalist tones were played, the white cockade, distributed by the ladies who attended the queen, was mounted with enthusiasm, and it is said that of the nation was trodden under foot.

If we consider the cause of this wild scene, it seems natural enough that the queen, timid as a woman, anxious as a wife and a mother, might, in order to propitiate the favour of men who were summoned expressly to be guard of the royal family, incautiously have recourse to imitate, in a slight degree, and towards one regiment, the arts of conciliation, which in a much grosser shape had been used by the popular party to shake the fidelity of the whole army. But it is impossible to conceive that the king, or ministers, could have hoped, by the transitory and drunken flash of enthusiasm elicited from a few hundred men during a carousal, to commence the counter-revolution, which they dared not attempt when they had at their command thirty thousand troops, under an experienced general.

But as no false step among the royalists remained unimproved by their adversaries, the military feast of Versailles was presented to the people of Paris under a light very different from that in which it

must be viewed by posterity. The jacobins were the first to sound the alarm through all their clubs and societies, and the hundreds of hundreds of popular orators whom they had at their command, excited the citizens by descriptions of the most dreadful plots, fraught with massacres and proscriptions. Every effort had already been used to heat the popular mind against the king and queen, whom, in allusion to the obnoxious power granted to them by the law, they had of late learned to curse and insult, under the names of Monsieur and Madame Veto. The king had recently delayed yielding his sanction to the declarations of the Rights of Man, until the constitution was complete. This had been severely censured by the Assembly, who spoke of sending a deputation to extort his consent to these declarations, before presenting him with the practical results which they intended to bottom on them. A dreadful scarcity, amounting nearly to a famine, rendered the populace even more accessible than usual to desperate counsels. The feasts, amid which the aristocrats were represented as devising their plots, seemed an insult on the public misery. When the minds of the lower orders were thus prejudiced, it was no difficult matter to produce an insurrection.

That of the 5th October, 1789, was of a singular description, the insurgents being chiefly of the female sex. The market-women, *dames de la halle*, as they are called, half unsexed by the masculine nature of their employments, and entirely so by the ferocity of their manners, had figured early in the Revolution. With these were allied and associated most of the worthless and barbarous of their own sex, such disgraceful specimens of humanity as serve but to show in what a degraded state it may be found to exist. Females of this description began to assemble early in the morning, in large groups, with the cries for "bread," which so easily rouse a starving metropolis. There were observed amongst them many men disguised as women, and they compelled all the females they met to go along with them. They marched to the Hôtel de Ville, broke boldly through several squadrons of the National Guard, who were drawn up in front of that building for its defence, and were with difficulty dissuaded from burning the records it contained. They next seized a magazine of arms, with three or four pieces of cannon, and were joined by a miscellaneous rabble, armed with pikes, scythes, and similar instruments, who called themselves the conquerors of the Bastille. The still increasing multitude re-echoed the cry of "Bread, bread!—to Versailles! to Versailles!"

The National Guard were now called out in force, but speedily showed their officers that they too were infected with the humour of the times, and as much indisposed to subordination as the mob, to disperse which they were summoned. La Fayette put himself at their head, not to give his own, but to receive their orders. They refused to act against women, who, they said, were starving, and in their turn demanded to be led to Versailles, to dethrone,—such was their language,—"the king, who was a driver, and place the crown on the head of his son." La Fayette hesitated, implored, explained;

* October 1st.

but he had as yet to learn the situation of a revolutionary general. "Is it not strange," said one of his soldiers, who seemed quite to understand the military relation of officer and private on such an occasion, "is it not strange that La Fayette pretends to command the people, when it is his part to receive orders from them?"

Soon afterwards an order arrived from the Assembly of the Commune of Paris, enjoining the commandant's march, upon his own report that it was impossible to withstand the will of the people. He marched accordingly in good order, and at the head of a large force of the National Guard, about four or five hours after the departure of the mob, who, while he waited in a state of indecision, were already far on their way to Versailles.

It does not appear that the king, or his ministers, had any information of these hostile movements. Assuredly, there could not have been a royalist in Paris willing to hazard a horse or a groom to carry such intelligence, where the knowledge of it must have been so important. The leading members of the assembly, assembled at Versailles, were better informed. "These gentlemen," said Barabantanne, looking at the part of the hall where the nobles and clergy usually sat, "wish more light—they shall have lanterns,* they may rely upon it." Mirabeau went behind the chair of Mounier, the president. "Paris is marching upon us," he said.—"I know not what you mean," said Mounier.—"Believe me or not, all Paris is marching upon us—dissolve sitting."—"I never hurry the deliberations," said Mounier.—"Then feign illness," said Mirabeau,—"go to the palace, tell them what I say, and give me for authority. But there is not a minute to lose—Paris marches upon us."—"So much the better," answered Mounier; "we will be a republic the sooner."†

Shortly after this singular dialogue, occasioned probably by a sudden movement, in which Mirabeau showed the aristocratic feelings from which he never could shake himself free, the female battalion, together with their masculine allies, continued their march uninterruptedly, and entered Versailles in the afternoon, singing patriotic airs, intermingled with blasphemous obscenities, and the most furious threats against the queen. Their first visit was to the National Assembly, where the beating of drums, shouts, shrieks, and a hundred confused sounds, interrupted the deliberations. A man called Mailard, brandishing a sword in his hand, and supported by a woman holding a long pole, to which was at-

tached a tambour de basque, commenced a harangue in the name of the sovereign people. He announced that they wanted bread; that they were convinced the ministers were traitors; that the arm of the people was uplifted, and about to strike;—with much to the same purpose, in the exaggerated eloquence of the period. The same sentiments were echoed by his followers, mingled with the bitterest threats, against the queen in particular, that fury could contrive, expressed in language of the most energetic brutality.

The Amazons then crowded into the assembly, mixed themselves with the members, occupied the seat of the president, of the secretaries, produced or procured victuals and wine, drank, sung, swore, scolded, screamed,—abused some of the members, and loaded others with their loathsome caresses.

A deputation of these madwomen was at length sent to St-Priest, the minister, a determined royalist, who received them sterner, and replied, to their demand of bread, "When you had but one king, you never wanted bread—you have now twelve hundred—go ask it of them." They were introduced to the king, however, and were so much struck with the kind interest which he took in the state of Paris, that their hearts relented in his favour, and the deputies returned to their constituents, shouting *Vive le roi!*

Had the tempest depended on the mere popular breeze, it might now have been lulled to sleep; but there was a secret ground-swell, a heaving upwards of the bottom of the abyss, which could not be conjured down by the awakened feelings or convinced understandings of the deputation. A cry was raised that the deputies had been bribed to represent the king favourably; and, in this humour of suspicion, the army of Amazons stripped their garters, for the purpose of strangling their own delegates. They had by this time ascertained, that neither the National Guard of Versailles, nor the regiment of Flanders, whose transitory loyalty had passed away with the fumes of the wine of the banquet, would oppose them by force, and that they had only to deal with the *Gardes du Corps*, who dared not to act with vigour, lest they should provoke a general attack on the palace, while the most complete distraction and indecision reigned within its precincts. Bold in consequence, the female mob seized on the exterior avenues of the palace, and threatened destruction to all within.

The attendants of the king saw it necessary to take measures for the safety of his person, but they were marked by indecision and confusion. A force was hastily gathered of two or three hundred gentlemen, who, it was proposed, should mount the horses of the royal stud, and escort the king to Rambouillet, out of this scene of confusion.* The *Gardes du*

* In the beginning of the Revolution, when the mob executed their pleasure on the individuals against whom their suspicions were directed, the lamp-irons served for gibbets, and the lines by which the lamps, or lanterns, were disposed across the street, were ready halteres. Hence the cry of "*Les Aristocrates à la lanterne.*" The answer of the Abbé Maury is well known. "*Eh! mes amis, quand vous m'avez mis à la lanterne, est-ce que vous y verrez plus clair?*"

† Mounier must be supposed to speak ironically, and in allusion, not to his own opinions, but to Mirabeau's revolutionary tenets. Another account of this singular conversation states his answer to have been, "All the better. If the mob kill all of us—remark, I say *all* of us, it will be the better for the country."

* This was proposed by that Marquis de Favras, whose death upon the gallows for a royalist plot gave afterwards such exquisite delight to the citizens of Paris. Being the first man of quality whom they had seen hanged (that punishment having been hitherto reserved for plebeians), they encored the performance, and would fain have hung him up a second time. The same unfortunate gentleman had previously proposed to secure the bridge at Sèvres with a body of cavalry, which would have prevented the women

Corps, with such assistance, might certainly have forced their way through a mob of the tumultuary description which surrounded them; and the escape of the king from Versailles, under circumstances so critical, might have had a great effect in changing the current of popular feeling. But those opinions prevailed, which recommended that he should abide the arrival of La Fayette with the civic force of Paris.

It was now night, and the armed rabble of both sexes showed no intention of departing or breaking up. On the contrary, they bivouacked after their own manner upon the parade, where the soldiers usually mustered. There they kindled large fires, ate, drank, sang, caroused, and occasionally discharged their fire-arms. Scuffles arose from time to time, and one or two of the *Gardes du Corps* had been killed and wounded in the quarrel, which the rioters had endeavoured to fasten on them; besides which, this devoted corps had sustained a volley from their late guests, the National Guard of Versailles. The horse of a *Garde du Corps*, which fell into the hands of these female demons, was killed, torn in pieces, and eaten half raw and half roasted. Everything seemed tending to a general engagement, when, late at night, the drums announced the approach of La Fayette at the head of his civic army, which moved slowly, but in good order.

The presence of this great force seemed to restore a portion of tranquillity, though no one seemed to know with certainty how it was likely to act. La Fayette had an audience of the king, explained the means he had adopted for the security of the palace, recommended to the inhabitants to go to rest, and unhappily set the example by retiring himself. Before doing so, however, he also visited the assembly, pledged himself for the safety of the royal family and the tranquillity of the night, and, with some difficulty, prevailed on the President Mounier to adjourn the sitting, which had been voted permanent. He thus took upon himself the responsibility for the quiet of the night. We are loth to bring into question the worth, honour, and fidelity of La Fayette; and we can therefore only lament, that weariness should have so far overcome him at an important crisis, and that he should have trusted to others the execution of those precautions, which were most grossly neglected.

A band of the rioters found means to penetrate into the palace about three in the morning, through a gate which was left unlocked and unguarded. They rushed to the queen's apartment, and bore down the few *Gardes du Corps* who hastened to her defence. The sentinel knocked at the door of her bed-chamber, called to her to escape, and then gallantly exposed himself to the fury of the murderers. His single opposition was almost instantly overcome, and he himself left for dead. Over his bleeding body they forced their way into the queen's apartment; but their victim, reserved for farther and worse woes, had escaped by a secret passage

into the chamber of the king, while the assassins, bursting in, stabbed the bed she had just left with pikes and swords.*

The *Gardes du Corps* assembled in what was called the *Œil de Bœuf*, and endeavoured there to defend themselves; but several, unable to gain this place of refuge, were dragged down into the courtyard, where a wretch, distinguished by a long beard, a broad bloody axe, and a species of armour which he wore on his person, had taken on himself, by taste and choice, the office of executioner. The strangeness of the villain's costume, the sanguinary relish with which he discharged his office, and the hoarse roar with which from time to time he demanded new victims, made him resemble some demon whom hell had vomited forth, to augment the wickedness and horror of the scene.†

Two of the *Gardes du Corps* were already beheaded, and the man with the beard was clamorous to do his office upon the others who had been taken, when La Fayette, roused from his repose, arrived at the head of a body of grenadiers of the old French Guards, who had been lately incorporated with the civic guard, and were probably the most efficient part of his force. He did not think of avenging the unfortunate gentlemen who lay murdered before his eyes for the discharge of their military duty, but he entreated his soldiers to save him the dishonour of breaking his word, which he had pledged to the king, that he would protect the *Gardes du Corps*. It is probable he attempted no more than was in his power, and so far acted wisely, if not generously.

To redeem Monsieur de la Fayette's pledge, the grenadiers did, what they ought to have done in the name of the king, the law, the nation, and insulted humanity: they cleared, and with perfect ease, the court of the palace from these bands of murderous bacchantes, and their male associates. The instinct of ancient feelings was in some degree awakened in the grenadiers. They experienced a sudden sensation of compassion and kindness for the *Gardes du Corps*, whose duty on the royal person they had

* One of the most accredited calumnies against the unfortunate Marie Antoinette pretends, that she was on this occasion surprised in the arms of a paramour. Bonaparte is said to have mentioned this as a fact, upon the authority of Madame Campan. We have now Madame Campan's own account, describing the conduct of the queen on this dreadful occasion as that of a heroine, and totally excluding the possibility of the pretended anecdote. But let it be farther considered, under what circumstances the queen was placed—at two in the morning, retired to a privacy liable to be interrupted (as it was) not only by the irruption of the furious banditti who surrounded the palace, demanding her life, but by the entrance of the king, or of others, in whom circumstances might have rendered the intrusion duty; and let it then be judged whether the dangers of the moment, and the risk of discovery, would not have prevented Messalina herself from chusing such a time for an assassination.

† The miscreant's real name was Jourdan, afterwards called *Coupe-tête*, distinguished in the massacres of Arignon. He gained his bread by sitting as an academy-model to painters, and for that reason cultivated his long beard. In the depositions before the Châtelet, he is called *l'homme à la barbe*,—an epithet which might distinguish the ogre or goblin of some ancient legend.

from advancing to Versailles. The Queen signed an order for the horses with this remarkable clause.—“To be used if the king's safety is endangered, but in no danger which affects me only.”

in former times shared. There arose a cry among them,—“Let us save the *Gardes du Corps*, who saved us at Fontenoy.” They took them under their protection, exchanged their caps with them in sign of friendship and fraternity, and a tumult, which had something of the character of joy, succeeded to that which had announced nothing but blood and death.

The outside of the palace was still besieged by the infuriated mob, who demanded, with hideous cries, and exclamations the most barbarous and obscene, to see the Austrian, as they called the queen. The unfortunate princess appeared on the balcony with one of her children in each hand. A voice from the crowd called out, “No children!” as if on purpose to deprive the mother of that appeal to humanity, which might move the hardest heart. Marie Antoinette, with a force of mind worthy of Maria Theresa, her mother, pushed her children back into the room, and, turning her face to the tumultuous multitude, which tossed and roared beneath, brandishing their pikes and guns with the wildest attitudes of rage, the reviled, persecuted, and denounced queen stood before them, her arms folded on her bosom, with a noble air of courageous resignation. The secret reason of this summons—the real cause of repelling the children—could only be to afford a chance of some desperate hand among the crowd executing the threats which resounded on all sides. Accordingly, a gun was actually leveled, but one of the bystanders struck it down; for the passions of the mob had taken an opposite turn, and, astonished at Marie Antoinette’s noble presence, and graceful firmness of demeanour, there arose, almost in spite of themselves, a general shout of *Vive la reine!**

But if the insurgents, or rather those who prompted them, missed their first point, they did not also lose their second. A cry arose, “To Paris!” at first uttered by a solitary voice, but gathering strength, until the whole multitude shouted, “To Paris—to Paris!” The cry of these blood-thirsty bacchanals, such as they had that night shown themselves, was, it seems, considered as the voice of the people, and as such, La Fayette neither remonstrated himself, nor permitted the king to interpose a moment’s delay in yielding obedience to it; nor was any measure taken to put some appearance even of decency on the journey, or to disguise its real character, of a triumphant procession of the sovereign people, after a complete victory over their nominal monarch.

The carriages of the royal family were placed in the middle of an immeasurable column, consisting partly of La Fayette’s soldiers, partly of the revolutionary rabble whose march had preceded his, amounting to several thousand men and women of the lowest and most desperate description, intermingling in groups amongst the bands of French Guards, and civic soldiers, whose discipline could not enable them to preserve even a semblance of order. Thus they rushed along, howling their songs of triumph. The harbingers of the march bore the two bloody heads of the murdered *Gardes du Corps* paraded on pikes,

* *Mémoires de Weber, concernant Marie-Antoinette*, vol. 1, p. 451: 2 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1822.

at the head of the column, as the emblems of their prowess and success.* The rest of this body, worn down by fatigue, most of them despoiled of their arms, and many without hats, anxious for the fate of the royal family, and harassed with apprehensions for themselves, were dragged like captives in the midst of the mob, while the drunken females around them bore aloft in triumph their arms, their belts, and their hats. These wretches, stained with the blood in which they had bathed themselves, were now singing songs, of which the burthen bore,—“We bring you the baker, his wife, and the little apprentice;” as if the presence of the unhappy royal family, with the little power they now possessed, had been in itself a charm against scarcity. Some of these Amazons rode upon the cannon, which made a formidable part of the procession. Many of them were mounted on the horses of the *Gardes du Corps*, some in masculine fashion, others *en croupe*. All the muskets and pikes which attended this immense cavalcade were garnished, as if in triumph, with oak-boughs, and the women carried long poplar-branches in their hands, which gave the column, so grotesquely composed in every respect, the appearance of a moving grove. Scarce a circumstance was omitted which could render this entrance into the capital more insulting to the king’s feelings—more degrading to the royal dignity.

After six hours of dishonour and agony, the unfortunate Louis was brought to the Hôtel de Ville, where Bailly, then mayor, complimented him upon the “*beau jour*,” the “splendid day,” which restored the monarch of France to his capital; assured him that order, peace, and all the gentler virtues, were about to revive in the country under his royal eye, and that the king would henceforth become powerful through the people, the people happy through the king; and, “what was truest of all,” that as Henry IV. had entered Paris by means of reconquering his people, Louis XVI. had done so, because his people, had reconquered their king.† His wounds salved with this lip-comfort, the unhappy and degraded prince was permitted to retire to the palace of the Tuileries, which, long uninhabited, and almost unfurnished, yawned upon him like the tomb where alone he at length found repose.

The events of the 14th July, 1789, when the Bastille was taken, formed the first great stride of the Revolution, actively considered. Those of the 5th and 6th October, in the same year, which we have detailed at length, as peculiarly characteristic of the features which it assumed, made the second

* It has been said they were borne immediately before the royal carriage; but this is an exaggeration where exaggeration is unnecessary. These bloody trophies preceded the royal family a great way on the march to Paris.

† *Mémoires d'un Témoin de la Révolution, ouvrage posthume de Jean-Sylvain Bailly (Choix de ses Lettres et Discours)*, vol. III. p. 262: 3 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1804. The Mayor of Paris, although such language must have sounded like the most bitter irony, had no choice of words on the 6th October, 1789. But if he seriously termed that a glorious day, what could Bailly complain of the studied insults and cruelties which he himself sustained, when, in October, 1792, the same banditti of Paris, who forced the king from Versailles, dragged himself to death, with every circumstance of refined cruelty and protracted insult?

grand phasis. The first had rendered the inhabitants of the metropolis altogether independent of their sovereign, and indeed of any government but that which they chose to submit to; the second deprived the king of that small appearance of freedom which he had hitherto exercised, and fixed his dwelling in the midst of his metropolis, independent and self-regulated as we have described it. "It is wonderful," said Louis, "that with such love of liberty on all sides, I am the only person that is deemed totally unworthy of enjoying it." Indeed, after the march from Versailles, the king could only be considered as the signet of royal authority, used for attesting public acts at the pleasure of those in whose custody he was detained, but without the exercise of any free-will on his own part.

All the various parties found their account; less or more, in this state of the royal person, excepting the pure royalists, whose effective power was little, and their comparative numbers few. There remained, indeed, attached to the person and cause of Louis, a party of those members, who, being friends to freedom, were no less so to regulated monarchy, and who desired to fix the throne on a firm and determined basis. But their numbers were daily tamed, and their spirits were broken. The excellent Mounier, and the eloquent Lally Tolendal, emigrated after the 9th October, unable to endure the repetition of such scenes as were then exhibited. The indignant adieus of the latter to the National Assembly were thus forcibly expressed:—

"It is impossible for me, even my physical strength alone considered, to discharge my functions amid the scenes we have witnessed.—Those heads borne in trophy; that queen half assassinated; that king dragged into Paris by troops of robbers and assassins; the 'splendid day' of Monsieur Bailly; the jest of Barnave, when blood was floating around us; Mounier escaping, as if by miracle, from a thousand assassins; these are the causes of my oath never again to enter that den of cannibals. A man may endure a single death; he may brave it more than once, when the loss of life can be useful—but no power under Heaven shall induce me to suffer a thousand tortures every passing minute—while I am witnessing the progress of cruelty—the triumph of guilt—which I must witness without interrupting it. They may proscribe my person—they may confiscate my fortune—I will labour the earth for my bread, and I will see them no more."

The other parties into which the state was divided saw the events of the 5th October with other feelings, and if they did not forward, at least found their account in them.

The constitutional party, or those who desired a democratical government with a king at its head, had reason to hope that Louis, being in Paris, must remain at their absolute disposal, separated from those who might advise counter-revolutionary steps, and guarded only by national troops, embodied in the name, and through the powers, of the Revolution. Every day, indeed, rendered Louis more dependent on La Fayette and his friends, as the only force which remained to preserve order; for he soon found it a necessary though a cruel measure to disband his faithful *Gardes du Corps*, and that per-

haps as much with a view to their safety as to his own.

The constitutional party seemed strong both in numbers and reputation. La Fayette was commandant of the National Guards, and they looked up to him with that homage and veneration with which young troops, and especially of this description, regard a leader of experience and bravery, who, in accepting the command, seems to share his laurels with the citizen-soldier, who has won none of his own. Bailly was Mayor of Paris, and, in the height of a popularity not undeserved, was so well established in the minds of the better class of citizens, that, in any other times than those when he lived, he might safely have despised the suffrages of the rabble, always to be bought, either by largesses or flattery. The constitutionalists had also a strong majority in the assembly, where the republicans dared not yet throw off the mask, and the assembly, following the person of the king, came also to establish its sittings in their strong-hold, the metropolis. They seemed, therefore, to assume the ascendancy in the first instance, after the 5th and 6th of October, and to reap all the first fruits of the victory then achieved, though by their connivance rather than their active co-operation.

It is wonderful, that, meaning still to assign to the regal dignity a high constitutional situation, La Fayette should not have exerted himself to preserve its dignity undegraded, and to save the honour, as he certainly saved the lives, of the royal family. Three reasons might prevent his doing what, as a gentleman and a soldier, he must otherwise at least have attempted. First, although he boasted highly of his influence with the National Guard of Paris, it may be doubted whether all his popularity would have borne him through in any endeavour to deprive the good people of that city of such a treat as the Joyous Entry of the 6th of October, or whether the civic power would, even for the immediate defence of the king's person, have used actual force against the band of Amazons who directed that memorable procession. Secondly, La Fayette might fear the revival of the fallen colossus of despotism, more than the rising spirit of anarchy, and thus be induced to suppose that a conquest in the king's cause over a popular insurrection, might be too active a cordial to the drooping spirits of the royalists. And, lastly, the revolutionary general, as a politician, might not be unwilling that the king and his consort should experience, in their own persons, such a specimen of popular power, as might intimidate them from further opposition to the popular will, and incline Louis to assume unresistingly his diminished rank in the new constitution.

The republican party, with better reason than the constitutionalists, exulted in the king's change of residence. It relieved them as well as La Fayette's party from all apprehensions of Louis raising his standard in the provinces, and taking the field on his own account, like Charles of England in similar circumstances. Then they already foresaw, that whenever the constitutionalists should identify themselves with the crown, whom all parties had hitherto laboured to represent as the common enemy, they would become proportionally unpopular with the

people at large, and lose possession of the superior power as a necessary consequence. Aristocrats, the only class which was sincerely united to the king's person, would, they might safely predict, dread and distrust the constitutionalists, while with the democrats, so very much the more numerous party, the king's name, instead of a tower of strength, as the poet has termed it, must be a stumbling-block and a rock of offence. They foresaw, finally, either that the king must remain the mere passive tool of the constitutionalists, acting unresistingly under their order,—in which case the office would be soon regarded as an idle and expensive bauble, without any force or dignity of free-will, and fit only to be flung aside as an unnecessary incumbrance on the republican forms,—or, in the event of the king attempting, either by force or escape, to throw off the yoke of the constitutionalists, he would equally furnish arms to the pure democrats against his person and office, as the source of danger to the popular cause. Some of the republican chiefs had probably expected a more sudden termination to the reign of Louis from an insurrection so threatening; at least these leaders had been the first to hail and to encourage the female insurgents, on their arrival at Versailles.* But though the issue of that insurrection may have fallen short of their hopes, it could not but be highly acceptable to them so far as it went.

The party of Orleans had hitherto wrapt in its dusky folds many of those names, which were afterwards destined to hold dreadful rank in the revolutionary history. The prince whose name they adopted is supposed to have been animated partly by a strong and embittered spirit of personal hatred against the queen, and partly, as we have already said, by an ambitious desire to supplant his kinsman. He placed, according to general report, his treasures, and all which his credit could add to them, at the disposal of men, abounding in those energetic talents which carry their owners forward in times of public confusion, but devoid alike of fortune, character, and principle; who undertook to serve their patron by enlisting in his cause the obscure and subordinate agents, by whom mobs were levied, and assassins subsidized. It is said, that the days of the 5th and 6th of October were organized by the secret agents of Orleans, and for his advantage; that, had the enterprise succeeded, the king would have been deposed, and the Duke of Orleans proclaimed lieutenant-general of the kingdom, while his revenge would probably have been satiated with the queen's assassination. He is stated to have skulked in disguise about the outskirts of the scene when the tumult was at the highest, but never to have had courage to present himself boldly to the people, either to create a sensation by surprise, or to avail himself of that which his satellites had already excited in his favour.† His resolution having thus failed him at the point where it was most necessary,

and the tumult having ended without anything taking place in his favour, the Duke of Orleans was made a scape-goat, and the only one, to atone for the whole insurrection. Under the title of an Embassy to England, he was honourably exiled from his native country. Mirabeau spoke of him in terms of the utmost contumely, as being base-minded as a lackey, and totally unworthy the trouble which had been taken on his account. His other adherents gradually and successively dropped away, in proportion as the wealth, credit, and character of this besotted prince rendered him incapable of maintaining his gratuities; and they sailed henceforth under their own flag, in the storms he had fitted them to navigate. These were men who had resolved to use the revolutionary axe for cutting out their own private fortunes, and, little interesting themselves about the political principles which divided the other parties of the state, they kept firm hold of all the subordinate machinery despised by the others in the abstraction of metaphysical speculation, but which gave them the exclusive command of the physical force of the mob of Paris—Paris, the metropolis of France, and the prison-house of her monarch.

CHAPTER VI.

La Fayette resolves to enforce order.—A baker is murdered by the rabble.—One of his murderers executed.—Decree imposing martial law in case of insurrection.—Democrats supported by the audience in the gallery of the assembly.—Introduction of the doctrines of equality.—They are in their exaggerated sense inconsistent with human nature and the progress of society.—The assembly abolishes titles of nobility, armorial bearings, and phrases of courtesy.—Reasoning on these innovations.—Disorder of finance.—Necker becomes unpopular.—Seizure of church-lands.—Issue of assignats.—Necker leaves France in unpopularity.—New religious institution.—Oath imposed on the clergy.—Resisted by the greater part of the order.—Bad effects of the innovation.—General view of the operations of the Constituent Assembly.—Enthusiasm of the people for their new privileges.—Limited privileges of the crown.—King is obliged to dissemble.—His negotiations with Mirabeau.—With Bouille.—Attack on the palace of the king.—Prevented by La Fayette.—Royalists expelled from the palace of the Tuileries.—Escape of Louis.—He is captured at Varennes.—Brought back to Paris.—Riot in the Champ de Mars.—Put down by military force.—Louis accepts the constitution.

LA FAYETTE followed up his victory over the Duke of Orleans by some bold and successful attacks upon the revolutionary right of insurrection, through which the people of late had taken on themselves the office of judges at once and executioners. This had hitherto been thought one of the sacred privileges of the Revolution; but, determined to set bounds to its farther progress, La Fayette resolved to restore the dominion of the law over the will of the rabble.

A large mob, in virtue of the approbation, the indulgence at least, with which similar frolics had been hitherto treated, had seized upon and hanged an unhappy baker, who fell under their resentment as a public enemy, because he sold bread dear when he could only purchase grain at an enormous price.

* Barnave, as well as Mirabeau, the republican as well as the orientalist, was heard to exclaim,—“Courage, brave Parisians—liberty for ever—fear nothing—we are for you!” —*Mémoires du Marquis de Ferrières*, Livre 4e (vol. I, p. 307) : 3 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1822.

† See the proceedings before the Châtelet.

They varied the usual detail with some additional circumstances, causing many of his brethren in trade to salute the bloody head; which they paraded according to their wont; and finally, by pressing the dead lips to those of the widow, as she lay fainting before them. This done, and in the full confidence of impunity, they approached the hall of the Assembly, in order to regale the representatives of the people with the same edifying spectacle.

The baker being neither an aristocrat nor nobleman, the authorities ventured upon punishing the murder, without fearing the charge of incivism. La Fayette, at the head of a detachment of the National Guards, attacked and dispersed the assassins, and the active citizen who carried the head was tried, condemned, and hanged, just as if there had been no revolution in the kingdom. There was much surprise at this, as there had been no such instance of severity since the day of the Bastille. This was not all.

La Fayette, who may now be considered as at the head of affairs, had the influence and address to gain from the assembly a decree, empowering the magistracy, in case of any rising, to declare martial law by displaying a red flag; after which signal, those who refused to disperse should be dealt with as open rebels. This edict, much to the purpose of the British Riot Act, did not pass without opposition, as it obviously tended to give the bayonets of the National Guard a decided ascendancy over the pikes and clubs of the rabble of the suburbs. The Jacobins, meaning the followers of Marat, Robespierre, and Danton, and even the republicans, or brissotins, had hitherto considered these occasional insurrections and murders like affairs of posts in a campaign, in which they themselves had enjoyed uniformly the advantage; but while La Fayette was followed and obeyed by the National Guard, men of substance, and interested in maintaining order, it was clear that he had both the power and will to stop in future these revolutionary excesses.

This important advantage in some degree balanced the power which the republican and revolutionary party had acquired. These predominated, as has been already said, in the Club of Jacobins, in which they reviewed the debates of the assembly, denouncing at their pleasure those who opposed them; but they had besides a decided majority among the daily attendants in the tribunes, who, regularly paid, and supplied with food and liquors, filled the assembly with their clamours of applause or disapprobation, according to the rules they had previously received. It is true, the hired auditors gave their voices and applause to those who paid them, but nevertheless they had party feelings of their own, which often dictated unbought suffrages, in favour of those who used the most exaggerated tone of revolutionary fury. They shouted with sincere and voluntary zeal for such men as Marat, Robespierre, and Danton, who yelled out for the most bloody measures of terror and proscription, and proclaimed war against the nobles with the same voice with which they flattered the lowest vices of the multitude.

By degrees the Revolution appeared to have assumed a different object from that for which it was

commenced. France had obtained liberty, the first, and certainly the worthiest, object which a nation can desire. Each individual was declared as free as it was possible for him to be, retaining the least respect to the social compact. It is true, the Frenchman was not practically allowed the benefit of this freedom; for though the rights of man permitted the citizen to go where he would, yet, in practice, he was apt to find his way to the next prison unless furnished with a municipal passport, or to be murdered by the way, if accused of aristocracy. In like manner, his house was secure as a castle, his property sacred as the ornaments of a temple;—excepting against the Committee of Research, who might, by their arbitrary order, break into the one, and dilapidate the other at pleasure. Still, however, the general principle of liberty was established in the fullest metaphysical extent, and it remained to place on as broad a footing the sister principle of equality.

To this the attention of the assembly was now chiefly directed. In the proper sense, equality of rights and equality of laws, a constitution which extends like protection to the lowest and the highest, are essential to the existence and to the enjoyment of freedom. But to erect a leveling system, designed to place the whole mass of the people on the same footing as to habits, manners, tastes, and sentiments, is a gross and ridiculous contradiction of the necessary progress of society. It is a fruitless attempt to wage war with the laws of Nature. She has varied the face of the world with mountain and valley, lake and torrent, forest and champaign, and she has formed the human body in all the different shapes and complexions we behold, with all the various degrees of physical force and weakness. She has avoided equality in all her productions, as she was formerly said to have abhorred a vacuum; even in those of her works which present the greatest apparent similarity, exact equality does not exist; no one leaf of a tree is precisely similar to another, and among the countless host of stars, each differs from the other in glory. But what are these physical varieties to the endless change exhibited in the human character, with all its various passions, powers, and prejudices, so artfully compounded in different proportions, that it is probable there has not existed, since Adam's time to ours, an exact resemblance between any two individuals? As if this were not enough, there came, to aid the diversity, the effects of climate, of government, of education, and habits of life, all of which lead to endless modifications of the individual. The inequalities arising from the natural differences of talent and disposition are multiplied beyond calculation, as society increases in civilization.

The savage may, indeed, boast a rude species of equality in some patriarchal tribes, but the wildest and strongest, the best hunter, and the bravest warrior, soon lords it over the rest, and becomes a king or chief. One portion of the nation, from happy talents, or happy circumstances, rises to the top, another sinks, like dregs, to the bottom; a third portion occupies a mid-place between them. As society advances, the difference of ranks advances with it. And can it be proposed seriously, that any

other quality, than that of rights, can exist between those who think and those who labour; those "whose talk is of bullocks," and those whose time permits them to study the paths of wisdom? Happy, indeed, is the country and constitution, where those distinctions, which must necessarily exist in every society, are not separated by insurmountable barriers, but where the most distinguished rank is open to receive that precious supply of wisdom and talent, which so frequently elevates individuals from the lowest to the highest classes; and so far as general equality can be attained, by each individual having a fair right to raise himself to the situation which he is qualified to occupy, by his talents, his merits, or his wealth, the gates cannot be thrown open too widely. But the attempt of the French legislators was precisely the reverse, and went to establish the proposed equality of ranks, by depressing the upper classes into the same order with those who occupy the middle of society, while they essayed the yet more absurd attempt, to crush down these last, by the weight of legislative authority, into a level with the lowest orders,—men whose education, if it has not corrupted their hearts, must necessarily have blunted their feelings, and who, in a great city like Paris, exchange the simplicity which makes them respectable under more favourable circumstances, for the habitual indulgence of the coarsest and grossest pleasures. Upon the whole, it must be admitted, that in every state far advanced in the progress of civilization, the inequality of ranks is a natural and necessary attribute. Philosophy may comfort those who regret this necessity, by the assurance that the portions of individual happiness and misery are divided amongst high and low with a very equal hand; and religion assures us that there is a future state, in which, with amended natures and improved faculties, the vain distinctions of this world will no longer subsist. But any practical attempt to remedy the inequality of rank in civilized society by forcible measures, may indeed degrade the upper classes, but cannot improve those beneath them. Laws may deprive the gentleman of his title, the man of education of his books, or, to use the French illustration, the *muscadin* of his clothes; but this cannot make the clown a man of breeding, or give learning to ignorance, or decent attire to the *sans-culottes*. Much will be lost to the grace, the information, and the decency of society in general, but nothing can possibly be gained by any individual. Nevertheless, it was in this absolutely impracticable manner, that the exaggerated feelings of the French legislators, at this period of total change, undertook to equalize the nation which they were now regenerating.

With a view to this great experiment upon human society, the assembly abolished all titles of honour, all armorial bearings, and even the insignificant titles of *Monsieur* and *Madame*; which, meaning nothing but phrases of common courtesy, yet, with other expressions of the same kind, serve to soften the ordinary intercourse of life, and preserve that gentleness of manners which the French, by a happy name, were wont to call *la petite morale*. The first of these, abrogations affected the nobles in particular. In return for their liberal and unlimited

surrender of their essential powers and privileges, they were now despoiled of their distinction and rank in society;—as if those who had made prisoner and plundered a cavalier, should, last of all, have snatched away in derision the plume from his hat. The aristocracy of France, so long distinguished as the flower of European chivalry, were now, so far as depended on the legislature, entirely abolished. The voice of the nation had pronounced against them a general sentence of degradation, which, according to the feelings of the order, could only be the punishment of some foul and disgraceful crime; and the condition of the ex-nobles might justly have been described as Bolingbroke paints his own,

Eating the bitter bread of banishment,
While you have fed upon my seigniories,
Dispark'd my parks, and fell'd my forest woods,
From my own windows torn my household coat,
Razed out my impress, leaving me no sign,
Save men's opinions and my living blood,
To show the world I was a gentleman.

It was a fatal error, that, in search of that equality which it is impossible to attain, the assembly should have torn down the ancient institutions of chivalry. Viewing them philosophically, they are indeed of little value; but where are the advantages beyond the means, first, of mere subsistence, secondly, of information, which ought not to be indifferent to true philosophers? And yet, where exists the true philosopher, who has been able effectually to detach himself from the common mode of thinking on such subjects? The estimation set upon birth or rank, supposing its foundation illusory, has still the advantage of counterbalancing that which is attracted by wealth only; the prejudice has something generous and noble in it, is connected with historical recollections and patriotic feelings, and if it sometimes gives rise to extravagances, they are such as society can restrain and punish by the mere effect of ridicule. It is curious, even in the midst of the Revolution, and amongst those who were its greatest favourers, what difficulties were found to emancipate themselves from those ancient prejudices which affected the difference of rank.*

As for the proscription of the phraseology of civilized society, it had an absurd appearance of affectation in the eyes of most people of understanding; but on some enthusiastic minds it produced a worse effect than that of mere disgust. Let a man place himself in the attitude of fear or of rage, and he will in some measure feel the passion arise in his mind which corresponds with the gesture he has assumed. In like manner, those who affected the brutal manners, coarse language, and slovenly dress of the lower orders, familiarized their imaginations with the violent and savage thoughts and actions

* The Count de Mirabeau was furious at being called *Riquetti l'aîné*, and said, with great bitterness, when his speeches were promulgated under that name, "*Avec votre Riquetti, vous avez desorienté l'Europe pour trois jours.*" Mirabeau was at heart an aristocrat. But what shall we say of Citizenne Roland, who piques herself on the plebeian sound of her name, *Manon Philpott*, yet inconsequently upbraids Citizen Fache with his father's having been a porter!

proper to the class whose costume they had thus adopted. Above all, when this sacrifice was made to the very taste and phraseology of that class (the last points in which one would think them deserving of imitation), it appeared to intimate the progressive strength of the revolutionary tide, which, sweeping before it all distinctions, trivial as well as important, seemed soon destined to overthrow the throne, now isolated and well nigh undefended. The next step was necessary to fix the executive government in the same body which enjoyed the powers of legislation,—the surest of all roads to tyranny. But although the doctrine of equality, thus understood, is absurd in theory and impossible in practice, yet it will always find willing listeners when preached to the lower classes, whose practical view of it results into an agrarian law, or a general division of property.

There was one order yet remained, however, which was to be leveled,—the destruction of the church was still to be accomplished; and the republican party proceeded in the work of demolition with infinite address, by including the great object in a plan for restoring finance, and providing for the expenses of the state, without imposing further burthens on the people.

It must be remembered that the States-general had been summoned to restore the finances of the country. This was the cause of their convocation. But although they had exercised almost every species of power—had thrown down and rebuilt every constituted authority in the kingdom, still the finances were as much embarrassed as ever, or much more so; since most men in France judged the privilege of refusing to pay taxes, the most unequivocal, and not the least pleasing part, of their newly-acquired freedom.

Necker, so often received among the populace as a saviour of the country, was here totally at a loss. The whole relative associations which bind men together in the social contract, seemed to be rent asunder; and where public credit is destroyed, a financier, however able, resembles Prospero, after his wand is broken, and his book sunk in the deep sea. Accordingly, Necker in vain importuned the assembly, by representing the pressure of the finances. They became wearied with his remonstrances, and received them with manifest symptoms of coldness and disrespect. What service, indeed, could the regulated advice, and deep-calculated and combined schemes of a financier, have rendered to men, who had already their resources in their eye, and were determined that no idle scruple should prevent their pouncing upon them? Necker's expostulations, addressed to their ears, were like a lecture upon thrift and industry to Robin Hood and his merry-men, when they were setting forth to rob the rich in the name of the poor.

The assembly had determined, that, all prejudices apart, the property of the church should come under confiscation for the benefit of the nation. It was in vain that the clergy exclaimed against these acts of rapine and extortion—in vain that they stated themselves as an existing part of the nation, and that as such they had coalesced with the assembly under the implied ratification of their

own rights—in vain that they resounded in the hall the declaration solemnly adopted, that property was inviolable, save upon full compensation. It was to as little purpose that Mirabeau was reminded of his language, addressed to the Emperor Joseph upon a similar occasion.—“Despise the monks,” he had said, “as much as you will, but do not rob them. Robbery is equally a crime, whether perpetrated on the most profligate atheist, or the most bigoted capuchin.” The clergy were told with insulting gravity, that the property belonging to a community was upon a different footing from that belonging to individuals, because the state might dissolve the community or body-corporate, and resume the property attached to it; and, under this sophism, they assumed for the benefit of the public the whole right of property belonging to the Church of France.

As it was impossible to bring these immense subjects at once to sale, the assembly adopted a system of paper-money called *assignats*, which were secured or hypothecated upon the church-lands. The fluctuation of this paper, which was adopted against Necker's earnest cautions, created a spirit of stock-jobbing and gambling, nearly resembling that which distinguished the famous scheme of the Mississippi. Spelman would have argued, that the taint of sacrilege attached to funds raised upon the spoils of the church; yet it must be admitted that these supplies enabled the National Assembly not only to avoid the gulph of general bankruptcy, but to dispense with many territorial exactions which pressed hard on the lower orders, and to give relief and breath to that most useful portion of the community. These desirable results, however, flowed from that divine alchemy which calls good out of evil, without affording a justification to the perpetrators of the latter.

Shortly after the adoption of this plan, embraced against his opinion and his remonstrances, Necker saw his services were no longer acceptable to the assembly, and that he could not be useful to the king. He tendered his resignation, which was received with cold indifference by the assembly; and even his safety was endangered, on his return to his native country, by the very people who had twice hailed him as their deliverer. This accomplished statesman discovered too late, that public opinion requires to be guided and directed towards the ends of public good, which it will not reach by its own unassisted and misdirected efforts; and that his own popularity had only been the stalking-horse, through means of which, men less honest, and more subtle than himself, had taken aim at their own objects.

But the majority of the National Assembly had yet another and even a more violent experiment to try upon the Gallican Church establishment. It was one which touched the consciences of the French clergy in the same degree as the former affected their fortunes, and was so much the less justifiable, that it is difficult to suggest any motive except the sweeping desire to introduce novelty in every department of the state, and to have a constitutional clergy as they had a constitutional king, which should have instigated them to such a measure.

When the assembly had decreed the assumption

of the church-lands, it remained to be settled on what foundation religion was to be placed within the kingdom. A motion was made for decreeing, that the holy apostolical religion was that of France, and that its worship alone should be permitted. A carthusian monk, named Dom Gerle, made this proposal, alarmed too late lest the popular party, to which he had so long adhered, should now be about to innovate in the matters of the church, as they had already in those of the state. The debate was conducted with decency for one day, but on the second the hall of the assembly was surrounded by a large and furious multitude, who insulted, beat, and maltreated all who were known to favour the measure under consideration. It was represented within the house, that the passing the decree proposed would be the signal for a religious war; and Dom Gerle withdrew his motion in terror and despair.

The success of this opposition showed, that almost any experiment on the church might be tried with effect, since the religion which it taught seemed no longer to interest the national legislators. A scheme was brought forward, in which the public worship (*culte public*) as it was affectively termed, without any addition of reverence (as if to give it the air of a mere code of formal enactments), was provided for on the narrowest and most economical plan. But this was not all. A civil constitution was by the same code framed for the clergy, declaring them totally independent of the See of Rome, and vesting the choice of bishops in the departmental authorities. To this constitution each priest and prelate was required to adhere by a solemn oath. A subsequent decree of the assembly declared forfeiture of his benefice against whosoever should hesitate; but the clergy of France showed in that trying moment that they knew how to chuse betwixt sinning against their conscience, and suffering wrong at the hands of man. Their dependence on the See of Rome was a part of their creed, an article of their faith, which they would not compromise. The noble attitude of firmness and self-denial adopted by prelates and richly-beneficed clergymen, who had hitherto been thought more governed by levities of every kind than by regard to their profession, commanded for a time the respect of the assembly, silenced the blasphemies of the hired assistants in the tribunes, and gave many to fear that, in depriving the church of its earthly power, the assembly might but give them means to extend their spiritual dominion more widely, and awake an interest in their fate which slumbered during their prosperity. "Beware what you do," said Montlosier. "You may expel the bishop from his episcopal residence, but it will be only to open to him the cabins of the poor. If you take from his hands the cross of gold, he will display a cross of wood; and it was by a cross of wood that the world was saved."

Summoned one by one to take the oath, or refuse it under the consequences menaced, the assembly, fearful of the effect of their firmness, would scarce hear these sufferers speak a syllable, save yes or no. Their tumult on the occasion resembled the beating of drums to drown the last words of a martyr. Few, indeed, were the priests who accepted the constitutional oath. There were in the

number only three bishops. One had been a person of note—it was that Archbishop of Sens—that very cardinal, whose mal-administration of fifteen months had led to this mighty change. Another of the three constitutional prelates was destined to be much more remarkable—it was the celebrated Talleyrand, whose talents as a statesman have been so distinguished.

The National Assembly failed totally in their attempts to found a national church. The priests who took the oaths received neither reverence nor affection, and were only treated with decency by such as considered religion in the light of a useful political institution. They were alike despised by the sincere catholic, and the declared infidel. All of real religious feeling or devotion that was left in France turned towards their ancient pastors, and though the impulse was not strong enough to counteract the revolutionary movement, it served on many occasions to retard and embarrass it. The experiment which had thus signally miscarried, was indeed as impolitic as it was unnecessary. It can only be imputed, on the one hand, to the fanaticism of the modern philosophers, who expected by this indirect course to have degraded the christian religion; and, on the other, to the preconceived determination of the revolutionists, that no consideration should interfere with the plan of new-modeling the nation through all its institutions, as well of church as of state.

Victorious at once over altar and throne, mitre and coronet, king, nobles, and clergy, the National Assembly seemed in fact to possess, and to exert, that omnipotence, which has been imputed to the British Parliament. Never had any legislature made such extensive and sweeping changes, and never were such changes so easily accomplished. The nation was altered in all its relations; its flag and its emblems were changed—everything of a public character was destroyed and replaced, down to the very title of the sovereign, who, no longer termed King of France and Navarre, was now called King of the French. The names and divisions of the provinces, which had existed for many years were at once obliterated, and were supplied by a geographical partition of the territory into eighty-three departments, subdivided into six hundred districts, and these again portioned out into forty-eight thousand communities or municipalities. By thus recasting as it were the whole geographical relations of the separate territories of which France consisted, the Abbé Siéyes designed to obliterate former recollections and distinctions, and to bring everything down to the general level of liberty and equality. But it had an effect beyond what was proposed. While the provinces existed they had their separate capitals, their separate privileges; and those capitals, though in a subordinate rank, being yet the seats of provincial parliaments, had a separate consequence, inferior to, but yet distinct from, that of Paris. But when France became one single province, the importance of its sole capital, Paris, was increased to a most formidable degree: and during the whole Revolution, and through all its changes, whatever party held the metropolis was sure speedily to acquire the supreme power through the whole departments; and woe to those who made the fruit-

less attempt to set the sense or feelings of the nation in opposition to those of the capital! Republican or royalist was equally sure to perish in the rash attempt.

The Parliaments of France, long the strong-holds of liberty, now perished unnoticed, as men pull down old houses to clear the ground for modern edifices. The sale of offices of justice was formally abolished; the power of nominating the judges was taken from the crown; the trial by jury, with inquests of accusation and conviction, corresponding to the grand and petty juries of England, were sanctioned and established. In thus clearing the channels of public justice, dreadfully clogged as they had become during the decay of the monarchy, the National Assembly rendered the greatest possible services to France, the good effects of which will long be felt. Other alterations were of a more doubtful character. There might be immediate policy, but there was certainly much harshness, in wresting from the crown the power of granting pardons. If this was for fear lest grace should be extended to those condemned for the new crime of *lèse-nation*, or treason against the constitution, the legislators might have remembered how seldom the king dares to exercise this right of mercy in favour of an unpopular criminal. It requires no small courage to come betwixt the dragon and his wrath, the people and their victim. Charles I. dared not save Strafford.

The National Assembly also recognized the freedom of the press; and, in doing so, conferred on the nation a gift fraught with much good and some evil, capable of stimulating the worst passions, and circulating the most atrocious calumnies, and occasioning frequently the most enormous deeds of cruelty and injustice; but ever bearing along with it the means of curing the very evils caused by its abuses, and of transmitting to futurity the sentiments of the good and wise, so invaluable when the passions are silenced, and the calm slow voice of reason and reflection comes to obtain a hearing. The press stimulated massacres and proscriptions during the frightful period which we are approaching; but the press has also held up to horror the memory of the perpetrators, and exposed the artifices by which the actors were instigated. It is a rock on which a vessel may be, indeed, and is often wrecked; but that same rock affords the foundation of the brightest and noblest beacon.

We might add to the weight of benefits which France unquestionably owes to the Constituent Assembly, that they restored liberty of conscience by establishing universal toleration. But against this benefit must be set the violent imposition of the constitutional oath upon the catholic clergy, which led afterwards to such horrible massacres of innocent and reverend victims, murdered in defiance of those rules of toleration, which, rather in scorn of religion of any kind than regard to men's consciences, the assembly had previously adopted.

Faithful to their plain of forming, not a popular monarchy, but a species of royal republic, and stimulated by the real republicans, whose party was daily gaining ground among their ranks, as well as by the howls and threats of those violent and outrageous demagogues, who, from the seats they had

adopted in the assembly, were now known by the name of the Mountain, the framers of the constitution had rendered it democratical in every point, and abridged the royal authority, till its powers became so dim and obscure as to merit Burke's happy illustration, when he exclaimed, speaking of the new-modeled French government,—

— What seem'd its head,
The likeness of a kingly crown had on.

The crown was deprived of all appointments to civil offices, which were filled up by popular elections, the constitutionalists being in this respect faithful to their own principles, which made the will of the people the source of all power. Never was such an immense patronage vested in the body of any nation at large, and the arrangement was politic in the immediate sense, as well as in conformity with the principles of those who adopted it; for it attached to the new constitution the mass of the people, who felt themselves elevated from village into the exercise of sovereign power. Each member of the elective assembly of a municipality, through whose collective votes bishops, administrators, judges, and other official persons received their appointments, felt for the moment the importance which his privilege bestowed, and recognized in his own person, with corresponding self-complacency, a fraction, however small, of the immense community, now governed by those whom they themselves elected into office. The charm of power is great at all times, but exquisite to intoxication to those to whom it is a novelty.

Called to the execution of these high duties, which hitherto they had never dreamed of, the people at large became enamoured of their own privileges, carried them into every department of society, and were legislators and debaters in season and out of season. The exercise even of the extensive privilege committed to them seemed too limited to these active citizens. The Revolution appeared to have turned the heads of the whole lower classes, and those who had hitherto thought least of political rights were now seized with the fury of deliberating, debating, and legislating, in all possible times and places. The soldiers on guard debated at the *Oratoire*—the journeymen tailors held a popular assembly at the *Colonnade*—the peruke-makers met at the *Champs Élysées*. In spite of the opposition of the National Guard, three thousand shoemakers deliberated on the price of shoes, in the *Place Louis Quinze*; every house of call was converted into the canvassing-hall of a political body; and France for a time presented the singular picture of a country, where every one was so much involved in public business, that he had little leisure to attend to his own.

There was, besides, a general disposition to assume and practise the military profession; for the right of insurrection having been declared sacred, each citizen was to be prepared to discharge effectually so holy a duty. The citizens procured muskets to defend their property—the rabble obtained pikes to invade that of others—the people of every class everywhere possessed themselves of arms, and the most peaceful burgesses were desirous of the honours

of the epaulet. The children, with mimicry proper to their age, formed battalions in the streets, and the spirit in which they were formed was intimated by the heads of cats borne upon pikes in front of the juvenile revolutionists.*

In the departments, the fever of legislation was the same. Each district had its permanent committee, its committee of police, its military committee, civil committee, and committee of subsistence. Each committee had its president, its vice-president, and its secretaries. Each district was desirous of exercising legislative authority; each committee of usurping the executive power.† Amid these subordinate conclaves, every theme of eulogy and enthusiasm referred to the Revolution which had made way for the power they enjoyed, every subject of epidemic alarm to the most distant return towards the ancient system which had left the people in insignificance. Rumour found a ready audience for every one of her thousand tongues; Discord a prompt hand, in which she might place each of her thousand snakes.

The affiliation, as it was called, or close correspondence of the jacobin clubs in all their ramifications, tended to influence this political fever, and to direct its fury against the last remains of royalty. Exaggerated and unfounded reports of counter-revolutionary plots and aristocratical conspiracies not a little increased by the rash conversation and impotent efforts of the nobility in some districts, were circulated with the utmost care; and the falsehood, which had been confuted at Paris, received new currency in the departments, as that which was of departmental growth was again circulated with eagerness in the metropolis. Thus, the minds of the people were perpetually kept in a state of excitation, which is not without its pleasures. They are of a nature peculiarly incompatible with soundness in judgment and moderation in action, but favourable in the same degree to audacity of thought, and determination in execution.

The royal prerogative of the king, so closely watched, was in appearance formidable enough to be the object of jealousy and suspicion, but in reality a mere pageant, which possessed no means either of attack or resistance. The king was said to be the organ of the executive power, yet he had named but a small proportion of the officers in the army and navy, and those who received their appointments from a source so obnoxious possessed little credit amongst those whom they commanded. He was the nominal head of six ministers, who were perpetually liable to be questioned by the assembly, in which they might be called to defend themselves as criminals, but had no seat or vote to enable them to mingle in its debates. This was, perhaps, one of the greatest errors of the constitution; for the relation which the ministers bore to the legislative body was of such a limited and dependent nature as excluded all ideas of confidence and cordiality. The king's person was said to be inviolable, but the

frowning brows of a large proportion of his subjects, their public exclamations, and the pamphlets circulated against him, intimated very different doctrine. He might propose to the assembly the question of peace or war, but it remained with them to decide upon it. Lastly, the king had the much-grudged privilege of putting a veto on any decree of the legislative body, which was to have the effect of suspending the passing of the law until the proposition had been renewed in two successive assemblies; after which the royal sanction was held as granted. This mode of arresting the progress of any favourite law was likely to be as dangerous to the sovereign, in its exercise, as the attempt to stop a carriage by catching hold of the wheel. In fact, whenever the king attempted to use this sole relic of monarchical power, he risked his life, and it was by doing so that he at length forfeited it. Among these mutilated features of sovereignty, it is scarce worth while to mention, that the king's effigy was still struck upon the public coin, and his name prefixed to public edicts.

Small as was the share of public power which the new constitution of France afforded to the crown, Louis, in outward semblance at least, appeared satisfied. He made it a rule to adopt the advice of the assembly on all occasions, and to sanction every decree which was presented to him. He accepted even that which totally changed the constitution of the Gallican Church. He considered himself doubtless as under forcible restraint, ever since he had been dragged in triumph from Versailles to Paris, and therefore complied with what was proposed to him, under the tacit protest that his acquiescence was dictated by force and fear. His palace was guarded by eight hundred men, with two pieces of cannon; and although this display of force was doubtless intended by La Fayette to assure Louis's personal safety, yet it was no less certain that it was designed also to prevent his escape from the metropolis. The king had, therefore, good cause to conceive himself possessed of the melancholy privilege of a prisoner, who cannot incur any legal obligation by acts which do not flow from free-will, and therefore finds a resource against oppression in the incapacities which attend it. It was, however, carrying this privilege to the verge of dissimulation, nay, beyond it, when* the king went, apparently freely and voluntarily, down to the National Assembly, and, in a dignified and touching speech (could it have been thought a sincere one), accepted the constitution, made common cause with the regenerated nation, and declared himself the head of the Revolution. Constrained as he was by circumstances, anxious for his own safety and that of his family, the conduct of Louis must not be too severely criticised; but this step was unkingly as well as impolitic; and the unfortunate monarch gained nothing by abasing himself to the deceit which he practised at the urgency of his ministers, excepting the degradation attending a deception, by which none are deceived. No one, when the heat of the first enthusiasm was over, gave the king credit for sincerity in his acceptance of the constitution.

* *Mémoires du Marquis de Ferrières*, Livre 3e (vol. I.) 3 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1822.

† *Mémoires d'un Témoin de la Révolution*, ouvrage posthume de Jean-Sylvain Bailly; 16 Août (vol. III, p. 87) 3 vols. 8vo, Paris, 1804.

* 4th February, 1790.

tion; the royalists were revolted, and the revolutionists could only regard the speech and accession as the acts of royal hypocrisy. Louis was openly spoken of as a prisoner; and the public voice, in a thousand different forms, announced that his life would be the penalty of any attempt to his deliverance.

Meanwhile, the king endeavoured to work out his escape from Paris and the Revolution at once, by the means of two separate agents in whom alone he confided.

The first was no other than Mirabeau, that very Mirabeau who had contributed so much to the Revolution, but who, an aristocrat at heart, and won over to the royal party by high promises of wealth and advancement, at length laboured seriously to undo his own work. His plan was, to use the assembly itself, in which his talents, eloquence, and audacity, gave him so much influence, as the means of re-establishing the royal authority. He proposed, as the final measure, that the king should retire from Paris to Metz, then under the government of the Marquis de Bouillé, and he conceived his own influence in the assembly to be such, that he could have drawn thither, upon some reasonable terms of accommodation, a great majority of the members. It is certain he had the highest ascendancy which any individual orator exercised over that body, and was the only one who dared to retort threats and defiance to the formidable jacobins. "I have resisted military and ministerial despotism," said he, when opposing a proposed law against the emigrants; "can it be supposed I will yield to that of a club?"—"By what right," exclaimed Goupil, "does Mirabeau act as a dictator in the assembly?"—"Goupil," replied Mirabeau, "is as much mistaken when he calls me a dictator, as formerly when he termed me a Catiline."—"The indignant roar of the jacobins bellowing from their boasted Mountain, in vain endeavoured to interrupt him."—"Silence these thirty voices," said Mirabeau, at the full pitch of his thundering voice; and the volcano was silent at his bidding. Yet, possessed as he was of this mighty power, Mirabeau did not, perhaps, reflect how much less it would have availed him on the royal side, than when he sailed with all the wind and tide which the spirit of a great and general revolution could lend him. He was a man, too, as remarkable for his prodigacy as his wonderful talents, and the chance which the king must have risked in embarking with him, was like that of the prince in the tale, who escaped from a desert island by embarking on board a skiff drifting among dangerous eddies, and rowed by a figure half human and half tiger.* The experiment was prevented by the sudden and violent illness and death of Mirabeau, who fell a victim

* Mirabeau bore much of his character imprinted on his person and features. He was short, bull-necked, and very strongly made. A quantity of thick matted hair hung round features of a coarse and exaggerated character, strongly scorched and seamed. "Figure to your mind," he said, describing his own countenance to a lady who knew him not, "a tiger who has had the small-pox." When he talked of confronting his opponents in the assembly, his favourite phrase was, "I will show them *La Hure*," that is, the bear's head, meaning his own tusked and shaggy countenance.

to his debaucheries. His death was greatly lamented, though it is probable that, had the apostle of the Revolution lived much longer, he would either have averted its progress, or his dissevered limbs would have ornamented the pikes of those multitudes, who, as it was, followed him to the grave with weapons trailed, and howling and lamentation.*

The king's other confidant was the Marquis de Bouillé, a person entirely different from Mirabeau. He was a French soldier of the old stamp, a royalist by birth and disposition; had gained considerable fame during the American war, and at the time of the Revolution was governor of Metz and Alsace. Bouillé was endowed with a rare force of character, and proved able, without having recourse to disguise of any kind, to keep the garrison of Metz in tolerable discipline during the general dissolution of the army. The state of military insubordination was so great, that La Fayette, and his party in the assembly, not only hesitated to dismiss a general who was feared and obeyed by the regiments under his command, but, royalist as he was, they found themselves obliged to employ the Marquis de Bouillé and his troops in subduing the formidable revolt of three regiments quartered at Nancy, which he accomplished with complete success, and such slaughter among the insurgents, as was likely to recommend subordination in future. The republican party of course gave this act of authority the name of a massacre of the people, and even the assembly at large, though Bouillé acted in consequence of their authority, saw with anxiety the increased importance of an avowed royalist. La Fayette, who was Bouillé's relation, spared no pains to gain him to the constitutional side, while Bouillé avowed publicly that he only retained his command in obedience to the king, and in the hope of serving him.

With this general, who had as yet preserved an authority that was possessed by no other royalist in France, the king entered into a close though secret correspondence in cypher, which turned chiefly on the best mode of facilitating the escape of the royal family from Paris, where late incidents had rendered his abode doubly odious and doubly dangerous.

La Fayette's strength consisted in his popularity with the middle classes of the Parisians, who, in the character of National Guards, looked up to him as their commandant, and in general obeyed his orders in dispersing those tumultuous assemblies of the lower orders, which threatened danger to persons and property. But La Fayette, though fixed in his principle to preserve monarchy as a part of the constitution, seems to have been always on cold and distrustful terms with the monarch personally. He was perpetually trying his own feelings, and those whom he influenced, by the thermometer, and became alarmed if his own loyalty or theirs arose above the most tepid degree.

Two marked incidents served to show that the civic guard were even less warm than their commandant in zeal for the royal person.

The National Guard, headed by La Fayette, to-

* He died 2d April, 1791.

gether with the edict respecting martial law, had, as we have observed, greatly contributed to the restoration of order in Paris, by checking, and dispersing, upon various occasions, those disorderly assemblies of rioters, whose violence and cruelty had dishonoured the commencement of the Revolution. But the spirit which raised these commotions was unabated, and was carefully nourished by the jacobins and all their subordinate agents, whose popularity lay among the rabble, as that of the constitutionalists did with the citizens. Among the current falsehoods of the day, arose a report that the old Castle of Vincennes, situated about three miles from Paris, was to be used as a state prison in place of the Bastille. A large mob marched from the suburb called St-Antoine, the residence of a great number of labourers of the lowest order, already distinguished by its zeal for the revolutionary doctrines.* They were about to commence the destruction of the ancient castle, when the vigilant commandant of Paris arrived and dispersed them, not without bloodshed. In the meantime, the few royalists whom Paris still contained became alarmed lest this tumult, though beginning in another quarter, might be turned against the person of the king. For his protection about three hundred gentlemen repaired to the Tuileries, armed with sword-canes, short swords, pistols, and such other weapons as could be best concealed about their persons, as they went through the streets. Their services and zeal were graciously acknowledged by the unfortunate Louis, little accustomed of late to such marks of devotion. But when La Fayette returned to the palace, at the head of his grenadiers of the National Guard, he seems not to have been ill pleased that the intrusion of these gentlemen gave him an opportunity of showing, that if he had dispersed the revolutionary mob of the faubourgs, it was without any undue degree of affection to the royal cause. He felt, or affected, extreme jealousy of the armed aristocrats whom he found in the Tuileries, and treated them as men who had indecently thrust themselves into the palace, to usurp the duty of defending the king's person, by law consigned to the National Guard. To appease the jealousy of the civic soldiers, the king issued his commands upon the royalists to lay down their arms. He was no sooner obeyed by those, to whom alone out of so many millions he could still issue his commands, than a most scandalous scene ensued. The soldiers, falling upon the unfortunate gentlemen, expelled them from the palace with blows and insult, applying to them the name of Knights of the Poniard, afterwards often repeated in revolutionary objur-gation. The vexation and sorrow of the captive prince had a severe effect on his health, and was followed by indisposition.

The second incident we have alluded to intimat-ed even more directly the personal restraint in which he was now held. Early in spring† Louis had expressed his purpose of going to St-Cloud, under the pretext of seeking a change of air, but in reality, it may be supposed, for the purpose of ascertaining what

degree of liberty he would be permitted to exercise. The royal carriages were drawn out, and the king and queen had already mounted theirs, when the cries of the spectators, echoed by those of the National Guards who were upon duty, declared that the king should not be permitted to leave the Tuileries. La Fayette arrived—commanded, implored, threatened the refractory guards, but was answered by their unanimous refusal to obey his orders. After the scene of tumult had lasted more than an hour, and it had been clearly proved that La Fayette's authority was unable to accomplish his purpose, the royal persons returned to the palace, now their absolute and avowed prison.

La Fayette was so much moved by this affront, that he laid down his commission as commandant of the National Guard, and although he resumed it, upon the general remonstrances and excuses of the corps, it was not without severely reproaching them for their want of discipline, and intimating justly, that the respect they showed ought to be for his rank and office, not for his person.

Meantime, the natural inferences from these cruel lessons drove the king and queen nearly desperate. The events of the 28th of February had shown that they were not to be permitted to introduce their friends or defenders within the fatal walls which enclosed them; those of the 18th April proved, that they were not allowed to leave their precincts. To fly from Paris, to gather around him such faithful subjects as might remain, seemed, though a desperate resource, the only one which remained to the unhappy monarch, and the preparations were already made for the fatal experiment.

The Marquis de Bouillé had, under various pretences, formed a camp at Montmédy, and had drawn thither some of the troops he could best depend upon; but such was the universal indisposition, both of the soldiery and the people of every description, that the general seems to have entertained almost no hope of any favourable result for the royal cause. The king's life might have been saved by his escaping into foreign parts, but there was hardly any prospect of restoring the monarchy.

The history of the unhappy journey to Varennes is well known. On the night between the 20th and 21st of June, Louis and his queen, with their two children, attended by one lady, and escorted by three gentlemen of the *Gardes du Corps*, set out in disguise from Paris. The king left behind him a long manifesto, inculcating the assembly for various political errors, and solemnly protesting against the acts of government to which he had been compelled, as he stated, to give his assent, during what he termed his captivity, which he seemed to have dated from his compulsory residence in the Tuileries.

The very first person whom the queen encountered in the streets was La Fayette himself, as he crossed the Place du Carrousel. A hundred other dangers attended the route of the unfortunate fugitives; and the hair-breadth escapes by which they profited seemed to intimate the favour of fortune, while they only proved her mutability. An escort, placed for them at the Pont de Sommeville, had been withdrawn, after their remaining at that place for a time had excited popular suspicion. At Sainte Méné-

* February 28th, 1791.

† 18th April, 1791.

should they met a small detachment of dragoons, stationed there by Bouillé also for their escort. But while they halted to change horses, the king, whose features were remarkable, was recognized by Drouet, a son of the postmaster. The young man was a keen revolutionist, and, resolving to prevent the escape of the sovereign, he mounted a horse, and pushed forwards to Varennes to prepare the municipality for the arrival of the king.

Two remarkable chances seemed to show that the good angel of Louis still strove in his favour. Drouet was pursued by a resolute royalist, a quartermaster of dragoons, who suspected his purpose, and followed him with the design of preventing it at all hazards. But Drouet, better acquainted with the road, escaped a pursuit which might have been fatal to him. The other incident was, that Drouet for a time pursued the road to Verdun, instead of that to Varennes, concluding the king had taken the former direction, and was only undeceived by an accident.

He reached Varennes, and found a ready disposition to stop the flight of the unhappy prince. The king was stopped at Varennes and arrested; the National Guards were called out—the dragoons refused to fight in the king's defence—an escort of hussars, who might have cut a passage, arrived too late, acted with reluctance, and finally deserted the town. Still there remained one last throw for their freedom. If the time could have been protracted but for an hour and a half, Bouillé would have been before Varennes at the head of such a body of faithful and disciplined troops as might easily have dispersed the national militia. He had even opened a correspondence with the royal prisoners through a faithful emissary who ventured into Varennes, and obtained speech of the king; but could obtain no answer more decided than that, being a prisoner, Louis declined giving any orders. Finally, almost all the troops of the Marquis de Bouillé declared against the king and in favour of the nation, tending to show the little chance which existed of a favourable issue to the king's attempt to create a royalist force. The marquis himself made his escape with difficulty into the Austrian territories.

The Parisians in general, but especially the Legislative Assembly, had been at first astounded, as if by an earthquake. The king's escape seemed to menace his instant return at the head of aristocratical levies, supported by foreign troops. Reflection made most men see, as a more probable termination, that the dynasty of the Bourbons could no longer hold the crown; and that the government, already so democratical in principle, must become a republic in all its forms.* The constitutionalists grieved that

their constitution required a monarchical head; the republicans rejoiced, for it had long been their object to abolish the kingly office. Nor did the anarchists of the Jacobin Club less exult; for the events which had taken place, and their probable consequences, were such as to animate the revolutionary spirit, exasperate the public mind, prevent the return of order, and stimulate the evil passions of lawless ambition, and love of blood and rapine.

But La Fayette was determined not to relinquish the constitution he had formed, and, in spite of the unpopularity of the royal dignity, rendered more so by this frustrated attempt to escape, he was resolved to uphold it; and was joined in this purpose by Barnave and others, who did not always share his sentiments, but who thought it shame, apparently, to show to the world, that a constitution, framed for immortality upon the best political principles of the most accomplished statesmen in France, was so slightly built, as to part and go asunder at the first shock. The purpose of the commandant of Paris, however, was not to be accomplished without a victory over the united strength of the republican and jacobinical parties, who on their part might be expected to put in motion on the occasion their many-handed revolutionary engine, an insurrection of the people.

Such was the state of political opinions, when the unfortunate Louis was brought back to Paris. He was, with his wife and children, covered with dust, dejected with sorrow, and exhausted with fatigue. The faithful *Gardes du Corps* who had accompanied their flight, sat bound like felons on the driving-seat of the carriage. His progress was at first silent and unhonoured. The guard did not present arms—the people remained covered—no man said God bless him. At another part of the route, a number of the rabble precipitated themselves on the carriage, and it was with the utmost difficulty that the National Guards, and some deputies, could assure it a safe passage. Under such auspices were the royal family committed once more to their old prison of the Tuileries.

Meantime the crisis of the king's fate seemed to be approaching. It was not long ere the political parties had an opportunity of trying their respective force. A meeting was held upon the motion of the republican and jacobinical leaders, in the Champ de

ter,—the King of Naples was also no more. 'Surely,' said the worthy Neapolitan, 'the sun must vanish from heaven at such a combination of fatalities.' But they did not cease here. The Archbishop of Palermo, he is informed, has also died suddenly. Overcome by this last shock, he retired to bed, but not to sleep. In the morning he was disturbed in his melancholy reverie by a rumbling noise, which he recognized at once to be the motion of the wooden instrument which makes macaroni. 'Aha!' says the good man, starting up, 'Can I trust my ears?—The pope is dead—the King of Naples is dead—the Bishop of Palermo is dead—yet my neighbour the baker makes macaroni! Come! The lives of these great folks are not then so indispensable to the world after all.' The man in the great coat jumped down and disappeared. "I have caught his meaning," said a woman amongst the listeners. "He has told us a tale, and it begins like all tales—*There was once a king and a queen.*"

* The following anecdote will serve to show by what means this conclusion was insinuated into the public mind. A group in the Palais Royal were discussing in great alarm the consequences of the king's flight, when a man dressed in a thread-bare great-coat leaped upon a chair and addressed them thus:—"Citizens, listen to a tale, which shall not be a long one. A certain well-meaning Neapolitan was once on a time startled in his evening walk, by the astounding intelligence that the pope was dead. He had not recovered his astonishment, when behold he is informed of a new disaster."

Mars,* to subscribe a petition for the dethronement of the king, couched in the boldest and broadest terms. There was in this plain a wooden edifice raised on scaffolding, called the Altar of the Country, which had been erected for the ceremony of the Federation of 14th July, 1790, when the assembled representatives of the various departments of France took their oath to observe the constitution. On this altar the petition was displayed for signature; but each revolutionary act required a preliminary libation of blood, and the victims on this occasion were two wretched invalids, whom the rabble found at breakfast under the scaffolding which supported the revolutionary altar, and accused of a design to blow up the patriots. To accuse was to condemn. They were murdered without mercy, and their heads, paraded on pikes, became as usual the standards of the insurgent citizens. The municipal officers attempted to disperse the assemblage, but to no purpose. Bailly, mayor of Paris, together with La Fayette, resolved to repel force by force; martial law was proclaimed, and its signal, the red flag, was displayed from the Hôtel de Ville. La Fayette, with a body of grenadiers, arrived in the Champ de Mars. He was received with abuse, and execrations of "Down with La Fayette! Down with martial law!" followed by a volley of stones. The commandant gave orders to fire, and was on this occasion most promptly obeyed; for the grenadiers pouring their shot directly into the crowd, more than a hundred men lay dead at the first volley. The Champ de Mars was empty in an instant, and the constituted authority, for the first time since the Revolution commenced, remained master of a contested field. La Fayette ought to have followed up this triumph of the legal force, by giving a triumph to the law itself, in the trial and conviction of some of his prisoners, selecting particularly the agitators employed by the Club of Jacobins; but he thought he had done enough in frightening these harpies back to their dens. Some of their leaders sought and found refuge among the republicans, which was not in that hour of danger very willingly granted.† Marat and many others, who had been hitherto the undaunted and unwearied instigators of the rabble, were compelled to skulk in obscurity for some time after this victory of the Champ de Mars, which the jacobins felt severely at the time, and forgot not afterwards to avenge most cruelly.

This victory led to the triumph of the constitutionalists in the assembly. The united exertions of those who argued against the deposition of Louis, founding their reasoning upon that constitutional law, which declares the king inviolable in his person, overpowered the party who loudly called on the assembly to proclaim his forfeiture, or appoint his trial. The assembly clogged, however, the future inviolability of the king with new penalties. If the king, having accepted the constitution, should retract, they decreed he should be considered as abdicated. If he should order his army, or any part of it, to act against the nation, this should in

like manner be deemed an act of abdication; and an abdicated monarch, it was farther decreed, should become an ordinary citizen, answerable to the laws for every act he had done before or since the act of abdication.

The constitution, with the royal immunity thus curtailed and maimed, was now again presented to the king, who again accepted it purely and simply, in terms which, while they excited acclamation from the assembly, were but feebly echoed from the gallery.* The legislators were glad to make a virtue of necessity, and complete their constitutional code, though in a precarious manner; but the hearts of the people were now decidedly alienated from the king, and, by a strange concurrence of misfortune, mixed with some errors, Louis, whose genuine and disinterested good intentions ought to have made him the darling of his subjects, had now become the object of their jealousy and detestation.

Upon reviewing the measures which had been adopted on the king's return to Paris, historians will probably be of opinion, that it was impolitic in the assembly to offer the constitutional crown to Louis, and imprudent in that unhappy prince to accept it under the conditions annexed. On the former point it must be remembered, that these innovators, who had changed everything else in the state, could, upon principle, have had no hesitation to alter the person or the dynasty of their sovereign. According to the sentiments which they had avowed, the king, as well as the nobles and clergy, was in their hands, as clay in that of the potter, to be used or thrown away at pleasure. The present king, in the manifesto left behind him on his flight, had protested to all Europe against the system of which he was made the head, and it was scarce possible that his sentiments could be altered in its favour, by the circumstances attending his unwilling return from Varennes. The assembly, therefore, acting upon their own principles, should have at once proceeded on the idea that his flight was a virtual abdication of the crown—they should have made honourable provision for a prince placed in so uncommon a situation, and suffered him to enjoy in Spain or Italy an honourable independence, so soon as the storm was ended which threatened them from abroad. In the meanwhile, the person of the king would have been a pledge in their hands, which might have given them some advantage in treating with the foreign princes of his family, and the potentates of Europe. The general policy of this appears so obvious, that it was probably rather the difficulty of arranging in what hands the executive authority should be lodged, than any preference of Louis XVI., which induced the assembly again to deposit it in his hands, shorn in a great measure even of the limited consequence and privileges constitutionally annexed to it. La Fayette and his party perhaps reckoned on the king's spirit having given way, from observing how unanimously the people of France were disposed in favour of the new state of things, and may have trusted to his accommodating himself, therefore, without further resistance, to act the part of the unsubstantial pageant which the constitution assigned him.

* July 17, 1791.

† *Mémoires de Madame Roland*—article Robert (vol. II, p. 201) : 2 vols 8vo, Paris, 1820.

* September 14, 1791.

If it was impolitic in the constitutionalists to replace the crown upon the head of Louis, it was certainly unworthy of that monarch to accept it, unless invested with such a degree of power as might give him some actual weight and preponderance in the system. Till his flight to Varennes, the king's dislike to the constitution was a secret in his own bosom, which might indeed be suspected from circumstances, but which could not be proved; and which, placed as he was, the king was entitled to conceal, since his real sentiments could not be avowed consistently with his personal safety. But now this veil was torn aside, and he had told all Europe in a public declaration, that he had been acting under constraint since the time he was brought in triumph from Versailles to Paris. It would certainly have been most dignified in Louis to have stood or fallen in conformity with this declaration, made on the only occasion which he had enjoyed for such a length of time, of speaking his own free sentiments. He should not, when brought back to his prison, have resumed the submission of a prisoner, or affected to accept as a desirable boon, the restoration, as it might be called, and that in a mutilated state, of a sovereignty, which he had voluntarily abandoned at such extreme personal risk. His resolutions were too flexible, and too much at the mercy of circumstances, to be royal or noble. Charles I., even in the Isle of Wight, treated with his subjects, as a prisoner indeed, but still as a king, refusing to accede to such articles as in his own mind he was determined not to abide by. Louis, we conceive, should have returned the same answer to the assembly which he did to the royalist officer at Varennes, "that a prisoner could give no orders, and make no concessions." He should not, like a bird which has escaped and been retaken, forget the notes which he uttered when at freedom, and return to his set and prescribed prison-song the instant that the cage again inclosed him. No man, above all no king, should place the language of his feelings and sentiments so much at the disposal of fortune. An adherence to the sentiments expressed in his voluntary declaration might, it is possible, have afforded him the means of making some more favourable composition; whereas the affectation of willing submission to the same force which his own voice had so lately proclaimed illegal, could but make the unhappy king suspected of attempting a deceit, by which no one could be deceived. But the difficulties of his situation were great, and Louis might well remember the proverb, which places the grave of deposed sovereigns close to their prison-gates. He might be persuaded to temporize with the party which still offered to preserve a show of royalty in the constitution, until time or circumstances permitted him to enlarge its basis. In the meantime, if we can believe Bertrand de Moleville, Louis avowed to him the determination to act under the constitution with all sincerity and good faith; but it must be owned, that it would have required the virtues of a saint to have enabled him to make good his pledge, had the success of the Austrians, or any strong counter-revolutionary movement, tempted him to renounce it. At all events, the king was placed in a doubtful and suspicious position towards the people

of France, who must necessarily have viewed with additional jealousy the head of a government, who, avowedly discontented with the share of power allotted to him, had nevertheless accepted it,—like the impoverished gamester, who will rather play for small stakes than be cut out of the game.

The work of the constitution being thus accomplished, the National, or, as it is usually called, the Constituent Assembly, dissolved itself, agreeably to the vow they had pronounced in the tennis-court at Versailles. The constitution, that structure which they raised for immortality, soon afterwards became ruinous; but in few assemblies of statesmen have greater and more varied talents been assembled. Their debates were often fierce and stormy, their mode of arguing wild and vehement, their resolutions sudden and ill-considered. These were the faults partly of the French character, which is peculiarly open to sudden impulses, partly to the great changes perpetually crowding upon them, and to the exciting progress of a revolution which hurried all men into extravagance. On the other hand, they respected freedom of debate; and the proscription of members of their body, for maintaining and declaring their sentiments, in opposition to that of the majority, is not to be found in their records, though so fearfully frequent in those of their successors. Their main and master error was the attempt to do too much, and to do it all at once. The parties kept no terms with each other, would wait for no conviction, and make no concession. It was a war for life and death betwixt men, who, had they seen more calmly for their country and for themselves, would rather have sacrificed some part of the theoretical exactness of principle on which they insisted, to the opportunity of averting practical evil, or attaining practical good. The errors of the assembly were accordingly those of extremes. They had felt the weight of the feudal chains, and they destroyed the whole nobility. The monarch had been too powerful for the liberties of the subject—they now bound him as a slave at the feet of the legislative authority. Their arch of liberty gave way, because they hesitated to place upon it, in the shape of an efficient executive government, a weight sufficient to keep it steady. Yet to these men France was indebted for the first principles of civil liberty. They kindled the flame, though they could not regulate it; and such as now enjoy its temperate warmth should have sympathy for the errors of those to whom they owe a boon so inestimable;—nor should this sympathy be the less, that so many perished in the conflagration, which, at the commencement, they had fanned too rashly. They did even more, for they endeavoured to heal the wounds of the nation by passing an act of general amnesty, which at once placed in security the jacobins of the Champ de Mars, and the unfortunate companions of the king's flight. This was one of their last and wisest decrees, could they have enforced its observance by their successors.

The adieus which they took of power were anything but prophetic. They pronounced the Revolution ended, and the constitution completed—the one was but commencing, and the other was baseless as a morning dream.

CHAPTER VII.

Legislative Assembly—Its composition.—Constitutionalists—Girondists or brissotins—Jacobins.—Views and sentiments of foreign nations—England—Views of the tories and whigs—Anacharsis Klotz—Austria—Prussia—Russia—Sweden.—Emigration of the French princes and clergy.—Increasing unpopularity of Louis from this cause.—Death of the Emperor Leopold, and its effects.—France declares war.—Views and interests of the different parties in France at this period.—Decree against Monsieur.—Louis interposes his veto.—Decree against the priests who should refuse the constitutional oath.—Louis again interposes his veto.—Consequences of these refusals.—Fall of De Lessart.—Ministers now chosen from the brissotins.—All parties favourable to war.

THE First, or Constituent Assembly, in destroying almost all which existed as law in France, when they were summoned together as States-general, had preserved, at least in form, the name and power of a monarch. The Legislative Assembly, which succeeded them, seemed preparing to destroy the symbol of royalty which their predecessors had left standing, though surrounded by republican enactments.

The composition of this second body of representatives was much more unfavourable to the royal cause than that of those whom they succeeded. In a bad hour for France and themselves, the Constituent Assembly had adopted two regulations, which had the same disabling effect on their own political interest, as the celebrated self-denying ordinance in the Long Parliament had upon that of the presbyterians. By the first of these decrees, the members of the Constituent Assembly were rendered incapable of being elected to that which should succeed its dissolution. By the second, they were declared ineligible to be ministers of the crown, until two years had elapsed after their sitting as legislators. Those individuals who had already acquired some political knowledge and information were thus virtually excluded from the counsels of the state, and pronounced inadmissible into the service of the crown. This exclusion was adopted upon the wild principle of leveling, which was one prime moving spring of the Revolution, and which affected to destroy even the natural aristocracy of talents. "Who are the distinguished members whom the speaker mentions?" said a jacobin orator, in the true spirit of this imaginary equality;—"There are no members of the assembly more distinguished than others by talents or skill, any more than by birth or rank—We are all EQUAL." Rare words indeed, and flattering, doubtless, to many in the assembly. Unhappily, no legislative decree can give sense to folly, or experience to ignorance; it could only prevent a certain portion of wisdom and talent from being called into the service of the country. Both king and people were necessarily obliged to put their confidence in men of inexperience in business, liable to act with all the rashness by which inexperience is generally attended. As the Constituent Assembly contained the first and readiest choice among the men of ability whom France had in her bosom, it followed that the se-

cond assembly could not be equal to the first in abundance of talent; but still the Legislative Assembly held in its ranks many men of no ordinary acquirements, and a few of a corresponding boldness and determination of character. A slight review of the parties into which it was divided, will show how much the influence of the crown was lowered in the scale.

There was no party remained which could be termed strictly or properly royalist. Those who were attached to the old monarchy of France were now almost all exiles, and there were left but few even of that second class of more moderate and more reasonable royalists, who desired to establish a free constitution on the basis of an effective monarchy, strong enough to protect the laws against license, but not sufficiently predominant to alter or overthrow them. Cazalès, whose chivalrous defence of the nobility,—Maury, whose eloquent pleadings for the church,—had so often made an honourable but vain struggle against the advances of revolution, were now silent and absent, and the few feeble remnants of their party had ranged themselves with the constitutionalists, who were so far favourers of monarchy as it made part of their favourite system—and no farther. La Fayette continued to be the organ of that party, and had assembled under his banners Duport, Barnave, Lameth, all of whom had striven to keep pace with the headlong spirit of the Revolution, but, being outstripped by more active and forward champions of the popular cause, now shifted ground, and formed a union with those who were disposed to maintain, that the present constitution was adapted to all the purposes of free and effectual government, and that, by its creation, all farther revolutionary measures were virtually superseded.

In stern opposition to those admirers of the constitution, stood two bodies of unequal numbers, strength, and efficacy; of which the first was determined that the Revolution should never stop until the downfall of the monarchy, while the second entertained the equally resolved purpose of urging these changes still farther onwards, to the total destruction of all civil order, and the establishment of a government in which terror and violence should be the ruling principles, to be wielded by the hands of the demagogues who dared to nourish a scheme so nefarious. We have indicated the existence of both these parties in the first, or Constituent Assembly; but in the second, called the Legislative, they assumed a more decided form, and appeared united towards the abolition of royalty as a common end, though certain, when it was attained, to dispute with each other the use which was to be made of the victory. In the words of Shakspeare, they were determined

To lay this Angiers even with the ground,
Then, after, fight who should be king of it.

The first of these parties took its most common denomination from the Gironde, a department which sent most of its members to the Convention. Condorcet, dear to science, was one of this party, and it was often named from Brissot, another of its principal leaders. Its most distinguished champions

were men bred as lawyers in the south of France, who had, by mutual flattery, and the habit of living much together, acquired no small portion of that self-conceit and overweening opinion of each others' talents, which may be frequently found among small provincial associations for political or literary purposes. Many had eloquence, and most of them a high fond of enthusiasm, which a classical education, and their intimate communication with each other, where each idea was caught up, lauded, re-echoed, and enhanced, had exalted into a spirit of republican zeal. They doubtless had personal ambition, but in general it seems not to have been of a low or selfish character. Their aims were often honourable though visionary, and they marched with great courage towards their proposed goal, with the vain purpose of erecting a pure republic, in a state so disturbed as that of France, and by hands so polluted as those of their jacobin associates. It will be recorded, however, to the disgrace of their pretensions to stern republican virtue, that the girondists were willing to employ, for the accomplishment of their purpose, those base and guilty tools which afterwards effected their own destruction. They were for using the revolutionary means of insurrection and violence, until the republic should be established, and no longer; or, in the words of the satirist,

For letting rapine loose and murder,
To rage just so far, but no further;
And setting all the land on fire
To burn to a scantling, but no higher.

The jacobins,—the second of these parties,—were allies of the brissotins, with the ulterior purpose of urging the revolutionary force to the utmost, but using as yet the shelter of their republican mantle. Robespierre, who, by an affectation of a frugal and sequestered course of life, preserved among the multitude the title of the Incorruptible, might be considered as the head of the jacobins, if they had indeed a leader more than wolves have, which time their united voices to the cry of him who bays the loudest. Danton, inexorable as Robespierre himself, but less prudent, because he loved gold and pleasure as well as blood and power, was next in authority. Marat, who loved to talk of murder as soldiers do of battles; the wretched Collet d'Herbois, a broken-down play-actor; Chabot, an ex-capuchin; with many other men of desperate character, whose moderate talents were eked out by the most profligate effrontery, formed the advanced guard of this party, soiled with every species of crime, and accustomed to act their parts in the management of those dreadful insurrections, which had at once promoted and dishonoured the Revolution. It is needless to preserve from oblivion names such as Santerre and Hébert, distinguished for cruelty and villany above the other subaltern villains. Such was the party who, at the side of the brissotins, stood prompt to storm the last bulwarks of the monarchy, reserving to themselves the secret determination, that the spoil should be all their own.

The force of these three parties was as variously composed as their principles. That of La Fayette, as we have repeatedly observed, lay amongst the better order of shopkeepers and citizens, and other

proprietors, who had assumed arms for their own protection, and to maintain something like general good order. These composed the steadiest part of the National Guard, and, generally speaking, were at the devotion of their commandant, though his authority was resisted by them on some occasions, and seemed daily to grow more precarious. The royalists might perhaps have added some force to the constitutional party, but La Fayette did not now possess such an unsuspected character with the so called friends of freedom, as could permit him to use the obnoxious assistance of those who were termed its enemies. His high character as a military man still sustained an importance, which, nevertheless, was already somewhat on the wane.

The party of the Gironde had in their favour the theoretical amateurs of liberty and equality, young men, whose heated imaginations saw the Forum of ancient Rome in the gardens of the Palais Royal, and yielded a ready assent to whatsoever doctrine came recommended by a flourishing and eloquent peroration, and was rounded off in a sounding sentence, or a quaint apophthegm. The partisans of Brissot had some interest in the southern departments, who had sent them to the capital, and conceived that they had a great deal more. They pretended that there existed in those districts a purer flame of freedom than in the metropolis itself, and held out, that Liberty, if expelled from Paris, would yet find refuge in a new republic, to be founded on the other side of the Loire. Such day-dreams did not escape the jacobins, who carefully treasured them to be the apology of future violence, and finally twisted them into an accusation which bestowed on the brissotins the odious name of federalists, and charged them with an intention to dismember France, by splitting it into a league of petty commonwealths, like those of Holland and Switzerland.

The brissotins had a point of union in the saloon of Madame Roland, wife to one of their number. The beauty, talents, courage, and accomplishments of this remarkable woman, pushed forward into public notice a husband of very middling abilities, and preserved a high influence over the association of philosophical rhapsodists, who hoped to oppose pikes with syllogisms, and to govern a powerful country by the discipline of an academy.

The substantial and dreadful support of the jacobins lay in the club so named, with the yet more violent association of cordeliers, and their original affiliated societies, which reigned paramount over those of the municipal bodies, which in most departments were fain to crouch under their stern and sanguinary dominion. This club had more than once changed masters, for its principal and leading feature being the highest point of democratical ardour, it drove from its bosom in succession those who fell short of the utmost pitch of extravagant zeal for liberty and equality, manifested by the most uncompromising violence. The word *moderation* was as odious in this society as could have been that of slavery, and he who could affect the most exaggerated and outrageous strain of patriotism, was sure to outstrip their former leaders. Thus the Lameths took the guidance of the club out of the

hands of La Fayette; Robespierre and Marat wrenched the management from the Lameths; and, considering their pitch of extravagant ferocity, there was little chance of *their* losing it, unless an Avatar of the Evil Spirit had brought Satan himself to dispute the point in person.

The leaders, who were masters of this club, had possession, as we have often remarked, of the masterkeys of the passions of the populace, could raise a forest of pikes with one word, and unsheathe a thousand daggers with another. They directly and openly recommended the bloodiest and most ruffian-like actions, instead of those which, belonging to open and manly warfare, present something that is generous even in the midst of violence. "Give me," said the atrocious Marat, when instructing Barbaroux in his bloody science,—"Give me two hundred Neapolitans—the knife in their right hand, in their left a *muff*, to serve for a target—with these I will traverse France, and complete the Revolution." At the same lecture he made an exact calculation (for the monster was possessed of some science), showing in what manner two hundred and sixty thousand men might be put to death in one day. Such were the means, the men, and the plans of the jacobins, which they were now, in the Legislative Assembly, to oppose to the lukewarm loyalty of the constitutionalists, and, in the hour of need, to the fine-spun republican theories of the brissotins. But ere we proceed in our review of the internal affairs of the nation, it becomes now necessary to glance at her external relations.

Hitherto France had acted alone in this dreadful tragedy, while the other nations of Europe looked on in amazement, who now began to give place to a desire of action. No part of public law is more subtle in argument than that which pretends to define the exact circumstances in which, according to the proper interpretation of the *Jus gentium*, one nation is at liberty, or called upon, to interfere in the internal concerns of another. If my next neighbour's house is on fire, I am not only entitled, but obliged, by rules alike of prudence and humanity, to lend my aid to extinguish it; or if a cry of murder arises in his household, the support due to the law, and the protection of the innocent, will excuse my forcible entrance upon his premises. These are extreme cases, and easily decided; they have their parallels in the laws of nations, but they are of rare occurrence. But there lies between them and the general maxim, prohibiting the uncalled-for interference of one party in what primarily and principally concerns another, a whole *terra incognita* of special cases, in which it may be difficult to pronounce any satisfactory decision.

In the history of nations, however, little practical difficulty has been felt, for wherever the juriconsults have found a Gordian knot, the sword of the sovereign has severed it without ceremony. The doubt has usually been decided on the practical questions, What benefit the neutral power is like to derive from his interference? and, Whether he possesses the power of using it effectually, and to his own advantage? In free countries, indeed, the public opinion must be listened to; but man is the same in every situation, and the same desire of aggrandize-

ment, which induces an arbitrary monarch to shut his ears to the voice of justice, is equally powerful with senates and popular assemblies; and aggressions have been as frequently made by republics and limited monarchs on the independence of their neighbours, as by those princes who have no bounds to their own royal pleasure. The gross and barefaced injustice of the partition of Poland had gone far to extinguish any remains of hesitation upon such subjects, and might be said to be a direct recognition of the right of the strongest. There would not, therefore, have wanted pretexts for interference in the affairs of France, of the nations around her, had any of them been at the time capable of benefiting by the supposed opportunity.

England, the rival of France, might, from the example of that country, have exercised a right of interfering with her domestic concerns, in requital of the aid which she afforded to the Americans; but besides that the publicity of the parliamentary debates must compel the most ambitious British minister to maintain at least an appearance of respect to the rights of other countries, England was herself much divided upon the subject of the French Revolution.

This was not the case when the eventful scene first commenced. We believe that the first display of light, reason, and rational liberty in France, was hailed as a day-spring through all Britain, and that there were few, if any, in that country, who did not feel their hearts animated and enlarged by seeing such a great and noble nation throwing aside the fetters, which at once restrained and disbonoured them, and assuming the attitude, language, and spirit of a free people. All men's thoughts and eyes were bent on struggles, which seemed to promise the regeneration of a mighty country, and the British generally felt as if days of old hate and mutual rivalry would thereafter be forgotten, and that in future the similarity of liberal institutions, and the possession of a just portion of rational liberty on either side, would throw kindness and cordiality into the intercourse between the two countries, since France would no longer have ground to contemn England as a country of seditious and sullen clowns, or Britain to despise France as a nation of willing slaves.

This universal sympathy was not removed by the forcible capture of the Bastille, and the violence of the people on that occasion. The name of that fortress was so unpopular, as to palliate and apologize for the excesses which took place on its fall, and it was not to be expected that a people so long oppressed, when exerting their power for the first time, should be limited by the strict bounds of moderation. But in England there always have been, and must exist, two parties of politicians, who will not long continue to regard events of such an interesting nature with similar sensations.

The revolutionists of France were naturally desirous to obtain the applause of the elder-born of Freedom, and the societies in Britain, which assumed the character of the peculiar admirers and protectors of liberty, conceived themselves obliged to extend their countenance to the changes in the neighbouring nation. Hence there arose a great intercourse

between the clubs and self-constituted bodies in Britain, which assumed the extension of popular freedom as the basis of their association, and the revolutionists in France, who were realizing the systems of philosophical theorists upon the same ground. Warm tributes of applause were transmitted from several of these associations; the ambassadors sent to convey them were received with great distinction by the National Assembly; and the urbane intercourse which took place on these occasions, led to exaggerated admiration of the French system on the part of those, who had thus unexpectedly become the medium of intercourse between a great nation and a few private societies. The latter were gradually induced to form unfavourable comparisons betwixt the temple of French freedom, built, as it seemed to them, upon the most perfect principles of symmetry and uniformity, and that in which the goddess had been long worshiped in England, and which, on the contrast, appeared to them like an ancient edifice constructed in barbaric times, and incongruously encumbered with Gothic ornaments and emblems, which modern political architects had discarded. But these political sages overlooked the important circumstance, that the buttresses, which seemed in some respects incumbrances to the English edifice, might, on examination, be found to add to its stability; and that in fact they furnished evidence to show, that the venerable pile was built with cement fitted to endure the test of ages, while that of France, constructed of lath daubed with untempered mortar, like the pageants she exhibited on the revolutionary festivals, was only calculated to be the wonder of a day.

The earnest admiration of either party of the state is sure in England to be balanced by the censure of the other, and leads to an immediate trial of strength betwixt them. The popular side is always the more loud, the more active, the more imposing of the two contending parties. It is formidable, from the body of talents which it exhibits (for those ambitious of distinction are usually friends to innovation), and from the unanimity and vigour with which it can wield them. There may be, and indeed always are, great differences in the point to which each leader is desirous to carry reformation; but they are unanimous in desiring its commencement. The opposition, also, as it is usually termed, has always included several of the high aristocracy of the country, whose names ennoble their rank, and whose large fortunes are a pledge, that they will, for their own sakes, be a check upon eager and violent experimentalists. The whigs, moreover, have the means of influencing assemblies of the lower orders, to whom the name of liberty is, and ought to be dear, since it is the privilege which must console them for narrow circumstances and inferiority of condition; and these means the party, so called, often use successfully, always with industry and assiduity.

The counterbalance to this active and powerful body is to be found, speaking generally, in the higher classes at large—the great mass of nobility and gentry—the clergy of the Established Church—the superior branches of the law—the wealthier of the commercial classes—and the bulk of those who

have property to lose, and are afraid of endangering it. This body is like the Ban of the Germanic empire, a formidable force, but slow and diffident in its operations, and requiring the stimulus of sudden alarm to call it into effective exercise. To one or other of these great national parties, every Englishman, of education enough to form an opinion, professes to belong; with a perfect understanding on the part of all men of sense and probity, that the general purpose is to ballast the vessel of the state, not to overset it, and that it becomes a state-treason in any one to follow his party when they carry their doctrines to extremity.

From the nature of this grand national division it follows, that the side which is most popular should be prompt in adopting theories, and eager in recommending measures of alteration and improvement. It is by such measures that men of talents rise into importance, and by such that the popular part of the constitution is maintained in its integrity. The other party is no less useful, by opposing to each successive attempt at innovation the delays of form, the doubts of experience, the prejudices of rank and condition, legal objections, and the weight of ancient and established practice. Thus, measures of a doubtful tendency are severely scrutinized in parliament, and if at length adopted, it is only when public opinion has long declared in their favour, and when, men's minds having become habituated to the discussion, their introduction into our system cannot produce the violent effect of absolute novelty. If there were no whigs, our constitution would fall to pieces for want of repair; if there were no Tories, it would be broken in the course of a succession of rash and venturous experiments.

It followed as a matter of course, that the whigs of Britain looked with complacency, the Tories with jealousy, upon the progress of the new principles in France; but the latter had a powerful and unexpected auxiliary in the person of Edmund Burke, whose *Reflections on the French Revolution* had the most striking effect on the public mind of any work in our time. There was something exaggerated at all times in the character as well as the eloquence of that great man; and upon reading at this distance of time his celebrated composition, it must be confessed that the colours he has used in painting the extravagances of the Revolution ought to have been softened, by considering the peculiar state of a country, which, long labouring under despotism, is suddenly restored to the possession of unembarrassed license. On the other hand, no political prophet ever viewed futurity with a sorer ken. He knew how to detect the secret purpose of the various successive tribes of revolutionists, and saw in the constitution the future republic; in the republic the reign of anarchy; from anarchy he predicted military despotism, and from military despotism, last to be fulfilled, and hardest to be believed, he prophesied the late but secure resurrection of the legitimate monarchy. Above all, when the cupidity of the French rulers aspired no farther than the forcible possession of Avignon and the Venissin territories, he foretold their purpose of extending the empire of France by means of her new political theories, and, under pretext of propagating the principles of free-

dom, her project of assailing with her arms the states, whose subjects had been already seduced by her doctrines.

The work of Burke raised a thousand enemies to the French Revolution, who had before looked upon it with favour, or at least with indifference. A very large portion of the talents and aristocracy of the opposition party followed Burke into the ranks of the ministry, who saw with pleasure a member, noted for his zeal in the cause of the Americans, become an avowed enemy of the French Revolution, and with equal satisfaction heard him use arguments, which might in their own mouths have assumed an obnoxious and suspicious character.

But the sweeping terms in which the author reprobated all attempts at state-reformation, in which he had himself been at one time so powerful an agent, subjected him to the charge of inconsistency among his late friends, many of whom, and Fox in particular, declared themselves favourable to the progress of the Revolution in France, though they did not pretend to excuse its excesses. Out of parliament it met more unlimited applause; for England, as well as France, had talent impatient of obscurity, ardour which demanded employment, ambition which sought distinction, and men of head-long passions, who expected in a new order of things more unlimited means of indulging them. The middling classes were open in England as elsewhere, though not perhaps so much so, to the tempting offer of increased power and importance; and the populace of London and other large towns loved license as well as the sans-culottes of France. Hence the division of the country into aristocrats and democrats, the introduction of political hatred into the bosom of families, and the dissolution of many a band of friendship which had stood the strain of a life-time. One part of the kingdom looked upon the other with the stern and relentless glance of keepers who are restraining madmen, while the others bent on them the furious glare of madmen conspiring revenge on their keepers.

From this period the progress of the French Revolution seemed in England like a play presented upon the stage, where two contending factions divide the audience, and hiss or applaud as much from party spirit as from real critical judgment, while every instant increases the probability that they will try the question by actual force.

Still, though the nation was thus divided on account of French politics, England and France observed the usual rules of amity, and it seemed that the English were more likely to wage hostility with each other than to declare war against France.

There was, in other kingdoms and states upon the Continent, the same diversity of feeling, respecting the Revolution, which divided England. The favour of the lower and unprivileged classes, in Germany especially, was the more fixed upon the progress of the French Revolution, because they lingered under the same incapacities from which the changes in France had delivered the commons, or third estate, of that country. Thus far their partiality was not only innocent, but praiseworthy. It is as natural for a man to desire the liberty from which he is unjustly excluded, as it is for those who are

in an apartment, where the air is polluted, to wish for the wholesome atmosphere.

Unhappily, these justifiable desires were connected with others of a description less harmless and beneficial. The French Revolution had proclaimed war on castles, as well as peace to cottages. Its doctrine and practice held out the privileged classes in every country as the natural tyrants and oppressors of the poor, whom it encouraged by the thousand tongues of its declaimers to pull down their thrones, overthrow their altars, renounce the empire of God above, and of kings below, and arise, like regenerated France, alike from thralldom and from superstition. And such opinions, calling upon the other nations of Europe to follow them in their democratic career, were not only trumpeted forth in all affiliated clubs of the jacobins, whose influence in the National Assembly was formidable, but were formally recognized by that body itself upon an occasion, which, but for the momentous omen it presented, might have been considered as the most ridiculous scene ever gravely acted before the legislators of a great nation.

There was in Paris a native of Prussia, an exile from his country, whose brain, none of the soundest by nature, seems to have been affected by the progress of the Revolution, as that of ordinary madmen is said to be influenced by the increase of the moon. This personage, having become disgusted with his baptismal name, had adopted that of the Scythian philosopher, and, uniting it with his own Teutonic family appellation, entitled himself—"Anacharsis Klotz, Orator of the Human Race."

It could hardly be expected, that the assumption of such a title should remain undistinguished by some supreme act of folly. Accordingly, the self-dubbed Anacharsis set on foot a procession, which was intended to exhibit the representatives of delegates from all nations upon earth, to assist at the Feast of the Federation of the 14th July, 1790, by which the French nation proposed to celebrate the Revolution. In recruiting his troops, the orator easily picked up a few vagabonds of different countries in Paris; but as Chaldeans, Illinois, and Siberians, are not so common, the delegates of those more distant tribes were chosen among the rabble of the city, and subsidized at the rate of about twelve francs each. We are sorry we cannot tell whether the personage, whose dignity was much insisted upon as "a Miltonic Englishman," was genuine, or of Parisian manufacture. If the last, he must have been worth seeing.

Anacharsis Klotz, having got his ragged regiment equipped in costume at the expense of the refuse of some theatrical wardrobe, conducted them in solemn procession to the bar of the National Assembly, presented them as the representatives of all the nations on earth, awakened to a sense of their debased situation by the choral voices of twenty-five millions of freemen, and demanding that the sovereignty of the people should be acknowledged, and their oppressors destroyed, through all the universe, as well as in France.

So far this absurd scene was the extravagance of a mere madman, and if the assembly had sent Anacharsis to Bedlam, and his train to Bicêtre,

it would have ended as such a farce ought to have done. But the president, in the name of the assembly, Monsieur de Menon (the same, we believe, who afterwards turned Turk when in Egypt), applauded the zeal of the orator, and received the homage of his grotesque attendants as if they had been what they pretended, the deputies of the four quarters of the globe. To raise the jest to the highest, Alexander Lameth proposed,—as the feelings of these august pilgrims must necessarily be hurt to see, in the land of freedom, those kneeling figures representing conquered nations, which surround the statue of Louis XIV.,—that, from respect to this body of charlatans, these figures should be forthwith demolished. This was done accordingly, and the destruction of these symbols was regarded as a testimony of the assistance which France was ready to render such states as should require it, for following in the revolutionary course. The scene, laughable in itself, became serious when its import was considered, and went far to persuade the governments of the neighbouring countries, that the purpose of France was to revolutionize Europe, and spread the reign of liberty and equality over all the civilized nations of the globe. Hopes so flattering as these, which should assign to the commoner not merely freedom from unjust restraints and disqualifications (and that granted with reserve, and only in proportion as they became qualified to use it with advantage), but their hour of command and sovereignty, with the privilege of retaliation on those who had so long kept them in bondage, were sure to find a general good reception among all to whom they were addressed, in whatsoever country; while, on the contrary, the fears of existing governments for the propagation of doctrines so seductive in themselves, and which France seemed apparently prepared to support with arms, were excited in an equal proportion.

It is true that the National Assembly had formally declared that France renounced the unphilosophical practices of extending her limits by conquest, but although this disavowal spoke to the ear, it was contradicted by the annexation of those desirable possessions, the ancient city of Avignon, and the district called the Comtat Venaissin, to the kingdom of France; while the principle on which the annexation was determined on seemed equally applicable in all similar cases.

A dispute had broken out betwixt the aristocrats and democrats in the town and province in question; blood had flowed; a part of the population had demanded to become citizens of regenerated France. Would it be worthy of the protectress of liberty, said the advocates for the annexation, to repel from her bosom supplicants, who panted to share the freedom they had achieved? And so Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin were declared lawful prize, and reunited to France (so went the phrase), as Napoleon afterwards reunited the broken fragments of the empire of Charlemagne. The prescient eye of Burke easily detected, in these petty and surreptitious acquisitions, the gigantic plan by which France afterwards encircled herself by dependent states, which, while termed allies and auxiliaries, were in fact her most devoted

subjects, and the governments of which changed their character from monarchical to popular, like the Great Nation.

The princes at the head of despotic governments were, of course, most interested in putting an end, if it were possible, to the present Revolution of France, and extinguishing a flame which appeared so threatening to its neighbours. Yet there was a long hesitation ere anything to this purpose was attempted. Austria, whom the matter concerned as so near an ally of France, was slow ere she made any decisive step towards hostility. The Emperor Joseph was too much embroiled by the dissensions which he had provoked in the Netherlands to involve himself in war with France. His successor, Leopold, had been always reckoned to belong to the philosophical party. He put down, without much trouble, the insurrection which had nearly cost his brother the dominion of Flanders, and as he used the victory with moderation, it seemed unlikely that the tranquillity of his government should again be disturbed. Still, it would have been hazardous to expose the allegiance of the subjects, so newly restored to order, to the temptations which must have opened to the Flemings by engaging in a war with France, and Leopold, far from seeking for a ground of quarrel with the favourers of the Revolution, entered into friendly relations with the government which they established; and, with anxiety, doubtless, for the safety of his brother-in-law, and an earnest desire to see the government of France placed on something like a steady footing, the emperor continued in amicable terms with the existing rulers of that country down till his death. Francis, his successor, for some time seemed to adopt the same pacific policy.

Prussia, justly proud of her noble army, her veteran commanders, and the bequest of military fame left her by the Great Frederick, was more eager than Austria to adopt what began to be called the cause of kings and nobles, though the sovereign of the latter kingdom was so nearly connected with the unfortunate Louis. Frederick William had been taught to despise revolutionary movements by his cheap victory over the Dutch democracy, while the resistance of the Low Countries had induced the Austrians to dread such explosions.

Russia declared herself hostile to the French Revolution, but hazarded no effective step against them. The King of Sweden, animated by the adventurous character which made Gustavus, and after him Charles, sally forth from their frozen realms to influence the fates of Europe, showed the strongest disposition to play the same part, though the limited state of his resources rendered his valour almost nugatory.

Thus, while so many increasing discontents and suspicions showed that a decision by arms became every day more inevitable, Europe seemed still reluctant to commence the fatal encounter, as if the world had anticipated the long duration of the dreadful struggle, and the millions of lives which it must cost to bring it to a termination.

There can be no doubt that the emigration of the French princes, followed by a great part of the nobles of France, a step ill-judged in itself, as removing

beyond the frontiers of the country all those most devotedly interested in the preservation of the monarchy, had the utmost effect in precipitating the impending hostilities. The presence of so many noble exiles, the respect and sympathy which their misfortunes excited in those of the same rank, the exaggerated accounts which they gave of their own consequence, above all the fear that the revolutionary spirit should extend beyond the limits of France, and work the same effects in other nations, produced through the whole aristocracy of Germany a general desire to restore them to their country and to their rights by the force of arms, and to extinguish by main force a spirit which seemed destined to wage war against all established governments, and to abolish the privileges which they recognized in their higher classes.

The state of the expatriated French clergy, driven from their home, and deprived of their means of subsistence, because they refused an oath imposed contrary to their ecclesiastical vows, and to their conscience, added religious zeal to the general interest excited by the spectacle, yet new to Europe, of thousands of nobility and clergy compelled to forsake their country, and take refuge among aliens.

Several petty princes of the empire made a show of levying forces, and complained of a breach of public faith, from the forfeiture of rights which individual princes of the Germanic body possessed in Alsace and Lorraine, and which, though sanctioned by the treaty of Westphalia, the National Assembly had not deemed worthy of exception from their sweeping abolition of feudal tenures. The emigrants formed themselves into armed corps at Trèves and elsewhere, in which the noblest youths in France carried arms as privates, and which, if their number and resources had been in any proportion to their zeal and courage, were qualified to bear a distinguished part in deciding the destinies of the nation. Thus united, they gave way but too much to the natural feelings of their rank and country, menaced the land from which they had emigrated, and boasted aloud that it needed but one thrust (*botte*) of an Austrian general, to parry and pay home all the decrees of the National Assembly. This ill-timed anticipation of success was founded in a great measure on the disorganization of the French army, which had been begun by the decay of discipline during the progress of the Revolution, and was supposed to be rendered complete by the emigration of such numbers of officers as had joined the princes and their standards. It was yet to be learned how soon such situations can be filled up, from the zeal and talent always found among the lower classes, when critical circumstances offer a reward to ambition.

Yet, while confident of success, the position of the emigrants was far from being flattering. Notwithstanding their most zealous exertions, the princes found their interest with foreign courts unable to bring either kings or ministers willingly or hastily to the point which they desired. The nearest approach was by the declaration of Pillnitz,* in which, with much diplomatic caution, the Emperor and

King of Prussia announced the interest which they took in the actual condition of the King of France; and intimated that, supposing the other nations appealed to should entertain feelings of the same kind, they would, conjoined with those other powers, use the most efficacious means to place Louis in a situation to establish in his dominions, on the basis of the most perfect liberty, a monarchical government, suitable to the rights of the sovereign, and the welfare of the people.

This implied threat, which was to be conditionally carried into effect in case other powers not named should entertain the same sentiments with the two sovereigns by whom it was issued, was well calculated to irritate, but far too vague to intimidate such a nation as France. It showed the desire to wound, but showed it accompanied by the fear to strike; and, instead of inspiring respect, only awakened indignation mingled with contempt.

The emigrants were generally represented among the people of France as men who, to recover their own vain privileges, were willing to lead a host of foreigners into the bosom of their country; and lest some sympathy with their situation, as men suffering for the cause to which they had devoted themselves, and stimulated by anxiety for the fate of their imprisoned king, should have moderated the severity of this judgment, forgery was employed to render their communication with the foreign monarchs still more odious and unpopular.

The secret articles of a pretended treaty were referred to, by which it was alleged that Monsieur and the Count d'Artois had agreed to a dismemberment of France: Lorraine and Alsace being to be restored to Austria, in consequence of her entering into the counter-revolutionary league. The date of this supposed treaty was first placed at Pavia, and afterwards transferred to Pillnitz; but although it was at one time assumed as a real document in the British House of Commons, it is now generally allowed to have had no existence.* In the meanwhile, as a calumny well adapted to the prejudices of the time, the belief in such a secret compact became generally current, and excited the utmost indignation against the selfish invaders, and against the exiles, who were supposed willing to dismember their native country, rather than submit to a change in its constitution adverse to their own selfish interests.

A great deal of this new load of unpopularity was transferred to the account of the unfortunate Louis, who was supposed to instigate and support in private the attempts of his brothers for engaging foreign courts in his favour, while the queen, from her relationship to the Emperor of Austria, was universally represented as a fury, urging him to revenge her loss of power on the rebellious people of France. An Austrian committee was talked of as managing the correspondence between these royal persons on the one part, and the foreign courts and emigrant princes on the other. This was totally groundless; but it is probable and natural that some intercourse

* See two articles on the pretended treaties of Pavia and Pillnitz, in the Anti-jacobin newspaper. They were, we believe, written by the late Mr Pitt.

was maintained between Louis and his brothers, as, though their warlike schemes suited the king's temper too little, he might wish to derive advantage from the dread which it was vainly supposed their preparations would inspire. The royal pair were indeed in a situation so disastrous, that they might have been excused for soliciting rescue by almost any means. But, in fact, Louis and Leopold seem to have agreed in the same system of temporising politics. Their correspondence, as far as can be judged from the letters of De Lessart, Louis's trusted minister for foreign affairs, seems always to point to a middle course; that of suffering the constitution of France to remain such as it had been chosen by the people, and sanctioned by the National Assembly, while the ministers attempted, by the influence of fear of dangers from abroad, to prevent any future assaults upon the power of the crown, and especially against the king's person. On condition that such further aggression should be abstained from, the emperor seems to have been willing to prohibit the mastering of the emigrant forces in his dominions. But Leopold demanded that, on their part, the French nation should release themselves from the clubs of jacobins and cordeliers (another assembly of the same nature), which, pretending to be no more than private associations, without public character or responsibility, nevertheless dictated to the National Assembly, the king, and all France, in virtue of the power of exciting the insurrectional movements, by which their denunciations and proposed revolutions had been as regularly seconded, as the flash is followed by the thunderbolt.

On the death of Leopold, and the succession of his brother Francis to the imperial throne, the disposition of Austria became much more turned towards war. It became the object of Francis to overcome the revolutionists, and prevent, if possible, the impending fate of the royal family. In adopting these warlike counsels, the mind of the new emperor was much influenced by the desire of Prussia to take the field. Indeed the condition of the royal family, which became every day more precarious, seemed to both powers to indicate and authorize hostile measures, and they were at no pains to conceal their sentiments. It is not probable that peace would have remained long unbroken, unless some change of an unexpected and unhoped-for character, in favour of royalty, had taken place in France; but after all the menaces which had been made by the foreign powers, it was France herself who, to the surprise of all Europe, first resorted to arms. The ostensible reason was, that, in declaring war, she only anticipated, as became a brave and generous nation, the commencement of hostilities which Austria had menaced. But each party in the state had its own private views for concurring in a measure, which, at the time, seemed of a very audacious character.

La Fayette now felt his influence in the National Guard of Paris was greatly on the wane. With the democrats he was regarded as a denounced and devoted man, for having employed the armed force to disperse the people in the Champ de Mars, upon the 17th of July, 1791. Those who countenanced him on that occasion were Parisian citizens of substance

and property, but timorous, even from the very consciousness of their wealth, and unwilling, either for the sake of La Fayette, or the constitution which he patronized, to expose themselves to be denounced by furious demagogues, or pillaged by the hordes of robbers and assassins whom they had at their disposal. This is the natural progress in revolutions. While order continues, property has always the superior influence over those who may be desirous of infringing the public peace; but when law and order are in a great measure destroyed, the wealthy are too much disposed to seek, in submission, or change of party, the means of securing themselves and their fortunes. The property which, in ordinary times, renders its owners bold, becomes, in those of imminent danger, the cause of their selfish cowardice. La Fayette tried, however, one decisive experiment, to ascertain what share remained of his once predominant influence over the Parisians. He stood an election for the mayoralty of Paris against Pétion, a person attached to the brissotin, or republican faction, and the latter was preferred. Unsuccessful in this attempt, La Fayette became desirous of foreign war. A soldier, and an approved one, he hoped his fortune would not desert him, and that at the head of armies which he trusted to render victorious over the public enemy, he might have a better chance of being listened to by those factions who began to hold in disrespect the red flag, and the decaying efforts of the National Guard of Paris; and thus gaining the power of once more enforcing submission to the constitution, which he had so large a share in creating. Unquestionably also, La Fayette remembered the ardour of the French for national glory, and welcomed the thoughts of shifting the scene to combat against a public and avowed enemy, from his obscure and unsatisfactory struggle with the clubs of Paris. La Fayette, therefore, desired war, and was followed in his opinion by most of the constitutional party.

The girondists were not less eager for a declaration of hostilities. Either the king must, in that case, place his veto upon the measure, or he must denounce hostilities against his brother-in-law and his brothers, subjecting himself to all the suspicions of bad faith which such a measure inferred. If the arms of the nation were victorious, the risk of a revolution in favour of royalty by insurrections within, or invasions from without the kingdom, was ended at once and for ever. And if the foreigners obtained advantages, it would be easy to turn the unpopularity of the defeat upon the monarch, and upon the constitutionalists, who had insisted, and did still insist, on retaining him as the ostensible head of the executive government.

The jacobins, those whose uniform object it was to keep the impulse of forcible and revolutionary measures in constant action, seemed to be divided among themselves on the great question of war or peace. Robespierre himself struggled, in the club, against the declaration of hostilities, probably because he wished the brissotins to take all the responsibility of that hazardous measure, secure beforehand to share the advantage which it might afford those republicans against the king and constitutionalists. He took care that Louis should profit

nothing by the manner in which he pleaded the cause of justice and humanity. He affected to prophesy disasters to the ill-provided and ill-disciplined armies of France, and cast the blame beforehand on the known treachery of the king and the royalists, the arbitrary designs of La Fayette and the constitutionalists, and the doubtful patriotism of Brissot and Condorcet. His arguments retarded, though they could not stop, the declaration of war which probably they were not intended seriously to prevent; and the most violent and sanguinary of men obtained a temporary character for love of humanity, by adding hypocrisy to his other vices. The jacobins in general, notwithstanding Robespierre's remonstrances, moved by the same motives which operated with the brissotins, declared ultimately in favour of hostilities.

The resolution for war, therefore, predominated in the assembly, and two preparatory measures served, as it were, to sound the intentions of the king on the subject, and to ascertain how far he was disposed to adhere to the constitutional government which he had accepted, against those who, in his name, seemed prepared by force of arms to restore the old system of monarchy. Two decrees were passed against the emigrants in the assembly.* The first was directed against the king's brother, and summoned Xavier Stanislas, Prince of France, to return into France in two months, upon pain of forfeiting his right to the regency. The king consented to this decree—he could not, indeed, dissent from it with consistency, being, as he had consented to be, the holder of the crown under a constitution, against which his exiled brother had publicly declared war. The second decree denounced death against all emigrants who should be found assembled in arms on the 1st of January next. The right of a nation to punish with extreme pains those of its native subjects who bear arms against her has never been disputed. But although on great changes of the state, the vanquished party, when essaying a second struggle, stand in the relation of rebels against the existing government, yet there is generally wisdom, as well as humanity, in delaying to assert this right in its rigour, until such a period shall have elapsed, as shall at once have established the new government in a confirmed state of possession, and given those attached to the old one time to forget their habits and predilections in its favour.

Under this defence, Louis ventured to use the sole constitutional weapon with which he was intrusted. He refused his consent to the decree. Sensible of the unpopularity attending this rejection, the king endeavoured to qualify it, by issuing a severe proclamation against the emigrants, countermanding their proceedings;—which was only considered as an act of dissimulation and hypocrisy.

The decree last proposed jarred necessarily on the heart and sensibility of Louis—the next affected his religious scruples. The National Assembly had produced a schism in the church, by imposing on the clergy a constitutional oath, inconsistent with their religious vows. The philosophers in the present Legislative Body, with all the intolerance

which they were in the habit of objecting against the catholic church, resolved to render the breach irreparable.

They had, they thought, the opportunity of striking a death's blow at the religion of the state, and they remembered that the watchword applied by the encyclopedists to christianity, had been *Écrasez l'infâme*. The proposed decree bore, that such priests as refused the constitutional oath should forfeit the pension allowed them for subsistence, when the state seized upon the estates of the clergy; that they should be put into a state of surveillance, in the several departments where they resided, and banished from France the instant they excited any religious dissensions.

A prince, with the genuine principles of philosophy, would have rejected this law as unjust and intolerant; but Louis had stronger motives to interpose his constitutional veto, as a catholic christian, whose conscience would not permit him to assent to the persecution of the faithful servants of his church. He refused his assent to this decree also.

In attempting to shelter the emigrants and the recusant churchmen, the king only rendered himself the more immediate object of the popular resentment. His compassion for the former was probably mingled with a secret wish, that the success of their arms might relieve him from his present restraint; at any rate, it was a motive easily imputed and difficult to be disproved. He was, therefore, represented to his people as in close union with the bands of exiled Frenchmen, who menaced the frontiers of the kingdom, and were about to accompany the foreign armies on their march to the metropolis. The royal rejection of the decree against the orthodox clergy was imputed to Louis's superstition, and his desire of rebuilding an ancient Gothic hierarchy unworthy of an enlightened age. In short, that was now made manifest, which few wise men had ever doubted, namely, that so soon as the king should avail himself of his constitutional right, in resistance to the popular will, he was sure to incur the risk of losing both his crown and life.

Meantime this danger was accelerated by the consequences of a dissension in the royal cabinet. It will scarce be believed, that situations in the ministry of France, so precarious in its tenure, so dangerous in its possession, so enfeebled in its authority, should have been even at this time the object of ambition; and that to possess such momentary and doubtful eminence, men, and wise men too, employed all the usual arts of intrigue and circumvention, by which rival statesmen, under settled governments and in peaceful times, endeavour to undermine and supplant each other. We have heard of criminals in the Scottish Highlands, who asserted with obstinacy the dignity of their clans, when the only test of pre-eminence was the priority of execution. We have read, too, of the fatal raft, where shipwrecked men in the midst of the Atlantic contended together with mortal strife for equally useless preferences. But neither case is equal in extravagance to the conduct of those rivals, who struggled for power in the cabinet of Louis XVI. in 1792, when, take what party they would, the jealousy of the assembly, and the far

* 9th November, 1791.

more fatal proscription of the jacobins, was sure to be the reward of their labours. So, however, it was, and the fact serves to show, that a day of power is more valuable in the eyes of ambition than a life-time of ease and safety.

De Lessart, the minister of foreign affairs already mentioned, had wished to avoid war, and had fed Leopold and his ministers with hopes, that the king would be able to establish a constitutional power superior to that of the dreadful jacobins. The Count de Narbonne, on the other side, being minister of war, was desirous to forward the views of La Fayette, who, as we have said, longed to be at the head of the army. To obtain his rival's disgrace, Narbonne combined with La Fayette and other generals to make public the opposition which De Lessart and a majority of the cabinet ministers had opposed to the declaration of hostilities. Louis, justly incensed at an appeal to the public from the interior of his own cabinet, displaced Narbonne.

The legislative body immediately fell on De Lessart. He was called to stand on his defence, and imprudently laid before the assembly his correspondence with Kannitz, the Austrian minister. In their communications De Lessart and Kannitz had spoken with respect of the constitution, and with moderation even of their most obnoxious measures; but they had reprobated the violence of the jacobins and cordeliers, and stigmatized the usurpations of those clubs over the constitutional authorities of the state, whom they openly insulted and controled. These moderate sentiments formed the real source of De Lessart's fall. He was attacked on all sides—by the party of Narbonne and his friends from rivalry—by Brissot and his followers from policy, and in order to remove a minister too much of a royalist for their purpose—by the jacobins, from hatred and revenge. Yet when Brissot condescended upon the following evidence of his guilt, argument and testimony against him must have indeed been scarce. De Lessart, with the view of representing the present affairs of France under the most softened point of view to the emperor, had assured him that the constitution of 1791 was firmly adhered to by a *majority* of the nation. "Hear the atrocious calumniator!" said the accuser. "The inference is plain. He dares to insinuate the existence of a minority, which is not attached to the constitution." Another accusation, which in like manner was adopted as valid by the acclamation of the assembly, was formed thus. A most horrible massacre had taken place during the tumults which attended the union of Avignon with the kingdom of France. Vergniaud, the friend and colleague of Brissot, alleged, that if the decree of union had

been early enough sent to Avignon, the dissensions would not have taken place; and he charged upon the unhappy De Lessart, that he had not instantly transmitted the official intelligence. Now the decree of reunion was, as the orator knew, delayed on account of the king's scruples to accede to what seemed an invasion of the territory of the church; and, at any rate, it could no more have prevented the massacre of Avignon, which was conducted by that same Jourdan, called *Compe-tête*, the Bearded Man of the march to Versailles, than the subsequent massacre of Paris, perpetrated by similar agents. The orator well knew this; yet, with eloquence as false as his logic, he summoned the ghosts of the murdered from the *glacière*, in which their mangled remains had been piled, to bear witness against the minister, to whose culpable neglect they owed their untimely fate. All the while he was imploring for justice on the head of a man, who was undeniably ignorant and innocent of the crime, Vergniaud and his friends secretly meditated extending the mantle of safety over the actual perpetrators of the massacre, by a decree of amnesty; so that the whole charge against De Lessart can only be termed a mixture of hypocrisy and cruelty. In the course of the same discussion, Gonchon, an orator of the suburb of St-Antoine, in which lay the strength of the jacobin interest, had already pronounced sentence in the cause, at the very bar of the assembly which was engaged in trying it. "Royalty may be struck out of the constitution," said the demagogue, but the unity of the legislative body defies the touch of time. Courtiers, ministers, kings, and their civil lists, may pass away; but the sovereignty of the people, and the pikes which enforce it, are perpetual."

This was touching the root of the matter. De Lessart was a royalist, though a timid and cautious one, and he was to be punished as an example to such ministers as should dare to attach themselves to their sovereign and his personal interest. A decree of accusation was passed against him, and he was sent to Orleans to be tried before the high court there. Other royalists of distinction were committed to the same prison, and, in the fatal month of September, 1792, were involved in the same dreadful fate.

Pétion, the Mayor of Paris, appeared next day at the bar, at the head of the municipality, to congratulate the assembly on a great act of justice, which he declared resembled one of those thunder-storms by which nature purifies the atmosphere from noxious vapours. The ministry was dissolved by this severe blow on one of the wisest, at least one of the most moderate, of its members. Narbonne, and the constitutional party who had espoused his cause, were soon made sensible that he or they were to gain nothing by the impeachment, to which their intrigues led the way. Their claims to share the spoils of the displaced ministry were passed over with contempt, and the king was compelled, in order to have the least chance of obtaining a hearing from the assembly, to select his ministers from the brissotin, or girondist faction, who, though averse to the existence of a monarchy, and desiring a republic instead, had still somewhat more of principle

* This strange argument reminds us of an essay read before a literary society in dispraise of the east wind, which the author supported by quotations from every poem or popular work, in which *Eurus* is the subject of invective. The learned auditors sustained the first part of this infection with becoming fortitude, but declined submitting to the second, understanding that the accomplished author had there fortified himself by the numerous testimonies of almost all poets in favour of the west, and which, with logic similar to that of Monsieur Brissot in the text, he regarded as indirect testimony against the east wind.

and morals than the mere revolutionists and jacobins, who were altogether destitute of both.

With the fall of De Lessart, all chance of peace vanished, as indeed it had been gradually disappearing before that event. The demands of the Austrian court went now, when fully explained, so far back upon the Revolution, that a peace negotiated upon such terms must have laid France and all its various parties (with the exception, perhaps, of a few of the first assembly) at the foot of the sovereign, and, what might be more dangerous, at the mercy of the restored emigrants. The emperor demanded the establishment of monarchy in France, on the basis of the royal declaration of 23d June, 1789, which had been generally rejected by the tiers état when offered to them by the king. He farther demanded the restoration of the effects of the church, and that the German princes having rights in Alsace and Lorraine should be replaced in those rights, agreeably to the treaty of Westphalia.

The Legislative Assembly received these extravagant terms as an insult on the national dignity; and the king, whatever might be his sentiments as an individual, could not, on this occasion, dispense with the duty his office as constitutional monarch imposed on him.—Louis, therefore, had the melancholy task of proposing* to an assembly, filled with the enemies of his throne and person, a declaration of war against his brother-in-law the emperor, in his capacity of King of Hungary and Bohemia, involving, as matter of course, a civil war with his own two brothers, who had taken the field at the head of that part of his subjects from birth and principle the most enthusiastically devoted to their sovereign's person, and who, if they had faults towards France, had committed them in love to him.

The proposal was speedily agreed to by the assembly; for the constitutionalists saw their best remaining chance for power was by obtaining victory on the frontiers,—the girondists had need of war, as what must necessarily lead the way to an alteration in the constitution, and the laying aside the regal government,—and the jacobins, whose chief, Robespierre, had just objected enough to give him the character and credit of a prophet if any reverses were sustained, resisted the war no longer, but remained armed and watchful, to secure the advantage of events as they might occur.

CHAPTER VIII.

Defeats of the French on the frontier.—Decay of the party of constitutionalists.—They form the club of feuillans, and are dispersed by the jacobins forcibly.—The ministry—Dumouriez—Versatility of his character.—Breach of confidence betwixt the king and his ministers.—Dissolution of the king's constitutional guard.—Extravagant measures of the jacobins—Alarm of the girondists.—Departmental army proposed.—King puts his veto on the decree, against Dumouriez's representations.—Decree against the recalcant priests—King refuses it.—Letter of the ministers to the king—He dismisses Roland, Clavière, and Servan—Dumouriez, Duranton, and Lacoste, appointed in their stead.—King ratifies the decree concerning the departmental army—Dumouriez retorts

against the late ministers in the assembly—Resigns, and departs for the frontiers—New ministers named from the constitutionalists.—Insurrection of the 20th of June—Armed mob intrude into the assembly—Thence into the Tuileries—Assembly send a deputation to the palace—And the mob disperse.—La Fayette repairs to Paris—Remonstrates in favour of the king—But is compelled to return to the frontiers, and leave him to his fate.—Marseillais appear in Paris.—Duke of Brunswick's manifesto—Its operation against the king.

It is not our purpose here to enter into any detail of military events. It is sufficient to say, that the first results of the war were more disastrous than could have been expected, even from the want of discipline and state of mutiny in which this call to arms found the troops of France. If Austria, never quick at improving an opportunity, had possessed more forces on the Flemish frontier, or had even pressed her success with the troops she had, events might have occurred to influence, if not to alter, the fortunes of France and her king. They were inactive, however, and La Fayette, who was at the head of the army, exerted himself, not without effect, to rally the spirits of the French, and infuse discipline and confidence into their ranks. But he was able to secure no success of so marked a character as to correspond with the reputation he had acquired in America; so that as the Austrians were few in number, and not very decisive in their movements, the war seemed to languish on both sides.

In Paris, the absence of La Fayette had removed the main stay from the constitutional interest, which were now nearly reduced to that state of nullity to which they had themselves reduced the party, first of pure royalists, and then that of the *modérés*, or friends of limited monarchy, in the first assembly. The wealthier classes, indeed, continued a fruitless attachment to the constitutionalists, which gradually diminished with their decreased power to protect their friends. At length this became so contemptible, that their enemies were emboldened to venture upon an insult, which showed how little they were disposed to keep measures with a feeble adversary.

Among other plans, by which they hoped to counterpoise the omnipotence of the Jacobin Club, the constitutionalists had established a counter association, termed, from its place of meeting, *Les Feuillans*. In this club,—which included about two hundred members of the Legislative Body, the ephemeral rival of the great jacobinical forge in which the revolutionists had their strength and fabricated their thunders,—there was more eloquence, argument, learning, and wit, than was necessary; but the feuillans wanted the terrible power of exciting the popular passions, which the orators of the Jacobin Club possessed and wielded at pleasure. These opposed factions might be compared to two swords, of which one had a gilded and ornamented hilt, but a blade formed of glass or other brittle substance, while the brazen handle of the other corresponded in strength and coarseness to the steel of the weapon itself. When two such weapons come into collision, the consequence may be anticipated, and it was so with the opposite clubs. The jacobins, after many preparatory insults, went down

* 20th April, 1792.

upon and assailed their adversaries with open force, insulting and dispersing them with blows and violence; while Pétion, the mayor of Paris, who was present on the occasion, consoled the fugitives, by assuring them that the law indeed protected them, but the people having pronounced against them, it was not for him to enforce the behests of the law in opposition to the will of that people, from whom the law originated. A goodly medicine for their aching bones!

The constitutional party, amidst their general humiliation, had lost almost all influence in the ministry, and could only communicate with the king underhand, and in a secret manner,—as if they had been in fact his friends and partisans, not the causes of, or willing consenters to, his present imprisoned and disabled condition. Of six ministers, by whom De Lessart and his comrades had been replaced, the husband of Madame Roland, and two others, Servan and Clavière, were zealous republicans; Dumanton and Lacoste were moderate in their politics, but timorous in character; the sixth, Dumourier, who held the war department, was the personal rival of La Fayette, both in civil and military matters, and the enemy, therefore, of the constitutional party. It is now, for the first time, that we mention one of those names renowned in military history, which had the address to attract Victory to the French banners, to which she long appeared to adhere without shadow of changing. Dumourier passed early from the scene, but left his name strongly written in the annals of France.

Dumourier was little in person, but full of vivacity and talent; a brave soldier, having distinguished himself in the civil dissensions of Poland; an able and skilful intriguer, and well fitted to play a conspicuous part in times of public confusion. He has never been supposed to possess any great firmness of principle, whether public or private; but a soldier's honour, and a soldier's frankness, together with the habits of good society, led him to condemn and hate the sordid treachery, cruelty, and cynicism of the jacobins; while his wit and common sense enabled him to see through and deride the affected and pedantic fanaticism of republican zeal of the girondists, who, he plainly saw, were amusing themselves with schemes to which the country of France, the age, and the state of manners, were absolutely opposed. Thus, he held the situation of minister at war, coquetting with all parties; wearing one evening in the Jacobin Club the red night-cap, which was the badge of breechless freedom, and the next, with better sincerity, advising the king how he might avoid the approaching evils; though the by-roads he pointed out were often too indirect to be trodden by the good and honest prince, to whom Providence had, in Dumourier, assigned a counsellor better fitted to a less scrupulous sovereign. The king nevertheless reposed considerable confidence in the general, which, if not answered with all the devotion of loyalty, was at least never betrayed.

The republican ministers were scarce qualified by their talents, to assume the air of areopagites, or Roman tribunes. Roland by himself, was but a tiresome pedant, and he could not bring his wife to the cabinet council, although it is said she attempted

to make her way to the ministerial dinners.* His colleagues were of the same character, and affected in their intercourse with the king a stoical contempt of the forms of the court, although, in effect, these are like other courtesies of society, which it costs little to observe, and is brutal to neglect.† Besides petty insults of this sort, there was a total want of confidence on both sides, in the intercourse betwixt them and the king. If the ministers were desirous to penetrate his sentiments on any particular subject, Louis evaded them by turning the discourse on matters of vague and general import; and did he, on the other hand, press them to adopt any particular measure, they were cold and reserved, and excused themselves under the shelter of their personal responsibility. Indeed, how was it possible that confidence could exist betwixt the king and his republican ministers, when the principal object of the latter was to procure the abolition of the regal dignity, and when the former was completely aware that such was their purpose?

The first step adopted by the factions of girondists and jacobins, who moved towards the same object side by side, though not hand in hand, was to deprive the king of a guard, assigned him by the constitution, in lieu of his disbanded *Gardes du Corps*. It was, indeed, of doubtful loyalty, being partly levied from soldiers of the line, partly from the citizens, and imbued in many cases with the revolutionary spirit of the day; but they were officered by persons selected for their attachment to the king, and even their name of guards expressed and inspired an *esprit de corps*, which might be formidable. Various causes of suspicion were alleged against this guard—that they kept in their barracks a white flag (which proved to be the ornament of a cake presented to them by the dauphin)—that their sword-hilts were formed into the fashion of a cock, which announced some anti-revolutionary enigma—that attempts were made to alienate them from the assembly, and fix their affections on the king. The guard contained several spies, who had taken that service for the purpose of betraying its secrets to the jacobins. Three or four of these men, produced at the bar, affirmed much that was, and much that was not true; and amid the causes they had for distrusting the king, and their reasons for desiring to weaken him, the assembly decreed the reduction of the constitutional guard. The king was with difficulty persuaded not to oppose his veto, and was thus left almost totally undefended to the next blast of the revolutionary tempest.

Every successive proceeding of the factions tended to show more strongly, that the storm was speedily to arise. The invention of the jacobins exhausted

* So says De Ferrières, and pretends that Madame Roland's pretensions to be presented at the ministerial parties being rejected, was the first breach to the amicable understanding of the ministers. But nothing of this sort is to be found in Madame Roland's Memoirs, and we are confident she would have recorded it, had the fact been accurate.

† When Roland, whose dress was somewhat like that of a quaker, appeared at court in shoe-strings, the usher approached him with a severe look, and addressed him, "How, sir, no buckles!"—"Ah," said Dumourier, who laughed at all and at everything, "all is lost."

itself in proposing and adopting revolutionary measures so extravagant, that very shame prevented the girondists from becoming parties to them. Such was the carrying the atrocious cut-throat Jourdan in triumph through the streets of Avignon, where he had piled eighty carcases into a glacière in the course of one night. A less atrocious, but not less insolent proceeding, was the feast given in honour of the regiment of Château Vieux, whose mutiny had been put down at Nancy by Monsieur de Bouillé, acting under the express decree of the first National Assembly.

In a word, understanding much better than the brissotins the taste of the vulgar for what was most violent, gross, and exaggerated, the jacobins purveyed for them accordingly, filled their ears with the most incredible reports, and gulled their eyes by the most absurd pageants.

The girondists, retaining some taste and some principle, were left far behind in the race of vulgar popularity, where he that throws off every mark of decency bids most fair to gain the prize. They beheld with mortification feats which they could not emulate, and felt that their own assertions of their attachment to freedom, emphatic as they were, seemed cold and spiritless compared to the extravagant and flaming declamations of the jacobins. They regarded with envy the advantages which their rivals acquired by those exaggerated proceedings, and were startled to find how far they were like to be outstripped by those uncompromising and unhesitating demagogues. The girondists became sensible that a struggle approached, in which, notwithstanding their strength in the assembly, they must be vanquished, unless they could raise up some body of forces, entirely dependent on themselves, to be opposed in time of need to the jacobin insurgents. This was indeed essentially necessary to their personal safety, and to the stability of their power. If they looked to the National Guard, they found such of that body as were no longer attached to La Fayette, wearied of revolutions, unmoved by the prospect of a republic, and only desirous to protect their shops and property. If they turned their eyes to the lower orders, and especially the suburbs, the myriads of pikemen which they could pour forth were all devoted to the jacobins, from whom their leaders received orders and regular pay.

The scheme of a departmental army was resorted to by the girondists as the least startling, yet most certain mode of bringing together a military force sufficient to support the schemes of the new administration. Five men were to be furnished by every canton in France, which would produce a body of 20,000 troops, to be armed and trained under the walls of Paris. This force was to serve as a central army to reinforce the soldiers on the frontier, and maintain order in the capital, as occasion should demand. The measure, proposed by the girondists, was unexpectedly furthered by the jacobins, who plainly saw, that through the means of their affiliated societies, which existed in every canton, they would be able to dictate the choice of so large a part of the departmental army, that, when assembled, it should add to the power of their insurrectionary hands at Paris, instead of controlling them.

The citizens of Paris were disposed to consider this concourse of undisciplined troops under the walls of the city as dangerous to its safety, and an insult to the National Guard, hitherto thought adequate to the defence of the metropolis. They petitioned the assembly against the measure, and even invoked the king to reject the decree, when it should pass through that body.

To this course Louis was himself sufficiently inclined, for neither he nor any one doubted that the real object of the girondists was to bring together such an army as would enable them to declare their beloved republic without fear of La Fayette, even if he should find himself able to bring the army which he commanded to his own sentiments on the subject.

Dumourier warned Louis against following this course of direct opposition to the assembly. He allowed that the ultimate purpose of the proposal was evident to every thinking person, but still its ostensible object being the protection of the country and capital, the king, he said, would, in the eyes of the vulgar, be regarded as a favourer of the foreign invasion, if he objected to a measure represented as essential to the protection of Paris. He undertook, as minister of war, that as fast as a few hundreds of the departmental forces arrived he would have them regimented and dismissed to the frontier, where their assistance was more necessary than at home. But all his remonstrances on this subject were in vain. Louis resolved at all risks to place his veto on the measure. He probably relied on the feelings of the National Guard, of which one or two divisions were much attached to him, while the dispositions of the whole had been certainly ameliorated, from their fear of fresh confusion by means of these new levies. Perhaps also the king could not bring himself at once to trust the versatile disposition of Dumourier, whose fidelity, however, we see no reason for suspecting.

Another renewed point of discussion and disagreement betwixt the king and his ministers respected the recalcitrant clergy. A decree was passed in the assembly, that such priests as might be convicted of a refusal to subscribe the oath to the civil constitution should be liable to deportation. This was a point of conscience with Louis, and was probably brought forward in order to hasten him into a resignation of the crown. He stood firm accordingly, and determined to oppose his veto to this decree also, in spite at once of all the arguments which the worldly prudence of Dumourier could object, and of the urgency of the republican ministers.

The firm refusal of the king disconcerted the measures of the girondist counsellors. Madame Roland undertook to make the too scrupulous monarch see the errors of his ways; and composed, in name of her husband and two of his colleagues, a long letter, to which Dumourier and the other two refused to place their names. It was written in what the citoyenne termed an austere tone of truth—that is to say, without any of the usual marks of deference and respect, and with a harshness calculated to jar all the feelings, affectionate or religious, of him whom they still called king. Alas! the severest and most offensive truths, however late in reaching the

ears of powerful and prosperous monarchs, make themselves sternly loud to those princes who are captive and unfriended. Louis might have replied to this rude expostulation like the knight who received a blow from an enemy when he was disarmed and a prisoner—"There is little bravery in this now." The king, however, gave way to his resentment as far as he could. He dismissed Roland and the other two ministers, and with difficulty prevailed on Dumourier, Duranton, and Lacoste, to retain their situations, and endeavour to supply the place of those whom he had deprived of office; but he was obliged to purchase their adherence by ratifying the decree concerning the federal or departmental army of twenty thousand men, on condition that they should rendezvous at Soissons, not at Paris. On the decree against the priests his resolution continued unmoved and immovable. Thus Religion, which had for half a century been so slightly regarded in France, at length interposed her influence in deciding the fate of the king and the kingdom.

The three discarded ministers affected to congratulate each other on being released from scenes so uncongenial to their republican virtues and sentiments, as the ante-chambers of a court, where men were forced to wear buckles instead of shoe-strings, or undergo the frowns of ushers and masters of ceremonies, and where patriotic tongues were compelled to practise court-language, and to address a being of the same flesh and blood as their own, with the titles of sire, and your majesty. The unhappy pedants were not long in learning that there are constraints worse to undergo than the etiquette of a court, and sterner despots to be found in the ranks of a republic, than the good-humoured and lenient Louis. As soon as dismissed, they posted to the assembly, to claim the applause due to suffering virtue, and exhibit their letter to those for whose ears it was really written—the sympathising democrats and the tribunes.

They were accordingly, as victims of their democratic zeal, received with acclamation; but the triumph of those who bestowed it was unexpectedly qualified and diminished. Dumourier, who spoke fluently, and had collected proofs for such a moment, overwhelmed the assembly by a charge of total neglect and incapacity, against Roland and his two colleagues. He spoke of unrecruited armies, un-garrisoned forts, unprovided commissariats, in a tone which compelled the assembly to receive his denunciations against his late associates in the ministry.

But although his unpleasant and threatening communications made a momentary impression on the assembly, almost in spite of themselves, the wily and variable orator saw that he could only maintain his ground as minister, by procuring, if possible, the assent of the king to the decree against the recalcitrant clergy. He made a final attempt, along with his ephemeral colleagues; stated his conviction, that the refusal of the king, if persisted in, would be the cause of insurrection; and, finally, tendered his resignation, in case their urgent advice should be neglected. "Think not to terrify me by threats," replied Louis. "My resolution is fixed." Dumourier was not a man to perish under the ruins of the throne which he could not preserve. His re-

signation was again tendered and accepted, not without marks of sensibility on the king's part and his own; and having thus saved a part of his credit with the assembly, who respected his talents, and desired to use them against the invaders, he departed from Paris to the frontiers, to lead the van among the French victors.

Louis was now left to the pitiless storm of revolution, without the assistance of any one who could in the least assist him in piloting through the tempest. The few courtiers—or, much better named—the few ancient and attached friends, who remained around his person, possessed neither talents nor influence to aid him; they could but lament his misfortunes and share his ruin. He himself expressed a deep conviction, that his death was near at hand, yet the apprehension neither altered his firmness upon points to which he esteemed his conscience was party, nor changed the general quiet placidity of his temper. A negotiation to resign his crown was, perhaps, the only mode which remained, affording even a chance to avert his fate; but the days of deposed monarchs are seldom long, and no pledge could have assured Louis that any terms which the girondists might grant, would have been ratified by their sterner and uncompromising rivals of the jacobin party. These men had been long determined to make his body the step to their iniquitous power. They affected to feel for the cause of the people, with the zeal which goes to slaying. They had heaped upon the crown, and its unhappy wearer, all the guilt and all the misfortunes of the revolution; it was incumbent on them to show that they were serious in their charge, by rendering Louis a sin-offering for the nation. On the whole, it was the more kingly part not to degrade himself by his own voluntary act, but to await the period which was to close at once his life and his reign. He named his last ministry from the dispirited remnants of the constitutional party, which still made a feeble and unsupported struggle against the girondists and jacobins in the assembly. They did not long enjoy their precarious office.

The factions last named were now united in the purpose of precipitating the king from his throne by actual and direct force. The voice of the girondists Vergniaud had already proclaimed in the assembly. "Terror," he said, "must, in the name of the people, burst its way into yonder palace, whence she has so often sallied forth at the command of monarchs."

Though the insurrection was resolved upon, and thus openly announced, each faction was jealous of the force which the other was to employ, and apprehensive of the use which might be made of it against themselves, after the conquest was obtained. But, however suspicious of each other, they were still more desirous of their common object, the destruction of the throne, and the erection of a republic, which the brissotins supposed they could hold under their rule, and which the jacobins were determined to retain under their misrule. An insurrection was at length arranged, which had all the character of that which brought the king a prisoner from Versailles, the jacobins being the prime movers of their desperate followers, and the

actors on both occasions; while the girondists, on the 20th June, 1792, hoped, like the constitutionalists on the 6th October, 1789, to gain the advantage of the enterprise which their own force would have been unable to accomplish. The community, or magistracy, of Paris, which was entirely under the dominion of Robespierre, Danton, and the jacobins, had been long providing for such an enterprise, and under pretext that they were arming the lower classes against invasion, had distributed pikes and other weapons to the rabble, who were to be used on this occasion.

On the 20th June, the *sans-culottes* of the suburbs of St-Marceau and St-Antoine assembled together, armed with pikes, scythes, hay-forks, and weapons of every description, whether those actually forged for the destruction of mankind, or those which, invented for peaceful purposes, are readily converted by popular fury into offensive arms. They seemed, notwithstanding their great numbers, to act under authority, and amid their cries, their songs, their dances, and the wild intermixture of grotesque and fearful revel, appeared to move by command, and to act with an unanimity that gave the effect of order to that which was in itself confusion. They were divided into bodies, and had their leaders. Standards also were displayed, carefully selected to express the character and purpose of the wretches who were assembled under them. One ensign was a pair of tattered breeches, with the motto, "*Vivent les sans-culottes*." Another ensign-bearer, dressed in black, carried on a long pole a hog's head, that is, part of the entrails of that animal, still bloody, with the legend, "*La fressure d'un aristocrate*." This formidable assemblage was speedily recruited by the mob of Paris, to an immense multitude, whose language, gestures, and appearance, all combined to announce some violent catastrophe.

The terrified citizens, afraid of general pillage, concentrated themselves,—not to defend the king or protect the Legislative Assembly, but for the preservation of the Palais Royal, where the splendour of the shops was most likely to attract the cupidity of the *sans-culottes*. A strong force of armed citizens guarded all the avenues to this temple of Mammon, and, by excluding the insurgents from its precincts, showed what they could have done for the Hall of the Legislature, or the palace of the monarch, had the cause of either found favour in their eyes.

The insurrection rolled on to the hall of the assembly, surrounded the alarmed deputies, and filled with armed men every avenue of approach; talked of a petition which they meant to present, and demanded to file through the hall to display the force by which it was supported. The terrified members had nothing better to reply, than by a request that the insurgents should only enter the assembly by a representative deputation—at least that, coming in a body, they should leave their arms behind. The formidable petitioners laughed at both proposals, and poured through the hall, shaking in triumph their insurrectionary weapons. The assembly, meanwhile, made rather an ignoble figure; and their attempts to preserve an outward appearance of indifference, and even of cordiality towards

their foul and frightful visitants, have been apt compared to a band of wretched comedians, endeavouring to mitigate the resentment of a brut and incensed audience.*

From the hall of the assembly, the populace rushed to the Tuileries. Preparations had been made for defence, and several bodies of troops were judiciously placed, who, with the advantages afforded by the grates and walls, might have defended their posts against the armed rabble, which approached. But there was neither union, loyalty, nor energy, in those to whom the defence was trusted, nor did the king, by placing himself at the head, attempt to give animation to their courage.

The National Guards drew off at the command of the two municipal officers, decked with the scarfs of office, who charged them not to oppose the will of the people. The grates were dashed to pieces with sledge-hammers. The gates of the palace itself were shut, but the rabble, turning cannon upon them, compelled entrance, and those apartments of royal magnificence, so long the pride of France, were laid open to the multitude, like those of Troy to her invaders;—

Apparet domus intus, et atria longa patebant,
Apparent Præmii et veterum penetralia regum.†

The august palace of the proud house of Bourbon lay thus exposed to the rude gaze, and vulgar tread of a brutal and ferocious rabble. Who dared have prophesied such an event to the royal founders of this stately pile, to the chivalrous Henry of Navarre, or the magnificent Louis XIV.!—The door of the apartment entering into the vestibule was opened by the hands of Louis himself, the ill-fated representative of this lofty line. He escaped with difficulty the thrust of a bayonet, made as the door was in the act of expanding. There were around him

* It may be alleged in excuse, that the assembly had no resource but submission. Yet, brave men in similar circumstances have, by a timely exertion of spirit, averted similar insolencies. When the furious anti-catholic mob was in possession of the avenues to, and even the lobbies of, the House of Commons, in 1790, General Cosmo Gordon, a member of the house, went up to the unfortunate nobleman under whose guidance they were supposed to act, and addressed him thus: "My lord, is it your purpose to bring your rascally adherents into the House of Commons?—For so, I apprise you, that the instant one of them enters, I pass my sword, not through his body, but your lordship's." The hint was sufficient, and the mob was directed to another quarter. Undoubtedly there were, in the French Legislative Assembly, men capable of conjuring down the storm they had raised, and who might have been moved to do so had any man of courage made them directly and personally responsible for the consequences.

† Dryden has expanded these magnificent lines, without expressing entirely either their literal meaning or their spirit. But he has added, as usual, beautiful ideas of his own, equally applicable to the scene described in the text.

A mighty breach is made: the rooms conceal'd
Appear, and all the palace is reveal'd;
The halls of audience, and of public state,
And where the lovely queen in secret state;
Arm'd soldiers now by trembling maids are seen,
With not a door, and scarce a space between.

Æneid, Book II.

a handful of courtiers, and a few of the grenadiers of the National Guard, belonging to the section of Filles St-Thomas, which had been always distinguished for fidelity. They hurried and almost forced the king into the embrasure of a window, erected a sort of barricade in front with tables, and stood beside him as his defenders. The crowd, at their first entrance, leveled their pikes at Madame Elisabeth, whom they mistook for the queen. "Why did you undeceive them?" said the heroic princess to those around her—"It might have saved the life of my sister." Even the insurgents were affected by this trait of heroism. They had encountered none of those obstacles which chafe such minds, and make them thirsty of blood, and it would seem that their leaders had not received decided orders, or, having received them, did not think the time served for their execution. The insurgents defiled through the apartments, and passed the king, now joined by the queen with her children. The former, though in the utmost personal danger, would not be separated from her husband, exclaiming, that her post was by his side; the latter were weeping with terror at a scene so horrible.

The people seemed moved, or rather their purpose was deprived of that energetic unanimity which had hitherto carried them so far. Some shouted against the veto—some against the unconstitutional priests, some more modestly called out for lowering the price of bread and butcher-meat. One of them flung a red cap to the king, who quietly drew it upon his head; another offered him a bottle, and commanded him to drink to the nation. No glass could be had, and he was obliged to drink out of the bottle. These incidents are grotesque and degrading, but they are redeemed by one of much dignity. "Fear nothing, sire," said one of the faithful grenadiers of the National Guard who defended him. The king took his hand, and pressing it to his heart, replied, "Judge yourself if I fear."

Various leaders of the republicans were present at this extraordinary scene, in the apartments, or in the garden, and expressed themselves according to their various sentiments. "What a figure they have made of him with the red night-cap and the bottle!" said Manuel, the procureur of the commune of Paris—"What a magnificent spectacle!" said the artist David, looking out upon the tumultuary sea of pikes, agitated by fifty thousand hands, as they rose and sunk, welked and waved;—"Tremble, tremble, tyrants!"—"They are in a fair train," said the fierce Gorsas; "we shall soon see their pikes garnished with several heads." The crowds who thrust forward into the palace and the presence were pressed together till the heat increased almost to suffocation, nor did there appear any end to the confusion.

Late and slow, the Legislative Assembly did at length send a deputation of twenty-five members to the palace. Their arrival put an end to the tumult; for Pétion, the Mayor of Paris, and the other authorities, who had hitherto been well nigh passive, now exerted themselves to clear away the armed populace from the palace and gardens, and were so readily obeyed, that it was evident that similar efforts would have entirely prevented the insurrec-

tion. The "poor and virtuous people," as Robespierre used to call them, with an affectedunction of pronunciation, retired for once with their pikes unbloodied, not a little marveling why they had been called together for such a harmless purpose.

That a mine so formidable should have exploded without effect, gave some momentary advantages to the party at whose safety it was aimed. Men of worth exclaimed against the ignamy of such a gratuitous insult to the crown, while it was still called a constitutional authority. Men of substance dreaded the recurrence of such acts of revolutionary violence, and the commencement of riots, which were likely to end in pillage. Petitions were presented to the assembly, covered with the names of thousands, praying that the leaders of the insurgents should be brought to punishment; while the king demanded, in a tone which seemed to appeal to France and to Europe, some satisfaction for his insulted dignity, the violation of his palace, and the danger of his person. But La Fayette, at the head of an army whose affections he was supposed to possess, was the most formidable intercessor. He had two or three days before transmitted to the assembly a letter, or rather a remonstrance, in which, speaking in the name of the army, as well as his own, he expressed the highest dissatisfaction with the recent events at Paris, complaining of the various acts of violation of the constitution, and the personal disrespect offered to the king. This letter of itself had been accounted an enormous offence, both by the jacobins and the girondists; but the tumult of the 20th of June roused the general to bolder acts of intercession.

On the 28th of the same month of June, all parties heard with as much interest as anxiety, that General La Fayette was in Paris. He came, indeed, only with a part of his staff. Had he brought with him a moderate body of troops upon whom he could have absolutely depended, his presence so supported, in addition to his influence in Paris, would have settled the point at issue. But the general might hesitate to diminish the French army then in front of the enemy, and by doing so to take on himself the responsibility of what might happen in his absence; or, as it appeared from subsequent events, he may not have dared to repose the necessary confidence in any corps of his army, so completely had they been imbued with the revolutionary spirit. Still his arrival, thus slightly attended, indicated a confidence in his own resources, which was calculated to strike the opposite party with anxious apprehension.

He appeared at the bar of the assembly, and addressed the members in a strain of decision which had not been lately heard on the part of those who pleaded the royal cause in that place. He denounced the authors of the violence committed on the 20th of June, declared that several corps of his army had addressed him, and that he came to express their horror as well as his own at the rapid progress of faction; and to demand that such measures should be taken as to insure the defenders of France, that while they were shedding their blood on the frontiers, the constitution, for which they combated, should not be destroyed by traitors in the interior. This speech, delivered by a man of

great courage and redoubted influence, had considerable effect. The girondists, indeed, proposed to inquire, whether La Fayette had permission from the minister of war to leave the command of his army; and sneeringly affirmed, that the Austrians must needs have retreated from the frontier, since the general of the French army had returned to Paris: but a considerable majority preferred the motion of the constitutionalist Ramond, who, eulogising La Fayette as the eldest son of Liberty, proposed an inquiry into the causes and object of those factious proceedings of which he had complained.

Thus happily commenced La Fayette's daring enterprise; but those by whom he expected to be supported did not rally around him. To disperse the Jacobin Club was probably his object, but no sufficient force gathered about him to encourage the attempt. He ordered for the next day a general review of the National Guards, in hopes, doubtless, that they would have recognized the voice which they had obeyed with such unanimity of submission; but this civic force was by no means in the state in which he left them at his departure. The several corps of grenadiers, which were chiefly drawn from the more opulent classes, had been, under pretence of the general principle of equality, melted down and united with those composed of men of an inferior description, and who had a more decided revolutionary tendency. Many officers, devoted to La Fayette and the constitution, had been superseded; and the service was, by studied contumely and ill usage, rendered disgusting to those who avowed the same sentiments, or displayed any remaining attachment to the sovereign. By such means Pétion, the Mayor of Paris, had now authority enough with the civic army to prevent the review from taking place. A few grenadiers of different sections did indeed muster, but their number was so small that they dispersed in haste and alarm.

The girondists and jacobins, closely united at this crisis, began to take heart, yet dared not on their part venture to arrest the general. Meantime La Fayette saw no other means of saving the king than to propose his anew attempting an escape from Paris, which he offered to further by every means in his power. The plan was discussed, but dismissed in consequence of the queen's prejudices against La Fayette, whom, not unaturally (though as far as regarded intention certainly unjustly), she regarded as the original author of the king's misfortune. After two days' lingering in Paris, La Fayette found it necessary to return to the army which he commanded, and leave the king to his fate.

La Fayette's conduct on this occasion may always be opposed to any aspersions thrown on his character at the commencement of the Revolution; for, unquestionably, in June, 1792, he exposed his own life to the most imminent danger in order to protect that of the king, and the existence of royalty. Yet he must himself have felt a lesson, which his fate may teach to others; how perilous, namely, it is, to set the example of violent and revolutionary courses, and what dangerous precedents such rash-

ness may afford to those who use similar means for carrying events to still farther extremities. The march from Versailles, 6th October, 1789, in which La Fayette to a certain degree co-operated, and of which he reaped all the immediate advantage, had been the means of placing Louis in that precarious situation from which he was now so generously anxious to free him. It was no less La Fayette's own act, by means of his personal aide-de-camp, to bring back the person of the king to Paris from Varennes; whereas he was now recommending, and offering to further his escape, by precisely such measures as his interference had then thwarted.

Notwithstanding the low state of the royal party, one constituted authority, amongst so many, had the courage to act offensively on the weaker and the injured side. The Directory of the Department (or province) of Paris, declared against the mayor, imputed to him the blame of the scandalous excesses of the 20th of June, and suspended him and Manuel, the procurer of the community of Paris, from their offices. This judgment was affirmed by the king. But, under the protection of the girondists and jacobins, Pétion appealed to the assembly, where the demon of discord seemed now let loose, as the advantage was contended for by at least three parties, avowedly distinct from each other, together with innumerable subdivisions of opinion. And yet, in the midst of such complicated and divided interests, such various and furious passions, two individuals, a lady and a bishop, undertook to restore general concord, and, singular to tell, they had a momentary success. Olympia de Gouges was an ardent lover of liberty, but she united with this passion an intense feeling of devotion, and a turn like that entertained by our friends the quakers, and other sects who affect a transcendental love of the human kind, and interpret the doctrines of christian morality in the most strict and literal sense. This person had sent abroad several publications, recommending to all citizens of France, and the deputies especially of the assembly, to throw aside personal views, and form a brotherly and general union with heart and hand, in the service of the public.

The same healing overture, as it would have been called in the civil dissensions of England, was brought before the assembly,* and recommended by the constitutional Bishop of Lyons, the Abbe Lamourette. This good-natured orator affected to see, in the divisions which rent the assembly to pieces, only the result of an unfortunate error—a mutual misunderstanding of each other's meaning. "You," he said to the republican members, "are afraid of an undue attachment to aristocracy: you dread the introduction of the English system of two chambers into the constitution. You of the right hand, on the contrary, misconstrue your peaceful and ill-understood brethren, so far as to suppose them capable of renouncing monarchy, as established by the constitution. What then remains to extinguish these fatal divisions, but for each party to disown the designs falsely imputed to them, and for the assembly united to swear anew their devotion to the constitution, as it has been bequeathed to us by the Constituent Assembly."

* 9th July.

This speech, wonderful as it may seem, had the effect of magic; the deputies of every faction, royalist, constitutionalist, girondist, jacobin, and orleanist, rushed into each other's arms, and mixed tears with the solemn oaths by which they renounced the innovations supposed to be imputed to them. The king was sent for to enjoy this spectacle of concord, so strangely and so unexpectedly renewed. But the feeling, though strong,—and it might be with many overpowering for the moment,—was but like oil spilt on the raging sea, or rather like a shot fired across the waves of a torrent, which, though it counteracts them by its momentary impulse, cannot for a second alter their course. The factions, like Le Sage's demons, detested each other the more for having been compelled to embrace, and from the name and country of the benevolent bishop, the scene was long called, in ridicule, *le Baiser d'Amourette*, and *la Reconciliation Normande*.

The next public ceremony showed how little party spirit had been abated by this singular scene. The king's acceptance of the constitution was repeated in the Champ de Mars before the federates, or deputies sent up to represent the various departments of France; and the figure made by the king during that pageant formed a striking and melancholy parallel with his actual condition in the state. With hair powdered and dressed, with clothes embroidered in the ancient court-fashion, surrounded and crowded unceremoniously by men of the lowest rank, and in the most wretched garbs, he seemed something belonging to a former age, but which in the present has lost its fashion and value. He was conducted to the Champ de Mars under a strong guard, and by a circuitous route, to avoid the insults of the multitude, who dedicated their applauses to the girondist Mayor of Paris, exclaiming "Pétion or death!" When he ascended the altar to go through the ceremonial of the day, all were struck with the resemblance to a victim led to sacrifice, and the queen so much so, that she exclaimed and nearly fainted. A few children alone called, *Vive le roi!* This was the last time Louis was seen in public until he mounted the scaffold.

The departure of La Fayette renewed the courage of the girondists, and they proposed a decree of impeachment against him in the assembly; but the spirit which the general's presence had awakened was not yet extinguished, and his friends in the assembly undertook his defence with a degree of unexpected courage, which alarmed their antagonists. Nor could their fears be termed groundless. The constitutional general might march his army upon Paris, or he might make some accommodation with the foreign invaders, and receive assistance from them to accomplish such a purpose. It seemed to the girondists, that no time was to be lost. They determined not to trust to the jacobins, to whose want of resolution they seem to have ascribed the failure of the insurrection on the 20th of June. They resolved upon occasion of the next effort, to employ some part of that departmental force, which was now approaching Paris in straggling bodies, under the name of federates. The affiliated clubs had faithfully obeyed the mandates of the parent society of the jacobins, by procuring that the most

staunch and exalted revolutionists should be sent on this service. These men, or the greater part of them, chose to visit Paris, rather than to pass straight to their rendezvous at Soissons. As they believed themselves the armed representatives of the country, they behaved with all the insolence which the consciousness of bearing arms gives to those who are unaccustomed to discipline. They walked in large bodies in the Garden of the Tuileries, and when any persons of the royal family appeared, they insulted the ladies with obscene language and indecent songs, the men with the most hideous threats. The girondists resolved to frame a force, which might be called their own, out of such formidable materials.

Barbaroux, one of the most enthusiastic admirers of the Revolution, a youth like the Seid of Voltaire's tragedy, filled with the most devoted enthusiasm for a cause of which he never suspected the truth, offered to bring up a battalion of federates from his native city of Marseilles, men, as he describes them, who knew how to die, and who, as it proved, understood at least as well how to kill. In raking up the disgusting history of mean and bloody-minded demagogues, it is impossible not to dwell on the contrast afforded by the generous and self-devoted character of Barbaroux, who, young, handsome, generous, noble-minded, and disinterested, sacrificed his family-happiness, his fortune, and finally his life, to an enthusiastic though mistaken zeal for the liberty of his country. He had become from the commencement of the Revolution one of its greatest champions at Marseilles, where it had been forwarded and opposed by all the fervour of faction, influenced by the southern sun. He had admired the extravagant writings of Marat and Robespierre; but when he came to know them personally, he was disgusted with their low sentiments and savage dispositions, and went to worship Freedom amongst the girondists, where her shrine was served by the fair and accomplished Citoyenne Roland.

The Marseillais, besides the advantage of this enthusiastic leader, marched to the air of the finest hymn to which liberty or the Revolution had yet given birth. They appeared in Paris, where it had been agreed, between the jacobins and the girondists, that the strangers should be welcomed by the fraternity of the suburbs, and whatever other force the factions could command. Thus united, they were to march to secure the municipality, occupy the bridges and principal posts of the city with detached parties, while the main body should proceed to form an encampment in the Garden of the Tuileries, where the conspirators had no doubt they should find themselves sufficiently powerful to exact the king's resignation, or declare his forfeiture.

This plan failed through the cowardice of Santerre, the chief leader of the insurgents of the suburbs, who had engaged to meet the Marseillais with forty thousand men. Very few of the promised auxiliaries appeared; but the undismayed Marseillais, though only about five hundred in number, marched through the city to the terror of the inhabitants, their keen black eyes seeming to seek out aristocratic victims, and their songs partaking of the wild Moorish character that lingers in the south of France, de-

nouncing vengeance on kings, priests, and nobles.

In the Tuileries the federates fixed a quarrel on some grenadiers of the National Guard, who were attached to the constitution, and, giving instant way to their habitual impetuosity, attacked, defeated, and dispersed them. In the riot, d'Epréménil, who had headed the opposition to the will of the king in parliament, which led the way to the convocation of estates, and who had been once the idol of the people, but now had become the object of their hate, was cut down and about to be massacred. "Assist me," he called out to Pétion, who had come to the scene of confusion,—"I am d'Epréménil—once, as you are now, the minion of the people's love." Pétion, not unmoved, it is to be supposed, at the terms of the appeal, hastened to rescue him. Not long afterwards both suffered by the guillotine, which was the bloody conclusion of so many popular favourites. The riot was complained of by the constitutional party, but, as usual, it was explained by a declaration on the part of ready witeasses, that the forty civic soldiers had insulted and attacked the five hundred Marseillais, and therefore brought the disaster upon themselves.

Meanwhile, though their hands were strengthened by this band of unscrupulous and devoted implementers of their purpose, the girondists failed totally in their attempt against La Fayette in the assembly, the decree of accusation against him being rejected by a victorious majority. They were therefore induced to resort to measures of direct violence, which unquestionably they would willingly have abstained from, since they could not attempt them without giving a perilous superiority to the Jacobin faction. The manifesto of the Duke of Brunswick, and his arrival on the French frontier at the head of a powerful Prussian army, acted upon the other motives for insurrection, as a high pressure upon a steam-engine, producing explosion.

It was the misfortune of Louis, as we have often noticed, to be as frequently injured by the false measures of his friends as by the machinations of his enemies; and this proclamation, issued by a monarch who had taken arms in the king's cause, was couched in language intolerable to the feelings even of such Frenchmen as might still retain towards their king some sentiments of loyalty. All towns or villages which should offer the slightest resistance to the allies, were in this ill-timed manifesto menaced with fire and sword. Paris was declared responsible for the safety of Louis, and the most violent threats of the total subversion of that great metropolis were denounced as the penalty.

The Duke of Brunswick was undoubtedly induced to assume this tone, by the ease which he had experienced in putting down the revolution in Holland; but the cases were by no means parallel. Holland was a country much divided in political opinions, and there was existing among the constituted authorities a strong party in favour of the stadtholder. France, on the contrary, excepting only the emigrants who were in the duke's own army, was united, like the Jews of old, against foreign invasion, though divided into many bitter factions within itself. Above all, the comparative strength of France and Holland was so different, that a force

which might overthrow the one country, without almost a struggle, would scarce prove sufficient to wrest from such a nation as France even the most petty of her frontier fortresses. It cannot be doubted, that this haughty and insolent language on the part of the invaders irritated the personal feelings of every true Frenchman, and determined them to the most obstinate resistance against invaders, who were confident enough to treat them as a conquered people, even before a skirmish had been fought. The imprudence of the allied general recoiled on the unfortunate Louis, on whose account he used this menacing language. Men began to consider his cause as identified with that of the invaders, of course as standing in diametrical opposition to that of the country; and these opinions spread generally among the citizens of Paris. To animate the citizens to their defence, the assembly declared that the country was in danger; and in order that the announcement might be more impressive, cannon were hourly discharged from the Hôtel des Invalides—bands of military music traversed the streets—bodies of men were drawn together hastily, as if the enemy were at the gates—and all the hurried and hasty movements of the constituted authorities seemed to announce, that the invaders were within a day's march of Paris.

These distracting and alarming movements, with the sentiments of fear and anxiety which they were qualified to inspire, aggravated the unpopularity of Louis, in whose cause his brothers and his allies were now threatening the metropolis of France. From these concurring circumstances the public voice was indeed so strongly against the cause of monarchy, that the girondists ventured by their organ, Vergniaud, to accuse the king, in the assembly, of holding intelligence with the enemy, or at least of omitting sufficient defensive preparations, and proposed in express terms that they should proceed to declare his forfeiture. The orator, however, did not press this motion, willing, doubtless, that the power of carrying through and enforcing such a decree should be completely ascertained, which could only be after a mortal struggle with the last defenders of the crown; but when a motion like this could be made and seconded, it showed plainly how little respect was preserved for the king in the assembly at large. For this struggle all parties were arranging their forces, and it became every hour more evident, that the capital was speedily to be the scene of some dreadful event.

CHAPTER IX.

The day of the 10th of August—Tocin sounded early in the morning.—Swiss Guards, and relics of the royal party, repair to the Tuileries.—Mandat assassinated.—Dejection of Louis, and energy of the queen.—King's ministers appear at the bar of the assembly, stating the peril of the royal family, and requesting a deputation might be sent to the palace—Assembly pass to the order of the day—Louis and his family repair to the assembly—Conflict at the Tuileries.—Swiss ordered to repair to the king's person—and are many of them shot and dispersed on their way to the assembly—At the close of the day almost all of them are massacred.—Royal family

spend the night in the neighbouring Convent of the Feuillans.

THE king had, since the insurrection of the 20th of June, which displayed how much he was at the mercy of his enemies, renounced almost all thoughts of safety or escape. Henry IV. would have called for his arms—Louis XVI. demanded his confessor. "I have no longer anything to do with earth," he said; "I must turn all my thoughts on Heaven." Some vain efforts were made to bribe the leaders of the jacobins, who took the money, and pursued, as might have been expected, their own course with equal rigour. The motion for the declaration of the king's forfeiture still lingered in the Convention, its fate depending upon the coming crisis. At length the fatal 10th of August approached, being the day which, after repeated adjournments, had been fixed by the groundists and their rivals for the final rising.

The king was apprised of their intention, and had hastily recalled from their barracks at Courbevoie about a thousand Swiss Guards, upon whose fidelity he could depend. The formidable discipline and steady demeanour of these gallant mountaineers might have recalled the description given by historians, of the entrance of their predecessors into Paris under similar circumstances, the day before the affair of the Barricades, in the reign of Henry II.* But the present moment was too anxious to admit of reflections upon past history.

Early on the morning of the 10th of August, the tocsin rung out its alarm peal over the terrified city of Paris, and announced that the long-menaced insurrection was at length on foot. In many parishes the constitutional party resisted those who came to sound this awful signal; but the well-prepared jacobins were found everywhere victorious, and the prolonged mournful sound was soon tolled out from every steeple in the metropolis.

To this melancholy music the contending parties arranged their forces for attack and defence, upon a day which was doomed to be decisive.

The Swiss Guards got under arms, and repaired to their posts in and around the palace. About four hundred grenadiers of the loyal section of Filles St-Thomas, joined by several from that of Les Petits Pères, in whom all confidence could justly be reposed, were posted in the interior of the palace, and associated with the Swiss for its defence. The relics of the royalist party, undismayed at the events of the 28th of February in the year preceding,† had repaired to the palace on the first signal given by the tocsin. Joined to the domestic attendants of the royal family, they might amount to about four hundred persons. Nothing can more strongly mark the unprepared state of the court, than that there were neither muskets nor bayonets for suitably

arming these volunteers, nor any supply of ammunition, save what the Swiss and national grenadiers had in their pouches. The appearance also of this little troop tended to inspire dismay rather than confidence. The chivalrous cry of "Entrance for the noblesse of France," was the signal for their filing into the presence of the royal family. Alas! instead of the thousand nobles whose swords used to gleam around their monarch at such a crisis, there entered but veteran officers of rank, whose strength, though not their spirit, was consumed by years, mixed with boys scarce beyond the age of children, and with men of civil professions, several of whom, Lamoignon Malesherbes for example, had now for the first time worn a sword. Their arms were as miscellaneous as their appearance. Rapiers, hangers, and pistols, were the weapons with which they were to encounter bands well provided with musketry and artillery. Their courage, however, was unabated. It was in vain that the queen conjured, almost with tears, men aged fourscore and upwards, to retire from a contest where their strength could avail so little. The veterans felt that the fatal hour was come, and, unable to fight, claimed the privilege of dying in the discharge of their duty.

The behaviour of Marie Antoinette was magnanimous in the highest degree. "Her majestic air," says Peltier, "her Austrian lip, and aquiline nose, gave her an air of dignity, which can only be conceived by those who beheld her in that trying hour." Could she have inspired the king with some portion of her active spirit, he might even at that extreme hour have wrested the victory from the revolutionists; but the misfortunes which he could endure like a saint, he could not face and combat like a hero; and his scruples about shedding human blood well nigh unmanned him.

The distant shouts of the enemy were already heard, while the Gardens of the Tuileries were filled by the successive legions of the National Guard, with their cannon. Of this civic force, some, and especially the artillerymen, were as ill-disposed towards the king as was possible; others were well inclined to him; and the greater part remained doubtful. Mandat, their commander, was entirely in the royal interests. He had disposed the force he commanded to the best advantage for discouraging the mutinous, and giving confidence to the well-disposed, when he received an order to repair to the municipality for instructions. He went thither accordingly, expecting the support of such constitutionalists as remained in that magistracy, but he found it entirely in possession of the jacobin party. Mandat was arrested, and ordered a prisoner to the Abbaye, which he never reached, being pistolled by an assassin at the gate of the Hôtel de Ville. His death was an infinite loss to the king's party.

A signal advantage had at the same time been suffered to escape. Pétion, the brisotin Mayor of Paris, was now observed among the National Guards. The royalists possessed themselves of his person, and brought him to the palace, where it was proposed to detain this popular magistrate as an hostage. Upon this, his friends in the assembly moved that he should be brought to the bar, to render

* Thus imitated by the dramatist Lee, from the historian Devils:

Have you not heard—the king, preventing day,
Received the guards within the city gates;
The jolly Swisses marching to their pipes,
The crowd stood gaping heedless and amazed,
Strunk to their shops, and left the passage free.

† When they were in similar circumstances maltreated by the National Guard. See p. 54.

an account of the state of the capital; a message was dispatched accordingly requiring his attendance, and Louis had the weakness to permit him to depart.

The motions of the assailants were far from being so prompt and lively as upon former occasions, when no great resistance was anticipated. Santerre, an eminent brewer, who, from his great capital, and his affectation of popular zeal, had raised himself to the command of the suburb forces, was equally inactive in mind and body, and by no means fitted for the desperate part which he was called on to play. Westermann, a zealous republican, and a soldier of skill and courage, came to press Santerre's march, informing him that the Marseillais and Breton federates were in arms in the Place du Carrousel, and expected the advance of the pikemen from the suburbs of St-Antoine and St-Marceau. On Santerre's hesitating, Westermann placed his sword-point at his throat, and the citizen commandant, yielding to the nearer terror, put his hands at length in motion. Their numbers were immense. But the real strength of the assault was to lie on the federates of Marseilles and Bretagne, and other provinces, who had been carefully provided with arms and ammunition. They were also secure of the gendarmes, or soldiers of police, although these were called out and arranged on the king's side. The Marseillais and Bretons were placed at the head of the long columns of the suburb pikemen, as the edge of an axe is armed with steel, while the back is of coarser metal to give weight to the blow. The charge of the attack was committed to Westermann.

In the meantime, the defenders of the palace advised Louis to undertake a review of the troops assembled for his defence. His appearance and mien were deeply dejected, and he wore, instead of an uniform, a suit of violet, which is the mourning colour of sovereigns. His words were broken and interrupted, like the accents of a man in despair, and void of the energy suitable to the occasion. "I know not," he said, "what they would have from me—I am willing to die with my faithful servants—Yes, gentlemen, we will at length do our best to resist." It was in vain that the queen laboured to inspire her husband with a tone more resolved—in vain that she even snatched a pistol from the belt of the Count d'Affray, and thrust it into the king's hand, saying, "Now is the moment to show yourself as you are." Indeed, Barbaroux, whose testimony can scarce be doubted, declares his firm opinion, that had the king at this time mounted his horse, and placed himself at the head of the National Guards, they would have followed him, and succeeded in putting down the Revolution. History has its strong parallels, and one would think we are writing of Margaret of Anjou, endeavouring in vain to inspire determination into her virtuous but feeble-minded husband.

Within the palace, the disposition of the troops seemed excellent, and there, as well as in the courts of the Tuileries, the king's address was answered with shouts of *Vive le roi!* But when he sallied out into the garden, his reception from the legions of the National Guard was at least equivocal, and that of the artillerymen, and of a battalion from

St-Marceau, was decidedly unfavourable. Some cried, *Vive la nation!* Some, Down with the tyrant! The king did nothing to encourage his own adherents, or to crush his enemies, but retired to hold counsel in the palace, around which the storm was fast gathering.

It might have been expected that the assembly, in which the constitutionalists possessed so strong a majority as to throw out the accusation against La Fayette by a triumphant vote, might now, in the hour of dread necessity, have made some effort to save the crown which that constitution recognized, and the innocent life of the prince by whom it was occupied. But fear had laid strong possession upon these unworthy and ungenerous representatives. The ministers of the king appeared at the bar, and represented the state of the city and of the palace, conjuring the assembly to send a deputation to prevent bloodshed. This was courageous on the part of those faithful servants; for to intimate the least interest in the king's fate, was like the bold swimmer who approaches the whirlpool caused by the sinking of a gallant vessel. The measure they proposed had been resorted to on the 20th June preceding, and was then successful, even though the deputation consisted of members the most unfriendly to the king. But now, the assembly passed to the order of the day, and thereby left the fate of the king and capital to chance, or the result of battle.

In the meantime, the palace was completely invested. The bridge adjacent to the Tuileries, called Pont Royal, was occupied by the insurgents, and the quay on the opposite side of the river was mounted with cannon, of which the assailants had about fifty pieces, served by the most determined jacobins; for the artillerymen had from the beginning embraced the popular cause with unusual energy.

At this decisive moment Roederer, the procureur-général syndic, the depositary and organ of the law, who had already commanded the Swiss and armed royalists not to make any offensive movement, but to defend themselves when attacked, began to think, apparently, that his own safety was compromised, by this implied grant of permission to use arms even in defence of the king's person. He became urgent with the king to retire from the palace, and put himself under the protection of the National Assembly. The queen felt at once all the imbecility and dishonour of throwing themselves as suppliants on the protection of a body, which had not shown even a shadow of interest in their safety, surrounded as they knew the royal family to be with the most inveterate enemies. Ere she consented to such infamy, she said, she would willingly be nailed to the walls of the palace. But the counsel which promised to avert the necessity of bloodshed on either part, suited well with the timorous conscience and irresolution of Louis. Other measures were hastily proposed by those who had devoted themselves to secure his safety. There was, however, no real alternative but to fight at the head of his guards, or to submit himself to the pleasure of the assembly, and Louis preferred the latter.

His wife, his sister, and his children, accompanied him on this occasion; and the utmost efforts of an escort of three hundred Swiss and national grena-

diers were scarce able to protect them, and a small retinue, consisting of the ministers and a few men of rank, the gleanings of the most brilliant court of Christendom, who accompanied their master in this last act of humiliation, which was, indeed, equal to a voluntary descent from his throne. They were, at every moment of their progress, interrupted by the deadliest threats and imprecations, and the weapons of more than one ruffian were leveled against them. The queen was robbed even of her watch and purse—so near might the worst criminals approach the persons of the royal fugitives. Louis showed the greatest composure amidst all these imminent dangers. He was feeble when called upon to kill, but strong in resolution when the question was only to die.

The king's entrance into the assembly was not without dignity. "My family and I are come among you," he said, "to prevent the commission of a great crime." Vergniaud, who was president at the time, answered with propriety, though ambiguously. He assured the king that the assembly knew its duties, and was ready to perish in support of them. A member of the Mountain observed, with bitter irony, that it was impossible for the assembly to deliberate freely in presence of the monarch, and proposed he should retreat into one of the most remote committee-rooms—a place where assassination must have been comparatively easy. The assembly rejected this proposal, alike insulting and insidious, and assigned a box or small apartment, called the *logographe's*, used for the reporters of the debates, for the place of refuge of this unhappy family. This arrangement was scarce made, ere a heavy discharge of musketry and cannon announced that the king's retreat had not prevented the bloodshed he so greatly feared.

It must be supposed to have been Louis's intention that his guards and defenders should draw off from the palace so soon as he himself had abandoned it; for to what purpose was it now to be defended, when the royal family were no longer concerned? and at what risk, when the garrison was diminished by three hundred of the best of the troops, selected as the royal escort? But no such order of retreat, or of non-resistance, had, in fact, been issued to the Swiss Guards, and the military discipline of this fine corps prevented their retiring from an assigned post without command. Captain Duler is said to have asked the Marshal de Mailly for orders, and to have received for answer, "Do not suffer your posts to be forced." "You may rely on it," replied the intrepid Swiss.

Meantime, to give no unnecessary provocation, as well as on account of their diminished numbers, the court in front of the palace was abandoned, and the guards were withdrawn into the building itself, their outermost sentinels being placed at the bottom of the splendid staircase, to defend a sort of *barricade* which had been erected there ever since the 20th June, to prevent such intrusions as distinguished that day.

The insurgents, with the Marseillais and Breton *federates* at their heads, poured into the court-yard without opposition, planted their cannon where some small building gave them advantage, and advanced without hesitation to the outposts of the Swiss.—They had already tasted blood that day, having

massacred a patrol of royalists who, unable to get into the Tuileries, had attempted to assist the defence, by interrupting, or at least watching and discovering, the measures adopted by the insurgents. These men's heads were, as usual, borne on pikes among their ranks.

They pushed forward, and it is said the Swiss at first offered demonstrations of truce. But the assailants thronged onward, crowded on the barricade, and when the parties came into such close collision, a struggle ensued, and a shot was fired. It is doubtful from what side it came, nor is it of much consequence, for on such an occasion that body must be held the aggressors who approach the pickets of the other, armed and prepared for assault; and although the first gun be fired by those whose position is endangered, it is no less defensive than if discharged in reply to a fire from the other side.

This unhappy shot seems to have dispelled some small chance of a reconciliation between the parties. Hard firing instantly commenced from the *federates* and Marseillais, whilst the palace blazed forth fire from every window, and killed a great many of the assailants. The Swiss, whose numbers were now only about seven hundred men, determined, notwithstanding, upon a sally, which, in the beginning, was completely successful. They drove the insurgents from the court-yard, killed many of the Marseillais and Bretons, took some of their guns, and, turning them along the streets, compelled the assailants to actual flight, so that word was carried to the National Assembly that the Swiss were victorious. The utmost confusion prevailed there; the deputies upbraided each other with their share in bringing about the insurrection; Brissot showed timidity; and several of the deputies, thinking the guards were hastening to massacre them, attempted to escape by the windows of the hall.

If, indeed, the sally of the Swiss had been supported by a sufficient body of faithful cavalry, the Revolution might have been that day ended. But the gendarmes, the only horsemen in the field, were devoted to the popular cause, and the Swiss, too few to secure their advantage, were obliged to return to the palace, where they were of new invested.

Westermann posted his forces and artillery with much intelligence, and continued a fire on the Tuileries from all points. It was now returned with less vivacity, for the ammunition of the defenders began to fail. At this moment d'Hervilly arrived from the assembly, with the king's commands that the Swiss should cease firing, evacuate the palace, and repair to the king's person. The faithful guards obeyed at once, not understanding that the object was submission, but conceiving they were summoned elsewhere, to fight under the king's eye. They had no sooner collected themselves into a body, and attempted to cross the Garden of the Tuileries, than, exposed to a destructive fire on all sides, the remains of that noble regiment, so faithful to the trust assigned to it, diminished at every step; until, charged repeatedly by the treacherous gendarmes, who ought to have supported them, they were separated into platoons, which continued to defend themselves with courage, even till the very last of them was overpowered, dispersed, and destroyed by multitudes. A better

defence against such fearful odds scarce remains on historical record—a more useless one can hardly be imagined.

The rabble, with their leaders, the federates, now burst into the palace, executing the most barbarous vengeance on the few defenders who had not made their escape; and while some massacred the living, others, and especially the unsexed women who were mingled in their ranks, committed the most shameful butchery on the corpses of the slain.

Almost every species of enormity was perpetrated upon that occasion excepting pillage, which the populace would not permit, even amid every other atrocity. There exist in the coarsest minds, nay, while such are engaged in most abominable wickedness, redeeming traits of character, which show that the image of the Deity is seldom totally and entirely defaced even in the rudest bosom. An ordinary workman of the suburbs, in a dress which implied abject poverty, made his way into the place where the royal family were seated, demanding the king by the name of Monsieur Veto. "So you are here," he said, "beast of a Veto! There is a purse of gold I found in your house yonder. If you had found mine, you would not have been so honest." There were, doubtless, amongst that dreadful assemblage many thousands, whose natural honesty would have made them despise pillage, although the misrepresentations by which they were influenced to fury easily led them to rebellion and murder.

Band after band of these fierce men, their faces blackened with powder, their hands and weapons streaming with blood, came to invoke the vengeance of the assembly on the head of the king and royal family, and expressed, in the very presence of the victims whom they claimed, their expectations and commands how they should be dealt with.

Vergniaud, who rather than Brissot, ought to have given name to the girondists, took the lead in gratifying the wishes of these dreadful petitioners. He moved, 1st, That a National Convention should be summoned. 2d, That the king should be suspended from his office. 3d, That the king should reside at the Luxembourg palace under safeguard of the law, —a word which they were not ashamed to use. These proposals were unanimously assented to.

An almost vain attempt was made to save the lives of that remaining detachment of Swiss which had formed the king's escort to the assembly, and to whom several of the scattered royalists had again united themselves. Their officers proposed, as a last effort of despair, to make themselves masters of the assembly, and declare the deputies hostages for the king's safety. Considering the smallness of their numbers, such an attempt could only have produced additional bloodshed, which would have been ascribed doubtless to the king's treachery. The king commanded them to resign their arms, being the last order which he issued to any military force. He was obeyed; but, as they were instantly attacked by the insurgents, few escaped slaughter, and submission preserved but a handful. About seven hundred and fifty fell in the defence, and after the storm of the Tuileries. Some few were saved by the generous exertions of individual deputies—others were sent to prison, where a bloody

end awaited them—the greater part were butchered by the rabble, so soon as they saw them without arms. The mob sought for them the whole night, and massacred many porters of private families, who, at Paris, are generally termed Swiss, though often natives of other countries.

The royal family were at length permitted to spend the night, which, it may be presumed, was sleepless, in the cells of the neighbouring Convent of the Feuillans.

Thus ended, for the period of twenty years and upwards, the reign of the Bourbons over their ancient realm of France.

CHAPTER X.

La Fayette compelled to escape from France.—Is made prisoner by the Prussians, with three companions.—Reflections.—The triumvirate, Danton, Robespierre, and Marat.—Revolutionary tribunal appointed.—Suspension of the Legislative Assembly.—Longwy, Sienay, and Verdun, taken by the Prussians.—Mob of Paris enraged.—Great massacre of prisoners in Paris, commencing on the 2d, and ending 6th September.—Apathy of the assembly during and after these events.—Review of its course.

THE success of the 10th of August had sufficiently established the democratic maxim, that the will of the people, expressed by their insurrections, was the supreme law; and the orators of the clubs its interpreters; and the pikes of the suburbs its executive power. The lives of individuals and their fortunes were from that time only to be regarded as leases at will, subject to be revoked so soon as an artful, envious, or grasping demagogue should be able to turn against the lawful owners the readily-excited suspicions of a giddy multitude, whom habit and impunity had rendered ferocious. The system established on these principles, and termed liberty, was in fact an absolute despotism, far worse than that of Algiers; because the tyrannic dey only executes his oppression and cruelties within a certain sphere, affecting a limited number of his subjects who approach near to his throne; while, of the many thousand leaders of the jacobins of France, every one had his peculiar circle in which he claimed right, as full as that of Robespierre or Marat, to avenge former slights or injuries, and to gratify his own individual appetite for plunder and blood.

All the departments of France, without exception, paid the most unreserved submission to the decrees of the assembly, or rather to those which the Community of Paris, and the insurgents, had dictated to that legislative body; so that the hour seemed arrived when the magistracy of Paris, supported by a democratic force, should, in the name and through the influence of the assembly, impose its own laws upon France.

La Fayette in vain endeavoured to animate his soldiers against this new species of despotism. The jacobins had their friends and representatives in the very trustiest of his battalions. He made an effort, however, and a bold one. He seized on the persons of three deputies, sent to him as commissioners by the assembly, to compel submission to their decrees, and proposed to reserve them as hostages for the king's safety. Several of his own general officers,

the intrepid Desaix amongst others, seemed willing to support him. Dumourier, however, the personal enemy of La Fayette, and ambitious of being his successor in the supreme command, recognized the decrees of the assembly in the separate army which he commanded. His example drew over Luckner, who also commanded an independent corps d'armée, and who at first seemed disposed to join with La Fayette.

That unfortunate general was at length left unsupported by any considerable part even of his own army; so that with three friends, whose names were well known in the Revolution, he was fain to attempt an escape from France, and, in crossing a part of the enemy's frontier, they were made prisoners by a party of Prussians.

Fugitives from their own camp for the sake of royalty, they might have expected refuge in that of the allied kings, who were in arms for the same object; but, with a littleness of spirit which augured no good for their cause, the allies determined that these unfortunate gentlemen should be consigned as state prisoners to different fortresses. This conduct on the part of the monarchs, however irritated they might be by the recollection of some part of La Fayette's conduct in the outset of the Revolution, was neither to be vindicated by morality, the law of nations, nor the rules of sound policy. We are no approvers of the democratic species of monarchy which La Fayette endeavoured to establish, and cannot but be of opinion, that if he had acted upon his victory in the Champ de Mars, he might have shot up the Jacobin Club, and saved his own power and popularity from being juggled out of his hands by those sanguinary charlatans. But errors of judgment must be pardoned to men placed amidst unheeded difficulties; and La Fayette's conduct on his visit to Paris bore testimony to his real willingness to save the king and preserve the monarchy. But even if he had been amenable for a crime against his own country, we know not what right Austria or Prussia had to take cognizance of it. To them he was a mere prisoner of war, and nothing farther. Lastly, it is very seldom that a petty and vindictive line of policy can consist with the real interest, either of great princes or of private individuals. In the present case, the arrest of La Fayette was peculiarly the contrary. It afforded a plain proof to France and to all Europe, that the allied monarchs were determined to regard as enemies all who had in any manner, or to any extent, favoured the Revolution, being indeed the whole people of France, excepting the emigrants now in arms. The effect must necessarily have been, to compel every Frenchman, who was desirous of enjoying more liberty than the ancient despotism permitted, into submission to the existing government, whatever it was, so long as invading armies of foreigners, whose schemes were apparently as inconsistent with the welfare as with the independence of the country, were hanging on the frontiers of France.

For a short space, like hounds over the carcass of the prey they have jointly run down, the girondists and jacobins suspended their dissensions; but when the constitutional party had ceased to show

all signs of existence, their brawl soon recommenced, and the girondists early discovered, that in the allies whom they had called on to assist them in the subjugation of royalty, they had already to strive with men, who, though inferior to them in speculative knowledge, and in the eloquence which was to sway the assembly, possessed in a much higher degree the practical energies by which revolutions are accomplished, were in complete possession of the Community (or magistracy) of Paris, and maintained despotic authority over all the bands of the metropolis. Three men of terror, whose names will long remain, we trust, unmatched in history by those of any similar miscreants, had now the unrivalled leading of the jacobins, and were called the triumvirate.

Danton deserves to be named first, as unrivalled by his colleagues in talent and audacity. He was a man of gigantic size, and possessed a voice of thunder. His countenance was that of an ogre on the shoulders of a Hercules. He was as fond of the pleasures of vice as of the practice of cruelty; and it was said there were times when he became humanized amidst his debauchery, laughed at the terror which his furious declamations excited, and might be approached with safety, like the Maelstrom at the turn of tide. His profusion was indulged to an extent hazardous to his popularity, for the populace are jealous of a lavish expenditure, as raising their favourites too much above their own degree; and the charge of peculation finds always ready credit with them, when brought against public men.

Robespierre possessed this advantage over Danton, that he did not seem to seek for wealth, either for hoarding or expending, but lived in strict and economical retirement, to justify the name of the Incorruptible, with which he was honoured by his partisans. He appears to have possessed little talent, saving a deep fund of hypocrisy, considerable powers of sophistry, and a cold exaggerated strain of oratory, as foreign to good taste, as the measures he recommended were to ordinary humanity. It seemed wonderful, that even the seething and boiling of the revolutionary cauldron should have sent up from the bottom, and long supported on the surface, a thing so miserably void of claims to public distinction; but Robespierre had to impose on the minds of the vulgar, and he knew how to beguile them, by accommodating his flattery to their passions and scale of understanding, and by acts of cunning and hypocrisy, which weigh more with the multitude than the words of eloquence, or the arguments of wisdom. The people listened as to their Cicero when he twanged out his apostrophes of *Pauvre peuple, Peuple vertueux!* and hastened to execute whatever came recommended by such homied phrases, though devised by the worst of men for the worst and most inhuman of purposes.

Vanity was Robespierre's ruling passion, and though his countenance was the image of his mind, he was vain even of his personal appearance, and never adopted the external habits of a sans-culotte. Amongst his fellow jacobins, he was distinguished by the nicety with which his hair was arranged and powdered; and the neatness of his dress was care-

fully attended to, so as to counterbalance, if possible, the vulgarity of his person. His apartments, though small, were elegant, and vanity had filled them with representations of the occupant. Robespierre's picture at length hung in one place, his miniature in another, his bust occupied a niche, and on the table were disposed a few medallions exhibiting his head in profile. The vanity which all this indicated was of the coldest and most selfish character, being such as considers neglect as insult, and receives homage merely as a tribute; so that, while praise is received without gratitude, it is withheld at the risk of mortal hate. Self-love of this dangerous character is closely allied with envy, and Robespierre was one of the most envious and vindictive men that ever lived. He never was known to pardon any opposition, affront, or even rivalry; and to be marked in his tablets on such an account was a sure, though perhaps not an immediate, sentence of death. Danton was a hero, compared with this cold, calculating, creeping miscreant; for his passions, though exaggerated, had at least some touch of humanity, and his brutal ferocity was supported by brutal courage. Robespierre was a coward, who signed death-warrants with a hand that shook, though his heart was relentless. He possessed no passions on which to charge his crimes; they were perpetrated in cold blood, and upon mature deliberation.

Marat, the third of this infernal triumvirate, had attracted the attention of the lower orders, by the violence of his sentiments in the journal which he conducted from the commencement of the Revolution, upon such principles that it took the lead in forwarding its successive changes. His political exhortations began and ended like the howl of a blood-hound for murder; or, if a wolf could have written a journal, the gaunt and famished wretch could not have raved more eagerly for slaughter. It was blood which was Marat's constant demand, not in drops from the breast of an individual, not in puny streams from the slaughter of families, but blood in the profusion of an ocean. His usual calculation of the heads which he demanded amounted to two hundred and sixty thousand; and though he sometimes raised it as high as three hundred thousand, it never fell beneath the smaller number. It may be hoped, and, for the honour of human nature, we are inclined to believe, there was a touch of insanity in this unnatural strain of ferocity; and the wild and squalid features of the wretch appear to have intimated a degree of alienation of mind. Marat was, like Robespierre, a coward. Repeatedly denounced in the assembly, he skulked instead of defending himself, and lay concealed in some obscure garret or cellar among his cat-throats, until a storm appeared, when, like a bird of ill omen, his death-screach was again heard. Such was the strange and fatal triumvirate, in which the same degree of cannibal cruelty existed under different aspects. Danton murdered to glut his rage; Robespierre, to avenge his injured vanity, or to remove a rival whom he envied; Marat, from the same instinctive love of blood, which induces a wolf to continue his ravage of the flocks long after his hunger is appeased.

These three men were in complete possession of the Community of Paris, which was filled with their

adherents exclusively, and which, now in command of the armed force that had achieved the victory of the 10th of August, held the assembly as absolutely under their control, as the assembly, prior to that period, had held the person of the king. It is true, Pétion was still Mayor of Paris; but, being considered as a follower of Roland and Brissot, he was regarded by the jacobins as a prisoner, and detained in a sort of honourable restraint, having a body of their most faithful adherents constantly around him, as a guard which they pretended was assigned for his defence and protection. The truth is, that Pétion, a vain man, and of very moderate talents, had already lost his consequence. His temporary popularity arose almost solely out of the enmity entertained against him by the court, and his having braved on one or two occasions the king's personal displeasure, particularly on the 20th of June. This merit was now forgotten, and Pétion was fast sinking into his natural nullity. Nothing could be more pitiful than the appearance of this magistrate, whose name had been so lately the theme of every tongue in Paris, when brought to the bar of the assembly, pale, and hesitating to back, by his appearance among his terrible revolutionary associates, petitions for measures, as distasteful to himself as to his friends of the Gironde party, who had apparently no power to deliver him from his state of humiliating restraint.

The demands of the Community of Paris, now the Sanhedrim of the jacobins, were of course for blood and vengeance, and revolutionary tribunals to make short and sharp execution upon constitutionalist and royalist, soldier and priest—upon all who acted on the principle, that the king had some right to defend his person and residence against a furious mob, armed with muskets and cannon—and upon all who could, by any possible implication, be charged with having approved such doctrines as leaned towards monarchy, at any time during all the changes of this changeful-featured revolution.

A revolutionary tribunal was appointed accordingly; but the girondists, to impose some check on its measures, rendered the judgment of a jury necessary for condemnation, an incumbrance which seemed to the jacobins a needless and uncivic restriction of the rights of the people. Robespierre was to have been appointed president of this tribunal, but he declined the office on account of his philanthropic principles! Meantime, the sharpness of its proceedings was sufficiently assured by the nomination of Danton to the office of minister of justice, which had fallen to his lot as a jacobin, while Roland, Servan, and Clavière, alike fearing and detesting their dreadful colleague, assumed, with Monge and Lebrun, the other offices, in what was now called a provisional executive. These last five ministers were girondists.

It was not the serious intention of the assembly to replace Louis in a palace, or to suffer him to retain the smallest portion of personal freedom or political influence. It had, indeed, been decreed on the night of the 10th of August, that he should inhabit the Luxembourg palace, but, on the 11th, his residence was transferred, with that of the royal family, to an ancient fortress called the Temple, from the Knights Templars, to whom it once belonged. There

was in front a house, with some more modern apartments, but the dwelling of Louis was the donjon or ancient keep, itself a huge square tower of great antiquity, consisting of four stories. Each story contained two or three rooms or closets; but these apartments were unfurnished, and offered no convenience for the accommodation of an ordinary family, much less to prisoners of such distinction. The royal family were guarded with a strictness, of which every day increased the rigour.

In the meanwhile, the revolutionary tribunal was proceeding against the friends and partisans of the deposed monarch with no lack, one would have thought, of zeal or animosity. De la Porte, intendant of the king's civil list, d'Angremont, and Durosot, a royalist author, were with others condemned and executed. But Montmorin, the brother of the royal minister, was acquitted; and even the Comte d'Alfay, though Colonel of the Swiss Guards, found grace in the eyes of this tribunal:—so lenient it was in comparison to those which France was afterwards doomed to groan under. Danton, baulked of his prey, or but half-supplied with victims, might be compared to the spectre-huntsman of Boccaccio,—

Stern look'd the fiend, as frustrate of his will,
Not half sufficed, and greedy yet to kill.

But he had already devised within his soul, and agitated amongst his compers, a scheme of vengeance so dark and dreadful, as never ruffian before or since had head to contrive, or nerve to execute. It was a measure of extermination which the jacobins resolved upon—a measure so sweeping in its purpose and extent, that it should at once drown in their own blood every royalist or constitutionalist who could raise a finger, or even entertain a thought, against them.

Three things were indispensable essential to their execrable plan. In the first place, they had to collect and place within reach of their assassins, the numerous victims whom they sought to overwhelm with this common destruction. Secondly, it was necessary to intimidate the assembly, and the girondist party in particular; sensible that they were likely to interfere, if it was left in their power, to prevent acts of cruelty incompatible with the principles of most or all of their number. Lastly, the jacobin chiefs were aware, that ere they could prepare the public mind to endure the massacres which they meditated, it was necessary they should wait for one of those critical moments of general alarm, in which fear makes the multitude cruel, and when the agitations of rage and terror combine to unsettle men's reason, and drown at once their humanity and their understanding.

To collect prisoners in any numbers was an easy matter, when the mere naming a man, however innocent, as an aristocrat or a suspected person, especially if he happened to have a name indicative of gentle blood, and an air of decency in apparel, was sufficient ground for sending him to prison. For the purpose of making such arrests upon suspicion, the Community of Paris openly took upon themselves the office of granting warrants for impri-

soning individuals in great numbers, and at length proceeded so far in their violent and arbitrary conduct, as to excite the jealousy of the Legislative Body.

This assembly of national representatives seemed to have been stunned by the events of the 10th of August. Two-thirds of the deputies had a few days before eulipated La Fayette for the zeal with which he impeached the unsuccessful attempt of the 20th June, designed to accomplish the same purpose which had been effected on this last dread epoch of the Revolution. The same number, we must suppose, were inimical to the revolution achieved by the taking of the Tuileries, and the dethronement of the monarch, whom it had been La Fayette's object to protect and defend, in dignity and person. But there was no energy left in that portion of the assembly, though by far the largest, and the wisest. Their benches were left deserted, nor did any voice arise, either to sustain their own dignity, or, as a last resource, to advise a union with the girondists, now the leading force in the representative body, for the purpose of putting a period to the rule of revolutionary terror over that of civil order. The girondists themselves proposed no decisive measures, and indeed appear to have been the most helpless party (though possessing in their ranks very considerable talent) that ever attempted to act a great part in the convulsions of a state. They seem to have expected, that, so soon as they had accomplished the overthrow of the throne, their own supremacy should have been established in its room. They became, therefore, liable to the disappointment of a child, who, having built his house of boughs after his own fashion, is astonished to find those bigger and stronger than himself throw its materials out of their way, instead of attempting, according to his expectations, to creep into it, for the purpose of shelter.

Late and timidly, they at length began to remonstrate against the usurped power of the Community of Paris, who paid them as little regard, as they were themselves doing to the constituted authorities of the executive power.

The complaints which were laid before them of the violent encroachments made on the liberty of the people at large, the girondists had hitherto answered by timid exhortations to the community to be cautious in their proceedings. But on the 29th of August they were startled out of their weak inaction, by an assumption of open force, and open villany, on the part of those formidable rivals, under which it was impossible to remain silent. On the night previous, the community, proceeding to act upon their own sole authority, had sent their satellites, consisting of the municipal officers who were exclusively attached to them (who were selected from the most determined jacobins, and had been augmented to an extraordinary number), to seize arms of every description, and to arrest suspicious persons in every corner of Paris. Hundreds and thousands of individuals had been, under these usurped powers, committed to the various prisons of the city, which were now filled even to choking, with all persons, of every sex and age, against whom political hatred could allege suspicion, or private

hatred revive an old quarrel, or love of plunder awake a thirst for confiscation.

The deeds of robbery, of license, and of ferocity, committed during these illegal proceedings, as well as the barefaced contempt which they indicated of the authority of the assembly, awakened the girondists, but too late, to some sense of the necessity of exertion. They summoned the municipality to their bar. They came, not to deprecate the displeasure of the assembly, not to submit themselves to its mercy,—they came to triumph; and brought the speechless and trembling Pétion in their train, as their captive, rather than their mayor. Tallien explained the defence of the community, which amounted to this: "The provisional representatives of the city of Paris," he said, "had been calumniated; they appeared to justify what they had done, not as accused persons, but as triumphing in having discharged their duty. "The sovereign people," he said, "had committed to them full powers, saying, Go forth, save the country in our name—whatever you do we will ratify." This language was, in effect, that of defiance, and it was supported by the shouts and howls of assembled multitudes, armed as for the attack on the Tuileries, and their courage, it may be imagined, not the less, that there were neither aristocrats nor Swiss Guards between them and the Legislative Assembly. Their cries were, "Long live our community—our excellent commissioners—we will defend them or die!"

The satellites of the same party, in the tribunes or galleries, joined in the cry, with invectives on those members of the assembly who were supposed, however republican in principles, to be opposed to the revolutionary measures of the community. The mob without soon forced their way into the hall,—joined with the mob within,—and left the theoretical republicans of the assembly the choice of acquiescence in their dictates, flight, or the liberty of dying on their posts like the senators of that Rome which they admired. None embraced this last alternative. They broke up the meeting in confusion, and left the jacobins, secure of impunity in whatever they might next choose to attempt.

Thus, Danton and his fell associates achieved the second point necessary to the execution of the horrors which they meditated; the Legislative Assembly were completely subdued and intimidated. It remained to avail themselves of some opportunity which might excite the people of Paris, in their present feverish state, to participate in, or to endure crimes, at which in calm moments the richest would probably have shuddered. The state of affairs on the frontier aided them with such an opportunity—aided them, we say, because every step of preparation beforehand shows that the horrors acted on the 3d September were premeditated; nay, the very treaches destined to inhuman hundreds and thousands of prisoners, yet alive, untried and undoomed, were already excavated.

A temporary success of the allied monarchs fell upon the mine already prepared, and gave fire to it, as lightning might have fired a powder magazine. Longwy, Stenay, and Verdun, were announced to have fallen into the hands of the King of Prussia. The first and last were barrier fortresses of reput-

ed strength, and considerable resistance had been expected. The ardent and military spirit of the French was awakened in the resolute, upon learning that their frontier was thus invaded; fear and discomfiture took possession of others, who thought they already heard the allied trumpets at the gates of Paris. Between the eager desire of some to march against the army of the invaders, and the terror and dismay of others, there arose a climax of excitation and alarm, favourable to the execution of every desperate design; as ruffians ply their trade best, and with least chance of interruption, in the midst of an earthquake or a conflagration.

On the 2d September, the Community of Paris announced the fall of Longwy, and the approaching fate of Verdun, and, as if it had been the only constituted authority in the country, commanded the most summary measures for the general defence. All citizens were ordered to keep themselves in readiness to march on an instant's warning. All arms were to be given up to the community, save those in the hands of active citizens, armed for the public protection. Suspected persons were to be disarmed, and other measures were announced, all of which were calculated to call men's attention to the safety of themselves and their families, and to destroy the interest which at ordinary times the public would have taken in the fate of others.

The awful voice of Danton astounded the assembly with similar information, hardly deigning to ask their approbation of the measures which the Community of Paris had adopted on their own sole authority. "You will presently hear," he said, "the alarm-guns—falsely so called—for they are the signal of a charge. Courage—courage—and once again courage, is all that is necessary to conquer our enemies." These words, pronounced with the accent and attitude of an exterminating spirit, appalled and stupified the assembly. We find nothing that indicated in them either interest in the imminent danger of the public from without, or in the usurpation from within. They appeared paralysed with terror.

The armed bands of Paris marched in different quarters, to seize arms and horses, to discover and denounce suspected persons; the youth fit for arms were everywhere mustered, and amid shouts, remonstrances, and debates, the general attention was so engaged, each individual with his own affairs, in his own quarter, that, without interference of any kind, whether from legal authority, or general sympathy, a universal massacre of the numerous prisoners was perpetrated, with a quietness and deliberation which has not its parallel in history. The reader, who may be still surprised that a transaction so horrid should have passed without opposition or interruption, must be again reminded of the astounding effects of the popular victory of the 10th of August; of the total quiescence of the Legislative Assembly; of the want of an armed force of any kind to oppose such outrages; and of the epidemic panic which renders multitudes powerless and passive as infants. Should these causes not appear to him sufficient, he must be contented to wonder at the facts we are to relate, as at one of those dreadful prodigies by which Providence confounds our reason, and shows what human nature can be brought

to, when the restraints of morality and religion are cast aside.

The number of individuals accumulated in the various prisons of Paris had increased by the arrests and domiciliary visits subsequent to the 10th of August to about eight thousand persons. It was the object of this infernal scheme to destroy the greater part of these under one general system of murder, not to be executed by the sudden and furious impulse of an armed multitude, but with a certain degree of cold blood and deliberate investigation. A force of armed banditti, Marseillais partly, and partly chosen ruffians of the faubourgs, proceeded to the several prisons, into which they either forced their passage, or were admitted by the jailers, most of whom had been apprised of what was to take place, though some even of these steeled officials exerted themselves to save those under their charge.

—A revolutionary tribunal was formed from among the armed ruffians themselves, who examined the registers of the prison, and summoned the captives individually to undergo the form of a trial. If the judges—as was almost always the case—declared for death, their doom, to prevent the efforts of men in despair, was expressed in the words—“Give the prisoner freedom.” The victim was then thrust out into the street or yard; he was dispatched by men and women, who, with sleeves tucked up, arms dyed elbow-deep in blood, hands holding axes, pikes, and sabres, were executioners of the sentence; and, by the manner in which they did their office on the living, and mangled the bodies of the dead, showed that they occupied their post as much from pleasure as from love of hire. They often exchanged places, the judges going out to take the executioners' duty, the executioners, with their reeking hands, sitting as judges in their turn. Maillard, a ruffian alleged to have distinguished himself at the siege of the Bastille, but better known by his exploits upon the march to Versailles,* presided during these brief and sanguinary investigations. His companions on the bench were persons of the same stamp. Yet there were occasions when they showed some transient gleams of humanity, and it is not unimportant to remark, that boldness had more influence on them than any appeal to mercy or compassion. An avowed royalist was occasionally dismissed unharmed, while the constitutionalists were sure to be massacred. Another trait of a singular nature is, that two of the ruffians who were appointed to guard one of these intended victims home in safety, as a man acquitted, insisted upon seeing his meeting with his family, seemed to share in the transports of the moment, and on taking leave shook the hand of their late prisoner, while their own were clotted with the gore of his friends, and had been just raised to shed his own. Few, indeed, and brief were these symptoms of relenting. In general, the doom of the prisoner was death, and that doom was instantly accomplished.

In the meanwhile the captives were penned up in their dungeons like cattle in a shambles, and, in many instances, might, from windows which looked outwards, mark the fate of their comrades, hear

their cries, and behold their struggles, and learn from the horrible scene how they might best meet their own appalling fate. They observed, according to Saint Méard, who, in his well-named *Agony of Thirty-Six Hours*, has given the account of this fearful scene, that those who intercepted the blows of the executioners, by holding up their hands, suffered protracted torment, while those who offered no show of struggle were more easily dispatched; and they encouraged each other to submit to their fate in the manner least likely to prolong their sufferings.

Many ladies, especially those belonging to the court, were thus murdered. The Princess de Lamballe, whose only crime seems to have been her friendship for Marie Antoinette, was literally hewn to pieces, and her head, and that of others, paraded on pikes through the metropolis. It was carried to the Temple on that accursed weapon, the features yet beautiful in death, and the long fair curls of the hair floating around the spear. The murderers insisted that the king and queen should be compelled to come to the window to view this dreadful trophy. The municipal officers who were upon duty over the royal prisoners had difficulty, not merely in saving them from this horrible inhumanity, but also in preventing the prison from being forced. Three-coloured ribbons were extended across the street, and this frail barrier was found sufficient to intimate that the Temple was under the safeguard of the nation. We do not read that the efficiency of the three-coloured ribbons was tried for the protection of any of the other prisons. No doubt the executioners had their instructions where and when they should be respected.

The clergy, who had declined the constitutional oath from pious scruples, were, during the massacre, the peculiar objects of insult and cruelty, and their conduct was such as corresponded with their religious and conscientious professions. They were seen confessing themselves to each other, or receiving the confessions of their lay companions in misfortune, and encouraging them to undergo the evil hour, with as much calmness as if they themselves had not been to share its bitterness. As protestants, we cannot abstractedly approve of the doctrines which render the established clergy of one country dependent upon a sovereign pontiff, the prince of an alien state. But these priests did not make the laws for which they suffered; they only obeyed them; and as men and christians we must regard them as martyrs, who preferred death to what they considered as apostacy.

In the brief intervals of this dreadful butchery, which lasted for four days, the judges and executioners ate, drank, and slept; and awoke from slumber, or rose from their meal, with fresh appetite for murder. There were places arranged for the male, and for the female murderers, for the work had been incomplete without the intervention of the latter. Prison after prison was invested, entered, and, under the same form of proceeding, made the scene of the same inhuman butchery. The jacobins had reckoned on making the massacre universal over France. But the example was not

* See p. 12.

generally followed. It required, as in the case of St Bartholomew, the only massacre which can be compared to this in atrocity, the excitation of a large capital, in a violent crisis, to render such horrors possible.

The Community of Paris were not in fault for this. They did all they could to extend the sphere of murder. Their warrant brought from Orleans near sixty persons, including the Duke de Cossé-Brissac, De Lessart, the late minister, and other royalists of distinction, who were to have been tried before the high court of that department. A band of assassins met them, by appointment of the community, at Versailles, who, uniting with their escort, murdered almost the whole of these unhappy men.

From the 2d to the 6th of September, these infernal crimes proceeded uninterrupted, protracted by the actors for the sake of the daily pay of a louis to each, openly distributed amongst them, by order of the commune.* It was either from a desire to continue as long as possible a labour so well requited, or because these beings had acquired an insatiable lust of murder, that, when the jails were emptied of state criminals, the assassins attacked Bicêtre, a prison where ordinary delinquents were confined. These unhappy wretches offered a degree of resistance which cost the assailants more dear than any they had experienced from their proper victims. They were obliged to fire on them with cannon, and many hundreds of the miserable creatures were in this way exterminated, by wretches worse than themselves.

No exact account was ever made of the number of persons murdered during this dreadful period; but not above two or three hundred of the prisoners arrested for state offences were known to escape, or be discharged, and the most moderate computation raises the number of those who fell to two or three thousand, though some carry it to twice the extent. Truchod announced to the Legislative Assembly, that four thousand had perished. Some exertion was made to save the lives of persons imprisoned for debt, whose numbers, with those of common felons, may make up the balance betwixt the number slain, and eight thousand who were prisoners when the massacre began. The bodies were interred in heaps, in immense trenches, prepared beforehand by order of the Community of Paris; but their bones have since been transferred to the subterranean catacombs, which form the general charnel-house of the city. In those melancholy regions, while other relics of mortality lie exposed all around, the remains of those who perished in the massacres of September are alone secluded from the eye. The vault in which they repose is closed with a screen of freestone, as if relating to crimes unfit to be thought of even in the proper abode of death, and which France would willingly hide in oblivion.

In the meanwhile the reader may be desirous to know what efforts were made by the assembly, to

save the lives of so many Frenchmen, or to put a stop to a massacre carried on in contempt of all legal interference, and by no more formidable force than that of two or three hundred atrocious felons. often, indeed, diminished to only fifty or sixty. He might reasonably expect that the national representatives would have thundered forth some of those decrees which they formerly directed against the crown and the noblesse; that they should have repaired by deputations to the various sections, called out the National Guards, and appealed to all, not only that were susceptible of honour or humanity, but to all who had the breath and being of man, to support them in interrupting a series of horrors disgraceful to mankind. Such an appeal to the feelings of their fellow-citizens made them at last successful in the overthrow of Robespierre. But the reign of Terror was now but in its commencement, and men had not yet learned that there lay a refuge in the efforts of Despair.

Instead of such energy as might have been expected from the principles of which they boasted, nothing could be more timid than the conduct of the girondists, being the only party in the assembly who had the power, and might be supposed to have the inclination, to control the course of crime.

We looked carefully through the *Moniteurs*, which contain the official account of the sittings of the assembly on these dreadful days. We find regular entries of many patriotic gifts, of such importance as the following:—A fusée from an Englishman—a pair of hackney-coach horses from the coachmen—a map of the country around Paris from a lady. While engaged in receiving and registering these civic donations, their journal bears few and doubtful references to the massacres then in progress. The assembly issued no decree against the slaughter—demanded no support from the public force, and restricted themselves to sending to the murderers a pitiful deputation of twelve of their number, whose commission seems to have been limited to petition for the safety of one of their colleagues, belonging to the constitutional faction. With difficulty they saved him, and the celebrated Abbé Sicard, the philanthropic instructor of the deaf and dumb, imprisoned as a non-juring priest, for whom the wails and tears of his hapless pupils had procured a reprieve even from the assassins. Dussaulx, one of that deputation, distinguished himself by the efforts which he used to persuade the murderers to desist. "Return to your place," said one of the ruffians, his arms crimsoned with blood. "You have made us lose too much time. Return to your own business, and leave us to ours."

Dussaulx went back, to recount to those who had sent him what he had witnessed, and how he had been received; and concluded with the exclamation, "Woe's me, that I should have lived to see such horrors, without the power of stopping them!" The assembly heard the detail, and remained timid and silent as before.

Where, in that hour, were the men who formed their judgment upon the models presented by Plutarch, their feelings on the wild eloquence of Rous-

* The books of the Hôtel de Ville preserve evidence of this fact. Billaud Varennes appeared publicly among the assassins, and distributed the price of blood.

sean? Where were the girondists, celebrated by one of their admirers,* as distinguished by good morals, by severe probity, by a profound respect for the dignity of man, by a deep sense of his rights and his duties, by a sound, constant, and immutable love of order, of justice, and of liberty? Were the eyes of such men blind, that they could not see the blood which flooded for four days the streets of the metropolis? were their ears deadened, that they could not hear the shouts of the murderers, and the screams of the victims? or were their voices mute, that they called not upon God and man—upon the very stones of Paris, to assist them in interrupting such a crime? Political reasons have, by royalist writers, been supposed to furnish a motive for their acquiescence; for there is, according to civilians, a certain degree of careless or timid imbecility, which can only be explained as having its origin in fraud. They allege that the girondists saw, rather with pleasure than horror, the atrocities which were committed, while their enemies the jacobins, exterminating their equally hated enemies the constitutionalists and royalists, took on themselves the whole odium of a glut of blood, which must soon, they might naturally expect, disgust the sense and feelings of a country so civilized as France. We remain, nevertheless, convinced, that Vergniaud, Brissot, Roland, and, to a certainty, his high-minded wife, would have stopped the massacres of September, had their courage and practical skill in public affairs borne any proportion to the conceit which led them to suppose, that their vocation lay for governing such a nation as France.

But whatever was the motive of their apathy, the Legislative Assembly was nearly silent on the subject of the massacres, not only while they were in progress, but for several days afterwards. On the 16th of September, when news from the army on the frontiers was beginning to announce successes, and when the panic of the metropolis began to subside, Vergniaud adroitly charged the jacobins with turning on unhappy prisoners of state the popular resentment, which should have animated them with bravery to march out against the common enemy. He upbraided also the Community of Paris with the assumption of unconstitutional powers, and the inhuman tyranny with which they had abused them; but his speech made little impression, so much are deeds of cruelty apt to become familiar to men's feelings, when of frequent recurrence. When the first accounts were read in the Constituent Assembly, of the massacres perpetrated at Avignon, the president fainted away, and the whole body manifested a horror, as well of the senses as of the mind; and now, that a far more cruel, more enduring, more extensive train of murders was perpetrated under their own eye, the Legislative Assembly looked on in apathy. The utmost which the eloquence of Vergniaud could extract from them was a decree, that in future the community should be answerable with their own lives for the security of the prisoners under their charge. After passing this decree, the Legislative Assembly, being the second representative body of the French nation, dissolved itself ac-

cording to the resolutions of the 10th of August, to give place to the National Convention.

The Legislative Assembly was, in its composition and its character, of a caste greatly inferior to that which it succeeded. The flower of the talents of France had naturally centred in the National Assembly, and, by an absurd regulation, its members were incapacitated from being re-elected; which necessarily occasioned their situation being in many instances supplied by persons of inferior attainments. Then the destinies of the first assembly had been fulfilled in a more lofty manner. They were often wrong, often absurd; often arrogant and presumptuous, but never mean or servile. They respected the liberty of debate, and even amidst the bitterest political discussions, defended the persons of their colleagues, however much opposed to them in sentiment, and maintained their constitutional inviolability. They had also the great advantage of being, as it were, free born. They were indeed placed in captivity by their removal to Paris, but their courage was not abated; nor did they make any concessions of a personal kind to the ruffians, by whom they were at times personally ill used.

But the second, or Legislative Assembly, had, on the contrary, been captive from the moment of their first convocation. They had never met but in Paris, and were inured to the habit of patient submission to the tribunes and the refuse of the city, who repentedly broke into their hall, and issued their mandates in the form of petitions. On two memorable occasions they showed too distinctly, that considerations of personal safety could overpower their sense of public duty. Two-thirds of the representatives joined in acquitting La Fayette, and declared by doing so that they abhorred the insurrection of the 20th of June; yet, when that of the 10th of August had completed what was before attempted in vain upon the occasion preceding, the assembly unanimously voted the deposition of the monarch, and committed him to prison. Secondly, they remained silent and inactive during all the horrors of September, and suffered the executive power to be wrenched out of their hands by the Community of Paris, and used before their eyes for the destruction of many thousands of Frenchmen whom they represented.

It must be, however, remembered, that the Legislative Assembly were oppressed by difficulties and dangers the most dreadful that can threaten a government;—the bloody discord of contending factions, the arms of foreigners menacing the frontier, and civil war breaking out in the provinces. In addition to these sources of peril and dismay, there were three divided parties within the assembly itself; while a rival power, equally formidable from its audacity and its crimes, had erected itself in predominating authority, like that of the Maires du Palais over the feeble monarchs of the Merovingian dynasty.

CHAPTER XI.

*Election of representatives for the National Convention.
—Jacobins are very active—Right hand party—Left hand side—Neutral members.—The girondists are in*

* Buzot.

possession of the ostensible power—They denounce the jacobin chiefs, but in an irregular and feeble manner.—Marat, Robespierre, and Danton, supported by the Community and populace of Paris.—France declared a Republic.—Duke of Brunswick's campaign—Neglects the French emigrants—Is tardy in his operations—Occupies the poorest part of Champagne—His army becomes sickly—Prospects of a battle.—Dumouriez's army recruited with Carmagnoles.—The duke resolves to retreat—Thoughts on the consequences of that measure.—The retreat disastrous.—The emigrants disbanded in a great measure—Reflections on their fate.—The Prince of Condé's army.

It was of course the object of each party to obtain the greatest possible majority in the National Convention now to be assembled, for arranging upon some new footing the government of France, and for replacing that constitution to which faith had been so repeatedly sworn.

The jacobins made the most energetic exertions. They not only wrote missives through their two thousand affiliated societies, but sent three hundred commissaries, or delegates, to superintend the elections in the different towns and departments; to exhort their comrades not only to be firm, but to be enterprising; and to seize with strong hand the same power over the public force, which the mother society possessed in Paris. The advice was poured into willing ears; for it implied the sacred right of insurrection, with the concomitant privileges of pillage and slaughter.

The power of the jacobins was irresistible in Paris, where Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, who shared the high places in their synagogue, were elected by an immense majority; and of the twenty deputies who represented Paris, there were not above five or six unconnected with the massacres. Nor were they anywhere unsuccessful, where there existed enough of their adherents to overawe by threats, clamour, and violence, the impartial voice of the public.

But in every state there is a great number of men who love order for itself, and for the protection it affords to property. There were also a great many persons at heart royalists, either pure or constitutional, and all these united in sending to the National Convention deputies, who, if no opportunity occurred of restoring the monarchy, might at least co-operate with the girondists and more moderate republicans in saving the life of the unfortunate Louis, and in protecting men's lives, and property in general, from the infuriate violence of the jacobins. These supporters of order—we know no better name to assign to them—were chiefly representatives of the departments, where electors had more time to discriminate and reflect, than when under the influence of the revolutionary societies and clubs of the towns. Yet Nantes, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Lyons, and other towns, chiefly in the west and south, were disposed to support the girondists, and sent deputies favourable to their sentiments. Thus the convention, when assembled, still presented the appearance of two strong parties; and the feebleness of that which, being moderate in its views, only sought to act defensively, consisted not in want of numbers but in want of energy.

It was no good omen, that on taking their places in the assembly, these last assumed the right side, a position which seemed doomed to defeat, since it had been successively occupied by the suppressed parties of moderate royalists and constitutionalists. There was defeat in the very sound of the *parti droit*, whereas the left hand position had always been that of victory. Men's minds are moved by small incidents in dubious times. Even this choice of seats made an impression upon spectators and auditors unfavourable to the girondists, as all naturally shrink from a union with bad fortune. There was a considerable party of neutral members, who, without joining themselves to the girondists, affected to judge impartially betwixt contending parties. They were chiefly men of consciences too timid to go all the lengths of the jacobins, but also of too timid nerves to oppose them openly and boldly. These were sure to succumb on all occasions, when the jacobins judged it necessary to use their favourite argument of popular terror.

The girondists took possession, however, of all ostensible marks of power. Danton was dismissed from his place as minister of justice; and they were, as far as mere official name and title could bestow it on them, in possession of the authority of government. But the ill-fated regulation which excluded ministers from seats in the assembly, and consequently from any right save that of defence, proved as fatal to those of the new system, as it had done to the executive government of Louis.

Our remarks upon the policy of the great change from monarchy to a republic will be more in place elsewhere. Indeed, violent as the change sounded in words, there was not such an important alteration in effect as to produce much sensation. The constitution of 1791 was a democracy to all intents and purposes, leaving little power with the king, and that little subject to be so much cramped and straitened in its operation, that the royal authority was even smaller in practice than it had been limited in theory. When to this is added, that Louis was a prisoner amongst his subjects, acting under the most severe restraint, and endangering his life every time he attempted to execute his constitutional power, he must long have been held rather an incumbrance on the motions and councils of the state, than as one of its efficient constituted authorities. The nominal change of the system of government scarcely made a greater alteration in the internal condition of France, than the change of a sign makes upon a house of entertainment, where the business of the tavern is carried on in the usual way, although the place is no longer distinguished as the King's Head.

While France was thus alarmed and agitated within, by change, by crime, by the most bitter political factions, the dawn of that course of victory had already risen on the frontiers, which in its noon-day splendour, was to blaze fiercely over all Europe. It is not our purpose to detail military events at present; we shall have but too many of them to discuss hereafter. We shall barely state, that the Duke of Brunswick's campaign, considered as relative to his proclamation, forms too good an illustration of the holy text, "Pride goeth before destruc-

tion, and a haughty spirit before a fall." The duke was at the head of a splendid army, which had been joined by fifteen thousand emigrants in the finest state of equipment, burning with zeal to rescue the king, and avenge themselves on those by whom they had been driven from their country. From what fatality it is hard to conceive, but the Duke of Brunswick seems to have looked with a certain degree of coldness and suspicion on those troops, whose chivalrous valour and high birth called them to the van, instead of the rear, in which the generalissimo was pleased to detain them. The chance of success that might justly have been expected from the fiery energy which was the very soul of French chivalry, from the fear which such an army might have inspired, or perhaps from the friends whom they might have found, was altogether lost. There was something in this extraordinary conduct, which almost vindicated the suspicion that Prussia was warring on her own account, and was not disposed to owe too much of the expected success to the valour of the emigrants. And it escaped not the remark, both of the emigrants and the French at large, that Longwy and Verdun were ostentatiously taken possession of by the allies, not under the name of the King of France, or the Count d'Artois, but in that of the emperor; which appeared to give colour to the insidious report, that the allies were to be indemnified for the cost of their assistance at the expense of the French line of frontier towns. Neither did the duke use his fine army of Prussians, or direct the motions of the Austrians under Clairfayt, to any greater advantage. He had, indeed, the troops of the Great Frederick; but under the command of an irresolute and incapable leader, it was the sword of Scanderbeg in the hands of a boy.

This tardiness of the Duke of Brunswick's movements intimated a latent doubt of his own capacity to conduct the campaign. The superiority of his veteran and finely-disciplined forces over the disorganized army of Dumourier, reinforced as it was by crowds of federates, who were perfect strangers to war, would have been best displayed by bold and rapid movements, evincing at once activity and combination, and alarming raw troops by a sense of danger, not in front alone, but on every point. Each day which these new soldiers spent unfought was one step towards military discipline, and, what is more, towards military confidence. The general who had threatened so hard seemed to suspend his blows in indecision; and he remained trifling on the frontiers, "when Frederick, had he been in our front," said the French general, "would long since have driven us back upon Châlons."

The result of so many false steps began soon to appear. Brunswick, whose army was deficient in battering guns, though entering France on a frontier of fortifications, was arrested by the obstinate defence of Thionville. Having at length decided to advance, he spent nine days in marching thirty leagues, but omitted to possess himself of the defiles of Argonne, by which alone the army of Luckner could co-operate with that of Dumourier. The allied general now found himself in the most elevated part of the province of Champagne, branded for its poverty and sterility with the unseemly name *La*

Champagne Pouilleuse, where he found difficulty to subsist his army. Meantime, if corn and forage were scarce, grapes and melons were, unfortunately, plenty. These last fruits are so proverbially wholesome, that the magistrates of Liège, and some other towns, forbid the peasants to bring them to market under pain of confiscation. It was the first time such delicacies had been presented to the hyperborean appetites of the Prussians; and they could not resist the temptation, though the same penalty was annexed to the banquet, as to that which produced the first transgression. They ate and died. A fatal dysentery broke out in the camp, which swept the soldiers away by hundreds in a day, sunk the spirits of the survivors, and seems to have totally broken the courage of their commander.

Two courses remained to the embarrassed general. One was, to make his way by giving battle to the French, by attacking them in the strong position which they had been permitted to occupy, notwithstanding the ease with which they might have been anticipated. It is true, Dumourier had been very strongly reinforced. France, from all her departments, had readily poured forth many thousands of her fiery youth, from city and town, village and grange and farm, to protect the frontiers, at once, from the invasion of foreigners, and the occupation of thousands of vengeful emigrants. They were undisciplined, indeed, but full of zeal and courage, heated and excited by the scenes of the Republic, and inflamed by the florid eloquence, the songs, dances, and signal-words with which it had been celebrated. Above all, they were of a country which, of all others in Europe, has been most familiar with war, and the youth of which are most easily rendered amenable to military discipline.

But to these new levies the Duke of Brunswick might have safely opposed the ardent valour of the emigrants, men descended of families whose deeds of chivalry fill the registers of Europe; men by whom the road to Paris was regarded as that which was to conduct them to victory, to honour, to the rescue of their king, to reunion with their families, to the recovery of their patrimony; men accustomed to consider disgrace as more dreadful by far than death, and who claimed, as their birth-right, military renown and the use of arms. In one skirmish, fifteen hundred of the emigrant cavalry had defeated, with great slaughter, a column of the Carmagnoles, as the republican levies were called. They were routed with great slaughter, and their opponents had the pleasure to count among the slain a considerable number of the assassins of September.

But the French general had more confidence in the Carmagnole levies, from which his military genius derived a valuable support, than Brunswick thought proper to repose in the chivalrous gallantry of the French noblesse. He could only be brought to engage in one action of artillery, near Valmy, which was attended with no marked consequence, and then issued his order for a retreat. It was in vain that the Count d'Artois, with a spirit worthy of the line from which he was descended, and the throne to which he has now succeeded, entreated, almost implored a recall of this fatal order; in vain that he offered in person to head the emigrant forces, and to

assume with them the most desperate post in the battle, if the generalissimo would permit it to be fought. But the duke, obstinate in his desponding, in proportion to his former presumption, was not of that high mind which adopts hazardous counsels in desperate cases. He saw his army mouldering away around him, beheld the French forming in his rear, knew that the resources of Prussia were unequal to a prolonged war, and, after one or two feeble attempts to negotiate for the safety of the captive Louis, he was at length contented to accept an implied permission to retreat without molestation. He raised his camp on the 29th of September, and left behind him abundant marks of the dreadful state to which his army was reduced.

When we look back on these events, and are aware of Dumourier's real opinions, and the interest which he took in the fate of the king, we have little reason to doubt, that the Duke of Brunswick might, by active and prompt exertions, have eluded that general's defensive measures; nay, that judicious negotiation might have induced him, on certain points being conceded, to have united a part at least of his forces with those of the emigrants in a march to Paris, for the king's rescue, and the punishment of the jacobins.

But had the restoration of Louis XVI. taken place by the armed hand of the emigrants and the allies, the final event of the war must still have been distant. Almost the whole body of the kingdom was diametrically opposed to the restoration of the absolute monarchy with all its evils; and yet it must have been the object of the emigrants, in case of success, again to establish, not only royalty in its most prerogative, but all the oppressive privileges and feudal subjections which the Revolution had swept away. Much was to have been dreaded, too, from the avidity of the strangers, whose arms had assisted the imprisoned Louis, and much more from what has since been aptly termed the reaction, which must have taken place upon a counter-revolution. It was greatly to be apprehended, that the emigrants, always deeming too lightly of the ranks beneath them, incensed by the murder of their friends, and stung by their own private wrongs and insults, would, if successful, have treated the Revolution not as an exertion of the public will of France to free the country from public grievances, but as a *Jacquerie* (which in some of its scenes it too much resembled), a domestic treason of the vassals against their liege lords. It was the will of Providence, that the experience of twenty years and upwards should make manifest, that in the hour of victory itself concessions to the defeated, as far as justice demands them, is the only mode of deriving permanent and secure peace.

The retreat of the Prussians was executed in the worst possible order, as is usually the case in such a manoeuvre when unprovided for, and executed by troops who had been led to expect a very different movement. But if to them it was a measure of disaster and disgrace, it was, to the unfortunate emigrants who had joined their standard, the signal of utter despair and ruin. These corps were composed of gentlemen, who, called suddenly and unprovided from their families and homes, had only

brought with them such moderate sums of money as could be raised in an emergency, which they had fondly conceived would be of very brief duration. They had expended most of their funds in providing themselves with horses, arms, and equipments—some part must have been laid out in their necessary subsistence, for they served chiefly at their own expense—and perhaps, as might have been expected among high-spirited and high-born youths, their slender funds had not been managed with an economical view of the possibility of the reverses which had taken place. In the confusion and disorder of the retreat, their baggage was plundered by their auxiliaries, that is to say, by the disorderly Prussian soldiers, who had shaken loose all discipline; and they were in most cases reduced for instant maintenance to sell their horses at such paltry prices as they could obtain. To end the history of such of this devoted army as had been engaged in the Duke of Brunswick's campaign, they were disbanded at Julliers, in November 1792.

The blindness of the sovereigns, who, still continuing a war on France, suffered such fine troops to be dissolved for want of the means of support, was inexcusable; their cold and hard-hearted conduct towards a body of gentlemen, who, if politically wrong, were at least devoted to the cause for which Austria asserted that she continued in arms, was equally unwise and ungenerous. These gallant gentlemen might have upbraided the kings who had encouraged, and especially the general who led, this ill-fated expedition, in the words of Shakspeare, if he had been known to them,—

Hast thou not spoke like thunder on our side,
Been sworn our soldier—bidding us depend
Upon thy stars, thy fortune, and thy strength?

But the reproaches of those who have no remedy but the exposition of their wrongs, seldom reach the ears of the powerful by whom these wrongs have been committed.

It is not difficult to conceive the agony with which these banished gentlemen abandoned all hopes of saving the life of their king, and the recovery of their rank and fortune. All their proud vanities of expected success were lost, or converted into serpents to sting them. They had no hope before them, and, what is worst to men of high spirit, they had fallen with scarce a blow struck for honour, far less for victory. They were now doomed, such as could, to exercise for mere subsistence the prosecution of sciences and arts, which they had cultivated to adorn prosperity—to wander in foreign lands, and live upon the precarious charity of foreign powers, embittered everywhere by the reflections of some, who pitied the folly that could forfeit rank and property for a mere point of honour; and of others, who saw in them the enemies of rational liberty, and upbraided them with the charge, that their misfortunes were the necessary consequence of their arbitrary principles.

It might have in some degree mitigated their calamity, could some gifted sage have shown them, at such distance as the legislator of Israel beheld the Promised Land from mount Pisgah, the final restoration of the royal house, in whose cause they had suffered shipwreck of their all. But how many

perished in the wilderness of misfortune which interred—how few survived the twenty years' wandering which conducted to this promised point! and of those few, who, war-worn and wearied by misfortunes, survived the restoration of royalty, how very few were rewarded by more than the disinterested triumph which they felt on that joyful occasion! and how many might use the simile of a royalist of Britain on a similar occasion,—“The fleece of Gideon remained dry, while the hoped-for restoration shed showers of blessings on all France beside!”

The emigrant regiments, under the command of the Prince of Condé, had another and nobler fate. They retained their arms, and signalized themselves by their exertions; were consumed by the sword, and in tails of service, and died at least the death of soldiers, mourned, and not unrevenged. But they were wasting their devoted courage in the service of foreigners; and if their gallantry was gratified by the defeat of those whom they regarded as the murderers of their king, and as usurpers of their rights, they might indeed feel that their revenge was satiated, but scarce in any sense could they regard their victories as serviceable to the cause to which they had sacrificed their country, their possessions, their hopes, their lives. Their fate, though on a much more extensive scale, much resembles that of the officers of the Scottish army in 1690, who, following the fortunes of James II. to France, were at length compelled to form themselves into a battalion of privates, and, after doing many feats of gallantry in the service of the country where they found refuge, at length melted away under the sword of the enemy, and the privations of military service. History, while she is called upon to censure or commend the actions of mankind according to the rules of immutable justice, is no less bound to lament the brave and generous, who, preferring the dictates of honourable feeling to those of prudence, are hurried into courses which may be doubtful in policy, and perhaps in patriotism, but to which they are urged by the disinterested wish of discharging what they account a conscientious duty. The emigrants were impolitic, perhaps, in leaving France, though that conduct had many apologies; and their entrance into their country in arms to bring back the despotic system, which Louis XVI. and the whole nation, save themselves, had renounced, was an enterprise unwisely and unjustly undertaken. But the cause they embraced was one dear to all the prejudices of the rank and sentiments in which they had been brought up; their loyal purpose in its defence is indisputable; and it would be hard to condemn them for following one extreme, when the most violent and tyrannical proceedings were, in the sight of all Europe, urging another, so bloody, black, and fatal as that of the faction which now domineered in Paris, and constrained men, whose prejudices of birth or education were in favour of freedom, to loathe the very name of France, and of the Revolution.

The tame and dishonourable retreat of the Duke of Brunswick and his Prussians naturally elated the courage of a proud and martial people. Recruits flowed into the republican ranks from every department; and the generals, Custine on the Rhine, and

Montesquieu on the side of Savoy, with Dumourier in the Netherlands, knew how to avail themselves of these reinforcements, which enabled them to assume the offensive on all parts of the extensive south-eastern frontier of France.

The attack of Savoy, whose sovereign, the King of Sardinia, was brother-in-law of the Count d'Artois, and had naturally been active in the cause of the Bourbons, was successfully commenced, and carried on by General Montesquieu already mentioned, a French noble, and an aristocrat of course by birth, and as it was believed by principle, but to whom, nevertheless, the want of experienced leaders had compelled the ruling party at Paris to commit the command of an army. He served them well, possessed himself of Nice and Chambéry, and threatened even Italy.

On the centre of the same line of frontier, Custine, an excellent soldier and a fierce republican, took Spire, Oppenheim, Worms, finally the strong city of Mentz, and spread dismay through that portion of the Germanic empire. Adopting the republican language of the day, he thundered forth personal vengeance, denounced in the most broad and insulting terms, against such princes of the Germanic body as had distinguished themselves by zeal against the Revolution; and, what was equally formidable, he preached to their subjects the flattering and exciting doctrines of the republicans, and invited them to join in the sacred league of the oppressed people against princes and magistrates, who had so long held over them an usurped power.

But the successes of Dumourier were of a more decided and more grateful character to the ruling men in the Convention. He had a heavier task than either Custine or Montesquieu; but his lively and fertile imagination had already devised modes of conquest with the imperfect means he possessed. The difference between commanders is the same as between mechanics. A workman of commonplace talents, however expert custom and habit may have made him in the use of his ordinary tools, is at a loss when deprived of those which he is accustomed to work with. The man of invention and genius finds out resources, and contrives to make such implements as the moment supplies answer his purpose, as well, and perhaps better, than a regular chest of working utensils. The ideas of the ordinary man are like a deep rutted road, through which his imagination moves slowly, and without departing from the track; those of the man of genius are like an avenue, clear, open, and smooth, on which he may traverse as occasion requires.

Dumourier was a man of genius, resource, and invention; Clairfayt, who was opposed to him, a brave and excellent soldier, but who had no idea of strategy or tactics, save those current during the Seven Years' War. The former knew so well how to employ the fire and eagerness of his Carmaignes, of whose blood he was by no means chary, and how to prevent the consequences of their want of discipline, by reserves of his most steady and experienced troops, that he gave Clairfayt a signal defeat at Jemappes, on the 6th November, 1792.

It was then that both Austria and Europe had

reason to regret the absurd policy of Joseph II., both in indisposing the inhabitants towards his government, and, in the fine provinces of the Austrian Netherlands, dismantling the iron girdle of fortified towns, with which the wisdom of Europe had invested that frontier. Clairfayt, who, though defeated, was too good a disciplinarian to be routed, had to retreat on a country unfriendly to the Austrians, from recollection of their own recent insurrection, and divested of all garrison towns; which must have been severe checks, particularly at this period, to the incursion of a revolutionary army, more fitted to win battles by its impetuosity, than to overcome obstacles which could only be removed by long and patient sieges.

As matters stood, the battle of Jemappes was won, and the Austrian Netherlands were fully conquered without further combat by the French general. We shall leave him in his triumph, and return to the fatal scenes acting in Paris.

CHAPTER XII.

Jacobins determine upon the execution of Louis.—Progress and reasons of the king's unpopularity.—Girondists taken by surprise, by a proposal for the abolition of royalty made by the jacobins—Proposal carried.—Thoughts on the new system of government—Compared with that of Rome, Greece, America, and other republican states.—Enthusiasm throughout France at the change—Follies it gave birth to—And crimes.—Monuments of art destroyed.—Madame Roland interposes to save the life of the king.—Barrière.—Girondists move for a departmental legion—Carried—Revoked—And girondists defeated.—The authority of the Community of Paris paramount even over the Convention.—Documents of the Iron-Chest.—Parallel betwixt Charles I. and Louis XVI.—Motion by Pétion, that the king should be tried before the Convention.

It is generally to be remarked, that crime, as well as religion, has her sacramental associations, fitted for the purposes to which she desires to pledge her votaries. When Catiline imposed an oath on his fellow-conspirators, a slave was murdered, and his blood mingled with the beverage in which they pledged each other to their treason against the republic. The most desperate mutineers and pirates too have believed, that by engaging their associates in some crime of a deep and atrocious nature, so contrary to the ordinary feelings of humanity as to strike with horror all who should bear of it, they made their allegiance more completely their own; and, as remorse is useless where retreat is impossible, that they thus rendered them in future the desperate and unscrupulous tools, necessary for the desperate designs of their leaders.

In like manner, the jacobins,—who had now full possession of the passions and confidence of the lower orders in France, as well as of all those spirits among the higher classes who, whether desirous of promotion by exertions in the revolutionary path, or whether enthusiasts whose imagination had become heated with the extravagant doctrines that had been current during these feverish times,—the jacobins resolved to engage their adherents, and all whom they influenced, in proceeding to the

death of the unfortunate Louis. They had no reason to doubt that they might excite the populace to desire and demand that final sacrifice, and to consider the moment of its being offered as a time of jubilee. Nor were the better classes likely to take a warm or decisive interest in the fate of their unhappy prince, so long the object of unpopularity.

From the beginning of the Revolution, down to the total overthrow of the throne, first the power of the king, and afterwards his person and the measures to which he resorted, were the constant subject of attack by the parties who successively forced themselves into his administration. Each faction accused the other during the time of their brief sway, of attempts to extend the power and the privileges of the crown; which was thus under a perpetual siege, though carried on by distinct and opposite factions, one of whom regularly occupied the lines of attack, to dislodge the others, as fast as they obtained successively possession of the ministry. Thus the third estate overcame the two privileged classes, in behalf of the people and against the crown; La Fayette and the constitutionalists triumphed over the moderates, who desired to afford the king the shelter and bulwark of an intermediate senate; and then, after creating a constitution as democratical as it could be, leaving a name and semblance of royalty, they sunk under the girondists, who were disposed altogether to dispense with that symbol. In this way it appeared to the people that the king was their natural enemy, and that the royal interest was directly opposed to a revolution which had brought them sundry advantages, besides giving them the feelings and consequence of freemen. In this manner, one of the mildest and best-disposed monarchs that ever swayed a sceptre became exposed to general suspicion and misconstruction in his measures, and (as is sure speedily to follow) to personal contempt, and even hatred. Whatever the king did, in compliance with the current tide of revolution, was accounted as fraudulent complaisance, designed to blind the nation. Whatever opposition he made to that powerful impulse was accounted an act of open treason against the sovereignty of the people.

His position, with regard to the invading powers, was enough of itself to load him with obloquy and suspicion. It is true, that he was called, and professed himself, the willing king of a popular, or democratic monarchy; but in the proclamations of his allies, he was described as a monarch imprisoned, degraded, and almost dethroned. To achieve his liberty (as they affirmed), and to re-establish his rights, the emperor his brother-in-law, the King of Prussia his ally, and above all, his brothers, the Princes of the Blood of France, were in arms, and had sent numerous armies to the frontiers. It was scarcely possible, in the utmost extent of candour, that the French people should give Louis credit for desiring the success of the revolutionary cause, by which not only his power had been circumscribed, but his person had been placed under virtual restraint, against forces armed avowedly for his safety and liberty, as well as the restoration of his power. We can allow as much to the disinterestedness of Louis, as to any whose feelings and rights were immediately concerned with the point at issue; and

we admit that all concessions which he made to the popular cause, before the National Assembly had asserted a paramount authority over his, were willingly and freely granted. But after the march from Versailles, he must have been an enthusiast for public liberty of a very uncommon character, if we could suppose him seriously wishing the defeat of his brothers and allies, and the victory of those who had deprived him first of authority, and then of freedom.

A single glance at his situation must have convinced the people of France, that Louis could scarcely be sincere in desiring the continuance of the system to which he had given his adhesion as sovereign; and the consciousness that they could not expect confidence where they themselves had made ungenerous use of their power, added force to their suspicions, and acrimony to the deep resentments which arose out of them. The people had identified themselves and their dearest interests (right or wrong, it signifies little to the result) with the Revolution, and with the increasing freedom which it bestowed, or rather promised to bestow, in every succeeding change. The king, who had been the regular opponent of every one of these innovations, was in consequence regarded as the natural enemy of the country, who, if he continued to remain at the helm of the executive government, did so with the sole view of running the vessel upon the rocks.

If there were any men in France generous enough to give the king credit for complete good faith with the constitutionalists, his flight from Paris, and the manifestoes which he left behind him, protesting against the measures in which he had acquiesced, as extorted from him by constraint, gave open proof of Louis's real feelings. It is true, the king denied any purpose of leaving the kingdom, or throwing himself into the hands of the foreign powers; but it could escape no one, that such a step, however little it was calculated upon in the commencement of his flight, might very easily have become inevitable before its completion. It does not appear, from the behaviour of the escorts of dragoons and hussars, that there was any attachment amongst the troops to the king's person; and had the matiny of Bouillé's forces against that general's authority taken place after the king reached the camp, the only safety of Louis must have been in a retreat into the Austrian territory. This chance was so evident, that Bouillé himself had provided for it, by requesting that the Austrian forces might be so disposed as to afford the king protection, should the emergency occur. Whatever, therefore, might be the king's first experiment, the point to which he directed his flight bore out those, who supposed and asserted that it must have ultimately terminated in his reunion with his brothers; and that such a conclusion must have repeatedly occurred to the king's thoughts.

But if the king was doubted and suspected before he gave this decisive proof of his disinclination to the constitution, there had surely happened nothing in the course of his being seized at Varennes, or the circumstances of his reception at Paris, tending to reconcile him to the constitutional crown, which was a second time proffered him, and which he again,

with all its duties and acts of self-denial, solemnly accepted.

We have before hinted, that the king's assuming of new the frail and barren sceptre, proffered to him under the most humiliating circumstances, was a piece of indifferent policy. There occurred almost no course of conduct by which, subjected as he was to general suspicion, he could show himself once more to his people in a clear and impartial point of view—each of his measures was sure to be the theme of the most malignant commentary. If his conduct assumed a popular aspect, it was accounted an act of princely hypocrisy; if it was like his opposition to the departmental army, it would have been held as intended to weaken the defence of the country; if it resembled his rejection of the decrees against the emigrants and refractory priests, then it might be urged as inferring a direct intention of bringing back the old despotic system.

In short, all confidence was lost between the sovereign and the people, from a concurrence of unhappy circumstances, in which it would certainly be unjust to cast the blame exclusively on either party, since there existed so many grounds for distrust and misunderstanding on both sides. The noble and generous confidence which Frenchmen had been wont to repose in the personal character of their monarch (that confidence, which the probity of no man could deserve more than that of Louis) was withered, root and branch; or those in whose breasts it still flourished were banished men, and had carried the oriflamme, and the ancient spirit of French chivalry, into a camp not her own. The rest of the nation, a scattered and intimidated remnant of royalists excepted, were constitutionalists, who, friends rather to the crown than to the king as an individual, wished to preserve the form of government, but without either zeal or attachment to Louis; or girondists, who detested his office as republicans; or jacobins, who hated his person. Every one, therefore, assailed Louis; and it was held enrolling himself amongst aristocrats, the most avowed and hated enemies of the new order of things, if any one lifted a voice in his defence, or even apology.

To this the influence of the revolutionary clubs, amounting to so many thousands, and of the daily press, almost the only kind of literature which France had left, added the full tribute of calumny and inculpation. The jacobins attacked the person of the king from the very commencement of the Revolution; for they desired that Louis should be dethroned, even when some amongst them were leagued for placing Orleans in his room. The girondists, on the contrary, would have been well contented to spare the person of Louis; but they urged argument after argument in the journal which they directed, against the royal office. But upon the whole, the king, whether in his royal or personal character, had been so long and uniformly calumniated and misinterpreted, that through most parts of France he was esteemed the enemy whom the people had most to dread, and whom they were most interested to get rid of. In evidence of which it may be added, that during all successive changes of parties, for the next year or two, the charge of a disposition towards royalty was always made an aggravation of the ac-

cusations which the parties brought against each other, and was considered as so necessary an ingredient of the charge, that it was not omitted even when circumstances rendered it impossible.

Both parties in the Convention were thus prepared to acquire popularity, by gratifying the almost universal prejudices against monarchy, and against the king. The girondists, constant to the republican principles they entertained, had resolved to abolish the throne; but their audacious rivals were prepared to go a step beyond them, by gratifying the popular spirit of vengeance which their own calumnies had increased to such a pitch, by taking the life of the dethroned monarch. This was the great national crime which was to serve France for a republican baptism, and which, once committed, was to be regarded as an act of definitive and deadly adhesion to the cause of the Revolution. But not contented with taking measures for the death of the monarch, this desperate but active faction resolved to anticipate their rivals in the proposal for the abolition of royalty.

The girondists, who counted much on the popularity which they were to attain by this favourite measure, were so far from fearing the anticipation of the jacobins, that, under the idea of Orleans having some interest remaining with Danton and others, they rather expected some opposition on their part. But what was their surprise and mortification when * Manuel arose, and demanded that the first proposal submitted to the Convention should be the abolition of royalty! Ere the girondists could recover from their surprise, Collot d'Herbois, a sorry comedian, who had been hissed from the stage, desired the motion to be instantly put to the vote. The girondists, anticipated in their scheme, had no resource left but to be clamorous in applauding the motion, lest their hesitation had brought their republican zeal into question. Thus all they could do was but to save their credit with the popular party, at a time when they expected to increase it to such a height. Their antagonists had been so alert as to steal the game out of their hands.

The violence with which the various orators expressed themselves against monarchy of every complexion, and kings in general, was such as to show, either that they were in no state of mind composed enough to decide on a great national measure, or that the horrors of the massacres, scarce ten days remote, impressed on them the danger of being lukewarm in the cause of the sovereign people, who were not only judges without resort, but the prompt executioners of their own decrees.

The Abbé Grégoire declared, that the dynasties of kings were a race of devouring animals, who fed on the blood of the people; and that kings were in the moral order of things what monsters are in the physical—that courts were the arsenals of crimes, and the centre of corruption—and that the history of princes was the martyrology of the people. Finally, that all the members of the Convention, being fully sensible of these self-evident truths, it was needless to delay even for a moment the vote of abolition, reserving it to more leisure to put their

declaration into better form. Ducos exclaimed, that the crimes of Louis alone formed a sufficient reason for the abolition of monarchy. The motion was received and passed unanimously; and each side of the hall, anxious to manifest their share in this great measure, echoed back to the other the new war-cry of *Vive la République!* Thus fell, at the voice of a wretched player and cut-throat, backed by that of a renegade priest, the most ancient and most distinguished monarchy of Europe. A few remarks may be permitted upon the new government, the adoption of which had been welcomed with so much gratulation.

It has been said, that the government which is best administered is best. This maxim is true for the time, but for the time only; as good administration depends often on the life of individuals, or other circumstances in themselves mutable. One would rather incline to say, that the government is best calculated to produce the happiness of a nation, which is best adapted to the existing state of the country which it governs, and possesses at the same time such internal means of regeneration as may enable it to keep pace with the changes of circumstances, and accommodate itself to the unavoidable alterations which must occur in a progressive state of society. In this point of view, and even in the patriarchal circle, the most natural form of government, in the early periods of society, is monarchy, or a republic. The father is head of his own family, the assembled council of the fathers governs the republic; or the *patria potestas* of the whole state is bestowed upon some successful warrior or eminent legislator, who becomes king of the tribe. But a republic, in the literal acceptation, which supposes all the individuals subject to its government to be consulted in council upon all affairs of the public, cannot survive the most early period of existence. It is only to be found around the council-fire of a North American tribe of Indians; and even there, the old men, forming a sort of senate, have already established a sort of aristocracy. As society advances, and the little state extends itself, ordinary matters of government are confided to delegates, or exclusively grasped by some of the higher orders of the state. Rome, when she dismissed the Tarquins, the period to which the girondists were fond of assimilating that of the French Revolution, had already its privileged body of patricians, its senate, from which were exclusively chosen the consuls; until at a later period, and at the expense of many feuds with the patricians, the plebeians succeeded in obtaining for their order many advantages. But the state of Rome was not more republican, in the proper sense, than before these concessions. The corporate citizens of Rome were indeed admitted into some of the privileges of the nobles; but the quantity of territory and of population over which these citizens extended their dominion was so great, that the rural and unrepresented part of the inhabitants quite outnumbered that of the citizens who voted in the Comitia, and constituted the source of authority. There was the whole body of slaves, who neither were nor could be represented, being considered by the law as no farther capable of political or legal rights, than a herd of so many cattle; and there

* 21st September, 1792.

were the numerous and extensive dominions, over which, under the name of auxiliaries, Rome exercised a right of absolute sovereignty. In fact, the so called democracy was rather an oligarchy, dispersed more widely than usual, and vesting the government of an immense empire in a certain limited number of the inhabitants of Rome called citizens, bearing a very small proportion in bulk to the gross number of the inhabitants. These privileged persons in some degree lived upon their votes;—the ambitious caressed them, fed them, caught their eyes with magnificent exhibitions, and their ears with extravagant eloquence, and by corrupting their principles, at last united the small class of privileged citizens themselves, under the very bondage in which they had long kept their extensive empire. There is no one period of the Roman republic, in which it can be said, considering the number of the persons governed relatively to those who had as citizens a share of that government by vote, or capacity of bearing office, that the people, as a whole, were fairly and fully represented.

All other republics of which we have any distinct account, including the celebrated states of Greece, were of so small a size, that it was by no means difficult to consult the citizens to a considerable extent in the affairs of the state. Still this right of being consulted was retained among the free citizens of Greece. Slaves, who amounted to a very large proportion of the inhabitants, were never permitted any interference there, more than in Rome. Now, as it was by slaves that the coarser, more debasing, and more sordid parts of the labour of the community were performed, there were thus excluded from the privilege of citizens almost all those, who, by constant toil, and by the sordid character of the employments to which their fate condemned them, might be supposed incapable of exercising political rights with due feelings of reflection and of independence. It is not too much to say, in conclusion, that excepting in the earliest stage of human society, there never existed a community, in which was to be found that liberty and equality, which the French claimed for each individual in the whole extent of their empire.

Not only the difficulty or impossibility of assigning to every person in France an equal portion of political power, was one against which antiquity had never attempted to struggle, but the wealth and size of the late French empire were circumstances which experience induced wise statesmen to conclude against the favourable issue of the experiment. Those memorable republics which Montesquien eulogises as being formed upon *virtue*, as the leading principle, inhabited the modest and sequestered habitations where virtue is most often found. In mountainous countries like those of the Swiss, where the inhabitants are nearly of the same rank, and not very much disproportioned in substance, and where they inhabit a small district or territory, a republic seems the most natural form of government. Nature has to a certain extent established an equality among the fathers of such a society, and there is no reason why policy should supplant it. In their public meetings, they come together upon the same general footing, and possess nearly the

same opportunity of forming a judgment; and the affairs of such a state are too simple, and too little complicated, to require frequent or prolonged discussions. The same applies to small states, like Geneva, and some of the Dutch provinces, where the inequality of wealth, if it exists in some instances, is qualified by the consideration, that it is gained in the same honourable pursuit of mercantile traffic, where all fortunes are founded on the same commercial system, and where the chance that has made one man rich yesterday may to-morrow depress him and raise another. Under such favourable circumstances, republics may exist long and happily, providing they can prevent luxury from working the secret dissolution of their moral principles, or the exterior force of more powerful neighbours from swallowing up their little community in the rage of conquest.

America must certainly be accounted a successful attempt to establish a republic on a much larger scale than those we have mentioned. But that great and flourishing empire consists, it must be remembered, of a federative union of many states, which, though extensive in territory, are comparatively thin in occupants. There do not exist in America, in the same degree, those circumstances of a dense and degraded population, which occasion in the old nations of Europe such an infinite difference of knowledge and ignorance, of wealth the most exuberant, and indigence the most horrible. No man in America need be poor, if he has a hatchet and arms to use it. The wilderness is to him the same retreat which the world afforded to our first parents. His family, if he has one, is wealth; if he is unincumbered with wife or children, he is the more easily provided for. A man who wishes to make a large fortune, may be disappointed in America; but he who seeks, with a moderate degree of industry, only the wants which nature demands, is certain to find them. An immense proportion of the population of the United States consists of agriculturists, who live upon their own property, which is generally of moderate extent, and cultivate it by their own labour. Such a situation is peculiarly favourable to republican habits. The man who feels himself really independent, — and so must each American who can use a spade or an axe, — will please himself with the mere exertion of his free-will, and form a strong contrast to the hawking, blustering rabble of a city, where a dram of liquor, or the money to buy a meal, is sure to purchase the acclamation of thousands, whose situation in the scale of society is too low to permit their thinking of their political right as a thing more valuable than to be bartered against the degree of advantage they may procure, or of license which they may exercise, by placing it at the disposal of one candidate or another.

Above all, before considering the case of America as parallel with that of France, the statesmen of the latter country should have observed one great and radical difference. In America, after the great change in their system had been effected by shaking off the sovereignty of the mother country, the states arranged their new government so as to make the least possible alteration in the habits of their people.

They left to a future and more convenient opportunity what further innovations this great change might render necessary, being more desirous to fix the general outlines of a firm and orderly government, although containing some anomalies, than to cast all existing authorities loose, in order that they might produce a constitution more regular in theory, but far less likely to be put into effectual execution than those old forms under which the people had grown up, and to which they were accustomed to render regular obedience. They abolished no nobility, for they had none in the colonies to abolish; but in fixing the basis of their constitution, they balanced the force and impulse of the representative body of the states by a senate, designed to serve the purposes answered by the House of Lords in the British constitution. The governors of the different states also, in whose power the executive government of each was reposed, continued to exercise the same duties as before, without much other change than that they were named by their fellow-citizens, instead of being appointed by the sovereign of the mother country. The Congress exercised the rights which success had given them over the loyalists with as much temperance as could be expected after the rage of a civil war. Above all, the mass of the American population was in a sound healthy state, and well fitted to bear their share in the exercise of political rights. They were independent, as we have noticed, and had comparatively few instances amongst them of great wealth, contrasted with the most degrading indigence. They were deeply imbued with a sense of religion, and the morality which is its fruit. They had been brought up under a free government, and in the exercise of the rights of freemen; and their fancies were not liable to be excited, or their understandings made giddy, with a sudden elevation to privileges, the nature of which was unknown to them. The republic of America, moreover, did not consist of one huge and populous country, with an overgrown capital, where the legislative body, cooped up in its precincts like prisoners, were liable to be acted upon by the applauses or threats of a desperate rabble. Each state of America carries on its own immediate government, and enjoys undiminished the privilege of adopting such plans as are best suited to their own peculiar situation, without embarrassing themselves with that ideal uniformity, that universal equality of rights, which it was the vain object of the French Constituent Assembly to establish. The Americans know that the advantage of a constitution, like that of a garment, consists neither in the peculiarity of the fashion nor in the fineness of the texture, but in its being well adapted to the person who receives protection from it. In short, the sagacity of Washington was not more apparent in his military exploits than in the manly and wise pause which he made in the march of revolution, so soon as peace gave an opportunity to interrupt its impulse. To replace law and social order upon an established basis was as much the object of this great general as it seems to have been that of the statesmen of Paris, civilians as they were, to protract a period of insurrection, murder, and revolutionary tyranny.

To such peculiarities and advantages as those we

have above stated, France opposed a direct contrast. Not only was the exorbitant influence of such a capital as Paris a bar to the existence of that republican virtue which is the essence of a popular form of government, but there was nothing like fixed or settled principles in the minds of the people of France at large. Everything had, within the last few years, been studiously and industriously altered, from the most solemn rites of the Church of Rome, to the most trifling article of dress; from the sacrament of the mass to the fashion of a shoe-tie. Religion was entirely out of the question, and the very slightest vestiges of an established church were about to be demolished. Republican virtue (with the exception of that of the soldiers, whose valour did honour to the name) consisted in wearing a coarse dress and foul linen, swearing the most vulgar oaths, obeying without scruple the most villainous mandates of the Jacobin Club, and assuming the title, manner, and sentiments of a real sans-culotte. The country was besides divided into an infinite variety of factions, and threatened with the plague of civil war. The streets of the metropolis had been lately the scene of a desperate conflict, and yet more recently of a horrible massacre. On the frontiers, the country was pressed by armies of invaders. It was a crisis in which the Romans, with all their love of freedom, would have called in the assistance of a dictator; yet it was then, when, without regarding either the real wants of the country or the temper of its inhabitants, France was erected into a Republic, a species of government the most inconsistent with energetic, secret, and successful councils.

These considerations could not have escaped the girondists. Neither could they be blind to the fact, that each republic, whatever its pretensions to freedom, has committed to some high officer of the state, under the name of doge, stadtholder, president, or other title, the custody of the executive power: from the obvious and undeniable principle, that, with safety to freedom, it cannot be lodged in the hands of the legislative body. But knowing this to be the case, they dared not even hint that such a separation of powers was indispensable, aware that their fierce enemies, the jacobins, while they would have seized on the office without scruple, would, with the other hand, sign an accusation of *lèse-nation* against them for proposing it. Thus crude, raw, and ill-considered, did one of the most important changes that could be wrought upon a country pass as hastily through this legislative body as the change of a decoration in the theatre.

The alteration was, notwithstanding, hailed by the community at large, as the consummation of the high fortunes to which France was called. True, half Europe was in arms at her gates—but the nation who opposed their swords to them were become republicans. True, the most frightful disorder had stalked abroad, in the shape of armed slaughter—it was but the effervescence and delirium of a republican consciousness of freedom. Peculation had crept into the finance, and theft had fingered the diamonds of the state—but the name of a republic was of itself sufficient to restore to the blackest jacobin of the gang, the moral virtues of a Cincinnati.

tax. The mere word *Republic* was now the universal medicine for all evils which France could complain of, and its regenerating operations were looked for with as much faith and confidence, as if the salutary effects of the convocation of the Estates of the Kingdom, once worshiped as a panacea with similar expectations, had not deceived the hopes of the country.

Meantime, the actors in the new drama began to play the part of Romans with the most ludicrous solemnity. The name of citizen was now the universal salutation to all classes; even when a deputy spoke to a shoe-black, that fond symbol of equality was regularly exchanged betwixt them; and, in the ordinary intercourse of society, there was the most ludicrous affectation of republican brevity and simplicity. "When you conquer Brussels," said Collet d'Herbois, the actor, to General Dumourier, "my wife, who is in that city, has my permission to reward you with a kiss." The general was ungallant enough not to profit by this flattering permission. His quick wit caught the ridicule of such an ejaculation as that which Camus addressed to him: "Citizen general," said the deputy, "thou dost meditate the part of Cæsar; but remember I will be Brutus, and plunge a poniard in your bosom."—"My dear Camus," said the lively soldier, who had been in worse dangers than were involved in this classical threat, "I am no more like Cæsar than you are like Brutus; and an assurance that I should live till you kill me, would be equal to a brevet of immortality."

With a similar assumption of republican dignity, men graced their children, baptized or unbaptized, with the formidable names of Roman heroes, and the folly of Anacharsis Klotz seemed to become general throughout the nation.

Republican virtues were of course adopted or affected. The duty of mothers nursing their own children, so eloquently insisted on by Rousseau, and nevertheless so difficult to practise under the forms of modern life, was generally adopted in Paris; and as the ladies had no idea that this process of parental attention was to interfere with the usual round of entertainment, mothers, with their infants dressed in the most approved Roman costume, were to be seen at the theatre, with the little disastrous victims of republican affectation, whose wailings, as well as other embarrassments occasioned by their presence, formed sometimes disagreeable interruptions to the amusements of the evening, and placed the inexperienced matrons in an awkward situation.

There were follies to be laughed at. But when men read Livy, for the sake of discovering what degree of private crime might be committed under the mask of public virtue, the affair became more serious. The deed of the younger Brutus served any man as an apology to betray to ruin and to death a friend, or a patron, whose patriotism might not be of the pitch which suited the time. Under the example of the elder Brutus, the nearest ties of blood were repeatedly made to give way before the ferocity of party zeal—a zeal too often assumed for the most infamous and selfish purposes. As some fanatics of yore studied the Old Testament for the purpose of finding examples of bad actions to vindicate those which themselves were tempted to com-

mit, so the republicans of France, we mean the desperate and outrageous bigots of the Revolution, read history, to justify, by classical instances, their public and private crimes. Informers, those scourges of a state, were encouraged to a degree scarce known in ancient Rome in the time of the emperors, though Tacitus has hurled his thunders against them, as the poison and pest of his time. The duty of lodging such informations was unblushingly urged as indispensable. The safety of the Republic being the supreme charge of every citizen, he was on no account to hesitate in *denouncing*, as it was termed, any one whomsoever, or howsoever connected with him,—the friend of his counsels, or the wife of his bosom,—providing he had reason to suspect the devoted individual of the crime of incivism,—a crime the more mysteriously dreadful, that no one knew exactly its nature.

The virtue, even of comparatively good men, gave way under the temptations held out by these fearful innovations on the state of morals. The girondists themselves did not scruple to avail themselves of the villany of others, when what they called the cause of the country, in reality that of their own faction, could be essentially served by it; but it was reserved for the jacobins to carry to the most hideous extremity the principle which made an exclusive idol of patriotism, and demanded that every other virtue, as well as the most tender and honourable dictates of feeling and conscience, should be offered up at the shrine of the Republic, as children were of old made to pass through the fire to Moloch.

Another eruption of republican zeal was directed against the antiquities and fine arts of France. The name of king being pronounced detestable, all the remembrances of royalty were to be destroyed. This task was committed to the rabble; and although a work dishonourable to their employers, and highly detrimental both to history and the fine arts, it was nevertheless infinitely more harmless than those in which the same agents had been lately employed. The royal sepulchres at St-Denis, near Paris, the ancient cemetery of the Bourbons, the Valois, and all the long line of French monarchs, were not only defaced on the outside, but utterly broken down, the bodies exposed, the bones dispersed, and the poor remains, even of Henry IV. of Navarre, so long the idol of the French nation, exposed to the rude gaze, and irreverent grasp, of the banditti who committed the sacrilege.

Le Noir, an artist, had the courage to interpose for preventing the total dispersion of the materials of those monuments, so valuable to history and to literature. He procured, with difficulty, permission to preserve and collect them in a house and garden in the Rue des Petits Augustins, where their mutilated remains continued in safety till after the restoration of the Bourbons. The enterprise was accomplished at much personal risk; for if the people he had to deal with had suspected that the zeal which he testified for the preservation of the monuments, was rather that of a royalist than of an antiquary, his idolatry would have been punished by instant death.

But the demolition of those ancient and sacred monuments was comparatively a trivial mode of showing

hatred to royalty. The vengeance of the republicans was directed against the emigrants, who, armed or unarmed, or from whatever cause they were absent from France, were now to be at once confounded in a general set of decrees. 1. All emigrants taken in arms were to suffer death within twenty-four hours. 2. Foreigners who had quitted the service of France since the 14th July, 1789, were, contrary to the law of nations, subjected to the same penalty. 3. All emigrants who had sought refuge in foreign parts, were banished for ever from their native country, without any distinction, or inquiry into the cause of their absence. The effects of these unfortunate exiles were already under sequestration, and by the assignats which were issued on the strength of this spoliation, Cambon, who managed the finances, carried on the war, and supplied the expenses of government.

The emigrants who had fled abroad were not more severely treated than those supposed to share their sentiments who had remained at home. Persons suspected, from whatever cause, or denounced by private malice as disinclined to the new system, were piled anew into the prisons, which had been emptied on the 2d and 3d of September, and where the blood of their predecessors in misfortune was yet visible on the walls. The refractory priests were particularly the objects of this species of oppression, and at length a summary decree was made for transporting them in the mass from the land of France to the unhealthy colony of Guiana, in South America. Many of these unfortunate men came to a more speedy fate.

But the most august victims destined to be sacrificed at the altar of republican virtue were the royal family in the Temple, whose continuing in existence seemed, doubtless, to the leaders, a daily reproach to their procrastination, and an object to which, when the present spirit should abate, the affections of the bewildered people might return with a sort of reaction. The jacobins resolved that Louis should die, were it only that the world might see they were not ashamed to attest, with a bloody seal, the truth of the accusations they had brought against him.

On the other hand, there was every reason to hope that the girondists would exert, in protection of the unhappy prince, whatever vigour they derived from their predominating influence in the Convention. They were, most of them, men whose philosophy, though it had driven them on wild political speculations, had not destroyed the sense of moral right and wrong, especially now that the struggle was ended betwixt monarchy and democracy, and the only question remaining concerned the use to be made of their victory. Although they had aided the attack on the Tuileries, on the 10th of August, which they considered as a combat, their hands were unstained with the massacres of September, which as we shall presently see, they urged as an atrocious crime against their rivals, the jacobins. Besides, they had gained the prize, and were in possession of the government; and, like the constitutionalists before them, the girondists now desired that here, at length, the revolutionary career should terminate, and that the ordinary forms of law

and justice should resume their usual channels through France, yielding to the people protection for life, personal liberty, and private property, and affording themselves, who held the reins of government, the means of guiding them honourably, safely, and with advantage to the community.

The philosophical statesmen, upon whom these considerations were not lost, felt nevertheless great embarrassment in the mode of interposing their protection in the king's favour. Their republicanism was the feature on which they most prided themselves. They delighted to claim the share in the downfall of Louis, which was due to their colleague Barbaroux, and the federates of Marseilles and Brest. It was upon their accession to this deed that the girondists rested their claims to popularity; and with what front could they now step forward the defenders, at least the apologists, of the king whom they had aided to dethrone; or what advantage would not the jacobins obtain over them, when they represented them to the people as lukewarm in their zeal, and as falling off from the popular cause, in order to preserve the life of the dethroned tyrant? The girondist ministers felt these embarrassments, and suffered themselves to be intimidated by them from making any open, manly, and direct interference in the king's cause.

A woman, and, although a woman, not the least distinguished among the girondist party, had the courage to urge a decisive and vigorous defence of the unhappy prince, without having recourse to the veil of a selfish and insidious policy. This was the wife of Roland, one of the most remarkable women of her time. A worthless, at least a careless father, and the doating folly of her mother, had left her when young to pick out such an education as she could, among the indecencies and impieties of French philosophy. Yet, though her Memoirs afford revolting specimens of indelicacy, and exaggerated sentiments in politics, it cannot be denied that the tenor of her life was innocent and virtuous in practice, and her sentiments unperverted, when left to their natural course. She saw the great question in its true and real position; she saw, that it was only by interposing themselves betwixt the legislative body of France and the commission of a great crime, that the girondists could either remain firm in the government, attract the confidence of honest men of any description, or have the least chance of putting a period to the anarchy which was devouring their country. "Save the life of Louis," she said; "save him by an open and avowed defence. It is the only measure that can assure your safety—the only course which can fix the stamp of public virtue on your government." Those whom she addressed listened with admiration; but, like one who has rashly climbed to a height where his brain grows giddy, they felt their own situation too tottering to permit their reaching a willing hand to support another, who was in still more imminent peril.

Their condition was indeed precarious. A large party in the Convention avowedly supported them; and in the Plain, as it was called, a position held by deputies affecting independence, both of the girondists and the jacobins, and therefore occupying the neutral ground betwixt them, sat a large number who, from the timidity of temper which makes

sheep and other weak animals herd together in numbers, had formed themselves into a faction, which could at any time cast decision into either scale which they favoured. But they exercised this power of inclining the balance, less with a view to carrying any political point, than with that of securing their own safety. In ordinary debates, they usually gave their votes to the ministers, both because they were ministers, and also because the milder sentiments of the girondists were more congenial to the feelings of men, who would gladly have seen peace and order restored. But then these timid members of the Plain also assiduously courted the jacobins, avoided joining in any measure which should give them mortal offence, and purchased a sort of immunity from their revenge, by showing plainly that they deserved only contempt. In this neutral party the gleanings of the defeated factions of moderates and of constitutionalists were chiefly to be found; resigning themselves to the circumstances of the moment, consulting their own safety as they gave their votes, and waiting, perhaps, till less disorderly days might restore to them the privilege of expressing their actual sentiments. The chief of these trucklers to fortune was Barrère, a man of wit and eloquence, prompt invention, supple opinions, and convenient conscience. His terror of the jacobins was great, and his mode of disarming their resentment, so far as he and the neutral party were concerned, was often very ingenious. When by argument or by eloquence the girondists had obtained some triumph in the assembly, which seemed to reduce their adversaries to despair, it was then Barrère, and the members of the Plain, threw themselves between the victors and vanquished, and, by some proposal of an insidious and neutralizing nature, prevented the completion of the conquest, and afforded a safe retreat to the defeated.

The majorities, therefore, which the girondists obtained in the assembly, being partly eked out by this heartless and fluctuating band of auxiliaries, could never be supposed to arm them with solid or effective authority. It was absolutely necessary that they should exhibit such a power of protecting themselves and those who should join them, as might plainly show that the force was on their side. This point once established, they might reckon Barrère and his party as faithful adherents. But while the jacobins retained the power of surrounding the Convention at their pleasure with an insurrection of the suburbs, without the deputies possessing other means of defence than arose out of their inviolability, the adherence of those whose chief object in voting was to secure their personal safety, was neither to be hoped nor expected. The girondists, therefore, looked anxiously round, to secure, if it were possible, the possession of such a force, to protect themselves and their timorous allies.

It has been thought, that a more active, more artful body of ministers, and who were better acquainted with the mode of carrying on revolutionary movements, might at this period have secured an important auxiliary, by detaching the formidable Danton from the ranks of the enemy, and receiving him into their own. It must be observed, that the camp of the jacobins contained three separate par-

ties, led each by one of the triumvirs whom we have already described, and acting in concert, for the common purpose of propelling the Revolution by the same violent means which had begun it—of unsheathing the sword of terror, and making it pass for that of justice—and, in the name of liberty, of letting murder and spoil, under the protection of armed ruffians of the basest condition, continue to waste and ravage the departments of France. But although agreed in this main object, the triumvirs were extremely suspicious of each other, and jealous of the rights each might claim in the spoil which they contemplated. Danton despised Robespierre for his cowardice, Robespierre feared the ferocious audacity of Danton; and with him to fear was to hate—and to hate was—when the hour arrived—to destroy. They differed in their ideas also of the mode of exercising their terrible system of government. Danton had often in his mouth the sentence of Machiavel, that when it becomes necessary to shed blood, a single great massacre has a more dreadful effect than a series of successive executions. Robespierre, on the contrary, preferred the latter process as the best way of sustaining the reign of terror. The appetite of Marat could not be satiated but by combining both modes of murder. Both Danton and Robespierre kept aloof from the sanguinary Marat. This position of the chiefs of the jacobins towards each other seemed to indicate, that one of the three at least might be detached from the rest, and might bring his ruffians in opposition to those of his late comrades, in case of any attempt on the assembly, and policy recommended Danton, not averse, it is said, to the alliance, as the most useful auxiliary.

Among the three monsters mentioned, Danton had that energy which the girondists wanted, and was well acquainted with the secret movements of those insurrections to which they possessed no key. His vices of wrath, luxury, love of spoil, dreadful as they were, are attributes of mortal men;—the envy of Robespierre, and the instinctive blood-thirstiness of Marat were the properties of fiends. Danton, like the huge serpent called the Bon, might be approached with a degree of safety when gorged with prey—but the appetite of Marat for blood was like the horse-leech, which says, Not enough—and the slaughterous envy of Robespierre was like the gnawing worm that dieth not, and yields no interval of repose. In glutting Danton with spoil, and furnishing the means of indulging his luxury, the girondists might have purchased his support; but nothing under the supreme rule in France would have gratified Robespierre; and an unlimited torrent of the blood of that unhappy country could alone have satiated Marat. If a colleague was to be chosen out of that detestable triumvirate, unquestionably Danton was to be considered as the most eligible.

On the other hand, men like Brissot, Vergniaud, and others, whose attachment to republicanism was mixed with a spirit of virtue and honour, might be well averse to the idea of contaminating their party with such an auxiliary, intensely stained as Danton was by his share in the massacres of September. They might well doubt, whether any physical force

which his revolutionary skill, and the arms it could put in motion, might bring to their standard, would compensate for the moral horror with which the presence of such a grisly proselyte must strike all who had any sense of honour or justice. They, therefore, discouraged the advances of Danton, and resolved to comprise him with Marat and Robespierre in the impeachment against the jacobin chiefs, which they designed to bring forward in the assembly.

The most obvious means by which the girondists could ascertain their safety, and the freedom of debate, was by levying a force from the several departments, each contributing its quota, to be called a Departmental Legion, which was to be armed and paid to act as a guard upon the National Convention. The subject was introduced by Roland in a report* to the assembly, and renewed on the next day by Kersaint, a spirited girondist, who candidly declared the purpose of his motion: "It was time," he said, "that assassins and their prompters should see that the law had scaffolds."

The girondists obtained, that a committee of six members should be named, to report on the state of the capital, on the encouragement afforded to massacre, and on the mode of forming a departmental force for the defence of the metropolis. The decree was carried for a moment, but on the next day the jacobins demanded that it should be revoked, denying that there was any occasion for such a defence to the Convention, and accusing the ministers of an intention to surround themselves with a force of armed satellites, in order to overawe the good city of Paris, and carry into effect their sacrilegious plan of dismembering France. Rebecqui and Barbaroux replied to this charge by impeaching Robespierre, on their own testimony, of aspiring to the post of dictator. The debate became more tempestuous the more that the tribunes or galleries of the hall were filled with the violent followers of the jacobin party, who shouted, cursed, and yelled, to back the exclamations and threats of their leaders in the assembly. While the girondists were exhausting themselves to find out terms of reproach for Marat, that prodigy stepped forth, and raised the disorder to the highest, by avowing himself the author and advocate for a dictatorship. The anger of the Convention seemed thoroughly awakened, and Vergniaud read to the deputies an extract from Marat's journal, in which, after demanding two hundred and sixty thousand heads, which was his usual stint, he abused the Convention in the grossest terms, and exhorted the people to act—words of which the import was by this time perfectly understood.

This passage excited general horror, and the victory for a moment seemed in the hands of the girondists; but they did not pursue it with sufficient vigour. The meeting passed to the order of the day; and Marat, in ostentatious triumph, produced a pistol, with which he said he would have blown out his brains, had a decree of accusation been passed against him. The girondists not only lost the advantage of discomfiting their enemies by the prosecution of one of their most noted leaders, but were compelled for the present to abandon their plan of a

departmental guard, and resign themselves to the guardianship of the faithful citizens of Paris.

This city of Paris was at the time under the power of the intrusive Community (or Common Council), many of whom had forced themselves into office on the 10th of August. It was the first act of their administration to procure the assassination of Mandat, the commandant of the National Guard; and their accomplices, still extant, bear testimony that it was by their instrumentality that the murderers of September were levied and paid. Trained jacobins and pitiless ruffians themselves, this civic body had raised to be their agents and assistants an unusual number of municipal officers, who were at once their guards, their informers, their spies, their jailers, and their executioners. They had, besides, obtained a majority of the inhabitants in most of the sections, whose votes placed them and their agents in command of the National Guard; and the pikemen of the suburbs were always ready to second their excellent community, even against the Convention itself, which, in point of freedom of action, or effective power, made a figure scarcely more respectable than that of the king after his return from Varennes.

Roland almost every day carried to the Convention his vain complaints, that the course of the law, for which he was responsible, was daily crossed, thwarted, and impeded, by the proceedings of this usurping body. The considerable funds of the city itself, with those of its hospitals and other public establishments of every kind, were dilapidated by these revolutionary intruders, and applied to their own purposes. The minister at length, in a formal report to the Convention, inculpated the community in these and such like offences. In another part of the report, he intimated a plot of the jacobins to assassinate the girondists, possess themselves of the government by arms, and chase Robespierre dictator. Louvet denounced Robespierre as a traitor, and Barbaroux proposed a series of decrees. The first, declaring the Convention free to leave any city where they should be exposed to constraint and violence. The second, resolving to form a conventional guard. The third, declaring that the Convention should form itself into a court of justice, for trial of state crimes. The fourth announcing, that in respect the sections of Paris had declared their sittings permanent, that resolution should be abrogated.

Instead of adopting the energetic measures proposed by Barbaroux, the Convention allowed Robespierre several days for his defence against Louvet's accusation, and ordered to the bar* ten members of the community, from whom they were contented to accept such slight apologies and evasive excuses, for their unauthorized interference with the power of the Convention, as these insolent demagogues condescended to offer.

The accusation of Robespierre, though boldly urged by Louvet and Barbaroux, was also eluded, by passing to the order of the day; and thus the Convention showed plainly, that however courageous they had been against their monarch, they dared not

* 24th September.

* 5th November.

protect the liberty which they boasted of, against the encroachments of fiercer demagogues than themselves.

Barbaroux endeavoured to embolden the assembly, by bringing once more from his native city a body of those fiery Marseillais, who had formed the van-guard of the mob on the 10th of August. He succeeded so far in his scheme that a few scores of those federates again appeared in Paris, where their altered demeanour excited surprise. Their songs were again chaunted, their wild Moresco dances and gestures again surprised the Parisians; and the more, as in their choruses they imprecated vengeance on the jacobins, called out for mercy to the "poor tyrant," so they termed the king, and shouted in the cause of peace, order, and the Convention.

The citizens of Paris, who could not reconcile the songs and exclamations of the Marseillais with their appearance and character, concluded that a snare was laid for them, and abstained from uniting themselves with men whose sincerity was so suspicious. The Marseillais themselves, discouraged with their cold reception, or not liking their new trade of maintaining order so well as their old one of over-setting it, melted away by degrees, and were soon no more seen or heard of. Some of the Breton federates, kept in the interest of the girondists, by their countrymen the deputies Kersaint and Kervélegan, remained still attached to the Convention, though their numbers were too few to afford them protection in any general danger.

If the *Memoirs* of Dumourier are to be relied on, that active and intriguing general presented to the girondists another resource, not free certainly from hazard or difficulty to the republican government, which was the idol of these theoretical statesmen, but affording, if his means had proved adequate to the execution of his plans, a certain bulwark against the encroachments of the hideous anarchy threatened by the jacobin ascendancy.

General Dumourier was sufficiently hated by the jacobins, notwithstanding the successes which he had gained on the part of France over foreign enemies, to induce him to feel the utmost desire of putting down their usurped power; but he was under the necessity of acting with great caution. The bad success of La Fayette, deserted by his army as soon as he attempted to lead them against Paris, was in itself discouraging; but Dumourier was besides conscious that the jacobin clubs, together with the commissioners of the Convention with Danton at their head, had been actively engaged in disorganizing his army, and diminishing his influence over them. This circumstance, he naturally resolved to avoid hazarding any violent measure without the support of the Convention, in case of being deserted by his army. But he affirms that he repeatedly informed the girondists, then predominant in the assembly, that if they could obtain a decree, but of four lines, authorizing such a measure, he was ready to march to Paris at the head of a chosen body of troops, who would have been willing to obey such a summons; and that he would by this means have placed the Convention in a situation, when they might have set the jacobins and his insurrectionary forces at absolute defiance.

Perhaps the girondists entertained the fear, first, that Dumourier's influence with his troops might prove as inefficient as that of La Fayette, and leave them to atone with their heads for such a measure attempted and unexecuted. Or, secondly, that if the manoeuvre proved successful, they would be freed from fear of the jacobins, only to be placed under the restraint of a military chief, whose mind was well understood to be in favour of monarchy of one kind or other. So that, conceiving they saw equal risk in the alternative, they preferred the hazard of seeing their fair and favourite vision of a republic overthrown by the pikes of the jacobins, rather than by the bayonets of Dumourier's army. They turned, therefore, a cold ear to the proposal, which afterwards they would gladly have accepted, when the general had no longer the power to carry it into execution.

Thus the factions, so intimately united for the destruction of royalty, could not, when that step was gained, combine for any other purpose save the great crime of murdering their deposed sovereign. Nay, while the jacobins and girondists seemed moving hand in hand to the ultimate completion of that joint undertaking, the union was only in outward appearance; for the girondists, though apparently acting in concert with their stern rivals, were in fact dragged after them by compulsion, and played the part less of actors than subdued captives in this final triumph of democracy. They were fully persuaded of the king's innocence as a man, of his inviolability and exemption from criminal process as a constitutional authority. They were aware that the deed meditated would render France odious to all the other nations of Europe; and that the jacobins, to whom war and confusion were natural elements, were desirous for that very reason to bring Louis to the scaffold. All this was plain to them, and yet their pride as philosophers made them ashamed to be thought capable of interesting themselves in the fate of a tyrant; and their desire of getting the French nation under their own exclusive government, induced them to consent to anything rather than protect the obnoxious though innocent sovereign, at the hazard of losing their popularity, and forfeiting their dearly-won character of being true republicans.

A committee of twenty-four persons had been appointed early in the session of the Convention, to inquire into, and report upon, the grounds for accusing Louis. Their report was brought up on the 1st of November, 1792, and a more loathsome tissue of confusion and falsehood never was laid upon the table of such an assembly. All acts that had been done by the ministers in every department, which could be twisted into such a shape as the times called criminal, were charged as deeds, for which the sovereign was himself responsible; and the burthen of the whole was to accuse the king, when he had scarcely a single regiment of guards even at his nominal disposal, of nourishing the intention of massacring the Convention, defended by thirty thousand National Guards, besides the federates and the militia of the suburbs.

The Convention were rather ashamed of this report, and would scarce permit it to be printed.

So soon as it appeared, two or three persons, who were therein mentioned as accomplices of particular acts charged against the king, contradicted the report upon their oath.* An additional charge was brought under the following mysterious circumstances :—Gamin, a locksmith of Versailles, communicated to Roland about the latter end of December, that in the beginning of May, 1792, he had been employed by the king to secrete an iron chest, or cabinet, in the wall of a certain apartment in the Tuileries, which he disclosed to the ministers of justice. He added a circumstance which throws discredit on his whole story, namely, that the king gave him with his own hand a glass of wine, after taking which he was seized with a cholic, followed by a kind of paralysis, which deprived him for fourteen months of the use of his limbs, and the power of working for his bread. The inference of the wretch was, that the king had attempted to poison him; which those may believe who can number fourteen months betwixt the beginning of May and the end of December in the same year. This gross falsehood utterly destroys Gamin's evidence; and as the king always denied his knowledge of the existence of such a chest, with such papers, we are reduced to suppose, either that Gamin had been employed by one of the royal ministers, and had brought the king personally into the tale for the greater grace of his story, or that the papers found in some other place of safety had been selected, and put into the chest by the jacobin commissioners, then employed in surveying and searching the palace, with the purpose of trumping up evidence against the king.

Roland acted very imprudently in examining the contents of the chest alone and without witness, instead of calling in the commissioners aforesaid, who were in the palace at the time. This was perhaps done with the object of putting aside such papers as might, in that hour of fear and uncertainty, have brought into danger some of his own party or friends. One of importance, however, was found, which the jacobins turned into an implement against the girondists. It was an overture from that party addressed to the king, shortly before the 10th of August, engaging to oppose the motion for the forfeiture of the king, providing Louis would recal to his councils the three discarded ministers of their faction.

The contents of the chest were of a very miscellaneous nature. The documents consisted of letters, memorials, and plans, from different persons, and at different dates, offering advice, or tendering support to the king, and proposing plans for the freedom of his person. The royalist project of Mirabeau, in his latter days, was found amongst the rest; in consequence of which his body was dragged out of the Panthéon, formerly the Church of Ste. Geneviève, now destined to receive the bodies of the great men of the Revolution, but whose lodgings shifted as often as if they had been taken by the month.

The documents, as we have said, consisted chiefly

* M. de Septeuil, in particular, quoted as being the agent by whom Louis XVI. was said to have transmitted money to his brothers when in exile, positively denied the charge, and made affidavit accordingly.

of projects for the king's service, on which he certainly never acted, probably never approved of, and perhaps never saw. The utmost to which he could be liable, was such penalty as may be due to one who retains possession of plans submitted to his consideration, but which have in no shape obtained his assent. It was sufficiently hard to account Louis responsible for such advice of his ministers as he really adopted; but it was a dreadful extension of his responsibility to make him answerable for such as he had virtually rejected. Besides which, the story of Gamin was so self-contradictory in one circumstance; and so doubtful in others, as to carry no available proof that the papers had been in the king's possession; so that this new charge was as groundless as those brought up by the first committee, and, arguing upon the known law of any civilized country, the accusations against him ought to have been dismissed, as founded on the most notorious injustice.

There was one circumstance which probably urged those into whose hands Louis had fallen, to proceed against his person to the uttermost. They knew that, in English history, a king had been condemned to death by his subjects, and were resolved that France should not remain behind England in the exhibition of a spectacle so interesting and edifying to a people newly regenerated. This parallel case would not perhaps have been thought a worthy precedent in other countries; but in France there is a spirit of wild enthusiasm, a desire of following out an example even to the most exaggerated point, and of outdoing, if possible, what other nations have done before them. This had doubtless its influence in causing Louis to be brought to the bar in 1792, like Charles of England in 1648.

The French statesmen did not pause to reflect, that the violent death of Charles only paved the way for a series of years spent in servitude under military despotism, and then to restoration of the legitimate sovereign. Had they regarded the precedent on this side, they would have obtained a glimpse into futurity, and might have presaged what were to be the consequences of the death of Louis. Neither did the French consider, that by a great part of the English nation the execution of Charles Stuart is regarded as a national crime, and the anniversary still observed as a day of fasting and penitence; that others who condemn the king's conduct in and preceding the Civil War, do, like the whig Churchill, still consider his death as an unconstitutional action; * that the number is small indeed who think it

* Unhappy Stuart! harshly though that name
Grates on my ear, I should have died with shame,
To see my king before his subjects stand,
And at their bar hold up his royal hand;
At their command to hear the monarch plead,
By their decrees to see that monarch bleed.
What though thy faults were many, and were great—
What though they shook the fabric of the state?
In royalty secure thy person stood,
An sacred was the fountain of thy blood.
Vile ministers, who dared abuse their trust,
Who dared seduce a king to be unjust.
Vengeance, with justice leagued, with power made strong,
Had nobly crush'd—The king can do no wrong.

CHURCHILL'S *Gotham*.

justifiable even on the precarious grounds of state necessity; and that it is barely possible a small portion of enthusiasts may still exist, who glory in the deed as an act of popular vengeance.

But even among this last description of persons, the French regicides would find themselves entirely at a loss to vindicate the execution of Louis by the similar fate of Charles; and it would be by courtesy only, if at all, that they could be admitted to the honours of the sitting at a calves-head club.

The comparison between these unhappy monarchs fails in almost every point, excepting in the closing scene; and no parallel can, with justice to either, be drawn betwixt them. The most zealous cavalier will, in these enlightened days, admit, that the early government of Charles was marked by many efforts to extend the prerogative beyond its legal bounds; that there were instances of oppressive fines, cruel punishments by mutilation, long and severe imprisonment in distant forts and castles; exertions of authority which no one seeks to justify, and which those who are the king's apologists can only endeavour to mitigate, by alleging the precedents of arbitrary times, or the interpretation of the laws by courtly ministers, and time-serving lawyers. The conduct of Louis XVI., from the hour he assumed the throne, was, on the contrary, an example of virtue and moderation. Instead of levying ship-money and benevolences, Louis lightened the feudal services of the vassals, and the *corvée* among the peasantry. Where Charles endeavoured to enforce conformity to the Church of England by pillory and ear-slitting, Louis allowed the protestants the free use of their religion, and discharged the use of torture in all cases whatever. Where Charles visited his parliament to violate their freedom by arresting five of their members, Louis may be said to have surrendered himself an unresisting prisoner to the representatives of the people, whom he had voluntarily summoned around him. But above all, Charles, in person, or by his generals, waged a long and bloody war with his subjects, fought battles in every county of England, and was only overcome and made prisoner, after a lengthened and deadly contest, in which many thousands fell on both sides. The conduct of Louis was in every respect different. He never offered one blow in actual resistance, even when he had the means in his power. He ordered up, indeed, the forces under Marshal Broglie; but he gave them command to retire, so soon as it was evident that they must either do so, or act offensively against the people. In the most perilous situations of his life, he showed the utmost reluctance to shed the blood of his subjects. He would not trust his attendants with pistols, during the flight to Varennes; he would not give the officer of *hussars* orders to clear the passage, when his carriage was stopped upon the bridge. When he saw that the martial array of the guards did not check the audacity of the assailants on the 10th of August, he surrendered himself to the Legislative Assembly, a prisoner at discretion, rather than mount his horse and place himself at the head of his faithful troops and subjects. The blood that was shed that day was without command of his. He could have no reason for encouraging such a strife,

which, far from defending his person, then in the custody of the assembly, was likely to place it in the most imminent danger. And in the very last stage, when he received private notice that there were individuals determined to save his life at peril of their own, he forbade the enterprise. "Let not a drop of blood be shed on my account," he said; "I would not consent to it for the safety of my crown: I never will purchase mere life at such a rate." These were sentiments perhaps fitter for the pious sectaries of the community of Friends, than for the king of a great nation; but, such as they were, Louis felt and conscientiously acted on them. And yet his subjects could compare his character, and his pretended guilt, with the bold and haughty Stuart, who, in the course of the Civil War, bore arms in person, and charged at the head of his own regiment of Guards!

Viewed in his kingly duty, the conduct of Louis is equally void of blame; unless it be that blame which attaches to a prince, too yielding and mild to defend the just rights of his crown. He yielded, with feeble struggling, to every demand in succession which was made upon him, and gave way to every inroad on the existing state of France. Instead of placing himself as a barrier between his people and his nobility, and bringing both to some fair terms of composition, he suffered the latter to be driven from his side, and by the ravaging their estates, and the burning of their houses, to be hurried into emigration. He adopted one popular improvement after another, each innovating on the royal authority, or derogatory to the royal dignity. Far from having deserved the charge of opposing the nation's claim of freedom, it would have been well for themselves and him, had he known how to limit his grant to that quantity of freedom which they were qualified to make a legitimate use of; leaving it for future princes to slacken the reins of government, in proportion as the public mind in France should become formed to the habitual exercise of political rights.

The king's perfect innocence was therefore notorious to the whole world, but especially to those who now usurped the title of arraigning him; and men could hardly persuade themselves that his life was seriously in danger. An ingenious contrivance of the jacobins seems to have been intended to drive the wavering girondists into the snare of voting for the king's trial. St-Just, one of their number, made a furious speech against any formality being observed, save a decree of death, on the urgency of the occasion. "What availed," said the supporters of this brief and sure measure, "the ceremonies of grand and petty jury? The cannon which made a breach in the Tuileries, the unanimous shout of the people on the 10th of August, had come in place of all other solemnities. The Convention had no farther power to inquire; its sole duty was to pronounce, or rather confirm and execute, the doom of the sovereign people."

This summary proposal was highly applauded, not only by the furious crowds by whom the galleries were always occupied, but by all the exaggerations of the more violent democrats. They exclaimed that every citizen had the same right over

the life of Louis which Brutus possessed over that of Cæsar. Others cried out, that the very fact of having reigned, was in itself a crime notorious enough to dispense with further investigation, and authorize instant punishment.

Stunned by these clamours, the girondists and neutral party, like all feeble-minded men, chose a middle course, and, instead of maintaining the king's innocence, adopted measures, calculated to save him indeed from immediate slaughter, but which ended by consigning him to a tribunal too timid to hear his cause justly. They resolved to urge the right of the National Convention to judge in the case of Louis.

There were none in the Convention that dared to avow facts to which their conscience bore witness, hut the consequences of admitting which were ingeniously urged by the sophist Robespierre, as a condemnation of their own conduct. "One party," said the wily logician, "must be clearly guilty; either the king, or the Convention, who have ratified the actions of the insurgent people. If you have dethroned an innocent and legal monarch, what are you but traitors? and why sit you here—why not hasten to the Temple, set Louis at liberty, instal him again in the Tuileries, and beg on your knees for a pardon you have not merited? But if you have, in the great popular act which you have ratified, only approved of the deposition of a tyrant, summon him to the bar, and demand a reckoning for his crimes." This dilemma pressed on the mind of many members, who could not but see their own condemnation the necessary consequence of the king's acquittal. And while some felt the force of this argument, all were aware of the obvious danger to be encountered from the wrath of the jacobins and their satellites, should they dare to dissent from the vote which these demagogues demanded from the assembly.

When Robespierre had ended, Pétion arose and moved, that the king should be tried before the Convention. It is said, the Mayor of Paris took the lead in this cruel persecution, because Louis had spoken to him sharply about the tumultuary uproar of the jacobin rabble into the Tuileries on the 20th of June; and when Pétion attempted to reply, had pointed to the broken grating through which the entrance had been forced, and sternly commanded him to be silent. If this was true, it was a bitter revenge for so slight an offence, and the subsequent fate of Pétion is the less deserving of pity.

The motion was carried without opposition, and the next chapter affords us the melancholy results.

CHAPTER XIII.

Indecision of the girondists and its effects.—The royal family in the Temple.—Insulted by the agents of the community, both within and without the prison.—Their exemplary patience.—The king deprived of his son's society.—Buzot's admission of the general dislike of France to a republican form of government.—The king brought to trial before the Convention.—His first examination.—Carried back to prison amidst insult and abuse.—Tumult in the assembly.—The king deprived of intercourse with his family.—Malesherbes appointed as counsel to defend the king.—and Desèze.—Louis again brought be-

fore the Convention.—Opening speech of Desèze.—King remanded to the Temple.—Stormy debate in the Convention.—Eloquent attack of Vergniaud on the jacobins.—Sentence of death pronounced against the king.—General sympathy for his fate.—Dumourier arrives in Paris.—Vainly tries to avert the king's fate.—Louis XVI. beheaded on 21st January, 1793.—Marie Antoinette on the 16th October thereafter.—The Princess Elisabeth in May, 1794.—The dauphin perishes, by cruelty, June 8th, 1795.—The princess royal exchanged for Beurnonville and others, 19th December, 1795.

WE have already said, that the vigorous and masculine, as well as virtuous exhortations of Madame Roland, were thrown away upon her colleagues, whose fears were more than female. The girondists could not be made to perceive, that, though their ferocious adversaries were feared through France, yet they were also hated. The moral feeling of all Frenchmen who had any left, detested the authors of a long train of the most cold-blooded murders; the suspicions of all men of property were attached to the conduct of a party, whose leaders rose from indigence to affluence by fines, confiscations, acquisitions, besides every other kind of plunder, direct and indirect. If the majority of the Convention had adopted the determination of boldly resisting their unprincipled tyrants, and preventing, at whatever hazard, the murder of the king, the strength of the country would probably have supported a constituted authority against the usurpations of the Community of Paris, which had no better title to tyrannize over the Convention, and by so doing to govern France at pleasure, than had the council of the meanest town in the kingdom.

The girondists ought to have been sensible, that, even by thwarting this favourite measure, they could not increase the hatred which the jacobins already entertained against them, and should have known that further delay to give open battle would not be received as an overture of friendship, but be regarded as a timid indecision, which must have heated their enemies, in proportion as it cooled their friends. The truckling, time-serving policy which they observed on this occasion, deprived the girondists of almost all chance of forming a solid and substantial interest in the country. By a bold, open, and manly defence of the king, they would have done honour to themselves as public men, willing to discharge their duty at the risk of their lives. They would have been sure of whatever number could be gathered, either of royalists, who were beginning to raise a head in Bretagne and La Vendée, or of constitutionalists, who feared the persecution of the jacobins. The materials were already kindled for those insurrections, which afterwards broke out at Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and generally through the south and west of France. They might have brought up five or six thousand federates from the departments, and the force would then have been in their own hands. They might, by showing a bold and animated front, have regained possession of the National Guard, which was only prevented by a jacobin commander and his staff-officers, as well as by their timidity, from throwing off a yoke so bloody and odious as that which they were groaning under. But to dare this, it was necessary that they should

have the encouragement of the Convention ; and that body, managed as it was by the girondists, showed a timorous unwillingness to support the measures of the jacobins, which implied their dislike indeed, but also evinced their fear.

Meantime the king, with the queen, his sister, and their children, the dauphin and the princess royal, remained in the tower of the Temple, more uncomfortably lodged, and much more harshly treated, than state prisoners before the Revolution had been in the execrable Bastille.* The royal prisoners were under the especial charge of the Community of Paris, who, partly from their gross ignorance, partly from their desire to display their furious jacobinical zeal, did all in their power to embitter their captivity.

Petion, whose presence brought with it so many cruel recollections, studiously insulted him by his visits to the prison. The municipal officers, sent thither to insure the custody of the king's person, and to be spies upon his private conversation, were selected among the worst and most malignant jacobins. His efforts at equanimity, and even civility, towards these brutal jailers, were answered with the most gross insolence. One of them, a mason, in his working dress, had thrown himself into an arm-chair, where, decorated with his municipal scarf, he reposed at his ease. The king condescended to ask him, by way of conversation, where he wrought. He answered gruffly, "at the Church of Ste Genevieve."—"I remember," said the king, "I laid the foundation stone—a fine edifice; but I have heard the foundation is insecure."—"It is more sure," answered the fellow, "than the thrones of tyrants." The king smiled, and was silent. He endured with the same patience the insolent answer of another of these officials. The man not having been relieved at the usual and regular hour, the king civilly expressed his hopes that he would find no inconvenience from the delay. "I am come here," answered the ruffian, "to watch your conduct, not for you to trouble yourself with mine. No one," he added, fixing his hat firm on his brow, "least of all you, have any business to concern themselves with it." We have seen prisons, and are sure that even the steeled jailer, accustomed as he is to scenes of distress, is not in the habit, unprovoked and wantonly, of answering with reproach and insult such ordinary expressions of civility, when offered by the worst criminals. The hearts of these men, who, by chance as it were, became dungeon-keepers, and whose first captive had been many years their king, must have been as hard as the nether millstone.

While such scenes occurred within the prison, those who kept watch without, either as sentinels or as patroles of the jacobins (who maintained stern vigilance in the environs of the prison), were equally ready to contribute their share of vexation and insult. Pictures and placards, representing the royal family under the hands of the executioner, were pasted up where the king and queen might see them. The most violent patriotic songs, turning upon the

approaching death of Monsieur and Madame Veto, were sung below their windows, and the most frightful cries for their blood disturbed such rest as prisoners can obtain. The head of the Princess of Lamballe was brought under their window on the 3d September, and one of the municipal officers would have enticed the royal family to the window that they might see this ghastly spectacle, had not the other, "of milder mood," prevented them from complying. When questioned concerning the names of these two functionaries by some less savage persons, who wished to punish the offending ruffian, Louis would only mention that of the more humane of the two; so little was this unhappy prince addicted to seek revenge, even for the most studied cruelties practised against him.

The conduct of the Community increased in rigor, as the process against Louis seemed to draw nearer. The most ordinary points of personal accommodation were made subjects of debate ere they could be granted, and that upon the king's being permitted to shave himself, lasted a long while. Every article was taken from him, even to his tooth-pick and pen-knife, and the queen and princesses were deprived of their scissors and housewives. This led to a touching remark of Louis. He saw his sister, while at work, obliged to bite asunder a thread which she had no means of cutting, and the words escaped him, "Ah! you wanted nothing in your pretty house at Montreuil."—"Dearest brother," answered the princess, whose character was that of sanctity, purity of thought, and benevolence, "can I complain of anything, since Heaven has preserved me to share and to comfort, in some degree, your hours of captivity?" It was, indeed, in the society of his family that the character of Louis shone to the greatest advantage; and if, when on the throne, he did not always possess the energies demanded of his high situation, in the dungeon of the Temple misfortune threw around him the glories of a martyr. His morning hours were spent in instructing or amusing the young dauphin, a task for which the king's extensive information well qualified him. The captives enjoyed, as they best might, a short interval, when they were permitted to walk in the gardens of the Temple, sure to be insulted (like Charles I. in the same situation) by the sentinels, who puffed volumes of tobacco-smoke in their faces as they passed them, while others annoyed the ears of the ladies with licentious songs, or the most cruel denunciations.

All this Louis and his family endured with such sainted patience, that several who obtained access to his person were moved by the spectacle of royalty reduced to a situation so melancholy, yet sustained with such gentleness and fortitude. Some of the municipal officers themselves became melted, and changed their ideas of the king, when they beheld him in so new and singular a light.

Stories of the insults which he daily received, and of the meekness with which he sustained them, began to circulate among the citizens of the higher classes; and, joined to their fear of falling completely under the authority of the sans-culottes, led many of the republicans to cast back their thoughts to the constitution of 1791, with all its faults,

* The reader may compare the account which Marmontel gives of his residence in the Bastille, with the faithful Cléry's narrative of Louis's captivity in the Temple.

and with its monarchical executive government.

The more wise and sensible of the girondists began to suspect that they had been too hasty in erecting their favourite republic, on ground incapable of affording a sound and secure foundation for such an edifice. Buzot gives testimony to this, dated later, no doubt, than the period we are treating of; but the grounds of the reasoning existed as much at the king's trial as after the expulsion of the girondists. The passage is remarkable. "My friends," says this distinguished girondist, "preserved a long time the hopes of establishing a republic in France, even when all seemed to demonstrate that the enlightened classes, whether from prejudice or from just reasoning, felt indisposed to that form of government. That hope did not forsake my friends when the most wicked and vilest of men obtained possession of the minds of the inferior classes, and corrupted them by the opportunities they offered of license and pillage. My friends reckoned on the lightness and aptitude to change proper to the French character, and which they considered to be peculiarly suitable to a republican nation. I have always considered that conclusion as entirely false, and have repeatedly in my heart despaired of my darling wish to establish a republic in my country." In another place he says, "It must not be dissembled that the majority of Frenchmen earnestly desired royalty, and the constitution of 1791. In Paris, the wish was general, and was expressed most freely, though only in confidential society, and among private friends. There were only a few noble and elevated minds who felt themselves worthy to be republicans, and whom the example of the Americans had encouraged to essay the project of a similar government in France, the country of frivolity and mutability. The rest of the nation, with the exception of the ignorant wretches, without either sense or substance, who vomited abuse against royalty, as at another time they would have done against a commonwealth, and all without knowing why—the rest of the nation were all attached to the constitution of 1791, and looked on the pure republicans as a very well-meaning kind of madmen."

In these lines, written by one of the most sincere of their number, we read the condemnation of the girondists, who, to adventure the precarious experiment of a republic, in which they themselves saw so many difficulties, were contented to lend their arms and countenance to the destruction of that very government, which they knew to be desired by all the enlightened classes of France except themselves, and which demolition only made room for the dreadful triumvirate,—Danton, Robespierre, and Marat.

But we also see, from this and other passages, that there existed feelings, both in Paris and in the departments, which, if the convention had made a manly appeal to them, might have saved the king's life, and prevented the reign of terror. There began to arise more obvious signs of disaffection to the rulers, and of interest in the king's fate. These were increased when he was brought before the convention for examination, an occasion upon which Louis was treated with the same marked appearance of premeditated insult, which had been offered to him when in his dungeon. He had as yet been al-

lowed to enjoy the society of his son, though his intercourse with the other members of the family had been much abridged. He was passionately attached to this unhappy son, who answered his affection, and showed early token of talents which were doomed never to blossom. It was the cruel resolution of his jailers to take the boy from his father on the very morning * when Louis was to undergo an interrogatory before the Convention. In other words, to give the deepest blow to his feelings, at the very moment when it was necessary he should combine his whole mental powers for defending his life against his subtle and powerful enemies.

This cruel measure produced in some respect the effect desired. The king testified more deep affliction than he had yet manifested. The child was playing at the game called Siam with his father, and by no effort could the dauphin get beyond the number sixteen. "That is a very unlucky number," said the child. "True, indeed, my child. I have long had reason to think so, my son," answered the king. This petty omen seemed soon accomplished by the commissioners of the assembly, who, without deigning further explanation than that Louis must prepare to receive the Mayor of Paris, tore the child from his father, and left him to his sorrow. In about two hours, during which the trampling of many horses was heard, and a formidable body of troops with artillery were drawn up around the prison, the mayor appeared, a man called Chambon, weak and illiterate, the willing tool of the ferocious community in which he presided. He read to the king the decree of the Convention, that Louis Capet should be brought to their bar. "Capet," answered Louis, "is not my name—it was that of one of my ancestors. I could have wished that I had not been deprived of the society of my son during the two hours I have expected you—but it is only of a piece with the usage I have experienced for four months. I will attend you to the Convention, not as acknowledging their right to summon me, but because I yield to the superior power of my enemies."

The crowd pressed much on the king during the passage from the Temple to the Tuileries, where the Convention had now established their sittings, as men who had slain and taken possession. Loud cries were heard, demanding the life of the tyrant; yet Louis preserved the most perfect composure, even when he found himself standing as a criminal before an assembly of his native subjects, born most of them in a rank which excluded them from judicial offices, till he himself had granted the privilege.

"Louis," said the president (the versatile, timorous, but subtle Barrère), "you may be seated." The king sat down accordingly, and listened without apparent emotion to a long act of accusation, in which every accident that had arisen out of the Revolution was gravely charged as a point of indictment against the king. He replied by short laconic answers, which evinced great presence of mind and composure, and alleged the decrees of the National Assembly as authority for the affair of Nancy, and the firing on the people in the Champ de Mars, both of which were urged against him as aggressions

* 11th December.

on the people. One or two replies we cannot omit inserting.

"You are accused," said the president, "of having authorized money to be distributed to poor unknowns in the suburb of St-Antoine. What have you to reply?"—"That I know no greater pleasure," answered Louis, "than in giving assistance to the needy."—"You held a review of the Swiss at five o'clock in the morning of the 10th of August."—"I did," replied the king, "review the troops that were about my person. It was in presence of the constituted authorities, the department, and the Mayor of Paris—I had sent in vain to request from the Convention a deputation of its members, and I came with my family to place myself in their hands."—"Why did you double the strength of the Swiss Guards at that time?" demanded the president.—"It was done with the knowledge of all the constituted authorities," said the king, in a tone of perfect composure;—"I was myself a constituted authority, I have a right to defend my office."—"You have caused," said the president, "the blood of Frenchmen to be shed. What have you to reply?"—"It was not I who caused it," answered Louis, speaking with more emphasis than he had before used.

The king was carried back to his prison, amid threats and abuse from the same banditti whose ranks he had before traversed.

In replying to the articles alleged against him, Louis had followed a different course from Charles, who refused to plead before the tribunal at which he was arraigned. The latter acted with the high spirit of a prince, unwilling to derogate from the honour of the crown he had worn; the former, as a man of honour and probity, was desirous of defending his character wherever it should be attacked, without stopping to question the authority of the court which was met to try him.

A great tumult followed in the assembly the moment when the king had withdrawn from the hall. The jacobins became sensible that the scene which had just passed had deeply affected many of the neutral party, and was not unlikely to influence their final votes. They demanded an instant decree of condemnation, and that in the name of the oppressed people. "You who have heard the tyrant," said Billaud Varennes, "ought in justice to hear the people whom he has oppressed." The Convention knew well what was meant by the appearance of the people at the bar, and while they trembled at this threat, Duham made a motion that the king should be executed that very night. The majority, however, retained too much sense of shame to permit themselves to be hurried farther that evening. They indulged the king with the selection of counsel to defend him.

The monarch, on returning to his prison, had found he was doomed to solitary confinement. All intercourse with his family was denied him. He wept, but neither wife, sister, nor child, was permitted to share his tears. It was for the fate of his son that he showed the deepest interest. Yet, anxious as his apprehensions were, they could not reach the extremities to which the child was reduced. The heart of man could not have imagined the cruelty of his lot.

Louis chose for his counsel two lawyers of celebrity, carefully selecting such as he thought would incur least risk of danger by the task imposed. One of these, Tronchet, was too sensible to the honour of his profession to hesitate a moment in accepting the perilous office; but the other, Target, refused to undertake it. The phrase used by this unworthy jurisconsult seemed to involve the king's condemnation. "A free republican," he said, "ought not to undertake functions of which he feels himself incapable." Timid as the Convention was, this excuse was heard with disapprobation. It was declaring that the defence of the king was untenable by any friend of the present system.

Several persons offered their services with voluntary devotion, but the preference was claimed by Lamoignon Malesherbes, who, twice called by Louis to be a member of his council, when the office was the object of general ambition, alleged his right to a similar function, when others might reckon it dangerous. This burst of honourable self-devotion awakened a sentiment of honour in the Convention, which, could it have lasted, might have even yet prevented a great national crime.

Paris began to show symptoms of returning interest in the person of Louis. The oft-repeated calumnies against him seemed to lose their influence on all but the ignorant multitude, and hired bandits. The honest devotion of Malesherbes, whose character was known through the nation as a man of talent, honour, and probity, reflected a forcible light on that of his royal client, who had, in the hour of need, found such a defender. Desèze, an excellent lawyer, was afterwards added to the king's band of counsel; but the king gained little more by this indulgence, excepting the consolation of communicating with such men as Malesherbes and his two associates, at a time when no other friend was suffered to approach him excepting the faithful Cléry, his valet-de-chambre.*

The lawyers entertained some hopes, and, in the spirit of their profession, exulted when they saw how facts contradicted the charges of the prosecutors. "Moderate your satisfaction, my friends," said Louis; "all these favourable circumstances are well known to the gentlemen of the Convention, and if they considered them as entitled to weight in my favour, I should not be in this difficulty. You take, I fear, a fruitless task in hand, but let us perform it as a last duty." When the term of his second appearance at the Convention arrived, he expressed anxiety at the thoughts of appearing before them with his beard and hair overgrown, owing to his being deprived of razors and scissors. "Were it not better your majesty went as you are at present," said the faithful Cléry, "that all men may see the usage you have received?"—"It does not become me," answered the king, "to seek to obtain pity." With the same spirit, he commanded his advocates to avoid all appeals to the passions or the

* Cléry we have seen and known, and the form and manners of that model of pristine faith and loyalty can never be forgotten. Gentlemanlike and complaisant in his manners, his deep gravity and melancholy features announced, that the sad scenes in which he had acted a part so honourable, were never for a moment out of his memory.

feelings of the judges and audience, and to rest his defence exclusively upon logical deductions from the evidence produced.

When summoned to the Convention, Louis was compelled to wait for a time in the outer hall, where he walked about conversing with his counsel. A deputy who passed heard Malesherbes during this intercourse use to his royal client the courtesies of *Sire—Your Majesty*. "What renders you so bold," he said, "that you utter these prohibited expressions?"—"Contempt of life," answered the generous Malesherbes.

Desèze opened his case with great ability. He pleaded with animation the right which the king had to the character of inviolability, a right confirmed to him by the Legislative Assembly after the flight to Varennes, and which implied a complete indemnity for that crime, even supposing a journey from his capital in a post carriage, with a few attendants, could be deemed criminal. But he urged that, if the Convention did not respect his inviolability—if, in a word, they did not consider him as a king, he was then entitled to the formal securities provided for every citizen by the laws. He ridiculed the idea that, with a trifling force of Swiss, Louis could meditate any serious injury against the Convention. "He prepared," said Desèze, "for his defence, as you citizens would doubtless do, when you heard that an armed multitude were on their way to surprise you in your sanctuary." He closed an excellent pleading with an enumeration of the benefits which Louis had conferred on the French nation, and reminded them that their king had given them liberty so soon as they desired to be free. Louis himself said a few words with much firmness. He was remanded to the Temple, and a stormy debate commenced.

At first, the jacobins attempted to carry all by a clamorous demand of the vote. Lanjuinais replied to them with unexpected spirit, charged them with planning and instigating the assault on the 10th of August, and then with turning on the king the blame which justly lay with themselves alone. Dreadful oateries followed this true and intrepid speech. "Let the friends of the despot die with him!" was the general exclamation of the jacobins; "to the Abbaye—to the scaffold with the perjured deputy, who slanders the glorious 10th of August!"—"Be it so," answered Lanjuinais. "Better death, than the crime of pronouncing an unjust sentence."

The girondists were too much themselves accessory to the attack on the Tuileries to follow this bold and manly line of defence, and Lanjuinais stood unsupported in his opinion.

St-Just and Robespierre eagerly called for a doom of death. The former accused the king of a design to cheat the people out of their liberties by a pretended show of submission to their will, and an affected moderation in exercising his authority. On the 10th of August (he had the effrontery to state this), the king, entering the hall of the Convention with armed followers (the small escort who had difficulty in protecting him through the armed crowd), had violated the asylum of the laws. Besides, as he triumphantly concluded, was it for a people who had declared war against all the tyrants in the

world, to sorrow for the fate of their own? Robespierre openly disowned the application of legal forms, and written rubrics of law, to such a case as was before the Convention. The people who had asserted their own right in wresting the sceptre from the hands of Louis, had a right to punish him for having swayed it. He talked of the case being already decided by the unanimous voice and act of the people, from whom all legal authority emanated, and whose authority was paramount to that of the Convention, which were only their representatives.

Vergniaud, the most eloquent of the girondists, found nothing better to propose, than that the case of Louis should be decided by an appeal to the nation. He alleged that the people, who, in solemn federation had sworn, in the Champ de Mars, to recognize the constitution, had thereby sworn the inviolability of the king. This was truly said; but, such being the case, what right had the Convention to protract the king's trial by sending the case from before themselves to the people? If his inviolability had been formally admitted and sworn to by the nation, what had the Convention more to do than recognize the inviolability with which the nation had invested the monarch, and dismiss him from the bar accordingly?

The explanation lay here;—that the eloquent orator was hampered and constrained in his reasoning, by the difficulty of reconciling his own conduct, and that of his associates, to the principles which he was now willing to adopt as those that were just and legal. If the person of the king was indeed inviolable, what was to be thought of their consistency, who, by the means of their daring and devoted associates, Barbaroux and Rebecqui, had actually brought up the force of Marseillais, who led the van, and were, in fact, the efficient and almost the only means by which the palace of that inviolable sovereign was stormed, his guards slaughtered, his person committed to prison, and, finally, his life brought in danger? It was the obvious and personal answer arising out of their own previous manoeuvres, the *argumentum ad hominem*, as it is called by logicians, which hung a padlock on the lips of the eloquent Vergniaud, while using the argument which, in itself most just and true, was irreconcilable with the revolutionary measures to which he had been an express party. "Do not evil, that good may come of it," is a lesson which may be learned, not indeed in the transcendental philosophy which authorizes the acting of instant and admitted wrong, with the view of obtaining some distant, hypothetical, and contingent good; but in the rules of christian faith and true philosophy, which commands that each case be weighed on its own circumstances, and decided upon the immutable rules of right or wrong, without admitting any subterfuge founded on the hope of remote contingencies and future consequences.

But Vergniaud's oratory was freed from these unhappy trammels, when, with the fervour of a poet, and the inspiration of a prophet, he declaimed against the faction of jacobins, and announced the consequences of that sanguinary body's ascending to supreme power, by placing their first step on the body of Louis. The picture which he drew of the

coming evil seemed too horrible for reality; and yet the scenes which followed even more than realized the predictions of the baffled republican, who saw too late and too clearly the tragic conclusion of the scenes, in which he had borne so active a part.

The appeal to the people, or to the nation, had been argued against by the jacobin speakers, as opening the nearest road to civil war. Indeed it was one of the many objections to this intermediate and evasive plan, that the people of France, convened in their different bodies, were likely to come to very different conclusions on the king's impeachment. Where the jacobin clubs were strong and numerous, they would have been sure, according to the maxim of their union, to use the compulsory but ready means of open violence, to disturb the freedom of voting on this important question, and would thus have carried by forcible measures the vote of death. In departments in which the constitutionalists and royalists had strong interest, it was probable that force would have been repelled by force; and upon the whole, in France, where the law had been long a dead letter, the arbitrement of the nation on the king's fate must and would have proved a bloody one.

But from that picture which must have followed the success of his party on this memorable occasion, Vergniaud endeavoured to avert the thoughts of his hearers, while he strove to fix them on the crimes and criminal ambition of the jacobins.

"It is *they* who wish civil war," he exclaimed, "who threaten with daggers the National Convention of France—they who preach in the tribune, and in the market place, doctrines subversive of all social order. *They* are the men who desire civil war, who accuse justice of pusillanimity, because she will not strike before conviction—who call common humanity a proof of conspiracy, and accuse all those as traitors to their country who will not join in acts of robbery and assassination—those, in fine, who pervert every sentiment and principle of morality, and by the grossest flatteries endeavour to gain the popular assent and countenance to the most detestable crimes." He dissected the arts of the demagogues in terms equally just and severe. They had been artfully referred to the Temple as the cause of every distress under which the populace laboured; after the death of Louis, which they so eagerly pursued, they would have the same reasons and the same power for directing the odium of every distress or misfortune against the Convention, and making the representatives of France equally obnoxious to the people, as they had now rendered the dethroned king. He concluded with a horrible picture of Paris under the domination of jacobinism, which was, however, exceeded by the facts that ensued. "To what horrors," he said, "will not Paris be delivered, when she becomes the prey of a horde of desperate assassins! Who will inhabit a city, where Death and Desolation will then fix their court? Who will console the ruined citizen, stripped of the wealth he has honourably acquired, or relieve the wants of his family, which his exertions can no longer supply? Go in that hour of need," he continued, "and ask bread of those who have precipitated you from competence into ruin, and they

will answer, 'Hence! dispute with hungry hounds for the carcases of those we have last murdered—or, if you would drink, here is the blood we have lately shed—other nourishment we have none to afford you.'"

The eloquence of Vergniaud, and the exertions of his associates, were in vain. Barrère, the auxiliary of the jacobins, though scarcely the partaker of their confidence, drew off as usual many of the timid host of neutrals, by alleging specious reasons, of which the convincing power lay in this, that they must consult their own safety rather than the cause of justice: The appeal to the people, on which the girondists relied as the means of relieving rather than saving the king—of giving their consciences the quieting opiate, that he died not by their direct agency—was rejected by four hundred and twenty voices against two hundred and eighty-one. A decisive appeal was made to the Convention on the question, to what punishment the dethroned monarch should be subjected.

The bravos of the jacobins surrounded the place of meeting on every point of access while this final vote was called, and, to men already affrighted with their situation, added every motive of terror that words, and sometimes acts of violence, could convey. "Think not," they said, "to rob the people of their prey. If you acquit Louis, we go instantly to the Temple to destroy him with his whole family, and we add to his massacre that of all who befriended him." Undoubtedly, among the terrified deputies, there were some moved by these horrible arguments, who conceived that, in giving a vote for Louis's life, they would endanger their own, without saving him. Still, however, among this overawed and trembling band of judges, there were many whose hearts failed them as they reflected on the crime they were about to commit, and who endeavoured to find some evasion stopping short of regicide. Captivity till the peace, was in general proposed as a composition. The philosophic humanity of Condorcet threw in fetters, to make the condition more acceptable to the jacobins. Others voted for death conditionally. The most intense anxiety prevailed during the vote; and even the banditti in the tribunes suspended their usual howls, and only murmured death to the voter, when the opinion given was for the more lenient punishment. When the Duke of Orleans, who had returned from England on the fall of La Fayette, and sat as a member of the Convention, under the absurd name of Citizen Egalité—when this base prince was asked his vote, there was a deep pause; and when the answer proved death, a momentary horror electrified the auditors.* When the voices were numbered, the direct doom was carried by a majority of fifty-three, being the difference between three hundred and eighty-seven and three hundred and thirty-four. The president announced that the doom of DEATH was pronounced against Louis Capet.

Let none, we repeat, dishonour the parallel passage in England's history, by comparing it with this disgraceful act of murder, committed by a few in

* His own death, by the guillotine, in 1793, was hardly sufficient retribution for his fendlike conduct on this affecting occasion.

rabid fury of gain, by the greater part in mere panic and cowardice. That deed, which Algernon Sidney pronounced the bravest and justest ever done in England,—that *facinus tam illustre* of Milton,—was acted by men, from whose principles and feelings we differ entirely, but not more than the ambition of Cromwell differed from that of the blood-thirsty and envious Robespierre, or the political views of Hutchinson and his associates, who acted all in honour, from those of the timid and pedantic girondists.

In Paris there was a general feeling for the king's condition, and a wish that he might be saved, but never strong enough to arise into the resolution to effect his safety. Dumourier himself came to Paris with all the splendour of a conqueror, whose victory at Jemappes had added Belgium, as Flanders began to be called, to the French nation; and there can be no doubt, that whatever might be his ulterior design, which his situation and character render somewhat doubtful, his purpose was, in the first place, to secure the person of Louis from farther danger or insult. But, conqueror as he was, Dumourier, though more favourably placed than La Fayette had been upon a similar attempt, was far from being, with respect to Paris, in the same independent situation in which Cromwell had been to London, or Cæsar to Rome.

The army with which he had accomplished his victories was yet but half his own. Six commissioners from the Convention, Danton himself being the principal, had carefully remained at his head-quarters, watching his motions, controlling his power, encouraging the private soldiers of each regiment to hold jacobin clubs exclusive of the authority of the general, studiously placing in their recollection at every instant, that the doctrines of liberty and equality rendered the soldier to a certain point independent of his commander; and reminding them that they conquered by the command of Dumourier, indeed, but under the auspices of the Republic, to whom the general, as they themselves, was but a servant and factor. The more absolute the rule of a community, the more do its members enjoy any relaxation of such severe bonds; so that he who can with safety preach a decay of discipline to an army, of which discipline is the very essence, is sure to find willing listeners. A great part of Dumourier's army was unsettled in their minds by doctrines, which taught an independence of official authority inconsistent with their situation as soldiers, but proper, they were assured, to their quality of citizens.

The manner in which Pache, the minister of war, who, brought into office by Roland, deserted his benefactor to join the jacobin faction, had conducted his branch of the administration, was so negligent, that it had given ground for serious belief that it was his intention to cripple the resources of the armed force (at whatever risk of national defeat), in such a manner, that if in their disorganized state Dumourier had attempted to move them towards Paris for insuring the safety of Louis, he should find them unfit for such a march. The army had no longer draught-horses for the artillery, and was in want of all with which a regular body of forces

should be supplied. Dumourier, according to his own account, both from the want of equipments of every kind, and from the manner in which the jacobin commissioners had enfeebled the discipline of his troops, could not have moved towards Paris without losing the command of the army, and his head to boot, before he had got beyond the frontiers of Belgium.

Dumourier had detached, however, according to his own statement, a considerable number of officers and confidential persons, to second any enterprise which he might find himself capable of undertaking in the king's behalf. While at Paris, he states that he treated with every faction in turn, attempting even to move Robespierre; and through means of his own intimate friend Gensonné, he renewed his more natural connexions with the girondists. But the one party were too determined on their bloody object to be diverted from it; the other, disconcerted in viewing the result of their timid and ambiguous attempt to carry through an appeal to the people, saw no further chance of saving the king's life otherwise than by the risk of their own, and chose rather to be executioners than victims.

Among the citizens of Paris, many of whom Dumourier states himself to have urged with argument, that the Convention, in assuming the power of judging the king, had exceeded the powers granted to them by the nation, he found hearers, not indeed uninterested or unmoved, but too lukewarm to promise efficient assistance. The citizens were in that state, in which an English poet has said of them,—

Cold burghers must be struck, and struck like flints,
Ere their hid fire will sparkle.

With the natural sense of right and justice, they perceived what was expected of them; but felt not the less the trammels of their situation, and hesitated to incur the fury of a popular insurrection, which passiveness on their own part might postpone or avert. They listened to the general with interest, but without enthusiasm; implored him to chuse a less dangerous subject of conversation; and spoke of the power of the jacobins, as of the influence of a tempest, which mortal efforts could not withstand. With one man of worth and confidence, Dumourier pressed the conversation on the meanness of suffering the city to be governed by two or three thousand banditti, till the citizen looked on the ground and blushed, as he made the degrading confession,—“I see, citizen-general, to what conclusion your argument tends; but we are cowards, and the king must perish. What exertion of spirit can you expect from a city, which, leaving under arms eighty thousand well-trained militia, suffered themselves, notwithstanding, to be domineered over and disarmed by a comparative handful of rascally federates from Brest and Marseilles?” The hint was sufficient. Dumourier, who was involved in much personal danger, desisted from efforts, in which he could only compromise his own safety without insuring that of the king. He affirms, that during twenty days' residence near Paris, he witnessed no effort, either public or private, to avert the king's fate; and that the only feelings which prevailed among the higher

classes, were those of consternation and apathy.

It was then especially to be regretted, that an emigration, certainly premature, had drained the country of those fiery and gallant nobles, whose blood would have been so readily ventured in defence of the king. Five hundred men of high character and determined bravery would probably have been seconded by the whole burgher-force of Paris, and might have bid open defiance to the federates, or, by some sudden and bold attempt, snatched from their hands their intended victim. Five hundred—but five hundred—of those who were winning barren laurels under Condé, or, yet more unhappily, were subsisting on the charity of foreign nations, might at this moment, could they have been collected in Paris, have accomplished the purpose for which they themselves most desired to live, by saving the life of their unhappy sovereign. But although powerful reasons, and yet more aggrieved feelings, had recommended the emigration from that country, it operated like the common experiment of the Leyden vial, one side of which being charged with an uncommon quantity of the electrical fluid, has the effect of creating a deficiency of the same essence upon the other. In the interior of France, the spirit of loyalty was at the lowest ebb; because those upon whom it especially acted as a principle, were divided from the rest of the nation, to whom they would otherwise have afforded both encouragement and example.

The sacrifice, therefore, was to be made—made in spite of those who certainly composed the great majority of Paris, at least of such as were capable of reflection,—in spite of the commander of the army, Dumourier,—in spite of the consciences of the girondists, who, while they affected an air of republican stoicism, saw plainly, and were fully sensible of the great political error, the great moral sin, they were about to commit.

Undoubtedly they expected, that by joining in, or acquiescing in at least, if not authorizing, this unnecessary and wanton cruelty, they should establish their character with the populace as firm and unshaken republicans, who had not hesitated to sacrifice the king, since his life was demanded at the shrine of freedom. They were not long of learning, that they gained nothing by their mean-spirited acquiescence in a crime which their souls must have abhorred. All were sensible that the girondists had been all along, notwithstanding their theoretical pretensions in favour of a popular government, lingering and looking back with some favour to the dethroned prince, to whose death they only consented in sheer coldness and cowardice of heart, because it required to be defended at some hazard to their own safety. The faults at once of duplicity and cowardice were thus fixed on this party; who, detested by the royalists, and by all who in any degree harboured opinions favourable to monarchy, had their lives and offices sought after by the whole host of jacobins in full cry, and that on account of faint-spirited wishes, which they had scarcely dared even to attempt to render efficient.

On the 21st of January, 1793, Louis XVI. was publicly beheaded in the midst of his own metropolis, in the Place Louis Quinze, erected to the memory

of his grandfather. It is possible, for the critical eye of the historian, to discover much weakness in the conduct of this unhappy monarch; for he had neither the determination necessary to fight for his rights, nor the power of submitting with apparent indifference to circumstances, where resistance inferred danger. He submitted, indeed, but with so bad a grace, that he only made himself suspected of cowardice, without getting credit for voluntary concession. But yet his behaviour on many trying occasions effectually vindicated him from the charge of timidity, and showed that the unwillingness to shed blood, by which he was peculiarly distinguished, arose from benevolence, not from pusillanimity.

Upon the scaffold, he behaved with the firmness which became a noble spirit, and the patience befitting one who was reconciled to Heaven. As one of the few marks of sympathy with which his sufferings were softened, the attendance of a confessor, who had not taken the constitutional oath, was permitted to the dethroned monarch. He who undertook the honourable but dangerous office, was a gentleman of the gifted family of Edgeworth of Edgeworthstown; and the devoted zeal with which he rendered the last duties to Louis, had like in the issue to have proved fatal to himself. As the instrument of death descended, the confessor pronounced the impressive words,—“Son of Saint Louis, ascend to Heaven!”

There was a last will of Louis XVI. circulated upon good authority, bearing this remarkable passage:—“I recommend to my son, should he have the misfortune to become king, to recollect that his whole faculties are due to the service of the public; that he ought to consult the happiness of his people, by governing according to the laws, forgetting all injuries and misfortunes, and in particular those which I may have sustained. But while I exhort him to govern under the authority of the laws, I cannot but add, that this will be only in his power, in so far as he shall be endowed with authority to cause right to be respected, and wrong punished; and that without such authority, his situation in the government must be more hurtful than advantageous to the state.”

Not to mingle the fate of the illustrious victims of the royal family with the general tale of the sufferers under the Reign of Terror, we must here mention the deaths of the rest of that illustrious house, which closed for a time a monarchy, that, existing through three dynasties, had given sixty-six kings to France.

It was not to be supposed, that the queen was to be long permitted to survive her husband. She had been even more than the object of revolutionary detestation; nay, many were disposed to throw on Marie Antoinette, almost exclusively, the blame of those measures which they considered as counter-revolutionary. She came to France a gay, young, and beautiful princess—she found in her husband a faithful, affectionate, almost an uxorious husband. In the early years of her reign she was guilty of two faults.

In the first place, she dispensed too much with court-etiquette, and wished too often to enjoy a retirement and freedom, inconsistent with her high rank and the customs of the court. This was a great

though natural mistake. The etiquette of a court places round the great personages whom it regards, a close and troublesome watch, but that very guard acts as a barrier against calumny; and when these formal witnesses are withdrawn, evil tongues are never wanting to supply with infamous reports a blank, which no testimony can be brought to fill up with the truth. No individual suffered more than Marie Antoinette from this species of slander, which imputed the most scandalous occupations to hours that were only meant to be stolen from form and from state, and devoted to the ease which crowned heads ought never to dream of enjoying.

Another natural, yet equally false step, was her interfering more frequently with politics than became her sex; exhibiting thus her power over the king, and at the same time lowering him in the eyes of his subjects, who, whatever be the auspices under which their own domestic affairs are conducted, are always scandalised if they see, or think they see, anything like female influence directing the councils of their sovereigns. We are uncertain what degree of credit is to be given to the Memoirs of Besenval, but we believe they approach near the truth in representing the queen as desirous of having a party of her own, and carrying points in opposition to the ministers; and we know that a general belief of this sort was the first foundation of the fatal report, that an Austrian cabal existed in the Court of France, under the direction of the queen, which was supposed to sacrifice the interests of France to favour those of the Emperor of Germany.

The terms of her accusation were too basely depraved to be even hinted at here. She scorned to reply to it, but appealed to all who had been mothers, against the very possibility of the horrors which were stated against her. The widow of a king, the sister of an emperor, was condemned to death, dragged in an open tumbrel to the place of execution, and beheaded on the 16th October 1793. She suffered death in her 39th year.

The Princess Elisabeth, sister of Louis, of whom it might be said, in the words of Lord Clarendon, that she resembled a chapel in a king's palace, into which nothing but piety and morality enter, while all around is filled with sin, idleness, and folly, did not, by the most harmless demeanour and inoffensive character, escape the miserable fate in which the jacobins had determined to involve the whole family of Louis XVI. Part of the accusation redounded to the honour of her character. She was accused of having admitted to the apartments of the Tuileries some of the National Guards, of the section of Filles St-Thomas, and causing the wounds to be looked to which they had received in a skirmish with the Marseillais, immediately before the 10th of August. The princess admitted her having done so, and it was exactly in consistency with her whole conduct. Another charge stated the ridiculous accusation, that she had distributed bullets chewed by herself and her attendants, to render them more fatal, to the defenders of the Castle of the Tuileries; a ridiculous fable, of which there was no proof whatever. She was beheaded in May, 1794, and met her death as became the manner in which her life had been spent.

We are weary of recounting these atrocities, as others must be of reading them. Yet it is not useless that men should see how far human nature can be carried, in contradiction to every feeling the most sacred, to every pleading whether of justice or of humanity. The dauphin we have already described as a promising child of seven years old, an age at which no offence could have been given, and from which no danger could have been apprehended. Nevertheless, it was resolved to destroy the innocent child, and by means to which ordinary murderers seem deeds of mercy.

The unhappy boy was put in charge of the most hard-hearted villain whom the Community of Paris, well acquainted where such agents were to be found, were able to select from their band of jacobins. This wretch, a shoemaker called Simon, asked his employers, "what was to be done with the young wolf-whelp; Was he to be slain?"—"No."—"Poisoned?"—"No."—"Starved to death?"—"No."—"What then?"—"He was to be got rid of." Accordingly, by a continuance of the most severe treatment—by beating, cold, vigils, fasts, and ill usage of every kind, so frail a blossom was soon blighted. He died on the 8th June, 1795.

After this last horrible crime, there was a relaxation in favour of the daughter, and now the sole child, of this unhappy house. The princess royal, whose qualities have since honoured even her birth and blood, experienced from this period a mitigated captivity. Finally, on the 19th December, 1795, this last remaining relic of the family of Louis was permitted to leave her prison and her country, in exchange for Beurnonville and others, whom, on that condition, Austria delivered from captivity. She became afterwards the wife of her cousin the Duke d'Angoulême, eldest son of the reigning monarch of France, and obtained, by the manner in which she conducted herself at Bordeaux in 1815, the highest praise for gallantry and spirit.

CHAPTER XIV.

Dumourier—His displeasure at the treatment of the Flemish provinces by the Convention—His projects in consequence—Gains the ill will of his army—and is forced to fly to the Austrian camp—Lives many years in retreat, and finally dies in England.—Struggles between the girondists and jacobins in the Convention.—Robespierre impeaches the leaders of the girondists—and is denounced by them.—Decree of accusation passed against Marat, who conceals himself.—Commission of Twelve appointed.—Marat acquitted, and sent back to the Convention with a civic crown.—Terror and indecision of the girondists.—Jacobins prepare to attack the Palais Royal, but are repulsed.—Repair to the Convention, who recall the Commission of Twelve.—Louvet and other girondist leaders fly from Paris.—Convention go forth in procession to expostulate with the people—Forced back to their hall, and compelled to decree the accusation of thirty of their body.—Girondists finally ruined—and their principal leaders perish in prison, by the guillotine, and by famine—Close of their history.

WHILE the Republic was thus indulging the full tyranny of irresistible success over the remains of the royal family, it seemed about to sustain a severe

shock from one of its own children, who had arisen to eminence by its path. This was Dumourier, whom we left victor at Jemappes, and conqueror, in consequence, of the Flemish provinces. These fair possessions, the Convention, without a moment's hesitation, annexed to the dominions of France, and proceeded to pour down upon them their tax-gatherers, commissaries, and every other denomination of spoilers, who not only robbed without ceremony the unfortunate inhabitants, but insulted their religion by pillaging and defacing their churches, set their laws and privileges at contempt, and tyrannized over them in the very manner, which had so recently induced the Flemings to offer resistance to their own hereditary princes of the house of Austria.

Dumourier, naturally proud of his conquest, felt for those who had surrendered to his arms upon assurance of being well treated, and was sensible that his own honour and influence were aimed at; and that it was the object of the Convention to make use of his abilities only as their implements, and to keep his army in a state of complete dependence upon themselves.

The general, on the contrary, had the ambition as well as the talents of a conqueror; he considered his army as the means of attaining the victories, which, without him, they could not have achieved, and he desired to retain it under his own immediate command, as a combatant wishes to keep hold of the sword which he has wielded with success. He accounted himself strongly possessed of the hearts of his soldiers, and therefore thought himself qualified to play the part of military umpire in the divisions of the state, which La Fayette had attempted in vain; and it was with this view, doubtless, that he undertook that expedition to Paris, in which he vainly attempted a mediation in behalf of the king.

After leaving Paris, Dumourier seems to have abandoned Louis personally to his fate, yet still retaining hopes to curb the headlong course of the Revolution.

Two plans presented themselves to his fertile invention, nor can it be known with certainty to which he was most inclined. He may have entertained the idea of prevailing upon the army to decide for the youthful dauphin to be their constitutional king; or, as many have thought, it may better have suited his personal views to have recommended to the throne a gallant young prince of the blood, who had distinguished himself in his army, the eldest son of the miserable Duke of Orleans. Such a change of dynasty might be supposed to limit the wishes of the proposed sovereign to that share of power intrusted to him by the Revolution, since he would have had no title to the crown save what arose from the constitution. But, to qualify himself in either case to act as the supreme head of the army, independent of the National Convention, it was necessary that Dumourier should pursue his conquests, act upon the plan laid down by the ministers at Paris, and, in addition to his title of victor in Belgium, add that of conqueror of Holland. He commenced, accordingly, an invasion of the latter country, with some prospect of success. But though he took Gertruydenberg,

and blockaded Bergen-op-Zoom, he was repulsed from Williamstadt; and at the same time he received information that an army of Austrians, under the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, a general of eminence, though belonging to the old military school of Germany, was advancing into Flanders. Dumourier retreated from Holland to make a stand against these new enemies, and was again unfortunate. The French were defeated at Aix-la-Chapelle, and their new levies almost entirely dispersed. Chagrined with this disaster, Dumourier gave an imprudent loose to the warmth of his temper. Following the false step of La Fayette, in menacing before he was prepared to strike, he wrote a letter to the Convention, threatening the jacobin party with the indignation of his army. This was on the 12th March, 1793, and six days afterwards he was again defeated in the battle of Neerwinden.

It must have been extremely doubtful, whether, in the very pitch of victory, Dumourier possessed enough of individual influence over his army, to have inclined them to declare against the National Convention. The forces which he commanded were not to be regarded in the light of a regular army, long embodied, and engaged perhaps for years in difficult enterprises, and in foreign countries, where such a force exists as a community only by their military relations to each other; where the common soldiers know no other home than their tents, and no other direction than the voice of their officers; and the officers no other laws than the pleasure of the general. Such armies, holding themselves independent of the civil authorities of their country, came at length, through the habit of long wars and distant conquests, to exist in the French empire, and upon such rested the foundation stone of the imperial throne; but as yet, the troops of the Republic consisted either of the regiments revolutionized, when the great change had offered commissions to privates, and batons to subalterns, or of new levies, who had their very existence through the Revolution, and whose common nickname of *Carmagnoles*, expressed their republican origin and opinions. Such troops might obey the voice of the general on the actual field of battle, but were not very amenable even to the ordinary course of discipline elsewhere, and were not likely to exchange their rooted political principles, with all the ideas of license connected with them, at Dumourier's word of command, as they would have changed their front, or have adopted any routine of military movement. Still less were they likely implicitly to obey this commander, when the *prestige* of his fortune seemed in the act of abandoning him, and least of all, when they found him disposed to make a compromise with the very foe who had defeated him, and perceived that he negotiated, by abandoning his conquests to the Austrians, to purchase the opportunity or permission of executing the counter-revolution which he proposed.

Nevertheless, Dumourier, either pushed on by an active and sanguine temper, or being too far advanced to retreat, endeavoured, by intrigues in his own army, and an understanding with the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, to render himself strong enough to overturn the reigning party in the Convention, and

restore, with some modifications, the constitution of 1791. He expressed this purpose with imprudent openness. Several generals of division declared against his scheme. He failed in obtaining possession of the fortresses of Lille, Valenciennes, and Conde. Another act of imprudence aggravated the unpopularity into which he began to fall with his army. Four commissioners of the Convention remonstrated publicly on the course he was pursuing. Dumourier, not contented with arresting them, had the imprudence to send them to the camp of the Austrians, prisoners, thus delivering up to the public enemy the representatives of the government under which he was appointed, and for which he had hitherto acted, and proclaiming his alliance with the invaders whom he was commissioned to oppose.

All this rash conduct disunited the tie between Dumourier and his army. The resistance to his authority became general, and finally, it was with great difficulty and danger that he made his escape to the Austrian camp, with his young friend the Duke de Chartres.

All that this able and ambitious man saved in his retreat was merely his life, of which he spent some years afterwards in Germany, concluding it in England about 1822, without again making any figure in the political horizon.* Thus, the attempt of Dumourier, to use military force to stem the progress of the Revolution, failed, like that of La Fayette some months before. To use a medical simile, the imposthume was not yet far enough advanced, and sufficiently come to a head, to be benefited by the use of the lancet.

Meanwhile, the Convention, though triumphant over the schemes of the revolted general, was divided by the two parties to whom its walls served for an arena, in which to aim against each other the most deadly blows. It was now manifest that the strife must end tragically for one of the parties, and all circumstances pointed out the girondists as the victims. They had indeed still the command of majorities in the Convention, especially when the votes were taken by scrutiny or ballot; on which occasions the feebler deputies of the Plain could give their voice according to their consciences, without its being known that they had done so. But in open debate, and when the members voted *viva voce*, amongst the intimidating cries and threats of tribunes filled by an infuriated audience, the spirit of truth and justice seemed too nearly allied to that of martyrdom, to be prevalent generally amongst men who made their own safety the rule of their political conduct. The party, however, continued for several months to exercise the duties of administration, and to make such a struggle in the Convention as could be achieved by oratory and reasoning, against underhand intrigue, supported by violent declamation, and which was, upon the least signal, sure of the aid of actual brutal violence.

The girondists, we have seen, had aimed decrees of the assembly at the triumvirate, and a plot was now laid among the jacobins, to repay that intended

distinction by the actual strokes of the axe, or, failing that, of the dagger.

When the news of Dumourier's defection arrived, the jacobins, always alert in prepossessing the public mind, held out the girondists as the associates of the revolted general. It was on them whom they directed the public animosity, great and furious in proportion to the nature of the crisis. That majority of the Convention, whom the traitor Dumourier affirmed was sound, and with which he acted in concert, intimated, according to the jacobins, the girondists the allies of his treasons. They called out in the Convention on the 8th of March, for a tribunal of judgment fit to decide on such crimes, without the delays arising from ordinary forms of pleading and evidence, and without even the intervention of a jury. The girondists opposed this measure, and the debate was violent. In the course of the subsequent days, an insurrection of the people was prepared by the jacobins, as upon the 20th June and 10th of August. It ought to have broken out upon the 10th of March, which was the day destined to put an end to the ministerial party by a general massacre. But the girondists received early intelligence of what was intended, and absented themselves from the Convention on the day of peril. A body of federates from Brest, about 400 strong, were also detached in their favour by Kervelegan, one of the deputies from the ancient province of Bretagne, and who was a zealous girondist. The precaution, however slight, was sufficient for the time. The men who were prepared to murder were unwilling to fight, however strong the odds on their side; and the mustering of the jacobin bravos proved, on this occasion, an empty menace.

Duly improved, a discovered conspiracy is generally of advantage to the party against which it was framed. But Vergniaud, when, in a subsequent sitting, he denounced to the Convention the existence of a conspiracy to put to death a number of the deputies, was contented to impute it to the influence of the aristocracy, of the nobles, the priests, and the emissaries of Pitt and Coburg; thus suffering the jacobins to escape every imputation of that blame, which all the world knew attached to them, and to them only. He was loudly applauded. Marat, who rose after him, was applauded as loudly, and the revolutionary tribunal was established.

Louvet, who exclaims against Vergniaud for his pusillanimity, says, that the orator alleged in his excuse, "the danger of incensing violent men, already capable of all excesses." They had come to the boar-chase, they had roused him and provoked his anger, and now they felt, too late, that they lacked weapons with which to attack the irritated monster. The plot of the 10th March had been compared to that of the catholics on the 5th November, in England. It had been described in the *Moniteur* as a horrible conspiracy, by which a company of ruffians, assuming the title of *de la Glacière*, in remembrance of the massacre of Avignon, surrounded the hall for two days, with the purpose of dissolving the National Convention by force, and putting to death a great proportion of the deputies. Yet the Convention passed over, without effective prosecution of any kind, a crime of so enormous a die; and in doing so, showed themselves more afraid

* Dumourier was a man of pleasing manners and lively conversation. He lived in retirement, near Ealing, in Middlesex.

of immediate personal consequences, than desirous of seizing an opportunity to rid France of the horrible faction by whom they were scourged and menaced.

In the midst of next month the jacobins became the assailants, proud, it may be supposed, of the impunity under which they had been sheltered. Robespierre impeached by name the leaders of the girondists, as accomplices of Damiourier. But it was not in the Convention where Robespierre's force lay. Guadet, with great eloquence, repelled the charge, and in his turn denounced Robespierre and the jacobins. He proclaimed to the Convention that they sat and debated under raised sabres and poniards, which a moment's signal could let loose on them; and he read from the journal conducted by Marat, an appeal, calling on the people to rise in insurrection. Fear and shame gave the Convention momentary courage. They passed a decree of accusation against Marat, who was obliged to conceal himself for a few days.

Bazot, it may be remarked, censures this decree against Marat as impolitic, seeing it was the first innovation affecting the inviolability of the persons of the deputies. In point of principle he is certainly right; but as to any practical effects resulting from this breach of privilege, by reprisals on the other side, we are quite sceptical: Whatever violence was done to the girondists, at the end of the conflict, was sure to have befallen them, whether Marat had been arrested or not. Precedents were as useless to such men, as a vizard to one of their ruffians. Both could do their business barefaced.

The Convention went farther than the decree of accusation against Marat; and for the first time showed their intention to make a stand against the jacobins. They nominated a commission of twelve members, some girondists, some neutrals, to watch over and repress the movements of such citizens as should seem disposed to favour anarchy.

The Convention were not long of learning the character of the opposition which they had now defied. Pache, Mayor of Paris, and one of the worst men of the Revolution, appeared at the bar of the Convention with two thousand petitioners, as they were called. They demanded, in the name of the sections, the arrest of twenty-two of the most distinguished of the girondist leaders. The Convention got rid of the petition by passing to the order of the day. But the courage of the anarchists was greatly increased; and they saw that they had only to bear down with repeated attacks an enemy who had no fortification save the frail defences of the law, which it was the pride of the jacobins to surmount and to defy. Their demand of proscription against these unfortunate deputies was a measure from which they never departed; and their audacity in urging it placed that party on the defensive, who ought, in all reason, to have been active in the attack.

The girondists, however, felt the extremity to which they were reduced, and sensible of the great advantage to be attained by being the assailants in such a struggle, they endeavoured to regain the offensive.

The Revolutionary Tribunal to which Marat had been sent by the decree of accusation, knew their

business too well to convict any one, much less such a distinguished patriot, who was only accused of stimulating the people to exercise the sacred right of insurrection. He was honourably acquitted, after scarcely the semblance of a trial, and brought back to his place in the Convention, crowned with a civic coronet, and accompanied by a band of such determined ruffians as were worthy to form his body-guard. They insisted on filing through the hall, while a huge pioneer, their spokesman, assured the Convention that the people loved Marat, and that the cause of Marat and the people would always be the same.

Meanwhile, the Committee of Twelve proceeded against the terrorists with some vigour. One of the most furious provokers of insurrection and murder was Hébert, a devoted jacobin, substitute of the procureur syndic of the community. Speaking to this body, who now exercised the whole powers of magistracy in Paris, this man had not blushed to demand the heads of three hundred deputies. He was arrested and committed to prison.

This decisive action ought in policy to have been followed by other steps equally firm. The girondists, by displaying confidence, might surely have united to themselves a large number of the neutral party, and might have established an interest in the sections of Paris, consisting of men who, though timid without leaders, held in deep horror the revolutionary faction, and trembled for their families and their property, if put under the guardianship, as it had been delicately expressed, of the rabble of the faubourgs. The very show of four hundred Bretons had disconcerted the whole conspiracy of the 10th of March; and therefore, with a moderate support of determined men, statesmen of a more resolute and practised character than these theoretical philosophers might have bid defiance to the mere mob of Paris, aided by a few hundreds of hired ruffians. At the worst, they would have perished in attempting to save their country from the most vile and horrible tyranny.

The girondists, however, sat in the Convention, like wild-fowl when the hawk is abroad, afraid either to remain where they were or to attempt a flight. Yet, as they could make no armed interest in Paris, there was much to induce them to quit the metropolis and seek a place of free deliberation elsewhere. France, indeed, was in such a state, that had these unfortunate experimentalists possessed any influence in almost any department, they could hardly have failed to bring friends around them if they had effected a retreat to it. Versailles seems to have been thought of as the scene of their adjournment by those who nourished such an idea; and it was believed that the inhabitants of that town, repentant of the part they had played in driving from them the royal family and the legislative body, would have stood in their defence. But neither from the public journals and histories of the time, nor from the private memoirs of Bazot, Barbaroux, or Louvet, does it appear that these insatuated philosophers thought either of flight or defence. They appear to have resembled the wretched animal whose chance of escape from its enemies rests only in the pitiful cries which it utters when seized.—

Their whole system was a castle in the air, and when it vanished they could only sit down and lament over it. On the other hand, it must be allowed to the girondists, that the inefficiency and imbecility of their conduct was not to be attributed to personal cowardice. Enthusiasts in their political opinions, they saw their ruin approaching, waited for it, and dared it; but, like that of the monarch they had been so eager to dethrone, and by dethroning whom they had made way for their own ruin, their resolution was of a passive, not an active, character—patient and steady to endure wrong, but inefficient where the object was to do right towards themselves and France.

For many nights these unhappy and devoted deputies, still possessed of the ministerial power, were so far from being able to insure their own safety, or that of the country under their nominal government, that they had shifted about from one place of rendezvous to another, not daring to occupy their own lodgings, and usually remaining, three or four together, armed for defence of their lives, in such places of secrecy and safety as they could devise.

It was on the night preceding the 30th of May, that Louvet, with five of the most distinguished of the girondist party, had absconded into such a retreat, more like robbers afraid of the police than legislators, when the tocsin was rung at dead of night. Rabaud de St-Étienne, a protestant clergyman, and one of the most distinguished of the party for humanity and resolution, received it as a death-knell, and continued to repeat, *Ille supremæ die.*

The alarm was designed to raise the suburbs; but in this task the jacobins do not seem to have had the usual facilities—at least they began by putting their blood-hounds on a scent, upon which they thought them likely to run more readily than the mere murder or arrest of twenty or thirty deputies of the Convention. They devised one which suited admirably, both to alarm the wealthier citizens, and teach them to be contented with looking to their own safety, and to animate the rabble with the hope of plunder. The rumour was spread, that the section of La Butte-des-Moulins, comprehending the Palais Royal, and the most wealthy shops in Paris, had become counter-revolutionary—had displayed the white cockade, and were declaring for the Bourbons.

Of this not a word was true. The citizens of the Palais Royal were disposed perhaps to royalty—certainly for a quiet and established government—but loved their own shops much better than the house of Bourbon, and had no intention of placing them in jeopardy either for king or kaiser. They heard with alarm the accusation against them, mustered in defence of their property, shut the gates of the Palais Royal, which admits of being strongly defended, turned cannon with lighted matches upon the mob as they approached their precincts, and showed, in a way sufficient to intimidate the rabble of St-Antoine, that though the wealthy bourgeois of Paris might abandon to the mob the care of killing kings and changing ministries, they had no intention whatsoever to yield up to them the charge of their

counters and tills. Five sections were under arms and ready to act. Not one of the girondist party seems to have even attempted to point out to them, that by an exertion to preserve the independence of the Convention, they might rid themselves for ever of the domination, under which all who had property, feeling, or education, were rendered slaves by these recurring insurrections. This is the more extraordinary, as Raffé, the commandant of the section of La Butte-des-Moulins, had actually marched to the assistance of the Convention on the 10th of March, then, as now, besieged by an armed force.

Left to themselves, the sections who were in arms to protect order thought it enough to provide against the main danger of the moment. The sight of their array, and of their determined appearance, far more than their three-coloured cockades, and cries of *Vive la République*, were sufficient to make the insurgents recognize those as good citizens, who could not be convicted of incivism without a bloody combat.

They were, however, at length made to comprehend by their leaders, that the business to be done lay in the Hall of the Convention, and that the exertions of each active citizen were to entitle him to forty *sous* for the day's work. In the whole affair there was so much of cold trick, and so little popular enthusiasm, that it is difficult to believe that the plotters might not have been countermined and blown to the moon with their own petard, had there been active spirit or practical courage on the side of those who were the assailed party. But we see no symptoms of either. The Convention were surrounded by the rabble, and menaced in the grossest terms. Under the general terror inspired by their situation, they finally recalled the Commission of Twelve, and set Hébert at liberty;—concessions which, though short of those which the jacobins had determined to insist upon, were such as showed that the power of the girondists was entirely destroyed, and that the Convention itself might be overawed at the pleasure of whosoever should command the mob of Paris.

The jacobins were now determined to follow up their blow, by destroying the enemy whom they had disarmed. The 2d of June was fixed for this purpose. Louvet, and some others of the girondist party, did not chuse to await the issue, but fled from Paris. To secure the rest of the devoted party, the barriers of the city were shut.

On this decisive occasion the jacobins had not trusted entirely to the efficiency of their suburb forces. They had also under their orders about two thousand federates, who were encamped in the Champs Élysées, and had been long tutored in the part they had to act. They harnessed guns and howitzers, prepared grape-shot and shells, and actually heated shot red-hot, as if their purpose had been to attack some strong fortress, instead of a hall filled with the unarmed representatives of the people. Henriot, commander-general of the armed force of Paris, a fierce, ignorant man, entirely devoted to the jacobin interest, took care, in posting the armed force which arrived from all hands around the Convention, to station those nearest to the

legislative body, whose dispositions with regard to them were most notoriously violent. They were thus entirely surrounded as if in a net, and the jacobins had little more to do than to select their victims.

The universal cry of the armed men who surrounded the Convention was for a decree of death or outlawry against twenty-two members of the girondist party, who had been pointed out, by the petition of Pache, and by subsequent petitions of the most inflammatory nature, as accomplices of Dumourier, enemies of the good city of Paris, and traitors, who meditated a federative instead of an indivisible republic. This list of proscription included the ministers.

The Convention were in a dreadful situation; it was manifest that the arm of strong force was upon them. Those who were supposed to belong to the girondist party were struck and abused as they entered the hall, booed and threatened as they arose to deliver their opinion. The members were no longer free to speak or vote. There could be no deliberation within the assembly, while such a scene of tumult and fury continued and increased without.

Barrère, leader, as we have said, of the Plain, or neutral party, who thought with the girondists in conscience, and acted with the jacobins in fear, proposed one of those seemingly moderate measures, which involve as sure destruction to those who adopt them, as if their character were more decisively hostile. With compliments to their good intentions, with lamentations for the emergency, he entreated the proscribed girondists to sacrifice themselves, as the unhappy subjects of disunion in the Republic, and to resign their character of deputies. The Convention, he said, would then declare them under the protection of the law,—as, if they were not invested with that protection while they were convicted of no crime, and clothed at the same time with the inviolability, of which he advised them to divest themselves. It was as if a man were requested to lay aside his armour, on the promise that the ordinary garments which he wore under it should be rendered impenetrable.

But a Frenchman is easily induced to do that to which he is provoked, as involving a point of honour.

This treacherous advice was adopted by Isnard, Dumas, and others of the proscribed deputies, who were thus persuaded to abandon what defences remained to them, in hopes to soften the ferocity of an enemy, too inveterate to entertain feelings of generosity.

Laquais maintained a more honourable struggle. "Expect not from me," he said to the Convention, "to hear either of submission, or resignation of my official character. Am I free to offer such a resignation, or are you free to receive it?" As he would have turned his eloquence against Robespierre and the jacobins, an attempt was made by Legendre and Chabot to drag him from the tribune. While he resisted he received several blows. "Cruelmen!" he exclaimed—"The Heathens adorned and caressed the victims whom they led to the slaughter—you load them with blows and insult."

Shame procured him a moment's hearing, during which he harangued the assembly with much effect on the baseness, treachery, cruelty, and impolicy, of thus surrendering their brethren to the call of a blood-thirsty multitude from without, stimulated by a vengeful minority of their own members. The Convention made an effort to free themselves from the toils in which they were entangled. They resolved to go out in a body, and ascertain what respect would be paid to their persons by the armed force assembled around them.

They sallied forth accordingly, in procession, into the Gardens of the Tuileries, the jacobins alone remaining in the hall; but their progress was presently arrested by Henriot, at the head of a strong military staff, and a large body of troops. Every passage leading from the gardens was secured by soldiers. The president read the decree of the assembly, and commanded Henriot's obedience. The commandant of Paris only replied by reining back his horse, and commanding the troops to stand to their arms. "Return to your posts," he said to the terrified legislators; "the people demand the traitors who are in the bosom of your assembly, and will not depart till their will is accomplished." Marat came up presently afterwards at the head of a select band of a hundred ruffians. He called on the multitude to stand firm to their purpose, and commanded the Convention, in the name of the people, to return to their place of meeting, to deliberate, and, above all, to obey.

The Convention re-entered their hall in the last degree of consternation, prepared to submit to the infamy which now seemed inevitable, yet loathing themselves for their cowardice, even while obeying the dictates of self-preservation. The jacobins meanwhile enhanced their demand, like her who sold the books of the Sibyls. Instead of twenty-two deputies, the accusation of thirty was now demanded. Amid terror mingled with acclamations, the decree was declared to be carried. This doom of proscription passed on the motion of Couthon, a decrepit being, whose lower extremities were paralysed,—whose benevolence of feeling seemed to pour itself out in the most gentle expressions, uttered in the most melodious tones,—whose sensibility led him constantly to foster a favourite spaniel in his bosom, that he might have something on which to bestow kindness and caresses,—but who was at heart as fierce as Danton, and as pitiless as Robespierre.

Great part of the Convention did not join in this vote, protesting loudly against the force imposed on them. Several of the proscribed deputies were arrested, others escaped from the hall by the connivance of their brethren, and of the official persons attached to the Convention; some, foreseeing their fate, had absented themselves from the meeting, and were already fled from Paris.

Thus fell, without a blow struck, or sword drawn in their defence, the party in the Convention which claimed the praise of acting upon pure republican principles, who had overthrown the throne, and led the way to anarchy, merely to perfect an ideal theory. They fell, as the wisest of them admitted, dopes to their own system, and to the vain and im-

practicable idea of ruling a large and corrupt empire, by the motives which may sway a small and virtuous community. They might, as they too late discovered, have as well attempted to found the Capitol on a bottomless and quaking marsh, as their pretended Republic in a country like France. The violent revolutionary expedients, the means by which they acted, were turned against them by men, whose ends were worse than their own. The girondists had gloried in their share of the triumphs of the 10th of August; yet what was that celebrated day, save an insurrection of the populace against the constituted authority of the time, as those of the 31st of May and 2d of June, 1793, under which the girondists succumbed, were directed against them as successors in the government? In the one case, a king was dethroned; in the other, a government or band of ministers dismissed. And if the people had a right, as the girondists claimed in their behalf, to act as the executioners of their own will in the one instance, it is difficult to see upon what principle their power should be trammelled in the other.

In the important process against the king, the girondists had shown themselves pusillanimous;—desirous to save the life of a guiltless man, they dared not boldly vouch his innocence, but sheltered themselves under evasions which sacrificed his character, while they could not protect his life. After committing this great error, they lost every chance of allying with efficacy under their standard what might remain of well-intentioned individuals in Paris and in France, who, if they had seen the girondists, when in power, conduct themselves with firmness, would probably rather have ranked themselves in the train of men who were friends to social order, however republican their tenets, than have given way to the anarchy which was doomed to ensue.

Upon all their own faults, whether of act or of omission, the unfortunate girondists had now ample time to meditate. Twenty-two of their leading members, arrested on the fatal 2d of June, already waited their doom in prison, while the others wandered on, in distress and misery, through the different departments of France.

The fate of those who were prisoners was not very long suspended. In about three months they were brought to trial, and convicted—of *royalism*! Such was the temper of France at the time, and so gross the impositions which might be put upon the people, that the men in the empire, who, upon abstract principle, were most averse to monarchy, and who had sacrificed even their consciences to join with the jacobins in pulling down the throne, were now accused and convicted of being royalists, and that at a time when what remained of the royal family was at so low an ebb, that the imprisoned queen could not obtain the most ordinary book for the use of her son, without a direct and formal application to the Community of Paris.*

When the girondists were brought before the tri-

bunal, the people seem to have shown more interest in men, whose distinguished talents had so often swayed the Legislative Body, than was altogether acceptable to the jacobins, who were induced to fear some difficulty in carrying through their conviction. They obtained a decree from the Convention, declaring that the President of the Revolutionary Tribunal should be at liberty to close the procedure so soon as the jury should have made up their minds, and without hearing the accused in their defence. This frightful expedient of cutting short the debate (*couper la parole* was the phrase) was often resorted to on those revolutionary trials. Unquestionably, they dreaded the reasoning of Brissot, and the eloquence of Vergniaud, of which they had so long and so often experienced the thunders. One crime,—and it was a fatal offence, considering before what judicature they stood,—seems to have been made out by Brissot's own letters. It was that by which the late members attempted to effect a combination among the departments, for the purpose of counterpoising, if possible, the tremendous influence which the capital and the revolutionary part of its magistracy exercised over the Convention, whom Paris detained prisoners within her walls. This delinquency alone was well calculated to remove all scruples from the minds of a jury, selected from that very class of Parisians whose dreadful importance would have been altogether annihilated by the success of such a scheme. The accused were found guilty as conspirators against the unity and indivisibility of the Republic, and the liberty and safety of the French people.

When the sentence of death was pronounced, one of their number, Valazé, plunged a dagger in his bosom. The rest suffered in terms of the sentence, and were conveyed to the place of execution in the same tumbril with the bloody corpse of their suicide colleague. Brissot seemed downcast and unhappy. Fauchet, a renegade priest, showed signs of remorse. The rest affected a Roman resolution, and went to execution singing a parody on the Hymn of the Marseillais, in which that famous composition was turned against the jacobins. They had long rejected the aids of religion, which, early received and cherished, would have guided their steps in prosperity, and sustained them in adversity. Their remaining stay was only that of the same vain and speculative philosophy, which had so deplorably influenced their political conduct.

Those members of the girondist party who, escaping from Paris to the departments, avoided their fate somewhat longer, saw little reason to pride themselves on the political part they had chosen to act. They found the eastern and southern departments in a ferment against Paris and the jacobins, and ready to rise in arms; but they became aware, at the same time, that no one was thinking of or regretting their system of a pure republic, the motives by which the malcontents were agitated being of a very different, and far more practical character. Great part of the nation, all at least of better feelings, had been deeply affected by the undeserved fate of the king, and the cruelty with which his family had been, and were still treated. The rich feared to be pillaged and murdered by the jacobins;

* Witness the following entry in the minutes of the *Commune*, on a day, he it remarked, betwixt the 29th May and the 2d June: "Antoinette fait demander pour son fils le roman du *Gil-Blas* de Santillane—accordé."

the poor suffered no less under scarcity of grain, under the depreciation of assignats, and a compulsory levy of no less than three hundred thousand men over France, to supply the enormous losses of the French army. But everywhere the insurrection took a royalist, and not a republican character; and although the girondists were received at Caen and elsewhere with compassion and respect, the votes they had given in the king's trial, and their fanatic zeal for a kind of government for which France was totally unfitted, and which those from whom they obtained refuge were far from desiring, prevented their playing any distinguished part in the disturbed districts of the west.

Buzot seems to see this in the true sense. "It is certain," he says, "that if we could have rested our pretensions upon having wished to establish in France a moderate government of that character, which, according to many well-instructed persons, best suited the people of France" (indicating a limited monarchy), "we might have entertained hopes of forming a formidable coalition in the department of Calvados, and rallying around us all whom ancient prejudices attached to royalty." As it was, they were only regarded as a few enthusiasts, whom the example of America had induced to attempt the establishment of a republic, in a country where all hopes and wishes, save those of the jacobins, and the vile rabble whom they courted and governed, were turned towards a moderate monarchy. Buzot also observed, that the many violences and atrocities, forced levies, and other acts of oppression practised in the name of the republic, had disgusted men with a form of government, where cruelty seemed to rule over misery by the sole aid of terror. With more candour than some of his companions, he avows his error, and admits that he would, at this closing scene, have willingly united with the moderate monarchists, to establish royalty under the safeguard of constitutional restraints.

Several of the deputies, Louvet, Riouffe, Barbaroux, Pétion, and others, united themselves with a body of royalists of Bretagne, to whom General Wimpfen had given something of the name of an army, but which never attained the solidity of one. It was defeated at Vernon, and never afterwards could be again assembled.

The proscribed deputies, at first with a few armed associates, afterwards entirely deserted, wandered through the country, incurring some romantic adventures, which have been recorded by the pen of their historian, Louvet. At length, six of the party succeeded in obtaining the means of transportation to Bordeaux, the capital of the Gironde from which their party derived its name, and which those who were natives of it, remembering only the limited society in which they had first acquired their fame, had described as possessing and cherishing the purest principles of philosophical freedom. Guadet had protested to his companions in misfortune a thousand times, that if liberal, honourable, and generous sentiments were chased from every other corner of France, they were nevertheless sure to find refuge in La Gironde. The proscribed wanderers had well nigh kissed the land of refuge, when they disembarked, as in a country of assured

protection. But Bordeaux was by this time no more than a wealthy trading town, where the rich, trembling before the poor, were not willing to increase their own imminent danger, by intermeddling with the misfortunes of others. All doors, or nearly so, of La Gironde itself, were shut against the girondists, and they wandered outcasts, in the country, suffering every extremity of toil and hunger, and bringing, in some cases, death upon the friends who ventured to afford them refuge.

Louvet alone escaped, of the six girondists who took refuge in their own peculiar province. Guadet, Salles, and the enthusiastic Barbaroux, were seized and executed at Bordeaux, but not till the last had twice attempted suicide with his pistols. Buzot and Pétion killed themselves in extremity, and were found dead in a field of corn. This was the same Pétion who had been so long the idol of the Parisians, and who, when the forfeiture of the king was resolved on, had been heard to say with simple vanity, "If they should force me to become regent now, I cannot see any means by which I can avoid it." Others of this unhappy party shared the same melancholy fate. Condorcet, who had pronounced his vote for the king's life, but in perpetual fetters, was arrested, and poisoned himself. Rabaud de St-Étienne was betrayed by a friend in whom he trusted, and was executed. Roland was found dead in the high-road, accomplishing a prophecy of his wife, whom the jacobins had condemned to death, and who had declared her conviction that her husband would not long survive her. "That remarkable woman, happy if her high talents had, in youth, fallen under the direction of those who could better have cultivated them, made before the Revolutionary Tribunal a defence more manly than the most eloquent of the girondins. The bystanders, who had become amateurs in cruelty, were as much delighted with her deportment, as the hunter with the pulling down a noble stag. "What sense," they said; "what wit, what courage! What a magnificent spectacle it will be to behold such a woman upon the scaffold!" She met her death with great firmness, and, as she passed the statue of Liberty, on her road to execution, she exclaimed, "Ah, Liberty! what crimes are committed in thy name!"

About forty-two of the girondist deputies perished by the guillotine, by suicide, or by the fatigue of their wanderings. About twenty-four escaped these perils, and were, after many and various sufferings, recalled to the Convention, when the jacobin influence was destroyed. They owed their fall to the fantastic philosophy and visionary theories which they had adopted, not less than to their presumptuous confidence, that popular assemblies, when actuated by the most violent personal feelings, must yield to the weight of argument, as inanimate bodies obey the impulse of external force; and that they who possess the highest powers of oratory, can, by mere elocution, take the weight from clubs, the edge from sabres, and the angry and brutal passions from those who wield them. They made no further figure as a party in any of the state changes in France; and, in relation to their experimental republic, may remind the reader of the presumptuous

champion of antiquity, who was caught in the cleft oak, which he in vain attempted to rend asunder. History has no more to say on the subject of La Gironde, considered as a party name.

CHAPTER XV.

Views of parties in Britain relative to the Revolution—Affiliated Societies—Counterpoised by Aristocratic Associations—Aristocratic party eager for war with France.—The French proclaim the navigation of the Scheldt.—British ambassador recalled from Paris, and French envoy no longer accredited in London.—France declares war against England.—British army sent to Holland, under the Duke of York—State of the army.—View of the military positions of France—in Flanders—on the Rhine—in Piedmont—Savoy—on the Pyrenees.—State of the war in La Vendée—Description of the country—La Bocage—La Lézarde—Close union betwixt the nobles and peasantry—Both strongly attached to royalty, and abhorrent of the Revolution.—The priests.—The religion of the Vendéans outraged by the Convention.—A general insurrection takes place in 1793.—Military organization and habits of the Vendéans.—Division in the British Cabinet on the mode of conducting the war—Pitt—Windham—Reasoning upon the subject—Capitulation of Mentz enables 15,000 veterans to act in La Vendée—Vendéans defeated, and pass the Loire—They defeat, in their turn, the French troops at Laval—But are ultimately destroyed and dispersed.—Unfortunate expedition to Quiberon.—Charrette defeated and executed, and the war of La Vendée finally terminated.—Return to the state of France in spring 1793.—Unsuccessful resistance of Bordeaux, Marseilles, and Lyons, to the Convention.—Siege of Lyons—Its surrender and dreadful punishment.—Siege of Toulon.

THE jacobins, by their successive victories on the 31st May and 2d June, 1793, had vanquished and driven from the field their adversaries; and we have already seen with what fury they had pursued their scattered enemies, and dealt among them vengeance and death. But the situation of the country, both in regard to external and internal relations, was so precarious, that it required the exertion of men as bold and unhesitating as now assumed the guidance of the power of France, to exert the energies necessary to repel foreign force, and at the same time to subdue internal dissension.

We have seen that England had become in a great measure divided into two large parties, one of which continued to applaud the French Revolution, although the wise and good among them reprobated its excesses; while the other, with eyes fixed in detestation upon the cruelties, confiscations, and horrors of every description which it had given rise to, looked on the very name of this great change,—though no doubt comprehending much good as well as evil,—with the unmixed feelings of men contemplating a spectacle equally dreadful and disgusting.

The affair of the 10th of August, and the approaching fate of the king, excited general interest in Britain; and a strong inclination became visible among the higher and middling classes, that the nation should take up arms, and interfere in the fate of the unhappy Louis.

Mr Pitt had been making up his mind to the same point; but feeling how much his own high talents

were turned to the improvement of the internal regulations and finances of the country, he hesitated for some time to adopt a hostile course, though approved by the sovereign, and demanded by a large proportion of his subjects. But new circumstances arose every day to compel a decision on this important point.

The French, whether in their individual or collective capacities, have been always desirous to take the lead among European nations, and to be considered as the foremost member of the civilized republic. In almost all her vicissitudes, France has addressed herself as much to the citizens of other countries as to those of her own; and it was thus, that in the speeches of her statesmen, invitations were thrown out to the subjects of other states, to imitate the example of the Republic, cast away the rubbish of their old institutions, dethrone their kings, demolish their nobility, divide the lands of the church and the aristocracy among the lower classes, and arise a free and regenerated people. In Britain, as elsewhere, these doctrines carried a fascinating sound; for Britain, as well as France, had men of parts who thought themselves neglected,—men of merit, who conceived themselves oppressed,—experimentalists, who would willingly put the laws in their revolutionary crucible,—and men desirous of novelties in the church and in the state, either from the eagerness of restless curiosity, or the hopes of bettering by the change. Above all, Britain had a far too ample mass of poverty and ignorance, subject always to be acted upon by the hope of license. Affiliated societies were formed in almost all the towns of Great Britain. They corresponded with each other, held very high and intimidating language, and seemed to frame themselves on the French model. They addressed the National Convention of France directly in the name of their own bodies, and of societies united for the same purpose; and congratulated them on their freedom, and on the manner in which they had gained it, with many a broad hint that their example would not be lost on Britain. The persons who composed these societies had, generally speaking, little pretension to rank or influence; and though they contained some men of considerable parts, there was a deficiency of anything like weight or respectability in their meetings. Their consequence lay chiefly in the numbers who were likely to be influenced by their arguments; and these were extraordinarily great, especially in large towns, and in the manufacturing districts. That state of things began to take place in Britain, which had preceded the French Revolution; but the British aristocracy, well cemented together, and possessing great weight in the state, took the alarm sooner, and adopted precautions more effectual, than had been thought of in France. They associated together in political unions on their side, and, by the weight of influence, character, and fortune, soon obtained a superiority which made it dangerous, or at least inconvenient, to many whose situations in society rendered them in some degree dependent upon the favour of the aristocracy, to dissent violently from their opinions. The political Shibboleth, used by these associations, was a renunciation of the doctrines of the French Revolution; and they

have been reproached that this abhorrence was expressed by some of them in terms so strong, as if designed to withhold the subscribers from attempting any reformation in their own government, even by the most constitutional means. In short, while the democratical party made in their clubs the most violent and furious speeches against the aristocrats, the others became doubly prejudiced against reform of every description, and all who attempted to assert its propriety. After all, had this political ferment broke out in Britain at any other period, or on any other occasion, it would have probably passed away like other head-burnings of the same description, which interest for a time, but weary out the public attention, and are laid aside and forgotten. But the French Revolution blazed in the neighbourhood like a beacon of hope to the one party, of fear and caution to the other. The shouts of the democratic triumphs—the foul means by which their successes were obtained, and the cruel use which was made of them, increased the animosity of both parties in England. In the fury of party zeal, the democrats excused many of the excesses of the French Revolution, in respect of its tendency; while the other party, in condemning the whole Revolution, both root and branch, forgot that, after all, the struggle of the French nation to recover their liberty, was, in its commencement, not only justifiable, but laudable.

The wild and inflated language addressed by the French statesmen to mankind in general, and the spirit of conquest which the nation had lately evinced, mixed with their marked desire to extend their political principles, and with the odium which they had heaped upon themselves by the king's death, made the whole aristocratic party, commanding a very large majority in both Houses of Parliament, become urgent that war should be declared against France; a holy war, it said, against treason, blasphemy, and murder, and a necessary war, in order to break off all connexion betwixt the French government and the discontented part of our own subjects, who could not otherwise be prevented from the most close, constant, and dangerous intercourse with them.

Another reason for hostilities, more in parallel with similar cases in history, occurred, from the French having, by a formal decree, proclaimed the Scheldt navigable. In so doing, a point had been assumed as granted, upon the denial of which the States of Holland had always rested as the very basis of their national prosperity. It is probable that this might, in other circumstances, have been made the subject of negotiation. But the difference of opinion on the general politics of the Revolution, and the mode in which it had been carried on, set the governments of France and England in such direct and mortal opposition to each other, that war became inevitable.

Lord Gower, the British ambassador, was recalled from Paris, immediately on the king's execution. The prince to whom he was sent was no more; and, on the same ground, the French envoy at the Court of St James's, though not dismissed by his majesty's government, was made acquainted that the ministers no longer considered him as an ac-

credited person. Yet, through Maret,* a subordinate agent, Pitt continued to keep up some correspondence with the French government, in a lingering desire to preserve peace, if possible. What the British minister chiefly wished was, to have satisfactory assurances that the strong expressions of a decree, which the French Convention had passed on the 19th November, were not to be considered as applicable to England. The decree was in these words: "The National Convention declares, in the name of the French nation, that it will grant fraternity and assistance to all people who wish to recover their liberty; and it charges the executive power to send the necessary orders to the generals, to give succours to such people, and to defend those citizens who have suffered, or may suffer, in the cause of liberty."—"That this decree might not remain a secret to those for whose benefit it was intended, a translation of it, in every foreign language, was ordered to be printed."[†] The Convention, as well as the ministers of France, refused every disavowal of the decree as applicable to Great Britain; were equally reluctant to grant explanation of any kind on the opening of the Scheldt; and finally, without one dissentient voice, the whole Convention, in a full meeting, declared war upon England;—which last nation is, nevertheless, sometimes represented, even at this day, as having declared war upon France.

In fact, Mr Pitt came unwillingly into the war. With even more than his great father's ministerial talents, he did not habitually nourish the schemes of military triumph which were familiar to the genius of Chatham, and was naturally unwilling, by engaging in an expensive war, to derange those plans of finance by which he had retrieved the revenues of Great Britain from a very low condition. It is said of Chatham, that he considered it as the best economy, to make every military expedition which he fitted out of such a power and strength as to overbear, as far as possible, all chance of opposition. A general officer, who was to be employed in such a piece of service, having demanded a certain body of troops as sufficient to effect his purpose, "Take double the number," said Lord Chatham, "and answer with your head for your success." His son had not the same mode of computation, and would perhaps have been more willing to have reduced the officer's terms, chaffered with him for the lowest number, and finally dispatched him at the head of as small a body as the general could have been prevailed on to consider as affording any prospect of success. This untimely economy of resources arose from the expense attending the British army. They are certainly one of the bravest, best appointed, and most liberally paid in Europe; but in forming demands on their valour, and expectations from their exertions, their fellow-subjects are apt to indulge extravagant computations, from not being in the habit of considering military calculations, or being altogether aware of the numerical superiority possessed by other countries. That one Englishman will fight two Frenchmen is certain; but that he

* Since Duke of Bassano.

† *Annual Register* for 1793, p. 153.

will beat them, though a good article of the popular creed, must be allowed to be more dubious; and it is not wise to wage war on such odds, or to suppose that, because our soldiers are infinitely valuable to us, and a little expensive besides, it is therefore judicious to send them in small numbers against desperate odds.

Another point, well touched by Sheridan, on the debate on the question of peace or war, was not sufficiently attended to by the British administration. That statesman, whose perception of the right and wrong of any great constitutional question was as acute as that of any whomsoever of his great political contemporaries, said, "He wished every possible exertion to be made for the preservation of peace. If, however, that were impracticable, in such case, but in such case only, he proposed to vote for a vigorous war. Not a war of shifts and scraps, of timid operation, or protracted effort; but a war conducted with such energy as might convince the world that we were contending for our dearest and most valuable privileges."^{*}

Of this high-spirited and most just principle, the policy of Britain unfortunately lost sight during the first years of the war, when there occurred more than one opportunity in which a home and prostrating blow might have been aimed at her gigantic adversary.

A gallant auxiliary army was, however, immediately fitted out, and embarked for Holland, with his Royal Highness the Duke of York at their head, as if the king had meant to give to his allies the dearest pledge in his power, how serious was the interest which he took in their defence.

But though well equipped, and commanded, under the young prince, by Abercrombie, Dundas, Sir William Erskine, and many other officers of gallantry and experience, it must be owned that the British army had not then recovered the depressing and disorganizing effects of the American war. The soldiers were, indeed, fine men on the parade; but their external appearance was acquired by dint of a thousand minute and vexatious attentions, exacted from them at the expense of private comfort, and which, after all, only gave them the exterior appearance of high drilling, in exchange for ease of motion and simplicity of dress. No general system of manoeuvres, we believe, had been adopted for the use of the forces; each commanding-officer managed his regiment according to his own pleasure. In a field-day, two or three battalions could not act in concert, without much previous consultation; in action, they got on as chance directed. The officers, too, were acquainted both with their soldiers and with their duty, in a degree far inferior to what is now exacted from them. Our system of purchasing commissions, which is necessary to connect the army with the country, and the property of the country, was at that time so much abused, that a mere beardless boy might be forced at once through the subordinate and subaltern steps into a company or a majority, without having been a month in the army. In short, all those gigantic abuses were still subsisting, which the illustrious prince whom we

have named eradicated from the British army, by regulations for which his country can never be sufficiently grateful, and without which they could never have performed the distinguished part finally destined to them in the terrible drama, which was about to open under less successful auspices.

There hung also, like a cloud, upon the military fame of England, the unfortunate issue of the American struggle, in which the advantages obtained by regulars, against less disciplined forces, had been trifled with in the commencement, until the genius of Washington, and the increasing spirit and numbers of the continental armies, completely overbalanced, and almost annihilated, that original preponderance.

Yet the British soldiery did not disgrace their high national character, nor show themselves unworthy of fighting under the eye of the son of their monarch; and when they joined the Austrian army, under the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, gave many demonstrations both of valour and discipline. The storming of the fortified camp of the French at Famars—the battle of Lincelles—the part they bore in the sieges of Valenciennes and Condé, both of which surrendered successively to the allied forces, upheld the reputation of their country, and amounted, indeed, to what in former wars would have been the fruits of a very successful campaign. But Europe was now arrived at a time when war was no longer to be carried on according to the old usage, by the agency of standing armies of moderate numbers; when a battle lost and won, or a siege raised or successful, was thought sufficient for the active exertions of the year, and the troops on either side were drawn off into winter quarters, while diplomacy took up the contest which tactics had suspended. All this was to be laid aside; and instead of this drowsy state of hostility, nations were to contend with each other like individuals in mortal conflict, bringing not merely the hands, but every limb of the body, into violent and furious struggle. The situation of France, both in internal and external relations, required the most dreadful efforts which had been ever made by any country; and the exertions which she demanded were either willingly made by the enthusiasm of the inhabitants, or extorted by the energy and severity of the revolutionary government. We must hestow a single glance on the state of the country, ere we proceed to notice the measures adopted for its defence.

On the north-eastern frontier of France, considerable advances had been made by the English and Hanoverian army, in communication and conjunction with the Austrian force under the Prince of Saxe-Coburg, an excellent officer, but who, belonging to the old school of formal and prolonged war, never sufficiently considered that a new description of enemies were opposed to him, who were necessarily to be combated in a different manner from those whom his youth had encountered, and who, unenterprising himself, does not appear either to have calculated upon, or prepared to counteract, strokes of audacity and activity on the part of the enemy.

The war on the Rhine was furiously maintained by Prussians and Austrians united. The French

^{*} *Annual Register for 1793, p. 250.*

lost the important town of Mentz, were driven out of other places, and experienced many reverses, although Custine, Moreau, Houchard, Beauharnais, and other general officers of high merit, had already given lustre to the arms of the Republic. The loss of the strong lines of Weissenburg, which were carried by General Wurmser, a distinguished Austrian officer, completed the shade of disadvantage which here hung on the republican banners.

In Piedmont the French were also unsuccessful, though the scale was less grand and imposing. The republican general, Brunet, was unfortunate, and he was forced from his camp at Belvedere; while, on the side of Savoy, the King of Sardinia also obtained several temporary advantages.

On the Pyrenees the republican armies had been equally unsuccessful. A Spanish army, conducted with more spirit than had been lately the case with the troops of that once proud monarchy, had defeated the republican General Servan, and crossed the Bidassoa. On the eastern extremity of these celebrated mountains, the Spaniards had taken the towns of Port Vendre and Collioure.

Assailed on so many sides, and by so many enemies, all of whom, excepting the Sardinians, had more or less made impression upon the frontiers of the Republic, it might seem that the only salvation which remained for France must have been sought for in the unanimity of her inhabitants. But so far was the nation from possessing this first of requisites for a successful opposition to the overpowering coalition which assailed her, that a dreadful civil war was already waged in the western provinces of France, which threatened, from its importance and the success of the insurgents, to undo, in a great measure, the work of the Revolution; while similar discords, breaking out on different points in the south, menaced conclusions no less formidable.

It does not belong to us to trace the interesting features of the war in La Vendée with a minute pencil, but they mingle too much with the history of the period to be altogether omitted.

We have elsewhere* said that, speaking of La Vendée as a district, it was there alone, through the whole kingdom of France, that the peasants and the nobles—in other words, the proprietors and cultivators of the soil—remained on terms of close and intimate connexion and friendship, which made them feel the same undivided interest in the great changes created by the Revolution. The situation of La Vendée, its soil and character, as well as the manners of the people, had contributed to an arrangement of interests and habits of thinking which rendered the union betwixt these two classes indissoluble.

La Vendée is a wooded and pastoral country, not indeed mountainous, but abounding in inequalities of ground, crossed by brooks, and intersected by a variety of canals and ditches, made for drainage, but which become, with the numerous and intricate thickets, posts of great strength in the time of war. The inclosures seemed to be won, as it were, out of the woodland; and the paths which traversed the country were so intricate and perplexed as to ren-

der it inaccessible to strangers, and not easily traveled through by the natives themselves. There were almost no roads practicable for ordinary carriages during the rainy season; and the rainy season in La Vendée is a long one. The ladies of rank, when they visited, went in carriages drawn by bullocks; the gentlemen, as well as the peasants, traveled chiefly on foot, and by assistance of the long leaping-poles which they carried for that purpose, surmounted the ditches and other obstacles which other travelers found impassable.

The whole tract of country is about one hundred and fifty miles square, and lies at the mouth and on the southern bank of the Loire. The internal part is called *Le Bocage* (the Thicket), because partaking in a peculiar degree of the wooded and intricate character which belongs to the whole country. That portion of La Vendée which lies close to the Loire, and nearer its mouth, is called *Le Louroux*. The neighbouring districts partook in the insurrection, but the strength and character which it assumed were derived chiefly from La Vendée.

The union betwixt the noblesse of La Vendée and their peasants was of the most intimate character. Their chief exportations from the district consisted in the immense herds of cattle which they reared in their fertile meadows, and which supplied the consumption of the metropolis. These herds, as well as the land on which they were raised, were in general the property of the seigneur; but the farmer possessed a joint interest in the latter. He managed the stock and disposed of it at market, and there was an equitable adjustment of their interest in disposing of the produce.

Their amusements were also in common. The chase of wolves, not only for the sake of sport, but to clear the woods of those ravenous animals, was pursued as of yore by the seigneur at the head of his followers and vassals. Upon the evenings of Sundays and holidays, the young people of each village and *métairie* repaired to the court-yard of the château, as the natural and proper scene for their evening amusement, and the family of the baron often took part in the pastime.

In a word, the two divisions of society depended mutually on each other, and were strongly knit together by ties, which, in other districts of France, existed only in particular instances. The Vendean peasant was the faithful and attached, though humble friend of his lord; he was his partner in bad and good fortune; submitted to his decision the disputes which might occur betwixt him and his neighbours; and had recourse to his protection, if he sustained wrong, or was threatened with injustice from any one.

This system of simple and patriarchal manners could not have long subsisted under any great inequality of fortune. Accordingly, we find that the wealthiest of the Vendean nobility did not hold estates worth more than twelve or fifteen hundred a-year, while the lowest might be three or four hundred. They were not accordingly much tempted by exuberance of wealth to seek to display magnificence; and such as went to court, and conformed to the fashions of the capital, were accustomed to lay them aside in all haste when they returned to the *Bocage*,

* See p. 8.

and to reassume the simple manners of their ancestors.

All the incentives to discord which abounded elsewhere through France, were wanting in this wild and wooded region, where the peasant was the noble's affectionate partner and friend, the noble the natural judge and protector of the peasant. The people had retained the feelings of the ancient French in favour of royalty; they listened with dissatisfaction and disgust to the accounts of the Revolution as it proceeded; and feeling themselves none of the evils in which it originated, its whole tendency became the object of their alarm and suspicion. The neighbouring districts, and Bretagne in particular, were agitated by similar commotions; for although the revolutionary principles predominated in the towns of the west, they were not relished by the country people any more than by the nobles. Great agitation had for some time taken place through the provinces of Bretagne, Anjou, Maine, and Poitou, to which the strength of the insurrection in La Vendée gave impulse. It was not, however, a political impulse which induced the Vendéans to take the field. The influence of religion, seconded by that of natural affection, was the immediate stimulating motive.

In a country so simple and virtuous in its manners as we have described La Vendée, religious devotion must necessarily be a general attribute of the inhabitants, who, conscious of loving their neighbours as themselves, are equally desirous, to the extent of their strength and capacity, to love and honour the Great Being who created all. The Vendéans were therefore very regular in the performance of their prescribed religious duties; and their parish priest, or *curé*, held an honoured and influential rank in their little society, was the attendant of the sick-bed of the peasant, as well for rendering medical as religious aid; his counsellor in his family affairs, and often the arbiter of disputes not of sufficient importance to be carried before the seigneur. The priests were themselves generally natives of the country, more distinguished for the primitive duty with which they discharged their office, than for talents and learning. The *curé* took frequent share in the large hunting parties which he announced from the pulpit, and, after having said mass, attended in person with the fowling-piece on his shoulder. This active and simple manner of life rendered the priests predisposed to encounter the fatigues of war. They accompanied the bands of Vendéans with the crucifix displayed, and promised, in the name of the Deity, victory to the survivors, and honour to those who fell in the patriotic combat. But Madame la Roche-Jacquelin repels, as a calumny, their bearing arms, except for the purpose of self-defence.

Almost all these parish priests were driven from their cures by the absurd and persecuting fanaticism of that decree of the assembly,* which, while its promoters railed against illiberality and intolerance, deprived of their office and of their livelihood, soon after of liberty and life, those churchmen who would not renounce the doctrines in which they had been educated, and which they had sworn to maintain. In La Vendée, as elsewhere, where the curates

resisted this unjust and impolitic injunction of the legislature, persecution followed on the part of the government, and was met in its turn by violence on that of the people.

The peasants maintained in secret their ancient pastors, and attended their ministry in woods and deserts; while the intruders, who were settled in the livings of the recusants, dared hardly appear in the churches without the protection of the National Guards.

So early as 1791, when Dumourier commanded the forces at Nantes, and the districts adjacent, the flame of dissension had begun to kindle. That general's sagacity induced him to do his best to appease the quarrel by moderating betwixt the parties. His military eye detected in the inhabitants and their country an alarming scene for civil war. He received the slightest concessions on the part of the parish priests as satisfactory, and appears to have quieted the disturbances of the country, at least for a time.

But in 1793, the same causes of discontent, added to others, hurried the inhabitants of La Vendée into a general insurrection of the most formidable description. The events of the 10th of August, 1792, had driven from Paris a great proportion of the royalist nobility, who had many of them carried their discontents and their counter-revolutionary projects into a country prepared to receive and adopt them.

Then followed the conventional decree, which supported their declaration of war by a compulsory levy of three hundred thousand men throughout France. This measure was felt as severe by even those departments in which the revolutionary principles were most predominant, but was regarded as altogether intolerable by the Vendéans, averse alike to the republican cause and principles. They resisted its exaction by main force, delivered the conscripts in many instances, defeated the National Guards in others, and finding that they had incurred the vengeance of a sanguinary government, resolved by force to maintain the resistance which in force had begun. Thus originated that celebrated war, which raged so long in the very bosom of France, and threatened the stability of her government, even while the Republic was achieving the most brilliant victories over her foreign enemies.

It is remote from our purpose to trace the history of these hostilities; but a sketch of their nature and character is essential to a general view of the Revolution, and the events connected with it.

The insurgents, though engaged in the same cause, and frequently co-operating, were divided into different bodies, under leaders independent of each other. Those of the right bank of the Loire were chiefly under the orders of the celebrated Charette, who, descended from a family distinguished as commanders of privaters, and himself a naval officer, had taken on him this dangerous command. An early wandering disposition, not unusual among youth of eager and ambitious character, had made him acquainted with the inmost recesses of the woods, and his native genius had induced him to anticipate the military advantages which they afforded. In his case, as in many others, either the sagacity of these uninstructed peasants led them to

* See p. 50.

chuse for command men whose talents best fitted them to enjoy it; or perhaps the perils which environed such authority prevented its being aspired to, save by those whom a mixture of resolution and prudence led to feel themselves capable of maintaining their character when invested with it. It was remarkable also, that, in choosing their leaders, the insurgents made no distinction between the noblesse and the inferior ranks. Names renowned in ancient history—Talmont, d'Antichamp, Lescure, and La Roche-Jacquelin, were joined in equal command with the gamekeeper Stofflet; Cathelineau, an itinerant wool-merchant; Charette, a *roturier* of slight pretensions; and others of the lowest order, whom the time and the public voice called into command, but who, nevertheless, do not seem, in general, to have considered their official command as altering the natural distinction of their rank in society.* In their success, they formed a general council of officers, priests, and others, who held their meetings at Châtillon, and directed the military movements of the different bodies; assembled them at pleasure on particular points, and for particular objects of service; and dispersed them to their homes when these were accomplished.

With an organization so simple, the Vendean insurgents, in about two months, possessed themselves of several towns and an extensive tract of country; and though repeatedly attacked by regular forces, commanded by experienced generals, they were far more frequently victors than vanquished, and inflicted more loss on the republicans by gaining a single battle, than they themselves sustained in repeated defeats.

Yet at first their arms were of the most simple and imperfect kind. Fowling-pieces, and fuseses of every calibre, they possessed from their habits as huntsmen and fowlers; for close encounter they had only scythes, axes, clubs, and such weapons as anger places most readily in the hands of the peasant. Their victories, latterly, supplied them with arms in abundance, and they manufactured gunpowder for their own use in great quantity.

Their tactics were peculiar to themselves, but of a kind so well suited to their country and their habits, that it seems impossible to devise a better and more formidable system. The Vendean took the field with the greatest simplicity of military equipment. His gird served as a cartridge-box, his uniform was the country short jacket and pantaloons, which he wore at his ordinary labour; a cloth knapsack contained bread and some necessities, and thus he was ready for service. They were accustomed to move with great secrecy and silence among the thickets and inclosures by which their country is intersected, and were thus enabled to chuse at pleasure the most favourable points of attack or defence. Their army, unlike any other in the world,

was not divided into companies, or regiments, but followed in bands, and at their pleasure, the chiefs to whom they were most attached. Instead of drums or military music, they used, like the ancient Swiss and Scottish soldiers, the horns of cattle for giving signals to their troops. Their officers wore, for distinction, a sort of chequered red handkerchief knotted round their head, with others of the same colour tied round their waist, by way of sash, in which they stuck their pistols.*

The attack of the Vendéans was that of sharpshooters. They dispersed themselves so as to surround their adversaries with a semi-circular fire, maintained by a body of formidable marksmen, accustomed to take aim with fatal precision, and whose skill was the more dreadful, because, being habituated to take advantage of every tree, bush, or point of shelter, those who were dealing destruction amongst others were themselves comparatively free from risk. This manœuvre was termed *s'égailer*; and the execution of it, resembling the Indian bush-fighting, was, like the attack of the Red Warriors, accompanied by whoops and shouts, which seemed, from the extended space through which they resounded, to multiply the number of the assailants.

When the republicans, galled in this manner, pressed forward to a close attack, they found no enemy on which to wreak their vengeance; for the loose array of the Vendéans gave immediate passage to the head of the charging column, while its flanks, as it advanced, were still more exposed than before to the murderous fire of their invisible enemies. In this manner they were sometimes led on from point to point, until the regulars meeting with a barricade, or an *abatis*, or a strong position in front, or becoming perhaps involved in a defile, the Vendéans exchanged their fatal musketry for a close and furious onset, throwing themselves with the most devoted courage among the enemy's ranks, and slaughtering them in great numbers. If, on the other hand, the insurgents were compelled to give way, a pursuit was almost as dangerous to the republicans as an engagement. The Vendean, when hard-pressed, threw away his clogs, or wooden-shoes, of which he could make himself a new pair at the next resting-place, sprang over a fence or canal, loaded his fusée as he ran, and discharged it at the pursuer with a fatal aim, whenever he found opportunity of pausing for that purpose.

This species of combat, which the ground rendered so advantageous to the Vendéans, was equally so in case of victory or defeat. If the republicans were vanquished, their army was nearly destroyed; for the preservation of order became impossible, and without order their extermination was inevitable, while baggage, ammunition, carriages, guns, and all the material part, as it is called, of the de-

* Madame la Roche-Jacquelin mentions an interesting anecdote of a young plebeian, a distinguished officer, whose habits of respect would scarce permit him to sit down in her presence. This cannot be termed servility. It is the noble pride of a generous mind, faithful to its original impressions, and disclaiming the merits which others are ready to heap on it.

* The adoption of this wild costume, which procured them the name of *Brigands*, from its fantastic singularity, originated in the whim of Henri la Roche-Jacquelin, who first used the attire. But as this peculiarity, joined to the venturous exposure of his person, occasioned a general cry among the republicans, of "Aim at the red handkerchief," other officers assumed the fashion to diminish the danger of the chief whom they valued so highly, until at length it became a kind of uniform.

feated army, fell into possession of the conquerors. On the other hand, if the Vendéans sustained a loss, the victors found nothing on the field but the bodies of the slain, and the *sabots*, or wooden-shoes, of the fugitives. The few prisoners whom they made had generally thrown away or concealed their arms, and their army having no baggage or carriages of any kind, could of course lose none. Pursuit was very apt to convert an advantage into a defeat; for the cavalry could not act, and the infantry, dispersed in the chase, became frequent victims to those whom they pursued.

In the field, the Vendéans were courageous to rashness. They hesitated not to attack and carry artillery with no other weapons than their staves; and most of their worst losses proceeded from their attacking fortified towns and positions with the purpose of carrying them by main force. After conquest they were in general humane and merciful. But this depended on the character of their chiefs. At Machecoul, the insurgents conducted themselves with great ferocity in the very beginning of the civil war; and towards the end of it, mutual and reciprocal injuries had so exasperated the parties against each other, that quarter was neither given nor taken on either side. Yet until provoked by the extreme cruelties of the revolutionary party, and unless when conducted by some peculiarly ferocious chief, the character of the Vendéans united clemency with courage. They gave quarter readily to the vanquished, but having no means of retaining prisoners, they usually shaved their heads before they set them at liberty, that they might be distinguished, if found again in arms, contrary to their parole. A no less striking feature was the severity of a discipline respecting property, which was taught them only by their moral sense. No temptation could excite them to pillage; and Madame la Roche-Jacquelin has preserved the following singular instance of their simple honesty:—"After the peasants had taken the town of Bressuire by storm, she overheard two or three of them complain of the want of tobacco, to the use of which they were addicted, like the natives of moist countries in general. "What," said the lady, "is there no tobacco in the shops?"—"Tobacco enough," answered the simple-hearted and honest peasants, who had not learned to make steel supply the want of gold,—"tobacco enough; but we have no money to pay for it."

Amidst these primitive warriors were mingled many gentlemen of the first families in France, who, royalists from principle, had fled to La Vendée rather than submit to the dominion of the Convention, or the Convention's yet more cruel masters. There were found many men, the anecdotes told of whom remind us continually of the age of Henri Quatre, and the heroes of chivalry. In these ranks, and almost on a level with the valiant peasants of which they were composed, fought the calm, steady, and magnanimous Lescure,—d'Elbée, a man of the most distinguished military reputation,—Bonchamp, the gallant and the able officer, who, like the Constable Montmorency, with all his talent, was persecuted by fortune,—the chivalrous Henri la Roche-Jacquelin, whose call upon his soldiers was—"If I fly, slay me—if I advance, follow me—if I fall, avenge me:"

with other names distinguished* in the roll of fame, and not the less so that they have been recorded by the pen of affection.

The object of the insurrection was announced in the title of The Royal and Catholic Army assumed by the Vendéans. In their moments of highest hope their wishes were singularly modest. Had they gained Paris, and replaced the royal authority in France, they meditated the following simple boons:—1. They had resolved to petition, that the name of La Vendée be given to the Bocage and its dependencies, which should be united under a separate administration, instead of forming, as at present a part of three distinct provinces.—2. That the restored monarch would honour the Bocage with a visit.—3. That in remembrance of the loyal services of the country, a white flag should be displayed from each steeple, and the king should add a cohort of Vendéans to his body-guard.—4. That former useful projects of improving the navigation of the Loire and its canals, should be perfected by the government. So little of selfish hope or ambition was connected with the public spirit of these patriarchal warriors.

The war of La Vendée was waged with various fate for nearly two years, during which the insurgents, or brigands as they were termed, gained by far the greater number of advantages, though with means infinitely inferior to those of the government, which detached against them one general after another, at the head of numerous armies, with equally indifferent success. Most of the republicans intrusted with this fatal command suffered by the guillotine, for not having done that which circumstances rendered impossible.

Upwards of two hundred battles and skirmishes were fought in this devoted country. The revolutionary fever was in its access; the shedding of blood seemed to have become positive pleasure to the perpetrators of slaughter, and was varied by each invention which cruelty could invent to give it new zest. The habitations of the Vendéans were destroyed, their families subjected to violation and massacre, their cattle houghed and slaughtered, and their crops burnt and wasted. One republican column assumed and merited the name of the Infernal, by the horrid atrocities which they committed. At Pillau, they roasted the women and children in a heated oven. Many similar horrors could be added, did not the heart and hand recoil from the task. Without quoting any more special instances of horror, we use the words of a republican eye-witness, to express the general spectacle presented by the theatre of civil conflict.

"I did not see a single male being at the towns of St-Amand, Chantonny, or Les Herbiers. A few

* The Memoirs of Madame Bonchamp, and still more those of La Roche-Jacquelin, are remarkable for the virtues of the heart, as well as the talents, which are displayed by their authors. Without affectation, without vanity, without violence or impotent repining, these ladies have described the sanguinary and irregular warfare, in which they and those who were dearest to them were engaged for so long and stormy a period; and we arise from the perusal sadder and wiser, by having learned what the brave can dare, and what the gentle can endure with patience.

women alone had escaped the sword. Country-seats, cottages, habitations of whichever kind, were burnt. The herds and flocks were wandering in terror around their usual places of shelter, now smoking in ruins. I was surprised by night, but the wavering and dismal blaze of conflagration afforded light over the country. To the bleating of the disturbed flocks, and bellowing of the terrified cattle, was joined the deep hoarse notes of carrion crows, and the yells of wild animals coming from the recesses of the woods to prey on the carcasses of the slain. At length a distant column of fire, widening and increasing as I approached, served me as a beacon. It was the town of Mortagne in flames. When I arrived there, no living creatures were to be seen, save a few wretched women, who were striving to save some remnants of their property from the general conflagration.*

Such is civil war; and to this pass had its extremities reduced the smiling, peaceful, and virtuous country, which we have described a few pages before.

It is no wonder, after such events, that the hearts of the peasants became hardened in turn, and that they executed fearful vengeance on those who could not have the face to expect mercy. We read, therefore, without surprise, that the republican general Haro, a man of great military talent, and who had distinguished himself in the Vendean war, shot himself through the head when he saw his army defeated by the insurgents, rather than encounter their vengeance.

During the superiority of the Vendéans, it may be asked why their efforts, so gigantic in themselves, never extended beyond the frontier of their own country; and why an insurrection, so considerable and so sustained, neither made any great impression on the French Convention, where they were spoken of only as a handful of brigands, nor on foreign nations, by whom their existence, far less their success, seems hardly to have been known? On the former subject, it is perhaps sufficient to observe, that the war of the Vendéans, and their mode of conducting it, so formidable in their own country, became almost nugatory when extended into districts of an open character, and affording high-roads and plains, by which cavalry and artillery could act against peasants, who formed no close ranks, and carried no bayonets. Besides, the Vendéans remained bound to their ordinary occupation—they were necessarily children of the soil—and their army usually dispersed after the battle was over, to look after their cattle, cultivate their plot of arable land, and attend to their families. The discipline of their army, in which mere good-will supplied the place of the usual distinctions of rank, would not have been sufficient to keep them united in long and distant marches, and they must have found the want of a commissariat, a train of baggage, field-pieces, a general staff, and all the other accompaniments of a regular army, which in the difficult country of La Vendée, familiar to the natives, and unknown to strangers, could be so easily dispensed with. In

a word, an army which, under circumstances of hope and excitement, might one day amount to thirty or forty thousand, and on the next be diminished to the tenth part of the number, might be excellent for fighting battles, but could not be relied on for making conquests, or securing the advantages of victory.

It is not but that a man of d'Elbée's knowledge in the art of war, who acted as one of their principal leaders, meditated higher objects for the Vendéans than merely the defence of their own province.

A superb prospect offered itself to them by a meditated attack on the town of Nantes. Upon the success of this attempt turned perhaps the fate of the Revolution. This beautiful and important commercial city is situated on the right bank of the Loire, which is there a fine navigable river, about twenty-seven miles from its junction with the sea. It is without fortifications of any regular description, but had a garrison of perhaps ten thousand men, and was covered by such hasty works of defence as time had permitted them to erect. The force of the Vendéans by which it was attacked has been estimated so high as thirty or forty thousand men under d'Elbée, while the place was blockaded on the left bank by Charette, and an army of royalists equal in number to the actual assailants. Had this important place been gained, it would probably have changed the face of the war. One or more of the French princes might have resorted there with such adherents as they had then in arms. The Loire was open to succours from England, the indecision of whose cabinet might have been determined by a success so important. Bretagne and Normandy, already strongly disposed to the royal cause, would have, upon such encouragement, risen in mass upon the republicans; and as Poitou and Anjou were already in possession of the royal and catholic army, they might probably have opened a march upon Paris, distracted as the capital then was by civil and foreign war.

Accordingly,* the rockets which were thrown up, and the sound of innumerable bugle-horns, intimated to General Canclaux, who commanded the town, that he was to repel a general attack of the Vendéans. Fortunately for the infant Republic, he was a man of military skill and high courage, and by his dexterous use of such means of defence as the place afforded, and particularly by a great superiority of artillery, he was enabled to baffle the attacks of the Vendéans, although they penetrated, with the utmost courage, into the suburbs, and engaged at close quarters the republican troops. They were compelled to retreat after a fierce combat, which lasted from three in the morning till four in the afternoon.†

* 18th June, 1793.

† A picture by Vernet, representing the attack on Nantes, estimable as a work of art, but extremely curious in a historical point of view, used to be in the Luxembourg Palace, and is probably now removed to the Louvre. The Vendéans are presented there in all their simplicity of attire, and devoted valour; the priests who attended them displaying their crosses, and encouraging the assault, which is, on the other hand, repelled by the regular steadiness of the republican forces.

* *Mémoires d'un ancien Administrateur des Armées républicaines.*

At different times after the failure of this bold and well-imagined attempt, opportunities occurred during which the allies, and the English government in particular, might have thrown important succours into La Vendée. The island of Noirmoutier was for some time in possession of the royalists, when arms and money might have been supplied to them to any amount. Auxiliary forces would probably have been of little service, considering in what sort of country they were to be engaged, and with what species of troops they were to act. At least it would have required the talents of a Peterborough or a Montrose, in a foreign commander, to have freed himself sufficiently from the trammels of military pedantry, and availed himself of the peculiar qualities of such troops as the Vendéans, irresistible after their own fashion, but of a character the most opposite possible to the ideas of excellence entertained by a mere martinet.

But it is now well known, there was a division in the British cabinet concerning the mode of carrying on the war. Pitt was extremely unwilling to interfere with the internal government of France. He desired to see the Barrier of Flanders (so foolishly thrown open by the Emperor Joseph) again re-established, and he hoped, from the success of the allied arms, that this might be attained,—that the French lust for attacking their neighbours might be ended—their wildness for crusading in the cause of innovation checked, and some political advances to a regular government effected. On the other hand, the enthusiastic, ingenious, but somewhat extravagant opinions of Windham, led him to espouse those of Burke in their utmost extent; and he recommended to England, as to Europe, the replacing the Bourbons, with the ancient royal government and constitution, as the fundamental principle on which the war should be waged. This variance of opinion so far divided the British counsels, that, as it proved, no sufficient efforts were made, either on the one line of conduct or the other.

Indeed, Madame la Roche-Jacquelin (who, however, we are apt to think, has been in some degree misled in her account of that matter) says, the only dispatches received by the Vendéans from the British cabinet, indicated a singular ignorance of the state of La Vendée, which was certainly near enough to Jersey and Guernsey, to have afforded the means of obtaining accurate information upon the nature and principles of the Vendean insurrection.

The leaders of the royal and catholic army received their first communication from Britain through a royalist emissary, the Chevalier de Tinténac, who carried them concealed in the wadding of his pistols, addressed to a supposed chief named Gaston, whose name had scarce been known among them. In this document they were required to say for what purpose they were in arms, whether in behalf of the old government, or of the constitution of 1791, or the principles of the girondists? These were strange questions to be asked of men who had been in the field as pure royalists for more than five months, who might have reasonably hoped that the news of their numerous and important victories had resounded through all Europe, but must at least have expect-

ed they should be well known to those neighbours of France who were at war with her present government. Assistance was promised, but in a general and indelusive way; nor did the testimony of Monsieur de Tinténac give his friends much assurance that it was seriously proposed. In fact, no support ever arrived until after the first pacification of La Vendée. The ill-fated expedition to Quiberon, delayed until the cause of royalty was nigh hopeless, was at length undertaken, when its only consequence was that of involving in absolute destruction a multitude of brave and high-spirited men. But on looking back on a game so doubtful, it is easy to criticise the conduct of the players; and perhaps no blunder in war or politics is so common, as that which arises from missing the proper moment of exertion.

The French, although more able to seize the advantageous opportunity than we (for their government being always in practice something despotic, is at liberty to act more boldly, secretly, and decisively, than that of England), are nevertheless chargeable with similar errors. If the English cabinet missed the opportunities given by the insurrection of La Vendée, the French did not more actively improve those afforded by the Irish rebellion; and if we had to regret the too tardy and unhappy expedition to Quiberon, they in their turn might repent having thrown away the troops whom they landed at Castlehaven, after the pacification of Ireland, for the sole purpose, it would seem, of surrendering at Ballinamuck.

It is yet more wonderful, that a country whose dispositions were so loyal, and its local advantages so strong, should not have been made by the royalists in general the centre of those counter-revolutionary exertions which were vainly expended on the iron eastern frontier, where the fine army of Condé wasted their blood about paltry frontier redoubts and fortresses. The nobles and gentlemen of France, fighting abreast with the gallant peasants of La Vendée, inspired with the same sentiments of loyalty with themselves, would have been more suitably placed than in the mercenary ranks of foreign nations. It is certain that the late king, Louis XVIII., and also his present majesty, were desirous to have exposed their persons in the war of La Vendée. The former wrote to the Duke d'Harcourt—"What course remains for me but La Vendée?—Who can place me there?—England—Insist upon that point: and tell the English ministers in my name, that I demand from them a crown or a tomb." If there were a serious intention of supporting these unfortunate princes, the means of this experiment ought to have been afforded them, and that upon no stinted scale. The error of England, through all the early part of the war, was an unwillingness to proportion her efforts to the importance of the ends she had in view.

Looking upon the various chances which might have befriended the unparalleled exertions of the Vendéans, considering the generous, virtuous, and disinterested character of those primitive soldiers, it is with sincere sorrow that we proceed to trace their extermination by the blood-thirsty ruffians of the reign of terror. Yet the course of Providence,

after the lapse of time, is justified even in our weak and undiscerning eyes. We should indeed have read with hearts throbbing with the just feelings of gratified vengeance, that Charette or La Roche-Jacquelin had successfully achieved, at the head of their gallant adherents, the road to Paris—had broke in upon Committees of Public Safety and Public Security, like Thalaba the Destroyer into the Dom-Daniel; and with the same dreadful result to the agents of the horrors with which these revolutionary bodies had deluged France. But such a reaction, accomplished solely for the purpose of restoring the old despotic monarchy, could not have brought peace to France or to Europe—nay, could only have laid a foundation for farther and more lasting quarrels. The flame of liberty had been too widely spread in France to be quenched even by such a triumph of royalty as we have supposed, however pure the principles and high the spirit of the Vendéans. It was necessary that the nation should experience both the extremes of furious license and of stern despotism, to fix the hopes of the various contending parties upon a form of government in which a limited power in the monarch should be united to the enjoyment of all rational freedom in the subject. We return to our sad task.

Notwithstanding the desolating mode in which the republicans conducted the war, with the avowed purpose of rendering La Vendée uninhabitable, the population seemed to increase in courage, and even in numbers, as their situation became more desperate. Renewed armies were sent into the devoted district, and successively destroyed in assaults, skirmishes, and ambuscades, where they were not slaughtered in general actions. More than a hundred thousand men were employed at one time in their efforts to subjugate this devoted province.—But this could not last for ever; and a chance of war upon the frontiers, which threatened reverses to the Convention, compensated them by furnishing new forces, and of a higher description in point of character and discipline, for the subjection of La Vendée.

This was the surrender of the town of Mentz to the Prussians. By the capitulation, a garrison of near fifteen thousand experienced soldiers, and some officers of considerable name, were debarr'd from again bearing arms against the allies. These troops were employed in La Vendée, where the scale had already begun to preponderate against the dauntless and persevering insurgents. At the first encounters the soldiers of Mentz, unacquainted with the Vendéan mode of fighting, sustained loss, and were thought lightly of by the royalists.* This opinion of their new adversaries was changed in consequence of a defeat near Chollet, more dreadful in its consequences than any which the Vendéans had yet received, and which determined their generals to pass the Loire with their whole collected force, leave their beloved Bocage to the axes and brands of the victors, and carry the war into Bretagne, where they expected either to be supported by a

descent of the English, or by a general insurrection of the inhabitants.

In this military emigration the royalists were accompanied by their aged people, their wives, and their children; so that their melancholy march resembled that of the Cimbrians or Helvetians of old, when, abandoning their ancient dwellings, they wandered forth to find new settlements in a more fertile land. They crossed the river near St-Florent, and the banks were blackened with nearly a hundred thousand pilgrims of both sexes, and of every age. The broad river was before them, and behind them their burning cottages and the exterminating sword of the republicans. The means of embarkation were few and precarious; the affright of the females almost ungovernable; and such was the tumult and terror of the scene, that, in the words of Madame la Roche-Jacquelin, the awe-struck spectators could only compare it to the day of judgment. Without food, directions, or organization of any kind—without the show of an army, saving in the front and rear of the column, the centre consisting of their defenceless families marching together in a mass—these indomitable peasants defeated a republican army under the walls of Laval.

The garrison of Mentz, whose arrival in La Vendée had been so fatal to the insurgents, and who had pursued them in a state of rout, as they thought, out of their own country, across the Loire, were almost exterminated in this most unexpected defeat. An unsuccessful attack upon Granville more than counterbalanced this advantage, and although the Vendéans afterwards obtained a brilliant victory at Dol, it was the last success of what was termed the Great Army of La Vendée, and which well deserved that title, on more accounts than in its more ordinary sense. They had now lost, by the chances of war, most of their best chiefs; and misfortunes, and the exasperating feelings attending them, had introduced disunion, which had been so long a stranger to their singular association. Charette was reflected upon as being little willing to aid La Roche-Jacquelin; and Stofflet seems to have set up an independent standard. The insurgents were defeated at Mons, where of three republican generals of name, Westermann, Marceau, and Kléber, the first disgraced himself by savage cruelty, and the other two gained honour by their clemency. Fifteen thousand male and female natives of La Vendée perished in the battle and the massacre which ensued.

But though La Vendée, after this decisive loss, which included some of her best troops and bravest generals, could hardly be said to exist, Charette continued, with indefatigable diligence, and undaunted courage, to sustain the insurrection of Lower Poitou and Bretagne. He was followed by a division of peasants from the Marais, whose activity in marshy grounds gave them similar advantages to those possessed by the Vendéans in their woodlands. He was followed also by the inhabitants of Morbihan, called, from their adherence to royalism, the Little Vendée. He was the leader, besides, of many of the bands called Chouans, a name of doubtful origin given to the insurgents of Bretagne, but which their courage has rendered celebrated.*

* Some derived it from *Chat-huant*, as if the insurgents,

* They punned on the word *Meyence* (Mentz), and said, the newly arrived republicans were soldiers of *sayence* (potter's ware), which could not endure the fire.

Charette himself, who, with these and other forces, continued to sustain the standard of royalty in Bretagne and Poitou, was one of those extraordinary characters, made to shine amidst difficulties and dangers. As prudent and cautious as he was courageous and adventurous, he was at the same time so alert and expeditious in his motions, that he usually appeared at the time and place where his presence was least expected and most formidable. A republican officer, who had just taken possession of a village, and was speaking of the royalist leader as of a person at twenty leagues' distance, said publicly,—"I should like to see this famous Charette."—"There he is," said a woman, pointing with her finger. In fact, he was at that moment in the act of charging the republican troops, who were all either slain or made prisoners.

After the fall of Robespierre, the Convention made offers of pacification to Charette, which were adjusted betwixt the Vendean chief and General Canclaux, the heroic defender of Nantes. The articles of treaty were subscribed in that place, which Charette entered at the head of his military staff, with his long white plume streaming in the wind. He heard with coldness shouts of welcome from a city, to which his name had been long a terror; and there was a gloom on his brow as he signed his name to the articles agreed upon. He certainly suspected the faith of those with whom he transacted, and they did not by any means confide in him. An armistice was agreed on until the Convention should ratify the pacification. But this never took place. Mutual complaints and recriminations followed, and the soldiers of Charette and of the Republic began once more to make a petty war on each other.

Meantime, that party in the British cabinet which declared for a descent on France, in name and on behalf of the successor to the crown, had obtained the acquiescence of their colleagues in an experiment of this nature; but unhappily it had been postponed until its success had become impossible. The force, too, which composed this experimental operation, was injudiciously selected. A certain proportion consisted of emigrants, in whom the highest confidence might be with justice reposed; but about two battalions of this invading expedition were vagrant foreigners of various descriptions, many or most of them enlisted from among the prisoners of war, who readily took any engagement to get out of captivity, with the mental resolution of breaking it the first opportunity. Besides these imprudences, the purpose and time of executing a project, which, to be successful, should have been secret and sudden, were generally known in France and England before the expedition weighed anchor.

The event, as is universally known, was most disastrous: The mercenaries deserted to the republicans as soon as they got ashore; And the unfortunate emigrants, who became prisoners in great numbers, were condemned and executed without mercy. The ammunition and muskets, of which a

quantity had been landed, fell into the hands of the enemy; and, what was worse, England did not, among other lighter losses, entirely save her honour. She was severely censured as giving up her allies to destruction, because she had yielded to the wishes which enthusiastic and courageous men had elevated into hope.

Nothing, indeed, can be more difficult, than to state the just extent of support which can prudently be extended by one nation to a civil faction in the bosom of another. Indeed, nothing short of success—absolute success—will prove the justification of such enterprises in the eyes of some, who will allege, in the event of failure, that men have been enticed into perils, in which they have not been adequately supported; or of others, who will condemn such measures as squandering the public resources, in enterprises which ought not to have been encouraged at all. But in fair judgment, the expedition of Quiberon ought not to be summarily condemned. It was neither inadequate, nor, excepting as to the description of some of the forces employed, ill calculated for the service proposed. Had such reinforcements and supplies arrived while the royalists were attacking Nantes or Grenoble, or while they yet held the island of Noirmoutier, the good consequences to the royal cause might have been incalculable. But the expedition was ill-timed, and that was in a great measure owing to those unfortunate gentlemen engaged, who, impatient of inactivity, and sanguine by character, urged the British ministry, or rather Mr Windham, to authorize the experiment, without fully considering more than their own zeal and courage. We cannot, however, go so far as to say, that their impatience relieved ministers from the responsibility attached to the indifferently intelligence on which they acted. There could be no difficulty in getting full information on the state of Bretagne by way of Jersey; and they ought to have known that there was a strong French force collected from various garrisons, for the purpose of guarding against a descent at Quiberon.*

After this unfortunate affair, and some subsequent vain attempts to throw in supplies on the part of the English, Charette still continued in open war. But Hoche, an officer of high reputation, was now sent into the disturbed districts, with a larger army than had yet been employed against them. He was thus enabled to form moveable columns, which acted in concert, supporting each other when unsuccessful, or completing each other's victory when such was obtained. Charette, after his band was almost entirely destroyed, was himself made prisoner. Being

* We can and ought to make great allowances for national feeling; yet it is a little hard to find a well-informed historian, like Monsieur Lacretelle, gravely insinuate that England threw the unfortunate royalists on the coast of Quiberon to escape the future burthen of maintaining them. Her liberality towards the emigrants, honourable and meritorious to the country, was entirely gratuitous. She might have withdrawn when she pleased a bounty conferred by her benevolence; and it is rather too hard to be supposed capable of meditating their murder, merely to save the expense of supporting them. The expedition was a blunder, but one in which the unfortunate sufferers contributed to mislead the British government.

like owls, appeared chiefly at night—others traced it to *Chouans*, the name of two brothers, said to have been the earliest leaders of the Breton insurgents.

condemned to be shot, he refused to have his eyes covered, and died as courageously as he had lived. With him and Stoffet, who suffered a similar fate, the war of La Vendée terminated.

To trace this remarkable civil war, even so slightly as we have attempted the task, has carried us beyond the course of our narrative. It broke out in the beginning of March, 1793, and Charette's execution, by which it was closed, took place at Nantes, 29th March, 1796. The astonishing part of the matter is, that so great a conflagration should not have extended itself beyond a certain limited district, while within that region it raged with such fury, that for a length of time no means of extinguishing it could be discovered.

We now return to the state of France in spring, 1793, when the jacobins, who had possessed themselves of the supreme power of the Republic, found that they had to contend, not only with the allied forces on two frontiers of France, and with the royalists in the west, but also with more than one of the great commercial towns, which, with less inclination to the monarchical cause, than a general terror of revolutionary measures, prepared for resistance after the proscription of the girondists upon the 31st of May.

Bordeaux, Marseilles, Toulon, and Lyons, had declared themselves against the jacobin supremacy. Rich from commerce and their maritime situation, and, in the case of Lyons, from their command of internal navigation, the wealthy merchants and manufacturers of those cities foresaw the total insecurity of property, and in consequence their own ruin, in the system of arbitrary spoliation and murder upon which the government of the jacobins was founded. But property, for which they were solicitous, though, if its natural force is used in time, the most powerful barrier to withstand revolution, becomes, after a certain period of delay, its most helpless victim. If the rich are in due season liberal of their means, they have the power of enlisting in their cause, and as adherents, those among the lower orders, who, if they see their superiors dejected and despairing, will be tempted to consider them as objects of plunder. But this must be done early, or those who might be made the most active defenders of property will join with such as are prepared to make a prey of it.

We have already seen that Bordeaux, in which the brissotins or girondists had ventured to hope for a zeal purely republican, at once adverse to royalty and to jacobin domination, had effectually disappointed their expectations, and succumbed with little struggle under the ferocious victors.

Marseilles showed at once her good-will and her impotency of means. The utmost exertions of that wealthy city, whose revolutionary band had contributed so much to the downfall of the monarchy in the attack on the Tuileries, were able to equip only a small and doubtful army of about 3,000 men, who were dispatched to the relief of Lyons. This inconsiderable army threw themselves into Avignon, and were defeated with the utmost ease, by the republican general Cartaux, despicable as a military officer, and whose forces would not have stood a

single *égalitément* of the Vendean sharp-shooters. Marseilles received the victors, and bowed her head to the subsequent horrors which it pleased Cartaux, with two formidable jacobins, Barras and Fréron, to inflict on that flourishing city. The place underwent the usual terrors of jacobin purification, and was for a time affectively called "the nameless commune."

Lyons made a more honourable stand. That noble city had been subjected for some time to the domination of Châlier, one of the most ferocious, and at the same time one of the most extravagantly absurd, of the jacobins. He was at the head of a formidable club, which was worthy of being affiliated with the mother society, and ambitious of treading in its footsteps; and he was supported by a garrison of two revolutionary regiments, besides a numerous artillery, and a large addition of volunteers, amounting in all to about ten thousand men, forming what was called a revolutionary army. This Châlier was an apostate priest, an atheist, and a thorough-paced pupil in the school of terror. He had been created Procureur of the Community, and had imposed on the wealthy citizens a tax, which was raised from six to thirty millions of livres. But blood as well as gold was his object. The massacre of a few priests and aristocrats confined in the fortress of Pierre-Ancise, was a pitiful sacrifice; and Châlier, ambitious of deeds more decisive, caused a general arrest of a hundred principal citizens, whom he destined as a hecatomb more worthy of the demon whom he served.

This sacrifice was prevented by the courage of the Lyonnais; a courage which, if assumed by the Parisians, might have prevented most of the horrors which disgraced the Revolution. The meditated slaughter was already announced by Châlier to the Jacobin Club. "Three hundred heads," he said, "are marked for slaughter. Let us lose no time in seizing the persons of the departmental office-bearers, the presidents and secretaries of the sections, all the local authorities who obstruct our revolutionary measures. Let us make one fagot of the whole, and deliver them at once to the guillotine."

But ere he could execute his threat, terror was awakened into the courage of despair. The citizens rose in arms and besieged the Hôtel de Ville, in which Châlier, and his revolutionary troops, made a desperate, and for some time a successful, yet ultimately a vain defence.* But the Lyonnais unhappily knew not how to avail themselves of their triumph. They were not sufficiently aware of the nature of the vengeance which they had provoked, or of the necessity of supporting the bold step which they had taken, by measures which precluded a compromise. Their resistance to the violence and atrocity of the jacobins had no political character, any more than that offered by the traveler against robbers who threaten him with plunder and murder. They were not sufficiently aware, that, having done so much, they must necessarily do more. They ought, by declaring themselves royalists, to have endeavoured to prevail on the troops of Savoy, if not

* 29th May, 1793.

on the Swiss (who had embraced a species of neutrality, which, after the 10th of August, was dishonourable to their ancient reputation), to send in all haste soldiery to the assistance of a city which had no fortifications or regular troops to defend it; but which possessed, nevertheless, treasures to pay their auxiliaries, and strong hands and able officers to avail themselves of the localities of their situation, which, when well defended, are sometimes as formidable as the regular protection erected by scientific engineers.

The people of Lyons vainly endeavoured to establish a revolutionary character for themselves, upon the system of the Gironde, two of whose proscribed deputies tried to draw them over to their unpopular and hopeless cause; and they inconsistently sought protection by affecting a republican zeal, even while resisting the decrees, and defeating the troops, of the jacobins. There were undoubtedly many of royalist principles among the insurgents, and some of their leaders were decidedly such; but these were not numerous or influential enough to establish the true principle of open resistance, and the ultimate chance of rescue, by a bold proclamation of the king's interest. They still appealed to the Convention as their legitimate sovereign, in whose eyes they endeavoured to vindicate themselves, and at the same time tried to secure the interest of two jacobin deputies, who had countenanced every violence attempted by Châlier, that they might prevail upon them to represent their conduct favourably. Of course they had enough of promises to this effect, while Messrs Gautier and Nioche, the deputies in question, remained in their power; promises, doubtless, the more readily given, that the Lyonnais, though desirous to conciliate the favour of the Convention, did not hesitate in proceeding to the punishment of the jacobin Châlier. He was condemned and executed, along with one of his principal associates, termed *Reard*.

To defend these vigorous proceedings, the unhappy insurgents placed themselves under the interim government of a council, who, still desirous to temporize and maintain the revolutionary character, termed themselves "The Popular and Republican Commission of Public Safety of the Department of the Rhone and Loire;" a title which, while it excited no popular enthusiasm, and attracted no foreign aid, no ways soothed, but rather exasperated, the resentment of the Convention, now under the absolute domination of the jacobins, by whom everything short of complete fraternization was accounted presumptuous defiance. Those who were not with them, it was their policy to hold as their most decided enemies.

The Lyonnais had indeed letters of encouragement, and promised concurrence, from several departments; but no effectual support was ever directed towards their city, excepting the petty reinforcement from Marseilles, which we have seen was intercepted and dispersed with little trouble by the jacobin general Cartaux.

Lyons had expected to become the patroness and focus of an anti-jacobin league, formed by the great commercial towns, against Paris and the predominant part of the Convention. She found herself

isolated and unsupported, and left to oppose her own proper forces and means of defence, to an army of sixty thousand men, and to the numerous jacobins contained within her own walls. About the end of July, after a lapse of an interval of two months, a regular blockade was formed around the city, and in the first week of August hostilities took place. The besieging army was directed in its military character by General Kellermann, who, with other distinguished soldiers, had now begun to hold an eminent rank in the republican armies. But for the purpose of executing the vengeance for which they thirsted, the jacobins relied chiefly on the exertions of the deputies they had sent along with the commander, and especially of the representative Dubois Crancé, a man whose sole merit appears to have been his frantic jacobinism. General Précy, formerly an officer in the royal service, undertook the almost hopeless task of defence, and, by forming redoubts on the most commanding situations around the town, commenced a resistance against the immensely superior force of the besiegers, which was honourable if it could have been useful. The Lyonnais, at the same time, still endeavoured to make fair weather with the besieging army, by representing themselves as firm republicans. They celebrated as a public festival the anniversary of the 10th of August, while Dubois Crancé, to show the credit he gave them for their republican zeal, fixed the same day for commencing his fire on the place, and caused the first gun to be discharged by his own concubine, a female born in Lyons. Bombs and red hot bullets were next resorted to, against the second city of the French empire: while the besieged sustained the attack with a constancy, and on many parts repelled it with a courage, highly honourable to their character.

But their fate was determined. The deputies announced to the Convention their purpose of pouring their instruments of havoc on every quarter of the town at once, and when it was on fire in several places to attempt a general storm. "The city," they said, "must surrender, or there shall not remain one stone upon another, and this we hope to accomplish in spite of the suggestions of false compassion. Do not then be surprised when you shall hear that Lyons exists no longer." The fury of the attack threatened to make good these promises.

In the meantime the Piedmontese troops made a show of descending from their mountains to the succour of the city, and it is probable their interference would have given a character of royalism to the insurrection. But the incursion of the Piedmontese and Sardinians was speedily repelled by the skill of Kellermann, and produced no effect in favour of the city of Lyons, except that of supporting for a time the courage of its defenders.

The sufferings of the citizens became intolerable. Several quarters of the city were on fire at the same time, immense magazines were burnt to the ground, and a loss incurred, during two nights' bombardment, which was calculated at two hundred millions of livres. A black flag was hoisted by the besieged on the Great Hospital, as a sign that the fire of the assailants should not be directed on that asylum of hopeless misery. The signal seemed only to draw

the republican bombs to the spot where they could create the most frightful distress, and outrage in the highest degree the feelings of humanity. The devastations of famine were soon added to those of slaughter; and after two months of such horrors had been sustained, it became obvious that farther resistance was impossible.

The military commandant of Lyons, Pr cy, resolved upon a sally, at the head of the active part of the garrison, hoping that, by cutting his way through the besiegers, he might save the lives of many of those who followed him in the desperate attempt, and gain the neutral territory of Switzerland, while the absence of those who had been actual combatants during the siege, might, in some degree, incline the Convention to lenient measures towards the more helpless part of the inhabitants. A column of about two thousand men made this desperate attempt. But pursued by the republicans, and attacked on every side by the peasants, to whom they had been represented in the most odious colours by the jacobin deputies, and who were stimulated besides by the hope of plunder, scarcely fifty of the devoted body reached, with their leader, the protecting soil of Switzerland. Lyons reluctantly opened her gates after the departure of her best and bravest. The rest may be described in the words of Horace,—

*Barbarus heu cineres insistet victor, et urbem,
dissipabit insensum.*

The paralytic Conthon, with Collot d'Herbois, and other deputies, were sent to Lyons by the Committee of Public Safety, to execute the vengeance which the jacobins demanded; while Dubois Cranc  was recalled, for having put, it was thought, less energy in his proceedings than the prosecution of the siege required. Collot d'Herbois had a personal motive of a singular nature for delighting in the task intrusted to him and his colleagues. In his capacity of a play actor, he had been hissed from the stage at Lyons, and the door to revenge was now open. The instructions of this committee enjoined them to take the most satisfactory revenge for the death of Ch lier, and the insurrection of Lyons, not merely on the citizens, but on the town itself. The principal streets and buildings were to be leveled with the ground, and a monument, erected where they stood, was to record the cause;—

“ Lyons rebelled against the Republic—Lyons is no more.” Such fragments of the town as might be permitted to remain, were to bear the name of Ville Affranchie. It will scarce be believed, that a doom like that which might have passed the lips of some Eastern despot, in all the frantic madness of arbitrary power and utter ignorance, could have been seriously pronounced, and as seriously enforced, in one of the most civilized nations in Europe; and that in the present enlightened age, men who pretended to wisdom and philosophy, should have considered the labours of the architect as a proper subject of punishment. So it was, however; and to give the demolition more effect, the impotent Conthon was carried from house to house, devoting each to ruin, by striking the door with a silver hammer, and pronouncing these words—“House of a

rebel; I condemn thee in the name of the law.” Workmen followed in great multitudes, who executed the sentence by pulling the house down to the foundations. This wanton demolition continued for six months, and is said to have been carried on at an expense equal to that which the superb military hospital, the H tel des Invalides, cost its founder, Louis XIV. But republican vengeance did not waste itself exclusively upon senseless lime and stone—it sought out sentient victims.

The deserved death of Ch lier had been atoned by an apotheosis, executed after Lyons had surrendered; but Collot d'Herbois declared that every drop of that patriotic blood fell as if scalding his own heart, and that the murder demanded atonement. All ordinary process, and every usual mode of execution, was thought too tardy to avenge the death of a jacobin proconsul. The judges of the revolutionary commission were worn out with fatigue—the arm of the executioner was weary—the very steel of the guillotine was blunted. Collot d'Herbois devised a more summary mode of slaughter. A number of from two to three hundred victims at once were dragged from prison to the Place des Brotteaux, one of the largest squares in Lyons, and there subjected to a fire of grape-shot. Efficacious as this mode of execution may seem, it was neither speedy nor merciful. The sufferers fell to the ground like singed flies, mutilated but not slain, and imploring their executioners to dispatch them speedily. This was done with sabres and bayonets, and with such haste and zeal, that some of the jailers and assistants were slain along with those whom they had assisted in dragging to death; and the mistake was not discerned, until, upon counting the dead bodies, the military murderers found them amount to more than the destined tale. The bodies of the dead were thrown into the Rh ne, to carry news of the republican vengeance, as Collot d'Herbois expressed himself, to Toulon, then also in a state of revolt. But the sullen stream rejected the office imposed on it, and heaved back the dead in heaps upon the banks; and the Committee of Representatives was compelled at length to allow the relics of their cruelty to be interred, to prevent the risk of contagion.

The people of the south of France have always been distinguished by the vivacity of their temperament. As cruelties beget retaliation, it may be as well here mentioned, that upon the fall of the jacobins, the people of Lyons forgot not what indeed was calculated for eternal remembrance, and took by violence a severe and sanguinary vengeance on those who had been accessory to the atrocities of Couthon and Collot d'Herbois. They rose on the jacobins after the fall of Robespierre, and put to death several of them.

Toulon, important by its port, its arsenals, and naval yard, as well as by its fortifications both on the sea and land side, had partaken deeply in the feelings which pervaded Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Lyons. But the insurgents of Toulon were determined royalist. The place had been for some time subjected to the administration of a Jacobin Club, and had seen the usual quantity of murders and excesses with the greater pain, that the town con-

tained many naval officers and others who had served under the king, and retained their affection for the royal cause. Their dissatisfaction did not escape the notice of men, to whom every sullen look was cause of suspicion, and the slightest cause of suspicion a ground of death. The town being threatened with a complete purification after the jacobin fashion, the inhabitants resolved to anticipate the blow.

At the dead of night the tocsin was sounded by the citizens, who dispersed the Jacobin Club, seized on the two representatives who had governed its proceedings, arrested seven or eight jacobins, who had been most active in the previous assassinations, and, in spite of some opposition, actually executed them. With more decision than the inhabitants of Lyons, they proceeded to proclaim Louis XVII. under the constitution of 1791. Cartaux presently marched upon the insurgent city, driving before him the Marseillais, whom, as before-mentioned, he had defeated upon their march towards Lyons. Alarmed at this movement, and destitute of a garrison which they could trust, the Toulonnais implored the assistance of the English and Spanish admirals, Lord Hood and Gravina, who were cruising off their port. It was instantly granted, and marines were sent on shore for their immediate protection, while efforts were made to collect from the different allied powers such a supply of troops, as could be immediately thrown into the place. But the event of the siege of Toulon brings our general historical sketch into connexion with the life of that wonderful person, whose actions we have undertaken to record. It was during this siege that the light was first distinguished, which, broadening more and more, and blazing brighter and brighter, was at length to fill with its lustre the whole hemisphere of Europe, and was then to set with a rapidity equal to that with which it had arisen.

Ere, however, we produce this first-rate actor upon the stage, we must make the reader still more particularly acquainted with the spirit of the scene.

CHAPTER XVI.

Views of the British cabinet regarding the French Revolution.—Extraordinary situation of France.—Explanation of the anomaly which it exhibited.—System of terror.—Committee of Public Safety.—Of Public Security.—David the painter.—Law against suspected persons.—Revolutionary Tribunal.—Effects of the emigration of the princes and nobles.—Causes of the passiveness of the French people under the tyranny of the jacobins.—Singular address of the Committee of Public Safety.—General reflections.

It has been a maxim with great statesmen, that evil governments must end by becoming their own destruction, according to the maxim, *Res nolunt diu male administrari*. Pitt himself was of opinion, that the fury of the French Revolution would wear itself out; and that it already presented so few of the advantages and privileges of social compact, that it seemed as if its political elements must either altogether dissolve, or assume a new form more similar to that on which all other states and governments rest their stability. It was on this ac-

count that this great English statesman declined assisting, in plain and open terms, the royal cause, and desired to keep England free from any pledge concerning the future state of government in France, aware of the danger of involving her in any declared and avowed interference with the right of a people to chuse their own system. However anxious to prevent the revolutionary opinions, as well as arms, from extending beyond their own frontier, it was thought in the British cabinet, by one large party, that the present frantic excess of republican principles must, of itself, produce a reaction in favour of more moderate sentiments. Some steady system for the protection of life and property was, it was said, essential to the very existence of society. The French nation must assume such, and renounce the prosecution of those revolutionary doctrines, for the sake of their own as well as of other countries. The arrangement must, it was thought, take place, from the inevitable course of human affairs, which, however they may fluctuate, are uniformly determined at length by the interest of the parties concerned.

Such was the principle assumed by many great statesmen, whose sagacity was unhappily baffled by the event. In fact, it was calculating upon the actions and personal exertions of a raving madman, as if he had been under the regulation of his senses, and acting upon principles of self-regard and self-preservation. France continued not only to subsist, but to be victorious, without a government, unless the revolutionary committees and jacobin clubs could be accounted such—for the Convention was sunk into a mere engine of that party, and sanctioned whatever they proposed; without religion, which, as we shall see, they formally abolished; without municipal laws or rights, except that any one of the ruling party might do what mischief he would, while citizens, less distinguished for patriotism, were subjected, for any cause, or no cause, to loss of liberty, property, and life itself; without military discipline, for officers might be dragged from their regiments, and generals from their armies, on the information of their own soldiers; without revenues of state, for the depression of the assignats was extreme; without laws, for there were no ordinary tribunals left to appeal to; without colonies, ships, manufactories, or commerce; without fine arts, any more than those which were useful:—in short, France continued to subsist, and to achieve victories, although apparently forsaken of God, and deprived of all the ordinary resources of human wisdom.

The whole system of society, indeed, appeared only to retain some appearances of cohesion from mere habit, the same which makes trained horses draw up in something like order, even without their riders, if the trumpet is sounded. And yet in foreign wars, notwithstanding the deplorable state of the interior, the Republic was not only occasionally, but permanently and triumphantly victorious. She was like the champion in Berni's romance, who was so delicately sliced asunder by one of the Paladins, that he went on fighting, and slew other warriors, without discovering for a length of time that he was himself killed.

All this extraordinary energy was, in one word,

the effect of TERROR. Death—a grave—are sounds which awaken the strongest efforts in those whom they menace. There was never anywhere, save in France during this melancholy period, so awful a comment on the expression of Scripture, "All that a man hath he will give for his life." Force, immediate and irresistible force, was the only logic used by the government—Death was the only appeal from their authority—the guillotine the all-sufficing argument, which settled each debate betwixt them and the governed.

Was the exchequer low, the guillotine filled it with the effects of the wealthy, who were judged aristocratical in exact proportion to the extent of their property. Were these supplies insufficient, diminished as they were by peculation ere they reached the public coffers, the assignats remained, which might be multiplied to any quantity. Did the paper medium of circulation fall in the market to fifty under the hundred, the guillotine was ready to punish those who refused to exchange it at par. A few examples of such jobbers in the public funds made men glad to give one hundred francs for state money, which they knew to be worth no more than fifty. Was bread wanting, corn was to be found by the same compendious means, and distributed among the Parisians, as among the ancient citizens of Rome, at a regulated price. The guillotine was a key to storehouses, barns, and granaries.

Did the army want recruits, the guillotine was ready to exterminate all conscripts who should hesitate to march. On the generals of the republican army, this decisive argument, which, *a priori*, might have been deemed less applicable, in all its rigour, to them than to others, was possessed of the most exclusive authority. They were beheaded for want of success, which may seem less different from the common course of affairs; * but they were also guillotined when their successes were not improved to the full expectations of their masters.† Nay, they were guillotined, when, being too successful, they were suspected of having acquired over the soldiers who had conquered under them, an interest dangerous to those who had the command of this all-sufficing reason of state.** Even mere mediocrity, and a limited but regular discharge of duty, neither so brilliant as to incur jealousy, nor so important as to draw down censure, was no protection.‡ There was no rallying point against this General, and very simple system—of main force.

The Vendéens, who tried the open and manly mode of generous and direct resistance, were, as

* The fate of Custine illustrates this,—a general who had done much for the Republic, and who, when his fortune began to fail him, excused himself by saying, Fortune was a woman, and his hairs were growing grey.

† Witness Houchard, who performed the distinguished service of raising the siege of Dunkirk, and who, during his trial, could be hardly made to understand that he was to suffer for not carrying his victory still farther.

** Several generals of reputation sustained capital punishment from no other reason than the jealousy of the committees of their influence with the army.

‡ Luckner, an old German thick-headed soldier, who was of no party, and scrupulously obeyed the command of whichever was uppermost at Paris, had no better fate than others.

we have seen, finally destroyed, leaving a name which will live for ages. The commercial towns, which, upon a scale more modified, also tried their strength with the revolutionary torrent, were successively overpowered. One can, therefore, be no more surprised that the rest of the nation gave way to predominant force, than we are daily at seeing a herd of strong and able-bodied cattle driven to the shambles before one or two butchers, and as many bull-dogs. As the victims approach the slaughter-house, and smell the blood of those which have suffered the fate to which they are destined, they may be often observed to hesitate, start, roar, and bellow, and intimate their dread of the fatal spot, and instinctive desire to escape from it; but the cudgels of their drivers, and the fangs of the mastiffs, seldom fail to compel them forward, slaving, and snorting, and trembling, to the destiny which awaits them.

The power of exercising this tremendous authority over a terrified nation was vested in few hands, and rested on a very simple basis.

The Convention bad, after the fall of the girondists, remained an empty show of what it had once some title to call itself,—the Representative Body of the French Nation. The members belonging to the Plain, who had observed a timid neutrality betwixt the Mountain and the girondists, if not without talent, were without courage to make any opposition to the former when triumphant. They crouched to their fate, were glad to escape in silence, and to yield full passage to the revolutionary torrent. They consoled themselves with the usual apology of weak minds—that they submitted to what they could not prevent; and their adversaries, while despising them, were yet tolerant of their presence, and somewhat indulgent to their scruples, because, while these timid neutrals remained in their ranks, they furnished to the eye at least the appearance of a full senate, filled the ranks of the representative body, as a garment is stuffed out to the required size by buckram, and countenanced by their passive acquiescence the measures which they most detested in their hearts. It was worth the while of the Mountain to endure the imbecility of such associates, and even to permit occasionally some diffident opposition on their part, had it only been to preserve appearances, and afford a show of a free assembly debating on the affairs of the nation. Thus, although the name of the National Convention was generally used, its deputies, carefully selected from the jacobin or ruling party, were everywhere acting in their name, with all the authority of Roman proconsuls; while two-thirds of the body sat with submitted necks and padlocked lips, unresisting slaves to the minor proportion, which again, under its various fierce leaders, was beginning to wage a civil war within its own limited circle.

But the young reader, to whom this eventful history is a novelty, may ask in what hands was the real power of the government lodged, of which the Convention, considered as a body, was thus effectually deprived, though permitted to retain, like the apparition in Macbeth,—

—upon its baby brow the round
And type of sovereignty.

France had, indeed, in 1792, accepted, with the usual solemnities, a new constitution, which was stated to rest on the right republican basis, and was, of course, alleged to afford the most perfect and absolute security for liberty and equality, that the nation could desire. But this constitution was entirely superseded in practice by the more expeditious mode of governing by means of a *junta*, selected out of the Convention itself, without observing any farther ceremony. In fact, two small committees, vested with the full authority of the state, exercised the powers of a dictatorship, while the representatives of the people, like the senate under the Roman empire, retained the form and semblance of supreme sway, might keep their curule chairs, and enjoy the dignity of fasces and lictors, but had in their possession and exercise scarcely the independent powers of an English vestry, or quarter-sessions.

The Committee of Public Safety dictated every measure of the Convention, or more frequently acted without deigning to consult the legislative body at all. The number of members who exercised this executive government fluctuated betwixt ten and twelve; and, as they were all chosen jacobins, and selected as men capable of going all the lengths of their party, care was taken, by re-elections from time to time, to render the situation permanent. This body deliberated in secret, and had the despotic right of interfering with and controlling every other authority in the state; and before its absolute powers, and the uses which were made of them, the Council of Ten of the Venetian government sunk into a harmless and liberal institution. Another committee, with powers of the same revolutionary nature, and in which the members were also renewed from time to time, was that of Public Security. It was inferior in importance to that of Public Safety, but was nevertheless as active within its sphere. We regret to record of a man of genius, that David, the celebrated painter,* held a seat in the Committee of Public Security. The fine arts, which he studied, had not produced on his mind the softening and humanising effect ascribed to them. Frightfully ugly in his exterior, his mind seemed to correspond with the harshness of his looks. "Let us grind enough of the Red!" † was the professional phrase of which he made use, when sitting down to the bloody work of the day.

That these revolutionary committees might have in their hands a power subject to no legal defence or evasion on the part of the accused, Merlin of Douay, a lawyer, it is said, of eminence, framed what was termed the law against suspected persons, which was worded with so much ingenuity, that not only it enveloped every one who, by birth, friendship, habits of life, dependencies, or other ties, was linked, however distantly, with aristocracy, whether of birth or property, but also all who had, in the various changes and phases of the Revolution, taken one step too few in the career of the most violent patriotism, or had, though it were but for one

misguided and doubtful moment, held opinions short of the most extravagant jacobinism. This crime of suspicion was of the nature of theameleon; it derived its peculiar shade or colour from the person to whom it attached for the moment. To have been a priest, or even an assertor of the rights and doctrines of christianity, was fatal; but in some instances, an overflow of atheistical blasphemy was equally so. To be silent on public affairs, betrayed a culpable indifference; but it incurred darker suspicion to speak of them otherwise than in the most violent tone of the ruling party. By a supplementary law, this spider's web was so widely extended, that it appeared no fly could be found insignificant enough to escape its meshes. Its general propositions were of a nature so vague, that it was impossible they could ever be made subjects of evidence. Therefore they were assumed without proof; and at length, definition of the characteristics of suspicion seems to have been altogether dispensed with, and all those were suspected persons whom the revolutionary committees and their assistants chose to hold as such.

The operation of this law was terrible. A suspected person, besides being thrown into prison, was deprived of all his rights, his effects sealed up, his property placed under care of the state, and he himself considered as civilly dead. If the unfortunate object of suspicion had the good fortune to be set at liberty, it was no security whatever against his being again arrested on the day following. There was, indeed, no end to the various shades of sophistry which brought almost every kind of person under this oppressive law, so ample was its scope, and undefined its objects.

That the administrators of this law of suspicion might not have too much trouble in seeking for victims, all householders were obliged to publish on the outside of their doors a list of the names and description of their inmates. Domestic security, the most precious of all rights to a people who know what freedom really is, was violated on every occasion, even the slightest, by domiciliary visits. The number of arrests which took place through France choked the prisons anew, which had been so fearfully emptied on the 2d and 3d of September, and is said to have been only moderately computed at three hundred thousand souls, one-third of whom were women. The jacobins, however, found a *mode* of jail-delivery less summary than by direct massacre; although differing so little from it in every other respect, that a victim might have had pretty nearly the same chance of a fair trial before Mailard and his men of September, as from the Revolutionary Tribunal. It requires an effort even to write that word, from the extremities of guilt and horror which it recalls. But it is the lot of humanity to record its own greatest disgraces; and it is a wholesome and humbling lesson to exhibit a just picture of those excesses, of which, in its unassisted movements, and when agitated by evil and misguided passions, human nature can be rendered capable.

The extraordinary criminal court, better known by the name of the Revolutionary Tribunal, was first instituted upon the motion of Danton. Its object was to judge of state crimes, plots, and attempts

* David is generally allowed to have possessed great merit as a draughtsman. Foreigners do not admire his composition and colouring so much as his countrymen.

† *Broyons du rouge.*

against liberty, or in favour of royalty, or affecting the rights and liberty of man, or in any way, more or less, tending to counteract the progress of the Revolution. In short, it was the business of this court to execute the laws, or inflict the sentence rather, upon such as had been arrested as suspected persons; and they generally saw room to punish in most of the instances where the arresting functionaries had seen ground for imprisonment.

This frightful court consisted of six judges, a public accuser, and two assistants. There were twelve jurymen; but the appointment of these was a mere mockery. They were official persons, who held permanent appointments; had a salary from the state; and were in no manner liable to the choice or challenge of the party tried. It may be sure the jurors and judges were selected for their republican zeal and steady qualities, and were capable of seeing no obstacle either of law or humanity in the path of their duty. This tribunal had the power of deciding without proof,—or cutting short evidence when in the progress of being adduced,—or stopping the defence of the prisoners at pleasure; privileges which tended greatly to shorten the forms of court, and aid the dispatch of business.

The Revolutionary Tribunal was in a short time so overwhelmed with work, that it became necessary to divide it into four sections, all armed with similar powers. The quantity of blood which it caused to be shed was something unheard of even during the proscriptions of the Roman empire; and there were involved in its sentences crimes the most different, personages the most opposed, and opinions the most dissimilar. When Henry VIII. roused the fires of Smithfield both against protestant and papist, burning at the same stake one wretch for denying the king's supremacy, and another for disbelieving the divine presence in the Eucharist, the association was consistency itself compared to the scenes presented at the Revolutionary Tribunal, in which royalist, constitutionalist, girondist, churchman, theophilanthropist, noble and *roturier*, prince and peasant, both sexes and all ages, were involved in one general massacre, and sent to execution by scores together, and on the same sledge.

Supporting by their numerous associations the government as exercised by the revolutionary committees, came the mass of jacobins, who, divided into a thousand clubs, emanating from that which had its meetings at Paris, formed the strength of the party to which they gave the name.

The sole principle of the jacobinical institutions was to excite against all persons who had anything to lose, the passions of those who possessed no property, and were, by birth and circumstances, brutally ignorant, and envious of the advantages enjoyed by the higher classes. All other governments have made individual property the object of countenance and protection; but in this strangely-inverted state of things, it seemed the object of constant suspicion and persecution, and exposed the owner to perpetual danger. We have elsewhere said that equality (unless in the no less intelligible than sacred sense of equal submission to the law) is a mere chimera, which can no more exist with respect to property, than in regard to mental qualifications, or

personal strength, beauty, or stature. Divide the whole property of a country equally among its inhabitants, and a week will bring back the inequality which you have endeavoured to remove; nay, a much shorter space will find the industrious and saving richer than the idle and prodigal. But in France, at the period under discussion, this equality, in itself so unattainable, had completely superseded even the principle of liberty, as a watchword for exciting the people. It was to sin against this leading principle to be possessed of, and more especially to enjoy ostentatiously, anything which was wanting to your neighbour. To be richer, more accomplished, better bred, or better taught, subjected you to the law of suspicion, and you were conducted instantly before a revolutionary committee, where you were probably convicted of incivism; not for interfering with the liberty and property of others, but for making what use you pleased of your own.

The whole of the terrible mystery is included in two regulations, communicated by the Jacobin Club of Paris to the Committee of Public Safety.—1. That when, by the machinations of opulent persons, seditions should arise in any district, it should be declared in a state of rebellion.—2. That the Convention shall avail themselves of such opportunity *to excite the poor to make war on the rich*, and to restore order at any price whatsoever.—This was so much understood, that one of the persons tried by the Revolutionary Tribunal, when asked what he had to say in his defence, answered,—“I am wealthy—what avails it to me to offer any exculpation when such is my offence?”

The Committees of Government distributed large sums of money to the Jacobin Club and its affiliated societies, as being necessary to the propagation of sound political principles. The clubs themselves took upon them in every village the exercise of the powers of government; and while they sat swearing, drinking, and smoking, examined passports, imprisoned citizens, and enforced to their full extent the benefits of liberty and equality. “Death or Fraternity” was usually inscribed over their place of assembly, which some one translated,—“Become my brother, or I will kill thee.”

These clubs were composed of members drawn from the lees of the people, that they might not, in their own persons, give an example contradicting the equality which it was their business to enforce.

They were filled with men without resources or talents, but towards whom the confidence of the deceived people was directed, from the conviction that, because taken from among themselves, they would have the interest of the lower orders constantly in view. Their secretaries, however, were generally selected with some attention to alertness of capacity; for on them depended the terrible combination which extended from the mother society of jacobins in Paris, down into the most remote villages of the most distant provinces, in which the same tyranny was maintained by the influence of similar means. Thus rumours could be either circulated or collected with a speed and uniformity, which enabled a whisper from Robespierre to regulate the sentiments of the jacobins at the most distant part

of his empire; for his it unquestionably was, for the space of two dreadful years.

France had been subjected to many evils ere circumstances had for a time reduced her to this state of passive obedience to a yoke, which, after all, when its strength was fairly tried, proved as brittle as it was intolerable. Those who witnessed the tragedies which then occurred look back upon that period as the delirium of a national fever, filled with visions too horrible and painful for recollection, and which, being once wiped from the mind, we recall with difficulty and reluctance, and dwell upon with disgust. A long course of events, tending each successively to disorganize society more and more, had unhappily prevented a brave, generous, and accomplished people from combining together in mutual defence. The emigration and forfeiture of the nobles and clergy had deprived the country at once of those higher classes, that right-hand file, who are bred up to hold their lives light if called on to lay them down for religion, or in defence of the rights of their country, or the principles of their own honour or conscience. Whatever may be thought of the wisdom or necessity of emigration, its evils were the same. A high-spirited and generous race of gentry, accustomed to consider themselves as peculiar depositaries of the national honour—a learned and numerous priesthood, the guardians of religious opinion—had been removed from their place, and society was so much the more weak and more ignorant for the want of them. Whether voluntarily abandoning or forcibly driven from the country, the expulsion of so large a mass, belonging entirely to the higher orders, tended instantly to destroy the balance of society, and to throw all power into the hands of the lower class, who, deceived by bad and artful men, abused it to the frightful excess we have described.

We do not mean to say that the emigrants had carried with them beyond the frontiers all the worth and courage of the better classes in France, or that there were not, among men attached to the cause of liberty, many who would have shed their blood to have prevented its abuse. But these had been unhappily, during the progress of the Revolution, divided and subdivided among themselves, were split up into a variety of broken and demolished parties, which had repeatedly suffered proscription; and, what was worse, sustained it from the hand of each other. The constitutionalist could not safely join in league with the royalist, or either with the girondist; and thus there existed no confidence on which a union could be effected, among materials repulsive of each other. There extended besides through France, far and near, that sorrow and sinking of the heart, which prevails amid great national calamities, where there is little hope. The state of oppression was so universal, that no one strove to remedy its evils more than they would have struggled to remedy the *malaria* of an infected country. Those who escaped the disorder contented themselves with their individual safety, without thinking of the general evil as one which human art could remedy, or human courage resist.

Moreover, the jacobinical rulers had surrounded themselves with such a system of espionage and delation, that the attempt to organize any resistance to

their power would have been in fact to fall inevitably and fatally under their tyranny. If the bold conspirator against this most infernal authority did not bestow his confidence on a false friend or a concealed emissary of the jacobin party, he was scarce the safer on that account; for if he breathed forth in the most friendly ear anything tending to reflect on the free, happy, and humane government under which he had the happiness to live, his hearer was bound, equally as a hired spy, to carry the purport of the conversation to the constituted authorities—that is, to the revolutionary committees or republican commissioners; and, above all, to the Committee of Public Safety. Silence on public affairs, and acquiescence in democratic tyranny, became, therefore, matter of little wonder; for men will be long mute, when to indulge the tongue may endanger the head. And thus, in the kingdom which boasts herself most civilized in Europe, and with all that ardour for liberty which seemed but of late to animate every bosom, the general apathy of terror and astonishment, joined to a want of all power of combination, palsied every effort at resistance. They who make national reflections on the French for remaining passive under circumstances so hopeless, should first reflect, that our disposition to prevent or punish crime, and our supposed readiness to resist oppression, have their foundation in a strong confidence in the laws, and in the immediate support which they are sure to receive from the numerous classes who have been trained up to respect them, as protectors of the rich equally and of the poor. But in France the whole system of the administration of justice was in the hands of brutal force; and it is one thing to join in the hue and cry against a murderer, seconded by the willing assistance of a whole population—another to venture upon withstanding him in his den, he at the head of his banditti, the assailant defenceless, excepting in the justice of his cause.

It has further been a natural subject of wonder, not only that the richer and better classes, the avowed objects of jacobin persecution, were so passively resigned to this frightful tyranny, but also why the French populace, whose general manners are so civilized and so kindly, that they are, on ordinary occasions, the gayest and best-humoured people in Europe, should have so far changed their character as to delight in cruelty, or at least to look on, without expressing disgust, at cruelties perpetrated in their name.

But the state of a people, in ordinary times and peaceful occupations, is in every country totally different from the character which they manifest under strong circumstances of excitation. Rousseau says, that no one who sees the ordinary greyhound, the most sportive, gentle, and timid perhaps of the canine race, can form an idea of the same animal pursuing and strangling its screaming and helpless victim. Something of this sort must plead the apology of the French people in the early excesses of the Revolution; and we must remember, that men collected in crowds, and influenced with a sense of wrongs, whether real or imaginary, are acted upon by the enthusiasm of the moment; and are besides in a state of such general and undistinguishing fury,

that they adopt, by joining in the clamours and general shouts, deeds of which they hardly witness the import, and which perhaps not one of the assembled multitude out of a thousand would countenance, were that import distinctly felt and known. In the revolutionary massacres and cruelties, there was always an executive power, consisting of a few well-breathed and thorough-paced ruffians, whose hands perpetrated the actions to which the ignorant vulgar only lent their acclamations.

This species of association became less wonderful when instant slaughter, without even the ceremony of inquiry, had been exchanged for some forms, however flimsy and unsubstantial, of regular trial, condemnation, and execution. These served for a time to satisfy the public mind. The populace saw men dragged to the guillotine, convicted of criminal attempts, as they were informed, against the liberty of the people; and they shouted as at the punishment of their own immediate enemies.

But as the work of death proceeded daily, the people became softened as their passions abated; and the frequency of such sacrifices having removed the odious interest which for a while attended them, the lower classes, whom Robespierre desired most to conciliate, looked on, first with indifference, but afterwards with shame and disgust, and at last with the wish to put an end to cruelties, which even the most ignorant and prejudiced began to regard in their own true undisguised light.

Yet the operation of these universal feelings was long delayed. To support the reign of Terror, the Revolutionary Committees had their own guards and executioners, without whom they could not have long withstood the general abhorrence of mankind. All official situations were scrupulously and religiously filled up by individuals chosen from the sans-culottes, who had rendered themselves, by their zeal, worthy of that honourable appellation. Were they of little note, they were employed in the various capacities of guards, officers, and jailers, for which the times created an unwearied demand. Did they hold places in the Convention, they were frequently dispatched upon commissions to different parts of France, to give new edge to the guillotine, and superintend in person the punishment of conspiracy or rebellion, real or supposed. Such commissioners, or proconsuls as they were frequently termed, being vested with unlimited power, and fresh in its exercise, signalized themselves by their cruelty, even more than the tyrants whose will they discharged.

We may quote, in illustration, a remarkable passage in an address by the Commissioners of Public Safety, to the representatives absent upon commissions, in which there occur some gentle remarks on their having extended capital punishment to cases where it was not provided by law, although the lustre of their services to the Republic far outshone the shade of such occasional peccadilloes. For their future direction, they are thus exhorted. "Let your energy awaken anew as the term of your labour approaches. The Convention charges you to complete the purification and reorganization of the constituted authorities with the least possible delay, and to report the conclusion of these two operations before

the end of the next month. A simple measure may effect the desired purification. *Convoke the people in the popular societies—Let the public functionaries appear before them—Interrogate the people on the subject of their conduct, and let their judgment dictate yours.*"* Thus the wildest prejudices arising in the Jacobin Club, consisting of the lowest, most ignorant, most prejudiced, and often most malicious members in society, were received as evidence, and the populace declared masters, at their own pleasure, of the property, honour, and life, of those who had held any brief authority over them.

Where there had occurred any positive rising or resistance, the duty of the commissioners was extended by all the powers that martial law, in other words the rule of superior force, could confer.—We have mentioned the murders committed at Lyons; but even these, though hundreds were swept away by volleys of musket-shot, fell short of the horrors perpetrated by Carrier at Nantes, who, in avenging the Republic on the obstinate resistance of La Vendée, might have summoned hell to match his cruelty, without a demon venturing to answer his challenge. Hundreds—men, women, and children—were forced on board of vessels, which were scuttled and sunk in the Loire, and this was called republican baptism. Men and women were stripped, bound together, and thus thrown into the river, and this was called republican marriage. But we have said enough to show that men's blood seems to have been converted into poison, and their hearts into stone, by the practices in which they were daily engaged. Many affected even a lust of cruelty, and the instrument of punishment was talked of with the fondness and gaiety with which we speak of a beloved and fondled object. It had its pet name of the Little National Window, and others equally expressive; and although saints were not much in fashion, was, in some degree, canonised by the name of the Holy Mother Guillotine. That active citizen, the executioner, had also his honours, as well as the senseless machine which he directed. This official was admitted to the society of some of the more emphatic patriots, and, as we shall afterwards see, shared in their civic festivities. It may be questioned, whether even *his* company was not too good for the patrons who thus regaled him.

There was also an armed force raised among the most thorough-paced and hardened satellites of the lower order, termed by pre-eminence the Revolutionary Army. They were under the command of Ronsin, a general every way worthy of such soldiers. These troops were produced on all occasions, when it was necessary to intimidate the metropolis and the National Guard. They were at the more immediate disposal of the Commune of Paris, and were a ready, though not a great, force, which always could be produced at a moment's notice, and were generally joined by the more active democrats, in the capacity of a jacobin militia. In their own ranks they mustered six thousand men.

It is worthy of remark, that some of the persons whose agency was distinguished during this dis-

* *Moniteur*, No 995; Nivose, an 11. 25th December, 1793.

graceful period, and whose hands were deeply dyed in the blood so unrelentingly shed, under whatever frenzy of brain, or state of a generally maddening impulse, they may have acted, nevertheless made amends in their after conduct for their enormities then committed. This was the case with Tallien, with Barras, with Fouché, Legendre, and others, who, neither good nor scrupulous men, were yet, upon many subsequent occasions, much more humane and moderate than could have been expected from their early acquaintance with revolutionary horrors. They resembled disbanded soldiers, who, returned to their native homes, often resume so entirely the habits of earlier life, that they seem to have forgotten the wild, and perhaps sanguinary, character of their military career. We cannot, indeed, pay any of these reformed jacobins the compliment ascribed to Octavius by the Romans, who found a blessing in the emperor's benevolent government which compensated the injuries inflicted by the triumvir. But it is certain that had it not been for the courage of Tallien and Barras in particular, it might have been much longer ere the French had been able to rid themselves of Robespierre, and that the revolution of 9th Thermidor, as they called the memorable day of his fall, was, in a great measure, brought about by the remorse or jealousy of the dictator's old comrades. But ere we arrive at that more auspicious point of our story, we have to consider the train of causes which led to the downfall of jacobinism.

Periods which display great national failings or vices are those also which bring to light distinguished and redeeming virtues. France unfortunately, during the years 1793 and 1794, exhibited instances of extreme cruelty, in principle and practice, which make the human blood curdle. She may also be censured for a certain abasement of spirit, for sinking so long unresistingly under a yoke so unnaturally horrible. But she has to boast that, during this fearful period, she can produce as many instances of the most high and honourable fidelity, of the most courageous and devoted humanity, as honour the annals of any country whatever.

The cruelty of the laws denounced the highest penalties against those who relieved proscribed fugitives. These were executed with the most merciless rigour. Madame Boucquoy and her husband were put to death at Bordeaux for affording shelter to the members of the Gironde faction; and the interdiction of fire and water to outlawed persons, of whatever description, was enforced with the heaviest penalty. Yet, not only among the better classes, but among the poorest of the poor, were there men of noble minds found, who, having but half a morsel to support their own family, divided it willingly with some wretched fugitive, though death stood ready to reward their charity.

In some cases, fidelity and devotion aided the suggestions of humanity. Among domestic servants, a race whose virtues should be the more esteemed, that they are practised sometimes in defiance of strong temptation, were found many distinguished instances of unshaken fidelity. Indeed, it must be said, to the honour of the French manners, that the master and his servant live on a footing of much

more kindness than attends the same relation in other countries, and especially in Britain. Even in the most trying situations, there were not many instances of domestic treason, and many a master owed his life to the attachment and fidelity of a menial. The feelings of religion sheltered others. The recusant and exiled priests often found among their former flock the means of concealment and existence, when it was death to administer them. Often, this must have flowed from grateful recollection of their former religious services—sometimes from unmingled veneration for the being whose ministers they professed themselves.* Nothing short of such heroic exertions, which were numerous (and especially in the class where individuals, hard pressed on account of their own wants, are often rendered callous to the distress of others), could have prevented France, during this horrible period, from becoming an universal charnel-house, and her history an unvaried calendar of murder.

CHAPTER XVII

Marat, Danton, Robespierre.—Marat poisoned.—Danton and Robespierre become rivals.—Commune of Paris.—Their gross irreligion.—Gobet.—Goddess of Reason.—Marriage reduced to a civil contract.—Views of Danton—and of Robespierre.—Principal leaders of the commune arrested—and nineteen of them executed.—Danton arrested by the influence of Robespierre—and, along with Camille Desmoulins, Westermann, and Lacroix, taken before the Revolutionary Tribunal, condemned, and executed.—Decree issued, on the motion of Robespierre, acknowledging a Supreme Being.—Cécile Renaud.—Gradual change in the public mind.—Robespierre becomes unpopular.—Makes every effort to retrieve his power.—Stormy debate in the Convention.—Collot d'Herbois, Tallien, etc., expelled from the Jacobin Club at the instigation of Robespierre.—Robespierre denounced in the Convention on the 9th Thermidor (27th July), and after furious struggles, arrested, along with his brother, Couthon, and St-Just.—Henriot, Commandant of the National Guard, arrested.—Terrorists take refuge in the Hôtel de Ville.—Attempt their own lives.—Robespierre wounds himself—but lives, along with most of the others, long enough to be carried to the guillotine, and executed.—His character.—Struggles that followed his fate.—Final destruction of the jacobinical system—and return of tranquillity.—Singular colour given to society in Paris.—Ball of the Victims.

THE reader need not be reminded, that the three distinguished champions who assumed the front in

* Strangers are forcibly affected by the trifling incidents which sometimes recall the memory of those fearful times. A venerable French ecclesiastic being on a visit at a gentleman's house in North Britain, it was remarked by the family, that a favourite cat, rather wild and capricious in his habits, paid particular attention to their guest. It was explained, by the priest giving an account of his lurking in the waste garret, or lumber-room, of an artisan's house, for several weeks. In this condition he had no better amusement than to study the manners and habits of the cats which frequented his place of retreat, and acquire the mode of conciliating their favour. The difficulty of supplying him with food, without attracting suspicion, was extreme, and it could only be placed near his place of concealment in small quantities, and at uncertain times. Men, women,

the jacobin ranks, were Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. The first was poniarded by Charlotte Corday, an enthusiastic young person, who had nourished, in a feeling betwixt lunacy and heroism, the ambition of ridding the world of a tyrant. Danton and Robespierre, reduced to a duumvirate, might have divided the power betwixt them. But Danton, far the more able and powerful-minded man, could not resist temptations to plunder and to revel; and Robespierre, who took care to preserve proof of his rival's peculations, a crime of a peculiarly unpopular character, and from which he seemed to keep his own hands pure, possessed thereby the power of ruining him whenever he should find it convenient. Danton married a beautiful woman, became a candidate for domestic happiness, withdrew himself for some time from state affairs, and quitted the stern and menacing attitude which he had presented to the public during the earlier stages of the Revolution. Still his ascendancy, especially in the Club of Cordeliers, was formidable enough to command Robespierre's constant attention, and keep awake his envy, which was like the worm that dieth not, though it did not draw down any indication of his immediate and active vengeance. A power, kindred also in crime, but more within his reach, for the moment, was first to be demolished, ere Robespierre was to measure strength with his great rival.

This third party consisted of those who had possessed themselves of official situations in the Commune of Paris, whose civic authority, and the implement which they commanded in the revolutionary army, commanded by Rousin, gave them the power of marching, at a moment's warning, upon the Convention, or even against the Jacobin Club. It is true, these men, of whom Hébert, Chaumette, and others, were leaders, had never shown the least diffidence of Robespierre, but, on the contrary, had used all means to propitiate his favour. But the man whom a tyrant fears becomes, with little farther provocation, the object of his mortal enmity. Robespierre watched, therefore, with vigilance, the occasion of overreaching and destroying this party, whose power he dreaded; and, singular to tell, he sought the means of accomplishing their ruin in the very extravagance of their revolutionary zeal, which shortly before he might have envied, as pushed farther than his own. But Robespierre did not want sense; and he saw with pleasure Hébert, Chaumette, and their followers, run into such inordinate extravagancies, as he thought might render his own interference desirable, even to those who most disliked his principles, most abhorred the paths by which he had climbed to power, and most feared the use which he made of it.

It was through the subject of religion that this means of ruining his opponents, as he hoped, arose. A subject, which one would have thought so indifferent to either, came to be on both sides the occasion

and children, knew of his being in that place; there were rewards to be gained by discovery, life to be lost by persevering in concealing him; yet he was faithfully preserved, to try upon a Scottish cat, after the restoration of the monarchy, the arts which he had learned in his miserable place of shelter during the reign of Terror. The history of the time abounds with similar instances.

of quarrel between the Commune of Paris and the jacobin leader. But there is a fanaticism of atheism, as well as of superstitious belief; and a philosopher can harbour and express as much malice against those who persevere in believing what he is pleased to denounce as unworthy of credence, as an ignorant and bigoted priest can bear against a man who cannot yield faith to dogmata which he thinks insufficiently proved. Accordingly, the throne being totally annihilated, it appeared to the philosophers of the school of Hébert (who was author of the most gross and braastly periodical paper of the time, called the *Père Duchesne*), that in totally destroying such vestiges of religion and public worship as were still retained by the people of France, there was room for a splendid triumph of liberal opinions. It was not enough, they said, for a regenerate nation to have dethroned earthly kings, unless she stretched out the arm of defiance towards those powers which superstition had represented as reigning over boundless space.

An unhappy man, named Gobet, Constitutional Bishop of Paris, was brought forward to play the principal part in the most impudent and scandalous farce ever acted in the face of a national representation.

It is said that the leaders of the scene had some difficulty in inducing the bishop to comply with the task assigned him, which, after all, he executed, not without present tears and subsequent remorse. But he did play the part prescribed. He was brought forward in full procession, to declare to the Convention, that the religion which he had taught so many years, was, in every respect, a piece of priestcraft, which had no foundation either in history or sacred truth. He disowned, in solemn and explicit terms, the existence of the Deity to whose worship he had been consecrated, and devoted himself in future to the homage of Liberty, Equality, Virtue, and Morality. He then laid on the table his episcopal decorations, and received a fraternal embrace from the President of the Convention. Several apostate priests followed the example of this prelate.

The gold and silver plate of the churches was seized upon and desecrated; processions entered the Convention, travestied in priestly garments, and singing the most profane hymns; while many of the chalices and sacred vessels were applied by Chaumette and Hébert to the celebration of their own impious orgies. The world, for the first time, heard an assembly of men, born and educated in civilization, and assuming the right to govern one of the finest of the European nations, uplift their united voice to deny the most solemn truth which man's soul receives, and renounce unanimously the belief and worship of a Deity. For a short time the same mad profanity continued to be acted upon.

One of the ceremonies of this insane time stands unrivaled for absurdity, combined with impiety. The doors of the Convention were thrown open to a band of musicians; preceded by whom, the members of the Municipal Body entered in solemn procession, singing a hymn in praise of liberty, and escorting, as the object of their future worship, a veiled female, whom they termed the Goddess of Reason. Being brought within the bar, she was unveiled with great

form, and placed on the right hand of the president, when she was generally recognized as a dancing-girl of the Opera, with whose charms most of the persons present were acquainted from her appearance on the stage, while the experience of individuals was farther extended. To this person, as the fittest representative of that Reason whom they worshipped, the National Convention of France rendered public homage.

This impious and ridiculous mummery had a certain fashion; and the installation of the Goddess of Reason was renewed and imitated throughout the nation, in such places where the inhabitants desired to show themselves equal to all the heights of the Revolution. The churches were, in most districts of France, closed against priests and worshippers—the bells were broken and cast into cannon—the whole ecclesiastical establishment destroyed—and the republican inscription over the cemeteries, declaring death to be perpetual sleep, announced to those who lived under that dominion, that they were to hope no redress even in the next world.

Intimately connected with these laws affecting religion, was that which reduced the union of marriage, the most sacred engagement which human beings can form, and the permanence of which leads most strongly to the consolidation of society, to the state of a mere civil contract of a transitory character, which any two persons might engage in, and cast loose at pleasure, when their taste was changed, or their appetite gratified. If fiends had set themselves to work to discover a mode of most effectually destroying whatever is venerable, graceful, or permanent in domestic life, and of obtaining at the same time an assurance that the mischief which it was their object to create should be perpetuated from one generation to another, they could not have invented a more effectual plan than the degradation of marriage into a state of mere occasional cohabitation, or licensed concubinage. Sophie Arnould, an actress famous for the witty things she said, described the republican marriage as the sacrament of adultery.

These anti-religious and anti-social regulations did not answer the purpose of the frantic and inconsiderate zealots by whom they had been urged forward. Hébert and Chaumette had outrun the spirit of the time, evil as that was, and had contrived to get beyond the sympathy even of those, who, at heart as vicious and criminal as they, had still the sagacity to fear, or the taste to be disgusted with, this overstrained tone of outrageous impiety. Perhaps they might have other motives for condemning so gross a display of irreligion. The most guilty of men are not desirous, generally speaking, totally to disbelieve and abandon all doctrines of religious faith. They cannot, if they would, prevent themselves from apprehending a future state of retribution; and little effect as such feeble glimmering of belief may have on their lives, they will not in general willingly throw away the slight chance, that it may be possible on some occasion to reconcile themselves to the church or to the Deity. This hope, even to those on whom it has no salutary influence, resembles the confidence given to a sailor during a gale of wind, by his knowing that there is a port un-

der his lee. His purpose may be never to run for the haven, or he may judge there is great improbability that by doing so he should reach it in safety; yet still, such being the case, he would esteem himself but little indebted to any one who should blot the harbour of refuge out of the chart. To all those, who, in various degrees, received and believed the great truths of religion, on which those of morality are dependent, the professors of those wild absurdities became objects of contempt, dislike, hatred, and punishment.

Danton regarded the proceedings of Hébert and his philosophers of the commune with scorn and disgust. However wicked he had shown himself, he was too wise and too proud to approve of such impolitic and senseless folly. Besides, this perpetual undermining whatever remained of social institutions, prevented any stop being put to the revolutionary movements, which Danton, having placed his party at the head of affairs, and himself nearly as high as he could promise to climb, was now desirous should be done.

Robespierre looked on these extravagant proceedings with a different and more watchful eye. He saw what Hébert and his associates had lost in popularity, by affecting the doctrines of atheism and utter profaneness; and he imagined a plan, first for destroying these blasphemers, by the general consent of the nation, as noxious animals, and then of enlarging, and, as it were, sanctifying his own power, by once more connecting a spirit of devotion of some modified kind or other with the revolutionary form of government, of which he desired to continue the head.

It has even been supposed, that Robespierre's extravagant success in rising so much above all human expectation, had induced him to entertain some thoughts of acting the part of a new Mahomet, in bringing back religious opinion into France, under his own direct auspices. He is said to have countenanced in secret the extravagancies of a female called Catherine Théot, or Théos, an enthusiastic devotee, whose doctrines leaned to Quietism. She was a kind of Joanna Southcote, and the Aaron of her sect was Dom Gerle, formerly a carthusian monk, and remarkable for the motion he made in the first National Assembly, that the catholic religion should be recognized as that of France.* Since that time he had become entirely deranged. A few visionaries of both sexes attended secret and nightly meetings, in which Théot and Dom Gerle presided. Robespierre was recognized by them as one of the elect, and is said to have favoured their superstitious doctrines. But whether the dictator saw in them anything more than tools, which might be applied to his own purpose, there seems no positive authority to decide. At any rate, whatever religious opinions he might have imbibed himself, or have become desirous of infusing into the state, they were not such as were qualified to modify either his ambition, his jealousy, or his love of blood.

The power of Hébert, Chaumette, and of the Community of Paris, was now ripe for destruction.

* See p. 50.

Ronsin, with the other armed satellites of the revolutionary army, bullied indeed, and spoke about taking the part of the magistracy of Paris against the Convention; but though they had the master and active ruffians still at their service, they could no longer command the long sable columns of pikes, which used to follow and back them, and without whose aid they feared they might not be found equal in number to face the National Guard. So early as 27th December, 1793, we find Chaumette expressing himself to the commune as one who had fallen on evil times and evil days. He brought forward evidence to show, that it was not he who had conducted the installation of the Goddess of Reason in his native city of Nevers; and he complains heavily of his lot, that the halls were crowded with women demanding the liberty of their husbands, and complaining of the conduct of the revolutionary societies. It was plain that a change was taking place in the political atmosphere, when Chaumette was obliged to vindicate himself from the impiety which used to be his boast, and was subjected besides to female reproach for his republican zeal, in imprisoning and destroying a few thousand suspected persons.

The spirit of reaction increased, and was strengthened by Robespierre's influence, now thrown into the scale against the commune. The principal leaders in the commune, many of whom seem to have been foreigners, and among the rest the celebrated Anacharsis Klotz, were arrested.*

The case of these men was singular, and would have been worthy of pity, had it applied to any but such worthless wretches. They were accused of almost every species of crime, which seemed such in the eyes of a *sans-culotte*. Much there was which could be only understood metaphysically, much there was of literal falsehood, but little or nothing like a distinct or well-grounded accusation of a specific criminal fact. The charge bore, that they were associates of Pitt and Coburg, and had combined against the sovereignty of the people—loaded them with the intention of starving thereby Paris—with that of ridiculing the Convention, by a set of puppets dressed up to imitate that scarce less passive assembly—and much more to the same purpose, consisting of allegations that were totally unimportant, or totally unproved. But nothing was said of their rivalry to Robespierre, which was the true cause of their trial, and as little of their revolutionary murders, being the ground on which they really deserved their fate. Something was talked of pillage, at which Ronsin, the commandant of the revolutionary army, lost all patience. "Do they talk to me of pilfering?" he says.—"Dare they accuse such a man as I am of a theft of bed and body linen? Do they bring against me a charge of petty larceny—against me, who have had all their throats at my disposal?"

The accused persons were convicted and executed, to the number of nineteen. From that time the city of Paris lost the means of being so pre-eminent in the affairs of France, as her commune had formerly rendered her. The power of the ma-

gistracy was much broken by the reduction of the revolutionary army, which the Convention dissolved, as levied upon false principles, and as being rather a metropolitan than a national force, and one which was easily applied to serve the purposes of a party.

The Hebertists being removed, Robespierre had yet to combat and defeat a more formidable adversary. The late conspirators had held associations with the Club of Cordeliers, with which Danton was supposed to have particular relations, but they had not experienced his support, which in policy he ought to have extended to them. He had begun to separate his party and his views too distinctly from his old friends and old proceedings. He imagined, falsely as it proved, that his bark could sail 'as triumphantly upon waves composed only of water,' as on those of blood. He and others seem to have been seized with a loathing against these continued acts of cruelty, as if they had been gorged and nauseated by the constant repetition. Danton spoke of mercy and pardon; and his partisan, Camille Desmoulins, in a very ingenious parody upon Tacitus, drew a comparison between the tyrants and informers of the French jacobin government, and those of the Roman imperial court. The parallels were most ably drawn, and Robespierre and his agents might read their own characters in those of the most odious wretches of that odious time. From these aggressions Danton seemed to meditate the part which Tallien afterwards adopted, of destroying Robespierre and his power, and substituting a mode of government which should show some regard at least to life and to property. But he was too late in making his movement; Robespierre was beforehand with him; and, on the morning of the 31st of March, the Parisians and the members of the Convention hardly dared whisper to each other, that Danton, whose name had been as formidable as the sound of the tocsin, had been arrested like any poor ex-noble, and was in the hands of the fatal dictators. There was no end of exclamation and wonder; for Danton was the great apostle, the very Mahomet of jacobinism. His gigantic stature, his huge and ferocious physiognomy, his voice which struck terror in its notes of distant thunder, and the energies of talent and vehemence mingled, which supplied that voice with language worthy of its deep tones, were such as became the prophet of that horrible and fearful sect. Marat was a madman, raised into consequence only by circumstances,—Robespierre a cold, creeping, calculating hypocrite, whose malignity resembled that of a paltry and second-rate fiend,—but Danton was a character for Shakespeare or Schiller to have drawn in all its broad lights and shades; or Bruce could have sketched from him a yet grander *Ras Michael* than he of *Tigré*. His passions were a hurricane, which, furious, regardless, and desolating in its course, had yet its intervals of sunshine and repose. Neither good by nature, nor just by principle or political calculation, men were often surprised at finding he still possessed some feelings of generosity, and some tendency even towards magnanimity. Early habits of profligate indulgence, the most complete stiffer of human virtue, and his implication at the beginning of his career

with the wretched faction of Orleans, made him, if not a worse, certainly a meaner villain than nature had designed him; for his pride must have saved him from much, which he yielded to from the temptations of gross indulgence, and from the sense of narrow circumstances. Still, when Danton fell under Robespierre, it seemed as if the mousing-owl had hawked at and struck an eagle, or at least a high-soaring vulture. His avowed associates lamented him of course; nay, Legendre and others, by undertaking his defence in the Convention, and arrogating for him the merit of those violent measures which had paved the way to the triumph of jacobinism, showed more consistency in their friendship than these ferocious demagogues manifested on any other occasion.

Danton, before his fall, seemed to have lost much of his sagacity as well as energy. He had full warning of his danger from Lacroix, Westermann, and others, yet took no steps either for escape or defence, though either seemed in his power. Still his courage was in no degree abated, or his haughty spirit tamed; although he seemed to submit passively to his fate, with the disheartening conviction, which often unmans great criminals, that his hour was come.

Danton's process was, of course, a short one. He and his comrades, Camille Desmoulins, Westermann, and Lacroix, were dragged before the Revolutionary Tribunal, a singular accomplishment of the prophecy of the girondist, Boyer Foulfré. This man had exclaimed to Danton, under whose auspices that engine of arbitrary power was established, "You insist, then, upon erecting this arbitrary judgment-seat? Be it so; and, like the tormenting engine devised by Phalaris, may it not fall to consume its inventors?" As judges, witnesses, accusers, and guards, Danton was now surrounded by those who had been too humble to aspire to be companions of his atrocities, and held themselves sufficiently honoured in becoming his agents. They looked on his unstopping pride and unshaken courage, as timid spectators upon a lion in a cage, while they still doubt the security of the bars, and have little confidence in their own personal safety. He answered, to the formal interrogatories concerning his name and dwelling, "My dwelling will be soon with annihilation—my name will live in the Pantheon of History." Camille Desmoulins, Héroult de Séchelles, Fabre d'Églantine, men of considerable literary talent, and amongst the few jacobins who had any real pretension to such accomplishments, shared his fate. Westermann was also numbered with them, the same officer who directed the attack on the palace of the Tuileries on 10th August, and who afterwards was distinguished by so many victories and defeats in La Vendée, that he was called, from his activity, the scourge of that district.

Their accusation was, as in all such cases at the period, an olla podrida, if we can be allowed the expression, in which every criminal ingredient was mixed up; but so incoherently mingled and assembled together, so inconsistent with each other, and so obscurely detailed in the charge and in the proof, that it was plain that malignant falsehood

had made the gruel thick and slab. Had Danton been condemned for his real crimes, the doom ought, in justice, to have involved judges, jurors, witnesses, and most of the spectators in the court.

Robespierre became much alarmed for the issue of the trial. The Convention showed reviving signs of spirit; and when a revolutionary deputation demanded, at the bar, "that death should be the order of the day," and reminded them, that, "had they granted the moderate demand of three hundred thousand heads, when requested by the philanthropic, and now canonised Marat, they would have saved the Republic the wars of La Vendée," they were received with discouraging murmurs. Tallien, the president, informed them, "that not death, but justice, was the order of the day;" and the petitioners, notwithstanding the patriotic turn of their modest request, were driven from the bar with execrations.

This looked ill; but the power of Robespierre was still predominant with the Revolutionary Tribunal, and after a gallant, and unusually long defence (of which no notice was permitted to appear in the *Moniteur*), Danton and his associates were condemned, and carried to instant execution. They maintained their firmness, or rather hardness of character, to the last; and when Danton observed Fabre d'Églantine beginning to look gloomy, he cheered him with a play on words: "Courage, my friend," he said, in his deep, sullen tone of voice, "we are all about to take up your trade—*Nous allons faire des vers*." The sufferers on this occasion were men whose accomplishments and talents attracted a higher degree of sympathy, than that which had been given to the equally eloquent but less successful girondists. Even honest men looked on the fate of Danton with some regret, as when a furious bull is slain with a slight blow by a crafty tauridor; and many men of good feelings had hoped, that the cause of order and security might at least have been benefited in some degree, by his obtaining the victory in a struggle with Robespierre. Those, on the other hand, who followed the fortunes of the latter, conceived his power had been rendered permanent, by the overthrow of his last and most formidable rival, and exalted in proportion. Both were deceived in their calculations. The predominance of such a man as Danton might possibly have protracted the reign of jacobinism, even by rendering it somewhat more endurable; but the permanent, at least the ultimate, success of Robespierre, was becoming more impossible, from the repeated decimations to which his jealousy subjected his party. He was like the wild chief, Lope d'Aguirre, whose story is so well told by Southey, who, descending the great river Orrellana with a party of buccaniers, cut off one part of his followers after another, in doubt of their fidelity, until the remainder saw no chance of escaping a similar fate, unless by being beforehand with their leader in murder.

Alluding to Robespierre's having been the instrument of his destruction, Danton had himself exclaimed, "The cowardly poltroon! I am the only person who could have commanded influence enough to save him." And the event showed that he spoke with the spirit of prophecy which the approach

of fate has been sometimes thought to confer.

In fact, Robespierre was much isolated by the destruction of the party of Hébert, and still more by that of Danton and his followers. He had, so to speak, scraped away the ground which he occupied, until he had scarce left himself standing-room; and, detested by honest men, he had alienated, by his successive cruelties, even the knaves who would otherwise have adhered to him for their own safety. All now looked on him with fear, and none dared hope at the hands of the dictator a better boon than that which is promised to Othello, that he should be the last devoured.

It was at this period that Robespierre conceived the idea of reversing the profanities of Chaumette, Hébert, and the atheists, by professing a public belief in the existence of a Deity. This, he conceived, would at once be a sacrifice to public opinion, and, as he hoped to manage it, a new and potent spring, to be moved by his own finger. In a word, he seems to have designed to unite, with his power in the state, the character of high pontiff of the new faith.

As the organ of the Committee of Public Safety, Robespierre, by a speech of great length, and extremely dull, undertook the conversion of the French nation from infidelity. Upon all such occasions he had recourse to that gross flattery, which was his great, rarely-failing, and almost sole receipt for popularity. He began by assuring them, that, in her lights, and the progress of her improvement, France had preceded the rest of Europe by a mark of at least two thousand years; and that, existing among the ordinary nations of the world, she appeared to belong to another race of beings. Still he thought some belief in a Deity would do her no harm. Then he was again hurried away by his eloquence, of which we cannot help giving a literal specimen, to show at how little expense of sense, taste, or talent, a man may be held an excellent orator, and become dictator of a great nation:—

— Yes, the delicious land which we inhabit, and which Nature caresses with so much predilection, is made to be the domain of liberty and of happiness; and that people, at once so open to feeling and to generous pride, are born for glory and for virtue. O my native country! if fortune had caused my birth in some region remote from thy shores, I would not the less have addressed constant prayers to heaven in thy behalf, and would have wept over the recital of thy combats and thy virtues. My soul would have followed with restless ardour every change in this eventful revolution—I would have envied the lot of thy natives—of thy representatives. But I am myself a native of France—I am myself a representative. Intoxicating rapture!—O sublime people, receive the sacrifice of my entire being! Happy is he who is born in the midst of thee! More happy he who can lay down his life for thy welfare!—*

Such was the language which this great dema-

* When we read such miserable stuff, and consider the crimes which such oratory occasioned, it reminds us of the opinion of a Mahomedan doctor, who assumed Bruce that the Devil, or Antichrist, was to appear in the form of an ass, and that multitudes were to follow him to hell, attracted by the music of his braying.

gogue held to the sublime people whose lives he disposed of at the rate of fifty per day, regular task-work; and who were so well protected in person and property, that no man dared call his hat his own, or answer for ten minutes' space for the security of the head that wore it. Much there was, also, about the rashness of the worshippers of Reason, whose steps he accuses of being too premature in her cause—much about England and Mr Pitt, who, he says, fasted on account of the destruction of the catholic religion in France, as they were mourning for Capet and his wife. But the summary of this extraordinary oration was a string of decrees, commencing with a declaration that the Republic of France acknowledged the existence of a Supreme Being, in the precise form in which the grand nation might have recognized the government of a co-ordinate state. The other decrees established the nature of the worship to be rendered to the Great Being whom these frail atoms had restored to his place in their thoughts; and this was to be expressed by dedicating a day in each decade to some peculiar and established Virtue, with hymns and processions in due honour of it, approaching as near to paganism as could well be accomplished. The last decree appointed a fête to be given in honour of the Supreme Being himself, as the nation might have celebrated by public rejoicings a pacification with some neighbouring power.

The speech was received with servile applause by the Convention. Couthon, with affected enthusiasm, demanded that not only the speech should be published in the usual form, by supplying each member with six copies, but that the plan should be translated into all languages, and dispersed through the universe.

The conducting of this heathen mummery, which was substituted for every external sign of rational devotion, was intrusted to the genius of the painter, David; and had it not been that the daring blasphemy of the purpose threw a chill upon the sense of ridicule, it was scarcely matched as a masquerade even by the memorable procession conducted by the notorious Orator of the Human Race.* There was a general muster of all Paris, divided into bands of young women and matrons, and old men and youths, with oaken boughs and drawn swords, and all other emblems appertaining to their different ages. They were preceded by the representatives of the people, having their hands full of ears of corn, and spices, and fruits; while Robespierre, their president, clad in a sort of purple garment, moved apart and alone, and played the part of sovereign pontiff.

After marching up and down through the streets, to the sound of doggrel hymns, the procession drew up in the Gardens of the Tuileries, before some fireworks which had been prepared, and Robespierre

* Poor Anacharsis Klootz. He had been expelled from the Jacobin Club as a Prussian, an ex-noble, and, what perhaps was not previously suspected, a person of fortune enough to be judged an aristocrat. His real offence was being a Hébertist, and he suffered accordingly with the leaders of that party.—This note was rather unnecessary; but Anacharsis Klootz was, in point of absurdity, one of the most inimitable personages in the Revolution.

made a speech, entirely addressed to the bystanders, without a word either of prayer or invocation. His acknowledgment of a divinity was, it seems, limited to a mere admission in point of fact, and involved no worship of the great Being, whose existence he at length condescended to own. He had no sooner made his offering, than fire was set to some figures dressed up to resemble atheism, ambition, egotism, and other evil principles. The young men then brandished their weapons, the old patted them on the head, the girls flung about their flowers, and the matrons flourished aloft their children, all as it had been set down in David's programme. And this scene of masking was to pass for the repentance of a great people turning themselves again to the Deity, whose worship they had forsaken, and whose being they had denied!

I will appeal—not to a sincere christian—but to any philosopher forming such idea of the nature of the Deity, as even were unassisted reason can attain to, whether there does not appear more impiety in Robespierre's mode of acknowledging the divinity, than in Hébert's horrible avowal of direct atheism?

The procession did not, in common phrase, *take* with the people; it produced no striking effect—awakened no deep feeling. By catholics it was regarded with horror; by wise men of every or no principle as ridiculous; and there were politicians, who, under the disguise of this religious ceremony, pretended to detect further and deeper schemes of the dictator Robespierre. Even in the course of the procession, threats and murmurs had reached his ears, which the impatient resentment of the friends of Danton was unable to suppress; and he saw plainly that he must again betake himself to the task of murder, and dispose of Tallien, Collot d'Herbois, and others, as he had done successively of Hébert and Danton himself, or else his former victories would but lead to his final ruin.

Meanwhile the despot, whose looks made even the democrats of the Mountain tremble, when directed upon them, shrunk himself before the apprehended presence of a young female. Cécile Regnaud, a girl, and, as it would seem, unarmed, came to his house and demanded to see Robespierre. Her manner exciting some suspicion, she was seized upon by the body-guard of jacobins, who day and night watched the den of the tyrant, amidst riot and blasphemy, while he endeavoured to sleep under the security of their neighbourhood. When the young woman was brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal, she would return no answer to the question respecting her purpose, excepting that she wished to see "what a tyrant was like." She was condemned to the guillotine of course; and about sixty persons were executed as associates of a conspiracy, which was never proved, by deed or word, to have existed at all. The victims were drawn at hazard out of the prisons, where most of them had been confined for months previous to the arrest of Cécile Regnaud, on whose account they were represented as suffering.* Many have thought the crime entirely

* This unheard-of iniquity is stated in the report of the committee appointed to examine Robespierre's papers, of which Courtois was the reporter. It is rather a curious circumstance that, about the time of Cécile Regnaud's ad-

imaginary, and only invented by Robespierre, to represent his person as endangered by the plots of the aristocracy, and attach to himself a part at least of the consequence, which Marat had acquired by the act of Charlotte Corday.

A few weeks brought on a sterner encounter than that of the supposed female assassin. The terrorists were divided among themselves. The chosen and ancient bands of the 10th August, 2d September, 31st May, and other remarkable periods of the Revolution, continued attached to the jacobins, and the majority of the Jacobin Club adhered to Robespierre; it was there his strength consisted. On the other hand, Tallien, Barras, Legendre, Fouché, and other of the Mountain party, remembered Danton, and feared for a similar fate. The Convention at large were sure to embrace any course which promised to free them from their present thralldom.

The people themselves were beginning to be less passive. They no longer saw the train of victims pass daily to the guillotine, in the Place de la Révolution, with stupid wonder, or overwhelming fear, but, on the contrary, with the sullenness of manifest resentment, that waited but an opportunity to display itself. The citizens in the Rue St-Honoré shut up their shops at the hours when the fatal tumbrils passed to the scene of death, and that whole quarter of the city was covered with gloom.

These ominous feelings were observed, and the fatal engine was removed to a more obscure situation at the Barrière du Trône, near the Faubourg St-Antoine, to the inhabitants of which it was thought a daily spectacle of this nature must be an interesting relief from labour. But even the people of that turbulent suburb had lost some of their republican zeal—the men's feelings were altered. They saw, indeed, blood stream in such quantities, that it was necessary to make an artificial conduit to carry it off; but they did not feel that they, or those belonging to them, received any advantages from the number of victims, daily immolated, as they were assured, in their behalf. The constant effusion of blood, without plunder or license to give it zest, disgusted them, as it would have disgusted all but literal cannibals, to whose sustenance, indeed, the Revolutionary Tribunal would have contributed plentifully.

Robespierre saw all this increasing unpopularity with much anxiety. He plainly perceived that, strong as its impulse was, the stimulus of terror began to lose its effect on the popular mind; and he resolved to give it novelty, not by changing the character of his system, but by varying the mode of its application. Hitherto, men had only been executed for political crimes, although the circle had been so vaguely drawn; and capable of such extension when desired, that the law regarding suspected persons was alone capable of desolating a whole country. But if the penalty of death were to be inflicted for religious and moral delinquencies, as well as for crimes directed against the state, it would at once throw the lives of thousands at his disposal, venture, there appeared, at a masked ball at London, a character dressed like the spectre of Charlotte Corday, come, as she said, to seek Robespierre, and inflict on him the doom of Marat.

upon whom he could have no ready hold on political motives, and might support, at the same time, his newly-assumed character as a reformer of manners. He would also thus escape the disagreeable and embarrassing necessity, of drawing lines of distinction betwixt his own conduct and that of the old friends whom he found it convenient to sacrifice. He could not say he was less a murderer than the rest of his associates, but he might safely plead more external decency of morals. His own manners had always been reserved and austere; and what a triumph would it have been, had the laws permitted him the benefit of slaying Danton, not under that political character which could hardly be distinguished from his own, but on account of the gross pecculation and debauchery, which none could impute to the austere and incorruptible Robespierre.

His subordinate agents began already to point to a reformation of manners. Payan, who succeeded Hébert in the important station of Procureur to the Commune of the metropolis, had already adopted a very different line from his predecessor, whose style derived energy by printing at full length the foulest oaths, and most beastly expressions, used by the refuse of the people. Payan, on the contrary, in direct opposition to Père Duchesne, is found gravely advising with the Commune of Paris, on a plan of preventing the exposing licentious prints and works to sale, to the evident danger of corrupting the rising generation.

There exists also a curious address from the Convention, which tends to evince a similar purpose in the framer, Robespierre. The guilt of profane swearing, and of introducing the sacred name into ordinary speech, as an unmeaning and blasphemous expletive, is severely censured. The using indecent and vicious expressions in common discourse is also touched upon; but as this unbounded energy of speech had been so very lately one of the most accredited marks of a true sans-culotte, the legislators were compelled to qualify their censure by admitting that, at the commencement of the Revolution, the vulgar mode of speaking had been generally adopted by patriots, in order to destroy the jargon employed by the privileged classes, and to popularize, as it was expressed, the general language of society. But these ends being effected, the speech of republicans ought, it is said, to be simple, manly, and concise, but at the same time free from coarseness and violence.

From these indications, and the tenor of a decree to be hereafter quoted, it seems plain that Robespierre was about to affect a new character, not, perhaps, without the hope of finding a puritanic party in France as favourable to his ambitious views as that of the independents was to Cromwell. He might then have added the word *virtue* to liberty and equality, which formed the national programme, and, doubtless, would have made it the pretext of committing additional crimes. The decree which we allude to was brought forward by the philanthropic Couthon, who, with his kindness of manner, rendered more impressive by a silver-toned voice, and an affectation of extreme gentleness, tendered a law, extending the powers of the Revolutionary

Tribunal, and the penalty of death, not only to all sorts of persons who should in any manner of way neglect their duty to the Republic, or assist her enemies, but to the following additional classes:—All who should have deceived the people or their representatives; all who should have sought to inspire discouragement into good citizens, or to favour the undertakings of tyrants; all who should spread false news; all who should seek to lead astray the public opinion, and to prevent the instruction of the people, or to debauch manners, and corrupt the public conscience; or who should diminish the purity of revolutionary principles by counter-revolutionary works, etc., etc., etc.

It is evident that, compared with a law couched in terms so vague and general, so obscure and indefinite, the description of crimes concerning suspected persons was broad sunshine; that there was no Frenchman living who might not be brought within the danger of the decree, under one or other of those sweeping clauses—that a loose or careless expression, or the repetition of an inaccurate article of news, might be founded on as corrupting the public conscience, or misleading the public opinion; in short, that the slightest indulgence in the most ordinary functions of speech might be brought under this comprehensive edict, and so cost the speaker his life.

The decree sounded like a death-knell in the ears of the Convention. All were made sensible that another decimation of the legislative body approached, and beheld with terror that no provision was made in the proposed law for respecting the personal inviolability of the deputies, but that the obnoxious members of the Convention, without costing Robespierre even the formality of asking a decree from their complaisant brethren, might be transferred, like any ordinary individuals, to the butchery of the Revolutionary Tribunal, not only by the medium of either of the committees, but at the instance of the public prosecutor, or even of any of their own brethren of the representative body, who were acting under a commission. Ruamps, one of the deputies, exclaimed in accents of despair, that if this decree were resolved upon, the friends of liberty had no other course left than to blow their own brains out.

The law passed for the night, in spite of all opposition; but the terrified deputies returned to the attack next day. The measure was again brought into debate, and the question of privileges was evasively provided for. At a third sitting the theme was renewed; and, after much violence, the fatal decree was carried, without any of the clogs which had offended Robespierre, and he attained possession of the fatal weapon, such as he had originally forged it.

From this moment there was mortal though secret war betwixt Robespierre and the most distinguished members of the assembly, particularly those who had sate with him on the celebrated Mountain, and shared all the atrocities of jacobinism. Collot d'Herbois, the demolisher of Lyons, and regenerator of Ville Affranchie, threw his weight into the scale against his master; and several other members of both committees, which were Robespierre's

own organs, began secretly to think on means of screening themselves from a power, which, like the huge Amconda, enveloped in its coils, and then crushed and swallowed, whatever came in contact with it. The private progress of the schism cannot be traced; but it is said that the dictator found himself in a minority in the Committee of Public Safety, when he demanded the head of Fouché, whom he had accused as a Dantonist in the Convention and the Jacobin Club. It is certain he had not attended the meeting of the committee for two or three weeks before his fall, leaving his interest there to be managed by Couthon and St-Just.

Feeling himself thus placed in the lists against his ancient friends the terrorists, the astutious tyrant endeavoured to acquire allies among the remains of the girondists, who had been spared in contempt more than clemency, and permitted to hide themselves among the neutral party who occupied the Plain, and who gave generally their votes on the prudential system of adhering to the stronger side.

Finding little countenance from this timid and long-neglected part of the Legislative Body, Robespierre returned to his more steady supporters in the Jacobin Club. Here he retained his supremacy, and was heard with enthusiastic applause; while he intimated to them the defection of certain members of the legislature from the true revolutionary course; complained of the inactivity and lukewarmness of the Committees of Public Safety and Public Security, and described himself as a persecuted patriot, almost the solitary supporter of the cause of his country, and exposed for that reason to the blows of a thousand assassins.

"All patriots," exclaimed Couthon, "are brothers and friends! For my part, I invoke on myself the poniards destined against Robespierre."

"So do we all!" exclaimed the meeting, unanimously.

Thus encouraged, Robespierre urged a purification of the society, directing his accusations against Fouché and other members of the Mountain; and he received the encouragement he desired.

He next ascertained his strength among the judges of the Revolutionary Tribunal, and his willing agents among the reformed Commune of Paris, which, after the fall of Hébert and Chaumette, he had taken care to occupy with his most devoted friends. But still he knew that, in the storm which was about to arise, these out-of-door demagogues were but a sort of tritons of the minnows, compared to Tallien, Fouché, Barras, Collot d'Herbois, Billaud Varennes, and other deputies of distinguished powers, accustomed to make their voices heard and obeyed amid all the roar of revolutionary tempest. He measured and remeasured his force with theirs; and for more than six weeks avoided the combat, yet without making any overtures for reconciliation, in which, indeed, neither party would probably have trusted the other.

Meantime the dictator's enemies had also their own ground on which they could engage advantageously in these skirmishes, which were to serve as preludes to the main and fatal conflict. Vadier, on the part of the Committee of Public Safety, laid before the Convention, in a tone of bitter satirical

ridicule, the history of the mystical meetings and formation of a religious sect under Catherine Théot, whose pretensions have been already hinted at. No mention was indeed made of Robespierre, or of the countenance he was supposed to have given to these fanatical intriguers. But the fact of his having done so was well known; and the shafts of Vadier were aimed with such malignant dexterity, that, while they seemed only directed against the mystics of whom he spoke, they galled to the quick the high pontiff, who had so lately conducted the new and singular system of worship which his influence had been employed to ingraft upon the genuine atheism natural to jacobinism.

Robespierre felt he could not remain long in this situation—that there were no means of securing himself where he stood—that he must climb higher, or fall—and that every moment in which he supported insults and endured menaces, without making his vengeance felt, brought with it a diminution of his power. He seems to have hesitated between combat and flight. Among his papers, according to the report of Courtois who examined them, was found an obscure intimation, that he had acquired a competent property, and entertained thoughts of retiring at the close of his horrible career, after the example of the celebrated Sylla. It was a letter from some unknown confidant, unsigned and undated, containing the following singular passage: "You must employ all your dexterity to escape from the scene on which you are now once more to appear, in order to leave it for ever. Your having attained the president's chair will be but one step to the guillotine, through a rabble who will spit upon you as you pass, as they did upon *Egalité*. Since you have collected a treasure sufficient to maintain you for a long time, as well as those for whom you have made provision, I will expect you with anxiety, that we may enjoy a hearty laugh together at the expense of a nation as credulous as it is greedy of novelty." If, however, he had really formed such a plan, which would not have been inconsistent with his base spirit, the means of accomplishing it were probably never perfected.

At length his fate urged him on to the encounter. Robespierre descended to the Convention, where he had of late but rarely appeared, like the far nobler dictator of Rome; and in his case also, a band of senators was ready to poniard the tyrant on the spot, had they not been afraid of the popularity he was supposed to enjoy, and which they feared might render them instant victims to the revenge of the jacobins. The speech which Robespierre addressed to the Convention was as menacing as the first distant rustle of the hurricane, and dark and lurid as the eclipse which announces its approach. Anxious murmurs had been heard among the populace who filled the tribunals, or crowded the entrances of the hall of the Convention, indicating that a second 31st of May (being the day on which the jacobins proscribed the girondists) was about to witness a similar operation.

The first theme of the gloomy orator was the display of his own virtues and his services as a patriot, distinguishing as enemies to their country all whose opinions were contrary to his own. He then reviewed successively the various departments of the govern-

ment, and loaded them in turn with censure and contempt. He declaimed against the supineness of the Committees of Public Safety and Public Security, as if the guillotine had never been in exercise; and he accused the Committee of Finance of having counter-revolutionized the revenues of the Republic. He enlarged with no less bitterness on withdrawing the artillerymen (always violent jacobins) from Paris, and on the mode of management adopted in the conquered countries of Belgium. It seemed as if he wished to collect within the same lists all the functionaries of the state, and in the same breath to utter defiance to them all.

The usual honorary motion was made to print the discourse; but then the storm of opposition broke forth, and many speakers vociferously demanded, that before so far adopting the grave inculcations which it contained, the discourse should be referred to the two Committees. Robespierre, in his turn, exclaimed, that this was subjecting his speech to the partial criticism and revision of the very parties whom he had accused. Exculpations and defences were heard on all sides against the charges which had been thus sweepingly brought forward; and there were many deputies who complained in no obscure terms of individual tyranny, and of a conspiracy on foot to outlaw and murder such part of the Convention as might be disposed to offer resistance. Robespierre was but feebly supported, save by St-Just, Couthon, and by his own brother. After a stormy debate, in which the Convention were alternately swayed by their fear and their hatred of Robespierre, the discourse was finally referred to the Committees, instead of being printed; and the haughty and sullen dictator saw, in the open slight thus put on his measures and opinions, the sure mark of his approaching fall.

He carried his complaints to the Jacobin Club, to repose, as he expressed it, his patriotic sorrows in their virtuous bosoms, where alone he hoped to find succour and sympathy. To this partial audience he renewed, in a tone of yet greater audacity, the complaints with which he had loaded every branch of the government, and the representative body itself. He reminded those around him of various heroic eras, when their presence and their pikes had decided the votes of the trembling deputies. He reminded them of their pristine actions of revolutionary vigour — asked them if they had forgot the road to the Convention, and concluded by pathetically assuring them, that if they forsook him, "he stood resigned to his fate; and they should behold with what courage he would drink the fatal hemlock." The artist, David, caught him by the hand as he closed, exclaiming, in rapture at his elocution, "I will drink it with thee."

The distinguished painter has been reproached, as having, on the subsequent day, declined the pledge which he seemed so eagerly to embrace. But there were many of his original opinion, at the time he expressed it so boldly; and had Robespierre possessed either military talents, or even decided courage, there was nothing to have prevented him from placing himself that very night at the head of a desperate insurrection of the jacobins and their followers.

Payan, the successor of Hébert, actually proposed that the jacobins should instantly march against the two committees, which Robespierre charged with being the focus of the anti-revolutionary machinations, surprise their handful of guards, and stifle the evil with which the state was menaced, even in the very cradle. This plan was deemed too hazardous to be adopted, although it was one of those sudden and master-strokes of policy which Machiavel would have recommended. The fire of the jacobins spent itself in tumult and threatening, and in expelling from the bosom of their society Collot d'Herbois, Tallien, and about thirty other deputies of the Mountain party, whom they considered as specially leagued to effect the downfall of Robespierre, and whom they drove from their society with execrations and even blows.

Collot d'Herbois, thus outraged, went straight from the meeting of the jacobins to the place where the Committee of Public Safety was still sitting, in consultation on the report which they had to make to the Convention the next day upon the speech of Robespierre. St-Just, one of their number, though warmly attached to the dictator, had been intrusted by the Committee with the delicate task of drawing up that report. It was a step towards reconciliation; but the entrance of Collot d'Herbois, frantic with the insults he had received, broke off all hope of accommodation betwixt the friends of Danton and those of Robespierre. Collot d'Herbois exhausted himself in threats against St-Just, Couthon, and their master, Robespierre, and they parted on terms of mortal and avowed enmity. Every exertion now was used by the associated conspirators against the power of Robespierre, to collect and combine against him the whole forces of the Convention, to alarm the deputies of the Plain with fears for themselves, and to awaken the rage of the Mountaineers, against whose throat the dictator now waved the sword, which their short-sighted policy had placed in his hands. Lists of proscribed deputies were handed around, said to have been copied from the tablets of the dictator; genuine or false, they obtained universal credit and currency; and those whose names stood on the fatal scrolls engaged themselves for protection in the league against their enemy. The opinion that his fall could not be delayed now became general.

This sentiment was so commonly entertained in Paris on the 9th Thermidor, or 27th July, that a herd of about eighty victims, who were in the act of being dragged to the guillotine, were nearly saved by means of it. The people, in a generous burst of compassion, began to gather in crowds, and interrupted the melancholy procession, as if the power which presided over these hideous exhibitions had already been deprived of energy. But the hour was not come. The vile Henriot, commandant of the National Guards, came up with fresh forces, and, on the day destined to be the last of his own life, proved the means of carrying to execution this crowd of unhappy and doubtless innocent persons.

On this eventful day, Robespierre arrived in the Convention, and beheld the Mountain in close array and completely manned, while, as in the case of Catiline, the bench on which he himself was accus-

tomed to sit seemed purposely deserted. St-Just, Couthon, Lebas (his brother-in-law), and the younger Robespierre, were the only deputies of name who stood prepared to support him. But could he make an effectual struggle, he might depend upon the aid of the servile Barrère, a sort of Belial in the Convention, the meanest, yet not the least able, amongst those fallen spirits, who with great adroitness and ingenuity, as well as wit and eloquence, caught opportunities as they arose, and was eminently dexterous in being always strong upon the strongest, and safe upon the safest side. There was a tolerably numerous party ready, in times so dangerous, to attach themselves to Barrère, as a leader who professed to guide them to safety, if not to honour; and it was the existence of this vacillating and uncertain body, whose ultimate motions could be never calculated upon, which rendered it impossible to presage with assurance the event of any debate in the Convention during this dangerous period.

St-Just arose, in the name of the Committee of Public Safety, to make, after his own manner, not theirs, a report on the discourse of Robespierre on the previous evening. He had begun a harangue in the tone of his patron, declaring that, were the tribune which he occupied the Tarpeian rock itself, he would not the less, placed as he stood there, discharge the duties of a patriot.—“I am about,” he said, “to lift the veil.”—“I tear it asunder,” said Tallien, interrupting him. “The public interest is sacrificed by individuals, who come hither to speak exclusively in their own name, and conduct themselves as superior to the whole Convention.” He forced St-Just from the tribune, and a violent debate ensued.

Billaud Varennes called the attention of the assembly to the sitting of the Jacobin Club on the preceding evening. He declared the military force of Paris was placed under the command of Henriot, a traitor and a parricide, who was ready to march the soldiers whom he commanded against the Convention. He denounced Robespierre himself as a second Catiline, artful as well as ambitious, whose system it had been to nurse jealousies and inflame dissensions in the Convention, so as to disunite parties, and even individuals, from each other, attack them in detail, and thus destroy those antagonists separately, upon whose combined and united strength he dared not have looked.

The Convention echoed with applause every violent expression of the orator, and when Robespierre sprang to the tribune, his voice was drowned by a general shout of “Down with the tyrant!” Tallien moved the denunciation of Robespierre, with the arrest of Henriot, his staff-officers, and of others connected with the meditated violence on the Convention. He had undertaken to lead the attack upon the tyrant, he said, and to poniard him in the Convention itself, if the members did not show courage enough to enforce the law against him. With these words he brandished an unsheathed poniard, as if about to make his purpose good. Robespierre still struggled hard to obtain audience, but the tribune was adjudged to Barrère; and the part taken against the fallen dictator by that versatile and self-interested statesman, was the most

absolute sign that his overthrow was irrecoverable. Torrents of invective were now uttered from every quarter of the hall, against him whose single word was wont to hush it into silence.

The scene was dreadful; yet not without its use to those who may be disposed to look at it as an extraordinary crisis, in which human passions were brought so singularly into collision. While the vaults of the hall echoed with exclamations from those who had hitherto been the accomplices, the flatterers, the followers, at least the timid and overawed assentators to the dethroned demagogue—he himself, breathless, foaming, exhausted, like the hunter of classical antiquity when on the point of being overpowered and torn to pieces by his own hounds, tried in vain to raise those screech-owl notes by which the Convention had formerly been terrified and put to silence. He appealed for a hearing from the president of the assembly to the various parties of which it was composed. Rejected by the Montagneers, his former associates, who now headed the clamour against him, he applied to the girondists, few and feeble as they were, and to the more numerous but equally helpless deputies of the Plain, with whom they sheltered. The former shook him from them with disgust, the last with horror. It was in vain he reminded individuals that he had spared their lives, while at his mercy. This might have been applied to every member in the house; to every man in France; for who was it during two years that had lived on other terms than under Robespierre's permission? and deeply must he internally have regretted the clemency, as he might term it, which had left so many with ungnashed throats to bay at him. But his agitated and repeated appeals were repulsed by some with indignation, by others with sullen, or embarrassed and timid silence.

A British historian must say, that even Robespierre ought to have been heard in his defence; and that such calmness would have done honour to the Convention, and dignified their final sentence of condemnation. As it was, they no doubt treated the guilty individual according to his deserts; but they fell short of that regularity and manly staidness of conduct which was due to themselves and to the law, and which would have given to the punishment of the demagogue the effect and weight of a solemn and deliberate sentence, in place of its seeming the result of the hasty and precipitate seizure of a temporary advantage.

Haste was, however, necessary, and must have appeared more so at such a crisis than perhaps it really was. Much must be pardoned to the terrors of the moment, the horrid character of the culprit, and the necessity of hurrying to a decisive conclusion. We have been told that his last audible words, contending against the exclamations of hundreds, and the bell which the president was ringing incessantly, and uttered in the highest tones which despair could give to a voice naturally shrill and discordant, dwelt long on the memory, and haunted the dreams, of many who heard him:—“President of assassins,” he screamed, “for the last time I demand privilege of speech!”—After this exertion his breath became short and faint; and while he still uttered broken murmurs and hoarse ejaculations, the members of

the Mountain called out, that the blood of Danton choked his voice.

The tumult was closed by a decree of arrest against Robespierre, his brother, Couthon, and St-Jast; Lebas was included on his own motion, and indeed could scarce have escaped the fate of his brother-in-law, though his conduct then, and subsequently, showed more energy than that of the others. Couthon, hugging in his bosom the spaniel upon which he was wont to exhaust the overflowing of his affected sensibility, appealed to his decrepitude, and asked whether, maimed of proportion and activity as he was, *he* could be suspected of nourishing plans of violence or ambition.—“Wretch,” said Legendre, “thou hast the strength of Hercules for the perpetration of crime.” Dumas, president of the Revolutionary Tribunal, with Henriot, Commandant of the National Guards, and other satellites of Robespierre, were included in the doom of arrest.

The officers of the legislative body were ordered to lay hands on Robespierre; but such was the terror of his name, that they hesitated for some time to obey; and the reluctance of their own immediate satellites afforded the Convention an indifferent omen of the respect which was likely to be paid without doors to their decree against this powerful demagogue. Subsequent events seemed for a while to confirm the apprehensions thus excited.

The Convention had declared their sitting permanent, and had taken all precautions for appealing for protection to the large mass of citizens, who, wearied out by the reign of Terror, were desirous to close it at all hazards. They quickly had deputations from several of the neighbouring sections, declaring their adherence to the national representatives, in whose defence they were arming, and (many undoubtedly prepared beforehand) were marching in all haste to the protection of the Convention. But they heard also the less pleasing tidings, that Henriot, having effected the dispersion of those citizens who had obstructed, as elsewhere mentioned, the execution of the eighty condemned persons, and consummated that final act of murder, was approaching the Tuileries, where they had held their sitting, with a numerous staff, and such of the jacobinical forces as could hastily be collected.

Happily for the Convention, this commandant of the National Guards, on whose presence of mind and courage the fate of France perhaps for the moment depended, was as stupid and cowardly as he was brutally ferocious. He suffered himself, without resistance, to be arrested by a few gendarmes, the immediate guards of the Convention, headed by two of its members, who behaved in the emergency with equal prudence and spirit.

But fortune, or the demon whom he had served, afforded Robespierre another chance for safety, perhaps even for empire; for moments which a man of self-possession might have employed for escape, one of desperate courage might have used for victory, which, considering the divided and extremely unsettled state of the capital, was likely to be gained by the boldest competitor.

The arrested deputies had been carried from one prison to another, all the jailers refusing to receive under their official charge Robespierre, and those

who had aided him in supplying their dark habitations with such a tide of successive inhabitants. At length the prisoners were secured in the office of the Committee of Public Safety. But by this time all was in alarm amongst the Commune of Paris, where Fleuriot, the mayor, and Payan, the successor of Hébert, convoked the civic body, dispatched municipal officers to raise the city and the faubourgs in their name, and caused the tocsin to be rung. Payan speedily assembled a force sufficient to liberate Henriot, Robespierre, and the other arrested deputies, and to carry them to the Hôtel de Ville, where about two thousand men were congregated, consisting chiefly of artillerymen, and of insurgents from the suburb of St-Antoine, who already expressed their resolution of marching against the Convention. But the selfish and cowardly character of Robespierre was unfit for such a crisis. He appeared altogether confounded and overwhelmed with what had passed and was passing around him; and not one of all the victims of the reign of Terror felt its disabling influence so completely as he, the despot who had so long directed its sway. He had not, even though the means must have been in his power, the presence of mind to disperse money in considerable sums, which of itself would not have failed to insure the support of the revolutionary rabble.

Meantime the Convention continued to maintain the bold and commanding front which they had so suddenly and critically assumed. Upon learning the escape of the arrested deputies, and hearing of the insurrection at the Hôtel de Ville, they instantly passed a decree outlawing Robespierre and his associates, inflicting a similar doom upon the Mayor of Paris, the procureur, and other members of the commune, and charging twelve of their members, the boldest who could be selected, to proceed with the armed force to the execution of the sentence. The drums of the National Guards now beat to arms in all the sections under authority of the Convention, while the tocsin continued to summon assistance with its iron voice to Robespierre and the civic magistrates. Everything appeared to threaten a violent catastrophe, until it was seen clearly that the public voice, and especially amongst the National Guards, was declaring itself generally against the terrorists.

The Hôtel de Ville was surrounded by about fifteen hundred men, and cannon turned upon the doors. The force of the assailants was weakest in point of number, but their leaders were men of spirit, and night concealed their inferiority of force.

The deputies commissioned for the purpose read the decree of the assembly to those whom they found assembled in front of the city-hall, and they shrunk from the attempt of defending it, some joining the assailants, others laying down their arms and dispersing. Meantime the deserted group of terrorists within conducted themselves like scorpions, which, when surrounded by a circle of fire, are said to turn their stings on each other, and on themselves. Mutual and ferocious upbraiding took place among these miserable men. “Wretch, were these the means you promised to furnish?” said

Payan to Henriot, whom he found intoxicated and incapable of resolution or exertion; and, seizing on him as he spoke, he precipitated the revolutionary general from a window. Henriot survived the fall only to drag himself into a drain, in which he was afterwards discovered and brought out to execution. The younger Robespierre threw himself from the window, but had not the good fortune to perish on the spot. It seemed as if even the melancholy fate of suicide, the last refuge of guilt and despair, was denied to men who had so long refused every species of mercy to their fellow-creatures. Lebas alone had calmness enough to dispatch himself with a pistol-shot. St-Just, after imploring his comrades to kill him, attempted his own life with an irresolute hand, and failed. Couthon lay beneath the table, brandishing a knife, with which he repeatedly wounded his bosom, without daring to add force enough to reach his heart. Their chief, Robespierre, in an unsuccessful attempt to shoot himself, had only inflicted a horrible fracture on his under-jaw.

In this situation they were found like wolves in their lair, foul with blood, mutilated, despairing, and yet not able to die. Robespierre lay on a table in an ante-room, his head supported by a deal-box, and his hideous countenance half-hidden by a bloody and dirty cloth bound round the shattered chin.*

The captives were carried in triumph to the Convention, who, without admitting them to the bar, ordered them, as outlaws, for instant execution. As the fatal cars passed to the guillotine, those who filled them, but especially Robespierre, were overwhelmed with execrations from the friends and relatives of victims whom he had sent on the same melancholy road. The nature of his previous wound, from which the cloth had never been removed till the executioner tore it off, added to the torture of the sufferer. The shattered jaw dropped, and the wretch yelled aloud, to the horror of the spectators.† A masque taken from that dreadful head was long exhibited in different nations of Europe, and appalled the spectator by its ugliness, and the mixture of fiendish expression with that of bodily agony.

Thus fell Maximilian Robespierre, after having been the first person in the French Republic for nearly two years, during which time he governed it upon the principles of Nero or Caligula. His elevation to the situation which he held involved more contradictions than perhaps attach to any similar event in history. A low-born and low-minded tyrant was permitted to rule with the rod of the most frightful despotism a people, whose anxiety for liberty had shortly before rendered them unable to endure the rule of a humane and lawful sovereign. A dastardly coward arose to the command of one of the bravest nations in the world; and it was under the auspices of a man who dared scarce fire

a pistol, that the greatest generals in France began their careers of conquest. He had neither eloquence nor imagination; but substituted in their stead a miserable, affected, bombastic style, which, until other circumstances gave him consequence, drew on him general ridicule. Yet, against so poor an orator, all the eloquence of the philosophical girondists, all the terrible powers of his associate Danton, employed in a popular assembly, could not enable them to make an effectual resistance. It may seem trifling to mention, that in a nation where a good deal of prepossession is excited by amiable manners and beauty of external appearance, the person who ascended to the highest power was not only ill-looking, but singularly mean in person, awkward and constrained in his address, ignorant how to set about pleasing, even when he most desired to give pleasure, and as tiresome nearly as he was odious and heartless.

To compensate all these deficiencies, Robespierre had but an insatiable ambition, founded on a vanity which made him think himself capable of filling the highest situation; and therefore gave him daring, when to dare is frequently to achieve. He mixed a false and overstrained, but rather fluent species of bombastic composition, with the grossest flattery to the lowest classes of the people; in consideration of which, they could not but receive as genuine the praises which he always bestowed on himself. His prudent resolution to be satisfied with possessing the essence of power, without seeming to desire its rank and trappings, formed another art of cajoling the multitude. His watchful envy, his long-protracted but sure revenge, his craft, which to vulgar minds supplies the place of wisdom, were his only means of competing with his distinguished antagonists. And it seems to have been a merited punishment of the extravagances and abuses of the French Revolution, that it engaged the country in a state of anarchy which permitted a wretch, such as we have described, to be for a long period master of her destiny. Blood was his element, like that of the other terrorists, and he never fastened with so much pleasure on a new victim, as when he was at the same time an ancient associate. In an epitaph, of which the following couplet may serve as a translation, his life was represented as incompatible with the existence of the human race :—

Here lies Robespierre—let no tear be shed :
Reader, if he had lived, thou hadst been dead.*

When the report of Robespierre's crimes was brought to the Convention, in which he is most justly charged with the intention of possessing himself of the government, the inconsistent accusation is added, that he plotted to restore the Bourbons; in support of which it is alleged that a seal, bearing a fleur-de-lis, was found at the Hôtel de Ville. Not even the crimes of Robespierre were thought sufficiently atrocious, without their being mingled with a tendency to royalism!

With this celebrated demagogue the reign of Terror may be said to have terminated, although

* It did not escape the minute observers of this scene, that he still held in his hand the bag which had contained the fatal pistol, and which was inscribed with the words *Au grand monarque*, alluding to the sign, doubtless, of the gunsmith who sold the weapon, but singularly applicable to the high pretensions of the purchaser.

† The fate of no tyrant in story was so hideous at the conclusion, excepting perhaps that of Jugurtha.

* *Pasant, ne pleure point son sort,
Car, s'il vivait, tu serais mort.*

those by whose agency the tyrant fell were as much terrorists as himself, being, indeed, the principal members of the very Committees of Public Safety and Public Security, who had been his colleagues in all the excesses of his revolutionary authority. Among the *thermidoriens*, as the actors in Robespierre's downfall termed themselves, there were names almost as dreadful as that of the dictator, for whom the ninth Thermidor proved the Ides of March. What could be hoped for from Collot d'Herbois, the butcher of the Lyonnais—what from Billaud Varennes—what from Barras, who had directed the executions at Marseilles after its ephemeral revolt—what from Tallien, whose arms were afterwards dyed double red, from finger-nails to elbow, in the blood of the unfortunate emigrant gentlemen who were made prisoners at Quiberon? It seemed that only a new set of septembriseurs had succeeded, and that the same horrible principle would continue to be the moving spring of the government, under the direction of other chiefs indeed, but men who were scarce less familiar with its horrors than was the departed tyrant.

Men looked hopelessly towards the Convention, long rather like the corpse of a legislative assembly, actuated, during its apparent activity, like the supposed Vampire, by an infernal spirit not its own, which urged it to go forth and drink blood, but which, deserted by the animating demon, must, it was to be expected, sink to the ground in helpless incapacity. What could be expected from Barrère, the ready panegyrist of Robespierre, the tool who was ever ready to show to the weak and the timid the exact point where their safety recommended to them to join the ranks of the wicked and the strong? But in spite of these discouraging circumstances, the feelings of humanity, and a spirit of self-protection, dictating a determined resistance to the renovation of the horrid system under which the country had so long suffered, began to show itself both in the Convention and without doors. Encouraged by the fall of Robespierre, complaints poured in against his agents on all sides. Lebon was accused before the Convention by a deputation from Cambrai; and as he ascended the tribune to put himself on his defence, he was generally hailed as the hangman of Robespierre. The monster's impudence supported him in a sort of defence; and when it was objected to him that he had had the common executioner to dine in company with him, he answered, "That delicate people might think that wrong; but Lequinio (another jacobin proconsul of horrible celebrity) had made the same useful citizen the companion of his leisure and hours of relaxation." He acknowledged, with the same equanimity, that an aristocrat being condemned to the guillotine, he kept him lying in the usual posture upon his back, with his eyes turned up to the axe, which was suspended above his throat,—in short, in all the agonies which can agitate the human mind, when within a hair's-breadth of the distance of the great separation between Time and Eternity,—until he had read to him, at length, the Gazette which had just arrived, giving an account of a victory gained by the republican armies. This monster, with Héron, Rossignol,

and other agents of terror more immediately connected with Robespierre, were ordered for arrest, and shortly after for execution. Tallien and Barras would have here paused in the retrospect; but similar accusations now began to pour in from every quarter, and, when once stated, were such as commanded public attention in the most forcible manner. Those who invoked vengeance backed the solicitations of each other—the general voice of mankind was with them; and leaders who had shared the excesses of the reign of Terror, thermidoriens as they were, began to see some danger of being themselves buried in the ruins of the power which they had overthrown.

Tallien, who is supposed to have taken the lead in the extremely difficult navigation which lay before the vessel of the state, seems to have experienced a change in his own sentiments, at least his principles of action, inclining him to the cause of humanity. He was also, it is said, urged to so favourable a modification of feelings by his newly-married wife, formerly Madame Fontenai, who, bred a royalist, had herself been a victim to the law of suspicion, and was released from a prison to receive the hand, and influence the activity, of the republican statesman. Barras, who, as commanding the armed force, might be termed the hero of the 9th Thermidor, was supposed to be also inclined towards humanity and moderation.

Thus disposed to destroy the monstrous system which had taken root in France, and which, indeed, in the increasing impatience of the country, they would have found it impossible to maintain, Tallien and Barras had to struggle, at the same time, to diminish and restrict the general demand for revenge, at a time when, if past tyranny was to be strictly inquired into and punished, the doom, as Carrier himself told them, would have involved everything in the Convention, excepting perhaps the president's bell and his arm-chair. So powerful were these feelings of resisting a retrospect, that the thermidoriens declined to support Le Cointre in bringing forward a general charge of inculpation against the two Committees of Public Safety and Public Security, in which accusation, notwithstanding their ultimate quarrel with Robespierre, he showed their intimate connexion with him, and their joint agency in all which had been imputed to him as guilt. But the time was not mature for hazarding such a general accusation, and it was rejected by the Convention with marks of extreme displeasure.

Still, however, the general voice of humanity demanded some further atonement for two years of outrage, and, to satisfy this demand, the thermidoriens set themselves to seek victims connected more immediately with Robespierre: while they endeavoured gradually to form a party, which, setting out upon a principle of amnesty, and oblivion of the past, should in future pay some regard to that preservation of the lives and property of the governed, which, in every other system saving that which had been just overthrown in France, is regarded as the principal end of civil government. With a view to the consolidation of such a party, the restrictions of the press were removed, and men of talent and

literature, silenced during the reign of Robespierre, were once more admitted to exercise their natural influence in favour of civil order and religion. Mar-montel, La Harpe, and others, who in their youth had been enrolled in the list of Voltaire's disciples, and amongst the infidels of the *Encyclopédie*, now made amends for their youthful errors, by exerting themselves in the cause of good morals, and of a regulated government.

At length followed that general and long-desired measure, which gave liberty to so many thousands, by suspending the law denouncing suspected persons, and emptying at once of their inhabitants the prisons which had hitherto only transmitted them to the guillotine. The tales which these victims of jacobinism had to repeat, when revealing the secrets of their prison-house, together with the moral influence produced by such a universal gao-delivery, and the reunion which it effected amongst friends and relations that had been so long separated, tended greatly to strengthen the hands of the thermidoriens, who still boasted of that name, and to consolidate a rational and moderate party, both in the capital and provinces. It is, however, by no means to be wondered at, that the liberated sufferers showed a disposition to exercise retribution in a degree which their liberators trembled to indulge, lest it might have recoiled upon themselves. Still both parties united against the remains of the jacobins.

A singular and melancholy species of force supported these movements towards civilization and order. It was levied among the orphans and youthful friends of those who had fallen under the fatal guillotine, and amounted in number to two or three thousand young men, who acted in concert, were distinguished by black collars, and by their hair being plaited and turned up *à la victime*, as prepared for the guillotine. This costume was adopted in memory of the principle of mourning on which they were associated. These volunteers were not regularly armed or disciplined, but formed a sort of free corps, who opposed themselves readily and effectually to the jacobins, when they attempted their ordinary revolutionary tactics of exciting partial insurrections, and intimidating the orderly citizens by shouts and violence. Many scuffles took place betwixt the parties, with various success; but ultimately the spirit and courage of the young avengers seemed to give them daily a more decided superiority. The jacobins dared not show themselves, that is, to avouch their principles, either at the places of public amusement, or in the Palais Royal, or the Tuileries, all of which had formerly witnessed their victories. Their assemblies now took place under some appearance of secrecy, and were held in remote streets, and with such marks of diminished audacity as argued that the spirit of the party was crestfallen.

Still, however, the jacobin party possessed dreadful leaders in Billaud Varennes and Collot d'Herbois, who repeatedly attempted to awaken its terrific energy. These demagogues had joined, indeed, in the struggle against Robespierre, but it was with the expectation that an Amurath was to succeed an Amurath—a jacobin a jacobin—not for the purpose of relaxing the reins of the revolutionary govern-

ment, far less changing its character. These veteran revolutionists must be considered as separate from those who called themselves thermidoriens, though they lent their assistance to the revolution on the 9th Thermidor. They viewed as deserters and apostates Legendre, Le Cointre, and others, above all Tallien and Barras, who, in the full height of their career, had paused to take breath, and were now endeavouring to shape a course so different from that which they had hitherto pursued.

These genuine sans-culottes endeavoured to rest their own power and popularity upon the same basis as formerly. They re-opened the sittings of the Jacobin Club, shut up on the 9th Thermidor. This ancient revolutionary cavern again heard its roof resound with denunciations, by which Vadier, Billaud Varennes, and others, devoted to the infernal deities Le Cointre, and those who, they complained, wished to involve all honest republicans in the charges brought against Robespierre and his friends. Those threats, however, were no longer rapidly followed by the thunderbolts which used to attend such flashes of jacobin eloquence. Men's homes were now in comparison safe. A man might be named in a jacobin club as an aristocrat, or a moderate, and yet live. In fact, the demagogues were more anxious to secure immunity for their past crimes, than at present to incur new censure. The tide of general opinion was flowing strongly against them, and a singular incident increased its power, and rendered it irresistible.

The Parisians had naturally enough imagined, that the provinces could have no instances of jacobinical cruelty and misrule to describe, more tragic and appalling than the numerous executions which the capital had exhibited every day. But the arrival of eighty prisoners, citizens of Nantes, charged with the usual imputations cast upon suspected persons, undeceived them. These captives had been sent, for the purpose of being tried at Paris before the Revolutionary Tribunal. Fortunately, they did not arrive till after Robespierre's fall, and consequently when they were looked upon rather as oppressed persons than as criminals, and were listened to more as accusers of those by whom they were persecuted, than as culprits on their defence.

It was then that the metropolis first heard of horrors which we have formerly barely hinted at. It was then they were told of crowds of citizens, most of whom had been favourable to the republican order of things, and had borne arms against the Vendéans in their attack upon Nantes; men accused upon grounds equally slight, and incapable of proof, having been piled together in dungeons, where the air was pestilential from ordure, from the carcases of the dead, and the infectious diseases of the dying. It was then they heard of republican baptism, and republican marriages—of men, women, and children sprawling together, like toads and frogs in the season of spring, in the waters of the Loire, too shallow to afford them instant death. It was then they heard of a hundred other abominations—how those uppermost upon the expiring mass prayed to be thrust into the deeper water, that they might have the means of death—and of much more that humanity forbears to detail; but in regard to which, the sharp,

sudden, and sure blow of the Parisian guillotine was clemency.

This tale of horrors could not be endured; and the point of immediate collision between the thermidoriens, compelled and driven onward by the public voice and feeling, and the remnant of the old jacobin faction, became the accusation of Carrier, the commissioned deputy under whom these unheard-of horrors had been perpetrated. Vengeance on the head of this wretch was so loudly demanded, that it could not be denied even by those influential persons, who, themselves deeply interested in preventing recrimination, would willingly have drawn a veil over the past. Through the whole impeachment and defence, the thermidoriens stood on the most delicate and embarrassing ground; for horrid as his actions were, he had in general their own authority to plead for them. For example, a letter was produced with these directions to General Haxo—"It is my plan to carry off from that accursed country all manner of subsistence or provisions for man or beast, all forage—in a word, *everything*—give all the buildings to the flames, and exterminate the whole inhabitants. Oppose their being relieved by a single grain of corn for their subsistence. I give thee the most positive, most imperious order. Thou art answerable for the execution from this moment. In a word, leave nothing in that proscribed country—let the means of subsistence, provisions, forage, everything—absolutely everything, be removed to Nantes." The representatives of the French nation heard with horror such a fiendish commission; but with what sense of shame and abasement must they have listened to Carrier's defence, in which he proved he was only literally executing the decrees of the very Convention which was now inquiring into his conduct! A lunatic who, in a lucid moment, hears some one recount the crimes and cruelties he committed in his frenzy, might perhaps enter into their feelings. They were not the less obliged to continue the inquiry, fraught as it was with circumstances so disgraceful to themselves; and Carrier's impeachment and conviction proved the point on which the thermidoriens, and those who continued to entertain the violent popular opinions, were now at issue.

The atrocious Carrier was taken under the avowed protection of the Jacobin Club, before which audience he made out a case which was heard with applause. He acknowledged his enormities, and pleaded his patriotic zeal; ridiculed the delicacy of those who cared whether an aristocrat died by a single blow, or a protracted death; was encouraged throughout by acclamations, and received assurances of protection from the remnant of that once formidable association. But their magic influence was dissolved—their best orators had fallen successively by each other's impeachment—and of their most active ruffians, some had been killed or executed, some had fled, or lay concealed, many were in custody, and the rest had become intimidated. Scarce a man who had signalled himself in the French Revolution, but had enjoyed the applause of these demagogues, as versatile in personal attachments, as steady in their execrable principles—scarce one whom they had not been active in sacrificing.

Nevertheless, those members of the revolutionary committees, who had so lately lent their aid to dethrone Robespierre, the last idol of the society, ventured to invoke them in their own defence, and that of their late agents. Billaud Varennes, addressing the jacobins, spoke of the Convention as men spared by their clemency during the reign of Robespierre, who now rewarded the Mountain deputies by terming them men of blood, and by seeking the death of those worthy patriots, Joseph Lebon and Carrier, who were about to fall under their counter-revolutionary violence. These excellent citizens, he said, were persecuted, merely because their zeal for the Republic had been somewhat ardent—their forms of proceeding a little rash and severe. He invoked the awaking of the lion—a new revolutionary rising of the people, to tear the limbs and drink the blood—(these were the very words)—of those who had dared to beard them. The meeting dispersed with shouts, and vows to answer to the halloo of their leaders.

But the opposite party had learned that such menaces were to be met otherwise than by merely awaiting the issue, and then trying the force of remonstrances, or the protection of the law, with those to whom the stronger force is the only satisfying reason.

Well organized, and directed by military officers in many instances, large bands of anti-jacobins, as we may venture to call the volunteer force already mentioned, appeared in the neighbourhood of the suburbs, and kept in check those from whom the mother club expected its strongest aid; while the main body of the young avengers marched down upon the citadel of the enemy, and invested the Jacobin Club itself in the midst of its sitting. These demagogues made but a wretched defence when attacked by that species of popular violence, which they had always considered as their own especial weapon; and the facility with which they were dispersed amid ridicule and ignominy, served to show how easily, on former occasions, the mutual understanding and spirited exertion of well-disposed men could have at any time prevented criminal violence from obtaining the mastery. Had La Fayette marched against and shut up the Jacobin Club, the world would have been spared many horrors, and in all probability he would have found the task as easy as it proved to those bands of incensed young men.—It must be mentioned, though the recital is almost unworthy of history, that the female jacobins came to rally and assist their male associates, and that several of them were seized upon and punished in a manner, which might excellently suit their merits, but which shows that the young associates for maintaining order were not sufficiently aristocratic to be under the absolute restraints imposed by the rules of chivalry. It is impossible, however, to grudge the flagellation administered upon this memorable occasion.

When the jacobins had thus fallen in the popular contest, they could expect little success in the Convention; and the less, that the impulse of general feeling seemed about to recal into that assembly, by the reversal of their outlawry, the remnant of the unhappy girondists, and other members, who had

been arbitrarily proscribed on the 31st of May. The measure was delayed for some time, as tending to effect a change in the composition of the House, which the ruling party might find inconvenient. At length upwards of sixty deputies were first declared free of the outlawry, and finally readmitted into the bosom of the Convention, with heads which had been so long worn in insecurity, that it had greatly cooled their love of political theory.

In the meantime the government, through means of a revolutionary tribunal, acting however with much more of legal formality and caution than that of Robespierre, made a sacrifice to the public desire of vengeance. Lebon, Carrier, already mentioned, Fouquier, the public accuser under Robespierre, and one or two others of the same class, selected on account of the peculiar infamy and cruelty of their conduct, were condemned and executed as an atonement for injured humanity.

Here probably the thermidoriens would have wished the reaction to stop; but this was impossible. Barras and Tallien perceived plainly, that with whatever caution and clemency they might proceed towards their old allies of the Mountain, there was still no hope of anything like reconciliation; and that their best policy was to get rid of them as speedily and as quietly as they could. The Mountain, like a hydra whose heads bourgeoned, according to the poetic expression, as fast as they were cut off, continued to hiss at and menace the government with unwearied malignity, and to agitate the metropolis by their intrigues, which were the more easily conducted that the winter was severe, bread had become scarce and high-priced, and the common people of course angry and discontented. Scarcity is always the grievance of which the lower classes must be most sensible; and when it is remembered that Robespierre, though at the expense of the grossest injustice to the rest of the kingdom, always kept bread beneath a certain *maximum* or fixed price in the metropolis, it will not be wondered at that the population of Paris should be willing to favour those who followed his maxims. The impulse of these feelings, joined to the machinations of the jacobins, showed itself in many disorders.

At length the Convention, pressed by shame on the one side and fear on the other, saw the necessity of some active measure, and appointed a commission to consider and report upon the conduct of the four most obnoxious jacobin chiefs, Collot d'Herbois, Billaud Varennes, Vadier, and Barrère. The report was of course unfavourable; yet upon the case being considered, the Convention were satisfied to condemn them to transportation to Cayenne. Some resistance was offered to this sentence, so mild in proportion to what those who underwent it had been in the habit of inflicting; but it was borne down, and the sentence was carried into execution. Collot d'Herbois, the demolisher and depopulator of Lyons, is said to have died in the common hospital, in consequence of drinking off at once a whole bottle of ardent spirits. Billaud Varennes spent his time in teaching the innocent parrots of Guiana the frightful jargon of the Revolutionary Committee; and finally perished in misery.

These men both belonged to that class of atheists,

who, looking up towards heaven, loudly and literally defied the Deity to make his existence known by launching his thunderbolts. Miracles are not wrought on the challenge of a blasphemer more than on the demand of a sceptic; but both these unhappy men had probably before their death reason to confess, that in abandoning the wicked to their own free will, a greater penalty results even in this life, than if Providence had been pleased to inflict the immediate doom which they had impiously defied.

The notice of one more desperate attempt at popular insurrection finishes, in a great measure, the history of jacobinism and of the Mountain; of those, in short, who professed the most outrageous popular doctrines, considered as a political body. They continued to receive great facilities from the increasing dearth, and to find ready opportunities of agitating the discontented part of a population, disgusted by the diminution not only of comforts, but of the very means of subsistence. The jacobins, therefore, were easily able to excite an insurrection of the same description as those which had repeatedly influenced the fate of the Revolution, and which, in fact, proceeded to greater extremities than any which had preceded it in the same desperate game. The rallying word of the rabble was "Bread, and the democratic constitution of 1793;" a constitution which the jacobins had projected, but never attempted seriously to put into force. No insurrection had yet appeared more formidable in numbers, or better provided in pikes, muskets, and cannon. They invested the Convention,* without experiencing any effectual opposition; burst into the hall, assassinated one deputy, Ferraud, by a pistol-shot, and paraded his head amongst his trembling brethren, and through the neighbouring streets and environs on a pike. They presented Boissy d'Anglas, the president, with the motions which they demanded should be passed; but were defeated by the firmness with which he preferred his duty to his life.

The steadiness of the Convention gave at length confidence to the friends of good order without. The National Guards began to muster strong, and the insurgents to lose spirits. They were at length, notwithstanding their formidable appearance, dispersed with very little effort. The tumult, however, was renewed on the two following days; until at length the necessity of taking sufficient measures to end it at once and for ever, became evident to all.

Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, who chanced to be in Paris at the time, was placed at the head of the National Guards and the volunteers, whose character we have noticed elsewhere. At the head of this force, he marched in military order towards the Faubourg St. Antoine, which had poured forth repeatedly the bands of armed insurgents that were the principal force of the jacobins.

After a show of defending themselves, the inhabitants of this disorderly suburb were at length obliged to surrender up their arms of every kind. Those pikes, which had so often decided the destinies of France, were now delivered up by cartloads; and the holy right of insurrection was rendered

20th May, 1796.

ed in future a more dangerous and difficult task.

Encouraged by the success of this decisive measure, the government proceeded against some of the terrorists whom they had hitherto spared, but whose fate was now determined, in order to strike dismay into their party. Six jacobins, accounted among the most ferocious of the class, were arrested as encouragers of the late insurrection, and delivered up to be tried by a military commission. They were all deputies of the Mountain gang. Certain of their doom, they adopted a desperate resolution. Among the whole party, they possessed but one knife, but they resolved it should serve them all for the purpose of suicide. The instant their sentence was pronounced, one stabbed himself with this weapon; another snatched the knife from his companion's dying hand, plunged it in his own bosom, and handed it to the third, who imitated the dreadful example. Such was the consternation of the attendants, that no one arrested the fatal progress of the weapon—all fell either dead or desperately wounded—the last were dispatched by the guillotine.

After this decisive victory, and last dreadful catastrophe, jacobinism, considered as a pure and un-mixed party, can scarce be said to have again raised its head in France, although its leaven has gone to qualify and characterize, in some degree, more than one of the different parties which have succeeded them. As a political sect, the jacobins can be compared to none that ever existed, for none but themselves ever thought of an organized, regular, and continued system of murdering and plundering the rich, that they might debauch the poor by the distribution of their spoils. They bear, however, some resemblance to the frantic followers of John of Leyden and Knipperdoling, who occupied Munster in the seventeenth century, and committed, in the name of religion, the same frantic horrors which the French jacobins did in that of freedom. In both cases, the courses adopted by these parties were most foreign to, and inconsistent with, the alleged motives of their conduct. The anabaptists practised every species of vice and cruelty, by the dictates, they said, of inspiration—the jacobins imprisoned three hundred thousand of their countrymen in name of liberty, and put to death more than half the number, under the sanction of fraternity.

Now at length, however, society began to resume its ordinary course, and the business and pleasures of life succeeded each other as usual. But even social pleasures brought with them strange and gloomy associations of that Valley of the Shadow of Death, through which the late pilgrimage of France appeared to have lain. An assembly for dancing, very much frequented by the young of both sexes, and highly fashionable, was called the "Ball of the Victims." The qualification for attendance was the having lost some near and valued relation or friend in the late reign of Terror. The hair and head-dress were so arranged as to resemble the preparations made for the guillotine, and the motto adopted was, "We dance amidst tombs." In no country but France could the incidents have taken place which gave rise to this association; and certainly in no country but France would they have been used for such a purpose.

But it is time to turn from the consideration of the internal government of France, to its external relations; in regard to which the destinies of the country rose to such a distinguished height, that it is hardly possible to reconcile the two pictures of a nation, triumphant at every point against all Europe coalesced against her, making efforts and obtaining victories, to which history had been yet a stranger; while at the same time her affairs at home were directed by ferocious blood-thirsty savages, such as Robespierre. The Republic, regarded in her foreign and domestic relations, might be fancifully compared to the tomb erected over some hero, presenting, without, trophies of arms and the emblems of victory, while, within, there lies only a mangled and corrupted corpse.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Retrospective view of the external relations of France.—Her great military successes.—Whence they arose.—Effect of the compulsory levies.—Military genius and character of the French generals.—New mode of training the troops.—Light troops.—Successive attacks in column.—Attachment of the soldiers to the Revolution.—Also of the generals.—Carnot.—Effect of the French principles preached to the countries invaded by their arms.—Close of the Revolution with the fall of Robespierre.—Reflections upon what was to succeed.

It may be said of victory, as the English satirist has said of wealth, that it cannot be of much importance in the eye of Heaven, considering in what unworthy association it is sometimes found. While the rulers of France were disowning the very existence of a Deity, her armies appeared to move almost as if protected by the especial favour of Providence. Our former recapitulation presented a slight sketch of the perilous state of France in 1793, surrounded by foes on almost every frontier, and with difficulty maintaining her ground on any point; yet the lapse of two years found her victorious, nay, triumphantly victorious on all.

On the north-eastern frontier, the English, after a series of hard fighting, had lost not only Flanders, on which we left them advancing, but Holland itself, and had been finally driven with great loss to abandon the Continent. The King of Prussia had set out on his first campaign as the chief hero of the coalition, and had undertaken that the Duke of Brunswick, his general, should put down the Revolution in France as easily as he had done that of Holland. But finding the enterprise which he had undertaken was above his strength; that his accumulated treasures were exhausted in an unsuccessful war; and that Austria, not Prussia, was regarded as the head of the coalition, he drew off his forces, after they had been weakened by more than one defeat, and made a separate peace with France, in which he renounced to the new Republic the sovereignty of all those portions of the Prussian territory which lay on the east side of the Rhine. The king, to make up for these losses, sought a more profitable, though less honourable field of warfare, and concurred with Russia and Austria in effecting by conquest a final partition and appropriation of Poland, on the same unprincipled plan on which the first had been conducted.

Spain, victorious at the beginning of the contest, had been of late so unsuccessful in opposing the French armies, that it was the opinion of many that her character for valour and patriotism was lost for ever. Catalonia was overrun by the republicans, Rosas taken, and no army intervening betwixt the victors and Madrid, the King of Spain was obliged to clasp hands with the murderers of his kinsman, Louis XVI., acknowledge the French Republic, and withdraw from the coalition.

Austria had well sustained her ancient renown, both by the valour of her troops, the resolution of her cabinet, and the talents of one or two of her generals,—the Archduke Charles in particular, and the veteran Wurmser. Yet she too had succumbed under the republican superiority. Belgium, as the French called Flanders, was, as already stated, totally lost; and war along the Rhine was continued by Austria, more for defence than with a hope of conquest.

So much and so generally had the fortune of war declared in favour of France upon all points, even while she was herself sustaining the worst of evils from the worst of tyrannies. There must have been unquestionably several reasons for such success as seemed to attend universally on the arms of the Republic, instead of being limited to one peculiarly efficient army, or to one distinguished general.

The first and most powerful cause must be looked for in the extraordinary energy of the republican government, which, from its very commencement, threw all subordinate considerations aside, and devoted the whole resources of the country to its military defence. It was then that France fully learned the import of the word "Requisition," as meaning that which government needs, and which must at all hazards be supplied. Compulsory levies were universally resorted to; and the undoubted right which a state has to call upon each of its subjects to arise in defence of the community, was extended into the power of sending them upon expeditions of foreign conquest.

In the month of March, 1793, a levy of two hundred thousand men was appointed, and took place; but by a subsequent decree of the 21st August in the same year, a more gigantic mode of recruiting was resorted to.

Every man in France able to bear arms was placed at the orders of the state, and being divided into classes, the youngest, to the amount of five hundred thousand, afterwards augmented to a million, were commanded to march for immediate action. The rest of society were to be so disposed of as might best second the efforts of the actual combatants. The married men were to prepare arms and forward convoys,—the women to make uniforms,—the children to scrape lint, and the old men to preach republicanism. All property was in like manner devoted to maintaining the war—all buildings were put to military purposes—all arms appropriated to the public service—and all horses, excepting those which might be necessary for agriculture, seized on for the cavalry, and other military services. Representatives of the people were named to march with the various levies,—those terrible commissioners, who punished no fault with a slighter penalty than death. No ex-

case was sustained for want of personal compliance with the requisition for personal service—no delay permitted—no substitution allowed—actual and literal compliance was demanded from every one, and of what rank soever. Conscripts who failed to appear, resisted, or fled, were subjected to the penalties which attached to emigration.

By successive decrees of this peremptory nature, enforced with the full energy of revolutionary violence, the government succeeded in bringing into the field, and maintaining, forces to an amount more than double those of their powerful enemies; and the same means of supply—arbitrary requisition, namely—which brought them out, supported and maintained them during the campaign; so that, while there remained food and clothing of any kind in the country, the soldier was sure to be fed, paid, and equipped.

There are countries, however, in which the great numerical superiority thus attained is of little consequence, when a confused levy *en masse* of raw, inexperienced, and disorderly boys, are opposed against the ranks of a much smaller, but a regular and well-disciplined army, such as in every respect is that of Austria. On such occasions the taunting speech of Alaric recurs to recollection,—“The thicker the hay the more easily it is mowed.” But this was not found to be the case with the youth of France, who adopted the habits most necessary for a soldier with singular facility and readiness. Military service has been popular amongst them in all ages; and the stories of the grandeur in a French cottage have always tended to excite in his descendants ideas familiar with a military condition. They do not come to it as a violent change of life, which they had never previously contemplated, and where all is new and terrible; but as to a duty which every Frenchman is liable to discharge, and which is as natural to him as to his father or grandfather before him.

Besides this propensity, and undoubtedly connected with it, a young Frenchman is possessed of the natural character most desirable in the soldier. He is accustomed to fare hard, to take much exercise, to make many shifts, and to support with patience occasional deprivations. His happy gaiety renders him indifferent to danger, his good-humour patient under hardship. His ingenuity seems to amuse as well as to assist him in the contingencies of a roving life. He can be with ease a cook or an artificer, or what else the occasion may require. His talents for actual war are not less decided. Either in advancing with spirit, or in retreating with order, the Frenchman is one of the finest soldiers in the world; and when requisite, the privates in their army often exhibit a degree of intelligence and knowledge of the profession, which might become individuals of a higher rank in other services. If not absolute water-drinkers, they are less addicted to intoxication than the English soldier, who, perhaps, only brings, to counterbalance the numerous advantages on the part of his opponent, that mastiff-like perseverance and determination in combat, which induces him to repeat, maintain, and prolong his efforts, under every disadvantage of numbers and circumstances.

The spirits of the Frenchman, such as we have described, did not suffer much from the violent summons which tore him from his home. We have, unhappily, in our own navy, an example, how little men's courage is broken by their being forced into a dangerous service. But, comfortless as the state of France then was, and painful as the sights must have been by which the eyes were daily oppressed—closed up too as were the avenues to every civil walk of life, and cheap as they were held in a nation which had become all one vast camp, a youth of spirit was glad to escape from witnessing the desolation at home, and to take with gaiety the chance of death or promotion, in the only line which might now be accounted comparatively safe, and indubitably honourable. The armies with whom these new levies were incorporated were by degrees admirably supplied with officers. The breaking down the old distinctions of ranks had opened a free career to those desirous of promotion; and in times of hard fighting, men of merit are distinguished and get preferment. The voice of the soldier had often its influence upon the officer's preferment; and that is a vote seldom bestowed, but from ocular proof that it is deserved. The revolutionary rulers, though bloody in their resentment, were liberal, almost extravagant, in their rewards, and spared neither gold nor steel, honours nor denunciations, to incite their generals to victory, or warn them against the consequences of defeat.

Under that stern rule which knew no excuse for ill success, and stimulated by opportunities which seemed to offer every prize to honourable ambition, arose a race of generals whom the world scarce ever saw equaled, and of whom there certainly never at any other period flourished so many, in the same service. Such was Bonaparte himself—such were Pichegru and Moreau, doomed to suffer a gloomy fate under his ascendancy. Such were those marshals and generals who were to share his better fortunes, and cluster around his future throne as the paladins around that of Charlemagne, or as the British and Armorican champions begirt the Round Table of Uther's fabled son. In those early wars, and summoned out by the stern conscription, were trained Murat, whose eminence and fall seemed a corollary to that of his brother-in-law—Ney, the bravest of the brave—the calm, sagacious Macdonald—Joubert, who had almost anticipated the part reserved for Bonaparte—Masséna, the spoiled Child of Fortune—Augereau, Berthier, Lannes, and many others, whose names began already to stir the French soldier as with the sound of a trumpet.

These adventurers in the race of fame belonged some of them, as Macdonald, to the old military school; some, like Moreau, came from the civil class of society; many arose from origins that were positively mean, and were therefore still more decidedly children of the Revolution. But that great earthquake, by throwing down distinctions of birth and rank, had removed obstacles which would otherwise have impeded the progress of almost all these distinguished men; and they were therefore, for the greater part, attached to that new order of affairs which afforded full scope to their talents.

The French armies, thus recruited and thus com-

manded, were disciplined in a manner suitable to the materials of which they were composed. There was neither leisure nor opportunity to subject the new levies to all that minuteness of training which was required by the somewhat pedantic formality of the old school of war. Dumourier, setting the example, began to show that the principle of revolution might be introduced with advantage into the art of war itself; and that the difference betwixt these new conscripts and the veteran troops to whom they were opposed, might be much diminished by resorting to the original and more simple rules of strategy, and neglecting many formalities which had been once considered as essential to playing the great game of war with success. It is the constant error of ordinary minds to consider matters of mere routine as equally important with those which are essential, and to entertain as much horror at a disordered uniform as at a confused manoeuvre. It was to the honour of the French generals, as men of genius, that in the hour of danger they were able to surmount all the prejudices of a profession which has its pedantry as well as others, and to suit the discipline which they retained to the character of their recruits and the urgency of the time.

The foppery of the manual exercise was laid aside, and it was restricted to the few motions necessary for effectual use of the musket and bayonet. Easier and more simple manoeuvres were substituted for such as were involved and difficult to execute; and providing the line or column could be formed with activity, and that order was preserved on the march, the mere etiquette of military movements was much relaxed. The quantity of light troops was increased greatly beyond the number which had of late been used by European nations. The Austrians, who used to draw from the Tyrol, and from their wild Croatian frontier, the best light troops in the world, had at this time formed many of them into regiments of the line, and thus limited and diminished their own superiority in a species of force which was becoming of greater importance daily. The French, on the contrary, disciplined immense bodies of their conscripts as irregulars and sharpshooters. Their numbers and galling fire frequently prevented their more systematic and formal adversaries from being able to push forward reconnoitring parties, by which to obtain any exact information as to the numbers and disposition of the French; while the republican troops of the line, protected by this swarm of wasps, chose their time, place, and manner, of advancing to the attack or retreating, as the case demanded. It is true that this service cost an immense number of lives; but the French generals were sensible that human life was the commodity which the Republic set the least value upon; and that when Death was served with so wide a feast from one end of France to the other, he was not to be stinted in his own proper banquetting-hall, the field of battle.

The same circumstances dictated another variety or innovation in French tactics, which greatly increased the extent of slaughter. The armies with whom they engaged, disconcerted by the great superiority of numbers which were opposed to them, and baffled in obtaining intelligence by the teasing

activity of the French light troops, most frequently assumed the defensive, and taking a strong position, improved perhaps by field-works, waited until the fiery youth of France should come to throw themselves by thousands upon their batteries. It was then that the French generals began first to employ those successive attacks in column, in which one brigade of troops is brought up after another, without interruption, and without regard to the loss of lives, until the arms of the defenders are weary with slaying, and their line being in some point or other carried, through the impossibility of everywhere resisting an assault so continued and desperate, the battle is lost, and the army is compelled to give way; while the conquerors can, by the multitudes they have brought into action, afford to pay the dreadful price which they have given for the victory.

In this manner the French generals employed whole columns of the young conscripts, termed, from that circumstance, "food for the cannon" (*chair à canon*), before disease had deprived them of bodily activity, or experience had taught them the dangers of the profession on which they entered with the thoughtless vivacity of schoolboys. It also frequently happened, even when the French possessed no numerical superiority upon the whole, that by the celerity of their movements, and the skill with which they at once combined and executed them, they were able suddenly to concentrate such a superiority upon the point which they meant to attack, as insured them the same advantage.

In enumerating the causes of the general success of the republican arms, we must not forget the moral motive—the interest which the troops took in the cause of the war. The army, in fact, derived an instant and most flattering advantage from the Revolution, which could scarce be said of any other class of men in France, excepting the peasant. Their pay was improved, their importance increased. There was not a private soldier against whom the highest ranks of the profession were shut, and many attained to them. Masséna was originally a drummer, Ney a common hussar, and there were many others who arose to the command of armies from the lowest condition. Now this was a government for a soldier to live and flourish under, and seemed still more advantageous when contrasted with the old monarchical system, in which the prejudices of birth interfered at every turn with the pretensions of merit, where a *roturier* could not rise above a subaltern rank, and where all offices of distinction were, as matters of inheritance, reserved for the grande noblesse alone.

But besides the rewards which it held out to its soldiers, the service of the Republic had this irresistible charm for the soldiery—it was victorious. The conquests which they obtained, and the plunder which attended those conquests, attached the victors to their standards, and drew around them fresh hosts of their countrymen. *Vive la République!* became a war-cry, as dear to their army as in former times the shout of *Montjoie St. Denis*, and the tri-coloured flag supplied the place of the oriflamme. By the confusion, the oppression, the bloodshed of the Revolution, the soldiers were but little affected. They heard of friends imprisoned or guillotined,

indeed;* but a military man, like a monk, leaves the concerns of the civil world behind him, and while he plays the bloody game for his own life or death with the enemy who faces him, has little time to think of what is happening in the native country which he has abandoned. For any other acquaintance with the politics of the Republic, they were indebted to flowery speeches in the Convention, resounding with the praises of the troops, and to harangues of the representatives accompanying the armies, who never failed by flattery and largesses to retain possession of the affection of the soldiers, whose attachment was so essential to their safety. So well did they accomplish this, that while the Republic flourished, the armies were so much attached to that order of things, as to desert successively some of their most favourite leaders, when they became objects of suspicion to the fierce democracy.

The generals, indeed, had frequent and practical experience, that the Republic could be as severe with her military as with her civil subjects, and even more so, judging by the ruthlessness with which they were arrested and executed, with scarce the shadow of a pretext. Yet this did not diminish the zeal of the survivors. If the revolutionary government behended, they also paid, promised, and promoted; and amid the various risks of a soldier's life, the hazard of the guillotine was only a slight addition to those of the sword and the musket,† which, in the sanguine eye of courage and ambition, joined to each individual's confidence in his own good luck, did not seem to render his chance much worse. When such punishment arrived, the generals submitted to it as one of the casualties of war; nor was the Republic worse or more reluctantly served by those who were left.

Such being the admirable quality and talents, the mode of thinking and acting, which the republican, or rather revolutionary, armies possessed, it required only the ruling genius of the celebrated Carnot, who, bred in the department of engineers, was probably one of the very best tacticians in the world, to bring them into effectual use. He was a member of the frightful Committee of Public Safety; but it has been said in his defence, that he did not meddle with its atrocities, limiting himself entirely to the war department, for which he showed so much talent, that his colleagues left it to his exclusive management. In his own individual person he con-

* Such was the fate of Moreau, who, on the eve of one of his most distinguished victories, had to receive the news that his father had been beheaded.

† The risk was considered as a matter of course. Madame la Roche-Jacquelin informs us that General Quétineau, a republican officer who had behaved with great humanity in La Vendée, having fallen into the hands of the insurgents, was pressed by Lescure, who commanded them, not to return to Paris. "I know the difference of our political opinions," said the royalist; "but why should you deliver up your life to those men with whom want or success will be a sufficient reason for abridging it?"—"You say truly," replied Quétineau; "but as a man of honour, I must present myself in defence of my conduct wherever it may be impeached." He went, and perished by the guillotine accordingly.

stituted the whole *bureau militaire*, or war-office, of the Committee of Public Safety, corresponded with and directed the movements of the armies, as if inspired by the Goddess of Victory herself. He first daringly claimed for France her natural boundaries (that is, the boundaries most convenient for her). The Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, he assigned as the limits of her dominions; and asserted that all within these, belonging to other powers, must have been usurpations on France, and were unhesitatingly to be resumed as such. And he conquered by his genius the countries which his ambition claimed. Belgium became an integral part of the French Republic—Holland was erected into a little dependent democracy, as an outwork for defending the great nation—the Austrians were foiled on the Rhine—the King of Sardinia driven from Savoy—and schemes realized which Louis XIV. never dared to dream of. In return for the complaisance exhibited by the committee towards himself, he did not express any scruples, if he entertained such, concerning the mode in which they governed the interior of their unhappy country. Yet, notwithstanding his skill and his caution, the blighting eye of Robespierre was fixed on him, as that of the snake which watches its victims. He could not dispense with the talents of Carnot in the career of victory; but it is well known, that if his plans on any occasion had miscarried, the security of his head would have become very precarious.

It must also be allowed, that although the French armies were attached to the Republic, and moved usually under direction of a member of the Committee of Public Security, they did not adopt, in their brutal extent, the orders for exterminating warfare which were transmitted to them by their masters. At one time a decree was passed, refusing quarter to such of the allied troops as might be made prisoners; but the French soldiers could not be prevailed on to take a step which must have aggravated so dreadfully the necessary horrors of war. When we consider how the civil government of France were employed, when the soldiers refused their sanction to this decree, it seems as if Humanity had fled from cities and the peaceful dwellings of men, to seek a home in camps and combats.

One important part of the subject can be here treated but slightly. We allude to the great advantages derived by the French arms from the reception of their political doctrines at this period among the people whom they invaded. They proclaimed aloud that they made war on castles and palaces, but were at peace with cottages; and as on some occasions besieging generals are said to have bribed the governor of a place to surrender it, by promising they would leave in his unchallenged possession the military chest of the garrison, so the French in all cases held out to the populace the plunder of their own nobles, as an inducement for them to favour, at least not to oppose, the invasion of their country. Thus their armies were always preceded by their principles. A party favourable to France, and listening with delight to the doctrines of liberty and equality, was formed in the bosom of each neighbouring state, so that the power of the invaded nation was crushed, and its spirit quenched, under a

sense of internal discontent and discord. The French were often received at once as conquerors and deliverers by the countries they invaded; and in almost all cases, the governments on which they made war were obliged to trust exclusively to such regular forces as they could bring into the field, being deprived of the inappreciable advantage of general zeal among their subjects in their behalf. It was not long ere the inhabitants of those deceived countries found that the fruits of the misnamed tree of liberty resembled those said to grow by the Dead Sea—fair and goodly to the eye, but to the taste all filth and bitterness.

We are now to close our review of the French Revolution, the fall of Robespierre being the era at which its terrors began to ebb and recede, nor did they ever again arise to the same height. If we look back at the whole progress of the change, from the convocation of the States-general to the 9th Thermidor, as the era of that man's overthrow was called, the eye in vain seeks for any point at which even a probability existed of establishing a solid or permanent government. The three successive constitutions of 1791, 1792, and 1795, the successive work of constitutionalists, girondists, and jacobins, possessed no more power to limit or arrest the force of the revolutionary impulse, than a bramble or briar to stop the progress of a rock rushing down from a precipice. Though ratified and sworn to, with every circumstance which could add solemnity to the obligation, each remained, in succession, a dead letter. France, in 1795 and 1796, was therefore a nation without either a regular constitution or a regular administration; governed by the remnant of an assembly called a Convention, who continued sitting, merely because the crisis found them in possession of their seats, and who administered the government through the medium of provisional committees, with whose dictates they complied implicitly, and who really directed all things, though in the Convention's name.

In the meantime, and since those strange scenes had commenced, France had lost her king and nobles, her church and clergy, her judges, courts, and magistrates, her colonies and commerce. The greater part of her statesmen and men of note had perished by proscription, and her orators' eloquence had been cut short by the guillotine. She had no finances—the bonds of civil society seem to have retained their influence from habit only. The nation possessed only one powerful engine, which France called her own, and one impulsive power to guide it—these were her army and her ambition. She resembled a person in the delirium of a fever, who has stripped himself in his frenzy of all decent and necessary clothing, and retains in his hand only a bloody sword; while those who have endeavoured to check his fury, lie subdued around him. Never had so many great events successively taken place in a nation, without affording something like a fixed or determined result, either already attained, or soon to be expected.

Again and again did reflecting men say to each other,—This unheard-of state of things, in which all seems to be temporary and revolutionary, will not, cannot last;—and especially after the fall of Robespierre, it seemed that some change was approach-

ing. Those who had achieved that work did not hold on any terms of security the temporary power which it had procured them. They rather retained their influence by means of the jealousy of two extreme parties, than from any confidence reposed in themselves. Those who had suffered so deeply under the rule of the revolutionary government must have looked with suspicion on the thermidorians, as regular jacobins, who had shared all the excesses of the period of Terror, and now employed their power in protecting the perpetrators. On the other hand, those of the revolutionists who yet continued in the bond of jacobin fraternity, could not forgive Tallien and Barras the silencing the jacobin clubs, the exiling Collot d'Herbois and Billand Varennes, putting to death many other patriots, and totally crushing the system of revolutionary government. In fact, if the thoroughbred revolutionists still endured the domination of Tallien and Barras, it was only because it shielded them from the reaction, or retributive measures threatened by the moderate party. Matters, it was thought, could not remain in this uncertain state, nor was the present temporary pageant of government likely to linger long on the scene. But by whom was that scene next to be opened? Would a late returning to ancient opinions induce a people, who had suffered so much through innovation, to recal, either absolutely or upon conditions, the banished race of her ancient princes? Or would a new band of revolutionists be permitted by Heaven, in its continued vengeance, to rush upon the stage? Would the supreme power become the prize of some soldier as daring as Cæsar, or some intriguing statesman as artful as Octavius? Would France succumb beneath a Cromwell or a Monk, or again be ruled by a cabal of hackneyed statesmen, or an Institute of Theoretical Philosophy, or an anarchical Club of Jacobins? These were reflections which occupied almost all bosoms. But the hand of Fate was on the curtain, and about to bring the scene to light.

CHAPTER XIX.

Corsica.—Family of Bonaparte.—Napoleon born 15th August, 1769.—His early habits.—Sent to the Royal Military school at Brienne.—His great progress in mathematical science.—Deficiency in classical literature.—Anecdotes of him while at school.—Removed to the general school of Paris.—When seventeen years old, appointed 2d lieutenant of artillery.—His early politics.—Promoted to a captaincy.—Pascal Paoli.—Napoleon sides with the French government against Paoli.—Along with his brother Lucien, he is banished from Corsica.—Never revisits it.—Always unpopular there.

THE Island of Corsica was, in ancient times, remarkable as the scene of Seneca's exile, and in the last century was distinguished by the memorable stand which the natives made in defence of their liberties against the Genoese and French, during a war which tended to show the high and indomitable spirit of the islanders, united as it is with the fiery and vindictive feelings proper to their country and climate.

In this island, which was destined to derive its future importance chiefly from the circumstance,

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, or BONAPARTE,* had his origin. His family was noble, though not of much distinction, and rather reduced in fortune. Flattery afterwards endeavoured to trace the name, which he had made famous, into remote ages, and researches were made through ancient records, to discover that there was one Bonaparte who had written a book, another who had signed a treaty—a female of the name who had given birth to a pope, with other minute claims of distinction, which Napoleon justly considered as trivial, and unworthy of notice. He answered the Emperor of Austria, who had a fancy of tracing his son-in-law's descent from one of the petty sovereigns of Treviso, that he was the Rodolph of Hapsburg of his family; and to a genealogist, who made a merit of deducing his descent from some ancient line of Gothic princes, he caused reply to be made, that he dated his patent of nobility from the battle of Monte Notte, that is, from his first victory.

All that is known with certainty of Napoleon's family may be told in a few words. The Bonapartes were a family of some distinction in the middle ages; their names are inscribed in the Golden Book at Treviso, and their armorial bearings are to be seen on several houses in Florence. But attached, during the civil war, to the party of the Ghibellines, they of course were persecuted by the Guelphs; and being exiled from Tuscany, one of the family took refuge in Corsica, and there established himself and his successors, who were regularly enrolled among the noble natives of the island, and enjoyed all the privileges of gentle blood.

The father of Napoleon, Charles Bonaparte, was the principal descendant of this exiled family. He was regularly educated at Pisa, to the study of the law, and is stated to have possessed a very handsome person, a talent for eloquence, and a vivacity of intellect, which he transmitted to his son. He was a patriot also, and a soldier, and assisted at the gallant stand made by Paoli against the French. It is said he would have emigrated along with Paoli, who was his friend, and, it is believed, his kinsman, but was withheld by the influence of his father's brother, Lucien Bonaparte, who was Archdeacon of the Cathedral of Ajaccio, and the wealthiest person of the family.

It was in the middle of civil discord, fights, and skirmishes, that Charles Bonaparte married Letitia Ramolini, one of the most beautiful young women

* There was an absurd debate about the spelling of the name, which became, as trifles often do, a sort of party question. Bonaparte had disused the superfluous *n*, which his father retained in the name, and adopted a more modern spelling. This was represented on one side as an attempt to bring his name more nearly to the French idiom; and, as if it had been a matter of the last moment, the vowel was obstinately replaced in the name, by a class of writers who deemed it politic not to permit the successful general to relinquish the slightest mark of his Italian extraction, which was in every respect impossible for him either to conceal or to deny, even if he had nourished such an idea. In his baptismal register, his name is spelled Napoleone Bonaparte, though the father subscribes, Carlo Buonaparte. The spelling seems to have been quite indifferent.

of the island, and possessed of a great deal of firmness of character. She partook the dangers of her husband during the years of civil war, and is said to have accompanied him on horseback in some military expeditions, or perhaps hasty flights, shortly before her being delivered of the future emperor. Though left a widow in the prime of life, she had already borne her husband thirteen children, of whom five sons and three daughters survived him. 1. Joseph, the eldest, who, though placed by his brother in an obnoxious situation, as intrusive King of Spain, held the reputation of a good and moderate man. 2. Napoleon himself. 3. Lucien, scarce inferior to his brother in ambition and talent. 4. Louis, the merit of whose character consists in its unpretending worth, and who renounced a crown rather than consent to the oppression of his subjects. 5. Jérôme, whose disposition is said to have been chiefly marked by a tendency to dissipation. The females were, 1. Maria Anne, afterwards Grand Duchess of Tuscany, by the name of Elisa. 2. Maria Antonciada, who became Maria Pauline, Princess of Borghese. 3. Carlotta, or Caroline, wife of Murat, and Queen of Naples.

The family of Bonaparte being reconciled to the French government after the emigration of Paoli, enjoyed the protection of the Comte de Marboeuf, the French Governor of Corsica, by whose interest Charles was included in a deputation of the nobles of the island, sent to Louis XVI. in 1776. As a consequence of this mission, he was appointed to a judicial situation, that of assessor of the tribunal of Ajaccio, the income of which aided him to maintain his increasing family, which the smallness of his patrimony, and some habits of expense, would otherwise have rendered difficult. Charles Bonaparte, the father of Napoleon, died at the age of about forty years, of an ulcer in the stomach, on the 24th February, 1785. His celebrated son fell a victim to the same disease. During Napoleon's grandeur, the community of Montpellier expressed a desire to erect a monument to the memory of Charles Bonaparte. His answer was both sensible and in good taste. "Had I lost my father yesterday," he said, "it would be natural to pay his memory some mark of respect consistent with my present situation. But it is twenty years since the event, and it is one in which the public can take no concern. Let us leave the dead in peace."

The subject of our narrative was born, according to the best accounts, and his own belief, upon the 15th day of August, 1769, at his father's house in Ajaccio, forming one side of a court which leads out of the Rue Charles.* We read with interest, that his mother's good constitution, and bold character of mind, having induced her to attend mass upon the day of his birth (being the festival of the Assumption), she was obliged to return home immediately, and, as there was no time to prepare a bed or bed-room, she was delivered of the future victor upon a temporary couch prepared for her accommodation, and covered with an ancient piece of tapestry, representing the heroes of the Iliad. The infant was christened by the name of Napoleon, an obscure

saint, who had dropped to leeward, and fallen altogether out of the calendar, so that his namesake never knew which day he was to celebrate as the festival of his patron. When questioned on this subject by the bishop who confirmed him, he answered smartly, that there were a great many saints, and only three hundred and sixty five days to divide amongst them. The politeness of the pope promoted the patron in order to compliment the god-child, and Saint Napoleon des Ursins was accommodated with a festival. To render this compliment, which no one but a pope could have paid, still more flattering, the feast of Saint Napoleon was fixed for the fifteenth August, the birth-day of the emperor, and the day on which he signed the Concordat. So that Napoleon had the rare honour of promoting his patron saint.

The young Napoleon had, of course, the simple and hardy education proper to the natives of the mountainous island of his birth, and in his infancy was not remarkable for more than that animation of temper, and wilfulness and impatience of inactivity, by which children of quick parts and lively sensibility are usually distinguished. The winter of the year was generally passed by the family of his father at Ajaccio, where they still preserve and exhibit, as the ominous plaything of Napoleon's boyhood, the model of a brass cannon, weighing about thirty pounds.* We leave it to philosophers to inquire, whether the future love of war was suggested by the accidental possession of such a toy; or whether the tendency of the mind dictated the selection of it; or, lastly, whether the nature of the pastime, corresponding with the taste which chose it, may not have had each their action and reaction, and contributed between them to the formation of a character so warlike.

The same traveler, who furnishes the above anecdote, gives an interesting account of the country retreat of the family of Bonaparte, during the summer.

Going along the sea-shore from Ajaccio towards the Isle Sanguiniere, about a mile from the town, occur two stone pillars, the remains of a door-way, leading up to a dilapidated villa, once the residence of Madame Bonaparte's half-brother on the mother's side, whom Napoleon created Cardinal Fesch.† The house is approached by an avenue, surrounded and overhung by the cactus and other shrubs, which luxuriate in a warm climate. It has a garden and a lawn, showing amidst neglect vestiges of their former beauty, and the house is surrounded by shrubberies, permitted to run to wilderness. This was the summer residence of Madame Bonaparte and her family. Almost enclosed by the wild olive, the cactus, the clematis, and the almond-tree, is a very singular and isolated granite rock, called Napoleon's Grotto, which seems to have resisted the decomposition which has taken place around. The remains of a small summer-house are visible beneath the rock, the entrance to which is nearly closed by

* *Sketches of Corsica*, p. 4.

† The mother of Letitia Ramolini, wife of Carlo Bonaparte, married a Swiss officer in the French service named Fesch, after the death of Letitia's father.

* Benson's *Sketches of Corsica*, p. 4.

a luxuriant fig-tree. This was Bonaparte's frequent retreat, when the vacations of the school at which he studied, permitted him to visit home.—How the imagination labours to form an idea of the visions which, in this sequestered and romantic spot, must have arisen before the eyes of the future hero of a hundred battles!

The Count de Marboeuf, already mentioned as Governor of Corsica, interested himself in the young Napoleon, so much as to obtain him an appointment to the Royal Military School at Brienne, which was maintained at the royal expense, in order to bring up youths for the engineer and artillery service. The malignity of contemporary historians has ascribed a motive of gallantry towards Madame Bonaparte as the foundation of this kindness; but the Count de Marboeuf had arrived at a period of life when such connexions are not to be presumed, nor did the scandal receive any currency from the natives of Ajaccio.

Nothing could be more suitable to the nature of young Bonaparte's genius, than the line of study which thus fortunately was opened before him. His ardour for the abstract sciences amounted to a passion, and was combined with a singular aptitude for applying them to the purposes of war, while his attention to pursuits so interesting and exhaustless in themselves, was stimulated by his natural ambition and desire of distinction. Almost all the scientific teachers at Brienne, being accustomed to study the character of their pupils, and obliged by their duty to make memoranda and occasional reports on the subject, spoke of the talents of Bonaparte, and the progress of his studies, with admiration. Circumstances of various kinds, exaggerated or invented, have been circulated concerning the youth of a person so remarkable. The following are given upon good authority.*

The conduct of Napoleon among his companions was that of a studious and reserved youth, addicting himself deeply to the means of improvement, and rather avoiding than seeking the usual temptations to dissipation of time. He had few friends, and no intimates; yet at different times, when he chose to exert it, he exhibited considerable influence over his fellow-students, and when there was any joint plan to be carried into effect, he was frequently chosen dictator of the little republic.

In the time of winter, Bonaparte upon one occasion engaged his companions in constructing a fortress out of the snow, regularly defended by ditches and bastions, according to the rules of fortification. It was considered as displaying the great powers of the juvenile engineer in the way of his profession, and was attacked and defended by the students, who divided into parties for the purpose, until the battle became so keen that their superiors thought it proper to proclaim a truce.

The young Bonaparte gave another instance of address and enterprise upon the following occasion.

* They were many years since communicated to the author by Messrs Joseph and Louis Law, brothers of General Baron Lauriston, Bonaparte's favourite aide-de-camp. These gentlemen, or at least Joseph, were educated at Brienne, but at a later period than Napoleon. Their distinguished brother was his contemporary.

There was a fair held annually in the neighbourhood of Brienne, where the pupils of the Military School used to find a day's amusement; but on account of a quarrel betwixt them and the country people upon a former occasion, or for some such cause, the masters of the institution had directed that the students should not on the fair-day be permitted to go beyond their own precincts, which were surrounded with a wall. Under the direction of the young Corsican, however, the scholars had already laid a plot for securing their usual day's diversion. They had undermined the wall which encompassed their exercising ground, with so much skill and secrecy, that their operations remained entirely unknown till the morning of the fair, when a part of the boundary unexpectedly fell, and gave a free passage to the imprisoned students, of which they immediately took the advantage, by hurrying to the prohibited scene of amusement.

But although on these, and perhaps other occasions, Bonaparte displayed some of the frolic temper of youth, mixed with the inventive genius and the talent for commanding others by which he was distinguished in after time, his life at school was in general that of a recluse and severe student, acquiring by his judgment, and treasuring in his memory, that wonderful process of almost unlimited combination, by means of which he was afterwards able to simplify the most difficult and complicated undertakings. His mathematical teacher was proud of the young islander, as the boast of his school, and his other scientific instructors had the same reason to be satisfied.

In languages Bonaparte was less a proficient, and never acquired the art of writing or spelling French, far less foreign languages, with accuracy or correctness; nor had the monks of Brienne any reason to pride themselves on the classical proficiency of their scholar. The full energies of his mind being devoted to the scientific pursuits of his profession, left little time or inclination for other studies.

Though of Italian origin, Bonaparte had not a decided taste for the fine arts, and his taste in composition seems to have leaned towards the grotesque and the bombastic. He used always the most exaggerated phrases; and it is seldom, if ever, that his bulletins present those touches of sublimity which are founded on dignity and simplicity of expression.

Notwithstanding the external calmness and reserve of his deportment, he who was destined for such great things had, while yet a student at Brienne, a full share of that ambition for distinction and dread of disgrace, that restless and irritating love of fame, which is the spur to extraordinary attempts. Sparkles of this keen temper sometimes showed themselves. On one occasion, a harsh superintendent imposed on the future emperor, for some trifling fault, the disgrace of wearing a penitential dress, and being excluded from the table of the students, and obliged to eat his meal apart. His pride felt the indignity so severely, that it brought on a severe nervous attack; to which, though otherwise of good constitution, he was subject upon occasions of extraordinary irritation. Father Petrant, the professor of mathematics, hastened to deliver

his favourite pupil from the punishment by which he was so much affected.

It is also said that an early disposition to the popular side distinguished Bonaparte even when at Brienne. Pichegru, afterwards so celebrated, who acted as his monitor in the Military School (a singular circumstance), bore witness to his early principles, and to the peculiar energy and tenacity of his temper. He was long afterwards consulted whether means might not be found to engage the commander of the Italian armies in the royal interest. "It will be but lost time to attempt it," said Pichegru. "I knew him in his youth—his character is inflexible—he has taken his side, and he will not change it."

In 1783, Napoleon Bonaparte, then only fourteen years old, was, though under the usual age, selected by Monsieur de Kéralio, the inspector of the twelve military schools, to be sent to have his education completed in the general school of Paris. It was a compliment paid to the precocity of his extraordinary mathematical talent, and the steadiness of his application. While at Paris he attracted the same notice as at Brienne; and among other society, frequented that of the celebrated Abbé Raynal, and was admitted to his literary parties. His taste did not become correct, but his appetite for study in all departments was greatly enlarged; and notwithstanding the quantity which he daily read, his memory was strong enough to retain, and his judgment sufficiently ripe to arrange and digest, the knowledge which he then acquired; so that he had it at his command during all the rest of his busy life. Plutarch was his favourite author; upon the study of whom he had so modeled his opinions and habits of thought, that Paoli afterwards pronounced him a young man of an antique caste, and resembling one of the classical heroes.

Some of his biographers have about this time ascribed to him the anecdote of a certain youthful pupil of the Military School, who desired to ascend in the car of a balloon with the aeronaut Blanchard, and was so mortified at being refused, that he made an attempt to cut the balloon with his sword. The story has but a flimsy support, and indeed does not accord well with the character of the hero, which was deep and reflective, as well as bold and determined, and not likely to suffer its energies to escape in idle and useless adventure.

A better authenticated anecdote states, that at this time he expressed himself disrespectfully towards the king in one of his letters to his family. According to the practice of the school, he was obliged to submit the letter to the censorship of Monsieur Domairon, the professor of belles lettres, who, taking notice of the offensive passage, insisted upon the letter being burnt, and added a severe rebuke. Long afterwards, in 1802, Monsieur Domairon was commanded to attend Napoleon's levee, in order that he might receive a pupil in the person of Jérôme Bonaparte; when the first consul reminded his old tutor good-humouredly, that times had changed considerably since the burning of the letter.

Napoleon Bonaparte, in his seventeenth year, received his first commission as second lieutenant in a regiment of artillery, and was almost imme-

diately afterwards promoted to the rank of first lieutenant in the corps quartered at Valence. He mingled with society when he joined his regiment, more than he had hitherto been accustomed to do; mixed in public amusements, and exhibited the powers of pleasing, which he possessed in an uncommon degree, when he chose to exert them. His handsome and intelligent features, with his active and neat, though slight figure, gave him additional advantages. His manners could scarcely be called elegant, but made up in vivacity and variety of expression, and often in great spirit and energy, for what they wanted in grace and polish.

He became an adventurer for the honours of literature also, and was anonymously a competitor for the prize offered by the academy of Lyons on Raynal's question, "What are the principles and institutions, by application of which mankind can be raised to the highest pitch of happiness?" The prize was adjudged to the young soldier. It is impossible to avoid feeling curiosity to know the character of the juvenile theories respecting government, advocated by one who at length attained the power of practically making what experiments he pleased. Probably his early ideas did not exactly coincide with his more mature practice; for when Talleyrand, many years afterwards, got the essay out of the records of the academy, and returned it to the author, Bonaparte destroyed it after he had read a few pages. He also laboured under the temptation of writing a journey to Mount Cenis, after the manner of Sterne, which he was fortunate enough finally to resist. The affectation which pervades Sterne's peculiar style of composition was not likely to be simplified under the pen of Bonaparte.

Sternian times were fast approaching, and the nation was now fully divided by those factions which produced the Revolution. The officers of Bonaparte's regiment were also divided into royalists and patriots; and it is easily to be imagined, that the young and friendless stranger and adventurer should adopt that side to which he had already shown some inclination, and which promised to open the most free career to those who had only their merit to rely upon. "Were I a general officer," he is alleged to have said, "I would have adhered to the king; being a subaltern, I join the patriots."

There was a story current, that in a debate with some brother officers on the politics of the time, Bonaparte expressed himself so outrageously, that they were provoked to throw him into the Rhone, where he had nearly perished. But this is an inaccurate account of the accident which actually befel him. He was seized with the cramp when bathing in the river. His comrades saved him with difficulty, but his danger was matter of pure chance.

Napoleon has himself recorded that he was a warm patriot during the whole sitting of the National Assembly; but that on the appointment of the Legislative Assembly, he became shaken in his opinions. If so, his original sentiments regained force, for we shortly afterwards find him entertaining such as went to the extreme heights of the Revolution.

Early in the year 1792, Bonaparte became a captain in the artillery by seniority; and in the same

year, being at Paris, he witnessed the two insurrections of the 20th June and 10th August. He was accustomed to speak of the insurgents as the most despicable banditti, and to express with what ease a determined officer could have checked these apparently formidable, but dastardly and unwieldy masses. But with what a different feeling of interest would Napoleon have looked on that infuriated populace, those still resisting though overpowered Swiss, and that burning palace, had any seer whispered to him, "Emperor that shall be, all this blood and massacre is but to prepare your future empire!" Little anticipating the potent effect which the passing events were to bear on his own fortune, Bonaparte, anxious for the safety of his mother and family, was now desirous to exchange France for Corsica, where the same things were acting on a less distinguished stage.

It was a singular feature in the French Revolution, that it brought out from his retirement the celebrated Pascal Paoli, who, long banished from Corsica, the freedom and independence of which he had so valiantly defended, returned from exile with the flattering hope of still witnessing the progress of liberty in his native land. On visiting Paris, he was received there with enthusiastic veneration, and the National Assembly and royal family contended which should show him most distinction. He was created President of the Department, and Commander of the National Guard of his native island, and used the powers intrusted to him with great wisdom and patriotism.

But Paoli's views of liberty were different from those which unhappily began to be popular in France. He was desirous of establishing that freedom, which is the protector, not the destroyer of property, and which confers practical happiness, instead of aiming at theoretical perfection. In a word, he endeavoured to keep Corsica free from the prevailing infection of jacobinism; and in reward, he was denounced in the assembly. Paoli, summoned to attend for the purpose of standing on his defence, declined the journey on account of his age, but offered to withdraw from the island.

A large proportion of the inhabitants took part with the aged champion of their freedom, while the Convention sent an expedition, at the head of which were La Combe St-Michel, and Salicetti, one of the Corsican deputies to the Convention, with the usual instructions for bloodshed and pillage issued to their commissaries.

Bonaparte was in Corsica, upon leave of absence from his regiment, when these events were taking place; and although he himself and Paoli had hitherto been on friendly terms, and some family relations existed between them, the young artillery officer did not hesitate which side to choose. He embraced that of the Convention with heart and hand; and his first military exploit was in the civil war of his native island. In the year 1793, he was dispatched from Bastia, in possession of the French party, to surprise his native town Ajaccio, then occupied by Paoli or his adherents. Bonaparte was acting provisionally, as commanding a battalion of National Guards. He landed in the Gulf of Ajaccio with about fifty men, to take possession of a tower

called the Torre di Capitello, on the opposite side of the gulf, and almost facing the city. He succeeded in taking the place; but as there arose a gale of wind which prevented his communicating with the frigate which had put him ashore, he was besieged in his new conquest by the opposite faction, and reduced to such distress, that he and his little garrison were obliged to feed on horse-flesh. After five days he was relieved by the frigate, and evacuated the tower, having first in vain attempted to blow it up. The Torre di Capitello still shows marks of the damage it then sustained, and its remains may be looked on as a curiosity, as the first scene of his combats, before whom

— Temple and tower
Went to the ground — *

A relation of Napoleon, Masserio by name, effectually defended Ajaccio against the force employed in the expedition.

The strength of Paoli increasing, and the English preparing to assist him, Corsica became no longer a safe or convenient residence for the Bonaparte family. Indeed, both Napoleon and his brother Lucien, who had distinguished themselves as partisans of the French, were subjected to a decree of banishment from their native island; and Madame Bonaparte, with her three daughters, and Jérôme, who was as yet but a child, set sail under their protection, and settled for a time, first at Nice, and afterwards at Marseilles, where the family is supposed to have undergone considerable distress, until the dawning prospects of Napoleon afforded him the means of assisting them.

Napoleon never again revisited Corsica, nor does he appear to have regarded it with any feelings of affection. One small fountain at Ajaccio is pointed out as the only ornament which his bounty bestowed on his birth-place. He might perhaps think it impolitic to do anything which might remind the country he ruled that he was not a child of her soil, nay, was in fact very near having been born an alien, for Corsica was not united to, or made an integral part of France, until June, 1769, a few weeks only before Napoleon's birth. This stigma was repeatedly cast upon him by his opponents, some of whom reproached the French with having adopted a master, from a country from which the ancient Romans were unwilling even to chase a slave; and Napoleon may have been so far sensible to it, as to avoid showing any predilection to the

* Such is the report of the Corsicans, concerning the alleged first exploit of their celebrated countryman. See Benson's *Sketches*, p. 4. But there is room to believe that Bonaparte had been in action so early as February, 1793. Admirable Truguet, with a strong fleet, and having on board a large body of troops, had been at anchor for several weeks in the Corsican harbours, announcing a descent upon Sardinia. At length, having received on board an additional number of forces, he set sail on his expedition. Bonaparte is supposed to have accompanied the admiral, of whose talent and judgment he is made in the St Helena MSS. to speak with great contempt. Bonaparte succeeded in taking some batteries in the straits of Saint Bonifacio; but the expedition proving unsuccessful, they were speedily abandoned.

place of his birth, which might bring the circumstance strongly under observation of the great nation, with which he and his family seemed to be indissolubly united. But, as a traveler already quoted, and who had the best opportunities to become acquainted with the feelings of the proud islanders, has expressed it,—“The Corsicans are still highly patriotic, and possess strong local attachment—in their opinion, contempt for the country of one’s birth is never to be redeemed by any other qualities. Napoleon, therefore, certainly was not popular in Corsica, nor is his memory cherished there.”*

The feelings of the parties were not unnatural on either side. Napoleon, little interested in the land of his birth, and having such an immense stake in that of his adoption, in which he had everything to keep and lose,† observed a policy towards Corsica which his position rendered advisable; and who can blame the high-spirited islanders, who seeing one of their countrymen raised to such exalted eminence, and disposed to forget his connexion with them, returned with slight and indifference the disregard with which he treated them?*

CHAPTER XX.

Siege of Toulon.—Recapitulation.—Bonaparte appointed brigadier-general of artillery, with the command of the artillery at Toulon.—Finds everything in disorder.—His plan for obtaining the surrender of the place.—Adopted.—Anecdotes during the siege.—Allied Troops resolve to evacuate Toulon.—Dreadful particulars of the evacuation.—England censured on this occasion.—Lord Lynedoch.—Fame of Bonaparte increases, and he is appointed Chief of Battalion in the Army of Italy.—Joins head quarters at Nice.—On the fall of Robespierre, Bonaparte superseded in command.—Arrives in Paris in May, 1795, to solicit employment.—He is unsuccessful.—Taine.—Retrospect of the Proceedings of the National Assembly.—Difficulties in forming a new Constitution.—Appointment of the Directory—of the Two Councils of Elders and of Five Hundred.—Nation at large, and Paris in particular, disgusted with their pretensions.—Paris assembles in sections.—General Danican appointed their Commander-in-chief.—Menou appointed by the Directory to disarm the National Guards—but suspended for incapacity.—Bonaparte appointed in his room.—The Day of the Sections.—Conflict betwixt the Troops of the Convention under Bonaparte, and those of the Sections of Paris under Danican.—The latter defeated with much slaughter.—Bonaparte appointed second in command of the Army of the Interior—then General-in-chief.—Marries Madame Beauharnais—Her character.—Bonaparte immediately afterwards joins the Army of Italy.

THE siege of Toulon was the first incident of importance, which enabled Bonaparte to distinguish himself in the eyes of the French government, and of the world at large.

* Benson’s *Sketches of Corsica*, p. 121.

† Not literally, however; for it is worth mentioning that when he was in full-blown possession of his power, an inheritance fell to the family situated near Ajaccio, and was divided amongst them. The first consul, or emperor, received an olive garden as his share.—*Sketches of Corsica*.

** See Appendix, No. 1.—“Additional notices on Napoleon’s early career.”

We have already mentioned that a general diffidence, and dread of the proceedings of the jacobins, joined to the intrigues of the girondists, had, after the fall of the latter party, induced several of the principal towns in France to take arms against the Convention, or rather against the jacobin party, who had attained the complete mastery in that body. We have also said that Toulon, taking a more decided step than either Marseilles or Lyons, had declared for the king and the constitution of 1791, and invited the support of the English and Spanish squadrons, who were cruising upon the coast. A disembarkation was made, and a miscellaneous force, hastily collected, of Spaniards, Sardinians, Neapolitans, and English, was thrown into the place.

This was one of the critical periods when vigorous measures, on the part of the allies, might have produced marked effects on the result of the war. Toulon is the arsenal of France, and contained at that time immense naval stores, besides a fleet of seventeen sail of the line ready for sea, and thirteen or fourteen more, which stood in need of refitting. The possession of it was of the last importance, and with a sufficiently large garrison, or rather an army strong enough to cover the more exposed points without the town, the English might have maintained their footing at Toulon, as they did at a later period both at Lisbon and Cadiz. The sea would, by maintaining the defensive lines necessary to protect the roadstead, have been entirely at the command of the besieged; and they could have been supplied with provisions in any quantity from Sicily, or the Barbary states, while the besiegers would have experienced great difficulty, such was the dearth in Provence at the time, in supporting their own army. But to have played this bold game, the presence of an army, instead of a few battalions, would have been requisite; and a general of consummate ability must have held the chief command. This was the more especially necessary, as Toulon, from the nature of the place, must have been defended by a war of posts, requiring peculiar alertness, sagacity, and vigilance. On the other hand, there were circumstances very favourable for the defence, had it been conducted with talent and vigour. In order to invest Toulon on the right and left side at once, it was necessary there should be two distinct blocking armies; and these could scarce communicate with each other, as a steep ridge of mountains, called Pharon, must interpose betwixt them. This gave opportunity to the besieged to combine their force, and chuse the object of attack when they sallied; while, on the other hand, the two bodies of besiegers could not easily connect their operations, either for attack or defence.

Lord Mulgrave, who commanded personally in the place, notwithstanding the motley character of the garrison, and other discouraging circumstances, began the defence with spirit. Sir George Keith Elphinstone also defeated the republicans at the mountain-pass, called Ollioules. The English for some time retained possession of this important gorge, but were finally driven out from it. Cartaux, a republican general whom we have already mentioned, now advanced on the west of Toulon, at the head of a very considerable army, while General

Lapoype blockaded the city on the east with a part of the army of Italy. It was the object of the French to approach Toulon on both sides of the mountainous ridge called Pharon. But on the east the town was covered by the strong and regular fort of La Malgue, and on the west side of the road by a less formidable work, called Malbosquet. To support Malbosquet, and to protect the entrance to the roadstead and the harbour, the English engineers fortified with great skill an eminence called Hauteur de Grasse. The height bent into a sort of bay, the two promontories of which were secured by redoubts, named l'Éguillette and Balaguier, which communicated with and supported the new fortification, which the English had termed Fort Mulgrave.

Several sallies and skirmishes took place, in most of which the republicans were worsted. Lieutenant-general O'Hara arrived from Gibraltar with reinforcements, and assumed the chief command.

Little could be said for the union of the commanders within Toulon; yet their enterprises were so far successful that the French began to be alarmed at the slow progress of the siege. The dearth of provisions was daily increasing; the discontent of the people of Provence was augmented; the catholics were numerous in the neighbouring districts of Vivarais and Lower Languedoc; and Barras and Fréron wrote from Marseilles to the Convention, suggesting that the siege of Toulon should be raised,* and the besieging army withdrawn beyond the Durance. But while weaker minds were despairing, talents of the first order were preparing to achieve the conquest of Toulon.

Bonaparte, since his return from Corsica, seems to have enjoyed some protection from his countryman Salicetti, the only one of the Corsican deputies who voted for the king's death, and a person to whom the young artillery officer had been known during the civil war of his native island. Napoleon had shown that his own opinions were formed on the model of the times, by a small jacobin publication, called *Le Souper de Beaucaire*, a political dialogue between Marat and a federalist, in which the latter is overwhelmed and silenced by the arguments and eloquence of the Friend of the People. Of this juvenile production Bonaparte was afterwards so much ashamed, that he caused the copies to be collected and destroyed with the utmost rigour, so that it is now almost impossible to meet with one. It is whimsical to observe that in the manuscripts of St Helena he mentions this publication as one in which he assumed the mask of jacobin principles; merely to convince the girondists and royalists that they were chasing an unfit time for insurrection, and attempting it in a hopeless manner. He adds that it made many converts.

Bonaparte's professional qualifications were still better vouched than the soundness of his political principles, though these were sufficiently decided. The notes which the inspectors of the Military School always preserve concerning their scholars, described his genius as being of the first order; and

to these he owed his promotion to the rank of a brigadier-general of artillery, with the command of the artillery during the siege of Toulon.

When he had arrived at the scene of action, and had visited the posts of the besieging army, he found so many marks of incapacity, that he could not conceal his astonishment. Batteries had been erected for destroying the English shipping, but they were three gun-shots' distance from the point which they were designed to command; red-hot balls were preparing, but they were not heated in furnaces beside the guns, but in the country-houses in the neighbourhood, at the most ridiculous distance, as if they had been articles of easy and ordinary transportation. Bonaparte with difficulty obtained General Cartaux's permission to make a shot or two by way of experiment; and when they fell more than half-way short of the mark, the general had no excuse but to rail against the aristocrats, who had, he said, spoiled the quality of the powder with which he was supplied.

The young officer of artillery, with prudence, and at the same time with spirit, made his remonstrances to the member of Convention, Gasparin, who witnessed the experiment, and explained the necessity of proceeding more systematically, if any successful result was expected.

At a council of war, where Gasparin presided, the instructions of the Committee of Public Safety were read, directing that the siege of Toulon should be commenced according to the usual forms, by investing the body of the place, in other words, the city itself. The orders of the Committee of Public Safety were no safe subject of discussion or criticism for those who were to act under them; yet Bonaparte ventured to recommend their being departed from on this important occasion. His comprehensive genius had at once discovered a less direct, yet more certain manner, of obtaining the surrender of the place. He advised, that, neglecting the body of the town, the attention of the besiegers should be turned to attain possession of the promontory called Hauteur de Grasse, by driving the besieged from the strong work of Fort Mulgrave, and the two redoubts of l'Éguillette and Balaguier, by means of which the English had established the line of defence necessary to protect the fleet and harbour. The fortress of Malbosquet, on the same point, he also recommended as a principal object of attack. He argued, that if the besiegers succeeded in possessing themselves of these fortifications, they must obtain a complete command of the roads where the English fleet lay, and oblige them to put to sea. They would, in the same manner, effectually command the entrance of the bay, and prevent supplies or provisions from being thrown into the city. If the garrison were thus in danger of being totally cut off from supplies, by their vessels being driven from their anchorage, it was natural to suppose that the English troops would rather evacuate Toulon, than remain within the place, blockaded on all sides, until they might be compelled to surrender by famine.

The plan was adopted by the council of war after much hesitation, and the young officer by whom it was projected received full powers to carry it on.

* This letter appeared in the *Moniteur*, 10th December, 1793. But as the town of Toulon was taken a few days afterwards, the Convention voted the letter a fabrication.

He rallied round him a number of excellent artillery officers and soldiers; assembled against Toulon more than two hundred pieces of cannon, well served; and stationed them so advantageously, that he annoyed considerably the English vessels in the roads, even before he had constructed those batteries on which he depended for reducing Fort Mulgrave and Malbosquet, by which they were in a great measure protected.

In the meanwhile, General Doppet, formerly a physician, had superseded Cartaux, whose incapacity could no longer be concealed by his rhodomontading language; and, wonderful to tell, it had nearly been the fate of the ex-doctor to take Toulon, at a time when such an event seemed least within his calculation. A tumultuary attack of some of the young French carmagnoles on a body of Spanish troops which garrisoned Fort Mulgrave, had very nearly been successful. Bonaparte galloped to the spot, hurrying his reluctant commander along with him, and succours were ordered to advance to support the attack, when an aide-de-camp was shot by Doppet's side; on which the medical general, considering this as a bad symptom, pronounced the case desperate, and, to Bonaparte's great indignation, ordered a retreat to be commenced. Doppet being found as incapable as Cartaux, was in his turn superseded by Dugonmier, a veteran who had served for fifty years, was covered with scars, and as fearless as the weapon he wore.

From this time the commandant of artillery, having the complete concurrence of his general, had no doubt of success. To insure it, however, he used the utmost vigilance and exertion, and exposed his person to every risk.

One of the dangers which he incurred was of a singular character. An artilleryman being shot at the gun which he was serving, while Napoleon was visiting a battery, he took up the dead man's rammer, and, to give encouragement to the soldiers, charged the gun repeatedly with his own hands. In consequence of using this implement, he caught an infectious cutaneous complaint, which, being injudiciously treated and thrown inward, was of great prejudice to his health, until after his Italian campaigns, when he was completely cured by Dr Corvisart; after which, for the first time, he showed that tendency to *embonpoint*, which marked the latter part of his life.

Upon another occasion, while Napoleon was overlooking the construction of a battery, which the enemy endeavoured to interrupt by their fire, he called for some person who could write, that he might dictate an order. A young soldier stepped out of the ranks, and, resting the paper on the breast-work, began to write accordingly. A shot from the enemy's battery covered the letter with earth the instant it was finished. "Thank you—we shall have no occasion for sand this bout," said the military secretary. The gaiety and courage of the remark drew Bonaparte's attention on the young man, who was the celebrated General Junot, afterwards created Duke d'Abrantes. During this siege, also, he discovered the talents of Duroc, afterwards one of his most faithful adherents. In these and many other instances, Bonaparte showed his extensive

knowledge of mankind, by the deep sagacity which enabled him to discover and attach to him those whose talents were most distinguished, and most capable of rendering him service.

Notwithstanding the influence which the commandant of artillery had acquired, he found himself occasionally thwarted by the members of the Convention upon mission to the siege of Toulon, who latterly were Fréron, Ricord, Salicetti, and the younger Robespierre. These representatives of the people, knowing that their commission gave them supreme power over generals and armies, never seem to have paused to consider whether nature or education had qualified them to exercise it, with advantage to the public and credit to themselves. They criticised Bonaparte's plan of attack, finding it impossible to conceive how his operations, being directed against detached fortifications at a distance from Toulon, could be eventually the means of placing the town itself with facility in their hands. But Napoleon was patient and temporising; and having the good opinion of Salicetti, and some intimacy with young Robespierre, he contrived to have the works conducted according to his own plan.

The presumption of these dignitaries became the means of precipitating his operations. It was his intention to complete his proposed works against Fort Mulgrave before opening a large and powerful battery, which he had constructed with great silence and secrecy against Malbosquet, so that the whole of his meditated assault might confound the enemy by commencing at the same time. The operations, being shrouded by an olive plantation, had been completed without being observed by the English, whom Bonaparte proposed to attack on the whole line of defence simultaneously. Messrs Fréron and Robespierre, however, in visiting the military posts, stumbled upon this masked battery; and, having no notion why four mortars and eight twenty-four pounders should remain inactive, they commanded the fire to be opened on Malbosquet without any further delay.

General O'Hara, confounded at finding this important post exposed to a fire so formidable and unexpected, determined by a strong effort to carry the French battery at once. Three thousand men were employed in this sally; and the general himself, rather contrary to what is considered the duty of the governor of a place of importance, resolved to put himself at their head. The sally was at first completely successful; but while the English pursued the enemy too far, in all the confidence of what they considered as assured victory, Bonaparte availed himself of some broken ground and a covered way, to rally a strong body of troops, bring up reserves, and attack the scattered English both in flank and rear. There was a warm skirmish, in which Napoleon himself received a bayonet wound in the thigh, by which, though a serious injury, he was not, however, disabled. The English were thrown into irretrievable confusion, and retreated, leaving their general wounded, and a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. It is singular, that during his long warfare, Bonaparte was never personally engaged with the British, except in his first, and at Waterloo, his last and fatal battle. The attack

upon Acre can scarce be termed an exception, as far as his own person was concerned.

The loss of their commandant, added to the discouragement which began to prevail among the defenders of Toulon, together with the vivacity of the attack which ensued, seem finally to have disheartened the garrison. Five batteries were opened on Fort Mulgrave, the possession of which Bonaparte considered as insuring success. After a fire of twenty-four hours, Dugommier and Napoleon resolved to try the fate of a general attack, for which the representatives of the people showed no particular zeal. The attacking columns advanced before day, during a heavy shower of rain. They were at first driven back on every point by the most determined opposition; and Dugommier, as he saw the troops fly in confusion, exclaimed, well knowing the consequences of bad success to a general of the Republic, "I am a lost man!" Renewed efforts, however, at last prevailed; the Spanish artillerymen giving way on one point, the fort fell into the possession of the French, who showed no mercy to its defenders.

Three hours, according to Bonaparte, after the fort was taken, the representatives of the people appeared in the trenches, with drawn swords, to congratulate the soldiers on their successful valour, and hear, from their commandant of artillery, the reiterated assurance, that, this distant fort being gained, Toulon was now their own. In their letter to the Convention, the deputies gave a more favourable account of their own exploits, and failed not to represent Ricord, Salicetti, and young Robespierre, as leading the attack with sabre in hand, and, to use their own phrase, showing the troops the road to victory. On the other hand, they ungraciously forgot, in their dispatches, to mention so much as the name of Bonaparte, to whom the victory was entirely to be ascribed.

In the meantime, Napoleon's sagacity was not deceived in the event. The officers of the allied troops, after a hurried council of war, resolved to evacuate Toulon, since the posts gained by the French must drive the English ships from their anchorage, and deprive them of a future opportunity of retreating, if they neglected the passing moment. Lord Hood alone urged a bolder resolution, and recommended the making a desperate effort to regain Fort Mulgrave, and the heights which it commanded. But his spirited counsel was rejected, and the evacuation resolved on; which the panic of the foreign troops, especially the Neapolitans, would have rendered still more horrible than it proved, but for the steadiness of the British seamen.

The safety of the unfortunate citizens, who had invoked their protection, was not neglected, even amid the confusion of the retreat. The numerous merchant vessels, and other craft, offered means of transportation to all, who, having to fear the resentment of the republicans, might be desirous of quitting Toulon. Such was the dread of the victor's cruelty, that upwards of fourteen thousand persons accepted this melancholy refuge. Meantime there was other work to do.

It had been resolved, that the arsenal and naval stores, with such of the French ships as were not

ready for sea, should be destroyed; and they were set on fire accordingly. This task was in a great measure intrusted to the dauntless intrepidity of Sir Sydney Smith, who carried it through with a degree of order, which, everything considered, was almost marvellous. The assistance of the Spaniards was offered and accepted; and they undertook the duty of scuttling and sinking two vessels used as powder magazines, and destroying some part of the disabled shipping. The rising conflagration, growing redder and redder, seemed at length a great volcano, amid which were long distinctly seen the masts and yards of the burning vessels, and which rendered obscurely visible the advancing bodies of republican troops, who attempted on different points to push their way into the place. The jacobins began to rise in the town upon the flying royalists;—horrid screams and yells of vengeance, and revolutionary choruses, were heard to mingle with the cries and plaintive entreaties of the remaining fugitives, who had not yet found means of embarkation. The guns from Malbosquet, now possessed by the French, and turned on the bulwarks of the town, increased the uproar. At once a shock, like that of an earthquake, occasioned by the explosion of many hundred barrels of gunpowder, silenced all noise save its own, and threw high into the midnight heaven a thousand blazing fragments, which descended, threatening ruin wherever they fell. A second explosion took place, as the other magazine blew up, with the same dreadful effects.

This tremendous addition to the terrors of the scene, so dreadful in itself, was owing to the Spaniards setting fire to those vessels used as magazines, instead of sinking them, according to the plan which had been agreed upon. Either from ill-will, carelessness, or timidity, they were equally awkward in their attempts to destroy the dismantled ships intrusted to their charge, which fell into the hands of the French but little damaged. The British fleet, with the flotilla crowded with fugitives which it escorted, left Toulon without loss, notwithstanding an ill-directed fire maintained on them from the batteries which the French had taken.

It was upon this night of terror, conflagration, tears, and blood, that the star of Napoleon first ascended the horizon; and though it gleamed over many a scene of horror ere it set, it may be doubtful whether its light was ever blended with those of one more dreadful.

The capture of Toulon crushed all the hopes of resistance to the jacobins, which had been cherished in the south of France. There was a strong distrust excited against England, who was judged only desirous to avail herself of the insurrection of these unhappy citizens to cripple and destroy the naval power of France, without the wish of effectually assisting the royalists. This was an unjust belief, but it cannot be denied that there were specious grounds for the accusation. The undertaking the protection of a city in such a situation as that of Toulon, if the measure was embraced at all, should have been supported by efforts worthy of the country whose assistance was implored and granted. Such efforts were not made, and the assistance actually

afforded was not directed by talent, and was squandered by disunion. The troops showed gallantry; but the leaders, excepting the naval officers, evinced little military skill, or united purpose of defence. One gentleman, then in private life, chancing to be in Toulon at the time, distinguished himself as a volunteer,* and has since achieved a proud career in the British army. Had he, or such as he, been at the head of the garrison, the walls of Toulon might have seen a battle like that of Barossa, and a very different result of the siege might probably have ensued.

So many of the citizens of Toulon concerned in the late resistance had escaped, by the means provided by the English, that republican vengeance could not collect its victims in the usual numbers. Many were shot, however, and it has been said that Bonaparte commanded the artillery, by which, as at Lyons, they were exterminated; and also, that he wrote a letter to Fréron and the younger Robespierre, congratulating them and himself on the execution of these aristocrats, and signed Brutus Bonaparte, sans-culotte. If he actually commanded at this execution, he had the poor apology, that he must do so or himself perish; but, had the fact and the letter been genuine, there has been enough of time since his downfall to prove the truth of the accusation, and certainly enough of writers disposed to give these proofs publicity. He himself positively denied the charge; and alleged that the victims were shot by a detachment of what was called the revolutionary army, and not by troops of the line. This we think highly probable. Bonaparte has besides affirmed, that, far from desiring to sharpen the vengeance of the jacobins, or act as their agent, he hazarded the displeasure of those whose frown was death, by interposing his protection to save the unfortunate family of Chabrilant, emigrants and aristocrats, who, being thrown by a storm on the coast of France, shortly after the siege of Toulon, became liable to punishment by the guillotine, but whom he saved by procuring them the means of escape by sea.

In the meanwhile the young general of artillery was rapidly rising in reputation. The praises which were suppressed by the representatives of the people, were willingly conferred and promulgated by the frank old veteran, Dugommier. Bonaparte's name was placed on the list of those whom he recommended for promotion, with the pointed addition, that, if neglected, he would be sure to force his own way. He was accordingly confirmed in his provisional situation of chief of battalion, and appointed to hold that rank in the Army of Italy. Before joining that army, the genius of Napoleon was employed by the Convention in surveying and fortifying the sea-coast of the Mediterranean; a very troublesome task, as it involved many disputes with the local authorities of small towns and villages, and even hamlets, all of whom wished to have

batteries erected for their own special protection, without regard to the general safety. It involved him, moreover, as we shall presently see, in some risk with the Convention at home.

The chief of battalion discharged his task scientifically. He divided the necessary fortifications into three classes, distinguishing those designed to protect harbours and roadsteads, from such as were intended to defend anchorages of less consequence, and both from the third class, which were to be placed on proper situations, to prevent insults and partial descents on the coasts by an enemy superior at sea. Napoleon dictated to General Gourgand hints on this subject, which must be of consequence to the sea-coasts which need such military defences.*

Having made his report to the Convention, Bonaparte proceeded to join the head-quarters of the French army, then lying at Nice, straitened considerably and hemmed in by the Sardinians and Austrians, who, after some vain attempts of General Brunet to dislodge them, had remained masters of the Col di Tende, and lower passes of the Alps, together with the road leading from Turin to Nice, by Saorgio.

Bonaparte had influence enough to recommend with success to the general, Dumerbion, and the representatives of the people, Ricord and Robespierre, a plan for driving the enemy out of this position, forcing them to retreat beyond the higher Alps, and taking Saorgio; all which measures succeeded as he had predicted. Saorgio surrendered, with much stores and baggage, and the French army obtained possession of the chain of the higher Alps,† which, being tenable by defending few and difficult passes, placed a great part of the Army of Italy (as it was already termed, though only upon the frontier), at disposal for actual service. While directing the means of attaining these successes, Bonaparte, at the same time, acquired a complete acquaintance with that Alpine country, in which he was shortly to obtain victories in his own name, not in that of others, who obtained reputation by acting on his suggestions. But while he was thus employed, he was involved in an accusation before the Convention, which, had his reputation been less for approved patriotism, might have cost him dear.

In his plans for the defence of the Mediterranean, Napoleon had proposed repairing an old state prison at Marseilles, called the fort of Saint Nicholas, that it might serve as a powder magazine. This plan his successor on the station proceeded to execute, and, by doing so, gave umbrage to the patriots, who charged the commandant of artillery then at Marseilles, and superintending the work, with an intention to rebuild this fort, to serve as a Bastille for controlling the good citizens. The officer, being summoned to the bar of the Convention, proved that

* An Englishman will probably remember the sublime passage in "The Mariners of England;"—

Britannia needs no bulwark,
No towers along the steep;
Her march is o'er the mountain-ware,
Her home is on the deep.

† The Sardinians were dislodged from the Col di Tende, 7th of May, 1794.

* Mr Graham of Balgowan, now Lord Lynedoch. He marched out on one of the sorties, and when the affair became hot, seized the musket and cartouch-box of a fallen soldier, and afforded such an example to the troops, as contributed greatly to their gaining the object desired.

the plan was not his own, but drawn out by Bonaparte. The representatives of the army in Italy, however, not being able to dispense with his services, wrote to the Convention in his behalf, and gave such an account of the origin and purpose of the undertaking, as divested it of all shade of suspicion, even in the suspicious eye of the Committee of Public Safety.

In the remainder of the year 1794, there was little service of consequence in the Army of Italy, and the 9th and 10th Thermidor (27th and 28th July) of that year, brought the downfall of Robespierre, and threatened unfavourable consequences to Bonaparte, who had been the friend of the tyrant's brother, and was understood to have participated in the tone of exaggerated patriotism affected by his party. He endeavoured to shelter himself under his ignorance of the real tendency of the proceedings of those who had fallen; an apology which resolves itself into the ordinary excuse, that he found his late friends had not been the persons he took them for. According to this line of defence, he made all haste to disclaim accession to the political schemes of which they were accused. "I am somewhat affected," he wrote to a correspondent, "at the fate of the younger Robespierre; but, had he been my brother, I would have ponarded him with my own hand, had I been aware that he was forming schemes of tyranny."

Bonaparte's disclamations do not seem at first to have been favourably received. His situation was now precarious, and when those members were restored to the Convention, who had been expelled and proscribed by the jacobins, it became still more so. The reaction of the moderate party, accompanied by horrible recollections of the past, and fears for the future, began now to be more strongly felt, as their numbers in the Convention acquired strength. Those officers who had attached themselves to the jacobin party were the objects of their animosity; and besides, they were desirous to purify the armies as far as possible of those whom they considered as their own enemies, and those of good order; the rather, that the jacobinical principles still continued to be more favoured in the armies than in the interior.

To the causes of this we have before alluded; but it may not be unnecessary to repeat, that the soldiers had experienced all the advantages of the fierce energies of a government which sent them out to conquest, and offered them the means of achieving it; and they had not been witnesses to the atrocities of their tyranny in the interior. It was highly desirable to the moderate party to diminish the influence of the jacobins with the army, by dismissing the officers supposed most friendly to such principles. Bonaparte, among others, was superseded in his command, and for a time detained under arrest. This was removed by means of the influence which his countryman Salicetti still retained among the thermidoriens, and Bonaparte appears to have visited Marseilles, though in a condition to give or receive little consolation from his family.

In May 1795, he came to Paris to solicit employment in his profession. He found himself unfriended and indigent in the city of which he was at no distant

period to be the ruler. Some individuals, however, assisted him, and among others the celebrated performer Talma, who had known him while at the Military School, and even then entertained high expectations of the part in life which was to be played by "*le petit Bonaparte*." *

On the other hand, as a favourer of the jacobins, his solicitations for employment were resolutely opposed by a person of considerable influence. Aubry, an old officer of artillery, president of the military committee, placed himself in strong opposition to his pretensions. He had been nominated as removed from the artillery service to be placed in that of the infantry. He remonstrated with great spirit against this proposed change; and when, in the heat of discussion, Aubry objected his youth, Bonaparte replied, that presence in the field of battle ought to anticipate the claim of years. The president, who had not been much in action, considered his reply as a personal insult; and Napoleon, disdaining farther answer, tendered his resignation. It was not, however, accepted; and he still remained in the rank of expectants, but among those whose hopes were entirely dependent upon their merits.

Bonaparte had something of his native country in his disposition—he forgot neither benefits nor injuries. He was always, during the height of his grandeur, particularly kind to Talma, and honoured him even with a degree of intimacy. As for Aubry, being amongst those belonging to Pichegru's party who were banished to Cayenne, he caused him to be excepted from the decree which permitted the return of those unfortunate exiles, and Aubry died at Demarara.

Meantime, his situation becoming daily more unpleasant, Bonaparte solicited Barras and Fréron, who, as thermidoriens, had preserved their credit, for occupation in almost any line of his profession, and even negotiated for permission to go into the Turkish service, to train the Mussulmans to the use of artillery. A fanciful imagination may pursue him to the rank of pacha, or higher; for, go where he would, he could not have remained in mediocrity. His own ideas had a similar tendency. "How strange," he said, "it would be, if a little Corsican officer of artillery were to become King of Jerusalem!" He was offered a command in La Vendée, which he declined to accept, and was finally named to command a brigade of artillery in Holland. But it was in a land where there still existed so many separate and conflicting factions as in France, that he was doomed to be raised, amid the struggles of his contending countrymen, and upon their shoulders, and over their heads, to the very highest eminence to which Fortune can exalt an individual. The times required such talents as his, and the opportunity for exercising them soon arose.

The French nation were in general tired of the National Convention, which successive proscriptions had drained of all the talent, eloquence, and energy, it had once possessed; and that assembly had become hateful and contemptible to all men, by suffering itself to be the passive tool of the terrorists for two years, when, if they had shown proper

* On the authority of the late John Philip Kemble.

firmness, the revolution of the 9th Thermidor might as well have been achieved at the beginning of that frightful anarchy, as after that long period of unheard-of suffering. The Convention was not greatly improved in point of talent, even by the return of their banished brethren; and, in a word, they had lost the confidence of the public entirely. They therefore prepared to gratify the general wish by dissolving themselves.

But before they resigned their ostensible authority, it was necessary to prepare some mode of carrying on the government in future.

The jacobin constitution of 1793 still existed on paper; but although there was an unrepented law, menacing with death any one who should propose to alter that form of government, no one appeared disposed to consider it as actually in exercise; and notwithstanding the solemnity with which it had been received and ratified by the sanction of the national voice, it was actually passed over and abrogated as a matter of course, by a tacit but unanimous consent. Neither was there any disposition to adopt the girondist constitution of 1791, or to revert to the democratic monarchy of 1792, the only one of these models which could be said to have had even the dubious endurance of a few months. As at the general change of the world, all former things were to be done away—all was to be made new.

Each of these forms of government had been solemnised by the national oaths and processions customary on such occasions; but the opinion was now universally entertained, that not one of them was founded on just principles, or contained the power of defending itself against aggression, and protecting the lives and rights of the subject. On the other hand, every one not deeply interested in the late anarchy, and implicated in the horrid course of bloodshed and tyranny which was its very essence, was frightened at the idea of reviving a government, which was a professed continuation of the despotism ever attendant upon a revolution, and which, in all civilized countries, ought to terminate with the extraordinary circumstances by which revolution has been rendered necessary. To have continued the revolutionary government, indeed, longer than this, would have been to have imitated the conduct of an ignorant empiric, who should persist in subjecting a convalescent patient to the same course of exhausting and dangerous medicines, which a regular physician would discontinue as soon as the disease had been brought to a favourable crisis.

It seems to have been in general felt and admitted, that the blending of the executive and legislative power together, as both had been exercised by the existing Convention, opened the road to the most afflicting tyranny; and that to constitute a stable government, the power of executing the laws, and administering the ministerial functions, must be vested in some separate individuals, or number of individuals, who should, indeed, be responsible to the national legislature for the exercise of this power, but neither subject to their direct control, nor enjoying it as emanating immediately from their body. With these reflections arose others, on the utility of dividing the legislative body itself into

two assemblies, one of which might form a check on the other, tending, by some exercise of an intermediate authority, to qualify the rash rapidity of a single chamber, and abstract the progress of any individual, who might, like Robespierre, obtain a dictatorship in such a body, and become, in doing so, an arbitrary tyrant over the whole authorities of the state. Thus, loath and late, the French began to cast an eye on the British constitution, and the system of checks and balances upon which it is founded, as the best means of uniting the protection of liberty with the preservation of order. Thinking men had come gradually to be aware, that in hopes of getting something better than a system which had been sanctioned by the experience of ages, they had only produced a set of models, which were successively wondered at, applauded, neglected, and broken to pieces, instead of a simple machine, capable, in mechanical phrase, of working well.

Had such a feeling prevailed during the commencement of the Revolution, as was advocated by Mounier, and others, France and Europe might have been spared the bloodshed and distress which afflicted them during a period of more than twenty years of war, with all the various evils which accompanied that great convulsion. France had then a king; nobles, out of whom a senate might have been selected; and abundance of able men to have formed a Lower House, or House of Commons. But the golden opportunity was passed over; and when the architects might, perhaps, have been disposed to execute the new fabric which they meditated, on the plan of a limited monarchy, the materials for the structure were no longer to be found.

The legitimate king of France no doubt existed, but he was an exile in a foreign country; and the race of gentry, from whom a House of Peers, or hereditary senate, might have been chiefly selected, were to be found only in foreign service, too much exasperated by their sufferings to admit a rational hope that they would ever make any compromise with those who had forced them from their native land, and confiscated their family property. Saving for these circumstances, and the combinations which arose out of them, it seems very likely, that at the period at which we have now arrived, the tide, which began to set strongly against the jacobins, might have been adroitly turned in favour of the Bourbons. But though there was a general feeling of melancholy regret, which naturally arose from comparing the peaceful days of the monarchy with those of the reign of Terror,—the rule of Louis the XVI. with that of Robespierre,—the memory of former quiet and security with the more recent recollections of blood and plunder,—still it seems to have existed rather in the state of a predisposition to form a royal party, than as the principle of one already existing. Fuel was lying ready to catch the flame of loyalty, but the match had not yet been applied; and to counteract this general tendency, there existed the most formidable obstacles.

In the first place, we have shown already the circumstances by which the French armies were strongly attached to the name of the Republic, in

whose cause all their wars had been waged, and all their glory won; by whose expeditions and energetic administration the military profession was benefited, while they neither saw nor felt the misery entailed on the nation at large. But the French soldier had not only fought in favour of democracy, but actively and directly against royalty. As *Vive la République* was his war-cry, he was in La Vendée, on the Rhine, and elsewhere, met, encountered, and sometimes defeated and driven back, by those who used the opposite signal-word, *Vive le roi*. The royalists were, indeed, the most formidable opponents of the military part of the French nation; and such was the animosity of the latter at this period to the idea of returning to the ancient system, that if a general could have been found capable of playing the part of Monk, he would probably have experienced the fate of La Fayette and Dumourier.

A second and almost insuperable objection to the restoration of the Bourbons occurred in the extensive change of property that had taken place. If the exiled family had been recalled, they could not, at this very recent period, but have made stipulations for their devoted followers, and insisted that the estates forfeited in their cause should have been compensated or restored; and such a resumption would have inferred ruin to all the purchasers of national demesnes, and, in consequence, a general shock to the security of property through the kingdom.

The same argument applied to the church lands. The Most Christian King could not resume his throne, without restoring the ecclesiastical establishment in part, if not in whole. It was impossible to calculate the mass of persons of property and wealth, with their various connexions, who, as possessors of national demesnes, that is, of the property of the church, or of the emigrants, were bound by their own interest to oppose the restoration of the Bourbon family. The revolutionary government had followed the coarse, but striking and deeply politic, admonition of the Scottish Reformer—"Pull down the nests," said Knox, when he urged the multitude to destroy churches and abbeys, "and the rooks will fly off." The French government, by dilapidating and disposing of the property of the emigrants and clergy, had established an almost insurmountable barrier against the return of the original owners. The cavaliers in the great Civil War of England had been indeed fined, sequestered, impoverished; but their estates were still, generally speaking, in their possession; and they retained, though under oppression and poverty, the influence of a national aristocracy, diminished, but not annihilated. In France, that influence of resident proprietors had all been transferred to other hands, tenacious in holding what property they had acquired, and determined to make good the defence of it against those who claimed a prior right.

Lastly, the fears and conscious recollections of those who held the chief power in France for the time, induced them to view their own safety as deeply compromised by any proposition of restoring the exiled royal family. This present sitting and ruling Convention had put to death Louis XVI.,—with what hope of safety could they instal his bro-

ther on the throne? They had formally, and in full conclave, renounced belief in the existence of a Deity—with what consistence could they be accessory to restore a national church? Some remained republicans from their heart and upon conviction; and a great many more of the deputies could not abjure democracy, without confessing, at the same time, that all the violent measures which they had carried through for the support of that system were so many great and treasonable crimes.

These fears of a retributive reaction were very generally felt in the Convention. The thermidoriens, in particular, who had killed Robespierre, and now reigned in his stead, had more substantial grounds of apprehension from any counter-revolutionary movement, than even the body of the representatives at large, many of whom had been merely passive in scenes where Barras and Tallien had been active agents. The timid party of the Plain might be overawed by the returning prince; and the members of the girondists, who could indeed scarce be said to exist as a party, might be safely despised. But the thermidoriens themselves stood in a different predicament. They were of importance enough to attract both detestation and jealousy; they held power, which must be an object of distrust to the restored monarch; and they stood on precarious ground, betwixt the hatred of the moderate party, who remembered them as colleagues of Robespierre and Danton, and that of the jacobins, who saw in Tallien and Barras deserters of that party, and the destroyers of the power of the sans-culottes. They had, therefore, just reason to fear, that, stripped of the power which they at present possessed, they might become the unpitied and unaided scapegoats, to expiate all the offences of the Revolution.

Thus each favourable sentiment towards the cause of the Bourbons was opposed, 1. By their unpopularity with the armies; 2. By the apprehensions of the confusion and distress which must arise from a general change of property; and, 3. By the conscious fears of those influential persons, who conceived their own safety concerned in sustaining the republican model.

Still the idea of monarchy was so generally received as the simplest and best mode of once more re-establishing good order and a fixed government, that some statesmen proposed to resume the form, but change the dynasty. With this view, divers persons were suggested by those, who supposed that by passing over the legitimate heir to the crown, the dangers annexed to his rights and claims might be avoided, and the apprehended measures of resumption and reaction might be guarded against. The son of the Duke of Orleans was named, but the infamy of his father clung to him. In another wild hypothesis, the Duke of York, or the Duke of Brunswick, were suggested as fit to be named constitutional kings of France. The Abbé Siéyès himself is said to have expressed himself in favour of the prince last named.*

* The Memoirs published under the name of Fouché make this assertion (See *Mémoires de Fouché, duc d'Ortrante*, vol. I, p. 71: 8vo, Paris, 1824). But although that work shows great intimacy with the secret history of the times, it is not to be implicitly relied upon.

But without regarding the wishes or opinions of the people without doors, the Convention resolved to establish such a model of government as should be most likely to infuse into a republic something of the stability of a monarchical establishment; and thus at once repair former errors, and preserve an appearance of consistency in the eyes of Europe.

For this purpose eleven commissioners, chiefly selected amongst the former girondists, were appointed to draw up a new constitution upon a new principle, which was to receive a new universal adhesion of the French by acclamation and oath, and to fall, in a short time, under the same neglect which had attended every preceding model. This, it was understood, was to be so constructed, as to unite the consistency of a monarchical government with the name and forms of a democracy.

That the system now adopted by the French commissioners might bear a form corresponding to the destinies of the nation, and flattering to its vanity, it was borrowed from that of the Roman republic, an attempt to imitate which had already introduced many of the blunders and many of the crimes of the Revolution. The executive power was lodged in a council of five persons, termed Directors, to whom were to be consigned the conduct of peace and war, the execution of the laws, and the general administration of the government. They were permitted no share of the legislative authority.

This arrangement was adopted to comply with the jealousy of those, who, in the individual person of a single Director, holding a situation similar to that of the Stadtholder in Holland, or the President of the United States, saw something too closely approaching to a monarchical government. Indeed, it is said, Louvet warned them against establishing such an office, by assuring them, that when they referred the choice of the individual who was to hold it, to the nation at large, they would see the Bourbon heir elected. But the inconvenience of this patriarch could not be disguised; and it seemed to follow as a necessary consequence of such a numerous executive council, either that there would be a schism, and a minority and majority established in that pre-eminent body of the state, where unity and vigour were chiefly requisite, or else that some one or two of the ablest and most crafty among the Directors would establish a supremacy over the others, and use them less as their colleagues than their dependents. The legislators, however, though they knew that the whole Roman empire was found insufficient to satiate the ambition of three men, yet appeared to hope that the concord and unanimity of their five Directors might continue unbroken, though they had but one nation to govern; and they decided accordingly.

The executive power being thus provided for, the legislative body was to consist of two councils; one of Elders, as it was called, serving as a House of Lords; another of Youngers, which they termed, from its number, the Council of Five Hundred. Both were elective, and the difference of age was the only circumstance which placed a distinction betwixt the two bodies. The members of the Council of Five Hundred were to be at least twenty-five years old, a qualification which, after the

seventh year of the Republic, was to rise to thirty years complete. In this assembly laws were to be first proposed, and, having received its approbation, they were to be referred to the Council of Ancients. The requisites to sit in the latter senate, were the age of forty years complete, and the being a married man or a widower. Bachelors, though above that age, were deemed unfit for legislation, perhaps from want of domestic experience.

The Council of Ancients had the power of rejecting the propositions laid before them by the Council of Five Hundred, or, by adopting and approving them, that of passing them into laws. These regulations certainly gained one great point, in submitting each proposed legislative enactment to two separate bodies, and, of course, to mature and deliberate consideration. It is true, that neither of the councils had any especial character, or separate interest, which could enable or induce the Ancients, as a body, to suggest to the Five Hundred a different principle of considering any proposed measure, from that which was likely to occur to them in their own previous deliberation. No such varied views, therefore, were to be expected, as must arise between assemblies composed of persons who differ in rank or fortune, and consequently view the same question in various and opposite lights. Still, delay and reconsideration were attained, before the irrevocable fiat was imposed upon any measure of consequence; and so far much was gained. An orator was supposed to answer all objections to the system of the two councils thus constituted, when he described that of the Juniors as being the imagination, that of the Ancients as being the judgment of the nation; the one designed to invent and suggest national measures, the other to deliberate and decide upon them. This was, though liable to many objections, an ingenious illustration indeed, but an illustration is not an argument, though often passing current as such.

On the whole, the form of the constitution of the year 3, *i. e.* 1795, showed a greater degree of practical efficacy, sense, and consistency, than any of those previously suggested; and in the introduction, though there was the usual proclamation of the Rights of Man, his duties to the laws and to the social system were for the first time enumerated in manly and forcible language, intimating the desire of the framers of these institutions to put a stop to the continuation of revolutionary violence in future.

But the constitution, now promulgated, had a blemish common to all its predecessors—it was totally new, and unsanctioned by the experience either of France or any other country; a mere experiment in politics, the result of which could not be known until it had been put in exercise, and which, for many years at least, must be necessarily less the object of respect than of criticism. Wise legislators, even when lapse of time, alteration of manners, or increased liberality of sentiment, require corresponding alterations in the institutions of their fathers, are careful, as far as possible, to preserve the ancient form and character of those laws, into which they are endeavouring to infuse prin-

ciples and a spirit accommodated to the altered exigencies and temper of the age. There is an enthusiasm in patriotism as well as in religion. We value institutions, not only because they are ours, but because they have been those of our fathers; and if a new constitution were to be presented to us, although perhaps theoretically showing more symmetry than that by which the nation had been long governed, it would be as difficult to transfer to it the allegiance of the people, as it would be to substitute the worship of a Madonna, the work of modern art, for the devotion paid by the natives of Zaragossa to their ancient Palladium, Our Lady of the Pillar.

But the constitution of the year 3, with all its defects, would have been willingly received by the nation in general, as affording some security from the revolutionary storm, had it not been for a selfish and usurping device of the thermidoriens to mutilate and render it nugatory at the very outset, by engraving upon it the means of continuing the exercise of their own arbitrary authority. It must never be forgotten, that these conquerors of Robespierre had shared all the excesses of his party before they became his personal enemies; and that when deprived of their official situations and influence, which they were likely to be by a representative body freely and fairly elected, they were certain to be exposed to great individual danger.

Determined, therefore, to retain the power in their own hands, the thermidoriens suffered with an indifference amounting almost to contempt, the constitution to pass through, and be approved of by, the Convention. But, under pretence that it would be highly impolitic to deprive the nation of the services of men accustomed to public business, they procured two decrees to be passed; the first ordaining the electoral bodies of France to chuse, as representatives to the two councils under the new constitution, at least two-thirds of the members presently sitting in convention; and the second declaring, that in default of a return of two-thirds of the present deputies, as prescribed, the Convention themselves should fill up the vacancies out of their own body; in other words, should name a large proportion of themselves their own successors in legislative power.

These decrees were sent down to the Primary Assemblies of the people, and every art was used to render them acceptable.

But the nation, and particularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this stretch of arbitrary authority. They recollected, that all the members who had sat in the first National Assembly, so remarkable for talent, had been declared ineligible, on that single account, for the second legislative body; and now, men so infinitely the inferiors of those who were the colleagues of Mirabeau, Mounier, and other great names, presumed not only to declare themselves eligible by re-election, but dared to establish two-thirds of their number as indispensable ingredients of the legislative assemblies, which, according to the words alike and spirit of the constitution, ought to be chosen by the free voice of the people. The electors, and particularly those of the sections of Paris, angrily demanded to know, upon what public services the deputies of the Convention

founded their title to a privilege so unjust and anomalous. Among the more active part of them, to whom the measure was chiefly to be ascribed, they saw but a few reformed terrorists, who wished to retain the power of tyranny, though disposed to exercise it with some degree of moderation, and the loss of whose places might be possibly followed by that of their heads; in the others, they only beheld a flock of timid and discountenanced helots, willing to purchase personal security at the sacrifice of personal honour and duty to the public; while in the Convention as a body, who pronounced so large a proportion of their number as indispensable to the service of the state, judging from their conduct hitherto, they could but discover an image composed partly of iron, partly of clay, deluged with the blood of many thousand victims—a pageant without a will of its own, and which had been capable of giving its countenance to the worst of actions, at the instigation of the worst of men—a sort of Moloch, whose name had been used by its priests to compel the most barbarous sacrifices. To sum up the whole, these experienced men of public business, without whose intermediation it was pretended the national affairs could not be carried on, could only shelter themselves from the charge of unbounded wickedness, by pleading their unlimited cowardice, and by poorly alleging that for two years they had sat, voted, and deliberated, under a system of compulsion and terror. So much meanness rendered those who were degraded by it unfit, not merely to rule, but to live; and yet two-thirds of their number were, according to their own decrees, to be intruded on the nation as an indispensable portion of its representatives.

Such was the language held in the assemblies of the sections of Paris, who were the more irritated against the domineering and engrossing spirit exhibited in these usurping enactments, because it was impossible to forget that it was their interference, and the protection afforded by the National Guard, which had saved the Convention from massacre on more occasions than one.

In the meanwhile, reports continued to be made from the Primary Assemblies, of their adhesion to the constitution, in which they were almost unanimous, and of their sentiments concerning the two decrees, authorising and commanding the re-election of two-thirds of the Convention, on which there existed a strong difference of opinion. The Convention, determined, at all rates, to carry through with a high hand the iniquitous and arbitrary measure which they proposed, failed not to make these reports such as they desired them to be, and announced that the two decrees had been accepted by a majority of the Primary Assemblies. The citizens of Paris challenged the accuracy of the returns—alleged that the reports were falsified—demanded a scrutiny, and openly bid defiance to the Convention. Their power of meeting together in their sections, on account of the appeal to the people, gave them an opportunity of feeling their own strength, and encouraging each other by speeches and applauses. They were farther emboldened and animated by men of literary talent, whose power was restored with the liberty of the press. Finally, they declared

their sittings permanent, and that they had the right to protect the liberties of France. The greater part of the National Guards were united on this occasion against the existing government; and nothing less was talked of, than that they should avail themselves of their arms and numbers, march down to the Tuileries, and dictate law to the Convention with their muskets, as the revolutionary mob of the suburbs used to do with their pikes.

The Convention, unpopular themselves, and embarked in an unpopular cause, began to look anxiously around for assistance. They chiefly relied on the aid of about five thousand regular troops, who were assembled in and around Paris. These declared for government with the greater readiness, that the insurrection was of a character decidedly aristocratical, and that the French armies, as already repeatedly noticed, were attached to the Republic. But besides, these professional troops entertained the usual degree of contempt for the National Guards, and on this account alone were quite ready to correct the insolence of the *pekings*,* or *muscadins*,† who usurped the dress and character of soldiers. The Convention had also the assistance of several hundred artillerymen, who, since the taking of the Bastille, had been always zealous democrats. Still, apprehensive of the result, they added to this force another of a more ominous description. It was a body of volunteers, consisting of about fifteen hundred men, whom they chose to denominate the Sacred Band, or the Patriots of 1789. They were gleaned out of the suburbs, and from the jails, the remnants of the insurrectional battalions which had formed the body-guard of Hébert and Robespierre, and had been the instruments by which they executed their atrocities. The Convention proclaimed them men of the 10th of August—undoubtedly they were also men of the massacres of September. It was conceived that the beholding such a pack of blood-hounds ready to be let loose might inspire horror into the citizens of Paris, to whom their very aspect brought so many fearful recollections. It did so, but it also inspired hatred; and the number and zeal of the citizens, compensating for the fury of the terrorists, and for the superior discipline of the regular troops to be employed against them, promised an arduous and doubtful conflict.

Much, it was obvious, must depend upon the courage and conduct of the leaders.

The sections employed, as their commander-in-chief, General Danican, an old officer of no high reputation for military skill, but otherwise a worthy and sincere man. The Convention at first made choice of Menou, and directed him, supported by a strong military force, to march into the section Lepeletier, and disarm the National Guards of that district. This section is one of the most wealthy, and, of course, most aristocratic in Paris, being inhabited by bankers, merchants, the wealthiest class of tradesmen, and the better orders in general. Its inhabitants had formerly composed the battalion of

National Guards des Filles St-Thomas, the only one which, taking part in the defence of the Tuileries, shared the fate of the Swiss Guards upon the memorable 10th of August. The section continued to entertain sentiments of the same character; and when Menou appeared at the head of his forces, accompanied by La Porte, a member of the Convention, he found the citizens under arms, and exhibiting such a show of resistance as induced him, after a parley, to retreat, without venturing an attack upon them.

Menou's indecision showed that he was not a man suited to the times, and he was suspended from his command by the Convention, and placed under arrest. The general management of affairs, and the direction of the conventional forces, was then committed to Barras; but the utmost anxiety prevailed among the members of the committees by whom government was administered, to find a general of nerve and decision enough to act under Barras in the actual command of the military force, in a service so delicate and times so menacing. It was then that a few words from Barras, addressed to his colleagues, Carnot and Tallien, decided the fate of Europe for well nigh twenty years. "I have the man," he said, "whom you want—a little Corsican officer, who will not stand upon ceremony."

The acquaintance of Barras and Bonaparte had been, as we have already said, formed at the siege of Toulon, and the former had not forgotten the inventive and decisive genius of the young officer to whom the conquest of that city was to be ascribed. On the recommendation of Barras, Bonaparte was sent for. He had witnessed the retreat of Menou, and explained, with much simplicity, the causes of that check, and the modes of resistance which ought to be adopted in case of the apprehended attack. His explanations gave satisfaction. Bonaparte was placed at the head of the conventional forces, and took all the necessary precautions to defend the same palace which he had seen attacked and carried by a body of insurgents on the 10th of August. But he possessed far more formidable means of defence than were in the power of the unfortunate Louis. He had two hundred pieces of cannon, which his high military skill enabled him to distribute to the utmost advantage. He had more than five thousand regular forces, and about fifteen hundred volunteers. He was thus enabled to defend the whole circuit of the Tuileries—to establish posts in all the avenues by which it could be approached—to possess himself of the bridges, so as to prevent co-operation between the sections which lay on the opposite banks of the river—and finally, to establish a strong reserve in the Place Louis Quinze, or, as it was then called, Place de la Révolution. Bonaparte had only a few hours to make all these arrangements, for he was named in place of Menou late on the night before the conflict.

A merely civic army, having no cannon (for the field-pieces, of which each section possessed two, had been almost all given up to the Convention after the disarming the suburb of St-Antoine), ought to have respected so strong a position as the Tuileries when so formidably defended. Their policy should have been, as in the days of Henry III., to have

* *Pekins*, a word of contempt, by which the soldiers distinguished those who did not belong to their profession.

† *Muscadins*, tops—a phrase applied to the better class by sans-culottes.

barricaded the streets at every point, and cooped up the conventional troops within the defensive position they had assumed, till want of provisions obliged them to sally at disadvantage, or to surrender. But a popular force is generally impatient of delay. The retreat of Menou had given them spirit, and they apprehended, with some show of reason, that the sections, if they did not unite their forces, might be attacked and disarmed separately. They therefore resolved to invest the Convention in a hostile manner, require of the members to recal the obnoxious decrees, and allow the nation to make a free and undictated election of its representatives.

On the 13th Vendémiaire, corresponding to the 4th October, the civil affray, commonly called the Day of the Sections, took place. The National Guards assembled, to the number of thirty thousand men and upwards, but having no artillery. They advanced by different avenues, in close columns, but everywhere found the most formidable resistance. One large force occupied the quays on the left bank of the Seine, threatening the palace from that side of the river. Another strong division advanced on the Tuileries, through the street of St-Honoré, designing to debouche on the palace, where the Convention was sitting, by the Rue de l'Echelle. They did so, without duly reflecting that they were flanked on most points by strong posts in the lanes and crossings, defended by artillery.

The contest began in the Rue St-Honoré. Bonaparte had established a strong post with two guns at the Cul-de-Sac Dauphin, opposite to the Church of St-Roch. He permitted the imprudent Parisians to involve their long and dense columns in the narrow street without interruption, until they established a body of grenadiers in the front of the church, and opposite to the position at the Cul-de-Sac. Each party, as usual, throws on the other the blame of commencing the civil contest for which both were prepared. But all agree the firing commenced with musketry. It was instantly followed by discharges of grape-shot and cannister, which, pointed as the guns were, upon thick columns of the National Guards, arranged on the quays and in the narrow streets, made an astounding carnage. The National Guards offered a brave resistance, and even attempted to rush on the artillery, and carry the guns by main force. But a measure which is desperate enough in the open field, becomes impossible when the road to assault lies through narrow streets, which are swept by the cannon at every discharge. The citizens were compelled to give way. By a more judicious arrangement of their respective forces different results might have been hoped; but how could Danican in any circumstances have competed with Bonaparte? The affair, in which several hundred men were killed and wounded, was terminated as a general action in about an hour; and the victorious troops of the Convention, marching into the different sections, completed the dispersion and disarming of their opponents, an operation which lasted till late at night.

The Convention used this victory with the moderation which recollection of the reign of Terror had inspired. Only two persons suffered death for the Day of the Sections. One of them, Lafond, had

been a Garde du Corps, was distinguished for his intrepidity, and repeatedly rallied the National Guard under the storm of grape-shot. Several other persons having fled, were in their absence capitally condemned, but were not strictly looked after; and deportation was the punishment inflicted upon others. The accused were indebted for this clemency chiefly to the interference of those members of Convention, who, themselves exiled on the 31st May, had suffered persecution, and learned mercy.

The Convention showed themselves at the same time liberal to their protectors. General Berruyer, who commanded the volunteers of 1789, and other general officers employed on the Day of the Sections, were loaded with praises and preferment. But a separate triumph was destined to Bonaparte, as the hero of the day. Five days after the battle, Barras solicited the attention of the Convention to the young officer, by whose prompt and skilful dispositions the Tuileries had been protected on the 13th Vendémiaire, and proposed that they should approve of General Bonaparte's appointment as second in command of the Army of the Interior, Barras himself still remaining commander-in-chief. The proposal was adopted by acclamation. The Convention retained their resentment against Menou, whom they suspected of treachery; but Bonaparte interfering as a mediator, they were content to look over his offence.

After this decided triumph over their opponents, the Convention ostensibly laid down their authority, and retiring from the scene in their present character, appeared upon it a-new in that of a Primary Assembly, in order to make choice of such of their members as, by virtue of the decrees of two-thirds, as they were called, were to remain on the stage, as members of the Legislative Councils of Elders and Five Hundred.

After this change of names and dresses, resembling the shifts of a strolling company of players, the two-thirds of the old Convention, with one-third of members newly elected, took upon them the administration of the new constitution. The two re-elected thirds formed a large proportion of the councils, and were, in some respects, much like those unfortunate women, who, gathered from jails and from the streets of the metropolis, have been sometimes sent out to foreign settlements; and, however profligate their former lives may have been, often regain character, and become tolerable members of society, in a change of scene and situation.

The Directory consisted of Barras, Siéyes, Rewbel, Letourneur de la Manche, and Réveillère Lépiaux, to the exclusion of Tallien, who was deeply offended. Four of these Directors were reformed jacobins, or thermidorians; the fifth, Réveillère Lépiaux, was esteemed a girondist. Siéyes, whose taste was rather for speculating in politics than acting in them, declined what he considered a hazardous office, and was replaced by Carnot.

The nature of the insurrection of the sections was not ostensibly royalist, but several of its leaders were of that party in secret, and, if successful, it would most certainly have assumed that complexion. Thus, the first step of Napoleon's rise commenced

by the destruction of the hopes of the house of Bourbon, under the reviving influence of which, twenty years afterwards, he himself was obliged to succumb. But the long path which closed so darkly was now opening upon him in light and joy. Bonaparte's high services, and the rank which he had obtained, rendered him now a young man of the first hope and expectation, mingling on terms of consideration among the rulers of the state, instead of being regarded as a neglected stranger, supporting himself with difficulty, and haunting public offices and bureaux in vain, to obtain some chance of preferment, or even employment.

From second in command, the new general soon became General-in-chief of the Army of the Interior, Barras having found his duties as a Director were incompatible with those of military command. He employed his genius, equally prompt and profound, in improving the state of the military forces; and, in order to prevent the recurrence of such insurrections as that of the 13th Vendémiaire, or Day of the Sections, and as the many others by which it was preceded, he appointed and organized a guard for the protection of the representative body.

As the dearth of bread, and other causes of disaffection, continued to produce commotions in Paris, the General of the Interior was sometimes obliged to oppose them with the military force. On one occasion, it is said, that when Bonaparte was anxiously admonishing the multitude to disperse, a very bulky woman exhorted them to keep their ground. "Never mind these coxcombs with the epaulets," she said; "they do not care if we are all starved, so they themselves feed and get fat."—"Look at me, good woman," said Bonaparte, who was then as thin as a shadow, "and tell me which is the fatter of us two." This turned the laugh against the Amazon, and the rabble dispersed in good humour. If not among the most distinguished of Napoleon's victories, this is certainly worthy of record, as achieved at the least cost.

Meantime circumstances, which we will relate according to his own statement, introduced Bonaparte to an acquaintance, which was destined to have much influence on his future fate. A fine boy, of ten or twelve years old, presented himself at the levee of the General of the Interior, with a request of a nature unusually interesting. He stated his name to be Eugène Beauharnais, son of the cîdevant Count de Beauharnais, who, adhering to the revolutionary party, had been a general in the republican service upon the Rhine, and falling under the causeless suspicion of the Committee of Public Safety, was delivered to the Revolutionary Tribunal, and fell by its sentence just four days before the overthrow of Robespierre. Eugène was come to request of Bonaparte, as General of the Interior, that his father's sword might be restored to him. The prayer of the young supplicant was as interesting as his manners were engaging, and Napoleon felt so much interest in him, that he was induced to cultivate the acquaintance of Eugène's mother, afterwards the Empress Joséphine.

This lady was a creolian, the daughter of a planter in Martinique. Her name at full length was Marie Joseph Rose Tascher de la Pagerie. She had suf-

fered her share of revolutionary miseries. After her husband, General Beauharnais, had been deprived of his command, she was arrested as a suspected person, and detained in prison till the general liberation, which succeeded the revolution of 9th Thermidor. While in confinement, Madame Beauharnais had formed an intimacy with a companion in distress, Madame Fontenai, now Madame Tallien, from which she derived great advantages after her friend's marriage. With a remarkably graceful person, amiable manners, and an inexhaustible fund of good-humour, Madame Beauharnais was formed to be an ornament to society. Barras, the thermidorien hero, himself an ex-noble, was fond of society, desirous of enjoying it on an agreeable scale, and of washing away the dregs which jacobinism had mingled with all the dearest interests of life. He loved slow, too, and pleasure, and might now indulge both without the risk of falling under the suspicion of incivism, which, in the reign of Terror, would have been incurred by any attempt to intermingle elegance with the enjoyments of social intercourse. At the apartments which he occupied, as one of the Directory, in the Luxembourg Palace, he gave its free course to his natural taste, and assembled an agreeable society of both sexes. Madame Tallien and her friend formed the soul of these assemblies, and it was supposed that Barras was not insensible to the charms of Madame Beauharnais,—a rumour which was likely to arise, whether with or without foundation.

When Madame Beauharnais and General Bonaparte became intimate, the latter assures us, and we see no reason to doubt him, that although the lady was two or three years older than himself,* yet being still in the full bloom of beauty, and extremely agreeable in her manners, he was induced, solely by her personal charms, to make her an offer of his hand, heart, and fortunes,—little supposing, of course, to what a pitch the latter were to arise.

Although he himself is said to have been a fatalist, believing in destiny and in the influence of his star, he knew nothing, probably, of the prediction of a negro sorceress, who, while Marie Joséphine was but a child, prophesied she should rise to a dignity greater than that of a queen, yet fall from it before her death.† This was one of those vague auguries, delivered at random by fools or impostors, which the caprice of fortune sometimes matches with a corresponding and conforming event. But without trusting to the African sibyl's prediction, Bonaparte may have formed his match under the

* Bonaparte was then in his twenty-sixth year. Joséphine gave herself in the marriage contract for twenty-eight.

† A lady of high rank, who happened to live for some time in the same convent at Paris, where Joséphine was also a pensioner or boarder, heard her mention the prophecy, and told it herself to the author, just about the time of the Italian expedition, when Bonaparte was beginning to attract notice. Another clause is usually added to the prediction—that the party whom it concerned should die in an hospital, which was afterwards explained as referring to Malmaison. This the author did not hear from the same authority. The lady mentioned used to speak in the highest terms of the simple manners and great kindness of Madame Beauharnais.

auspices of ambition as well as love. The marrying Madame Beauharnais was a mean of uniting his fortune with those of Barras and Tallien, the first of whom governed France as one of the Directors; and the last, from talents and political connexions, had scarcely inferior influence. He had already deserved well of them for his conduct on the Day of the Sections, but he required their countenance to rise still higher; and without derogating from the bride's merits, we may suppose her influence in their society corresponded with the views of her lover. It is, however, certain, that he always regarded her with peculiar affection; that he relied on her fate, which he considered as linked with and strengthening his own; and reposed, besides, considerable confidence in Joséphine's tact and address in political business. She had at all times the art of mitigating his temper, and turning aside the hasty determinations of his angry moments, not by directly opposing, but by gradually parrying and disarming them. It must be added to her great praise, that she was always a willing, and often a successful advocate, in the cause of humanity.

They were married 9th March, 1796; and the dowry of the bride was the chief command of the Italian armies, a scene which opened a full career to the ambition of the youthful general. Bonaparte remained with his wife only three days after his marriage, hastened to see his family, who were still at Marseilles, and, having enjoyed the pleasure of exhibiting himself as a favourite of Fortune in the city which he had lately left in the capacity of an indigent adventurer, proceeded rapidly to commence the career to which Fate called him, by placing himself at the head of the Italian army.

CHAPTER XXI.

The Alps.—Feelings and views of Bonaparte on being appointed to the command of the Army of Italy.—General account of his new principles of warfare.—Mountainous countries peculiarly favourable to them.—Retrospect of military proceedings since October, 1795.—Hostility of the French government to the pope.—Massacre of the French envoy Basseville, at Rome.—Austrian army under Beaulieu.—Napoleon's plan for entering Italy.—Battle of Monte Notte, and Bonaparte's first victory.—Again defeats the Austrians at Millesimo—and again under Colli.—Takes possession of Cherasco.—King of Sardinia requests an armistice, which leads to a peace, concluded on very severe terms.—Close of the Piedmontese campaign.—Napoleon's character at this period.

NAPOLEON has himself observed, that no country in the world is more distinctly marked out by its natural boundaries than Italy. The Alps seem a barrier erected by Nature herself, on which she has inscribed, in gigantic characters, "Here let Ambition be staid." Yet this tremendous circumvallation of mountains, as it could not prevent the ancient Romans from breaking out to desolate the world, so it has been in like manner found, ever since the days of Hannibal, unequal to protect Italy herself from invasion. The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorise them to claim all

which lay on the western side of these mountains, as naturally pertaining to their dominions; but they never deigned to respect them as such, when the question respected their invading on their own part the territories of other states, which lay on or beyond the formidable frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unchallengeable rule when it made in favour of France, but never allowed it to be quoted against her interest.

During the Revolutionary War, the general fortune of battle had varied from time to time in the neighbourhood of these mighty boundaries. The King of Sardinia possessed almost all the fortresses which command the passes on these mountains, and had therefore been said to wear the keys of the Alps at his girdle. He had indeed lost his Dukedom of Savoy, and the County of Nice, in the last campaign; but he still maintained in opposition to the French a very considerable army, and was supported by his powerful ally the Emperor of Austria, always vigilant regarding that rich and beautiful portion of his dominions which lies in the north of Italy. The frontiers of Piedmont were therefore covered by a strong Austro-Sardinian army, opposed to the French armies to which Napoleon had been just named commander-in-chief. A strong Neapolitan force was also to be added, so that in general numbers their opponents were much superior to the French; but a great part of this force was cooped up in garrisons which could not be abandoned.

It may be imagined with what delight the general, scarce aged twenty-six, advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest, confident in his own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the country which he had acquired, when, by his scientific plans of the campaign, he had enabled General Dumerbion to drive the Austrians back, and obtain possession of the Col di Tende, Saorgio, and the gorges of the higher Alps. Bonaparte's achievements had hitherto been under the auspices of others. He made the dispositions before Toulon, but it was Dugommier who had the credit of taking the place. Dumerbion, as we have just said, obtained the merit of the advantages in Piedmont. Even in the civil turmoil of 13th Vendémiaire, his actual services had been overshadowed by the official dignity of Barras, as commander-in-chief. But if he reaped honour in Italy, the success would be exclusively his own; and that proud heart must have throbbed to meet danger upon such terms, that keen spirit have toiled to discover the means of success.

For victory, he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale. It may not be unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the principles which he now called into action.

Nations in the savage state, being constantly engaged in war, always form for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the country they inhabit, and to the mode in which they are armed. The North-American Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharp-shooter, lays ambuscades in his pathless forests, and practises all the arts of irregular war. The Arab, or Scythian, manoeuvres his clouds of cavalry, so as to envelope and de-

stroy his enemy in his deserts by sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpected rallies; desolating the country around, cutting off his antagonist's supplies, and practising, in short, the species of war proper to a people superior in light cavalry.

The first stage of civilization is less favourable to success in war. As a nation advances in the peaceful arts, and the character of the soldier begins to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this system of natural tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign invasion, or civil broils, call the inhabitants to arms, they have no idea save that of fluding out the enemy, rushing upon him, and committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers. An example may be seen in the great Civil War of England, where men fought on both sides, in almost every county of the kingdom, without any combination, or exact idea of uniting in mutual support, or manœuvring so as to form their isolated bands into an army of preponderating force. At least, what was attempted for that purpose must have been on the rudest plan possible, where, even in actual fight, that part of an army which obtained any advantage pursued it as far as they could, instead of using their success for the support of their companions; so that the main body was often defeated, when a victorious wing was in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken.

But as war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study, it is gradually discovered, that the principles of tactics depend upon mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides. No man ever possessed in a greater degree than Bonaparte, the power of calculation and combination necessary for directing such decisive manœuvres. It constituted indeed his secret—as it was for some time called—and that secret consisted in an imagination fertile in expedients which would never have occurred to others; clearness and precision in forming his plans; a mode of directing with certainty the separate moving columns which were to execute them, by arranging so that each division should arrive on the destined position at the exact time when their service was necessary; and, above all, in the knowledge which enabled such a master-spirit to elude the most fitting subordinate implements, to attach them to his person, and, by explaining to them so much of his plan as it was necessary each should execute, to secure the exertion of their utmost ability in carrying it into effect.

Thus, not only were his manœuvres, however daring, executed with a precision which warlike operations had not attained before his time; but they were also performed with a celerity which gave them almost always the effect of surprise. Napoleon was like lightning in the eyes of his enemies; and when repeated experience had taught them to expect this portentous rapidity of movement, it sometimes induced his opponents to wait, in a dubious and hesitating posture, for attacks, which, with less apprehension of their antagonist, they would have

thought it more prudent to frustrate and to anticipate.

Great sacrifices were necessary to enable the French troops to move with that degree of celerity which Bonaparte's combinations required. He made no allowance for impediments or unexpected obstacles; the time which he had calculated for execution of manœuvres prescribed, was on no account to be exceeded—every sacrifice was to be made of baggage, stragglers, even artillery, rather than the column should arrive too late at the point of its destination. Hence, all that had hitherto been considered as essential not only to the health, but to the very existence of an army, was in a great measure dispensed with in the French service; and, for the first time, troops were seen to take the field without tents, without camp-equipage, without magazines of provisions, without military hospitals;—the soldiers eating as they could, sleeping where they could, dying where they could; but still advancing, still combating, and still victorious.

It is true, that the abandonment of every object, save success in the field, augmented frightfully all the usual horrors of war. The soldier with arms in his hands, and wanting bread, became a marauder in self-defence; and in supplying his wants by rapine, did mischief to the inhabitants in a degree infinitely beyond the benefit he himself received; for it may be said of military requisition, as truly as of despotism, that it resembles the proceedings of a savage, who cuts down a tree to come at the fruit. Still, though purchased at a high rate, that advantage was gained by this rapid system of tactics, which in a slower progress, during which the soldier was regularly maintained, and kept under the restraint of discipline, might have been rendered doubtful. It wasted the army through disease, fatigue, and all the consequences of want and toil; but still the victory was attained, and that was enough to make the survivors forget their hardships, and to draw forth new recruits to replace the fallen. Patient of labours, light of heart and temper, and elated by success beyond all painful recollections, the French soldiers were the very men calculated to execute this desperate species of service under a chief, who, their sagacity soon discovered, was sure to lead to victory all those who could sustain the hardships by which it was to be won.

The character of the mountainous countries, among which he was for the first time to exercise his system, was highly favourable to Bonaparte's views. Presenting many lines and defensible positions, it induced the Austrian generals to become stationary, and occupy a considerable extent of ground, according to their old system of tactics. But though abounding in such positions as might at first sight seem absolutely impregnable, and were too often trusted to as such, the mountains also exhibited to the sagacious eye of a great captain, gorges, defiles, and difficult and unsuspected points of access, by which he could turn the positions that appeared in front so formidable; and, by threatening them on the flank and on the rear, compel the enemy to a battle at disadvantage, or to a retreat with loss.

The forces which Bonaparte had under his com-

mand, were between fifty and sixty thousand good troops, having, many of them, been brought from the Spanish campaign, in consequence of the peace with that country; but very indifferently provided with clothing, and suffering from the hardships they had endured in those mountainous, barren, and cold regions. The cavalry, in particular, were in very poor order; but the nature of their new field of action not admitting of their being much employed, rendered this of less consequence. The misery of the French army, until these Alpine campaigns were victoriously closed by the armistice of Cherasco, could, according to Bonaparte's authority,* scarce bear description. The officers for several years had received no more than eight livres a month (twenty-pence sterling a-week) in name of pay, and staff-officers had not amongst them a single horse. Berthier preserved, as a curiosity, an order, dated on the day of the victory of Albenga, which munificently conferred a gratuity of three louis-d'or upon every general of division.† Among the generals to whom this donation was rendered acceptable by their wants, were, or might have been, many whose names became afterwards the praise and dread of war. Augereau, Masséna, Serrurier, Jonbert, Lannes, and Morat, all generals of the first consideration, served under Bonaparte in the Italian campaign.

The position of the French army had repeatedly varied since October, 1795, after the skirmish at Cairo. At that time the extreme left of the line, which extended from south to north, rested upon the Col d'Argentine, and communicated with the higher Alps—the centre was on the Col di Tende and Mont Bertrand—the left occupied the heights of Saint Bertrand, Saint Jacques, and other ridges running in the same direction, which terminated on the Mediterranean shore, near Finale.

The Austrians, strongly reinforced, attacked this line, and carried the heights of Mont Saint Jacques: and Kellermann, after a vain attempt to regain that point of his position, retreated to the line of defence more westward, which rests on Borghetto. Kellermann, an active and good brigade officer, but without sufficient talent to act as commander-in-chief, was superseded, and Schérer was placed in command of the Army of Italy. He risked a battle with the Austrians near Loano, in which the talents of Masséna and Augereau were conspicuous; and by the victory which ensued, the French regained the line of Saint Jacques and Finale, which Kellermann had been forced to abandon; so that, in a general point of view, the relative position of the two opposed armies was not very different from that in which they had been left by Bonaparte.

But though Schérer had been thus far victorious,

* *Mémoires écrits à Ste-Hélène, sous la dictée de l'Empereur, par le Général Comte de Montholon, vol. III. p. 102, 5 vols 8vo, Paris, 1823.*

† This piece of generosity reminds us of the liberality of the Kings of Brenford to their Knightsbridge forces—

First King. Here, take five guineas to these warlike men.

Second King. And here, five more, which makes the sum just ten.

Herald. We have not seen so much the Lord knows when!

he was not the person to whom the Directory desired to intrust the daring plan of assuming the offensive on a grand scale upon the Alpine frontier, and, by carrying their arms into Italy, compelling the Austrians to defend themselves in that quarter, and to diminish the gigantic efforts which that power had hitherto continued with varied success, but unabated vigour, upon the Rhine. The rulers of France had a farther object in this bold scheme. They desired to intimidate, or annihilate and dethrone the pope. He was odious to them as head of the church, because the attachment of the French clergy to the Roman See, and the points of conscience which rested upon that dependence, had occasioned the recusancy of the priests, especially of those who were most esteemed by the people, to take the constitutional oath. To the pope, and his claims of supremacy, were therefore laid the charge of the great civil war in La Vendée, and the general disaffection of the catholics in the south of France.

But this was not the only cause of the animosity entertained by the Directory against the head of the catholic church. They had three years before sustained an actual injury from the see of Rome, which was yet unavenged. The people of Rome were extremely provoked that the French residing there, and particularly the young artists, had displayed the three-coloured cockade, and were proposing to exhibit the scutcheon containing the emblems of the Republic over the door of the French consul. The pope, through his minister, had intimated his desire that this should not be attempted, as he had not acknowledged the Republic as a legitimate government. The French, however, pursued their purpose; and the consequence was, that a popular commotion arose, which the papal troops did not greatly exert themselves to suppress. The carriage of the French envoy, or chargé-d'affaires, named Basseville, was attacked in the streets, and chased home; his house was broken into by the mob, and he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. The French government considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and were the more desirous of avenging it, that by doing so they would approach nearer to the dignified conduct of the Roman republic, which, in good or evil, seems always to have been their model. The affair happened in 1793, but was not forgotten in 1796.

The original idea entertained by the French government for prosecuting their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with an army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome, and exacting from the pontiff complete atonement for the murder of Basseville. But as the English fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a matter of very doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita Vecchia by sea, not to mention the chance that, even if safely landed, they would have found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from supplies and succours, assaulted on all hands, and most probably blockaded by the British fleet. Bonaparte, who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, in order that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised; and this scheme, though in appear-

ance scarce a less bold measure, was a much safer one than the Directory had at first inclined to, since Bonaparte would only approach Rome in the event of his being able to preserve his communications with Lombardy and Tuscany, which he must conquer in the first place.

The plan of crossing the Alps and marching into Italy, suited in every respect the ambitious and self-confident character of the general to whom it was now intrusted. It gave him a separate and independent authority, and the power of acting on his own judgment and responsibility; for his countryman Salicetti, the deputy who accompanied him as commissioner of the government, was not probably much disposed to intrude his opinions. He had been Bonaparte's patron, and was still his friend. The young general's mind was made up to the alternative of conquest or ruin, as may be judged from his words to a friend at taking leave of him. "In three months," he said, "I will be either at Milan or at Paris," intimating at once his desperate resolution to succeed, and his sense that the disappointment of all his prospects must be the consequence of a failure.

With the same view of animating his followers to ambitious hopes, he addressed the Army of Italy to the following purpose:—"Soldiers, you are hungry and naked—The Republic owes you much, but she has not the means to acquit herself of her debts. The patience with which you support your hardships among these barren rocks is admirable, but it cannot procure you glory. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds—Rich provinces, opulent towns, honour, glory, wealth, all shall be at your disposal—Soldiers, with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy?" This was showing the deer to the bound when the leash is about to be slipped.

The Austro-Sardinian army, to which Bonaparte was opposed, was commanded by Beaulieu, an Austrian general of great experience and some talent, but no less than seventy-five years old; accustomed all his life to the ancient rules of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate, or frustrate, those plans, formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon.

Bonaparte's plan for entering Italy differed from that of former conquerors and invaders, who had approached that fine country by penetrating or surmounting at some point or other her Alpine barriers. This inventive warrior resolved to attain the same object, by turning round the southern extremity of the Alpine range, keeping as close as possible to the shores of the Mediterranean, and passing through the Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Bocchetta, leading around the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he proposed to penetrate into Italy by the lowest level which the surface of the country presented, which must be of course where the range of the Alps unites with that of the Apennines. The point of junction where these two immense ranges of mountains touch upon each other is at the heights of Mont Saint Jacques, above Genoa, where the Alps, running north-westward, ascend to Mont Blanc, their highest peak, and the Apennines, run-

ning to the south-east, gradually elevate themselves to Monte Velino, the tallest mountain of the range.

To attain his object of turning the Alps in the manner proposed, it was necessary that Bonaparte should totally change the situation of his army; those occupying a defensive line, running north and south, being to assume an offensive position, extending east and west. Speaking of an army as of a battalion, he was to form into column upon the right of the line which he had hitherto occupied. This was an extremely delicate operation, to be undertaken in presence of an active enemy, his superior in numbers; nor was he permitted to execute it uninterrupted.

No sooner did Beaulieu learn that the French general was concentrating his forces, and about to change his position, than he hastened to preserve Genoa, without possession of which, or at least of the adjacent territory, Bonaparte's scheme of advance could scarce have been accomplished. The Austrian divided his army into three bodies. Colli, at the head of a Sardinian division, he stationed on the extreme right at Ceva; his centre division, under d'Argenteau, having its head at Sassiello, had directions to march on a mountain called Monte Notte, with two villages of the same name, near to which was a strong position at a place called Montelegrino, which the French had occupied in order to cover their flank during their march towards the east. At the head of his left wing, Beaulieu himself moved from Novi upon Voltri, a small town within ten miles of Genoa, for the protection of that ancient city, whose independence and neutrality were like to be held in little reverence. Thus it appears, that while the French were endeavouring to penetrate into Italy by an advance from Sardinia by the way of Genoa, their line of march was threatened by three armies of Austro-Sardinians, descending from the skirts of the Alps, and menacing to attack their flank. But, though a skilful disposition, Beaulieu's had, from the very mountainous character of the country, the great disadvantage of wanting connexion between the three separate divisions; neither, if needful, could they be easily united on any point desired, while the lower line, on which the French moved, permitted constant communication and co-operation.

On the 10th of April, 1796, d'Argenteau, with the central division of the Austro-Sardinian army, descended upon Monte Notte, while Beaulieu on the left attacked the van of the French army, which had come as far as Voltri. General Cervoni, commanding the French division which sustained the attack of Beaulieu, was compelled to fall back on the main body of his countrymen; and had the assault of d'Argenteau been equally animated, or equally successful, the fame of Bonaparte might have been stifled in the birth. But Colonel Rampon, a French officer, who commanded the redoubts near Montelegrino, stopped the progress of d'Argenteau by the most determined resistance. At the head of not more than fifteen hundred men, whom he inspired with his own courage, and caused to swear either to maintain their post or die there, he continued to defend the redoubts, during the whole of the 11th, until d'Argenteau, whose conduct was

afterwards greatly blamed for not making more determined efforts to carry them, drew off his forces for the evening, intending to renew the attack next morning.

But on the morning of the 12th, the Austrian general found himself surrounded with enemies. Cervoni, who retreated before Beaulieu, had united himself with Laharpe, and both advancing northward during the night of the 11th, established themselves in the rear of the redoubts of Monteleghino, which Rampon had so gallantly defended. This was not all. The divisions of Augereau and Masséna had marched by different routes, on the flank and on the rear of d'Argenteau's column; so that next morning, instead of renewing his attack on the redoubts, the Austrian general was obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat, leaving behind him colours and cannon, a thousand slain, and two thousand prisoners.

Such was the battle of Monte Notte, the first of Bonaparte's victories; eminently displaying that truth and mathematical certainty of combination, which enabled him on many more memorable occasions, even when his forces were inferior in numbers, and apparently disunited in position, suddenly to concentrate them and defeat his enemy, by overpowering him on the very point where he thought himself strongest. He had accumulated a superior force on the Austrian centre, and destroyed it, while Colli, on the right, and Beaulieu himself, on the left, each at the head of numerous forces, did not even hear of the action till it was fought and won.

In consequence of the success at Monte Notte, and the close pursuit of the defeated Austrians, the French obtained possession of Cairo, which placed them on that side of the Alps which slopes towards Lombardy, and where the streams from these mountains run to join the Po.

Beaulieu had advanced to Voltri, while the French withdrew to unite themselves in the attack upon d'Argenteau. He had now to retreat northward with all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida, in order to resume communication with the right wing of his army, consisting chiefly of Sardinians, from which he was now nearly separated by the defeat of the centre. General Colli, by a corresponding movement on the right, occupied Millesimo, a small town about nine miles from Dego, with which he resumed and maintained communication by a brigade stationed on the heights of Biastro. From the strength of this position, though his forces were scarce sufficiently concentrated, Beaulieu hoped to maintain his ground till he should receive supplies from Lombardy, and recover the consequences of the defeat at Monte Notte. But the antagonist whom he had in front had no purpose of permitting him such respite.

Determined upon a general attack on all points of the Austrian position, the French army advanced in three bodies upon a space of four leagues in extent. Augereau, at the head of the division which had not fought at Monte Notte, advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under Masséna, directed themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the right wing, commanded by Laharpe, manœuvred on the right of all, for the purpose of

turning Beaulieu's left flank. Augereau was the first who came in contact with the enemy. He attacked General Colli on the 13th April. His troops, emulous of the honour acquired by their companions, behaved with great bravery, rushed upon the outposts of the Sardinian army at Millesimo, forced, and retained possession of the gorge by which it was defended, and thus separated from the Sardinian army a body of about two thousand men, under the Austrian General Provera, who occupied a detached eminence called Cossaria, which covered the extreme left of General Colli's position. But the Austrian showed the most obstinate courage. Although surrounded by the enemy, he threw himself into the ruinous castle of Cossaria, which crowned the eminence, and showed a disposition to maintain the place to the last; the rather that, as he could see from the turrets of his strong-hold the Sardinian troops, from whom he had been separated, preparing to fight on the ensuing day, he might reasonably hope to be disengaged.

Bonaparte in person came up; and seeing the necessity of dislodging the enemy from this strong post, ordered three successive attacks to be made on the castle. Joubert, at the head of one of the attacking columns, had actually, with six or seven others, made his way into the outworks, when he was struck down by a wound in the head. General Banal and Adjutant-general Quenin fell, each at the head of the column which he commanded; and Bonaparte was compelled to leave the obstinate Provera in possession of the castle for the night. The morning of the 14th brought a different scene. Contenting himself with blockading the castle of Cossaria, Bonaparte now gave battle to General Colli, who made every effort to relieve it. These attempts were all in vain. He was defeated and cut off from Beaulieu; he retired as well as he could upon Ceva, leaving to his fate the brave General Provera, who was compelled to surrender at discretion.

On the same day, Masséna, with the centre, attacked the heights of Biastro, being the point of communication betwixt Beaulieu and Colli, while Laharpe, having crossed the Bormida, where the stream came up to the soldiers' middle, attacked in front and in flank the village of Dego, where the Austrian commander-in-chief was stationed. The first attack was completely successful,—the heights of Biastro were carried, and the Piedmontese routed. The assault of Dego was not less so, although after a harder struggle. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat, and was entirely separated from the Sardinians, who had hitherto acted in combination with him. The defenders of Italy now retreated in different directions, Colli moving westward towards Ceva, while Beaulieu, closely pursued through a difficult country, retired upon Acqui.

Even the morning after the victory, it was nearly wrested out of the hands of the conquerors. A fresh division of Austrians, who had evacuated Voltri later than the others, and were approaching to form a junction with their general, found the enemy in possession of Beaulieu's position. They arrived at Dego like men who had been led astray, and were no doubt surprised at finding it in the hands of the French. Yet they did not hesitate to assume the offensive,

and by a brisk attack drove out the enemy, and replaced the Austrian eagles in the village. Great alarm was occasioned by this sudden apparition; for no one among the French could conceive the meaning of an alarm beginning on the opposite quarter to that on which the enemy had retreated, and without its being announced from the outposts towards Acqui.

Bonaparte hastily marched on the village. The Austrians repelled two attacks; at the third, General Lanusse, afterwards killed in Egypt, put his hat upon the point of his sword, and, advancing to the charge, penetrated into the place. Lanusse also, afterwards Duke of Montebello, distinguished himself on the same occasion by courage and military skill, and was recommended by Bonaparte to the Directory for promotion. In this battle of Dego, more commonly called of Millesimo, the Austro-Sardinian army lost five or six thousand men, thirty pieces of cannon, with a great quantity of baggage. Besides, the Austrians were divided from the Sardinians; and the two generals began to show, not only that their forces were disunited, but that they themselves were acting upon separate motives; the Sardinians desiring to protect Turin, whereas the movements of Beaulieu seemed still directed to prevent the French from entering the Milanese territory.

Leaving a sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu, Bonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and without hopes of succour, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and retreated to the line of the Tanaro.

Napoleon in the meantime fixed his headquarters at Ceva, and enjoyed from the heights of Monze-moto, the splendid view of the fertile fields of Piedmont stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet, watered by the Po, the Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which descend from the Alps. Before the eyes of the delighted army of victors lay this rich expanse like a promised land; behind them was the wilderness they had passed;—not in deed a desert of barren sand, similar to that in which the Israelites wandered, but a huge tract of rocks and inaccessible mountains, crested with ice and snow, seeming by nature designed as the barrier and rampart of the blessed regions, which stretched eastward beneath them. We can sympathize with the self-congratulation of the general who had surmounted such tremendous obstacles in a way so unusual. He said to the officers around him, as they gazed upon this magnificent scene, "Hannibal took the Alps by storm. We have succeeded as well by turning their flank."

The dispirited army of Colli was attacked at Mondovi during his retreat, by two corps of Bonaparte's army, from two different points, commanded by Masséna and Serrurier. The last general, the Sardinians repulsed with loss; but when he found Masséna, in the meantime, was turning the left of his line, and that he was thus pressed on both flanks, his situation became almost desperate. The cavalry of the Piedmontese made an effort to renew the combat. For a time they overpowered and drove back those of the French; and General Stengel, who commanded the latter, was slain in attempting

to get them into order. But the desperate valour of Murat, unrivaled perhaps in the heady charge of cavalry combat, renewed the fortune of the field; and the horse, as well as the infantry of Colli's army, were compelled to a disastrous retreat. The defeat was decisive; and the Sardinians, after the loss of the best of their troops, their cannon, baggage, and appointments, and being now totally divided from their Austrian allies, and liable to be overpowered by the united forces of the French army, had no longer hopes of effectually covering Turin. Bonaparte, pursuing his victory, took possession of Cherasco, within ten leagues of the Piedmontese capital.

Thus fortune, in the course of a campaign of scarce a month, placed her favourite in full possession of the desired road to Italy, by command of the mountain-passes, which had been invaded and conquered with so much military skill. He had gained three battles over forces far superior to his own; inflicted on the enemy a loss of twenty-five thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; taken eighty pieces of cannon, and twenty-one stand of colours; reduced to inaction the Austrian army; almost annihilated that of Sardinia; and stood in full communication with France upon the eastern side of the Alps, with Italy lying open before him, as if to invite his invasion. But it was not even with such laurels, and with facilities which now presented themselves for the accomplishment of new and more important victories upon a larger scale, and with more magnificent results, that the career of Bonaparte's earliest campaign was to be closed. The head of the royal house of Savoy, if not one of the most powerful, still one of the most distinguished in Europe, was to have the melancholy experience, that he had encountered with the Man of Destiny, as he was afterwards proudly called, who for a time had power, in the emphatic phrase of Scripture, "to bind kings with chains, and nobles with fetters of iron."

The shattered relics of the Sardinian army had fallen back, or rather fled, to within two leagues of Turin, without hope of being again able to make an effectual stand. The Sovereign of Sardinia, Savoy, and Piedmont, had no means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence on the continent, excepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor. Let it be remembered, that Victor Amadeus the Third was the descendant of a race of heroes, who, from the peculiar situation of their territories, as constituting a neutral ground of great strength betwixt France and the Italian possessions of Austria, had often been called on to play a part in the general affairs of Europe, of importance far superior to that which their condition as a second-rate power could otherwise have demanded. In general, they had compensated their inferiority of force by an ability and gallantry which did them the highest credit, both as generals and as politicians; and now Piedmont was at the feet, in her turn, of an enemy weaker in numbers than her own. Besides the reflections on the past fame of his country, the present humiliating situation of the king was rendered more mortifying by the state of his family connexions. Victor Amadeus was the

father-in-law of Monsieur (by right Louis XVIII.), and of the Count d'Artois (the reigning king of France). He had received his sons-in-law at his court at Turin, had afforded them an opportunity of assembling around them their forces, consisting of the emigrant noblesse, and had strained all the power he possessed, and in many instances successfully, to withstand both the artifices and the arms of the French republicans. And now, so born, so connected, and with such principles, he was condemned to sue for peace on any terms which might be dictated, from a general of France aged twenty-six years, who, a few months before, was desirous of an appointment in the artillery service of the Grand Seigneur!

An armistice was requested by the King of Sardinia under these afflicting circumstances, but could only be purchased by placing two of his strongest fortresses,—those keys of the Alps, of which his ancestors had long been the keepers,—Coni and Tortona, in the hands of the French, and thus acknowledging that he surrendered at discretion. The armistice was agreed on at Cberasco, but commissioners were sent by the king to Paris, to arrange with the Directory the final terms of peace. These were such as victors give to the vanquished.

Besides the fortresses already surrendered, the King of Sardinia was to place in the hands of the French five others of the first importance. The road from France to Italy was to be at all times open to the French armies; and indeed the king, by surrender of the places mentioned, had lost the power of interrupting their progress. He was to break off every species of alliance and connexion with the combined powers at war with France, and become bound not to entertain at his court, or in his service, any French emigrants whatsoever, or any of their connexions; nor was an exception even made in favour of his own two daughters. In short, the surrender was absolute. Victor Amadeus exhibited the utmost reluctance to subscribe this treaty, and did not long survive it. His son succeeded in name to the kingdom of Piedmont; but the fortresses and passes, which had rendered him a prince of some importance, were, excepting Turin, and one or two of minor consequence, all surrendered into the hands of the French.

Viewing this treaty with Sardinia as the close of the Piedmontese campaign, we pause to consider the character which Bonaparte displayed at that period. The talents as a general which he had exhibited were of the very first order. There was no disconnexion in his objects, they were all attained by the very means he proposed, and the success was improved to the utmost. A different conduct usually characterizes those who stumble unexpectedly on victory, either by good fortune or by the valour of their troops. When the favourable opportunity occurs to such leaders, they are nearly as much embarrassed by it as by a defeat. But Bonaparte, who had foreseen the result of each operation by his sagacity, stood also prepared to make the most of the advantages which might be derived from it.

His style in addressing the Directory was, at this period, more modest and simple, and therefore

more impressive, than the figurative and bombastic style which he afterwards used in his bulletins. His self-opinion, perhaps, was not risen so high as to permit him to use the sesquipedalian words and violent metaphors, to which he afterwards seems to have given a preference. We may remark also, that the young victor was honourably anxious to secure for such officers as distinguished themselves, the preferment which their services entitled them to. He urges the promotion of his brethren in arms in almost every one of his dispatches,—a conduct not only just and generous, but also highly politic. Were his recommendations successful, their general had the gratitude due for the benefit; were they overlooked, thanks equally belonged to him for his good wishes, and the resentment for the slight attached itself to the government, who did not give effect to them.

If Bonaparte spoke simply and modestly on his own achievements, the bombast which he spared was liberally dealt out to the council by an orator named Daubermesnil, who invokes all bards, from Tyrteus and Ossian down to the author of the Marseillais hymn—all painters, from Apelles to David—all musicians, from Orpheus to the author of the *Chant du départ*, to sing, point, and compose music, upon the achievements of the general and army of Italy.

With better taste, a medal of Bonaparte was struck in the character of the Conqueror of the battle of Monte Notte. The face is extremely thin, with lank hair, a striking contrast to the fleshy square countenance exhibited on his later coins. On the reverse, Victory, bearing a palm-branch, a wreath of laurel, and a naked sword, is seen flying over the Alps. This medal we notice as the first of the splendid series which records the victories and honours of Napoleon, and which was designed by Denon as a tribute to the genius of his patron.

CHAPTER XXII.

Further progress of the French army under Bonaparte.—He crosses the Po, at Piacenza, on 7th May.—Battle of Lodi takes place on the 10th, in which the French are victorious.—Remarks on Napoleon's tactics in this celebrated action.—French take possession of Cremona and Pizzighitton.—Milan deserted by the Archduke Ferdinand and his duchess.—Bonaparte enters Milan on the 14th May.—General situation of the Italian States at this period.—Napoleon inflicts fines upon the neutral and unoffending States of Parma and Modena, and extorts the surrender of some of their finest pictures.—Remarks upon this novel procedure.

THE ardent disposition of Bonaparte did not long permit him to rest after the advantages which he had secured. He had gazed on Italy with an eagle's eye; but it was only for a moment, ere stooping on her with the wing, and pouncing on her with the talons, of the king of birds.

A general with less extraordinary talent would perhaps have thought it sufficient to have obtained possession of Piedmont, revolutionizing its government as the French had done that of Holland, and would have awaited fresh supplies and reinforcements from France before advancing to farther and

more distant conquests, and leaving the Alps under the dominion of a hostile, though for the present a subdued and disarmed monarchy. But Bonaparte had studied the campaign of Villars in these regions, and was of opinion that it was by that general's hesitation to advance boldly into Italy, after the victories which the Marshal de Coigny had obtained at Parma and Gualtalla, that the enemy had been enabled to assemble an accumulating force, before which the French were compelled to retreat. He determined, therefore, to give the Republic of Venice, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and other States in Italy, no time to muster forces, and take a decided part, as they were likely to do, to oppose a French invasion. Their terror and surprise could not fail to be increased by a sudden irruption; while months, weeks, even days of consideration might afford those States, attached as the rulers must be to their ancient oligarchical forms of government, time and composure to assume arms to maintain them. A speedy resolution was the more necessary, as Austria, alarmed for her Italian possessions, was about to make every effort for their defence. Orders had already been sent by the Aulic Council of War to detach an army of thirty thousand men, under Wurmser, from the Army of the Rhine to the frontiers of Italy. These were to be strengthened by other reinforcements from the interior, and by such forces as could be raised in the mountainous district of the Tyrol, which furnishes perhaps the most experienced and most formidable sharpshooters in the world. The whole was to be united to the fragments of Beaulieu's defeated troops. If suffered to form a junction, and arrange their plans for attack or defence, an army, of force so superior to the French in numbers, veterans in discipline, and commanded by a general like Wurmser, was likely to prevent all the advantages which the French might gain by a sudden irruption, ere an opposition so formidable was collected and organized. But the daring scheme which Napoleon contemplated, corresponding to the genius of him who had formed it, required to be executed with caution, united with secrecy and celerity. These were the more necessary, as, although the thanks of the French government had been voted to the Army of Italy five times in the course of a month, yet the Directory, alarmed at the more doubtful state of hostilities upon the Rhine, had turned their exertions chiefly in that direction; and, trusting to the skill of their general, and the courage of his troops, had not transmitted recruits and supplies upon the scale necessary for the great undertakings which he meditated. But *Italia! Italia!** — the idea of penetrating into a country so guarded and defended by nature, as well as by military skill, the consciousness of having surmounted obstacles of a nature so extraordinary, and the hope that they were approaching the reward of so many labours—above all, their full confidence in a leader, who seemed to have bound Victory to his standard—made the soldiers follow their general, without counting their own deficiencies, or the enemy's numbers.

* *Italia, Italia! primus conclamat Achates;
Italiam socii, magno clamore, salutant.*

To encourage this ardour, Bonaparte circulated an address, in which, complimenting the army on the victories they had gained, he desired them at the same time to consider nothing as won so long as the Austrians held Milan, and while the ashes of those who had conquered the Tarquins were soiled by the presence of the assassins of Bassville. It would appear that classical allusions are either familiar to the French soldiers, or that, without being more learned than others of their rank, they are pleased with being supposed to understand them. They probably considered the oratory of their great leader as soldier-like words, and words of exceeding good command. The English soldier, addressed in such flights of eloquence, would either have laughed at them, or supposed that he had got a crazed play-actor put over him, instead of a general. But there is this peculiar trait in the French character, that they are willing to take everything of a complimentary kind in the manner in which it seems to be meant. They appear to have made that bargain with themselves on many points, which the audience usually do in a theatre, to accept of the appearance of things for the reality. They never inquire whether a triumphal arch is of stone or of wood; whether a scutcheon is of solid metal, or only gilt; or whether a speech, of which the tendency is flattering to their national vanity, contains genuine eloquence, or only tumid extravagance.

All thoughts were therefore turned to Italy. The fortress of Tortona was surrendered to the French by the King of Sardinia; Bonaparte's head-quarters were fixed there. Masséna concentrated another part of the army at Alexandria, menacing Milan, and threatening, by the passage of the Po, to invade the territories belonging to Austria on the northern bank of that river. As Bonaparte himself observed, the passage of a great river is one of the most critical operations in modern war; and Beaulieu had collected his forces to cover Milan, and prevent the French, if possible, from crossing the Po. But in order to avert the dangerous consequences of attempting to force his passage on the river, defended by a formidable enemy in front, Bonaparte's subtle genius had already prepared the means for deceiving the old Austrian respecting his intended operations.

Valenza appeared to be the point of passage proposed by the French; it is one of those fortresses which cover the eastern frontier of Piedmont, and is situated upon the river Po. During the conferences previous to the armistice of Cherasco, Bonaparte had thrown out hints as if he were particularly desirous to be possessed of this place, and it was actually stipulated in the terms of the treaty that the French should occupy it for the purpose of effecting their passage over the river. Beaulieu did not fail to learn what had passed, which coinciding with his own ideas of the route by which Bonaparte meant to advance upon Milan, he hastened to concentrate his army on the opposite bank, at a place called Valleggio, about eighteen miles from Valenza, the point near which he expected the attempt to be made, and from which he could move easily in any direction towards the river, before the French could send over any considerable force. Masséna also countenanced this report, and riveted the attention

of the Austrians on Valenza, by pushing strong reconnoitring parties from Alexandria in the direction of that fortress. Besides, Beaulieu had himself crossed the Po at this place, and like all men of routine (for such he was, though a brave and approved soldier), he was always apt to suppose that the same reasons which directed himself must needs seem equally convincing to others. In almost all delicate affairs, persons of ordinary talents are misled by their incapacity to comprehend, that men of another disposition will be likely to view circumstances, and act upon principles, with an eye and opinion very different from their own.

But the reports which induced the Austrian general to take the position at Valleggio arose out of a stratagem of war. It was never Bonaparte's intention to cross the Po at Valenza. The proposal was a feint to draw Beaulieu's attention to that point, while the French accomplished the desired passage at Piacenza, nearly fifty miles lower down the river than Valleggio, where their subtle general had induced the Austrians to take up their line of defence. Marching for this purpose with incredible celerity, Bonaparte, on the 7th of May, assembled his forces at Piacenza, when their presence was least expected, and where there were none to defend the opposite bank, except two or three squadrons of Austrians, stationed there merely for the purpose of reconnoitring. General Andréossi (for names distinguished during these dreadful wars begin to rise on the narrative, as the stars glimmer out on the horizon) commanded an advanced guard of five hundred men. They had to pass in the common ferry-boats, and the crossing required nearly half an hour; so that the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of achieving the operation, had they been seriously opposed, appears to demonstration. Colonel Lannes threw himself ashore first with a body of grenadiers, and speedily dispersed the Austrian hussars, who attempted to resist their landing. The vanguard having thus opened the passage, the other divisions of the army were enabled to cross in succession, and in the course of two days the whole were in the Milanese territory, and on the left bank of the Po. The military manœuvres, by means of which Bonaparte achieved, without the loss of a man, an operation of so much consequence, and which, without such address as he displayed, must have been attended with great loss, and risk of failure, have often been considered as among his most masterly movements.

Beaulieu, informed too late of the real plans of the French general, moved his advanced guard, composed of the division of General Liptay, from Valleggio towards the Po, in the direction of Piacenza. But here also the alert general of the French had been too rapid in his movements for the aged German. Bonaparte had no intention to wait an attack from the enemy, with such a river as the Po in his rear, which he had no means of re-crossing if the day should go against him; so that a defeat, or even a material check, would have endangered the total loss of his army. He was, therefore, pushing forward in order to gain ground on which to manœuvre, and the advanced divisions of the two armies met at a village called Fombio, not far from

Casal, on the 8th of May. The Austrians threw themselves into the place, fortified and manned the steeples, and whatever posts else could be made effectual for defence, and reckoned upon defending themselves there until the main body of Beaulieu's army should come up to support them. But they were unable to sustain the vivacity of the French onset, to which so many successive victories had now given a double impulse. The village was carried at the bayonet's point; the Austrians lost their cannon, and left behind one-third of their men, in slain, wounded, and prisoners. The wreck of Liptay's division saved themselves by crossing the Adda at Pizzighittone, while they protected their retreat by a hasty defence of that fortress.

Another body of Austrians having advanced from Casal, to support, it may be supposed, the division of Liptay, occasioned a great loss to the French army in the person of a very promising officer. This was General Laharpe, highly respected and trusted by Bonaparte, and repeatedly mentioned in the campaigns of Piedmont. Hearing the alarm given by the outposts, when the Austrian patrols came in contact with them, Laharpe rode out to satisfy himself concerning the nature and strength of the attacking party. On his return to his own troops, they mistook him and his attendants for the enemy, fired upon, and killed him. He was a Swiss by birth, and had been compelled to leave his country on account of his democratical opinions; a grenadier, says Bonaparte, in stature and in courage, but of a restless disposition. The soldiers, with the superstition belonging to their profession, remarked, that during the battle of Fombio, on the day before, he was less animated than usual, as if an obscure sense of his approaching fate already overwhelmed him.

The Austrian regiment of cavalry which occasioned this loss, after some skirmishing, was content to escape to Lodi, a point upon which Beaulieu was again collecting his scattered forces, for the purpose of covering Milan, by protecting the line of the Adda.

"The passage of the Po," said Bonaparte, in his report to the Directory, "had been expected to prove the most bold and difficult manœuvre of the campaign, nor did we expect to have an action of more vivacity than that of Dego. But we have now to recount the battle of Lodi." As the conqueror deservedly congratulated himself on this hard-won victory, and as it has become in a manner especially connected with his name and military character, we must, according to our plan, be somewhat minute in our details respecting it.

The Adda, a large and deep river, though fordable at some places and in some seasons, crosses the valley of the Milanese, rising and joining the Po at Pizzighittone; so that, if the few places at which it can be crossed are fortified or defended, it forms a line covering all the Milanese territory to the eastward, from any force approaching from the direction of Piedmont. This line Beaulieu proposed to make good against the victor before whom he had so often retreated, and he conjectured (on this occasion rightly) that, to prosecute his victory by marching upon Milan, Bonaparte would first desire to dislodge the covering army from the line of the Adda, as he could not safely advance to the capital

of Lombardy, leaving the enemy in possession of such a defensive line upon their flank. He also conjectured that this attempt would be made at Lodi.

This is a large town, containing twelve thousand inhabitants. It has old Gothic walls, but its chief defence consists in the river Adda, which flows through it, and is crossed by a wooden bridge about five hundred feet in length. When Beaulieu, after the affair of Fombio, evacuated Casal, he retreated to this place with about ten thousand men. The rest of his army was directed upon Milan and Cassano, a town situated, like Lodi, upon the Adda.

Bonaparte calculated that, if he could accomplish the passage of the Adda at Lodi, he might overtake and disperse the remainder of Beaulieu's army, without allowing the veteran time to concentrate them for farther resistance in Milan, or even for rallying under the walls of the strong fortress of Mantua. The judgment of the French general was in war not more remarkable for seizing the most advantageous moment of attack, than for availing himself to the very uttermost of victory when obtained. The quick-sighted faculty and power of instant decision with which nature had endowed him, had, it may be supposed, provided beforehand for the consequences of the victory ere it was yet won, and left no room for doubt or hesitation when his hopes had become certainties. We have already remarked, that there have been many commanders, who, after an accidental victory, are so much at a loss what is next to be done, that while they are hesitating, the golden moments pass away unimproved; but Bonaparte knew as well how to use, as how to obtain advantages.

Upon the 10th day of May, attended by his best generals, and heading the choicest of his troops, Napoleon pressed forward towards Lodi. About a league from Casal, he encountered the Austrian rear-guard, who had been left, it would appear, at too great a distance from their main body. The French had no difficulty in driving these troops before them into the town of Lodi, which was but slightly defended by the few soldiers whom Beaulieu had left on the western or right side of the Adda. He had also neglected to destroy the bridge, although he ought rather to have supported a defence on the right bank of the river (for which the town afforded many facilities), till the purpose of destruction was completed, than have allowed it to exist. If his rear-guard had been actually stationed in Lodi, instead of being so far in the rear of the main body, they might, by a protracted resistance from the old walls and houses, have given time for this necessary act of demolition.

But though the bridge was left standing, it was swept by twenty or thirty Austrian pieces of artillery, whose thunders menaced death to any one who should attempt that pass of peril. The French, with great alertness, got as many guns in position on the left bank, and answered this tremendous fire with equal spirit. During this cannonade, Bonaparte threw himself personally amongst the fire, in order to station two guns loaded with grape-shot in such a position, as rendered it impossible for any one to approach for the purpose of undermining or destroy-

ing the bridge; and then calmly proceeded to make arrangements for a desperate attempt.

His cavalry was directed to cross, if possible, at a place where the Adda was said to be fordable,—a task which they accomplished with difficulty. Meantime Napoleon observed that the Austrian line of infantry was thrown considerably behind the batteries of artillery which they supported, in order that they might have the advantage of a bending slope of ground, which afforded them shelter from the French fire. He, therefore, drew up a close column of three thousand grenadiers, protected from the artillery of the Austrians by the walls and houses of the town, and yet considerably nearer to the enemy's line of guns on the opposite side of the Adda than were their own infantry, which ought to have protected them. The column of grenadiers, thus secured, waited in comparative safety, until the appearance of the French cavalry, who had crossed the ford, began to disquiet the flank of the Austrians. This was the critical moment which Bonaparte expected. A single word of command wheeled the head of the column of grenadiers to the left, and placed it on the perilous bridge. The word was given to advance, and they rushed on with loud shouts of *Vive la République!* But their appearance upon the bridge was the signal for a redoubled shower of grape-shot, while, from the windows of the houses on the left side of the river, the soldiers who occupied them poured volley after volley of musketry on the thick column, as it endeavoured to force its way over the long bridge. At one time the French grenadiers, unable to sustain this dreadful storm, appeared for an instant to hesitate. But Berthier, the chief of Bonaparte's staff, with Masséna, Dallemagne, and Corvin, hurried to the head of the column, and by their presence and gallantry renewed the resolution of the soldiers, who now poured across the bridge. The Austrians had but one resource left; to rush on the French with the bayonet, and kill, or drive back into the Adda, those who had forced their passage, before they could deploy into line, or receive support from their comrades, who were still filing along the bridge. But the opportunity was neglected, either because the troops, who should have executed the manœuvre, had been, as we have already noticed, withdrawn too far from the river; or because the soldiery, as happens when they repose too much confidence in a strong position, became panic-struck when they saw it unexpectedly carried. Or it may be, that General Beaulieu, so old and so unfortunate, had somewhat lost that energy and presence of mind which the critical moment demanded. Whatever was the cause, the French rushed on the artillerymen, from whose fire they had lately suffered so tremendously, and, unsupported as they were, had little difficulty in bayoneting them.

The Austrian army now completely gave way, and lost in their retreat, annoyed as it was by the French cavalry, upwards of twenty guns, a thousand prisoners, and perhaps two thousand more wounded and slain.

Such was the famous passage of the Bridge of Lodi; achieved with such skill and gallantry, as gave the victor the same character for fearless intrepidity,

and practical talent in actual battle, which the former part of the campaign had gained him as a most able tactician.

Yet this action, though successful, has been severely criticised by those who desire to derogate from Bonaparte's military talents. It has been said, that he might have passed over a body of infantry at the same ford where the cavalry had crossed; and that thus, by manœuvring on both sides of the river, he might have compelled the Austrians to evacuate their position on the left bank of the Adda, without hazarding an attack upon their front, which could not but cost the assailants very dearly.

Bonaparte had perhaps this objection in his recollection when he states, that the column of grenadiers were so judiciously sheltered from the fire until the moment when their wheel to the left brought them on the bridge, that they only lost two hundred men during the storm of the passage. We cannot but suppose, that this is a very mitigated account of the actual loss of the French army. So slight a loss is not to be easily reconciled with the horrors of the battle, as he himself detailed them in his dispatches; nor with the conclusion, in which he mentions, that of the sharp contests which the Army of Italy had to sustain during the campaign, none was to be compared with that "terrible passage of the Bridge of Lodi."

In fact, as we may take occasion to prove hereafter, the memoranda of the great general, dictated to his officers at St Helena, have a little too much the character of his original bulletins; and while they show a considerable disposition to exaggerate the difficulties to be overcome, the fury of the conflict, and the exertions of courage by which the victory was attained, show a natural inconsistency, from the obvious wish to diminish the loss which was its unavoidable price.

But admitting that the loss of the French had been greater on this occasion than their general cared to recollect or acknowledge, his military conduct seems not the less justifiable.

Bonaparte appears to have had two objects in view in this daring exploit. The first was, to improve and increase the terror into which his previous successes had thrown the Austrians, and to impress on them the conviction, that no position, however strong, was able to protect them against the audacity and talent of the French. This discouraging feeling, exemplified by so many defeats, and now by one in circumstances where the Austrians appeared to have every advantage, it was natural to suppose, would hurry Beaulieu's retreat, induce him to renounce all subsequent attempts to cover Milan, and rather to reunite the fragments of his army, particularly that part of Liptay's divisions, which, after being defeated at Fombio, had thrown themselves into Pizzighitton. To have manœuvred slowly and cautiously, would not have struck that terror and confusion which was inspired by the desperate attack on the position at Lodi. In this point the victor perfectly succeeded; for Beaulieu, after his misadventure, drew off without any farther attempt to protect the ancient capital of Lombardy, and threw himself upon Mantua, with the intention of covering that strong fortress, and at the

same time of sheltering under it the remains of his army, until he could form a junction with the forces which Wurmser was bringing to his assistance from the Rhine.

Bonaparte himself has pointed out a second object, in which he was less successful. He had hoped the rapid surprise of the bridge of Lodi might enable him to overtake or intercept the rest of Beaulieu's army, which, as we have said, had retreated by Cassano. He failed, indeed, in this object; for these forces also made their way into the Mantuan territory, and joined Beaulieu, who, by crossing the classical Mincio, placed another strong line of military defence betwixt him and his victor. But the prospect of intercepting and destroying so large a force was worth the risk he encountered at Lodi, especially taking into view the spirit which his army had acquired from a long train of victory, together with the discouragement which had crept into the Austrian ranks from a uniform series of defeats.

It should also be remembered, in considering the necessity of forcing the bridge of Lodi, that the ford over the Adda was crossed with difficulty even by the cavalry, and that when once separated by the river, the communication between the main army and the detachment of infantry (which his censors say Napoleon should have sent across in the same manner), being in a great degree interrupted, the latter might have been exposed to losses, from which Bonaparte, situated as he was on the right bank, could have had no means of protecting them.

Leaving the discussion of what might have been, to trace that which actually took place, the French cavalry pursued the retreating Austrians as far as Cremona, of which they took possession. Pizzighitton was obliged to capitulate, the garrison being cut off from all possibility of succour. About five hundred prisoners surrendered in that fortress; the rest of Liptay's division, and other Austrian corps, could no otherwise escape, than by throwing themselves into the Venetian territory.

It was at this time that Bonaparte had some conversation with an old Hungarian officer, made prisoner in one of the actions, whom he met with at a bivouac by chance, and who did not know him. The veteran's language was a curious commentary on the whole campaign; nay, upon Bonaparte's general system of warfare, which appeared so extraordinary to those who had long practised the art on more formal principles. "Things are going on as ill and as irregularly as possible," said the old martinet. "The French have got a young general, who knows nothing of the regular rules of war; he is sometimes on our front, sometimes on the flank, sometimes on the rear. There is no supporting such a gross violation of rules." This somewhat resembles the charge which foreign tacticians have brought against the English, that they gained victories by continuing, with their insular ignorance and obstinacy, to fight on, long after the period when, if they had known the rules of war, they ought to have considered themselves as completely defeated.

A peculiar circumstance is worth mentioning. The French soldiers had a mode at that time of amusing themselves, by conferring an imaginary rank upon their generals, when they had done some

remarkable exploit. They showed their sense of the bravery displayed by Bonaparte at the battle of Lodi, by creating him a corporal; and by this phrase, of the Little Corporal, he was distinguished in the intrigues formed against him, as well as those which were carried on in his favour; in the language of Georges Cadoudal, who laid a scheme for assassinating him, and in the secret consultation of the old soldiers and others, who arranged his return from Elba.

We are now to turn for a time from war to its consequences, which possess an interest of a nature different from the military events we have been detailing. The movements which had taken place since the King of Sardinia's defeat, had struck terror into the government of Milan, and the Archduke Ferdinand, by whom Austrian Lombardy was governed. But while Beaulieu did his best to cover the capital by force of arms, the measures resorted to by the government were rather of a devotional than warlike character. Processions were made, relics exposed, and rites resorted to, which the catholic religion prescribes as an appeal to Heaven in great national calamities. But the saints they invoked were deaf or impotent; for the passage of the bridge of Lodi, and Beaulieu's subsequent retreat to Mantua, left no possibility of defending Milan. The archduke and his duchess immediately left Milan, followed by a small retinue, and leaving only a moderate force in the citadel, which was not in a very defensible condition. Their carriages passed through a large crowd which filled the streets. As they moved slowly along, the royal pair were observed to shed natural tears, at leaving the capital of these princely possessions of their house. The people observed a profound silence, only broken by low whispers. They showed neither joy nor sorrow at the event which was passing—all thoughts were bent in anxious anticipation upon what was to happen next.

When the archduke had departed, the restraint which his presence had imposed from habit and sentiment, as much as from fear of his authority, was of course removed, and many of the Milanese citizens began, with real or affected zeal for republicanism, to prepare themselves for the reception of the French. The three-coloured cockade was at first timidly assumed; but the example being shown, it seemed as if these emblems had fallen like snow into the caps and hats of the multitude. The imperial arms were removed from the public buildings, and a placard was put on the palace of the government with an inscription—"This house is to be let—apply for the keys to the French Commissioner Salicetti." The nobles hastened to lay aside their armorial bearings, their servants' liveries, and other badges of aristocracy. Meantime the magistrates caused order to be maintained in the town, by regular patrols of the burgher guard. A deputation of the principal inhabitants of Milan was sent to the victorious general with offers of full submission, since there was no longer room for resistance, or for standing upon terms.

On the 14th of May, Bonaparte made his public entry into Milan, under a triumphal arch prepared for the occasion, which he traversed, surrounded by

his guards, and took up his residence in the arch-episcopal palace. The same evening a splendid entertainment was given, and the Tree of Liberty (of which the aristocrats observed, that it was a bare pole without either leaves or fruit, roots or branches) was erected with great form in the principal square. All this affectation of popular joy did not disarm the purpose of the French general, to make Milan contribute to the relief of his army. He imposed upon the place a requisition of twenty millions of livres, but offered to accept of goods of any sort in kind, and at a rateable valuation; for it may be easily supposed that specie, the representative of value, must be scarce in a city circumstanced as Milan was. The public funds of every description, even those dedicated to the support of hospitals, went into the French military chest; the church-plate was seized as part of the requisition; and, when all this was done, the citizens were burthened with the charge of finding rations for fifteen thousand men daily, by which force the citadel, with its Austrian garrison, was instantly to be blockaded.

While Lombardy suffered much, the neighbouring countries were not spared. The reader must be aware, that for more than a century Italy had been silently declining into that state of inactivity which succeeds great exertion, as a rapid and furious blaze sinks down into exhaustion and ashes. The keen judgment of Napoleon had seen, that the geographical shape of Italy, though presenting in many respects advantages for a great and commercial nation, offered this main impediment to its separate existence as one independent state, that its length being too great in proportion to its breadth, there was no point sufficiently central to preserve the due influence of a metropolis in relation to its extreme northern and southern provinces; and that the inhabitants of Naples and Lombardy being locally so far divided, and differing in climate, habits, and the variety of temper which climate and habits produce, could hardly be united under the same government. From these causes Italy was, after the demolition of the great Roman empire, early broken up into different subdivisions, which, more civilized than the rest of Europe at the time, attracted in various degrees the attention of mankind; and at length, from the sacerdotal power of Rome, the wealth and extensive commerce of Venice and Genoa, the taste and splendour of Florence, and the ancient fame of the metropolis of the world, became of importance much over-proportioned to their actual extent of territory. But this time had passed away, and the Italian States, rich in remembrances, were now comparatively poor in point of immediate consequence in the scale of nations. They retained their oligarchical or monarchical forms and constitutions, as in the more vigorous state of their existence, but appeared to have lost their energies both for good and evil. The proud and jealous love which each Italian used to bear towards his own province was much abated; the jealousy of the factions which divided most of their states, and induced the citizens to hazard their own death or exile in the most trifling party quarrel, had subsided into that calm, selfish indifference, which disregards public interests of all kinds. They were ill governed, in so far as their rulers neglected

all means of benefiting the subjects or improving the country; and they were thus far well governed, that, softened by the civilization of the times, and perhaps by a tacit sense of their own weakness, their rulers had ceased, in a great measure, to exercise with severity the despotic powers with which they were in many cases invested, though they continued to be the cause of petty vexations, to which the natives had become callous. The Vatican slept like a volcano, which had exhausted its thunders; and Venice, the most jealous and cruel of oligarchies, was now shutting her wearied eyes, and closing her ears, against informers and spies of state. The Italian States stood, therefore, like a brotherhood of old trees, decayed at heart and root, but still making some show of branches and leaves, until the French invasion rushed down, like the whirlwind which lays them prostrate.

In the relations between France and Italy, it must be observed that two of the most considerable of these states, Tuscany and Venice, were actually in league with the former country, having acknowledged the Republic, and done nothing to deserve the chastisement of her armies. Others might be termed neutral, not having perhaps deemed themselves of consequence sufficient to take part in the quarrel of the coalesced powers against France. The pope had given offence by the affair of Basseville, and the encouragement which his countenance afforded to the non-conforming clergy of France. But, excepting Naples and Austrian Lombardy, no state in Italy could be exactly said to be at open war with the new Republic. Bonaparte was determined, however, that this should make no difference in his mode of treating them.

The first of these slumbering potentates with whom he came in contact, was the Duke of Parma. This petty sovereign, even before Bonaparte entered Milan, had deprecated the victor's wrath; and although neither an adherent of the coalition, nor at war with France, he found himself obliged to purchase an armistice by heavy sacrifices. He paid a tribute of two millions of livres, besides furnishing horses and provisions to a large amount, and agreeing to deliver up twenty of the finest paintings in his cabinet, to be chosen by the French general.

The next of these sufferers was the Duke of Modena. This prince was a man of moderate abilities; his business was hoarding money, and his pleasure consisted in nailing up, with his own princely hands, the tapestry which ornamented churches on days of high holiday; from which he acquired the nickname of the royal upholsterer. But his birth was illustrious as the descendant of that celebrated hero of Este, the patron of Tasso and of Ariosto; and his alliance was no less splendid, having married the sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, and of Joseph the Second; then his daughter was married to the Archduke Ferdinand, the Governor of Milan. Notwithstanding his double connexion with the imperial family, the principality of Modena was so small that he might have been passed over as scarce worthy of notice, but for the temptation of his treasures, in the works of art, as well as in specie. On the approach of a column of the French army to Modena, the duke fled from his capital, but sent his

brother, the Chevalier d'Este, to capitulate with Napoleon.

It might have been urged in his favour, that he was no avowed partner of the coalition; but Bonaparte took for granted his good-will towards his brother-in-law the Emperor of Austria, and esteemed it a crime deserving atonement. Indeed it was one which had not been proved by any open action, but neither could it admit of being disproved. The duke was therefore obliged to purchase the privilege of neutrality, and to expiate his supposed good inclination for the house of Austria. Five millions and a half of French livres, with large contributions in provisions and accoutrements, perhaps cost the Duke of Modena more anxious thoughts than he had bestowed on the misfortunes of his imperial relatives.

To levy on obnoxious states or princes the means of paying or accommodating troops, would have been only what has been practised by victors in all ages. But an exaction of a new kind was now for the first time imposed on these Italian princes. The Duke of Modena, like the Duke of Parma, was compelled to surrender twenty of his choicest pictures, to be selected at the choice of the French general, and the persons of taste with whom he might advise. This was the first time that a demand of this nature had been made in modern times in a public and avowed manner, and we must pause to consider the motives and justice of such a requisition.

Hitherto, works of art had been considered as sacred, even during the utmost extremities of war. They were judged to be the property, not so much of the nation or individuals who happened to possess them, as of the civilized world in general, who were supposed to have a common interest in these productions, which, if exposed to become the ordinary spoils of war, could hardly escape damage or destruction. To take a strong example of forbearance, Frederick of Prussia was a passionate admirer of the fine arts, and no scrupulous investigator of the rights conferred by conquest, but rather disposed to stretch them to the uttermost. Yet when he obtained possession of Dresden under circumstances of high irritation, Frederick respected the valuable gallery, cabinets, and museums of the capital of Saxony, and preserved their contents inviolate, as a species of property which could not, and ought not, to fall within the rights of a conqueror. He considered the elector as only the keeper of the gallery; and regarded the articles which it contained as belonging to the civilized world at large.

There are persons who demand the cause of this distinction, and require to know why works of art, the value of which is created solely by the opinion of those who pretend to understand them, and is therefore to be regarded as merely imaginary, or, as it is called by lawyers, a mere *pretium affectionis*, should be exempted from that martial law which disposes at pleasure of the real property of the vanquished.

It might easily be shown in reply, that the respect due to genius of the highest order attaches with a sort of religious zeal to the objects of our admiration in the fine arts, and renders it a species of sacrilege to subject them to the chances of war. It has

besides already been hinted, that these chefs-d'œuvre being readily liable to damage, scarcely admitting of being repaired, and absolutely incapable of being replaced, their existence is hazarded by rendering them the objects of removal, according to the fluctuation of victory.

But it is surely sufficient to say, that wherever the progress of civilization has introduced rules to qualify and soften the extremities of war, these should be strictly adhered to. In the rudest ages of society, man avails himself of the right of the strongest in the fullest extent. The victor of the Sandwich Islands devours his enemy—the North-American Indian tortures him to death—almost all savage tribes render their prisoners slaves, and sell them as such. As society advances, these inhumanities fall out of practice; and it is unnecessary to add, that, as the victorious general deserves honourable mention in history, who, by his clemency, relaxes in any respect the rigorous laws of conquest, so he must be censured in proportion, whose conduct tends to retrograde towards the brutal violence of primitive hostility.

Bonaparte cannot be exempted from this censure. He, as the willing agent of the Directory under whose commands he acted, had resolved to disregard the neutrality which had hitherto been considered as attaching to the productions of the fine arts, and, for the first time, had determined to view them as the spoils of conquest. The motive is more easily discovered than justified.

In the reign of Terror and Equality, the fine arts, with everything connected with cultivated feelings, had been regarded as inconsistent with the simplicity of the republican character; and, like the successful fanatics of England, and the first enthusiastic votaries of the Koran, the true sans-culottes were disposed to esteem a taste which could not generally exist without a previous superior education, as something aristocratic, and alien from the imaginary standard of equality, to which it was their purpose to lower all the exertions of intellect, as well as the possession of property. Palaces were therefore destroyed, and monuments broken to pieces.

But this brutal prejudice, with the other attempts of these frantic democrats to bring back the world to a state of barbarism, equally in moral and in general feeling, was discarded at the fall of the jacobin authority. Those who succeeded to the government exerted themselves laudably in endeavouring rather to excite men's minds to a love of those studies and tastes, which are ever found to humanize and soften the general tone of society, and which teach hostile nations that they have points of friendly union, even because they unite in admiring the same master-pieces of art. A Museum was formed at Paris, for the purpose of collecting and exhibiting to public admiration paintings and statues, and whatever was excellent in art, for the amusement of the citizens, whose chief scene of pleasure hitherto had been a wild and ill-regulated civic festival, to vary the usual exhibition of the procession of a train of victims moving towards the guillotine. The substitution of such a better object of popular attention was honourable, virtuous, and politic in itself, and speedily led the French people,

partly from taste, partly from national vanity, to attach consequence to the fine arts and their productions.

Unfortunately there were no ordinary measures by which the French, as purchasers, could greatly augment the contents of their Museum; and more unfortunately for other nations, and ultimately for themselves, they had the power and the will to increase their possessions of this kind, without research or expense, by means of the irresistible progress of their arms. We have no right to say that this peculiar species of spoliation originated with Bonaparte personally. He probably obeyed the orders of the Directory; and, besides, instances might no doubt be found in the history of all nations, of interesting articles of this nature having been transferred by the chance of war from one country to another, as in cases of plunder of an ordinary description, which, though seldom avowed or defended, are not the less occasionally practised. But Napoleon was unquestionably the first and most active agent, who made such exactions a matter of course, and enforced them upon principle; and that he was heartily engaged in this scheme of general plunder, is sufficiently proved from his expressions to the Directory, upon transmitting those paintings which the Duke of Modena, the first sufferer on this system, was compelled to surrender, and which were transferred to Paris as the legitimate spoils of war.

But before copying the terms in which Napoleon announces the transmission of master-pieces of art to the National Museum, it ought to be remarked, that the celebrated Saint Jerome, by Correggio, which he mentions with a sort of insulting triumph, was accounted so valuable, that the Duke of Modena offered two millions of livres as the ransom of that picture alone. This large sum the French general, acting on the principle which many in his situation were tempted to recognize, might have safely converted to his own use, under the certainty that the appropriation, indispensable as his services were to the government, would neither have been inquired into nor censured. But avarice cannot be the companion, far less the controller of ambition. The feelings of the young victor were of a character too elevated to stoop to the acquisition of wealth; nor was his career, at that or any other period, sullied by this particular and most degrading species of selfishness. When his officers would have persuaded him to accept the money, as more useful for the army, he replied, that the two millions of francs would soon be spent, but the Correggio would remain an ornament of the city of Paris for ages, and inspire the production of future master-pieces.

In his dispatch to the Directory, of 17th Floréal (8th of May), Napoleon desires to have some artists sent to him, who might collect the monuments of art; which shows that the purpose of seizing upon them had been already formed. In the letter which accompanies the transmission of the pictures, he has these remarkable expressions:—"You will receive the articles of the suspension of arms which I have granted to the Duke of Parma. I will send you as soon as possible the finest pictures of Correggio, amongst others a Saint Jerome, which is said to be his master-piece. I must own that the saint takes

an unlucky time to visit Paris, but I hope you will grant him the honours of the Museum."

The same system was followed at Milan, where several of the most valuable articles were taken from the Ambrosian collection. The articles were received in the spirit with which they were transmitted. The most able critics were dispatched to assist the general in the selection of the monuments of the fine arts to be transferred to Paris, and the Secretary-general of the Lyceum, confounding the possession of the productions of genius with the genius itself which created them, congratulated his countrymen on the noble dispositions which the victors had evinced. "It is no longer blood," said the orator, "which the French soldier thirsts for. He desires to lead no slaves in triumph behind his chariot—it is the glorious spoils of the arts and of industry with which he longs to decorate his victories—he cherishes that devouring passion of great souls, the love of glory, and the enthusiasm for high talents, to which the Greeks owed their astonishing successes. It was the defence of their temples, their monuments, their statues, their great artists, that stimulated their valour. It was from such motives they conquered at Salamis and at Marathon. It is thus that our armies advance, escorted by the love of arts, and followed by sweet peace, from Coni to Milan, and soon to proceed from thence to the proud basilic of St Peter's." The reasoning of the Secretary of the Lyceum is lost amidst his eloquence; but the speech, if it means anything, signifies that the seizing on those admired productions placed the nation which acquired the forcible possession of them, in the same condition as if she had produced the great men by whom they were achieved;—just as the ancient Scythians believed they became inspired with the talents and virtues of those whom they murdered. Or, according to another interpretation, it may mean that the French, who sought to deprive other nations of their property, had as praiseworthy motives of action as the Greeks who made war in defence of that which was their own. But, however their conduct might be regarded by themselves, it is very certain that they did by no means resemble those whose genius set the example of such splendid success in the fine arts. On the contrary, the classical prototype of Bonaparte in this transaction, was the Roman Consul Mummius, who violently plundered Greece of those treasures of art, of which he himself and his countrymen were insensible to the real and proper value.

It is indeed little to the purpose, in a moral point of view, whether the motives for this species of rapine were or were not genuine love of the art. The fingering connoisseur who secretes a gem cannot plead in mitigation, that he stole it, not on account of the value of the stone, but for the excellence of the engraving; any more than the devotee who stole a bible could shelter herself under a religious motive. But, in truth, we do not believe that the French or their general were actuated on this occasion by the genuine love of art. This taste leads men to entertain respect for the objects which it admires; and, feeling its genuine influence, a conqueror would decline to give an

example of a species of rapine, which, depriving those objects of admiration of the protection with which the general sentiment of civilized nations had hitherto invested them, must hold them up, like other ordinary property, as a prey to the strongest soldier. Again, we cannot but be of opinion, that a genuine lover of the arts would have hesitated to tear those paintings from the churches or palaces, for the decoration of which they had been expressly painted, and where they must always have been seen to the best effect, whether from the physical advantages of the light, size of apartment, and other suitable localities connected with their original situation, or from the moral feelings which connect the works themselves with the place for which they were primarily designed, and which they had occupied for ages. The destruction of these mental connexions, which give so much additional effect to painting and statuary, merely to gratify the selfish love of appropriation, is like taking a gem out of the setting which in many cases may considerably diminish its value.

We cannot therefore believe that this system of spoliation was dictated by any sincere and manly love of the arts, though this was so much talked of in France at the time. It must, on the contrary, be ascribed to the art and ambition of the Directory who ordered, and the general who obeyed; both of whom, being sensible that the national vanity would be flattered by this species of tribute, hastened to secure it an ample gratification. Bonaparte, in particular, was at least sufficiently aware, that, with however little purity of taste the Parisians might look upon these exquisite productions, they would be sufficiently alive to the recollection, that, being deemed by all civilized people the most admirable specimens in the world, the valour of the French armies, and the skill of their unrivaled general, had sent them to adorn the metropolis of France; and might hope, that, once brought to the prime city of the Great Nation, such chefs-d'œuvre could not again be subject to danger by transportation, but must remain there, fixed as household gods, for the admiration of posterity. So hoped, as we have seen, the victor himself; and doubtless with the proud anticipation, that in future ages the recollection of himself, and of his deeds, must be inseparably connected with the admiration which the Museum, ordained and enriched by him, was calculated to produce.

But art and ambition are apt to estimate the advantages of a favourite measure somewhat too hastily. By this breach of the law of nations, as hitherto acknowledged and acted upon, the French degraded their own character, and excited the strongest prejudice against their rapacity among the Italians, whose sense of injury was in proportion to the value which they set upon those splendid works, and to the dishonour which they felt at being forcibly deprived of them. Their lamentations were almost like those of Micah, the Ephraimite, when robbed of "the graven image, and the teraphim, and the ephod, and the molten image," by the armed and overbearing Danites—"Ye have taken away my gods that I have made, and what have I more?"

Again, by this unjust proceeding, Bonaparte pre-

pared for France and her capital the severe moral lesson inflicted upon her by the allies in 1815. Victory has wings as well as Riches; and the abuse of conquest, as of wealth, becomes frequently the source of bitter retribution. Had the paintings of Correggio and other great masters been left undisturbed in the custody of their true owners, there could not have been room, at an after period, when looking around the Louvre, for the reflection, "Here once were disposed the treasures of art, which, won by violence were lost by defeat."

CHAPTER XXIII.

Directory propose to divide the Army of Italy betwixt Bonaparte and Kellermann—Bonaparte resigns, and the Directory give up the point.—Insurrection against the French at Pavia—crushed—and the leaders shot—Also at the Imperial Piefs and Lugo, quelled and punished in the same way.—Reflections.—Austrians defeated at Borghetto, and retreat behind the Adige.—Bonaparte narrowly escapes being made prisoner at Valleggio.—Mantua blockaded—Verona occupied by the French.—King of Naples secedes from Austria.—Armistice purchased by the pope.—The neutrality of Tuscany violated, and Leghorn occupied by the French troops.—Views of Bonaparte respecting the revolutionizing of Italy—He temporises.—Conduct of the Austrian government at this crisis.—Beaulieu displaced, and succeeded by Wurmer.—Bonaparte sits down before Mantua,

OCCUPYING Milan, and conqueror in so many battles, Bonaparte might be justly considered as in absolute possession of Lombardy, while the broken forces of Beaulieu had been compelled to retreat under that sole remaining bulwark of the Austrian power, the strong fortress of Mantua, where they might await such support as should be detached to them through the Tyrol, but could undertake no offensive operations. To secure his position, the Austrian general had occupied the line formed by the Mincio, his left flank resting upon Mantua, his right upon Peschiera, a Venetian city and fortress, but of which he had taken possession, against the reclamation of the Venetian government, who were desirous of observing a neutrality between such powerful belligerents, not perhaps altogether aware how far the victor, in so dreadful a strife, might be disposed to neglect the general law of nations. The Austrian defence on the right was prolonged by the Lago di Garda, a large lake out of which the Mincio flows, and which, running thirty-five miles northward into the mountains of the Tyrol, maintained uninterrupted Beaulieu's communication with Germany.

Bonaparte, in the meantime, permitted his forces only the repose of four or five days ere he again summoned them to active exertion. He called on them to visit the Capitol, there to re-establish (he ought to have said, to carry away) the statues of the great men of antiquity, and to change, or rather renovate, the destinies of the finest district of Europe. But while thus engaged, he received orders from Paris respecting his farther proceedings, which must have served to convince him that all his personal enemies, all who doubted and feared him, were not to be found in the Austrian ranks.

The Directory themselves had begun to suspect the prudence of suffering the whole harvest of success which Italy afforded to be reaped by the adventurous and haughty character who had first thrust in the sickle. They perhaps felt already an instinctive distrust of the waxing influence which was destined one day to overpower their own. Under some such impression, they resolved to divide the Army of Italy betwixt Bonaparte and Kellermann, directing the former general to pass the Po, and advance southward on Rome and Naples with twenty thousand men; while Kellermann, with the other moiety of the Italian army, should press the siege of Mantua, and make head against the Austrians.

This was taking Bonaparte's victory out of his grasp, and he resented the proposal accordingly, by transmitting his resignation, and declining to have any concern in the loss of his army, and the fruits of his conquests. He affirmed that Kellermann, with an army reduced to twenty thousand men, could not face Beaulieu, but would be speedily driven out of Lombardy; and that, in consequence, the army which advanced southward would be overwhelmed and destroyed. One bad general, he said, was better than two good ones. The Directory must have perceived from such a reply the firm and inflexible nature of the man they had made the leader of their armies, but they dared not, such was his reputation, proceed in the plan they had formed for the diminution of his power; and perhaps, for the first time since the Revolution, the executive government of France was compelled to give way to a successful general, and adopt his views instead of their own. The campaign was left to his sole management; he obtained an ascendancy which he took admirable care not to relinquish, and it became the only task of the Directory, so far as Italy was concerned, to study phrases for intimating their approbation of the young general's measures.

Whatever were the ultimate designs of Bonaparte against Rome, he thought it prudent to suspend them until he should be free from all danger of the Austrians, by the final defeat of Beaulieu. For this object, he directed the divisions of his army towards the right bank of the Mincio, with a view of once more forcing Beaulieu's position, after having taken precautions for blockading the citadel of Milan, where the Austrians still held out, and for guarding Pavia and other points, which appeared necessary to secure his conquests.

Napoleon himself fixed his head-quarters at Lodi, upon the 24th of May. But he was scarcely arrived there, when he received the alarming intelligence, that the city of Pavia, with all the surrounding districts, were in arms in his rear; that the tocsin was ringing in every village, and that news were circulated that the Prince of Condé's army, united with a strong Austrian force, had descended from the Tyrol into Italy. Some commotions had shown themselves in Milan, and the Austrian garrison there made demonstrations towards favouring the insurrection in Pavia, where the insurgents were completely successful, and had made prisoners a French corps of three hundred men.

Bonaparte represents these disturbances as effected by Austrian agents; but he had formerly as-

sured us, that the Italians took little interest in the fate of their German masters. The truth is, that having entered Italy with the most flattering assurances of observing respect for public and private property, the French had disgusted the inhabitants, by exacting the contributions which they had imposed on the country with great severity. As catholics, the Italians were also disgusted with the open indignities thrown on the places and objects of public worship, as well as on the persons and character of their priests.*

The nobles and the clergy naturally saw their ruin in the success of the French; and the lower classes joined them for the time, from dislike to foreigners, love of national independence, resentment of the exactions made, and the acts of sacrilege committed by the ultramontane invaders. About thirty thousand insurgents were in arms; but having no regular forces on which to rest as a rallying point, they were ill calculated to endure the rapid assault of the disciplined French.

Bonaparte, anxious to extinguish a flame so formidable, instantly returned from Lodi to Milan, at the head of a strong division, took order for the safety of the capital of Lombardy, and moved next morning towards Pavia, the centre of the insurrection. The village of Benasco, which was defended against Lannes, was taken by storm, the inhabitants put to the sword, and the place plundered and burnt. Napoleon himself arrived before Pavia, blew the gates open with his cannon, dispersed with ease the half-armed insurgents, and caused the leaders of the insurrection to be put to death, for having attempted to defend the independence of their country. He then seized on the persons of many inhabitants, and sent them to Paris as hostages for the subjection of their fellow-citizens.

The French general published a proclamation in the republican style, in which he reproaches the insurgents for presuming to use arms in defence of their country, and menaces with fire and sword whatever individuals should in future prosecute the same daring course. He made his threat good some weeks afterwards, when a similar insurrection took place in those districts called the Imperial fiefs, and still later, when an effort at resistance was attempted in the town of Lugo. On both occasions, the leaders of the armed inhabitants were tried by a military commission, condemned, and shot. On the last, indeed, to revenge the defeat sustained by a squadron of French dragoons, Lugo was taken by storm, pillaged, burnt, and the men put to the sword; while some credit seems to be taken by Bonaparte in his dispatches, for the clemency of the French, which spared the women and children.

It is impossible to read the account of these severities, without contrasting them with the opinions professed on other occasions, both by the repub-

* It has been alleged, that in a farce exhibited on the public stage by authority of Bonaparte, the pope was introduced in his pontifical dress. This, which could not be looked on as less than sacrilege by a catholic population, does not accord with the general conduct of Bonaparte. See, however, *Tableau des premières guerres de Bonaparte*, par le Chevalier Michaud de Vilette, p. 41 : Paris, 1815.

lican and imperial governments of France. The first of these exclaimed as at an unheard-of cruelty, when the Duke of Brunswick, in his celebrated proclamation, threatened to treat as a brigand every Frenchman, not being a soldier, whom he should find under arms, and to destroy such villages as should offer resistance to the invading army. The French at that time considered with justice, that if there is one duty more holy than another, it is that which calls on men to defend their native country against invasion. Napoleon, being emperor, was of the same opinion in the years 1813 and 1814, when the allies entered the French territories, and when, in various proclamations, he called on the inhabitants to rise against the invaders with the implements of their ordinary labour when they had no better arms, and "to shoot a foreigner as they would a wolf." It would be difficult to reconcile these invitations with the cruel vengeance taken on the town of Lugo, for observing a line of conduct which, in similar circumstances, Bonaparte so keenly and earnestly recommended to those whom fortune had made his own subjects.

The brief insurrection of Pavia suppressed by these severities, Bonaparte once more turned his thoughts to the strong position of the Austrians, with the purpose of reducing Beaulieu to a more decided state of disability, before he executed the threatened vengeance of the Republic on the sovereign pontiff. For this purpose he advanced to Brescia, and manœuvred in such a manner as induced Beaulieu, whom repeated surprises of the same kind had not put upon his guard, to believe, that either the French general intended to attempt the passage of the Mincio at the small but strong town of Peschiera, where that river issues from the Lago di Garda, or else that, marching northward along the eastern bank, he designed to come round the head of the lake, and thus turn the right of the Austrian position. While Beaulieu disposed his forces as expecting an attack on the right of his line, Bonaparte, with his usual celerity, proposed to attack him on the centre, at Borghetto, a town situated on the Mincio, and commanding a bridge over it, about ten miles lower than Peschiera.

On the 30th May, the French general attacked, with superior force, and repulsed across the Mincio, an Austrian corps who endeavoured to cover the town. The fugitives endeavoured to demolish the bridge, and did break down one of its arches. But the French, rushing forward with impetuosity, under cover of a heavy fire upon the retreating Austrians, repaired the broken arch so as to effect a passage, and the Mincio, passed as the Po and the Adda had been before, ceased in its turn to be a protection to the army drawn up behind it.

Beaulieu, who had his head-quarters at Valleggio, a village nearly opposite to Borghetto, hastened to retreat, and, evacuating Peschiera, marched his dismayed forces behind the Adige, leaving five hundred prisoners, with other trophies of victory, in the hands of the French. Bonaparte had designed that this day of success should have been still more decisive, for he meditated an attack upon Peschiera at the moment when the passage at Borghetto was accomplished; but ere Augereau, to

whom this manœuvre was committed, had time to approach Peschiera, it was evacuated by the Austrians, who were in full retreat by Castel Nuovo, protected by their cavalry.

The left of the Austrian line, cut off from the centre by the passage of the French, had been stationed at Puzzuolo, lower on the Mincio. When Sebottendorf, who commanded the Imperial troops stationed on the left bank, heard the cannonade, he immediately ascended the river, to assist his commander-in-chief to repel the French, or to take them in flank if it was already crossed. The retreat of Beaulieu made both purposes impossible; and yet this march of Sebottendorf had almost produced a result of greater consequence than would have been the most complete victory.

The French division which first crossed the Mincio had passed through Valleggio without halting, in pursuit of Beaulieu, by whom the village had been just before abandoned. Bonaparte with a small retinue remained in the place, and Masséna's division were still on the right bank of the Mincio, preparing their dinner. At this moment the advanced guard of Sebottendorf, consisting of hulans and husars, pushed into the village of Valleggio. There was but barely time to cry to arms, and, shutting the gates of the inn, to employ the general's small escort in its defence, while Bonaparte, escaping by the garden, mounted his horse, and galloped towards Masséna's division. The soldiers threw aside their cookery, and marched instantly against Sebottendorf, who, with much difficulty, and not without loss, effected a retreat in the same direction as his commander-in-chief, Beaulieu. This personal risk induced Bonaparte to form what he called the corps of guides, veterans of ten years' service at least, who were perpetually near his person, and, like the *Triarii* of the Romans, were employed only when the most desperate efforts of courage were necessary. Bessières, afterwards Duke of Istria, and Marshal of France, was placed at the head of this chosen body, which gave rise to the formation of the celebrated Imperial Guards of Napoleon.

The passage of the Mincio obliged the Austrians to retire within the frontier of the Tyrol; and they might have been considered as completely expelled from Italy, had not Mantua and the citadel of Milan still continued to display the Imperial banners. The castle of Milan was a place of no extraordinary strength, the surrender of which might be calculated on so soon as the general fate of war had declared itself against the present possessors. But Mantua was by nature one of those almost impregnable fortresses, which may long, relying on its own resources, defy any compulsion but that of famine.

The town and fortress of Mantua are situated on a species of island, five or six leagues square, called the Seraglio, produced by three lakes, which communicate with, or rather are formed by, the Mincio. This island has access to the land by five causeways, the most important of which was in 1796 defended by a regular citadel, called, from the vicinity of a ducal palace, La Favorita. Another was defended by an entrenched camp extending between the fortress and the lake. The third was protected by a hornwork. The remaining two cause-

ways were only defended by gates and drawbridges. Mantua, low in situation, and surrounded by water, in a warm climate, is naturally unhealthy; but the air was likely to be still more destructive to a besieging army (which necessarily lay in many respects more exposed to the elements, and were besides in greater numbers, and less habituated to the air of the place), than to a garrison who had been seasoned to it, and were well accommodated within the fortress.

To surprise a place so strong by a coup-de-main was impossible, though Bonaparte represents his soldiers as murmuring that such a desperate feat was not attempted. But he blockaded Mantua with a large force, and proceeded to take such other measures to improve his success as might pave the way to future victories. The garrison was numerous, amounting to from twelve to fourteen thousand men; and the deficiencies of the fortifications, which the Austrians had neglected in over security, were made up for by the natural strength of the place. Yet, of the five causeways, Bonaparte made himself master of four; and thus the enemy lost possession of all beyond the walls of the town and citadel, and had only the means of attaining the mainland through the citadel of La Favorita. Lines of circumvallation were formed, and Serrurier was left in blockade of the fortress, which the possession of four of the accesses enabled him to accomplish with a body of men inferior to the garrison.

To complete the blockade, it was necessary to come to some arrangement with the ancient republic of Venice. With this venerable government Napoleon had the power of working his own pleasure; for although the state might have raised a considerable army to assist the Austrians, to whom its senate, or aristocratic government, certainly bore good-will, yet, having been in amity with the French Republic, they deemed the step too hazardous, and, vainly trusting that their neutrality would be respected, they saw the Austrian power completely broken for the time, before they took any active measures either to stand in their defence, or to deprecate the wrath of the victor. But when the line of the Mincio was forced, and Bonaparte occupied the Venetian territory on the left bank, it was time to seek by concessions that deference to the rights of an independent country, which the once haughty aristocracy of Venice had lost a favourable opportunity of supporting by force.

There was one circumstance which rendered their cause unfavourable. Louis XVIII., under the title of a private person, the Count de Lille, had received the hospitality of the republic, and was permitted to remain at Verona, living in strict seclusion. The permission to entertain this distinguished exile the Venetian government had almost meditated from the French revolutionary rulers, in a manner which we would term mean, were it not for the goodness of the intention, which leads us to regard the conduct of the ancient mistress of the Adriatic with pity rather than contempt. But when the screen of the Austrian force no longer existed between the invading armies of France and the Venetian territories—when the final subjugation of the north of Italy was resolved on—the Directory per-

emptorily demanded, and the senate of Venice were obliged to grant, an order, removing the Count de Laile from the boundaries of the republic.

The illustrious exile protested against this breach of hospitality, and demanded, before parting, that his name, which had been placed on the golden book of the republic, should be erased, and that the armour presented by Henry IV. to Venice, should be restored to his descendant. Both demands were evaded, as might have been expected in the circumstances, and the future monarch of France left Verona on the 21st of April, 1796, for the army of the Prince of Condé, in whose ranks he proposed to place himself, without the purpose of assuming any command, but only that of fighting as a volunteer in the character of the first gentleman of France. Other less distinguished emigrants, to the number of several hundreds, who had found an asylum in Italy, were, by the successes at Lodi and Borghetto, compelled to fly to other countries.

Bonaparte, immediately after the battle of Borghetto, and the passage of the Mincio, occupied the town of Verona, and did not fail to intimate to its magistrates, that if the *prefet*, as he termed him, to the throne of France, had not left Verona before his arrival, he would have burnt to the ground a town which, acknowledging him as King of France, assumed, in doing so, the air of being itself the capital of that republic. This might, no doubt, sound gallant in Paris; but Bonaparte knew well that Louis of France was not received in the Venetian territory as the successor to his brother's throne, but only with the hospitality due to an unfortunate prince, who, suiting his claim and title to his situation, was content to shelter his head, as a private man might have done, from the evils which seemed to pursue him.

The neutrality of Venice was, however, for the time admitted, though not entirely from respect for the law of nations; for Bonaparte is at some pains to justify himself for not having seized without ceremony on the territories and resources of that republic, although a neutral power as far as her utmost exertions could preserve neutrality. He contented himself for the time with occupying Verona, and other dependencies of Venice upon the line of the Adige. "You are too weak," he said to the Provéditore Foscarelli, "to pretend to enforce neutrality with a few hundred Slavonians on two such nations as France and Austria. The Austrians have not respected your territory where it suited their purpose, and I must, in requital, occupy such part as falls within the line of the Adige."

But he considered that the Venetian territories to the westward should in policy be allowed to retain the character of neutral ground, which the government, as that of Venice was emphatically called, would not, for their own sakes, permit them to lose; while otherwise, if occupied by the French as conquerors, these timid neutrals might upon any reverse have resumed the character of fierce opponents. And, at all events, in order to secure a territory as a conquest, which, if respected as neutral, would secure itself, there would have been a necessity for dividing the French forces, which it was Bonaparte's wish to concentrate. From in-

terested motives, therefore, if not from respect to justice, Bonaparte deferred seizing the territory of Venice, when within his grasp, conscious that the total defeat of the Austrians in Italy would, when accomplished, leave the prey as attainable, and more defenceless than ever. Having disposed his army in its position, and prepared some of its divisions for the service which they were to perform as moveable columns, he returned to Milan to reap the harvest of his successes.

The first of these consisted in the defection of the King of Naples from the cause of Austria, to which, from family connexion, he had yet remained attached, though of late with less deep devotion. His cavalry had behaved better during the engagements on the Mincio, than has been of late the custom with Neapolitan troops, and had suffered accordingly. The king, discouraged with the loss, solicited an armistice, which he easily obtained; for his dominions being situated at the lower extremity of Italy, and his force extending to sixty thousand men at least, it was of importance to secure the neutrality of a power who might be dangerous, and who was not, as matters stood, under the immediate control of the French. A Neapolitan ambassador was sent to Paris to conclude a final peace; in the meanwhile, the soldiers of the King of the Two Sicilies were withdrawn from the army of Beaulieu, and returned to their own country. The dispositions of the court of Naples continued, nevertheless, to vacillate, as opportunity of advantage, joined with the hatred of the queen (sister of Marie Antoinette), or the fear of the French military superiority, seemed to predominate.

The storm now thickened round the devoted head of the pope. Ferrara and Bologna, the territories of which belonged to the Holy See, were occupied by the French troops. In the latter place, four hundred of the papal troops were made prisoners, with a cardinal who acted as their officer. The latter was dismissed on his parole. But when summoned to return to the French headquarters, his eminence declined to obey, and amused the republican officers a good deal, by alleging that the pope had dispensed with his engagement. Afterwards, however, there were officers of no mean rank in the French service, who could contrive to extricate themselves from the engagement of a parole, without troubling the pope for his interference on the occasion. Influenced by the approaching danger, the Court of Rome sent Azara, the Spanish minister, with full powers to treat for an armistice. It was a remarkable part of Bonaparte's character, that he knew as well when to forbear as when to strike. Rome, it was true, was an enemy whom France, or at least its present rulers, both hated and despised, but the moment was then inopportune for the prosecution of their resentment. To have detached a sufficient force in that direction, would have weakened the French army in the north of Italy, where fresh bodies of German troops were already arriving, and might have been attended with great ultimate risk, since there was a possibility that the English might have transported to Italy the forces which they were about to withdraw from Corsica, amounting to six thousand men. But though these

considerations recommended to Napoleon a negotiation with the pope, his holiness was compelled to purchase the armistice at a severe rate. Twenty-one millions of francs, in actual specie, with large contributions in forage and military stores, the cession of Ancona, Bologna, and Ferrara, not forgetting one hundred of the finest pictures, statues, and similar objects of art, to be selected according to the choice of the committee of artists who attended the French army, were the price of a respite which was not of long duration. It was particularly stipulated, with republican ostentation, that the busts of the elder and younger Brutus were to be among the number of ceded articles; and it was in this manner that Bonaparte made good his vaunt, of establishing in the Roman capitol the statues of the illustrious and classical dead.

The Archduke of Tuscany was next to undergo the republican discipline. It is true, that prince had given no offence to the French Republic; on the contrary, he had claims of merit with them, from having been the very first power in Europe who acknowledged them as a legal government, and having ever since been in strict amity with them. It seemed also, that while justice required he should be spared, the interest of the French themselves did not oppose the conclusion. His country could have no influence on the fate of the impending war, being situated on the western side of the Apennines. In these circumstances, to have seized on his museum, however tempting, or made requisitions on his territories, would have appeared unjust towards the earliest ally of the French Republic; so Bonaparte contented himself with seizing on the Grand Duke's seaport of Leghorn, confiscating the English goods which his subjects had imported, and entirely ruining the once flourishing commerce of the dukedom. It was a principal object with the French to seize the British merchant vessels, who, confiding in the respect due to a neutral power, were lying in great numbers in the harbour; but the English merchantmen had such early intelligence as enabled them to set sail for Corsica, although a very great quantity of valuable goods fell into the possession of the French.

While the French general was thus violating the neutrality of the Grand Duke, occupying by surprise his valuable seaport, and destroying the commerce of his state, the unhappy prince was compelled to receive him at Florence, with all the respect due to a valued friend, and profess the utmost obligation to him for his lenity, while Mauffredini, the Tuscan minister, endeavoured to throw a veil of decency over the transactions at Leghorn, by allowing that the English were more masters in that port than was the Grand Duke himself. Bonaparte disdained to have recourse to any paltry apologies. "The French flag," he said, "has been insulted in Leghorn—You are not strong enough to cause it to be respected. The Directory has commanded me to occupy the place." Shortly after, Bonaparte, during an entertainment given to him by the Grand Duke, at Florence, received intelligence that the citadel of Milan had at length surrendered. He rubbed his hands with self-congratulation, and turning to the Grand Duke, observed, "that the emperor, his brother,

had now lost his last possession in Lombardy."

When we read of the exactions and indignities to which the strong reduce the weak, it is impossible not to remember the simile of Napoleon himself, who compared the alliance of France and an inferior state, to a giant embracing a dwarf. "The poor dwarf," he added, "may probably be suffocated in the arms of his friend; but the giant does not mean it, and cannot help it."

While Bonaparte made truce with several of the old states in Italy, or rather adjourned their destruction in consideration of large contributions, he was far from losing sight of the main object of the French Directory, which was to cause the adjacent governments to be revolutionized and new-modelled on a republican form, corresponding to that of the Great Nation herself.

This scheme was, in every respect, an exceedingly artful one. In every state which the French might overrun or conquer, there must occur, as we have already repeatedly noticed, men fitted to form the members of revolutionary government, and who, from their previous situation and habits, must necessarily be found eager to do so. Such men are sure to be supported by the rabble of large towns, who are attracted by the prospect of plunder, and by the splendid promises of liberty, which they always understand as promising the equalization of property. Thus provided with materials for their edifice, the bayonets of the French army were of strength sufficient to prevent the task from being interrupted, and the French Republic had soon to greet sister states, under the government of men who held their offices by the pleasure of France, and who were obliged, therefore, to comply with all her requisitions, however unreasonable.

This arrangement afforded the French government an opportunity of deriving every advantage from the subordinate republics, which could possibly be drained out of them, without at the same time incurring the odium of making the exactions in their own name. It is a custom in some countries, when a cow who has lost her calf will not yield her milk freely, to place before the refractory animal the skin of her young one stuffed, so as to have some resemblance to life. The cow is deceived by this imposture, and yields to be milked upon seeing this representative of her offspring. In like manner, the show of independence assigned to the Batavian, and other associated republics, enabled France to drain these countries of supplies, which, while they had the appearance of being given to the governments of those who granted the supplies, passed, in fact, into the hands of their engrossing ally. Bonaparte was sufficiently aware that it was expected from him to extend the same system to Italy, and to accelerate, in the conquered countries of that fertile land, this species of political regeneration; but it would appear that, upon the whole, he thought the soil scarcely prepared for a republican harvest. He mentions, no doubt, that the natives of Bologna and Reggio, and other districts, were impatient to unite with the French as allies and intimate friends; but even these expressions are so limited as to make it plain that the feelings of the Italians in general were not as yet favourable to that revolution which the Di-

rectory desired, and which he endeavoured to forward.

He had, indeed, in all his proclamations, declared to the inhabitants of the invaded countries, that his war was not waged with them but with their governments, and had published the strictest orders for the discipline to be observed by his followers. But though this saved the inhabitants from immediate violence at the hand of the French soldiery, it did not diminish the weight of the requisitions with which the country at large was burthened, and to which poor and rich had to contribute their share. They were pillaged with regularity, and by order, but they were not the less pillaged; and Bonaparte himself has informed us that the necessity of maintaining the French army at their expense very much retarded the march of French principles in Italy. "You cannot," he says, with much truth, "at the same moment strip a people of their substance, and persuade them, while doing so, that you are their friend and benefactor."

He mentions also, in the St Helena manuscripts, the regret expressed by the wise and philosophical part of the community, that the revolution of Rome, the source and director of superstitious opinions, had not been commenced; but frankly admits that the time was not come for going to such extremities, and that he was contented with plundering the Roman See of its money and valuables, waiting until the fit moment should arrive of totally destroying that ancient hierarchy.

It was not without difficulty that Bonaparte could bring the Directory to understand and relish these temporising measures. They had formed a false idea of the country, and of the state and temper of the people, and were desirous at once to revolutionize Rome, Naples, and Tuscany.

Napoleon, more prudently, left these extensive regions under the direction of their old and feeble governments, whom he compelled in the interim to supply him with money and contributions, in exchange for a protracted existence, which he intended to destroy so soon as the fit opportunity should offer itself. What may be thought of this policy in diplomacy, we pretend not to say; but in private life it would be justly branded as altogether infamous. In point of morality, it resembles the conduct of a robber, who, having exacted the surrender of the traveler's property, as a ransom for his life, concludes his violence by murder. It is alleged, and we have little doubt with truth, that the pope was equally insincere, and struggled only, by immediate submission, to prepare for the hour, when the Austrians should strengthen their power in Italy. But it is the duty of the historian loudly to proclaim, that the bad faith of one party in a treaty forms no excuse for that of the other; and that national contracts ought to be, especially on the stronger side, as pure in their intent, and executed as rigidly, as if those with whom they were contracted were held to be equally sincere in their propositions. If the more powerful party judge otherwise, the means are in their hand to continue the war; and they ought to encounter their more feeble enemy by detection, and punishment of his fraud, not by anticipating the same deceitful course which their opponent has

resorted to in the consciousness of his weakness,—like a hare which doubles before the hounds when she has no other hope of escape. It will be well with the world, when falsehood and finesse are as thoroughly exploded in international communication, as they are among individuals in all civilized countries.

But though those states, whose sovereigns could afford to pay for forbearance, were suffered for a time to remain under their ancient governments, it might have been thought that Lombardy, from which the Austrians had been almost totally driven, and where, of course, there was no one to compound with on the part of the old government, would have been made an exception. Accordingly, the French faction in these districts, with all the numerous class who were awakened by the hope of national independence, expected impatiently the declaration of their freedom from the Austrian yoke, and their erection, under the protection of France, into a republic on the same model with that of the Great Nation. But although Bonaparte encouraged men who held these opinions, and writers who supported them, he had two weighty reasons for procrastinating on this point. First, if France unumitted Lombardy, and converted her from a conquered province into an ally, she must in consistency have abstained from demanding of the liberated country those supplies, by which Bonaparte's army was entirely paid and supported. Again, if this difficulty could be got over, there remained the secret purpose of the Directory to be considered. They had determined, when they should make peace with the Emperor of Austria, to exact the cession of Belgium and the territory of Luxembourg, as provinces lying convenient to France, and had resolved, that, under certain circumstances, they would even give up Lombardy again to his dominion, rather than not obtain these more desirable objects. To erect a new republic in the country which they were prepared to restore to its former sovereign, would have been to throw a bar in the way of their own negotiation. Bonaparte had therefore the difficult task of at once encouraging, on the part of the republicans of Lombardy, the principles which induced them to demand a separate government, and of soothing them to expect with patience events, which he was secretly conscious might possibly never come to pass. The final issue shall be told elsewhere. It may be just necessary to observe, that the conduct of the French towards the republicans whom they had formed no predetermination to support, was as uncandid as towards the ancient governments whom they treated with. They sold to the latter false hopes of security, and encouraged the former to express sentiments and opinions, which must have exposed them to ruin, in case of the restoration of Lombardy to its old rulers, an event which the Directory all along contemplated in secret. Such is, in almost all cases, the risk incurred by a domestic faction, who trust to carry their peculiar objects in the bosom of their own country by means of a foreign nation. Their too powerful auxiliaries are ever ready to sacrifice them to their own views of emolument.

Having noticed the effect of Bonaparte's short

but brilliant campaign on other states, we must observe the effects which his victories produced on Austria herself. These were entirely consistent with her national character. The same tardiness which has long made the government of Austria slow in availing themselves of advantageous circumstances, cautious in their plans, and unwilling to adopt, or indeed to study to comprehend, a new system of tactics, even after having repeatedly experienced its terrible efficacies, is combined with the better qualities of firm determination, resolute endurance, and unquenchable spirit. The Austrian slowness and obstinacy, which have sometimes threatened them with ruin, have, on the other hand, often been compensated by their firm perseverance and courage in adversity.

Upon the present occasion, Austria showed ample demonstration of the various qualities we have ascribed to her. The rapid and successive victories of Bonaparte appeared to her only the rash flight of an eaglet, whose juvenile audacity had over-estimated the strength of his pinion. The Imperial Council resolved to sustain their diminished force in Italy, with such reinforcements as might enable them to reassume the complete superiority over the French, though at the risk of weakening their armies on the Rhine. Fortune in that quarter, though of a various complexion, had been on the whole more advantageous to the Austrians than elsewhere, and seemed to authorize the detaching considerable reinforcements from the eastern frontier, on which they had been partially victorious, to Italy, where, since Bonaparte had descended from the Alps, they had been uniformly unfortunate.

Beaulieu, aged and unlucky, was no longer considered as a fit opponent to his inventive, young, and active adversary. He was as full of displeasure, it is said, against the Aulic Council, for the associates whom they had assigned him, as they could be with him for his bad success.* He was recalled, therefore, in that species of disgrace which misfortune never fails to infer, and the command of his remaining forces, now drawn back and secured within the passes of the Tyrol, was provisionally assigned to the veteran Melas.

Meanwhile Wurmser, accounted one of the best of the Austrian generals, was ordered to place him-

self at the head of thirty thousand men from the Imperial forces on the Rhine, and, traversing the Tyrol, and collecting what recruits he could in that warlike district, to assume the command of the Austrian army, which, expelled from Italy, now lay upon its frontiers, and might be supposed eager to resume their national supremacy in the fertile climates out of which they had been so lately driven.

Aware of the storm which was gathering, Bonaparte made every possible effort to carry Mantua before the arrival of the formidable Austrian army, whose first operation would doubtless be to raise the siege of that important place. A scheme to take the city and castle by surprise, by a detachment which should pass to the Seraglio, or islet on which Mantua is situated, by night and in boats, having totally failed, Bonaparte was compelled to open trenches, and proceed as by regular siege. The Austrian general, Canto d'Iries, when summoned to surrender it, replied that his orders were to defend the place to extremity. Napoleon, on his side, assembled all the battering ordnance which could be collected from the walls of the neighbouring cities and fortresses, and the attack and defence commenced in the most vigorous manner on both sides; the French making every effort to reduce the city before Wurmser should open his campaign; the governor determined to protract his resistance, if possible, until he was relieved by the advance of that general. But although red-hot balls were expended in profusion, and several desperate and bloody assaults and sallies took place, many more battles were to be fought, and much more blood expended, before Bonaparte was fated to succeed in this important object.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Campaign on the Rhine—General plan.—Wartensleben and the Archduke Charles retire before Jourdan and Moreau.—The Archduke forms a junction with Wartensleben, and defeats Jourdan, who retires.—Moreau, also, makes his celebrated retreat through the Black Forest.—Bonaparte raises the siege of Mantua, and defeats the Austrians at Salo and Lonato.—Misbehaviour of the French General, Valette, at Castiglione.—Lonato taken, with the French artillery, on 3d August.—Retaken by Masséna and Augereau.—Singular escape of Bonaparte from being captured at Lonato.—Wurmser defeated between Lonato and Castiglione, and retreats on Trent and Roveredo.—Bonaparte resumes his position before Mantua.—Effects of the French victories on the different Italian States.—Inflexibility of Austria.—Wurmser recruited.—Battle of Roveredo.—French victorious, and Masséna occupies Trent.—Bonaparte defeats Wurmser at Primolano—and at Bassano, 8th September.—Wurmser flies to Vicenza.—Battle of Arcola.—Wurmser finally shut up within the walls of Mantua.

THE reader must, of course, be aware, that Italy, through which we are following the victorious career of Napoleon, was not the only scene of war betwixt France and Austria, but that a field of equally strenuous and much more doubtful contest was opened upon the Rhine, where the high military talents of the Archduke Charles were opposed to those of Moreau and Jourdan, the French generals.

* The following letter appears in the journals as an intercepted dispatch from Beaulieu to the Aulic Council of War. It is perhaps supposititious, but seems worthy of preservation, as expressing the irritated feelings with which the veteran general was certainly affected, whether he wrote the letter in question or not. It will be recollected, that d'Argenteau, of whom he complains, was the cause of his original misfortunes at Monte Notte. See p. 1834. "I asked you for a general, and you have sent me Argenteau—I am quite aware that he is a great lord, and that he is to be created Field-marshal of the Empire, to atone for my having placed him under arrest.—I apprise you that I have no more than twenty thousand men remaining, and that the French are sixty thousand strong. I apprise you farther, that I will retreat to-morrow—next day—the day after that—and every day—even to Siberia itself, if they pursue me so far. My age gives me right to speak out the truth. Hasten to make peace on any conditions whatsoever."—*Moniteur*, 17th. No. 209.

The plan which the Directory had adopted for the campaign of 1796 was of a gigantic character, and menaced Austria, their most powerful enemy upon the Continent, with nothing short of total destruction. It was worthy of the genius of Carnot, by whom it was formed, and of Napoleon and Moreau, by whom it had been revised and approved. Under sanction of this general plan, Bonaparte regulated the Italian campaign in which he had proved so successful; and it had been schemed, that to allow Austria no breathing space, Moreau, with the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, should press forward on the western frontier of Germany, supported on the left by Jourdan, at the head of the Army of the Rhine, and that both generals should continue to advance, until Moreau should be in a position to communicate with Bonaparte through the Tyrol. When this junction of the whole forces of France, in the centre of the Austrian dominions, was accomplished, it was Carnot's ultimate plan that they should advance upon Vienna, and dictate peace to the emperor under the walls of his capital.

Of this great project, the part intrusted to Bonaparte was completely executed, and for some time the fortune of war seemed equally auspicious to France upon the Rhine as in Italy. Moreau and Jourdan crossed that great national boundary at Neuweid and Kebl, and moved eastward through Germany, forming a connected front of more than sixty leagues in breadth, until Moreau had actually crossed the river Leck, and was almost touching with his right flank the passes of the Tyrol, through which he was, according to the plan of the campaign, to have communicated with Bonaparte.

During this advance of two hostile armies, amounting each to seventy-five thousand men, which filled all Germany with consternation, the Austrian leader Wartensleben was driven from position to position by Jourdan, while the Archduke Charles was equally unable to maintain his ground before Moreau. The Imperial generals were reduced to this extremity by the loss of the army, consisting of from thirty to thirty-five thousand men, who had been detached under Wurmser to support the remains of Beaulieu's forces, and reinstate the Austrian affairs in Italy, and who were now on their march through the Tyrol for that purpose. But the archduke was an excellent and enterprising officer, and at this important period he saved the empire of Austria by a bold and decided manœuvre. Leaving a large part of his army to make head against Moreau, or at least to keep him in check, the archduke moved to the right with the rest, so as to form a junction with Wartensleben, and overwhelm Jourdan with a local superiority of numbers, being the very principle on which the French themselves achieved so many victories. Jourdan was totally defeated, and compelled to make a hasty and disorderly retreat, which was rendered disastrous by the insurrection of the German peasantry around his fugitive army. Moreau, also unable to maintain himself in the heart of Germany, when Jourdan, with the army which covered his left flank, was defeated, was likewise under the necessity of retiring, but conducted his retrograde movement with such dexterity, that his retreat through the Black

Forest, where the Austrians hoped to cut him off, has been always judged worthy to be compared to a great victory. Such were the proceedings on the Rhine, and in the interior of Germany, which must be kept in view as influencing, at first by the expected success of Moreau and Jourdan, and afterwards by their actual failure, the movements of the Italian army.

As the divisions of Wurmser's army began to arrive on the Tyrolese district of Trent, where the Austrian general had fixed his head-quarters, Bonaparte became urgent, either that reinforcements should be dispatched to him from France, or that the armies on the Rhine should make such a movement in advance towards the point where they might co-operate with him, as had been agreed upon at arranging the original plan of the campaign. But he obtained no succours; and though the campaign on the Rhine commenced, as we have seen, in the month of June, yet that period was too late to afford any diversion in favour of Napoleon, Wurmser and his whole reinforcements being already either by that time arrived, or on the point of arriving, at the place where they were to commence operations against the French army of Italy.

The thunder-cloud which had been so long blackening on the mountains of the Tyrol seemed now about to discharge its fury. Wurmser, having under his command perhaps eighty thousand men, was about to march from Trent against the French, whose forces, amounting to scarce half so many, were partly engaged in the siege of Mantua, and partly dispersed in the towns and villages on the Adige and Chiese, for covering the division of Serrurier, which carried on the siege. The Austrian veteran, confident in his numbers, was only anxious so to regulate his advance as to derive the most conclusive consequences from the victory which he doubted not to obtain.—With an imprudence which the misfortunes of Beaulieu ought to have warned him against, he endeavoured to occupy with the divisions of his army so large an extent of country as rendered it very difficult for them to maintain their communications with each other. This was particularly the case with his right wing, under Qunadonowich, the Prince of Reuss, and General Ocsaky, who were detached down the valley of the river Chiese, with orders to direct their march on Brescia. This division was destined to occupy Brescia, and cut off the retreat of the French in the direction of Milan. The left wing of Wurmser's army, under Melas, was to descend the Adige by both banks at once, and manœuvre on Verona, while the centre, commanded by the Austrian field-marshal in person, was to march southward by the left bank of the Lago di Garda, take possession of Peschiera, which the French occupied, and, descending the Mincio, relieve the siege of Mantua. There was this radical error in the Austrian plan, that, by sending Qunadonowich's division by the valley of Chiese, Wurmser placed the broad lake of Garda, occupied by a French flotilla, between his right wing and the rest of his army, and of course made it impossible for the centre and left to support Qunadonowich, or even to have intelligence of his motions or his fate.

The active invention of Bonaparte, sure as he

was to be seconded by the zeal and rapidity of the French army, speedily devised the means to draw advantage from this dislocation of the Austrian forces. He resolved not to await the arrival of Wurmser and Melas, but, concentrating his whole strength, to march into the valley of Chiese, and avail himself of the local superiority thus obtained, to attack and overpower the Austrian division left under Quasdonowich, who was advancing on Brescia, down the eastern side of the lake. For this purpose one great sacrifice was necessary. The plan inevitably involved the raising of the siege of Mantua. Napoleon did not hesitate to relinquish this great object at whatever loss, as it was his uniform system to sacrifice all secondary views, and to incur all lesser hazards, to secure what he considered as the main object of the campaign. Serrurier, who commanded the blockading army, was hastily ordered to destroy as much as possible of the cannon and stores which had been collected with so much pains for the prosecution of the siege. A hundred guns were abandoned in the trenches, and Wurmser, on arriving at Mantua, found that Bonaparte had retired with a precipitation resembling that of fear.

On the night of the 31st July this operation took place, and, leaving the division of Augereau at Borghetto, and that of Masséna at Peschiera, to protect, while it was possible, the line of the Mincio, Bonaparte rushed, at the head of an army which his combinations had rendered superior, upon the right wing of the Austrians, which had already directed its march to Lonato, near the bottom of the Lago di Guarda, in order to approach the Mincio, and resume its communication with Wurmser. But Bonaparte, placed by the celerity of his movements between the two hostile armies, defeated one division of the Austrian right at Salò, upon the lake, and another at Lonato. At the same time, Augereau and Masséna, leaving just enough of men at their posts of Borghetto and Peschiera to maintain a respectable defence against Wurmser, made a forced march to Brescia, which was occupied by another division of the Austrian right wing. But that body, finding itself insulated, and conceiving that the whole French army was debouching on them from different points, was already in full retreat towards the Tyrol, from which it had advanced with the expectation of turning Bonaparte's flank, and destroying his retreat upon Milan. Some French troops were left to accelerate their flight, and prevent their again making head, while Masséna and Augereau, rapidly countermarching, returned to the banks of the Mincio to support their respective rear-guards, which they had left at Borghetto and Peschiera, on the line of that river.

They received intelligence, however, which induced them to halt upon this counter-march. Both rear-guards had been compelled to retire from the line of the Mincio, of which river the Austrians had forced the passage. The rear-guard of Masséna, under General Pignon, had fallen back in good order, so as to occupy Lonato; that of Augereau fled with precipitation and confusion, and failed to make a stand at Castiglione, which was occupied by Austrians, who entrenched themselves there. Valette, the general who commanded this body, was de-

prived of his commission in presence of his troops for misbehaviour, an example which the gallantry of the French generals rendered extremely infrequent in their service.

Wurmser became now seriously anxious about the fate of his right wing, and determined to force a communication with Quasdonowich at all risks. But he could only attain the valley of the Chiese, and the right bank of the Lago di Guarda, by breaking a passage through the divisions of Masséna and Augereau. On the 3d of August, at break of day, two divisions of Austrians, who had crossed the Mincio in pursuit of Pignon and Valette, now directed themselves, with the most determined resolution, on the French troops, in order to clear the way between the commander-in-chief and his right wing.

The late rear-guard of Masséna, which, by his counter-march, had now become his advanced guard, was defeated, and Lonato, the place which they occupied, was taken by the Austrians, with the French artillery, and the general officer who commanded them. But the Austrian general, thus far successful, fell into the great error of extending his line too much towards the right, in order, doubtless, if possible, to turn the French position on their left flank, thereby the sooner to open a communication with his own troops on the right bank of the Lago di Guarda, to force which had been his principal object in the attack. But in thus manœuvring he weakened his centre, an error of which Masséna instantly availed himself. He formed two strong columns under Augereau, with which he redeemed the victory, by breaking through and dividing the Austrian line, and retaking Lonato at the point of the bayonet. The manœuvre is indeed a simple one, and the same by which, ten years afterwards, Bonaparte gained the battle of Austerlitz; but it requires the utmost promptitude and presence of mind to seize the exact moment for executing such a daring measure to advantage. If it is but partially successful, and the enemy retains steadiness, it is very perilous; since the attacking column, instead of flanking the broken divisions of the opposite line, may be itself flanked by decided officers and determined troops, and thus experience the disaster which it was their object to occasion to the enemy. On the present occasion, the attack on the centre completely succeeded. The Austrians, finding their line cut asunder, and their flanks pressed by the victorious columns of the French, fell into total disorder. Some, who were farthest to the right, pushed forward, in hopes to unite themselves to Quasdonowich, and what they might find remaining of the original right wing; but these were attacked in front by General Soret, who had been active in defeating Quasdonowich upon the 31st July, and were at the same time pursued by another detachment of the French, which had broken through their centre.

Such was the fate of the Austrian right at the battle of Lonato, while that of the left was no less unfavourable. They were attacked by Augereau with the utmost bravery, and driven from Castiglione, of which they had become masters by the bad conduct of Valette. Augereau achieved this important result at the price of many brave men's

lives; but it was always remembered as an essential service by Bonaparte, who afterwards, when such dignities came in use, bestowed on Augereau the title of Duke of Castiglione. After their defeat, there can be nothing imagined more confused or calamitous than the condition of the Austrian divisions, who, having attacked, without resting on each other, found themselves opposed and finally overwhelmed by an enemy who appeared to possess ubiquity, simply from his activity and power of combining his forces.

A remarkable instance of their lamentable state of disorder and confusion, resembling in its consequences more than one example of the same sort, occurred at Lonato. It might, with any briskness of intelligence, or firmness of resolution, have proved a decisive advantage to their arms; it was, in its result, a humiliating illustration how completely the succession of bad fortune had broken the spirit of the Austrian soldiers. The reader can hardly have forgotten the incident at the battle of Millesimo, when an Austrian column which had been led astray, retook, as if it were by chance, the important village of Dego;* or the more recent instance, when a body of Sebottendorf's advanced guard, alike unwittingly, had nearly made Bonaparte prisoner in his quarters.† The present danger arose from the same cause, the confusion and want of combination of the enemy; and now, as in the former perilous occurrences, the very same circumstances which brought on the danger, served to ward it off.

A body of four or five thousand Austrians, partly composed of those who had been cut off at the battle of Lonato, partly of stragglers from Quidonovich, received information from the peasantry, that the French troops, having departed in every direction to improve their success, had only left a garrison of twelve hundred men in the town of Lonato. The commander of the division resolved instantly to take possession of the town, and thus to open his march to the Mincio, to join Wurmser. Now, it happened that Bonaparte himself, coming from Castiglione with only his staff for protection, had just entered Lonato. He was surprised when an Austrian officer was brought before him blindfolded, as is the custom on such occasions, who summoned the French commandant of Lonato to surrender to a superior force of Austrians, who, he stated, were already forming columns of attack to carry the place by irresistible force of numbers. Bonaparte, with admirable presence of mind, collected his numerous staff around him, caused the officer's eyes to be unbandaged, that he might see in whose presence he stood, and upbraided him with the insolence of which he had been guilty, in bringing a summons of surrender to the French commander-in-chief in the middle of his army. The credulous officer, recognizing the presence of Bonaparte, and believing it impossible that he could be there without at least a strong division of his army, stammered out an apology, and returned to persuade his dispirited commander to surrender himself, and the four thousand men and upwards

whom he commanded, to the comparatively small force which occupied Lonato. They grounded their arms accordingly, to one-fourth of their number, and missed an inviting and easy opportunity of carrying Bonaparte prisoner to Wurmser's headquarters.

The Austrian general himself, whose splendid army was thus destroyed in detail, had been hitherto employed in revictualing Mantua, and throwing in supplies of every kind; besides which, a large portion of his army had been detached in the vain pursuit of Serrurier, and the troops lately engaged in the siege, who had retreated towards Marcara. When Wurmser learned the disasters of his right wing, and the destruction of the troops dispatched to form a communication with it, he sent to recal the division which we have mentioned, and advanced against the French position between Lonato and Castiglione, with an army still numerous, notwithstanding the reverses which it had sustained. But Bonaparte had not left the interval unimproved. He had recalled Serrurier from Marcara, to assail the left wing and the flank of the Austrian field-marshal. The opening of Serrurier's fire was a signal for a general attack on all points of Wurmser's line. He was defeated, and nearly made prisoner; and it was not till after suffering great losses in the retreat and pursuit, that he gained with difficulty Trent and Roveredo, the positions adjacent to the Tyrol, from which he had so lately sallied with such confidence of victory. He had lost perhaps one half of his fine army, and the only consolation which remained was, that he had thrown supplies into the fortress of Mantua. His troops also no longer had the masculine confidence which is necessary to success in war. They were no longer proud of themselves and of their commanders; and those, especially, who had sustained so many losses under Beaulieu, could hardly be brought to do their duty, in circumstances where it seemed that destiny itself was fighting against them.

The Austrians are supposed to have lost nearly forty thousand men in these disastrous battles. The French must have at least suffered the loss of one fourth of the number, though Bonaparte confesses only to seven thousand men; and their army, desperately fatigued by so many marches, such constant fighting, and the hardships of a campaign, where even the general for seven days never laid aside his clothes, or took any regular repose, required some time to recover their physical strength.

Meantime, Napoleon resumed his position before Mantua; but the want of battering cannon, and the commencement of the unhealthy heats of autumn, amid lakes and inundations, besides the great chance of a second attack on the part of Wurmser, induced him to limit his measures to a simple blockade, which, however, was so strict as to retain the garrison within the walls of the place, and cut them off even from the islet called the Seraglio.

The events of this hurried campaign threw light on the feelings of the different states of Italy. Lombardy in general remained quiet, and the citizens of Milan seemed so well affected to the French, that Bonaparte, after the victory of Castiglione, returned

* See page 184-5.

† See page 197.

them his thanks in the name of the Republic. But at Pavia, and elsewhere, a very opposite disposition was evinced; and at Ferrara, the cardinal Mattei, archbishop of that town, made some progress in exciting an insurrection. His apology, when introduced to Bonaparte's presence to answer for his conduct, consisted in uttering the single word *Peccavi!* and Napoleon, soothed by his submission, imposed no punishment on him for his offence, but, on the contrary, used his mediation in some negotiations with the court of Rome. Yet though the Bishop of Ferrara, overawed and dejected, was permitted to escape, the conduct of his superior, the pope, who had shown vacillation in his purposes of submission, when he heard of the temporary raising of the siege of Mantua, was carefully noted and remembered for animadversion, when a suitable moment should occur.

Nothing is more remarkable, during these campaigns, than the inflexibility of Austria, which, reduced to the extremity of distress by the advance of Moreau and Jourdan into her territories, stood nevertheless on the defensive at every point, and by extraordinary exertions again recruited Wurmser with fresh troops, to the amount of twenty thousand men; which reinforcement enabled that general, though under no more propitious star, again to resume the offensive; by advancing from the Tyrol. Wurmser, with less confidence than before, hoped now to relieve the siege of Mantua a second time, and at a less desperate cost, by removing from Trent towards Mantua, through the defiles formed by the river Brenta. This manoeuvre he proposed to execute with thirty thousand men, while he left twenty thousand, under General Davidowich, in a strong position at or near Roveredo, for the purpose of covering the Tyrol; an invasion of which district, on the part of the French, must have added much to the general panic which already astounded Germany, from the apprehended advance of Moreau and Jourdan from the banks of the Rhine.

Bonaparte penetrated the design of the veteran general, and suffered him without disturbance to march towards Bassano upon the Brenta, in order to occupy the line of operations on which he intended to manoeuvre, with the secret intention that he would himself assume the offensive, and overwhelm Davidowich as soon as the distance betwixt them precluded a communication betwixt that general and Wurmser. He left General Kilmaine, an officer of Irish extraction, in whom he reposed confidence, with about three thousand men, to cover the siege of Mantua, by posting himself under the walls of Verona, while, concentrating a strong body of forces, Napoleon marched upon the town of Roveredo, situated in the valley of the Adige, and having in its rear the strong position of Calliano. The town is situated on the high-road to Trent, and Davidowich lay there with twenty-five thousand Austrians, intended to protect the Tyrol, while Wurmser moved down the Brenta, which runs in the same direction with the Adige, but at about thirty miles' distance, so that no communication for mutual support could take place between Wurmser and his lieutenant-general. It was upon Davidowich that Bonaparte first meant to pour his thunder.

The battle of Roveredo, fought upon the fourth of September, was one of that great general's splendid days. Before he could approach the town, one of his divisions had to force the strongly entrenched camp of Mori, where the enemy made a desperate defence. Another attacked the Austrians on the opposite bank of the Adige (for the action took place on both sides of the river), until the enemy at length retreated, still fighting desperately. Napoleon sent his orders to General Dubois, to charge with the first regiment of hussars—he did so, and broke the enemy, but fell mortally wounded with three balls. "I die," he said, "for the Republic—bring me but tidings that the victory is certain."

The retreating enemy were driven through the town of Roveredo, without having it in their power to make a stand. The extreme strength of the position of Calliano seemed to afford them rallying ground. The Adige is there bordered by precipitous mountains, approaching so near its course, as only to leave a pass of forty toises' breadth between the river and the precipice, which opening was defended by a village, a castle, and a strong defensive wall resting upon the rock, all well garnished with artillery. The French, in their enthusiasm of victory, could not be stopped even by these obstacles. Eight pieces of light artillery were brought forward, under cover of which the infantry charged and carried this strong position; so little do natural advantages avail when the minds of the assailants are influenced with an opinion that they are irresistible, and those of the defenders are depressed by a uniform and uninterrupted course of defeat. Six or seven thousand prisoners, and fifteen pieces of cannon captured, were the fruits of this splendid victory; and Masséna the next morning took possession of Trent in the Tyrol, so long the strong-hold where Wurmser had maintained his head-quarters.

The wrecks of Davidowich's army fled deeper into the Tyrol, and took up their position at Lavisa, a small village on a river of a similar name, about three leagues to the northward of Trent, and situated in the principal road which communicates with Brixen and Innsbruck. Bonaparte instantly pursued them with a division of his army, commanded by Vaubois, and passed the Lavisa with his cavalry, while the enemy were amused with an assault upon the bridge. Thus he drove them from their position, which, being the entrance of one of the chief defiles of the Tyrol, it was of importance to secure, and it was occupied accordingly by Vaubois with his victorious division.

Bonaparte, in consequence of his present condition, became desirous to conciliate the martial inhabitants of the Tyrol, and published a proclamation, in which he exhorted them to lay down their arms, and return to their homes; assuring them of protection against military violence, and labouring to convince them, that they had themselves no interest in the war, which he waged against the emperor and his government, but not against his subjects. That his conduct might appear to be of a piece with his reasoning, Napoleon issued an edict, disuniting the principality of Trent from the German empire, and annexing it in point of sovereignty to the French Republic, while he intrusted, or seemed to intrust,

the inhabitants themselves, with the power of administering their own laws and government.

Bounties which depended on the gift of an armed enemy, appeared very suspicious to the Tyrolese, who were aware that in fact the order of a French officer would be more effectual law, whenever that nation had the power, than that of any administrator of civil affairs whom they might themselves be permitted to chuse. As for the proclamation, the French general might as well have wasted his eloquence on the rocks of the country. The Tyrol, one of the earliest possessions of the house of Austria, had been uniformly governed by those princes with strict respect to the privileges of the inhabitants, who were possessed already of complete personal freedom. Secured in all the immunities which were necessary for their comfort, these sagacious peasants saw nothing to expect from the hand of a stranger general, excepting what Bonaparte himself has termed, those vexations necessarily annexed to a country which becomes the seat of war, and which, in more full detail, include whatever the avarice of the general, the necessities of the soldiers, not to mention the more violent outrage of marauders and plunderers, may chuse to exact from the inhabitants. But, besides this prudent calculation of consequences, the Tyrolese felt the generous spirit of national independence, and resolved that their mountains should not be dishonoured by the march of an armed enemy, if the unerring rifle-guns of their children were able to protect their native soil from such indignity. Every mode of resistance was prepared; and it was then that those piles of rocks, stones, and trunks of trees, were collected on the verge of the precipices which lie the valley of the Ino, and other passes of the Tyrol, but which remained in grim repose till rolled down, to the utter annihilation of the French and Bavarian invaders in 1809, under the direction of the valiant Hoffer and his companions in arms.

More successful with the sword than the pen, Bonaparte had no sooner disposed of Davidowich and his army, than he began his operations against Wurmser himself, who had by this time learned the whole defeat of his subordinate division, and that the French were possessed of Trent. The Austrian field-marshal immediately conceived that the French general, in consequence of his successes, would be disposed to leave Italy behind, and advance to Inspruck, in order to communicate with the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, which were now on the full advance into Germany. Instead, therefore, of renouncing his own scheme of relieving Mantua, Wurmser thought the time favorable for carrying it into execution; and in place of falling back with his army on Fribli, and thus keeping open his communication with Vienna, he committed the great error of involving himself still deeper in the Italian passes to the southward, by an attempt, with a diminished force, to execute a purpose, which he had been unable to accomplish when his army was double the strength of the French. With this ill-chosen plan, he detached Mezaros with a division of his forces, to manœuvre on Verona, where, as we have seen, Bonaparte had stationed Kilmaine, to cover the siege, or rather

the blockade, of Mantua. Mezaros departed accordingly, and, leaving Wurmser at Bassano on the Brenta, marched south-westward towards the collateral valley of the Adige, and attacked Kilmaine, who, by drawing his men under cover of the fortifications of Verona, made a resolute defence. The Austrian general, finding it impossible to carry the place by a coup-de-main, was meditating to cross the Adige, when he was recalled by the most urgent commands to rejoin Wurmser with all possible dispatch.

As soon as Bonaparte learned this new separation of Wurmser from a large division of his army, he anticipated the possibility of defeating the field-marshal himself, driving him from his position at Bassano, and, of consequence, cutting off at his leisure the division of Mezaros, which had advanced so far to the southward as effectually to compromise its safety.

To execute this plan required the utmost rapidity of movement; for, should Wurmser learn that Bonaparte was advancing towards Bassano, in time to recal Mezaros, he might present a front too numerous to be attacked with hope of success. There are twenty leagues' distance betwixt Trent and Bassano, and that ground was to be traversed by means of very difficult roads, in the space of two days at farthest. But it was in such circumstances that the genius of Napoleon triumphed through the enthusiastic power which he possessed over the soldiery, and by which he could urge them to the most incredible exertions. He left Trent on the 6th September at break of day, and reached, in the course of the evening, Borgo di Val Lugano, a march of ten French leagues. A similar forced march of five leagues and upwards, brought him up with Wurmser's advanced guard, which was strongly posted at Primolano.

The effect of the surprise, and the impetuosity of the French attack, surmounted all the advantages of position. The Austrian double lines were penetrated by a charge of three French columns—the cavalry occupied the high-road, and cut off the enemy's retreat on Bassano—in a word, Wurmser's van-guard was totally destroyed, and more than four thousand men laid down their arms. From Primolano the French, dislodging whatever enemies they encountered, advanced to Cismone, a village, where a river of the same name unites with the Brenta. There they halted, exhausted with fatigue; and on that evening no sentinel in the army endured more privations than Napoleon himself, who took up his quarters for the night without either staff-officers or baggage, and was glad to accept a share of a private soldier's ration of bread, of which the poor fellow lived to remind his general when he was become emperor.

Cismone is only about four leagues from Bassano, and Wurmser heard with alarm that the French leader, whom he conceived to be already deeply engaged in the Tyrolese passes, had destroyed his van-guard, and was menacing his own position. It was under this alarm that he dispatched expresses, as already mentioned, to recal Mezaros and his division. But it was too late; for that general was under the walls of Verona, nigh fifteen leagues from

Wurmser's position, on the night of the 7th September, when the French army was at Cismone, within a third part of that distance. The utmost exertions of Mezaros could only bring his division as far as Montebello, upon the 8th September, when the battle of Bassano seemed to decide the fate of his unfortunate commander-in-chief.

This victory was as decisive as any which Bonaparte had hitherto obtained. The village of Salagna was first carried by main force, and then the French army, continuing to descend the defile of the Brenta, attacked Wurmser's main body, which still lay under his own command in the town of Bassano. Augereau penetrated into the town upon the right, Masséna upon the left. They bore down all opposition, and seized the cannon by which the bridge was defended, in spite of the efforts of the Austrian grenadiers, charged with the duty of protecting Wurmser and his staff, who were now in absolute flight.

The field-marshal himself, with the military chest of his army, nearly fell into the hands of the French; and though he escaped for the time, it was after an almost general dispersion of his troops. Six thousand Austrians surrendered to Bonaparte; Quasdonowich, with three or four thousand men, effected a retreat to the north-east, and gained Friuli; while Wurmser himself, finding it impossible to escape otherwise, fled to Vicenza in the opposite direction, and there united the scattered forces which still followed him with the division of Mezaros. When this junction was accomplished, the aged marshal had still the command of about sixteen thousand men, out of sixty thousand, with whom he had, scarce a week before, commenced the campaign. The material part of his army, guns, waggons, and baggage, was all lost—his retreat upon the hereditary states of Austria was entirely cut off—the flower of his army was destroyed—courage and confidence were gone—there seemed no remedy but that he should lay down his arms to the youthful conqueror, by whose forces he was now surrounded on all sides, without, as it appeared, any possibility of extricating himself. But fate itself seemed to take some tardy compassion on this venerable and gallant veteran, and not only adjourned his final fall, but even granted him leave to gather some brief-dated laurels, as the priests of old were wont to garland their victims before the final sacrifice.

Surrounded by dangers, and cut off from any other retreat, Wurmser formed the gallant determination to throw himself and his remaining forces into Mantua, and share the fate of the beleaguered fortress which he had vainly striven to relieve. But to execute this purpose it was necessary to cross the Adige, nor was it easy to say how this was to be accomplished. Verona, one point of passage, was defended by Kilmaine, who had already repulsed Mezaros. Legnago, where there was a bridge, was also garrisoned by the French; and Wurmser had lost his bridge of pontoons at the battle of Bassano. At the village of Albarado, however, there was an established ferry, totally insufficient for passing over so considerable a force with the necessary dispatch, but which Wurmser used for the purpose of sending across two squadrons of cavalry, in order

to reconnoitre the blockade of Mantua, and the facilities which might present themselves for accomplishing a retreat on that fortress. This precaution proved for the time the salvation of Wurmser, and what remained of his army.

Fortune, which has such influence in warlike affairs, had so ordered it, that Kilmaine, apprehending that Wurmser would attempt to force a passage at Verona, and desirous to improve his means of resistance against so great a force, had sent orders that the garrison of four hundred men who guarded the bridge at Legnago should join him at Verona, and that an equal number should be detached from the blockade of Mantua, to supply their place on the Lower Adige. The former part of his command had been obeyed, and the garrison of Legnago were on their march for Verona. But the relief which was designed to occupy their post, though on their way to Legnago, had not yet arrived. The Austrian cavalry, who had passed over at Albarado, encountering this body on its march from the vicinity of Mantua, attacked them with spirit, and sabred a good many. The commander of the French battalion, confounded at this appearance, concluded that the whole Austrian army had gained the right bank of the Adige, and that he should necessarily be cut off if he prosecuted his march to Legnago. Thus the passage at that place was left altogether undefended; and Wurmser, apprised of this unhoped-for chance of escape, occupied the village, and took possession of the bridge.

Bonaparte, in the meantime, having moved from Bassano to Arcola in pursuit of the defeated enemy, learned at the latter place that Wurmser still lingered at Legnago, perhaps to grant his troops some indispensable repose, perhaps to watch whether it might be even yet possible to give the slip to the French divisions by which he was surrounded, and, by a rapid march back upon Padua, to regain his communication with the Austrian territories, instead of inclosing himself in Mantua. Bonaparte hastened to avail himself of these moments of indecision. Augereau was ordered to march upon Legnago by the road from Padua, so as to cut off any possibility of Wurmser's retreat in that direction; while Masséna's division was thrown across the Adige by a ferry at Ronco, to strengthen General Kilmaine, who had already occupied the line of a small river called the Molinella, which intersects the country between Legnago and Mantua. If this position could be made good, it was concluded that the Austrian general, unable to reach Mantua, or to maintain himself at Legnago, must even yet surrender himself and his army.

On the 12th September, Wurmser began his march. He was first opposed at Corea, where Murat and Pigeon had united their forces. But Wurmser made his dispositions, and attacked with a fury which swept out of the way both the cavalry and infantry of the enemy, and obtained possession of the village. In the heat of the skirmish, and just when the French were giving way, Bonaparte himself entered Corea, with the purpose of personally superintending the dispositions made for intercepting the retreat of Wurmser, when, but for the speed of his horse, he had nearly fallen as a prisoner

into the hands of the general whose destruction he was labouring to insure. Wurmser arrived on the spot a few minutes afterwards, and gave orders for a pursuit in every direction; commanding, however, that the French general should, if possible, be taken alive—a conjunction of circumstances worthy of remark, since it authorized the Austrian general for the moment to pronounce on the fate of him, who, before and after, was the master of his destiny.

Having again missed this great prize, Wurmser continued his march all night, and turning aside from the great road, where the blockading army had taken measures to intercept him, he surprised a small bridge over the Molinella, at a village called Villa Impenta, by which he eluded encountering the forces of Kilmaine. A body of French horse, sent to impede his progress, was cut to pieces by the Austrian cavalry. On the 14th, Wurmser obtained a similar success at Castel-Dui, where his cuirassiers destroyed a body of French infantry; and having now forced himself into a communication with Mantua, he encamped between the suburb of Saint George and the citadel, and endeavoured to keep open the communication with the country, for the purpose of obtaining a supply of forage and provisions.

But it was not Bonaparte's intention to leave him undisturbed in so commodious a position. Having received the surrender of an Austrian corps which was left in Porto Legnago, and gleaned up such other remnants of Wurmser's army as could not accompany their general in his rapid march to Mantua, he resolved once more to force his way into the islet of the Seraglio, upon which Mantua is built, and confine the besieged within the walls of their garrison. On the 15th, after a very severe and bloody action, the French obtained possession of the suburb of St George, and the citadel termed La Favorita, and a long series of severe sallies and attacks took place, which, although gallantly fought by the Austrians, generally tended to their disadvantage, so that they were finally again blockaded within the walls of the city and castle.

The woes of war now appeared among them in a different and even more hideous form than when inflicted with the sword alone. When Wurmser threw himself into Mantua, the garrison might amount to twenty-six thousand men; yet ere October was far advanced, there were little above the half of the number fit for service. There were nearly nine thousand sick in the hospitals,—infectious diseases, privations of every kind, and the unhealthy air of the lakes and marshes with which they were surrounded, had cut off the remainder. The French also had lost great numbers; but the conquerors could reckon up their victories, and forget the price at which they had been purchased.

It was a proud vaunt, and a cure in itself for many losses, that the minister of war had a right to make the following speech to the Directory, at the formal introduction of Marmont, then aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, and commissioned to present on his part the colours and standards taken from the enemy:—"In the course of a single campaign," he truly said, "Italy had been entirely conquered—three large armies had been entirely destroyed—more than fifty

stand of colours had been taken by the victors—forty thousand Austrians had laid down their arms—and, what was not the least surprising part of the whole, these deeds had been accomplished by an army of only thirty thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a general scarce twenty-six years old."

CHAPTER XXV.

Corsica re-united with France.—Critical situation of Bonaparte in Italy at this period.—The Austrian general Alvincz placed at the head of a new army.—Various contests, attended with no decisive result.—Want of concert among the Austrian generals.—French army begin to murmur.—First battle of Arcola.—Napoleon in personal danger.—No decisive result.—Second battle of Arcola.—The French victorious.—Fresh want of concert among the Austrian generals.—General views of military and political affairs, after the conclusion of the fourth Italian campaign.—Austria commences a fifth campaign—but has not profited by experience.—Battle of Rivoli, and victory of the French.—Further successful at La Favorita.—French regain their lost ground in Italy.—Surrender of Mantua.—Instances of Napoleon's generosity.

ABOUT this period the re-union of Corsica with France took place. Bonaparte contributed to this change in the political relations of his native country indirectly, in part by the high pride which his countrymen must have originally taken in his splendid career; and he did so more immediately, by seizing the town and port of Leghorn, and assisting those Corsicans, who had been exiled by the English party, to return to their native island. He intimated the event to the Directory, and stated that he had appointed Gentili, the principal partisan of the French, to govern the island provisionally; and that the Commissioner Salicetti was to set sail for the purpose of making other necessary arrangements. The communication is coldly made, nor does Bonaparte's love of his birth-place induce him to expatiate upon its importance, although the Directory afterwards made the acquisition of that island a great theme of exultation. But his destinies had called him to too high an elevation to permit his distinguishing the obscure islet which he had arisen from originally. He was like the young lion, who, while he is scattering the herds and destroying the hunters, thinks little of the forest-cave in which he first saw the light.*

* We have said (p. 166.) that Bonaparte never distinguished his native country after his high exaltation, and did not of course possess the affection of the inhabitants in a strong degree. But in his Memoirs, while at St Helena, he gives a sketch of the geographical description and history of Corsica, and suggests several plans for civilization of his countrymen,—one of which, the depriving them of the arms which they constantly wear, might be prudent were it practicable, but certainly would be highly unpalatable. There is an odd observation, "that the crown of Corsica must, on the temporary annexation of the island to Great Britain, have been surprised at finding itself appertaining to the successor of Fingal." Not more we should think than the diadem of France, and the iron crown of Italy, may have marvelled at meeting on the brow of a Corsican soldier of fortune.

Indeed Bonaparte's situation, however brilliant, was at the same time critical, and required his undivided thoughts. Mantua still held out, and was likely to do so. Wurmser had caused about three-fourths of the horses belonging to his cavalry to be killed and salted for the use of the garrison, and thus made a large addition, such as it was, to the provisions of the place. His character for courage and determination was completely established; and being now engaged in defending a fortress by ordinary rules of art, which he perfectly understood, he was in no danger of being overreached and outmanœuvred by the new system of tactics, which occasioned his misfortunes in the open field.

While, therefore, the last pledge of Austria's dominions in Italy was confided to such safe custody, the emperor and his ministers were eagerly engaged in making a new effort to recover their Italian territories. The defeat of Jourdan, and the retreat of Moreau before the Archduke Charles, had given the Imperialists some breathing time, and enabled them, by extensive levies in the warlike province of Illyria, as well as draughts from the army of the Rhine, to take the field with a new army, for the recovery of the Italian provinces, and the relief of Mantua. By orders of the Aulic Council, two armies were assembled on the Italian frontier; one at Friuli, which was partly composed of that portion of the army of Wurmser, which, cut off from their main body at the battle of Bassano, had effected, under Quasdonovich, a retreat in that direction; the other was to be formed on the Tyrol. They were to operate in conjunction, and both were placed under the command of Marshal Alvinzi, an officer of high reputation, which was then thought merited.

Thus, for the fourth time, Bonaparte was to contest the same objects on the same ground, with new forces belonging to the same enemy. He had, indeed, himself, received from France reinforcements to the number of twelve battalions, from those troops which had been formerly employed in La Vendée. The army, in general, since victory had placed the resources of the rich country which they occupied at the command of their leader, had been well supplied with clothes, food, and provisions, and were devotedly attached to the chief who had conducted them from starving on the barren Alps into this land of plenty, and had directed their military efforts with such skill, that they could scarce ever be said to have failed of success in whatever they undertook under his direction.

Napoleon had also on his side the good wishes, if not of the Italians in general, of a considerable party, especially in Lombardy, and friends and enemies were alike impressed with belief in his predestined success. During the former attempts of Wurmser, a contrary opinion had prevailed, and the news that the Austrians were in motion, had given birth to insurrections against the French in many places, and to the publication of sentiments unfavourable to them almost everywhere. But now, when all predicted the certain success of Napoleon, the friends of Austria remained quiet, and the numerous party who desire in such cases to keep on the winning side, added weight to the actual friends of France, by expressing their opinions in her fa-

vour. It seems, however, that Victory, as if displeased that mortals should presume to calculate the motives of so fickle a deity, was on this occasion disposed to be more coy than formerly even to her greatest favourite, and to oblige him to toil harder than he had done even when the odds were more against him.

Davidowich commanded the body of the Austrians which was in the Tyrol, and which included the fine militia of that martial province. There was little difficulty in prevailing on them to advance into Italy, convinced as they were that there was small security for their national independence while the French remained in possession of Lombardy. Bonaparte, on the other hand, had placed Vaubois in the passes upon the river Lavis, above Trent, to cover that new possession of the French Republic, and check the advance of Davidowich. It was the plan of Alvinzi to descend from Friuli, and approach Vicenza, to which place he expected Davidowich might penetrate by a corresponding movement down the Adige. Having thus brought his united army into activity, his design was to advance on Mantua, the constant object of bloody contention. He commenced his march in the beginning of October, 1796.

As soon as Bonaparte heard that Alvinzi was in motion, he sent orders to Vaubois to attack Davidowich, and to Masséna to advance to Bassano upon the Brenta, and make head against the Austrian commander-in-chief. Both measures failed in effect.

Vaubois indeed made his attack, but so unsuccessfully, that after two days' fighting he was compelled to retreat before the Austrians, to evacuate the city of Trent, and to retreat upon Calliano, already mentioned as a very strong position, in the previous account of the battle of Roveredo.* A great part of his opponents being Tyrolese, and admirably calculated for mountain warfare, they forced Vaubois from a situation which was almost impregnable; and their army, descending the Adige upon the right bank, appeared to manœuvre with the purpose of marching on Montebaldo and Rivoli, and thus opening the communication with Alvinzi.

On the other hand, though Masséna had sustained no loss, for he avoided an engagement, the approach of Alvinzi, with a superior army, compelled him to evacuate Bassano, and to leave the enemy in undisputed possession of the valley of the Brenta. Bonaparte, therefore, himself, saw the necessity of advancing with Angereau's division, determined to give battle to Alvinzi, and force him back on the Piave before the arrival of Davidowich. But he experienced unusual resistance; and it is amid complaints of the weather, of misadventures and mis-carriages of different sorts, that he faintly claims the name of a victory for his first encounter with Alvinzi. It is clear that he had made a desperate attempt to drive the Austrian general from Bassano—that he had not succeeded; but, on the contrary, was under the necessity of retreating to Vicenza. It is further manifest, that Bonaparte was sensible this retreat did not accord well with his claim of victory; and he says, with a consciousness which is

* Page 208.

amusing, that the inhabitants of Vicenza were surprised to see the French army retire through their town, as they had been witnesses of their victory on the preceding day. No doubt there was room for astonishment, if the Vicenzans had been as completely convinced of the fact as Bonaparte represents them. The truth was, Bonaparte was sensible that Vaubois, being in complete retreat, was exposed to be cut off unless he was supported, and he hastened to prevent so great a loss, by meeting and reinforcing him. His own retrograde movement, however, which extended as far as Verona, left the whole country betwixt the Brenta and Adige open to the Austrians; nor does there occur, to those who read the account of the campaign, any good reason why Davidowich and Alvinzi, having no body of French to interrupt their communication, should not instantly have adjusted their operations on a common basis. But it was the bane of the Austrian tactics, through the whole war, to neglect that connexion and co-operation betwixt their separate divisions, which is essential to secure the general result of a campaign. Above all, as Bonaparte himself remarked of them, their leaders were not sufficiently acquainted with the value of time in military movements.

Napoleon having retreated to Verona, where he could at pleasure assume the offensive by means of the bridge, or place the Adige between himself and the enemy, visited, in the first place, the positions of Rivoli and Corona, where were stationed the troops which had been defeated by Davidowich.

They appeared before him with dejected countenances, and Napoleon upbraided them with their indifferent behaviour. "You have displeased me," he said;—"You have shown neither discipline, nor constancy, nor bravery. You have suffered yourselves to be driven from positions where a handful of brave men might have arrested the progress of a large army. You are no longer French soldiers.—Let it be written on their colours—'They are not of the Army of Italy.' " Tears, and groans of sorrow and shame, answered this harangue—the rules of discipline could not stifle their sense of mortification, and several of the grenadiers, who had deserted and wore marks of distinction, called out from the ranks—"General, we have been misrepresented—Place us in the advance, and you may then judge whether we do not belong to the Army of Italy." Bonaparte, having produced the necessary effect, spoke to them in a more conciliatory tone; and the regiments who had undergone so severe a rebuke redeemed their character in the subsequent part of the campaign.

While Napoleon was indefatigable in concentrating his troops on the right bank of the Adige, and inspiring them with his own spirit of enterprise, Alvinzi had taken his position on the left bank, nearly opposite to Verona. His army occupied a range of heights called Caldiero, on the left of which, and somewhat in the rear, is the little village of Arcola, situated among marshes, which extend around the foot of that eminence. Here the Austrian general had stationed himself, with a view, it may be supposed, to wait until Davidowich and his division should descend the right bank of the Adige,

disquiet the French leader's position on that river, and give Alvinzi himself the opportunity of forcing a passage.

Bonaparte, with his usual rapidity of resolution, resolved to drive the Austrian from his position on Caldiero, before the arrival of Davidowich. But neither on this occasion was fortune propitious to him. A strong French division, under Masséna, attacked the heights amid a storm of rain; but their most strenuous exertions proved completely unsuccessful, and left to the general only his usual mode of concealing a check, by railing at the elements.

The situation of the French became critical, and, what was worse, the soldiers perceived it, and complained that they had to sustain the whole burden of the war, had to encounter army after army, and must succumb at last, under the renewed and unwearied efforts of Austria. Bonaparte parried these natural feelings as well as he could, promising that their conquest of Italy should be speedily sealed by the defeat of this Alvinzi; and he applied his whole genius to discover the means of bringing the war to an effective struggle, in which he confided that, in spite of numbers, his own talents, and the enterprising character of an army so often victorious, might assure him a favourable result.* But it was no easy way to discover a mode of attacking, with even plausible hopes of success. If he advanced northward on the right bank to seek out and destroy Davidowich, he must weaken his line on the Adige, by the troops withdrawn to effect that purpose; and during his absence, Alvinzi would probably force the passage of the river at some point, and thus have it in his power to relieve Mantua. The heights of Caldiero, occupied by the Austrian main body, and lying in his front, had, by dire experiment, been proved impregnable.

In these doubtful circumstances the bold scheme occurred to the French general, that the position of Caldiero, though it could not be stormed, might be turned, and that by possessing himself of the village of Arcola, which lies to the left and in the rear of Caldiero, the Austrians might be compelled to fight to disadvantage. But the idea of attacking Arcola was one which would scarce have occurred to any general save Bonaparte.

Arcola is situated upon a small stream called the Alpon, which, as already hinted, finds its way into the Adige, through a wilderness of marshes, intersected with ditches, and traversed by dikes in various directions. In case of an unsuccessful attack, the assailants were like to be totally cut off in the swamps. Then to debouche from Verona, and move in the direction of Arcola, would have put Alvinzi and his whole army on their guard. Secrecy and celerity are the soul of enterprise. All these difficulties gave way before Napoleon's genius.

Verona, it must be remembered, is on the left bank of the Adige—on the same with the point which was the object of Bonaparte's attack. At nightfall, the whole forces at Verona were under arms; and leaving fifteen hundred men under Kilmaine to defend the place from any assault, with strict orders to secure the gates, and prevent all communication of his nocturnal expedition to the enemy, Bonaparte commenced his march at first to

the rear, in the direction of Peschiera; which seemed to imply that his resolution was at length taken to resign the hopes of gaining Mantua; and perhaps to abandon Italy. The silence with which the march was conducted, the absence of all the usual rumours which used in the French army to precede a battle, and the discouraging situation of affairs, appeared to presage the same issue. But after the troops had marched a little way in this direction, the heads of columns were wheeled to the left, out of the line of retreat, and descended the Adige as far as Ronco, which they reached before day. Here a bridge had been prepared, by which they passed over the river, and were placed on the same bank with Arcola, the object of their attack, and lower than the heights of Caldiero.

There were three causeways by which the marsh of Arcola is traversed—each was occupied by a French column. The central column moved on the causeway which led to the village so named. The dikes and causeways were not defended, but Arcola and its bridge were protected by two battalions of Croats with two pieces of cannon, which were placed in a position to enfilade the causeway. These received the French column with so heavy a fire on its flank, that it fell back in disorder. Augereau rushed forward upon the bridge with his chosen grenadiers; but, enveloped as they were in a destructive fire, they were driven back on the main body.

Alvinzi, who conceived it only an affair of light troops, sent, however, forces into the marsh by means of the dikes which traversed them, to drive out the French. These were checked by finding that they were to oppose strong columns of infantry, yet the battle continued with unabated vigour. It was essential to Bonaparte's plan that Arcola should be carried; but the fire continued tremendous. At length, to animate his soldiers to a final exertion, he caught a stand of colours, rushed on the bridge, and planted them there with his own hand. A fresh body of Austrians arrived at that moment, and the fire on flank blazed more destructively than ever. The rear of the French column fell back; the leading files, finding themselves unsupported, gave way, but, still careful of their general, bore him back in their arms through the dead and dying, the fire and the smoke. In the confusion he was at length pushed into the marsh. The Austrians were already betwixt him and his own troops, and he must have perished or been taken had not the grenadiers perceived his danger. The cry instantly arose,—“Forward—forward—save the general!” Their love to Bonaparte's person did more than even his commands and example had been able to accomplish. They returned to the charge, and at length pushed the Austrians out of the village; but not till the appearance of a French corps under General Guieux had turned the position and he had thrown himself in the rear of it. These succours had passed at the ferry of Albarado, and the French remained in possession of the long-contested village. It was at the moment a place of the greatest importance; for the possession of it would have enabled Bonaparte, had the Austrians remained in their position, to operate on their communications with the Brenta, interpose

between Alvinzi and his reserves, and destroy his park of artillery. But the risk was avoided by the timely caution of the Austrian field-marshal.

Alvinzi was no sooner aware that a great division of the French army was in his rear, than, without allowing them time for farther operations, he instantly broke up his position on Caldiero, and evacuated these heights by a steady and orderly retreat. Bonaparte had the mortification to see the Austrians effect this manœuvre by crossing a bridge in their rear over the Alpon, and which could be have occupied, as was his purpose, he might have rendered their retreat impossible, or at least disastrous. As matters stood, however, the village of Arcola came to lose its consequence as a position, since, after Alvinzi's retreat, it was no longer in the rear, but in the front of the enemy.

Bonaparte remembered he had enemies on the right as well as on the left of the Adige; and that Davidowich might be once more routing Vaubois, while he was too far advanced to afford him assistance. He therefore evacuated Arcola, and the village of Porcil, situated near it, and retreating to Ronco, re-crossed the river, leaving only two demi-brigades in advance upon the left bank.

The first battle of Arcola, famous for the obstinacy with which it was disputed, and the number of brave officers and men who fell, was thus attended with no decisive result. But it had checked the inclination of Alvinzi to advance on Verona—it had delayed all communication betwixt his army and that of the Tyrol—above all, it had renewed the Austrians' apprehensions of the skill of Bonaparte and the bravery of his troops, and restored to the French soldiery the usual confidence of their national character.

Bonaparte remained stationary at Ronco until next morning at five o'clock, by which time he received intelligence that Davidowich had lain quiet in his former position; that he had no cause to be alarmed for Vaubois' safety, and might therefore operate in security against Alvinzi. This was rendered the more easy (16th November), as the Austrian general, not aware of Bonaparte's having halted his army at Ronco, imagined he was on his march to concentrate his forces near Mantua, and hastened therefore to overwhelm the rear-guard, whom he expected to find at the ferry. Bonaparte spared them the trouble of a close advance to the Adige. He again crossed to the left side, and again advanced his columns upon the dikes and causeways which traversed the marshes of Arcola. On such ground, where it was impossible to assign to the columns more breadth than the causeways could accommodate, the victorious soldiers of France had great advantage over the recent levies of Austria; for though the latter might be superior in number on the whole, success must in such a case depend on the personal superiority of the front or leading files only. The French, therefore, had the first advantage, and drove back the Austrians upon the village of Arcola; but here, as on the former day, Alvinzi constituted his principal point of defence, and maintained it with the utmost obstinacy.

After having repeatedly failed when attacking in front a post so difficult of approach, Napoleon en-

deavoured to turn the position by crossing the little river Alpon, near its union with the Adige. He attempted to effect a passage by means of fascines, but unsuccessfully; and the night approached without anything effectual being decided. Both parties drew off, the French to Ronco, where they recrossed the Adige; the Austrians to a position behind the well-contested village of Arcola.

The battle of the 16th November was thus far favourable to the French, that they had driven back the Austrians, and made many prisoners in the commencement of the day; but they had also lost many men; and Napoleon, if he had gained ground in the day, was fain to return to his position at night, lest Davidowich, by the defeat of Vaubois, might either relieve Mantua, or move on Verona. The 17th was to be a day more decisive.

The field of battle, and the preliminary manoeuvres, were much the same as on the preceding day; but those of the French were nearly disconcerted by the sinking of one of the boats which constituted their bridge over the Adige. The Austrians instantly advanced on the demi-brigade which had been stationed on the left bank to defend the bridge. But the French, having repaired the damage, advanced in their turn, and compelled the Austrians to retreat upon the marsh. Masséna directed his attack on Porcil—General Robert pressed forward on Arcola. But it was at the point where he wished to cross the Alpon that Bonaparte chiefly desired to attain a decided superiority, and, in order to win it, he added stratagem to audacity. Observing one of his columns repulsed, and retreating along the causeway, he placed the 32d regiment in ambuscade in a thicket of willows which bordered the rivulet, and saluting the pursuing enemy with a close, heavy, and unexpected fire, instantly rushed to close with the bayonet, and attacking the flank of a column of nearly three thousand Croats, forced them into the marsh, where most of them perished.

It was now that, after a calculation of the losses sustained by the enemy, Napoleon conceived their numerical superiority so far diminished, and their spirit so much broken, that he need no longer confine his operations to the dikes, but meet his enemy on the firm plain which extended beyond the Alpon. He passed the brook by means of a temporary bridge which had been prepared during night; and the battle raged as fiercely on the dry level, as it had done on the dikes and amongst the marshes.

The Austrians fought with resolution, the rather that their left, though stationed on dry ground, was secured by a marsh which Bonaparte had no means of turning. But though this was the case, Napoleon contrived to gain his point by impressing on the enemy an idea that he had actually accomplished that which he had no means of doing. This he effected by sending a daring officer, with about thirty of the guides (his own body-guards they may be called), with four trumpets, and directing these determined cavaliers to charge, and the trumpets to sound, as if a large body of horse had crossed the marsh. Augereau attacked the Austrian left at the same moment; and a fresh body of troops advancing from Legnago, compelled them to retreat, but not to fly.

Alvinzi was now compelled to give way, and commenced his retreat on Montebello. He disposed seven thousand men in échelons to cover this movement, which was accomplished without very much loss; but his ranks had been much thinned by the slaughter of the three battles of Arcola. Eight thousand men has been stated as the amount of his losses. The French, who made so many and so sanguinary assaults upon the villages, must also have suffered a great deal. Bonaparte acknowledges this in energetic terms. "Never," he writes to Carnot, "was field of battle so disputed. I have almost no generals remaining—I can assure you that the victory could not have been gained at a cheaper expense. The enemy were numerous, and desperately resolute." The truth is, that Bonaparte's mode of striking terror by these bloody and desperate charges in front upon strong positions, was a blemish in his system. They cost many men, and were not uniformly successful. That of Arcola was found a vain waste of blood, till science was employed instead of main force, when the position was turned by Guieux on the first day; on the third, by the troops who crossed the Alpon.

The tardy conduct of Davidowich, during these three undecided days of slaughterous struggle, is worthy of notice and censure. It would appear that from the 10th November that general had it in his power to attack the division which he had hitherto driven before him, and that he had delayed doing so till the 16th; and on the 18th, just the day after Alvinzi had made his retreat, he approached Verona on the right bank. Had these movements taken place before Alvinzi's defeat, or even during any of the three days preceding, when the French were engaged before Arcola, the consequences must have been very serious. Finding, however, that Alvinzi had retreated, Davidowich followed the same course, and withdrew into the mountains, not much annoyed by the French, who respected the character of his army, which had been repeatedly victorious, and felt the weakness incident to their own late losses.

Another incidental circumstance tends equally strongly to mark the want of concert and communication among the Austrian generals. Wurmser, who had remained quiet in Mantua during all the time when Alvinzi and Davidowich were in the neighbourhood, made a vigorous sally on the 23d November; when his doing so was of little consequence, since he could not be supported,

Thus ended the fourth campaign undertaken for the Austrian possessions in Italy. The consequences were not so decidedly in Bonaparte's favour as those of the three former. Mantua, it is true, had received no relief; and so far the principal object of the Austrians had miscarried. But Wurmser was of a temper to continue the defence till the last moment, and had already provided for a longer defence than the French counted upon, by curtailing the rations of the garrison. The armies of Friuli and the Tyrol had also, since the last campaign, retained possession of Bassano and Trent, and removed the French from the mountains through which access is gained to the Austrian hereditary dominions. Neither had Alvinzi suffered any such

heavy defeat as his predecessors Beaulieu or Wurmser; while Davidowich, on the contrary, was uniformly successful, had he known how to avail himself of his victories. Still the Austrians were not likely, till reinforced again, to interrupt Bonaparte's quiet possession of Lombardy.

During two months following the battle of Arcola and the retreat of the Austrians, the war which had been so vigorously maintained in Italy experienced a short suspension, and the attention of Bonaparte was turned towards civil matters—the arrangement of the French interests with the various powers of Italy, and with the congress of Lombardy, as well as the erection of the districts of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and Modena, into what was called the Cispadane Republic. These we shall notice elsewhere, as it is not advisable to interrupt the course of our military annals, until we have recounted the last struggle of the Austrians for the relief of Mantua.

It must be in the first place observed, that, whether from jealousy or from want of means, supplies and recruits were very slowly transmitted from France to their Italian army. About seven thousand men, who were actually sent to join Bonaparte, scarcely repaired the losses which he had sustained in the late bloody campaigns. At the same time the treaty with the pope being broken off, the supreme pontiff threatened to march a considerable army towards Lombardy. Bonaparte endeavoured to supply the want of reinforcements by raising a defensive legion among the Lombards, to which he united many Poles. This body was not fit to be brought into line against the Austrians, but was more than sufficient to hold at bay the troops of the Papal See, who have never enjoyed of late years a high degree of military reputation.

Meantime Austria, who seemed to cling to Italy with the tenacity of a dying grasp, again, and now for the fifth time, recruited her armies on the frontier, and placing Alvinzi once more at the head of sixty thousand men, commanded him to resume the offensive against the French in Italy. The spirit of the country had been roused instead of discouraged by the late defeats. The volunteer corps, consisting of persons of respectability and consideration, took the field, for the redemption, if their blood could purchase it, of the national honour. Vienna furnished four battalions, which were presented by the empress with a banner, that she had wrought for them with her own hands. The Tyrolese also thronged once more to their sovereign's standard, undismayed by a proclamation made by Bonaparte after the retreat from Arcola, and which paid homage, though a painful one, to these brave marksmen. "Whatever Tyrolese," said this atrocious document, "is taken with arms in his hand, shall be put to instant death." Alvinzi sent abroad a counter proclamation, "that for every Tyrolese put to death as threatened, he would hang up a French officer." Bonaparte again replied, "that if the Austrian general would use the retaliation he threatened, he should execute in his turn officer for officer out of his prisoners, commencing with Alvinzi's own nephew, who was in his power." A little calmness on either side brought them to reflect

on the cruelty of aggravating the laws of war, which are already too severe; so that the system of military execution was renounced on both sides.

But notwithstanding this display of zeal and loyalty on the part of the Austrian nation, its councils do not appear to have derived wisdom from experience. The losses sustained by Wurmser and by Alvinzi proceeded in a great measure from the radical error of having divided their forces, and commenced the campaign on a double line of operation, which could not, or at least were not made to, correspond and communicate with each other. Yet they commenced this campaign on the same unhappy principles. One army descending from the Tyrol upon Montebaldo, the other was to march down by the Brenta on the Paduan territory, and then to operate on the lower Adige, the line of which, of course, they were expected to force, for the purpose of relieving Mantua. The Aulic Council ordered that these two armies were to direct their course so as to meet, if possible, upon the beleaguered fortress. Should they succeed in raising the siege, there was little doubt that the French must be driven out of Italy; but even were the scheme only partially successful, still it might allow Wurmser with his cavalry to escape from that besieged city, and retreat into the Romagna, where it was designed that he should, with the assistance of his staff and officers, organize and assume the command of the papal army. In the meantime, an intelligent agent was sent to communicate, if possible, with Wurmser.

This man fell into the hands of the besiegers. It was in vain that he swallowed his dispatches, which were inclosed in a ball of wax; means were found to make the stomach render up its trust, and the document which the wax inclosed was found to be a letter, signed by the emperor's own hand, directing Wurmser to enter into no capitulation, but to hold out as long as possible in expectation of relief, and if compelled to leave Mantua, to accept of no conditions, but to cut his way into the Romagna, and take upon himself the command of the papal army. Thus Bonaparte became acquainted with the storm which was approaching, and which was not long of breaking.

Alvinzi, who commanded the principal army, advanced from Bassano to Roveredo upon the Adige. Provera, distinguished for his gallant defence of Cossaria during the action of Millesimo,* commanded the divisions which were to act upon the lower Adige. He marched as far as Bevi l'Acqua, while his advanced guard, under Prince Hohenzollern, compelled a body of French to cross to the right bank of the Adige.

Bonaparte, uncertain which of these attacks he was to consider as the main one, concentrated his army at Verona, which had been so important a place during all these campaigns as a central point, from which he might at pleasure march either up the Adige against Alvinzi, or descend the river to resist the attempts of Provera. He trusted that Joubert, whom he had placed in defence of Corona, a little town which had been strongly fortified for the pur-

* See p. 184.

pose, might be able to make a good temporary defence. He dispatched troops for Joubert's support to Castel Nuovo, but hesitated to direct his principal force in that direction until ten in the evening of 13th January, when he received information that Joubert had been attacked at La Corona by an immense body, which he had resisted with difficulty during the day, and was now about to retreat, in order to secure the important eminence at Rivoli, which was the key of his whole position.

Judging from this account that the principal danger occurred on the upper part of the Adige, Bonaparte left only Augereau's division to dispute with Provera the passage of that river on the lower part of its course. He was especially desirous to secure the elevated and commanding position of Rivoli, before the enemy had time to receive his cavalry and cannon, as he hoped to bring on an engagement ere he was suited with those important parts of his army. By forced marches Napoleon arrived at Rivoli at two in the morning of the 14th, and from that elevated situation, by the assistance of a clear moon-light, he was able to discover that the bivouac of the enemy was divided into five distinct and separate bodies, from which he inferred that their attack the next day would be made in the same number of columns.

The distance at which the bivouacs were stationed from the position of Joubert made it evident to Napoleon that they did not mean to make their attack before ten in the morning, meaning, probably, to wait for their infantry and artillery. Joubert was at this time in the act of evacuating the position which he only occupied by a rear-guard. Bonaparte commanded him instantly to counter-march, and resume possession of the important eminence of Rivoli.

A few Croats had already advanced so near the French line as to discover that Joubert's light troops had abandoned the chapel of Saint Marc, of which they took possession. It was retaken by the French, and the struggle to recover and maintain it, brought on a severe action, first with the regiment to which the detachment of Croats belonged, and afterwards with the whole Austrian column which lay nearest to that point, and which was commanded by Ocskay. The latter was repulsed, but the column of Kobler pressed forward to support them, and having gained the summit, attacked two regiments of the French who were stationed there, each protected by a battery of cannon. Notwithstanding this advantage, one of the regiments gave way, and Bonaparte himself galloped to bring up reinforcements. The nearest French were those of Massena's division, which, tired from the preceding night's march, had lain down to take some rest. They started up, however, at the command of Napoleon, and suddenly arriving on the field, in half an hour the column of Kobler was beaten and driven back. That of Liptay advanced in turn; and Quasdonovich, observing that Joubert, in prosecuting his success over the division of Ocskay, had pushed forward and abandoned the chapel of Saint Marc, detached three battalions to ascend the hill, and occupy that post. While the Austrians scaled, on one side, the hill on which the chapel is situated,

three battalions of French infantry, who had been counter-marched by Joubert to prevent Quasdonovich's purpose, struggled up the steep ascent on another point. The activity of the French brought them first to the summit, and having then the advantage of the ground, it was no difficult matter for them to force the advancing Austrians headlong down the hill which they were endeavouring to climb. Meantime, the French batteries thundered on the broken columns of the enemy—their cavalry made repeated charges, and the whole Austrians who had been engaged fell into inextricable disorder. The columns which had advanced were irretrievably defeated; those who remained were in such a condition, that to attack would have been madness.

Amid this confusion the division of Lusignan, which was the most remote of the Austrian columns, being intrusted with the charge of the artillery and baggage of the army, had, after depositing these according to order, mounted the heights of Rivoli, and assumed a position in rear of the French. Had this column attained the same ground while the engagement continued in front, there can be no doubt that it would have been decisive against Napoleon. Even as it was, their appearance in the rear would have startled troops, however brave, who had less confidence in their general; but those of Bonaparte only exclaimed, "There arrive farther supplies to our market," in full reliance that their commander could not be out-manceuvred. The Austrian division, on the other hand, arriving after the battle was lost, being without artillery or cavalry, and having been obliged to leave a proportion of their numbers to keep a check upon a French brigade, felt that, instead of being in a position to cut off the French, by attacking their rear while their front was engaged, they themselves were cut off by the intervention of the victorious French betwixt them and their defeated army. Lusignan's division was placed under a heavy fire of the artillery in reserve, and was soon obliged to lay down its arms. So critical are the events of war, that a military movement, which, executed at one particular period of time would have insured victory, is not unlikely, from the loss of a brief interval, to occasion only more general calamity.* The Austrians, on this as on some other occasions, verified too much Napoleon's allegation, that they did not sufficiently consider the value of time in military affairs.

The field of Rivoli was one of the most desperate that Bonaparte ever won, and was gained entirely by superior military skill, and not by the overbearing system of mere force of numbers, to which he has been accused of being partial. He himself had his horse repeatedly wounded in the course of the action, and exerted to the utmost his personal in-

* It is represented in some military accounts, that the division which appeared in the rear of the French belonged to the army of Provera, and had been detached by him on crossing the Adige, as mentioned below. But Napoleon's St Helena manuscripts prove the contrary. Provera only crossed on the 14th January, and it was on the morning of the same day that Napoleon had seen the five divisions of Alvinzi, that of Lusignan which afterwards appeared in the rear of his army being one, lying around Joubert's position of Rivoli.

fluence to bring up the troops into action where their presence was most required.

Alvinzi's error, which was a very gross one, consisted in supposing that no more than Joubert's inconsiderable force was stationed at Rivoli, and in preparing, therefore, to destroy him at his leisure; when his acquaintance with the French celerity of movement ought to have prepared him for the possibility of Bonaparte's night-march, by which, bringing up the chosen strength of his army into the position where the enemy only expected to find a feeble force, he was enabled to resist and defeat a much superior army, brought to the field upon different points, without any just calculation on the means of resistance which were to be opposed; without the necessary assistance of cavalry and artillery; and, above all, without a preconceived plan of co-operation and mutual support. The excellence of Napoleon's manœuvres was well supported by the devotion of his generals, and the courage of his soldiers. Masséna, in particular, so well seconded his general, that afterwards, when Napoleon as emperor conferred on him the title of duke, he assigned him his designation from the battle of Rivoli.

Almost before this important and decisive victory was absolutely gained, news arrived which required the presence of Bonaparte elsewhere. On the very same day of the battle, Provera, whom we left manœuvring on the Lower Adige, threw a bridge of pontoons over that river, where the French were not prepared to oppose his passage, and pushed forward to Mantua, the relief of which fortress he had by stratagem nearly achieved. A regiment of his cavalry, wearing white cloaks, and resembling in that particular the first regiment of French hussars, presented themselves before the suburb of St George, then only covered by a mere line of circumvallation. The barricades were about to be opened without suspicion, when it occurred to a sagacious old French sergeant, who was beyond the walls gathering wood, that the dress of this regiment of white cloaks was fresher than that of the French corps, called Berchini's, for whom they were mistaken. He communicated his suspicions to a drummer who was near him; they gained the suburb, and cried to arms, and the guns of the defences were opened on the hostile cavalry whom they were about to have admitted in the guise of friends.

About the time that this incident took place, Bonaparte himself arrived at Roverbella, within twelve miles of Mantua, to which he had marched with incredible dispatch from the field of battle at Rivoli, leaving to Masséna, Murat, and Joubert, the task of completing his victory, by the close pursuit of Alvinzi and his scattered forces.

In the meanwhile, Provera communicated with the garrison of Mantua across the lake, and concerted the measures for its relief with Wurmsér. On the 16th of January, being the morning after the battle of Rivoli, and the unsuccessful attempt to surprise the suburb of St George, the garrison of Mantua sallied from the place in strength, and took post at the causeway of La Favorita, being the only one which is defended by an inclosed citadel,

or independent fortress. Napoleon, returning at the head of his victorious forces, surrounded and attacked with fury the troops of Provera, while the blockading army compelled the garrison, at the bayonet's point, to re-enter the besieged city of Mantua. Provera, who had in vain, though with much decision and gallantry, attempted the relief of Mantua, which his Imperial master had so much at heart, was compelled to lay down his arms with a division of about five thousand men, whom he had still united under his person. The detached corps which he had left to protect his bridge, and other passes in his rear, sustained a similar fate. Thus, one division of the army, which had commenced the campaign of January only on the 7th of that month, were the prisoners of the destined conqueror before ten days had elapsed. The larger army, commanded by Alvinzi, had no better fortune. They were close pursued from the bloody field of Rivoli, and never were permitted to draw breath or to recover their disorder. Large bodies were intercepted and compelled to surrender, a practice now so frequent among the Austrian troops, that it ceased to be shameful.

Nevertheless, one example is so peculiar as to deserve commemoration, as a striking example of the utter consternation and dispersion of the Austrians after this dreadful defeat, and of the confident and audacious promptitude which the French officers derived from their unvaried success. René, a young officer, was in possession of the village called Guarda, on the lake of the same name, and, in visiting his advanced posts, he perceived some Austrians approaching, whom he caused his escort to surround and make prisoners. Advancing to the front to reconnoitre, he found himself close to the head of an Imperial column of eighteen hundred men, which a turning in the road had concealed till he was within twenty yards of them. "Down with your arms!" said the Austrian commandant; to which René answered with the most ready boldness, "Do you lay down your arms! I have destroyed your advanced guard, as witness these prisoners—ground your arms, or no quarter." And the French soldiers catching the hint of their leader, joined in the cry of "Ground your arms." The Austrian officer hesitated, and proposed to enter into capitulation; the Frenchman would admit of no terms but instant and immediate surrender. The dispirited Imperialist yielded up his sword, and commanded his soldiers to imitate his example. But the Austrian soldiers began to suspect the truth; they became refractory, and refused to obey their leader, whom René addressed with the utmost apparent composure. "You are an officer, sir, and a man of honour—you know the rules of war—you have surrendered—you are therefore my prisoner, but I rely on your parole—Here, I return your sword—compel your men to submission, otherwise I direct against you the division of six thousand men who are under my command." The Austrian was utterly confounded, betwixt the appeal to his honour and the threat of a charge from six thousand men. He assured René he might rely on his punctilious compliance with the parole he had given him; and speaking in German to his soldiers, persuaded them

to lay down their arms, a submission which he had soon afterward the satisfaction to see had been made to one twelfth part of their number.

Amid such extraordinary success, the ground which the French had lost in Italy was speedily regained. Trent and Bassano were again occupied by the French. They regained all the positions and strong-holds which they had possessed on the frontiers of Italy before Alvinzi's first descent, and might perhaps have penetrated deeper into the mountainous frontier of Germany, but for the snow which choked up the passes.

One crowning consequence of the victories of Rivoli and of La Favorita, was the surrender of Mantua itself, that prize which had cost so much blood, and had been defended with such obstinacy.

For several days after the decisive actions which left him without a shadow of hope of relief, Wurmser continued the defence of the place in a sullen yet honourable despair, natural to the feelings of a gallant veteran, who, to the last, hesitated between the desire to resist, and the sense that, his means of subsistence being almost totally expended, resistance was absolutely hopeless. At length he sent his aide-de-camp, Klenau (afterwards a name of celebrity), to the head-quarters of Serrurier, who commanded the blockade, to treat of a surrender. Klenau used the customary language on such occasions. He expatiated on the means which he said Mantua still possessed of holding out, but said, that as Wurmser doubted whether the place could be relieved in time, he would regulate his conduct as to immediate submission, or farther defence, according to the conditions of surrender to which the French generals were willing to admit him.

A French officer of distinction was present, muffled in his cloak, and remaining apart from the two officers, but within hearing of what had passed. When their discussion was finished, this unknown person stepped forward, and, taking a pen, wrote down the conditions of surrender to which Wurmser was to be admitted—conditions more honourable and favourable by far than what his extremity could have exacted. "These," said the unknown officer to Klenau, "are the terms which Wurmser may accept at present, and which will be equally tendered to him at any period when he finds farther resistance impossible. We are aware he is too much a man of honour to give up the fortress and city, so long and honourably defended, while the means of resistance remain in his power. If he delays accepting the conditions for a week, for a month, for two months, they shall be equally his when he chooses to accept them. To-morrow I pass the Po, and march upon Rome." Klenau, perceiving that he spoke to the French commander-in-chief, frankly admitted that the garrison could no longer delay surrender, having scarce three days' provisions unconsumed.

This trait of generosity towards a gallant but unfortunate enemy was highly honourable to Bonaparte. The taste which dictated the stage-effect of the cloak may indeed be questioned; but the real current of his feeling towards the venerable object of his respect, and at the same time compassion, is ascertained otherwise. He wrote to the Directory

on the subject, that he had afforded to Wurmser such conditions of surrender as became the generosity of the French nation towards an enemy, who, having lost his army by misfortune, was so little desirous to secure his personal safety, that he threw himself into Mantua, cutting his way through the blockading army; thus voluntarily undertaking the privations of a siege, which his gallantry protracted until almost the last morsel of provisions was exhausted.

But the young victor paid still a more delicate and noble-minded compliment, in declining to be personally present when the veteran Wurmser had the mortification to surrender his sword, with his garrison of twenty thousand men, ten thousand of whom were fit for service. This self-denial did Napoleon as much credit nearly, as his victory, and must not be omitted in a narrative, which, often called to stigmatise his ambition and its consequences, should not be the less ready to observe marks of dignified and honourable feeling. The history of this remarkable man more frequently reminds us of the romantic and improbable victories imputed to the heroes of the romantic ages, than of the spirit of chivalry attributed to them; but in this instance Napoleon's conduct towards Wurmser may be justly compared to that of the Black Prince to his royal prisoner, King John of France.

Serrurier, who had conducted the league, had the honour to receive the surrender of Wurmser, after the siege of Mantua had continued for six months, during which the garrison is said by Napoleon to have lost twenty-seven thousand men by disease, and in the various numerous and bloody sallies which took place. This decisive event put an end to the war in Italy. The contest with Austria was hereafter to be waged on the hereditary dominions of that haughty power.

The French, possessed of this grand object of their wishes, were not long in displaying their national characteristics. Their military and present sagacity were evinced in employing one of the most celebrated of their engineers, to improve and bring nearly to perfection the defence of a city which may be termed the citadel of Italy. They set afoot besides, civic feasts and ceremonies, and, among others, one in honour of Virgil, who, being the panegyrist of an emperor, was indifferently selected as the presiding genius of an infant republic. Their cupidity was evinced by their artists' exercising their ingenuity in devising means to cut from the wall and carry off the fresco paintings, by Titian, of the wars between the Gods and the Giants, at all risks of destroying what could never be replaced. Luckily the attempt was found totally unadvisable.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Situation and views of Bonaparte at this period of the campaign—His politic conduct towards the Italians—Popularity.—Severe terms of peace proposed to the pope—rejected.—Napoleon differs from the Directory, and negotiations are renewed—but again rejected.—The pope raises his army to 40,000 men—Napoleon invades the Papal Territories—The papal troops defeated near Imola—and at Ancona—which is captured

—Loretto taken.—Clemency of Bonaparte to the French recalcitrant clergy.—Peace of Tolentino.—Napoleon's letter to the pope.—San Marino.—View of the situation of the different Italian States.—Rome—Naples—Tuscany—Venice.

THE eyes of all Europe were now riveted on Napoleon Bonaparte, whose rise had been so sudden that he was become the terror of empires and the founder of states; the conqueror of the best generals and most disciplined troops in Europe, within a few months after he had been a mere soldier of fortune, seeking rather for subsistence than expecting honourable distinction. Such sudden elevations have occasionally happened amid semi-barbarous nations, where great popular insurrections, desolating and decisive revolutions, are common occurrences, but were hitherto unheard of in civilized Europe. The pre-eminence which he had suddenly obtained had, besides, been subjected to so many trials, as to afford every proof of its permanence. Napoleon stood aloft like a cliff on which successive tempests had expended their rage in vain. The means which raised him were equally competent to make good his greatness. He had infused into the armies which he commanded the firmest reliance on his genius, and the greatest love for his person; so that he could always find agents ready to execute his most difficult commands. He had even inspired them with a portion of his own indefatigable exertion and his commanding intelligence. The maxim which he inculcated upon them when practising those long and severe marches which formed one essential part of his system, was, "I would rather gain victory at the expense of your legs than at the price of your blood." The French, under his training, seemed to become the very men he wanted, and to forget, in the excitement of war and the hope of victory, even the feelings of weariness and exhaustion. The following description of the French soldier by Napoleon himself occurs in his dispatches to the Directory during his first campaign in Italy:—

"Were I to name all those who have been distinguished by acts of personal bravery, I must send the muster-roll of all the grenadiers and carabineers of the advanced guard. They jest with danger and laugh at death; and if anything can equal their intrepidity, it is the gaiety with which, singing alternately songs of love and patriotism, they accomplish the most severe forced marches. When they arrive at their bivouac, it is not to take their repose, as might be expected, but to tell each his story of the battle of the day, and produce his plan for that of to-morrow; and many of them think with great correctness on military subjects. The other day I was inspecting a demi-brigade, and as it filed past me, a common chasseur approached my horse, and said, 'General, you ought to do so and so.'—'Hold your peace, you rogue!' I replied. He disappeared immediately, nor have I since been able to find him out. But the manoeuvre which he recommended was the very same which I had privately resolved to carry into execution."

To command this active, intelligent, and intrepid soldiery, Bonaparte possessed officers entirely

worthy of the charge; men young, or at least not advanced in years, to whose ambition the Revolution, and the wars which it had brought on, had opened an unlimited career, and whose genius was inspired by the plans of their leader, and the success which attended them. Bonaparte, who had his eye on every man, never neglected to distribute rewards and punishments, praise and censure, with a liberal hand, or omitted to press for what latterly was rarely if ever denied to him—the promotion of such officers as particularly distinguished themselves. He willingly assumed the task of soothing the feelings of those whose relations had fallen under his banners. His letter of consolation to General Clarke upon the death of young Clarke his nephew, who fell at Arcola, is affecting, as showing that amid all his victories he felt himself the object of reproach and criticism.* His keen sensitiveness to the attacks of the public press attended him through life, and, like the slave in the triumphal car, seemed to remind him that he was still a mortal man.

It should further be remarked, that Napoleon withstood, instantly and boldly, all the numerous attempts made by commissaries, and that description of persons, to encroach upon the fund destined for the use of the army. Much of his public, and more of his private correspondence, is filled with complaints against these agents, although he must have known that, in attacking them, he disoblige men of higher influence, who had frequently some secret interest in their wealth. But his military fame made his services indispensable, and permitted him to set at defiance the enmity of such persons, who are generally as timid as they are sordid. Bonaparte's former patron, Barras, was supposed to be accessible to this species of corruption.

Towards the general officers there took place a gradual change of deportment, as the commander-in-chief began to feel gradually, more and more, the increasing sense of his own personal importance. We have been informed by an officer of the highest rank, that, during the earlier campaigns, Napoleon used to rejoice with, and embrace them as associates, nearly on the same footing, engaged in the same tasks. After a period, his language and carriage became those of a frank soldier, who, sensible of the merit of his subordinate assistants, yet makes them sensible, by his manner, that he is their commander-in-chief. When his infant fortunes began to come of age, his deportment to his generals was

* Letter from Napoleon to General Clarke, 25 Brumaire, 5th year of the Republic.—"Your nephew has been slain on the field of battle at Arcola. The young man had been familiar with arms—had led on columns, and would have been one day an excellent officer. He has died with glory in the face of the enemy. He did not suffer for an instant. What man would not envy such a death?—Who is he that would not accept as a favourable condition the choice of thus escaping from the vicissitudes of a contemptible world?—Who is there among us who has not a hundred times regretted that he has not been thus withdrawn from the powerful effects of calumny, of envy, and of all the odious passions which seem the almost exclusive directors of the conduct of mankind?"—This letter, remarkable in many respects, will remind the English reader of Cato's exclamation over the body of his son—

"Who would not be this youth?"

tinged with that lofty courtesy which princes use towards their subjects, and which plainly intimated, that he held them as subjects in the war, not as brethren.*

Napoleon's conduct towards the Italians individually was, in most instances, in the highest degree prudent and political, while, at the same time, it coincided, as true policy usually does, with the rules of justice and moderation, and served in a great measure to counterbalance the odium which he incurred by despoiling Italy of the works of art, and even by his infringements on the religious system of the catholics.

On the latter subject, the general became particularly cautious, and his dislike or contempt of the Church of Rome was no longer shown in that gross species of satire which he had at first given loose to. On the contrary, it was veiled under philosophical indifference; and, while relieving the clergy of their worldly possessions, Napoleon took care to avoid the error of the jacobins; never proposing their tenets as an object of persecution, but protecting their persons, and declaring himself a decided friend to general toleration on all points of conscience.

In point of politics, as well as religion, the opinions of Bonaparte appeared to have experienced a great change. It may be doubted, indeed, if he ever in his heart adopted those of the outrageous jacobins; but he must doubtless have professed them, whether sincerely or not, when he first obtained promotion under the influence of the younger Robespierre, Salicetti, and Barras, who, afterwards a thermidorien, was a sans-culotte during the siege of Toulon.† Bonaparte's clear and sound good sense speedily made him sensible, that such a violence on the established rules of reason and morality, as an attempt to make the brutal force of the multitude the forcible controul of those possessed of the wisdom, property and education of a country, is too unnatural to remain long, or to become the basis of a well-regulated state. Being at present a republican of the thermidorien party, Bonaparte, even though

he made use of the established phrases Liberty and Equality, acknowledged no dignity superior than citizen, and *there'd* and *thou'd* whomsoever he addressed, was permitted to mix many grains of liberality with those democratic forms. Indeed, the republican creed of the day began to resemble the leathern apron of the brazier who founded a dynasty in the east—his descendants continued to display it as their banner, but enriched it so much with gems and embroidery, that there was little of the original stuff to be discovered.

Jacobinism, for example, being founded on the principle of assimilating the national character to the gross ignorance of the lower classes, was the natural enemy of the fine arts and of literature, whose productions the sans-culottes could not comprehend, and which they destroyed for the same enlightened reasons that Jack Cade's followers hanged the clerk of Chatham, with his pen and inkhorn about his neck. Bonaparte, on the contrary, saw that knowledge, of whatsoever kind, was power; and therefore he distinguished himself honourably amidst his victories, by seeking the conversation of men distinguished for literary attainments, and displaying an interest in the antiquities and curiosities of the towns which he visited, that could not but seem flattering to the inhabitants. In a letter addressed publicly to Oriani, a celebrated astronomer, he assures him that all men of genius, all who had distinguished themselves in the republic of letters, were to be accounted natives of France, whatever might be the actual place of their birth. "Hitherto," he said, "the learned in Italy did not enjoy the consideration to which they were entitled—they lived retired in their laboratories and libraries, too happy if they could escape the notice, and consequently the persecution, of kings and priests. It is now no longer thus—there is no longer religious inquisition, nor despotic power. Thought is free in Italy. I invite the literary and scientific persons to consult together, and propose to me their ideas on the subject of giving new vigour and life to the fine arts and sciences. All who desire to visit France will be received with distinction by the government. The people of France have more pride in enrolling among their citizens a skilful mathematician, a painter of reputation, a distinguished man in any class of literature, than in adding to their territories a large and wealthy city. I request, sir, that you will make my sentiments known to the most distinguished literary persons in the state of Milan." To the municipality of Pavia he wrote, desiring that the professors of their celebrated university should resume their course of instruction under the security of his protection, and inviting them to point out to him such measures as might occur, for giving a more brilliant existence to their ancient seminaries.

The interest which he thus took in the literature and literary institutions of Italy, was shown by admitting men of science or letters freely to his person. Their communication was the more flattering, that being himself of Italian descent, and familiar with the beautiful language of the country from his infancy, his conversation with men of literary eminence was easily conducted. It may be mentioned episodically, that Napoleon found a remnant of his family in Italy,

* Count Las Cases mentions an incident of the same kind. An officer, who had known Bonaparte familiarly before Toulon, was, when he obtained the command of the Army of Italy, about to rush into the arms of his old comrade. But the look and manner of the general made it evident there was an end to their intimacy, and that the intercourse between them had changed its character with his friend's promotion.

† Even when before Toulon, he was not held by clear-sighted persons to be a very orthodox jacobin. General Cartaux, the stupid sans-culotte under whom he first served, was talking of the young commandant of artillery with applause, when his wife, who was somewhat first in command at home, advised him not to reckon too much on that young man, "who had too much sense to be long a sans-culotte."—"Sense! Female citizen Cartaux," said her offended husband, "do you take us for fools?"—"By no means," answered the lady: "but his sense is not of the same kind with yours."—*Mémoires de Sie-Hélène*, par le Comte de Las Cases, vol. I, pp. 201–2: 8 vols 8vo, Paris, 1823–4. In the same work, we read an admission of Napoleon, that his brother Lucien was a much more violent jacobin than himself, and that some papers published as his, with the signature, Brutus Bonaparte, ought in fact to be ascribed to Lucien.

in the person of the Abbé Gregorio Bonaparte, the only remaining branch of that Florentine family, of whom the Corsican line were cadets. He resided at San Miniato, of which he was canon, and was an old man, and said to be wealthy. The relationship was eagerly acknowledged, and the general, with his whole staff, dined with the Canon Gregorio. The whole mind of the old priest was wrapt up in a project of obtaining the honours of regular canonization for one of the family called Bonaventura, who had been a capuchin in the 17th century, and was said to have died in the odour of sanctity, though his right to divine honours had never been acknowledged. It must have been ludicrous enough to have heard the old man insist upon a topic so uninteresting to Napoleon, and press the French republican general to use his interest with the pope. There can be little doubt that the holy father, to have escaped other demands, would have canonized a whole French regiment of Carnagnoles, and ranked them with the old militia of the calendar, the Theban Legion. But Napoleon was sensible that any request on such a subject coming from him would be only ludicrous.*

The progress which Bonaparte made personally in the favour of the Italians was, doubtless, a great assistance to the propagation of the new doctrines which were connected with the French Revolution, and was much aided by the trust which he seemed desirous to repose in the natives of the country. He retained, no doubt, in his own hands the ultimate decision of everything of consequence; but in matters of ordinary importance he permitted and encouraged the Italians to act for themselves in a manner they had not been accustomed to under their German masters. The internal government of their towns was intrusted to provisional governors, chosen without respect to rank, and the maintenance of police was committed to the armed burghers, or national guards. Conscious of the importance annexed to these privileges, they already became impatient for national liberty. Napoleon could hardly rein back the intense ardour of the large party among the Lombards who desired an immediate declaration of independence, and he had no other expedient left than to amuse them with procrastinating excuses, which enhanced their desire of such an event while they delayed its gratification. Other towns of Italy—for it was among the citizens of the towns that these sentiments were chiefly cultivated—began to evince the same wish to new-model their governments on the revolutionary system; and this ardour was chiefly shown on the southern side of the Po.

It must be remembered, that Napoleon had engaged in treaty with the Duke of Modena, and had

agreed to guarantee his principality, on payment of immense contributions in money and stores, besides the surrender of the most valuable treasures of his museum. In consequence, the Duke of Modena was permitted to govern his estates by a regency, he himself fixing his residence in Venice. But his two principal towns, Reggio and Modena, especially the former, became desirous of shaking off his government. Anticipating in doing so the approbation of the French general and government, the citizens of Reggio rose in insurrection, expelled from their town a body of the ducal troops, and planted the tree of liberty, resolved, as they said, to constitute themselves a free state, under the protection of the French Republic. The ducal regency, with a view of protecting Modena from a similar attempt, mounted cannon on their ramparts, and took other defensive measures.

Bonaparte affected to consider these preparations as designed against the French, and, marching a body of troops, took possession of the city without resistance, deprived the duke of all the advantages which he had purchased by the mediation of the celebrated Saint Jerome, and declared the town under protection of France. Bologna and Ferrara, legations belonging to the papal see, had been already occupied by French troops, and placed under the management of a committee of their citizens. They were now encouraged to coalesce with Reggio and Modena. A congress of a hundred delegates from the four districts was summoned, to effect the formation of a government which should extend over them all. The congress met accordingly, engaged their constituents in a perpetual union, under title of the Cispadane Republic, from their situation on the right of the river Po; thus assuming the character of independence, while, in fact, they remained under the authority of Bonaparte, like clay in the hands of the potter, who may ultimately model it into any shape he has a mind. In the meantime, he was careful to remind them that the liberty which it was desirable to establish ought to be consistent with due subjection to the laws. "Never forget," he said, in reply to their address announcing their new form of government, "that laws are mere nullities without the force necessary to support them. Attend to your military organization, which you have the means of placing on a respectable footing—you will be more fortunate than the people of France, for you will arrive at liberty without passing through the ordeal of revolution."

This was not the language of a jacobin, and it fortifies the belief that, even now, while adhering ostensibly to the republican system, Bonaparte anticipated considerable changes in that of France.

Meanwhile the Lombards became impatient at seeing their neighbours outstrip them in the path of revolution and of nominal independence. The municipality of Milan proceeded to destroy all titles of honour, as a badge of feudal dependence, and became so impatient that Bonaparte was obliged to pacify them by a solemn assurance that they should speedily enjoy the benefits of a republican constitution, and, to tranquillize their irritation, placed them under the government of a provisional council, selected from all classes, labourers included.

* Las Cases says, that afterwards the pope himself touched on the same topic, and was disposed to see the immediate guidance and protection afforded by the conanguinean Saint Bonaventura in the great deeds wrought by his relation. It was said of the church-endowing saint, David King of Scotland, that he was a sore saint for the crown; certainly Saint Bonaventura must have been a sore saint for the papal see. The old abbé left Napoleon his fortune, which he conferred on some public institution.

This measure made it manifest, that the motives which had induced the delay of the French government to recognize the independence (as they termed it) of Lombardy, were now of less force; and in a short time, the provisional council of Milan, after some modest doubts on their own powers, revolutionized their country, and assumed the title of the Transpadane Republic, which they afterwards laid aside, when, on their union with the Cispadane, both were united under the name of the Cisalpine Commonwealth. This decisive step was adopted 3d January, 1797. Decrees of a popular character had preceded the declaration of independence, but an air of moderation was observed in the revolution itself. The nobles, deprived of their feudal rights and titular dignities, were subjected to no incapacities; the reformation of the church was touched upon gently, and without indicating any design of its destruction. In these particulars, the Italian commonwealths stopped short of their Gallic prototype.

If Bonaparte may be justly charged with want of faith, in destroying the authority of the Duke of Modena, after having accepted of a price for granting him peace and protection, we cannot object to him the same charge for acceding to the Cispadane Republic, in so far as it detached the legations of Ferrara and Bologna from the Roman See. These had been in a great measure reserved for the disposal of the French, as circumstances should dictate, when a final treaty should take place betwixt the Republic and the sovereign pontiff. But many circumstances had retarded this pacification, and seemed at length likely to break it off without hope of renewal.

If Bonaparte is correct in his statement, which we see no reason to doubt, the delay of a pacification with the Roman See was chiefly the fault of the Directory, whose avaricious and engrossing spirit was at this period its most distinguishing characteristic. An armistice, purchased by treasure, by contributions, by pictures and statues, and by the cession of the two legations of Bologna and Ferrara, having been mediated for his holiness by the Spanish ambassador Azara, the pope sent two plenipotentiaries to Paris to treat of a definitive peace. But the conditions proposed were so severe, that, however desperate his condition, the pope found them totally inadmissible. His holiness was required to pay a large contribution in grain for ten years, a regular tribute of six millions of Roman crowns for six years, to cede to France in perpetuity the ports of Ancona and Civita Vecchia, and to declare the independence of Ferrara, Bologna, and Ravenna. To add insult to oppression, the total cession of the Clementine Museum was required, and it was stipulated that France should have under management of her minister at Rome, a separate tribunal for judging her subjects, and a separate theatre for their amusement. Lastly, the secular sovereignty of the dominions of the church was to be executed by a senate and a popular body.

These demands might have been complied with, although they went the length of entirely stripping his holiness of the character of a secular prince.

But there were others made on him, in capacity of head of the church, which he could not grant, if he meant in future to lay claim to any authority under that once venerable title. The sovereign pontiff was required to recal all the briefs which he had issued against France since 1789, to sanction the constitutional oath which released the French clergy from the dominion of the Holy See, and to ratify the confiscation of the church-lands. Treasures might be expended, secular dignities resigned, and provinces ceded; but it was clear that the sovereign pontiff could not do what was expressly contrary to the doctrines of the church which he represented. There were but few clergymen in France who had hesitated to prove their devotion to the church of Rome, by submitting to expulsion, rather than take the constitutional oath. It was now for the head of the church to show in his own person a similar disinterested devotion to her interests.

Accordingly, the College of Cardinals having rejected the proposals of France, as containing articles contrary to conscience, the pope declared his determination to abide by the utmost extremity, rather than accede to conditions destructive, degrading, and, in his opinion, impious. The Directory instantly determined on the total ruin of the pope, and of his power, both spiritual and temporal.

Napoleon dissented from the opinion of the government. In point of moral effort, a reconciliation with the pope would have been of great advantage to France, and have tended to requite her with other catholic nations, and diminish the horror with which she was regarded as sacrilegious and atheistical. Even the army of the Holy See was not altogether to be despised, in case of any reverse taking place in the war with the Austrians. Under these considerations, he prevailed on the Directory to renew the negotiations at Florence. But the French commissioners, having presented as preliminaries sixty indispensable conditions, containing the same articles which had been already rejected, as contrary to the conscience of the pontiff, the conferences broke up; and the pope, in despair, resolved to make common cause with the house of Austria, and have recourse to the secular force, which the Roman See had disused for so many years.

It was a case of dire necessity; but the arming of the pope's government, whose military force had been long the subject of ridicule,* against the victorious conqueror of five Austrian armies, reminds us of Priam, when, in extremity of years and despair, he buckled on his rusty armour, to oppose age and decrepitude to the youthful strength of Pyrrhus.† Yet the measures of Sextus indicated considerable energy. He brought back to Rome an instalment of sixteen millions of stipulated tribute, which was on the road to Bonaparte's military chest—took every measure to increase his army,

* Voltaire, in some of his romances, terms the pope an old gentleman having a guard of one hundred men, who mount guard with umbrellas, and who make war on nobody.

† *Arma diu senior desueta, tremantibus ævo
Circumdatæ nequicquam humeris, et inutile ferrum
Cingitur*——— *Æneid. Lib. II.*

and by the voluntary exertions of the noble families of Rome, he actually raised it to forty thousand men, and placed at its head the same General Colli, who had commanded with credit the troops of Sardinia during the campaign on the Alps. The utmost pains were taken by the clergy, both regular and secular, to give the expected war the character of a crusade, and to excite the fierce spirit of those peasantry who inhabit the Appennines, and were doubly disposed to be hostile to the French, as foreigners and as heretics. The pope endeavoured also to form a close alliance with the King of the Two Sicilies, who promised in secret to cover Rome with an army of thirty thousand men. Little reliance was indeed to be placed in the good faith of the court of Naples; but the pope was compared, by the French envoy, to a man who, in the act of falling, would grasp for support at a hook of red-hot iron.

While the court of Rome showed this hostile disposition, Napoleon reproached the French government for having broken off the negotiation, which they ought to have protracted till the event of Alvinzi's march into Italy was known; at all events, until their general had obtained possession of the sixteen millions, so much wanted to pay his forces. In reply to his remonstrances, he received permission to renew the negotiations upon modified terms. But the pope had gone too far to recede. Even the French victory of Arcola, and the instant threats of Bonaparte to march against him at the head of a flying column, were unable to move his resolution. "Let the French general march upon Rome," said the papal minister; "the pope, if necessary, will quit his capital. The farther the French are drawn from the Adige, the nearer they are to their ultimate destruction." Napoleon was sensible, on receiving a hostile answer, that the pope still relied on the last preparations which were made for the relief of Mantua, and it was not safe to attempt his chastisement until Alvinzi and Provera should be disposed of. But the decisive battles of Rivoli and La Favorita having ruined these armies, Napoleon was at leisure to execute his purpose of crushing the power, such as it was, of the Holy See. For this purpose he dispatched Victor with a French division of four thousand men, and an Italian army of nearly the same force, supplied by Lombardy and by the Transpadane Republic, to invade the territories of the church on the eastern side of Italy, by the route of Imola.

Meantime, the utmost exertions had been made by the clergy of Romagna, to raise the peasants in a mass, and a great many obeyed the sound of the tocsin. But an insurrectionary force is more calculated to embarrass the movements of a regular army, by alarms on their flanks and rear, by cutting off their communications, and destroying their supplies, defending passes, and skirmishing in advantageous positions, than by opposing them in the open field. The papal army, consisting of about seven or eight thousand men, were encamped on the river Senio, which runs on the southward of the town of Imola, to dispute the passage. The banks were defended with cannon; but the river being unusually low, the French crossed about a league and a half

higher up than the position of the Roman army, which, taken in the rear, fled in every direction, after a short resistance. A few hundreds were killed, among whom were several monks, who, holding the crucifix in their hand, had placed themselves in the ranks to encourage the soldiers. Faenza held out, and was taken by storm; but the soldiers were withheld from pillage by the generosity or prudence of Napoleon, and he dismissed the prisoners of war to carry into the interior of the country the news of their own defeat, of the irresistible superiority of the French army, and of the clemency of their general.

Next day, three thousand of the papal troops, occupying an advantageous position in front of Ancona, and commanded by Colli, were made prisoners without firing a shot; and Ancona was taken after slight resistance, though a place of some strength. A curious piece of priestcraft had been played off in this town, to encourage the people to resistance. A miraculous image was seen to shed tears, and the French artists could not discover the mode in which the trick was managed until the image was brought to head-quarters, when a glass shrine, by which the illusion was managed, was removed. The Madonna was sent back to the church which owned her, but apparently had become reconciled to the foreign visitors, and dried her tears in consequence of her interview with Bonaparte.

On the 10th of February, the French, moving with great celerity, entered Loretto, where the celebrated Santa Casa is the subject of the catholic's devotional triumph, or secret scorn, according as his faith or his doubts predominate. The wealth which this celebrated shrine is once supposed to have possessed by gifts of the faithful, had been removed by Colli—if, indeed, it had not been transported to Rome long before the period of which we treat; yet, precious metal and gems to the amount of a million of livres, fell into the possession of the French, whose capture was also enriched by the holy image of Our Lady of Loretto, with the sacred porringer, and a bed-gown of dark-coloured camlet, warranted to have belonged to the Blessed Virgin. The image, said to have been of celestial workmanship, was sent to Paris, but was restored to the pope in 1802. We are not informed that any of the treasures were given back along with the Madonna, to whom they had been devoted.

As the French army advanced upon the Roman territory, there was a menace of the interference of the King of Naples, worthy to be mentioned, both as expressing the character of that court, and showing Napoleon's readiness in anticipating and defeating the arts of indirect diplomacy.

The prince of Belmonte-Pignatelli, who attended Bonaparte's head-quarters, in the capacity perhaps of an observer, as much as of ambassador for Naples, came to the French general in secrecy, to show him, under strict confidence, a letter of the Queen of the Two Sicilies, proposing to march an army of thirty thousand men towards Rome. "Your confidence shall be repaid," said Bonaparte, who at once saw through the spirit of the communication—"You shall know what I have long since settled

to do in case of such an event taking place." He called for the portfolio containing the papers respecting Naples, and presented to the disconcerted prince the copy of a dispatch written in November preceding, which contained this passage:—"The approach of Alvinzi would not prevent my sending six thousand men to chastise the court of Rome; but, as the Neapolitan army might march to their assistance, I will postpone this movement till after the surrender of Mantua; in which case, if the King of Naples should interfere, I shall be able to spare twenty-five thousand men to march against his capital, and drive him over to Sicily." Prince Pignatelli was quite satisfied with the result of this mutual confidence, and there was no more said of Neapolitan armed interference.

From Ancona the division commanded by Victor turned westward to Foligno, to unite itself with another column of French which penetrated into the territories of the church by Perugia, which they easily accomplished. Resistance seemed now unavailing. The pope in vain solicited his subjects to rise against the second Alaric, who was approaching the holy city. They remained deaf to his exhortations, though made in the names of the Blessed Virgin, and of the Apostles Peter and Paul, who had of old been the visible protectors of the metropolis of the christian world in a similar emergency. All was dismay and confusion in the patrimony of Saint Peter's, which was now the sole territory remaining in possession of his representative.

But there was an unhappy class of persons, who had found shelter in Rome, rather than disown whose allegiance they had left their homes, and resigned their means of living. These were the recusant French clergy, who had refused to take the constitutional oath, and who now, recollecting the scenes which they witnessed in France, expected little else, than that, on the approach of the republican troops, they would, like the Israelitish captain, be slain between the horns of the very altar at which they had taken refuge. It is said that one of their number, frantic at thoughts of the fate which he supposed awaited them, presented himself to Bonaparte, announced his name and condition, and prayed to be led to instant death. Napoleon took the opportunity to show once more that he was acting on principles different from the brutal and persecuting spirit of jacobinism. He issued a proclamation, in which, premising that the recusant priests, though banished from the French territory, were not prohibited from residing in countries which might be conquered by the French arms, he declares himself satisfied with their conduct. The proclamation goes on to prohibit, under the most severe penalty, the French soldiery, and all other persons, from doing any injury to these unfortunate exiles. The convents are directed to afford them lodging, nourishment, and fifteen French livres (twelve shillings and sixpence British) monthly to each individual, for which the priest was to compensate by saying masses *ad valorem*;—thus assigning the Italian convents payment for their hospitality, in the same coin with which they themselves required the laity.

Perhaps this liberality might have some weight with the pope in inducing him to throw himself upon

the mercy of France, as had been recommended to him by Bonaparte in a confidential communication through the superior of the monastic order of Camalduli, and more openly in a letter addressed to Cardinal Mattei. The King of Naples made no movement to his assistance. In fine, after hesitating what course to take, and having had at one time his equipage ready harnessed to leave Rome and fly to Naples, the pontiff judged resistance and flight alike unavailing, and chose the humiliating alternative of entire submission to the will of the conqueror.

It was the object of the Directory entirely to destroy the secular authority of the pope, and to deprive him of all his temporalities. But Bonaparte foresaw, that whether the Roman territories were united with the new Cispadane Republic, or formed into a separate state, it would alike bring on prematurely a renewal of the war with Naples, ere the north of Italy was yet sufficiently secure to admit the marching a French force into the southern extremities of the Italian peninsula, exposed to descents of the English, and insurrections in the rear. These Napoleon foresaw would be the more dangerous and difficult to subdue, that though he might strip the pope of his temporalities, he could not deprive him of the supremacy assigned him in spiritual matters by each catholic; which, on the contrary, was, according to the progress of human feeling, likely to be the more widely felt and recognized in favour of a wanderer and a sufferer for what would be accounted conscience-sake, than of one who, submitting to circumstances, retained as much of the goods of this world as the clemency of his conqueror would permit.

Influenced by these considerations, Bonaparte admitted the pope to a treaty which terminated in the peace of Tolentino, by which Sextus purchased such a political existence as was left to him, at the highest rate which he had the least chance of discharging. Napoleon mentions, as a curious instance of the crafty and unscrupulous character of the Neapolitans, that the same Pignatelli, whom we have already commemorated, attached himself closely to the plenipotentiaries during the whole treaty of Tolentino; and in his ardour to discover whether there existed any secret article betwixt the pope and Bonaparte which might compromise the interests of his master, was repeatedly discovered listening at the door of the apartment in which the discussions were carried on.

The articles which the pope was obliged to accept at Tolentino included the cession of Avignon and its territories, the appropriation of which, by France, had never yet been recognized; the resigning the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna; the occupation of Ancona, the only port excepting Venice which Italy has in the Adriatic; the payment of 30 millions of livres, in specie, or in valuable effects; the complete execution of the article in the armistice of Bologna respecting the delivery of paintings, manuscripts, and objects of art; and several other stipulations of similar severity.

Bonaparte informs us, that it was a principal object in this treaty to compel the abolition of the Inquisition, from which he had only departed in

consequence of receiving information, that it had ceased to be used as a religious tribunal, and subsisted only as a court of police. The conscience of the pope seemed also so tenderly affected by the proposal, that he thought it safe to desist from it.

The same dispatch, in which Bonaparte informs the Directory, that his committee of artist collectors "had made a good harvest of paintings in the papal dominions, and which, with the objects of art ceded by the pope, included almost all that was curious and valuable, excepting some few objects at Turin and Naples," conveyed to them a document of a very different kind. This was a respectful and almost reverential letter from Napoleon to the pope, recommending to his holiness to distrust such persons as might excite him to doubt the good intentions of France, assuring him that he would always find the Republic most sincere and faithful, and expressing in his own name the perfect esteem and veneration which he entertained for the person of his holiness, and the extreme desire which he had to afford him proofs to that effect.

This letter furnished much amusement at the time, and seemed far less to intimate the sentiments of a *sans-culotte* general, than those of a civilized highwayman of the old school of Macheath, who never dismissed the travelers whom he had plundered, without his sincere good wishes for the happy prosecution of their journey.

A more pleasing view of Bonaparte's character was exhibited about this time, in his conduct towards the little interesting Republic of San Marino. That state, which only acknowledges the pope as a protector, not as a sovereign, had maintained for very many years an independence, which conquerors had spared either in contempt or in respect. It consists of a single mountain and a single town, and boasts about seven thousand inhabitants, governed by their own laws. Citizen Monge, the chief of the committee of collecting-artists, was sent deputy to San Marino to knit the bands of amity between the two republics,—which might well resemble a union between Lilliput and Brobdingnag. There were no pictures in the little republic, or they might have been a temptation to the citizen collector. The people of San Marino conducted themselves with much sagacity; and although more complimentary to Bonaparte than Diogenes to Alexander the Great, when he came to visit the philosopher in his tub, they showed the same judgment in eschewing too much courtesy. They respectfully declined an accession of territory, which could but have involved them in subsequent quarrels with the sovereign from whom it was to be wrested, and only accepted as an honorary gift the present of four field-pieces, being a train of artillery upon the scale of their military force, and of which, it is to be hoped, the captain regents of the little contented state will never have any occasion to make use.

Rome might, for the present at least, be considered as completely subjugated. Naples was at peace, if the signature of a treaty can create peace. At any rate, so distant from Rome, and so controlled by the defeat of the papal arms—by the fear that the English fleet might be driven from the Mediterranean—and by their distance from the

scene of action—the King of the Two Sicilies, or rather his wife, the high-spirited daughter of Maria Theresa, dared not offer the least interference with the purposes of the French general. Tuscany had apparently consented to owe her political existence to any degree of clemency or contempt which Bonaparte might extend to her; and, entertaining hopes of some convention between the French and English, by which the Grand Duke's port of Leghorn might be restored to him, remained passive as the dead. The Republic of Venice alone, feeling still the stimulus arising from her ancient importance, and yet painfully conscious of her present want of power, strained every exertion to place herself in a respectable attitude. That city of lofty remembrances, the Tyre of the middle ages, whose traders were princes, and her merchants the honourable of the earth, fallen as she was from her former greatness, still presented some appearance of vigour. Her oligarchical government, so long known and so dreaded, for jealous precautions, political sagacity, the impenetrability of their plans, and the inflexibility of their rigour, still preserved the attitude of independence, and endeavoured, by raising additional regiments of Slavonians, disciplining their peasantry, who were of a very martial character, and forming military magazines of considerable extent, to maintain such an aspect, as might make their friendship to be courted, and their enmity to be feared. It was already evident that the Austrians, notwithstanding all their recent defeats, were again about to make head on their Italo-German frontier; and France, in opposing them, could not be indifferent to the neutrality of Venice, upon whose territories, to all appearance, Bonaparte must have rested the flank of his operations; in case of his advancing towards Friuli. So circumstanced, and when it was recollected that the mistress of the Adriatic had still fifty thousand men at her command, and those of a fierce and courageous description, chiefly consisting of Slavonians, Venice, even yet, was an enemy not to be lightly provoked. But the inhabitants were not unanimous, especially those of the *Terra Firma*, or mainland, who, not being enrolled in the golden book of the insular nobility of Venice, were discontented, and availed themselves of the encouragement and assistance of the new-created republics on the Po to throw off their allegiance. Brescia and Bergamo, in particular, were clamorous for independence.

Napoleon saw, in this state of dissension, the means of playing an adroit game; and while, on the one hand, he endeavoured to restrain, till a more favourable opportunity, the ardour of the patriots, he attempted, on the other, to convince the senate, that they had no safe policy but in embracing at once the alliance of France, offensive and defensive, and joining their forces to those of the army with which he was about to move against the Austrians. He offered, on these conditions, to guarantee the possessions of the republic, even without exacting any modification of their oligarchical constitution. But Venice declared for an impartial neutrality. It had been, they said, their ancient and sage policy, nor would they now depart from it. "Remain then neuter," said Napo-

leon; "I consent to it. I march upon Vienna, yet will leave enough of French troops in Italy to control your republic.—But dismiss these new levies; and remark that if, while I am in Germany, my communications shall be interrupted, my detachments cut off, or my convoys intercepted in the Venetian territory, the date of your republic is terminated. She will have brought on herself annihilation."

Lest these threats should be forgotten while he was at a distance, he took the best precautions in his power, by garrisoning advantageous points on the line of the Adige; and, trusting partly to this defence, partly to the insurgents of Bergamo and Brescia, who, for their own sakes, would oppose any invasion of the mainland by their Venetian masters, whose yoke they had cast aside, Napoleon again unfurled his banners, and marched to new triumphs over yet untried opponents.

CHAPTER XXVII.

Archduke Charles—Compared with Napoleon—Fettered by the Aulic Council.—Napoleon, by a stratagem, passes the Tagliamento, and compels the archduke to retreat.—Gradisca carried by storm.—Chiusa-Veneta taken by Masséna, with the loss of 5000 Austrians, baggage, cannon, &c.—The seaports of Trieste and Fiume occupied by the French—Venice breaks the neutrality, and commences hostilities by a massacre of 100 Frenchmen at Verona—Terrified on learning that an armistice had taken place betwixt France and Austria—Circumstances which led to this.—The archduke retreats by hasty marches on Vienna—His prospects of success in defending it.—The government and people irresolute, and the treaty of Leoben signed—Venice now makes the most humiliating submissions.—Napoleon's speech to the Venetian envoys—He declares war against Venice, and evades obeying the orders of the Directory to spare it.—The Great Council, on 31st May, concede every thing to Bonaparte, and disperse in terror.—Terms granted by the French general.

THE victories of the Archduke Charles of Austria on the Rhine, and his high credit with the soldiers, seemed to point him out as the commander falling most naturally to be employed against the young general of the French Republic, who, like a gifted hero of romance, had borne down successively all opponents who had presented themselves in the field. The opinions of Europe were suspended concerning the probable issue of the contest. Both generals were young, ambitious, enthusiastic in the military profession, and warmly beloved by their soldiers. The exploits of both had filled the trumpet of Fame; and although Bonaparte's success had been less uninterrupted, yet it could not be denied, that if the archduke's plans were not equally brilliant and original with those of his great adversary, they were just and sound, and had been attended repeatedly with great results, and by the defeat of such men as Moreau and Jourdan. But there were two particulars in which the Austrian prince fell far short of Napoleon,—first, in that ready, decided, and vigorous confidence, which seizes the favourable instant for the execution of plans resolved upon,—and, secondly, in having the disadvantage

to be subjected, notwithstanding his high rank, to the interference of the Aulic Council, who, sitting at Vienna, and ignorant of the changes and vicissitudes of the campaign, were yet, by the ancient and jealous laws of the Austrian empire, entitled to control his opinion, and prescribe beforehand the motions of the armies, while the generals intrusted with the execution of their schemes had often no choice left but that of adherence to their instructions, however emerging circumstances might require a deviation.

But although the encounter betwixt these two distinguished young generals be highly interesting, our space will not permit us to detail the campaigns of Austria at the same length as those of Italy. The latter formed the commencement of Bonaparte's military career, and at no subsequent period of his life did he achieve the same wondrous victories against such immense odds, or with such comparatively inadequate means. It was also necessary, in the outset of his military history, to show in minute detail the character of his tactics, and illustrate that spirit of energetic concentration, which, neglecting the extremities of an extended line of operations, combined his whole strength, like a bold and skilful fencer, for one thrust at a vital part, which, if successful, must needs be fatal. The astonishing rapidity of his movements, the audacious vivacity of his attack, having been so often described in individual cases, may now be passed over with general allusions; nor will we embarrass ourselves and our readers with minute details of positions, or encumber our pages with the names of obscure villages, unless when there is some battle calling for a particular narrative, either from its importance or its singularity.

By the direction of the Aulic Council, the Archduke Charles had taken up his position at Friuli, where it had been settled that the sixth Austrian army, designed to act against Bonaparte for the defence of the Italo-German frontier, should be assembled. This position was strangely preferred to the Tyrol, where the archduke could have formed a junction ten days sooner with an additional force of forty thousand men from the army of the Rhine, marching to reinforce his own troops,—men accustomed to fight and conquer under their leader's eye; whilst those with whom he occupied Friuli and the line of the Piave, belonged to the hapless Imperial forces, which, under Beaulieu, Wurms, and Alvinzi, had never encountered Bonaparte without incurring some notable defeat.

While the archduke was yet expecting those reinforcements which were to form the strength of his army, his active adversary was strengthened by more than twenty thousand men, sent from the French armies on the Rhine, and which gave him at the moment a numerical superiority over the Austrian general. Instead, therefore, of waiting, as on former occasions, until the Imperialists should commence the war by descending into Italy, Napoleon resolved to anticipate the march of the succours expected by the archduke, drive him from his position on the Italian frontiers, and follow him into Germany, even up to the walls of Vienna. No scheme appeared too bold for the general's imagination.

tion to form, or his genius to render practicable; and his soldiers, with the view before them of plunging into the midst of an immense empire, and placing chains of mountains betwixt them and every possibility of reinforcement or communication, were so confident in the talents of their leader, as to follow him under the most undoubting expectation of victory. The Directory had induced Bonaparte to expect a co-operation by a similar advance on the part of the armies of the Rhine, as had been attempted in the former campaign.

Bonaparte took the field in the beginning of March, advancing from Bassano. The Austrians had an army of observation under Lusignan on the banks of the Piave, but their principal force was stationed upon the Tagliamento, a river whose course is nearly thirty miles more to the eastward, though collateral with the Piave. The plains on the Tagliamento afforded facilities to the archduke to employ the noble cavalry which have always been the boast of the Austrian army; and to dislodge him from the strong and mountainous country which he occupied, and which covered the road that penetrates between the mountains and the Adriatic, and forms the mode of communication in that quarter betwixt Vienna and Italy, through Carinthia, it was not only necessary that he should be pressed in front, a service which Bonaparte took upon himself, but also that a French division, occupying the mountains on the prince's right, should precipitate his retreat by maintaining the perpetual threat of turning him on that wing. With this view, Masséna had Bonaparte's orders, which he executed with equal skill and gallantry. He crossed the Piave about the eleventh March, and ascending that river, directed his course into the mountains towards Belluno, driving before him Lusignan's little corps of observation, and finally compelling his rear-guard, to the number of five hundred men, to surrender.

The Archduke Charles, in the meantime, continued to maintain his position on the Tagliamento, and the French approached the right bank, with Napoleon at their head, determined apparently to force a passage. Artillery and sharp-shooters were disposed in such a manner as to render this a very hazardous attempt, while two beautiful lines of cavalry were drawn up, prepared to charge any troops who might make their way to the left bank, while they were yet in the confusion of landing.

A very simple stratagem disconcerted this fair display of resistance. After a distant cannonade, and some skirmishing, the French army drew off, as if despairing to force their passage, moved to the rear, and took up apparently their bivouac for the night. The archduke was deceived. He imagined that the French, who had marched all the preceding night, were fatigued, and he also withdrew from the bank of the river to his camp. But two hours afterwards, when all seemed profoundly quiet, the French army suddenly got under arms, and forming in two lines, marched rapidly to the side of the river, ere the astonished Austrians were able to make the same dispositions as formerly for defence. Arrived on the margin, the first line instantly broke up into columns, which, throwing themselves boldly into the stream, protected on the flanks by the ca-

valry, passed through and attained the opposite bank. They were repeatedly charged by the Austrian cavalry, but it was too late—they had gotten their footing, and kept it. The archduke attempted to turn their flank, but was prevented by the second line of the French, and by their reserve of cavalry. He was compelled to retreat, leaving prisoners and cannon in the hands of the enemy. Such was the first disastrous meeting between the Archduke Charles and his future relative.

The Austrian prince had the farther misfortune to learn, that Masséna had, at the first sound of the cannonade, pushed across the Tagliamento, higher up than his line of defence, and destroying what troops he found before him, had occupied the passes of the Julian Alps at the sources of that river, and thus interposed himself between the Imperial right wing and the nearest communication with Vienna. Sensible of the importance of this obstacle, the archduke hastened, if possible, to remove it. He brought up a fine column of grenadiers from the Rhine, which had just arrived at Klagenfurt, in his rear, and, joining them to other troops, attacked Masséna with the utmost fury, venturing his own person like a private soldier, and once or twice narrowly escaping being made prisoner. It was in vain—all in vain. He charged successively and repeatedly, even with the reserve of the grenadiers, but no exertion could change the fortune of the day.

Still the archduke hoped to derive assistance from the natural or artificial defences of the strong country through which he was thus retreating, and in doing so was involuntarily introducing Bonaparte, after he should have surmounted the border frontier, into the most fertile provinces of his brother's empire. The Lisonzo, usually a deep and furious torrent, closed in by a chain of impassable mountains, seemed to oppose an insurmountable barrier to his daring pursuers. But nature, as well as events, fought against the Austrians. The stream, reduced by frost, was fordable in several places. The river thus passed, the town of Gradisca, which had been covered with field-works to protect the line of the Lisonzo, was surprised and carried by storm, and its garrison of two thousand five hundred men made prisoners, by the divisions of Bernadotte and Serrurier.

Pushed in every direction, the Austrians sustained every day additional and more severe losses. The strong fort of Chiusa-Veneta was occupied by Masséna, who continued his active and indefatigable operations on the right of the retreating army. This success caused the envelopment, and dispersion or surrender, of a whole division of Austrians, five thousand of whom remained prisoners, while their baggage, cannon, colours, and all that constituted them an army, fell into the hands of the French. Four generals were made prisoners on this occasion; and many of the mountaineers of Carniola and Croatia, who had joined the Austrian army from their natural love of war, seeing that success appeared to have abandoned the Imperial cause, became despondent, broke up their corps, and retired as stragglers to their villages.

Bonaparte availed himself of their loss of courage, and had recourse to proclamations, a species of arms which he valued himself as much upon using to ad-

vantage, as he did upon his military fame. He assured them that the French did not come into their country to innovate on their rights, religious customs, and manners. He exhorted them not to meddle in a war with which they had no concern, but encouraged them to afford assistance and furnish supplies to the French army, in payment of which he proposed to assign the public taxes which they had been in the habit of paying to the emperor. His proposal seems to have reconciled the Carinthians to the presence of the French, or, more properly speaking, they submitted to the military exactions which they had no means of resisting. In the meanwhile, the French took possession of Trieste and Fiume, the only seaports belonging to Austria, where they seized much English merchandize, which was always a welcome prize, and of the quicksilver mines of Idria, where they found a valuable deposit of that mineral.

Napoleon repaired the fortifications of Klagenfurt, and converted it into a respectable place of arms, where he established his head-quarters. In a space of scarce twenty days, he had defeated the Austrians in ten combats, in the course of which Prince Charles had lost at least one-fourth of his army. The French had surmounted the southern chain of the Julian Alps; the northern line could, it was supposed, offer no obstacle sufficient to stop their irresistible general; and the archduke, the pride and hope of the Austrian armies, had retired behind the river Meahr, and seemed to be totally without the means of covering Vienna.

There were, however, circumstances less favourable to the French, which require to be stated. When the campaign commenced, the French general Joubert was posted with his division in the gorge of the Tyrol above Trent, upon the same river Lavis, the line of which had been lost and won during the preceding winter. He was opposed by the Austrian generals Kerpen and Landon, who, besides some regular regiments, had collected around them a number of the Tyrolese militia, who among their own mountains were at least equally formidable. They remained watching each other during the earlier part of the campaign; but the gaining of the battle of the Tagliamento was the signal for Joubert to commence the offensive. His directions were to push his way through the Tyrol to Brixen, at which place Napoleon expected he might hear news of the advance of the French armies from the Rhine, to co-operate in the march upon Vienna. But the Directory, fearing perhaps to trust nearly the whole force of the Republic in the hands of a general so successful and so ambitious as Napoleon, had not fulfilled their promises in this respect. The army of Moreau had not as yet crossed the Rhine.

Joubert, thus disappointed of his promised object, began to find himself in an embarrassing situation. The whole country was in insurrection around him, and a retreat in the line by which he had advanced, might have exposed him to great loss, if not to destruction. He determined, therefore, to elude the enemy, and by descending the river Drave, to achieve a junction with his commander-in-chief, Napoleon. He accomplished his difficult march by breaking down the bridges behind him, and thus

arresting the progress of the enemy; but it was with difficulty, and not without loss, that he effected his proposed union, and his retreat from the Tyrol gave infinite spirits not only to the martial Tyrolese, but to all the favourers of Austria in the north of Italy. The Austrian general, Landon, sallied from the Tyrol at the head of a considerable force, and compelled the slender body of French, under Bolland, to shut themselves up in garrisons; and their opponents were for the moment again lords of a part of Lombardy. They also re-occupied Trieste and Fiume, which Bonaparte had not been able sufficiently to garrison; so that the rear of the French army seemed to be endangered.

The Venetians, at this crisis, fatally for their ancient republic, if indeed its doom had not, as is most likely, been long before sealed, received with eager ears the accounts, exaggerated as they were by rumour, that the French were driven from the Tyrol, and the Austrians about to descend the Adige, and resume their ancient empire in Italy. The senate were aware that neither their government nor their persons were acceptable to the French general, and that they had offered him irreconcilably by declining the intimate alliance and contribution of troops which he had demanded. He had parted from them with such menaces as were not easily to be misunderstood. They believed, if his vengeance might not be instant, it was only the more sure; and conceiving him now deeply engaged in Germany, and surrounded by the Austrian levies *en masse* from the warlike countries of Hungary and Croatia, they imagined that throwing their own weight into the scale, at so opportune a moment, must weigh it down for ever. To chastise their insurgent subjects of Bergamo and Brescia, was an additional temptation.

Their mode of making war savoured of the ancient vindictive temper ascribed to their countrymen. An insurrection was secretly organized through all the territories which Venice still possessed on the mainland, and broke out, like the celebrated Sicilian vespers, in blood and massacre. In Verona they assassinated more than a hundred Frenchmen, many of them sick soldiers in the hospitals,—an abominable cruelty, which could not fail to bring a curse on their undertaking. Fioravante, a Venetian general, marched at the head of a body of Slavonians to besiege the forts of Verona, into which the remaining French had made their retreat, and where they defended themselves. Landon made his appearance with his Austrians and Tyrolese, and it seemed as if the fortunes of Bonaparte had at length found a check.

But the awakening from this pleasing dream was equally sudden and dreadful. News arrived that preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon, and an armistice signed between France and Austria. Landon, therefore, and the auxiliaries on whom the Venetians had so much relied, retired from Verona. The Lombards sent an army to the assistance of the French. The Slavonians, under Fioravante, after fighting vigorously, were compelled to surrender. The insurgent towns of Vicenza, Treviso, and Padua, were again occupied by the republicans. Rumour proclaimed the terrible return of

Napoleon and his army, and the ill-advised senate of Venice were lost in stupor, and scarce had sense left to decide betwixt unreserved submission and hopeless defence.

It was one of the most artful rules in Bonaparte's policy, that when he had an enemy at decided advantage, by some point having been attained which seemed to give a complete turn to the campaign in his favour, he seldom failed to offer peace, and peace upon conditions much more favourable than perhaps the opposite party expected. By doing this, he secured such immediate and undisputed fruits of his victory, as the treaty of peace contained; and he was sure of means to prosecute farther advantage at some future opportunity. He obtained, moreover, the character of generosity; and, in the present instance, he avoided the great danger of urging to bay so formidable a power as Austria, whose despair might be capable of the most formidable efforts.

With this purpose, and assuming for the first time that disregard for the usual ceremonial of courts, and etiquette of politics, which he afterwards seemed to have pleasure in displaying, he wrote a letter in person to the Archduke Charles on the subject of peace.

This composition affects that abrupt laconic severity of style, which cuts short argument, by laying down general maxims of philosophy of a trite character, and breaks through the usual laboured periphrastic introductions with which ordinary politicians preface their proposals, when desirous of entering upon a treaty. "It is the part of a brave soldier," he said, "to make war, but to wish for peace. The present strife has lasted six years. Have we not yet slain enough of men, and sufficiently outraged humanity? Peace is demanded on all sides. Europe at large has laid down the arms assumed against the French Republic. Your nation remains alone in hostility, and yet blood flows faster than ever. This sixth campaign has commenced under ominous circumstances—end how it will, some thousands of men more will be slain on either side; and at length, after all, we must come to an agreement, for everything must have an end at last, even the angry passions of men. The Executive Directory made known to the emperor their desire to put a period to the war which desolates both countries, but the intervention of the court of London opposed it. Is there then no means of coming to an understanding, and must we continue to cut each other's throats for the interests or passions of a nation, herself a stranger to the miseries of war? You, the general-in-chief, who approach by birth so near to the crown, and are above all those petty passions which agitate ministers, and the members of government, will you resolve to be the benefactor of mankind, and the true saviour of Germany? Do not suppose that I mean by that expression to intimate, that it is impossible for you to defend yourself by force of arms; but under the supposition, that fortune were to become favourable to you, Germany would be equally exposed to ravage. With respect to my own feelings, general, if this proposition should be the means of saving one single man's life, I should prefer a civic crown so merited, to the melancholy glory attending military success."

The whole tone of the letter is ingeniously calculated to give the proposition the character of moderation, and at the same time to avoid the appearance of too ready an advance towards his object. The archduke, after a space of two days, returned this brief answer, in which he stripped Bonaparte's proposal of its gilding, and treated it upon the footing of an ordinary proposal for a treaty of peace, made by a party, who finds it convenient for his interest:—"Unquestionably, sir, in making war, and following the road prescribed by honour and duty, I desire as much as you the attainment of peace for the happiness of the people, and of humanity. Considering, however, that in the situation which I hold, it is no part of my business to inquire into and determine the quarrel of the belligerent powers; and that I am not furnished on the part of the emperor with any plenipotentiary powers for treating, you will excuse me, general, if I do not enter into negotiation with you touching a matter of the highest importance, but which does not lie within my department. Whatever shall happen, either respecting the future chances of the war, or the prospect of peace, I request you to be equally convinced of my distinguished esteem."

The archduke would willingly have made some advantage of this proposal, by obtaining an armistice of five hours, sufficient to enable him to form a junction with the corps of Kerpen, which, having left the Tyrol to come to the assistance of the commander-in-chief, was now within a short distance. But Bonaparte took care not to permit himself to be hampered by any such ill-timed engagement, and after some sharp fighting, in which the French as usual were successful, he was able to interpose such a force as to prevent the junction taking place.

Two encounters followed at Neumark and at Unzmark—both gave rise to fresh disputes, and the continued retreat of the Archduke Charles and the Imperial army. The French general then pressed forward on the road to Vienna, through mountain-passes and defiles, which could not have been opened otherwise than by turning them on the flank. But these natural fastnesses were no longer defences. Judenburg, the capital of Upper Styria, was abandoned to the French without a blow, and shortly after Bonaparte entered Gratz, the principal town of Lower Styria, with the same facility.

The archduke now totally changed his plan of warfare. He no longer disputed the ground foot by foot, but began to retreat by hasty marches towards Vienna, determined to collect the last and utmost strength which the extensive states of the emperor could supply, and fight for the existence, it might be, of his brother's throne, under the walls of his capital. However perilous this resolution might appear, it was worthy of the high-spirited prince by whom it was adopted: and there were reasons, perhaps, besides those arising from soldierly pride and princely dignity, which seemed to recommend it.

The army with which the enterprising French general was now about to debouch from the mountains, and enter the very centre of Germany, had suffered considerably since the commencement of the campaign, not only by the sword, but by the severity of weather, and the excessive fatigue which

they endured in executing the rapid marches, by which their leader succeeded in securing victory; and the French armies on the Rhine had not, as the plan of the campaign dictated, made any movement in advance corresponding with the march of Bonaparte.

Nor, in the country which they were about to enter with diminished forces, could Bonaparte trust to the influence of the same moral feeling in the people invaded which had paved the way to so many victories on the Rhine. The citizens of Austria, though living under a despotic government, are little sensible of its severities, and are sincerely attached to the emperor, whose personal habits incline him to live with his people without much form, and mix in public amusements, or appear in the public walks, like a father in the midst of his family. The nobility were as ready as in former times to bring out their vassals, and a general knowledge of discipline is familiar to the German peasant as a part of his education. Hungary possessed still the high-spirited race of barons and cavaliers, who, in their great convocation in 1740, rose at once, and drawing their sabres, joined in the celebrated exclamation, "*Moriamur pro rege nostro, Maria Teresa!*" The Tyrol was in possession of its own warlike inhabitants, all in arms, and so far successful as to have driven Joubert out of their mountains. Trieste and Fiume were retaken in the rear of the French army. Bonaparte had no line of communication when separated from Italy, and no means of obtaining supplies, but from a country which would probably be soon in insurrection in his rear, as well as on his flanks. A battle lost, when there was neither support, reserve, nor place of arms nearer than Klagenfurt, would have been annihilation. To add to these considerations, it was now known that the Venetian Republic had assumed a formidable and hostile aspect in Italy; by which, joined to a natural explosion of feeling, religious and national, the French cause was considerably endangered in that country. There were so many favourers of the old system, together with the general influence of the catholic clergy, that it seemed not unlikely this insurrection might spread fast and far. Italy, in that case, would have been no effectual place of refuge to Bonaparte or his army. The archduke enumerated all these advantages to the cabinet of Vienna, and exhorted them to stand the last cast of the bloody die.

But the terror, grief, and confusion natural in a great metropolis, whose peace for the first time for so many years was alarmed with the approach of the unconquered and apparently fated general who, having defeated and destroyed five of their choicest armies, was now driving under its walls the remnants of the last, though commanded by that prince whom they regarded as the hope and flower of Austrian warfare, opposed this daring resolution. The alarm was general, beginning with the court itself; and the most valuable property and treasure were packed up to be carried into Hungary, where the royal family determined to take refuge. It is worthy of mention, that among the fugitives of the Imperial house was the Archduchess Maria Louisa, then between five and six years old, whom our imagination

may conceive agitated by every species of childish terror derived from the approach of the victorious general, on whom she was, at a future and similar crisis, destined to bestow her hand.

The cries of the wealthy burghers were of course for peace. The enemy were within fourteen or fifteen days' march of their walls; nor had the city (perhaps fortunately) any fortifications which in the modern state of war could have made it defensible even for a day. They were, moreover, seconded by a party in the cabinet; and, in short, whether it chanced for good or for evil, the selfish principle of those who had much to lose, and were timid in proportion, predominated against that which desired at all risks the continuance of a determined and obstinate defence. It required many lessons to convince both sovereign and people, that it is better to put all on the hazard—better even to lose all—than to sanction the being pillaged at different times, and by degrees, under pretence of friendship and amity. A bow which is forcibly strained back will regain its natural position; but if supple enough to yield of itself to the counter direction, it will never recover its elasticity.

The affairs, however, of the Austrians were in such a condition, that it could hardly be said whether the party who declared for peace, to obtain some respite from the distresses of the country, or those who wished to continue war with the chances of success which we have indicated, advised the least embarrassing course. The court of Vienna finally adopted the alternative of treaty, and that of Leoben was set on foot.

Generals Bellegarde and Merfeldt, on the part of the emperor, presented themselves at the headquarters of Bonaparte, 13th April, 1797, and announced the desire of their sovereign for peace. Bonaparte granted a suspension of arms, to endure for five days only; which was afterwards extended, when the probability of the definitive treaty of peace was evident.

It is affirmed, that in the whole discussions respecting this most important armistice, Napoleon—as a conqueror whose victories had been in a certain degree his own, whose army had been supported and paid from the resources of the country which he conquered, who had received reinforcements from France only late and reluctantly, and who had recruited his army by new levies among the republicanized Italians—maintained an appearance of independence of the government of France. He had, even at this period, assumed a freedom of thought and action, the tenth part of the suspicion attached to which would have cost the most popular general his head in the times of Danton and Robespierre. But, though acquired slowly, and in counteraction to the once overpowering, and still powerful, democratic influence, the authority of Bonaparte was great; and indeed, the power which a conquering general attains, by means of his successes, in the bosom of his soldiers, becomes soon formidable to any species of government, where the soldier is not intimately interested in the liberties of the subject.

Yet it must not be supposed that Napoleon exhibited publicly any of that spirit of independence

which the Directory appear to have dreaded, and which, according to the opinion which he himself intimates, seems to have delayed the promised co-operation, which was to be afforded by the eastern armies on the banks of the Rhine. Far from testifying such a feeling, his assertion of the rights of the Republic was decidedly striking, of which the following is a remarkable instance. The Austrian commissioner, in hopes to gain some credit for the admission, had stated in the preliminary articles of the convention, as a concession of consequence, that his Imperial majesty acknowledged the French government in its present state. "Strike out that condition," said Bonaparte, sternly; "the French Republic is like the sun in heaven. The misfortune lies with those who are so blind as to be ignorant of the existence of either." It was gallantly spoken; but how strange to reflect, that the same individual, in three or four years afterwards, was able to place an extinguisher on one of those suns, without even an eclipse being the consequence.*

It is remarkable also, that while asserting to foreigners this supreme dignity of the French Republic, Bonaparte should have departed so far from the respect he owed its rulers. The preliminaries of peace were proposed for signature on the 18th April. But General Clarke, to whom the Directory had committed full powers to act in the matter, was still at Turin. He was understood to be the full confident of his masters, and to have instructions to watch the motions of Bonaparte, nay to place him under arrest, should he see cause to doubt his fealty to the French government. Napoleon, nevertheless, did not hesitate to tender his individual signature and warranty, and these were readily admitted by the Austrian plenipotentiaries;—an ominous sign of the declension of the powers of the Directory, considering that a military general, without the support even of the commissioners from the government, or proconsuls, as they were called, was regarded as sufficient to ratify a treaty of such consequence. No doubt seems to have been entertained that he had the power to perform what he had guaranteed; and the part which he acted was the more remarkable, considering the high commission of General Clarke.

The articles in the treaty of Leoben remained long secret; the cause of which appears to have been, that the high contracting parties were not willing comparisons should be made between the preliminaries as they were originally settled, and the strange and violent alterations which occurred in the definitive treaty of Campo Formio. These two treaties of pacification differed, the one from the other, in relation to the degree and manner how a meditated partition of the territory of Venice, of the Cisalpine Republic, and other smaller powers, was to be accomplished, for the mutual benefit of France and Austria. It is melancholy to observe, but it is nevertheless an important truth, that there is no moment during which independent states of the second class have more occasion to be alarmed for

* Bonaparte first mentions this circumstance as having taken place at Leoben, afterwards at the definitive treaty of Campo Formio. The effect is the same wherever the words were spoken.

their security, than when more powerful nations in their vicinity are about to conclude peace. It is so easy to accommodate these differences of the strong at the expense of such weaker states, as, if they are injured, have neither the power of making their complaints heard, nor of defending themselves by force, that, in the iron age in which it has been our fate to live, the injustice of such an arrangement has never been considered as offering any counterpoise to its great convenience, whatever the law of nations might teach to the contrary.

It is unnecessary to enter upon the subject of the preliminaries of Leoben, until we notice the treaty of Campo Formio, under which they were finally modified, and by which they were adjusted and controled. It may be, however, the moment to state, that Bonaparte was considerably blamed, by the Directory and others, for stopping short in the career of conquest, and allowing the house of Austria terms which left her still formidable to France, when, said the censors, it would have cost him but another victory to blot the most constant and powerful enemy of the French Republic out of the map of Europe; or, at least, to confine her to her hereditary states in Germany. To such criticism he replied, in a dispatch to the Directory from Leoben, during the progress of the treaty: "If at the commencement of these Italian campaigns I had made a point of going to Turin, I should never have passed the Po—had I insisted prematurely on advancing to Rome, I could never have secured Milan—and now, had I made an indispensable object of reaching Vienna, I might have destroyed the Republic."

Such was his able and judicious defence of a conduct, which, by stopping short of some ultimate and extreme point apparently within his grasp, extracted every advantage from fear, which despair perhaps might not have yielded him, if the enemy had been driven to extremity. And it is remarkable, that the catastrophe of Napoleon himself was a corollary of the doctrine which he now laid down; for, had he not insisted upon penetrating to Moscow, there is no judging how much longer he might have held the empire of France.

The contents of the treaty of Leoben, so far as they were announced to the representatives of the French nation by the Directory, only made known as part of the preliminaries, that the cession of the Belgic provinces, and of such a boundary as France might chuse to demand upon the Rhine, had been admitted by Austria; and that she had consented to recognize a single republic in Italy, to be composed out of those which had been provisionally established. But shortly afterwards it transpired, that Mantua, the subject of so much and such bloody contest, and the very citadel of Italy, as had appeared from the events of these sanguinary campaigns, was to be resigned to Austria, from whose tenacious grasp it had been wrenched with so much difficulty. This measure was unpopular; and it will be found that Bonaparte had the ingenuity, in the definitive treaty of peace, to substitute an indemnification, which he ought not to have given, and which was certainly the last which the Austrians should have accepted.

It was now the time for Venice to tremble. She had declared against the French in their absence; her vindictive population had murdered many of them; the resentment of the French soldiers was excited to the utmost, and the Venetians had no right to reckon upon the forbearance of their general. The treaty of Leoben left the senate of that ancient state absolutely without support; nay, as they afterwards learned, Austria, after pleading their cause for a certain time, had ended by stipulating for a share of their spoils, which had been assigned to her by a secret article of the treaty. The doom of the oligarchy was pronounced ere Bonaparte had yet traversed the Noric and Julian Alps, for the purpose of enforcing it. By a letter to the doge, dated from the capital of Upper Styria, Napoleon, bitterly upbraiding the senate for requiting his generosity with treachery and ingratitude, demanded that they should return by his aide-de-camp who bore the letter, their instant choice betwixt war and peace, and allowing them only four-and-twenty hours to disperse their insurgent peasantry, and submit to his clemency.

Junot, introduced into the senate, made the threats of his master ring in the astounded ears of the members, and by the blunt and rough manner of a soldier, who had risen from the ranks, added to the dismay of the trembling nobles. The senate returned a humble apology to Bonaparte, and dispatched agents to deprecate his wrath. These envoys were doomed to experience one of those scenes of violence, which were in some degree natural to this extraordinary man, but to which in certain cases he seems to have designedly given way, in order to strike consternation into those whom he addressed. "Are the prisoners at liberty?" he said, with a stern voice, and without replying to the humble greetings of the terrified envoys. They answered with hesitation, that they had liberated the French, the Polish, and the Brescians, who had been made captive in the insurrectionary war. "I will have them all—all!" exclaimed Bonaparte—"all who are in prison on account of their political sentiments. I will go myself to destroy your dungeons on the Bridge of Tears—opinions shall be free—I will have no Inquisition. If all the prisoners are not set at instant liberty, the English envoy dismissed, the people disarmed, I declare instant war. I might have gone to Vienna if I had listed.—I have concluded a peace with the emperor—I have eighty thousand men, twenty gun-boats—I will hear of no Inquisition, and no senate either—I will dictate the law to you—I will prove an Attila to Venice. If you cannot disarm your population, I will do it in your stead—your government is antiquated—it must crumble to pieces."

While Bonaparte, in these disjointed yet significant threats, stood before the deputies like the Argantes of Italy's heroic poet, and gave them the choice of peace and war with the air of a superior being, capable at once to dictate their fate, he had not yet heard of the massacre of Verona, or of the batteries of a Venetian fort on the Lido having fired upon a French vessel, who had run into the port to escape the pursuit of two armed Austrian ships. The vessel was alleged to have been sunk, and the master and

some of the crew to have been killed. The news of these fresh aggressions did not fail to aggravate his indignation to the highest pitch. The terrified deputies ventured to touch with delicacy on the subject of pecuniary atonement. Bonaparte's answer was worthy of a Roman. "If you could proffer me," he said, "the treasures of Peru—if you could strew the whole district with gold, it could not atone for the French blood which has been treacherously spilt."

Accordingly, on the 3d of May, Bonaparte declared war against Venice, and ordered the French minister to leave the city; the French troops, and those of the new Italian republics, were at the same time commanded to advance, and to destroy in their progress, wherever they found it displayed, the winged Lion of St Marc, the ancient emblem of Venetian sovereignty. The declaration is dated at Palma Nova.

It had been already acted upon by the French who were on the Venetian frontier, and by La Hotze, a remarkable character, who was then at the head of the army of the Italian republics of the new model, and the forces of the towns of Brescia and Bergamo, which aspired to the same independence. This commander was of Swiss extraction; an excellent young officer, and at that time enamoured of liberty on the French system, though he afterwards saw so much reason to change his opinions, that he lost his life, as we may have occasion to mention, fighting under the Austrian banners.

The terrified senate of Venice proved unworthy descendants of the Zenos, Dandolo, and Morosinis, as the defenders of Christendom, and the proud opposers of papal oppression. The best resource they could imagine to themselves, was to employ at Paris those golden means of intercession which Bonaparte had so sturdily rejected. Napoleon assures us, that they found favour by means of these weighty arguments. The Directory, moved, we are informed, by the motives of ten millions of French francs, transmitted from Venice in bills of exchange, sent to the general of Italian orders to spare the ancient senate and aristocracy. But the account of the transaction, with the manner in which the remittances were distributed, fell into the hands of Napoleon, by dispatches intercepted at Milan. The members of the French government, whom these documents would have convicted of peculation and bribery, were compelled to be silent; and Bonaparte, availing himself of some chicanery as to certain legal solemnities, took it on him totally to disregard the orders he had received.

The senate of Venice, rather stupefied than stimulated by the excess of their danger, were holding on the 30th April a sort of privy council in the apartments of the doge, when a letter from the commandant of their flotilla informed them, that the French were erecting fortifications on the low grounds contiguous to the lagoons or shallow channels which divide from the mainland and from each other the little isles on which the amphibious mistress of the Adriatic holds her foundation; and proposing, in the blunt style of a gallant sailor, to batter them to pieces about their ears before the works could be completed. Indeed, nothing would have been more easy than to defend the lagoons

against an enemy, who, notwithstanding Napoleon's bravado, had not even a single boat. But the proposal, had it been made to an abbe and a convent of nuns, could scarce have appeared more extraordinary than it did to these degenerate nobles. Yet the sense of shame prevailed; and though trembling for the consequences of the order which they issued, the senate directed that the admiral should proceed to action. Immediately after the order was received, their deliberations were interrupted by the thunder of the cannon on either side—the Venetian gun-boats pouring their fire on the van of the French army, which had begun to arrive at Fusina.

To interrupt these ominous sounds, two plenipotentiaries were dispatched to make intercession with the French general; and to prevent delay, the doge himself undertook to report the result.

The grand council was convoked on the 1st May, when the doge, pale in countenance, and disconcerted in demeanour, proposed, as the only means of safety, the admission of some democratic modifications into their forms, under the direction of General Bonaparte; or, in other words, to lay their institutions at the feet of the conqueror, to be remodeled at his pleasure. Of six hundred and ninety patricians, only twenty-one dissented from a vote which inferred the absolute surrender of their constitution. The conditions to be agreed on were indeed declared subject to the revision of the council; but this, in the circumstances, could only be considered as a clause intended to save appearances. The surrender must have been regarded as unconditional and total.

Amidst the dejection and confusion which possessed the government, some able intriguer (the secretary, it was said, of the French ambassador at Venice, whose principal had been recalled) contrived to induce the Venetian government to commit an act of absolute suicide, so as to spare Bonaparte the trouble and small degree of scandal which might attach to totally destroying the existence of the republic.

On the 9th of May, as the committee of the great council were in close deliberation with the doge, two strangers intruded upon those councils, which heretofore—such was the jealous severity of the oligarchy—were like those of supernatural beings, those who looked on them died. But now, affliction, confusion, and fear, had withdrawn the guards from these secret and mysterious chambers, and laid open to the intrusion of strangers those stern haunts of a suspicious oligarchy, where, in other days, an official or licitor of the government might have been punished with death even for too loud a foot-fall, far more for the fatal crime of having heard more than was designed to come to his knowledge. All this was now ended; and without check or rebuke the two strangers were permitted to communicate with the senate by writing. Their advice, which had the terms of a command, was, to anticipate the intended reforms of the French—to dissolve the present government—throw open their prisons—disband their Slavonian soldiers—plant the tree of liberty on the Place of Saint Marc, and to take other popular measures of the same nature, the least of which, proposed but a few months

before, would have been a signal of death to the individual who had dared to hint at it.

An English satirist has told us a story of a man persuaded by an eloquent friend to hang himself, in order to preserve his life.* The story of the fall of Venice vindicates the boldness of the satire. It does not appear that Bonaparte could have gone farther, nay it seems unlikely he would have gone so far, as was now recommended.

As the friendly advisers had hinted that the utmost speed was necessary, the committee scarce interposed an interval of three days, between receiving the advice and recommending it to the great council; and began in the meanwhile to anticipate the destruction of their government and surrender of their city, by disbanding their fleet and disbanding their soldiers.

At length the great council assembled on the 31st May. The doge had commenced a pathetic discourse on the extremities to which the country was reduced, when an irregular discharge of firearms took place under the very windows of the council-house. All started up in confusion. Some supposed the Slavonians were plundering the citizens; some that the lower orders had risen on the nobility; others, that the French had entered Venice and were proceeding to sack and pillage it. The terrified and timid counsellors did not wait to inquire what was the real cause of the disturbance, but hurried forward, like sheep, in the path which had been indicated to them. They hastened to despoil their ancient government of all authority, to sign in a manner its sentence of civil death—added everything which could render the sacrifice more agreeable to Bonaparte—and separated in confusion, but under the impression that they had taken the best measure in their power for quelling the tumult, by meeting the wishes of the predominant party. But this was by no means the case. On the contrary, they had the misfortune to find that the insurrection, of which the firing was the signal, was directed not against the aristocrats, but against those who proposed the surrender of the national independence. Armed bands shouted, "Long live Saint Marc, and perish foreign domination!" Others indeed there were, who displayed, in opposition, three-coloured banners, with the war-cry of "Liberty for ever!" The disbanded and mutinous soldiers mixed among these hostile groups, and threatened the town with fire and pillage.

Amid this horrible confusion, and while the parties were firing on each other, a provisional government was hastily named. Boats were dispatched to bring three thousand French soldiers into the city. These took possession of the Place of Saint Marc, while some of the inhabitants shouted; but the greater part, who were probably not the less sensible of the execrable tyranny of the old aristocracy, saw it fall in mournful silence, because there fell, along with the ancient institutions of their country, however little some of these were to be regretted, the honour and independence of the state itself.

The terms which the French granted, or rather imposed, appeared sufficiently moderate, so far as

* Dr Arbuthnot, in the History of John Bull.

they were made public. They announced that the foreign troops would remain so long, and no longer, than might be necessary to protect the peace of Venice—they undertook to guarantee the public debt, and the payment of the pensions allowed to the impoverished gentry. They required, indeed, the continuance of the prosecution against the commander of that fort of Lugo who had fired on the French vessel; but all other offenders were pardoned, and Bonaparte afterwards suffered even this affair to pass into oblivion; which excited doubt whether the transaction had ever been so serious as had been alleged.

Five secret and less palatable articles attended these avowed conditions. One provided for the various exchanges of territory which had been already settled at the Venetian expense betwixt Austria and France. The second and third stipulated the payment of three millions of francs in specie, and as many in naval stores. Another prescribed the cession of three ships of war, and of two frigates, armed and equipped. A fifth ratified the exaction, in the usual style of French cupidity, of twenty pictures and five hundred manuscripts.

It will be seen hereafter what advantages the Venetians purchased by all these unconscionable conditions. At the moment, they understood that the stipulations were to imply a guarantee of the independent existence of their country as a democratical state. In the meanwhile, the necessity for raising the supplies to gratify the rapacity of the French, obliged the provisional government to have recourse to forced loans; and in this manner they inhospitably plundered the Duke of Modena (who had fled to Venice for refuge when Bonaparte first entered Lombardy) of his remaining treasure, amounting to one hundred and ninety thousand sequins.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Napoleon's amatory correspondence with Joséphine.—His court at Montebello.—Negotiations and pleasure mingled there.—Genoa—Revolutionary spirit of the Genoese.—They rise in insurrection, but are quelled by the government, and the French plundered and imprisoned.—Bonaparte interferes, and appoints the outlines of a new government.—Sardinia.—Naples.—The Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian Republics, united under the name of the Cisalpine Republic.—The Valtelline.—The Grisons.—The Valtelline united to Lombardy.—Great improvement of Italy, and the Italian character, from these changes.—Difficulties in the way of pacification betwixt France and Austria.—The Directory and Napoleon take different views.—Treaty of Campo Formio.—Bonaparte takes leave of the army of Italy, to act as French plenipotentiary at Rastadt.

WHEN peace returns, it brings back the domestic affections, and affords the means of indulging them. Bonaparte was yet a bridegroom, though he had now been two years married, and upwards. A part of his correspondence with his bride has been preserved,* and gives a curious picture of a tempera-

* It is published in a *Tour through the Netherlands, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Savoy, and France, in the years 1821–2*, by Charles Tennant, Esq: 2 vols. 8vo, Longman and Co. London. Autographs of the letters are

ment as fiery in love as in war. The language of the conqueror, who was disposing of states at his pleasure, and defeating the most celebrated commanders of the time, is as enthusiastic as that of an Arcadian. We cannot suppress the truth, that (in passages which we certainly shall not quote) it carries a tone of indelicacy, which, notwithstanding the intimacy of the married state, an English husband would not use, nor an English wife consider as the becoming expression of connubial affection. There seems no doubt, however, that the attachment which these letters indicate was perfectly sincere, and on one occasion at least, it was chivalrously expressed;—"Wurmser shall buy dearly the tears which he makes you shed!"

It appears from this correspondence that Joséphine had rejoined her husband under the guardianship of Junot, when he returned from Paris, after

given, and there seems no reason to doubt their authenticity. The following may serve as a specimen, and will perhaps confirm the opinion of a great lawyer, that love-letters seem the most unutterable nonsense in the world to all but the person who writes, and the party who receives them:—

"By what art is it that you have been able to captivate all my faculties, and to concentrate in yourself my moral existence? It is a magic, my sweet love, which will finish only with my life. To live for Joséphine—there is the history of my life. I am trying to reach you,—I am dying to be near you. Fool that I am, I do not perceive that I increase the distance between us. What lands, what countries separate us! What a time before you read these weak expressions of a troubled soul in which you reign! Ah! my adorable wife. I know not what fate awaits me, but if it keep me much longer from you, it will be insupportable,—my courage will not go so far. There was a time when I was proud of my courage; and sometimes, when contemplating on the filth that man could do me, on the fate which destiny could reserve for me, I fixed my eyes steadfastly on the most unheard-of misfortunes without a frown, without alarm;—but now the idea that my Joséphine may be unwell, the idea that she may be ill, and, above all, the cruel, the fatal thought, that she may love me less, withers my soul, stops my blood, renders me sad, cast down, and leaves me not even the courage of fury and despair. Formerly I used often to say to myself, men could not hurt him who could die without regret; but, now, to die without being loved by thee, to die without that certainty, is the torment of hell; it is the lively and striking image of absolute annihilation—I feel as if I were stifled. My incomparable companion, thou whom fate has destined to make along with me the painful journey of life, the day on which I shall cease to possess thy heart will be the day on which parched nature will be to me without warmth or vegetation.

"I stop, my sweet love, my soul is and—my body is fatigued—my head is giddy—men disgust me—I ought to hate them—they separate me from my beloved.

"I am at Port Maurice, near Onellie; to-morrow I shall be at Albenga; the two armies are in motion—We are endeavouring to deceive each other—Victory to the most skilful! I am pretty well satisfied with Beaulieu—if he alarm me much, he is a better man than his predecessor. I shall beat him, I hope, in good style. Do not be uneasy—love me as your eyes—but that is not enough—as yourself, more than yourself, than your thought, your mind, your sight, your all. Sweet love, forgive me,—I am sinking. Nature is weak for him who feels strongly, for him whom you love!"

having executed his mission of delivering to the Directory, and representatives of the French people, the banners and colours taken from Beaulieu. In December, 1796, Josephine was at Genoa, where she was received with studied magnificence, by those in that ancient state who adhered to the French interest, and where, to the scandal of the rigid catholics, the company continued assembled, at a ball given by Monsieur de Serva, till a late hour on Friday morning, despite the presence of a senator having in his pocket, but not venturing to enforce, a decree of the senate for the better observation of the fast day upon the occasion. These, however, were probably only occasional visits; but after the signature of the treaty of Leoben, and during the various negotiations which took place before it was finally adjusted, as ratified at Campo Formio, Josephine lived in domestic society with her husband, at the beautiful seat, or rather palace, of Montebello.

This villa, celebrated from the important negotiations of which it was the scene, is situated a few leagues from Milan, on a gently sloping hill, which commands an extensive prospect over the fertile plains of Lombardy. The ladies of the highest rank, as well as those celebrated for beauty and accomplishments,—all, in short, who could add charms to society,—were daily paying their homage to Josephine, who received them with a felicity of address, which seemed as if she had been born for exercising the high courtesies that devolved upon the wife of so distinguished a person as Napoleon.

Negotiations proceeded amid gaiety and pleasure. The various ministers and envoys of Austria, of the pope, of the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, of the Duke of Parma, of the Swiss Cantons, of several of the Princes of Germany,—the throng of generals, of persons in authority, of deputies of towns,—with the daily arrival and dispatch of numerous couriers, the bustle of important business, mingled with fêtes and entertainments, with balls and with hunting parties,—gave the picture of a splendid court, and the assemblage was called accordingly, by the Italians, the Court of Montebello. It was such in point of importance; for the deliberations agitated there were to regulate the political relations of Germany, and decide the fate of the King of Sardinia, of Switzerland, of Venice, of Genoa; all destined to hear, from the voice of Napoleon, the terms on which their national existence was to be prolonged or terminated.

Montebello was not less the abode of pleasure. The sovereigns of this diplomatic and military court made excursions to the Lago Maggiore, to Lago di Como, to the Borromean islands, and occupied at pleasure the villas which surround those delicious regions. Every town, every village, desired to distinguish itself by some peculiar mark of homage and respect to him, whom they then named the Liberator of Italy. These expressions are in a great measure those of Napoleon himself, who seems to have looked back on this period of his life with warmer recollections of pleasurable enjoyment than he had experienced on any other occasion.

It was probably the happiest time of his life.

Honour, beyond that of a crowned head, was his own, and had the full relish of novelty to a mind which two or three years before was pining in obscurity. Power was his, and he had not experienced its cares and risks; high hopes were formed of him by all around, and he had not yet disappointed them. He was in the flower of youth, and married to the woman of his heart. Above all, he had the glow of Hope, which was marshalling him even to more exalted dominion; and he had not yet become aware that possession brings satiety, and that all earthly desires and wishes terminate, when fully attained, in vanity and vexation of spirit.

The various objects which occupied Bonaparte's mind during this busy yet pleasing interval were the affairs of Genoa, of Sardinia, of Naples, of the Cisalpine Republic, of the Grisons, and lastly, and by far the most important of them, the definitive treaty with Austria, which involved the annihilation of Venice as an independent state.

Genoa, the proud rival of Venice, had never attained the same permanent importance with that sister republic; but her nobility, who still administered her government according to the model assigned them by Andrew Doria, preserved more national spirit, and a more warlike disposition. The neighbourhood of France, and the prevalence of her opinions, had stirred up among the citizens of the middling class a party taking the name of Morandists, from a club so termed, whose object it was to break down the oligarchy, and revolutionize the government. The nobles were naturally opposed to this, and a large body of the populace, much employed by them, and strict catholics, were ready to second them in their defence.

The establishment of two Italian democracies upon the Po, made the Genoese revolutionists conceive the time was arrived when their own state ought to pass through a similar ordeal of regeneration. They mustered their strength, and petitioned the doge for the abolition of the government as it existed, and the adoption of a democratic model. The doge condescended so far to their demand, as to name a committee of nine persons, five of them of plebeian birth, to consider and report on the means of infusing a more popular spirit into the constitution.

The three chief Inquisitors of State, or Censors, as the actual rulers of the oligarchy were entitled, opposed the spirit of religious enthusiasm to that of democratic zeal. They employed the pulpit and the confessional as the means of warning good catholics against the change demanded by the morandists—they exposed the Holy Sacrament, and made processions and public prayers, as if threatened with a descent of the Algerines.

Meanwhile the morandists took up arms, displayed the French colours, and, conceiving their enterprise was on the point of success, seized the gate of the arsenal and that of the harbour. But their triumph was short. Ten thousand armed labourers started as from out of the earth, under the command of their syndics, or municipal officers, with cries of *Viva Maria!* and declared for the aristocracy. The insurgents, totally defeated, were compelled to shut themselves up in their houses,

where they were assailed by the stronger party, and finally routed. The French residing in Genoa were maltreated by the prevailing party, their houses pillaged, and they themselves dragged to prison.

The last circumstance gave Bonaparte an ostensible right to interfere, which he would probably have done even had no such violence been committed. He sent his aide-de-camp, Lavalette, to Genoa, with the threat of instantly moving against the city a division of his army, unless the prisoners were set at liberty, the aristocratic party disarmed, and such alterations, or rather such a complete change of government adopted, as should be agreeable to the French commander-in-chief. Against this there was no appeal. The Inquisitors were laid under arrest, for having defended, with the assistance of their fellow-citizens, the existing institutions of the state; and the doge, with two other magistrates of the first rank, went to learn at Montebello, the head-quarters of Napoleon, what was to be the future fate of the city, proudly called of Palaces. They received the outlines of such a democracy as Napoleon conceived suitable for them; and he appears to have been unusually favourable to the state, which, according to the French affectation of doing everything upon a classical model, now underwent revolutionary baptism, and was called the Ligurian Republic. It was stipulated, that the French who had suffered should be indemnified; but no contributions were exacted for the use of the French army, nor did the collections and cabinets of Genoa pay any tribute to the Parisian Museum.

Shortly after, the democratic party having gone so far as to exclude the nobles from the government, and from all offices of trust, called down by doing so a severe admonition from Bonaparte. He discharged them to offend the prejudices, or insult the feelings of the more scrupulous catholics, declaring farther, that to exclude those of noble birth from public functions is a revolting piece of injustice, and, in fact, as criminal as the worst of the errors of the patricians. Bonaparte says he felt a partiality for Genoa; and the comparative liberality with which he treated the state on this occasion furnishes a good proof that he did so.

The King of Sardinia had been prostrated at the feet of France by the armistice of Cherasco, which concluded Napoleon's first campaign; and that sagacious leader had been long desirous that the Directory should raise the royal suppliant (for he could be termed little else) into some semblance of regal dignity, so as to make his power available as an ally. Nay, General Clarke had, 5th April, 1797, subscribed, with the representative of his Sardinian Majesty, a treaty offensive and defensive, by which Napoleon expected to add to the army under his command four thousand Sardinian or Piedmontese infantry, and five hundred cavalry; and he reckoned much on this contingent, in case of the war being renewed with Austria. But the Directory shifted and evaded his solicitations, and declined confirming this treaty, probably because they considered the army under his command as already sufficiently strong, being, as the soldiers were, so devoted to their leader. At length, however, the treaty was

ratified, but too late to serve Bonaparte's object.

Naples, whose conduct had been vacillating and insincere, as events seemed to promise victory or threaten defeat to the French general, experienced, notwithstanding, when he was in the height of triumph, the benefit of his powerful intercession with the government, and retained the full advantage secured to her by the treaty of Paris of 10th October, 1796.

A most important subject of consideration remained after the pacification of Italy, respecting the mode in which the new republics were to be governed, and the extent of territory which should be assigned to them. On this subject there had been long discussions; and as there was much animosity and ancient grudge betwixt some of the Italian cities and provinces, it was no very easy matter to convince them, that their true interest lay in as many of them being united under one energetic and active government, as should render them a power of some importance, instead of being divided as heretofore into petty states, which could not offer effectual resistance even to invasion on the part of a power of the second class, much more if attacked by France or Austria.

The formation of a compact and independent state in the north of Italy was what Napoleon had much at heart. But the Cispadane and Transpadane Republics were alike averse to a union, and that of Romagna had declined on its part a junction with the Cispadane Commonwealth, and set up for a pony and feeble independence, under the title of the Emilian Republic. Bonaparte was enabled to overcome these grudgings and heart-burnings, by pointing out to them the General Republic, which it was now his system to create, as being destined to form the kernel of a state, which should be enlarged from time to time as opportunities offered, until it should include all Italy under one single government. This flattering prospect, in assigning to Italy, though at some distant date, the probability of forming one great country, united in itself, and independent of the rest of Europe, instead of being, as now, parcelled out into petty states, naturally overcame all the local dislikes and predilections which might have prevented the union of the Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian Republics into one, and that important measure was resolved upon accordingly.

The Cisalpine Republic was the name fixed upon, to designate the united commonwealth. The French would more willingly have named it, with respect to Paris, the Transalpine Republic; but that would have been innovating upon the ancient title which Rome has to be the central point, with reference to which all other parts of Italy assume their local description. It would have destroyed all classical propriety, and have confused historical recollections, if, what had hitherto been called the *ultramontane* side of the Alps, had, to gratify Parisian vanity, been termed the *hither* side of the same chain of mountains.

The constitution assigned to the Cisalpine Republic was the same which the French had last of all adopted, in what they called the year Three, having a Directory of executive administrators, and two Councils. They were installed upon the 30th of June, 1797. Four members of the Directory were

named by Bonaparte, and the addition of a fifth was promised with all convenient speed. On the 14th of July following, a review was made of thirty thousand national guards. The fortresses of Lombardy, and the other districts, were delivered up to the local authorities, and the French army, retiring from the territories of the new republic, took up cantonments in the Venetian states. Proclamation had already been made, that the states belonging to the Cisalpine Republic having been acquired by France by the right of conquest, she had used her privilege to form them into their present free and independent government, which, already recognized by the emperor and the Directory, could not fail to be acknowledged within a short time by all the other powers of Europe.

Bonaparte soon after showed that he was serious in his design of enlarging the Cisalpine Republic, as opportunity could be made to serve. There are three valleys, termed the Valteline districts, which run down from the Swiss mountains towards the Lake of Como. The natives of the Valteline are about one hundred and sixty thousand souls. They speak Italian, and are chiefly of the catholic persuasion. These valleys were at this period the subjects of the Swiss Cantons, called the Grisons, not being a part of their league, or enjoying any of their privileges, but standing towards the Swiss community, generally and individually, in the rank of vassals to sovereigns. This situation of thralldom and dependence was hard to endure, and dishonourable in itself; and we cannot be surprised that, when the nations around them were called upon to enjoy liberty and independence, the inhabitants of the Valteline should have driven the Swiss garrisons out of their valleys, adopted the symbol of Italian freedom, and carried their complaints against the oppression of their German and protestant masters to the feet of Bonaparte.

The inhabitants of the Valteline unquestionably had a right to assert their natural liberty, which is incapable of suffering prescription; but it is not equally clear how the French could, according to the law of nations, claim any title to interfere between them and the Grisons, with whom, as well as with the whole Swiss Union, they were in profound peace. This scruple seems to have struck Bonaparte's own mind. He pretended, however, to assume that the Milanese government had a right to interfere, and his mediation was so far recognized, that the Grisons pleaded before him in answer to their contumacious vassals. Bonaparte gave his opinion, by advising the canton of the Grisons, which consists of three leagues, to admit their Valteline subjects to a share of their franchises, in the character of a fourth association. The moderation of the proposal may be admitted to excuse the irregularity of the interference.

The representatives of the Grey League were, notwithstanding, profoundly hurt at a proposal which went to make their vassals their brother freemen, and to establish the equality of the Italian serf, who drank of the Adde, with the free-born Switzer, who quaffed the waters of the Rhine. As they turned a deaf ear to his proposal, deserted his tribunal, and endeavoured to find support at Berne, Paris, Vienna,

and elsewhere, Napoleon resolved to proceed against them in default of appearance; and declaring that, as the Grisons had failed to appear before him, or to comply with his injunctions, by admitting the people of the Valteline to be parties to their league, he, therefore, adjudged the state, or district, of the Valteline, in time coming, to belong to and be part of the Cisalpine Republic. The Grisons in vain humbled themselves when it was too late, and protested their readiness to plead before a mediator too powerful to be declined under any ground known in law; and the Valteline territory was adjudged inalienably annexed to, and united with Lombardy, of which, doubtless, it forms, from manners and contiguity, a natural portion.

The existence of a state having free institutions, however imperfect, seemed to work an almost instant amelioration on the character of the people of the north of Italy. The effeminacy and trifling habits which resigned all the period of youth to intrigue and amusement, began to give place to firmer and more manly virtues—to the desire of honourable minds to distinguish themselves in arts and arms. Bonaparte had himself said, that twenty years would be necessary to work a radical change on the national character of the Italians; but even already those seeds were sown, among a people hitherto frivolous because excluded from public business, and timorous because they were not permitted the use of arms, which afterwards made the Italians of the north equal the French themselves in braving the terrors of war, besides producing several civil characters of eminence.

Amid those subordinate discussions, as they might be termed, in comparison to the negotiations betwixt Austria and France, these two high contracting parties found great difficulty in agreeing as to the pacific superstructure which they should build upon the foundation which had been laid by the preliminaries exchanged at Leoben. Nay, it seemed as if some of the principal stipulations, which had been there agreed upon as the corner-stones of their treaty, were even already beginning to be unsettled.

It will be remembered, that, in exchange for the cession of Flanders, and of all the countries on the left side of the Rhine, including the strong city of Mentz, which she was to yield up to France in perpetuity, Austria stipulated an indemnification on some other frontier. The original project bore, that the Lombardic Republic, since termed the Cisalpine, should have all the territories extending from Piedmont eastward to the river Oglio. Those to the eastward of that river were to be ceded to Austria, as an equivalent for the cession of Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine. The Oglio, rising in the Alps, descends through the fertile districts of Brescia and Cremona, and falls into the Po near Borgo-forte, inclosing Mantua on its left bank, which strong fortress, the citadel of Italy, was, by this allocation, to be restored to Austria. There were farther compensations assigned to the emperor, by the preliminaries of Leoben. Venice was to be deprived of her territories on the mainland, which were to be confiscated to augment the indemnity destined for the empire; and this, although Venice, as far as Bonaparte yet knew, had been faithful to the neu-

trality she had adopted. To redeem this piece of injustice, another was to be perpetrated. The state of Venice was to receive the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, in lieu of the dominions which she was to cede to Austria; and these legations, it must not be forgotten, were the principal materials of the Cispadane Republic, founded by Bonaparte himself. These, however, with their population, which he had led to hope for a free popular government, he was now about to turn over to the dominion of Venice, the most jealous oligarchy in the world, which was not likely to forgive those who had been forward in expressing a desire of freedom. This was the first concoction of the treaty of Leoben, from which it appears that the negotiators of the two great powers regarded the secondary and weaker states, whether ancient or of modern erection, merely as make-weights, to be thrown into either scale, as might be necessary to adjust the balance.

It is true, the infant Cispadane Republic escaped the fate to which its patron and founder was about to resign it; for, after this arrangement had been provisionally adjusted, news came of the insurrection of Venice, the attack upon the French through her whole territory, and the massacre at Verona. This aggression placed the ancient republic, so far as France was concerned, in the light of a hostile power, and entitled Bonaparte to deal with her as a conquered one, perhaps to divide, or altogether to annihilate her. But, on the other hand, he had received their submission, ratified the establishment of their new popular constitution, and possessed himself of the city, under pretence of assigning it a free government, according to the general hope which he had held out to Italy at large. The right of conquest was limited by the terms on which surrender had been accepted. Austria, on the other hand, was the more deeply bound to have protected the ancient republic, for it was in her cause that Venice so rashly assumed arms; but such is the gratitude of nations, such the faith of politicians, that she appears, from the beginning, to have had no scruple in profiting by the spoils of an ally, who had received a death-wound in her cause.

By the time the negotiators met for finally discussing the preliminaries, the Directory of France, either to thwart Bonaparte, whose superiority became too visible, or because they actually entertained the fears they expressed, were determined that Mantua, which had been taken with such difficulty, should remain the bulwark of the Cisalpine Republic, instead of returning to be once more that of the Austrian territories in Italy. The Imperial plenipotentiaries insisted, on the other hand, that Mantua was absolutely necessary to the safety of their Italian possessions, and became more so from the peculiar character of their new neighbour, the Cisalpine Republic, whose example was likely to be so perilous to the adjacent dependencies of an ancient monarchy. To get over this difficulty, the French general proposed that the remaining dominions of Venice should be also divided betwixt Austria and France, the latter obtaining possession of the Albanian territories and the Ionian islands belonging to the republic, of which the high contracting powers signed

the death-warrant; while Istria, Dalmatia, Venice herself, and all her other dominions, should be appropriated to Austria. The latter power, through her minister, consented to this arrangement with as little scruple as to the former appropriation of her forlorn ally's possessions on the Terra Firma.

But as fast as obstacles were removed on one side, they appeared to start up on another, and a sort of pause ensued in the deliberations, which neither party seemed to wish to push to a close. In fact, both Napoleon, plenipotentiary for France, and Count Cobentzel, a man of great diplomatic skill and address, who took the principal management on the part of Austria, were sufficiently aware that the French government, long disunited, was in the act of approaching to a crisis. This accordingly took place, under circumstances to be hereafter noticed, on 18th Fructidor, creating, by a new revolutionary movement, a total change of administration. When this revolution was accomplished, the Directory, who accomplished it, feeling themselves more strong, appeared to lay aside the idea of peace, and showed a strong disposition to push their advantages to the utmost.

Bonaparte was opposed to this. He knew that if war was resumed, the difficulties of the campaign would be thrown on him, and the blame also, if the results were not happy. He was determined, therefore, in virtue of his full powers, to bring the matter to a conclusion, whether the Directory would or not. For this purpose he confronted Cobentzel, who still saw his game in gaining delay, with the sternness of a military envoy. On the 16th October, the conferences were renewed upon the former grounds, and Cobentzel went over the whole subject of the indemnifications, insisting that Mantua, and the line of the Adige, should be granted to the emperor, threatened to bring down the Russians in case the war should be renewed, and insinuating that Bonaparte sacrificed the desire of peace to his military fame, and desired a renewal of the war. Napoleon, with stern but restrained indignation, took from a bracket an ornamental piece of china, on which Cobentzel set some value, as being a present from the Empress Catherine. "The truce," he said, "is then ended, and war declared. But beware—I will break your empire into as many fragments as that potsherd." He dashed the piece of china against the hearth, and withdrew abruptly. Again we are reminded of the Argantes of Tasso.*

The Austrian plenipotentiaries no longer hesitated to submit to all Napoleon's demands, rather than again see him commence his tremendous career of irresistible invasion. The treaty of Campo Formio therefore was signed; not the less promptly, perhaps, that the affairs at Paris appeared so doubtful as to invite an ambitious and aspiring man like Napoleon to approach the scene where honours and power were distributed, and where jarring factions seemed to await the influence of a character so distinguished and so determined.

* *Spiegò quel crudo il seno, e'l manto scosse,*

Ed a guerra mortal, disse, vi affido;

E'l disse in atto sì feroce ed empio

Che parve aprir di Giano il chiuso tempio.

La Gerusalemme Liberata, Canto II.

The fate of Venice, more from her ancient history than either the value of her institutions, which were execrable, or the importance of her late existence, still dwells somewhat on the memory. The ancient republic fell "as a fool dieth." The aristocrats cursed the selfishness of Austria, by whom they were swallowed up, though they had periled themselves in her cause. The republicans hastened to escape from Austrian domination, grinding their teeth with rage, and cursing no less the egotistic policy of the French, who, making a convenient pretext of their interest, had pretended to assign them a free constitution, and then resigned them to become the vassals of a despotic government.

The French secretary of legation, who had played a remarkably active part during the Revolution, hazarded a remonstrance to Bonaparte on the surrender of Venice to Austria, instead of its being formed into a free democracy, or united with the Cisalpine Republic. Bonaparte laughed to scorn a man, whose views were still fixed on diffusing and propagating the principles of jacobinism. "I have received your letter," was the stern and contemptuous reply, "and cannot comprehend it. The Republic of France is not bound by any treaty, to sacrifice its interests and advantages to the Committee of Public Safety in Venice, or to any other class of individuals. France does not make war in behalf and for the benefit of others.* I know it costs nothing for a few chattering declaimers, whom I might better describe as madmen, to talk of an universal republic—I wish they would try a winter campaign. The Venetian Republic exists no longer. Effeminate, corrupted, treacherous, and hypocritical, the Venetians are unfit for liberty. If she has the spirit to appreciate, or courage to assert it, the time is not unfavourable—let her stand up for it." Thus, with insult added to misery, and great contempt thrown by Napoleon on the friends of liberty all over the world, the fate of Venice was closed. The most remarkable incident of the final transfer to the Austrians was, that the aged Doge Marini dropt down senseless as he was about to take the oath of allegiance to the Imperial commissioner, and died shortly after.

Napoleon Bonaparte had now finished for the present his career of destiny in Italy, which country first saw his rising talents, and was always a subject of peculiar interest to him. He took an affecting leave of the soldiers, who could scarce hope ever to see him replaced by a general of merit so transcendent, and made a moderate and judicious address to the Cisalpine Republic. Finally, he departed, to return through Switzerland to Rastadt, where a congress was sitting for the settlement and pacification of the German empire, and where he was to act as a plenipotentiary on the part of France.

On the journey he was observed to be moody and deeply contemplative. The separation from a

hundred thousand men whom he might call his own, and the uncertainty of the future destinies to which he might be summoned, are enough to account for this, without supposing, as some have done, that he already had distinctly formed any of those projects of ambition which time opened to him. Doubtless, however, his ardent ambition showed him remote and undefined visions of greatness. He could not but be sensible that he returned to the capital of France in a situation which scarce admitted of any mediocrity. He must either be raised to a yet more distinguished height, or altogether broken down, leveled with the mass of subjects, and consigned to comparative obscurity. There was no middle station for the Conqueror and Liberator of Italy.

CHAPTER XXIX.

Retrospect.—The Directory—they become unpopular.—Causes of their unpopularity.—Also at enmity among themselves.—State of public feeling in France.—In point of numbers, favourable to the Bourbons; but the army and monied interest against them.—Pichegru, head of the royalists, appointed President of the Council of Five Hundred.—Barbè Marbois, another royalist, President of the Council of Ancients.—Directory throw themselves upon the succour of Hoche and Bonaparte.—Bonaparte's personal politics discussed.—Pichegru's correspondence with the Bourbons—known to Bonaparte—He dispatches Angereau to Paris.—Directory arrest their principal opponents in the councils on the 18th Fructidor, and banish them to Guiana.—Narrow and impolitic conduct of the Directory to Bonaparte.—Projected invasion of England.

WHILE the Conqueror of Italy was pursuing his victories beyond the Alps, the French Directory, in whose name he achieved them, had become, to the conviction of all men, as unlikely to produce the benefits of a settled government, as any of their predecessors vested with the supreme rule.

It is with politics as with mechanics, ingenuity is not always combined with utility. Some one observed to the late celebrated Mr Watt, that it was wonderful for what a number of useless inventions, illustrated by the most ingenious and apparently satisfactory models, patents were yearly issued; he replied, that he had often looked at them with interest, and had found several, the idea of which had occurred to himself in the course of his early studies. "But," said he, with his natural masculine sagacity, "it is one thing to make an ingenious model, and another to contrive an engine which shall work its task. Most of these pretty toys, when they are applied to practical purposes, are found deficient in some point of strength, or correctness of mechanism, which destroys all chance of their ever becoming long or generally useful." Some such imperfection seems to have attended the works of those speculative politicians who framed the various ephemeral constitutions of France. However well they looked upon paper, and however reasonable they sounded to the ear, no one ever thought of them as laws which required veneration and obedience. Did a constitutional rule preclude a favourite measure, to break it down, or leap over it,

* The language of injustice is alike in similar instances. When Edward I., in the course of overrunning Scotland, was reminded of the claims of the candidate for the throne, in whose cause he had pretended to take arms, he answered in the very words of Bonaparte,—"Have we nothing else to do but to conquer kingdoms for other people?"

was the French statesman's unhesitating practice. A rule was always devised applicable to circumstances; and before that, the theory of the constitution was uniformly made to give way.

The constitution of the year Three was not more permanent than those by which it had been preceded. For some time, the Directory, which contained men of considerable talent, conducted themselves with great prudence. The difficulty and danger of their situation served to prevent their separating, as the weight put above an arch keeps the stones in their places. Their exertions in the attempt to redeem the finances, support the war, and re-establish the tranquillity of the country, were attended at first with success. The national factions also sunk before them for a season. They had defeated the aristocratic citizens of Paris on the 13th Vendémiaire; and when the original revolutionists, or democrats, attempted a conspiracy, under the conduct of Gracchus Babeuf, their endeavour to seduce the troops totally failed, and their lives paid the forfeit of their rash attempt to bring back the reign of Terror. Thus, the Directory, or executive power, under the constitution of the year Three, were for a season triumphant over the internal factions, and, belonging to neither, were in a situation to command both.

But they had few who were really, and on principle, attached to their government, and most endured it only as something better than a new revolutionary movement, and otherwise in no respect eligible. To have rendered their authority permanent, the Directory must have had great unanimity in their own body, and also brilliant success abroad, and they enjoyed neither one nor the other. The very concoction of their body included the principles of disunion. They were a sort of five kings, retiring from office by rotation, inhabiting each his separate class of apartments in the Luxembourg palace, having each his different establishments, classes of clients, circles of courtiers, flatterers, and instruments. The republican simplicity, of late so essential to a patriot, was laid aside entirely. New costumes of the most splendid kind were devised for the different office-bearers of the state. This change took its rise from the weakness and vanity of Barras, who loved show, and used to go a-hunting with all the formal attendance of a prince. But it was an indulgence of luxury, which gave scandal to both the great parties in the state; the republicans, who held it altogether in contempt; and the royalists, who considered it as an usurpation of the royal dress and appendages.

The finances became continually more and more a subject of uneasiness. In the days of Terror money was easily raised, because it was demanded under pain of death, and assignats were raised to *par* by guillotining those who sold or bought them at less than their full value; but the powerful argument of violence and compulsion being removed, the paper money fell to a ruinous discount, till its depression threatened, unless remedied, altogether to stop the course of public business. It perhaps arose from the difficulty of raising supplies, that the Directory assumed towards other countries a greedy, grasping, and rapacious character, which threw disgrace

at once upon the individuals who indulged in it, and the state whom they represented. They loaded with exactions the trade of the Batavian republic, whose freedom they had pretended to recognize, and treated with most haughty superiority the ambassadors of independent states. Some of these high officers, and Barras in particular, were supposed accessible to gross corruption, and believed to hold communication with those agents and stock-brokers, who raised money by jobbing in the public funds—a more deservedly unpopular accusation than which can hardly be brought against a minister. It was indeed a great error in the constitution, that though one hundred thousand livres were yearly allowed to each Director while in office, yet he had no subsequent provision after he had retired from his fractional share of sovereignty. This penury, on the part of the public, opened a way to temptation, though of a kind to which mean minds only are obnoxious; and such men as Barras were tempted to make provision for futurity, by availing themselves of present opportunity.

Their five majesties (sires) of the Luxembourg, as people called them in ridicule, had also their own individual partialities and favorite objects, which led them in turn to tease the French people with unnecessary legislation. La Réveillère Lépauze was that inconsistent yet not uncommon character, an intolerant philosopher and an enthusiastic deist. He established a priesthood, and hymns and ceremonies for deism; and, taking up the hopeful project of substituting a deistical worship for the christian faith, just where Robespierre had laid it down, he harassed the nation with laws to oblige them to observe the *décades* of their new calendar as holidays, and to work at their ordinary trades on the christian Sabbath. At La Réveillère's theory freethinkers laughed, and religious men shuddered; but all were equally annoyed by the legislative measures adopted on a subject so ridiculous as this new ritual of heathenism. Another cause of vexation was the philosophical arrangement of weights and measures upon a new principle, which had in the meantime the inconvenience of introducing doubt and uncertainty into all the arrangements of internal commerce, and deranging entirely such as France continued to hold with countries who were only acquainted with the ordinary standard.

It might have been thought that the distinguished success of the French arms under the auspices of the Directory would have dazzled the eyes of the French, attached as they have always been to military glory, and blinded them to other less agreeable measures of their government. But the public were well aware, that the most brilliant share of these laurels had been reaped by Bonaparte on his own account; that he had received but slender reinforcements from France (the magnitude of his achievements considered); and that, in regard to the instructions of government, much of his success was owing to his departure from them, and following his own course. It was also whispered, that he was an object of suspicion to the directors, and on his part undervalued their talents, and despised their persons. On the Rhine, again, though nothing could have been more distinguishing than the behaviour of

the republican armies, yet their successes had been chequered with many reverses, and, contrasted with the Italian campaigns, lost their impression on the imagination.

While they were thus becoming unpopular in the public opinion, the Directory had the great misfortune to be at enmity among themselves. From the time that Letourneur retired from office in terms of the constitution, and Barthélemy was elected in his stead, there was a majority and an opposition in the Directory, the former consisting of Barras, Rewbel, and La Réveillère—the latter, of Carnot and Barthélemy. Of the two last, Carnot (who had been, it may be remembered, a member of the Committee of Public Safety under Robespierre) was a determined republican, and Barthélemy a royalist;—so strangely do revolutionary changes, like the eddies and currents of a swollen river, bring together and sweep down side by side, in the same direction, objects the most different and opposed. Barthélemy of course dissented from the majority of the directors, because secretly and warmly he desired the restoration of the Bourbons, an event which must have been fraught with danger to his colleagues, all of whom had voted for the death of Louis XVI. Carnot also differed from the majority, certainly with no such wish or view; but, his temper being as overbearing as his genius was extensive, he was impatient of opposition, especially in such cases where he knew he was acting wisely. He advised strongly, for example, the ratification of the articles of Leoben, instead of placing all which France had acquired, and all which she might lose, on the last fatal cast with an enemy, strong in his very despair, and who might raise large armies, while that of Bonaparte could neither be reinforced nor supported in case of a reverse. Barras's anger on the occasion was so great, that he told Carnot at the council-board, it was to him they owed that infamous treaty of Leoben.

While the Directory were thus disunited among themselves, the nation showed their dissatisfaction openly, and particularly in the two bodies of representatives. The majority indeed of the Council of Elders adhered to the Directory, many of that body belonging to the old republican partisans. But in the more popularly composed Council of Five Hundred, the opposition to the government possessed a great majority, all of whom were decidedly against the Directory, and most of them impressed with the wish of restoring, upon terms previously to be adjusted, the ancient race of legitimate monarchs. This body of persons so thinking was much increased by the number of emigrants, who obtained, on various grounds, permission to return to their native country after the fall of Robespierre. The forms of civil life began now to be universally renewed; and, as had been the case in France at all times, excepting during the bloody reign of Terror, women of rank, beauty, talent, and accomplishments, began again to resume their places in society, and their saloons or boudoirs were often the scene of deep political discourse, of a sort which in Britain is generally confined to the cabinet, library, or dining-parlour. The wishes of many, or most of these coteries, were in favour of royalty; the same feelings were entertained

by the many thousands who saw no possible chance of settling the nation on any other model; and there is little doubt, that had France been permitted at that moment an uninfluenced choice, the Bourbon family would have been recalled to the throne by the great majority of the French people.

But for reasons mentioned elsewhere, the military were the decided opponents of the Bourbons, and the purchasers of national domains, through every successive sale which might have taken place, were deeply interested against their restoration. Numbers might be on the side of the royalists; but physical force, and the influence of wealth and of the monied interest, were decidedly against them.

Pichegru might now be regarded as chief of the royal party. He was an able and successful general, to whom France owed the conquest of Holland. Like La Fayette and Dumourier, he had been disgusted with the conduct of the Revolution; and like the last of the two generals named, had opened a communication with the Bourbons. He was accused of having suffered his army to be betrayed in a defeat by Clairfayt, and the government in 1796 removed him from the command of the Army of the Sambre and Meuse, offering him in exchange the situation of ambassador to Sweden. He declined this species of honourable exile, and, retiring to Franche-Comté, continued his correspondence with the Imperial generals. The royalists expected much from the countenance of a military man of a name so imposing; but we have seen more than once in the course of these memoirs, that a general without an army is like a hilt without the blade which it should wield and direct.

An opportunity, however, offered Pichegru the means of serving his party in a civil capacity, and that a most important one. The elections of May 1797, made to replace that proportion of the councils which retired by rotation, terminated generally in favour of the royalists, and served plainly to show on which side the balance of popular feeling now leaned. Pichegru, who had been returned as one of the deputies, was chosen by acclamation President of the Council of Five Hundred, and Barbé Marbois, another royalist, was elected to the same office by the Council of Ancients, while, as we have already said, Barthélemy, likewise friendly to monarchy, was introduced into the Directory.

These elections were evil signs for the Directory, who did not fail soon to be attacked on every side, and upbraided with the continuance of the war and the financial distresses. Various journals were at the disposal of the party opposed to the majority of the Directors, and hostilities were commenced between the parties, both in the assemblies, where the royalists had the advantage, and in the public papers, where they were also favourably listened to. The French are of an impatient temper, and could not be long brought to carry on their warfare within the limits assigned by the constitution. Each party, without much regard to the state of the law, looked about for the means of physical force with which they might arm themselves. The Directory (that is, the majority of that body), sensible of their unpopularity, and the predominance of the opposite party, which seemed for a time to have succeeded

to the boldness and audacity of the revolutionary class, had, in their agony of extremity, recourse to the army, and threw themselves upon the succour of Hoche and of Bonaparte.

We have elsewhere said, that Bonaparte at this period was esteemed a steady republican. Pichegru believed him to be such when he dissuaded the royalists from any attempt to gain over the General of Italy; and as he had known him at school at Brienne, declared him of too stubborn a character to afford the least hope of success. Augereau was of the same opinion, and mistook his man so much, that when Madame de Stael asked whether Bonaparte was not inclined to make himself King of Lombardy, he replied with great simplicity, "that he was a young man of too elevated a character."^{*} Perhaps Bonaparte himself felt the same for a moment, when, in a dispatch to the Directory, he requests their leave to withdraw from the active service of the Republic, as one who had acquired more glory than was consistent with happiness. "Calumny," he said, "may torment herself in vain with ascribing to me treacherous designs. My civil, like my military career, shall be conforming to republican principles."[†]

The public papers also, those we mean on the side of the Directory, fell into a sort of rapture on the classical republican feelings by which Bonaparte was actuated, which they said rendered the hope of his return a pleasure pure and unmixed, and precluded the possibility of treachery or engrossing ideas on his side. "The factious of every class," they said, "cannot have an enemy more steady, or the government a friend more faithful, than he who, invested with the military power of which he has made so glorious a use, sighs only to resign a situation so brilliant, prefers happiness to glory, and now that the Republic is graced with triumph and peace, desires for himself only a simple and retired life."

But though such were the ideas then entertained of Bonaparte's truly republican character, framed, doubtless, on the model of Cincinnatus in his classical simplicity, we may be permitted to look a little closer into the ultimate views of him, who was admitted by his enemies and friends, avouched by himself, and sanctioned by the journals, as a pure and disinterested republican; and we think the following changes may be traced.

Whether Bonaparte was ever at heart a real jacobin, even for the moment, may be greatly doubted, whatever mask his situation obliged him to wear. He himself always repelled the charge as an aspersion. His engagement in the affair of the sections probably determined his opinions as republican, or rather thermidorien, at the time, as became him by whom the republican army had been led and commanded on that day. Besides, at the head of an army zealously republican, even his power over their minds required to be strengthened, for some time at least, by an apparent correspondence in political sentiments betwixt the troops and the general. But in the practical doctrines of government which he recommended to the Italian Repub-

lics, his ideas were studiously moderate, and he expressed the strongest fear of, and aversion to, revolutionary doctrines. He recommended the granting equal rights and equal privileges to the nobles, as well as to the indignant vassals and plebeians who had risen against them. In a word, he advocated a free set of institutions, without the intermediate purgatory of a revolution. He was therefore, at this period, far from being a jacobin.

But though Bonaparte's wishes were thus wisely moderated by practical views, he was not the less likely to be sensible that he was the object of fear, of hatred, and of course of satire and misrepresentation, to that side of the opposed parties in France which favoured royalty. Unhappily for himself, he was peculiarly accessible to every wound of this nature, and, anxiously jealous of his fame, suffered as much under the puny attacks of the journalists, as a noble steer or a gallant horse does amid his rich pasture, under the persecutions of insects, which, in comparison to himself, are not only impotent, but nearly invisible. In several letters to the Directory, he exhibits feelings of this nature which would have been more gracefully concealed, and evinces an irritability against the opposition parties, which we think likely to have increased the zeal with which he came forward on the republican side at this important crisis.

Another circumstance, which, without determining Bonaparte's conduct, may have operated in increasing his good-will to the cause which he embraced, was his having obtained the clew of Pichegru's correspondence with the house of Bourbon. To have concealed this would have made but a second-rate merit with the exiled family, whose first thanks must have been due to the partisan whom he protected. This was no part for Bonaparte to play; not that we have a right to say he would have accepted the chief character had it been offered to him, but his ambition could never have stooped to any inferior place in the drama. In all probability, his ideas fluctuated betwixt the example of Cromwell and of Washington—to be the actual liberator, or the absolute governor of his country.

His particular information respecting Pichegru's secret negotiations, was derived from an incident at the capture of Venice.

When the degenerate Venetians, more under the impulse of vague terror than from any distinct plan, adopted in haste and tumult the measure of totally surrendering their constitution and rights, to be modeled by the French general after his pleasure, they were guilty of a gross and aggravated breach of hospitality, in seizing the person and papers of the Count d'Entraigues,* agent, or envoy, of the

* This gentleman was one of the second emigration, who left France during Robespierre's ascendancy. He was employed as a political agent by the court of Russia, after the affair of Venice, which proves that he was not at least convicted of treachery to the Bourbon princes. In July, 1812, he was assassinated at his villa at Hackney, near London, by an Italian domestic, who, having murdered both the count and countess, shot himself through the head, leaving no clew to discover the motive of his villany. It was remarked that the villain used Count d'Entraigues' own pistols and dagger, which, apprehensive

^{*} *Il est trop bien élevé pour cela.*

[†] *Moniteur*, 1797, No. 224.

exiled Bourbons, who was then residing under their protection. The envoy himself, as Bonaparte alleges, was not peculiarly faithful to his trust; but, besides his information, his portfolio contained many proofs of Pichegru's correspondence with the allied generals and with the Bourbons, which placed his secret absolutely in the power of the General of Italy, and might help to confirm the line of conduct which he had already meditated to adopt.

Possessed of these documents, and sure that, in addressing a French army of the day, he would swim with the tide if he espoused the side of republicanism, Bonaparte harangued his troops on the anniversary of the taking the Bastille, in a manner calculated to awake their ancient democratic enthusiasm. "Soldiers, this is the 14th July! You see before you the manes of your companions in arms, dead in the field of honour for the liberty of their country. They have set you an example, that you owe your lives to thirty millions of Frenchmen, and to the national name, which has received new splendour from your victories. Soldiers, I am aware you are deeply affected by the dangers which threaten the country. But she can be subjected to none which are real. The same men who made France triumph over united Europe, still live—Mountains separate us from France, but you would traverse them with the speed of eagles, were it necessary, to maintain the constitution, defend liberty, protect the government and the republicans. Soldiers, the government watches over the laws as a sacred deposit committed to them. The royalists shall no longer show themselves but what they shall cease to exist. Be without uneasiness, and let us swear by the names of those heroes who have died by our sides for liberty—let us swear, too, on our standards—War to the enemies of the Republic, and fidelity to the constitution of the year Three!"

It is needless to remark, that, under the British constitution, or any other existing on fixed principles, the haranguing an armed body of soldiers, with the purpose of inducing them to interfere by force in any constitutional question, would be in one point of view mutiny, in another high treason.

The hint so distinctly given by the general was immediately adopted by the troops. Deep called to deep, and each division of the army, whatever its denomination, poured forth its menaces of military force and compulsion against the opposition party in the councils, who held opinions different from those of their military chief, but which they had, at least hitherto, only expressed and supported by those means of resistance which the constitution placed in their power. In other words, the soldier's idea of a republic was, that the sword was to decide the constitutional debates, which give so much trouble to ministers in a mixed or settled government. The Prætorian bands, the Strelitzes, the Janissaries, have all in their turn entertained this primitive and simple idea of reforming abuses in a state, and changing, by the application of military force, an unpopular dynasty, or an obnoxious ministry.

It was not by distant menaces alone that Bona-

of danger as a political intriguer, he had always ready prepared in his apartment.

parte served the Directory at this important crisis. He dispatched Augereau to Paris, ostensibly for the purpose of presenting the standards taken at Mantua, but in reality to command the armed force which the majority of the Directory had determined to employ against their dissentient colleagues, and the opponents of their measures in the national councils. Augereau was a blunt, bold, stupid soldier, a devoted jacobin, whose principles were sufficiently well known to warrant his standing upon no constitutional delicacies. But in case the Directory failed, Bonaparte kept himself in readiness to march instantly to Lyons at the head of fifteen thousand men. There rallying the republicans, and all who were attached to the Revolution, he would, according to his own well-chosen expression, like Cæsar, have crossed the Rubicon at the head of the popular party—and ended, doubtless, like Cæsar, by himself usurping the supreme command, which he pretended to assert in behalf of the people.

But Bonaparte's presence was not so essentially necessary to the support of the Directory as he might have expected, or as he perhaps hoped. They had military aid nearer at hand. Disregarding a fundamental law of the constitution, which declared that armed troops should not be brought within a certain distance of the legislative bodies, they moved towards Paris a part of General Hoche's army. The majority of the councils becoming alarmed, prepared means of defence by summoning the National Guards to arms. But Augereau allowed them no time. He marched to their place of meeting, at the head of a considerable armed force. The guards stationed for their protection, surprised or faithless, offered no resistance; and, proceeding as men possessed of the superior strength, the Directory treated their political opponents as state prisoners, arrested Barthélemy (Carnot having fled to Geneva), and made prisoners, in the hall of the assembly and elsewhere, Willot, President of the Council of Ancients, Pichegru, President of that of the Five Hundred, and above one hundred and fifty deputies, journalists, and other public characters. As an excuse for these arbitrary and illegal proceedings, the Directory made public the intercepted correspondence of Pichegru; although few of the others involved in the same accusation were in the secret of the royalist conspiracy. Indeed, though all who desired an absolute repose from the revolutionary altercations which tore the country to pieces, began to look that way, he must have been a violent partisan of royalty indeed, that could have approved of the conduct of a general, who, like Pichegru, commanding an army, had made it his business to sacrifice his troops to the sword of the enemy, by disappointing and deranging those plans which it was his duty to have carried into effect.

Few would at first believe Pichegru's breach of faith; but it was suddenly confirmed by a proclamation of Moreau, who, in the course of the war, had intercepted a baggage waggon belonging to the Austrian general Klinglin, and became possessed of the whole secret correspondence, which, nevertheless, he had never mentioned, until it came out by the seizure of the Count d'Entraigues' portfolio. Then indeed, fearing perhaps the consequences of

having been so long silent, Moreau published what he knew. Régnier had observed the same suspicious silence; which seems to infer, that if these generals did not precisely favour the royal cause, they were not disposed to be active in detecting the conspiracies formed in its behalf.

The Directory made a tyrannical use of the power which they obtained by their victory of the 18th Fructidor, as this epoch was called. They spilt, indeed, no blood, but otherwise their measures against the defeated party were of the most illegal and oppressive character. A law, passed in the heat of animosity, condemned two directors, fifty deputies, and a hundred and forty-eight individuals of different classes (most of whom were persons of some character and influence), to be transported to the scorching and unhealthy deserts of Guiana, which, to many, was a sentence of lingering but certain death. They were barbarously treated, both on the passage to that dreadful place, and after they arrived there. It was a singular part of their fate, that they found several of the fiercest of their ancient enemies, the jacobins, still cursing God and defying man, in the same land of wretchedness and exile.

Besides these severities, various elections were arbitrarily dissolved, and other strong measures of public safety, as they were called, adopted, to render the power of the Directory more indisputable. During this whole revolution, the lower portion of the population, which used to be so much agitated upon like occasions, remained perfectly quiet; the struggle lay exclusively between the middle classes, who inclined to a government on the basis of royalty, and the Directory, who, without having any very tangible class of political principles, had become possessed of the supreme power, desired to retain it, and made their point good by the assistance of the military.

Bonaparte was much disappointed at the result of the 18th Fructidor, chiefly because, if less decisive, it would have added more to his consequence, and have given him an opportunity of crossing, as he termed it, the Rubicon. As it was, the majority of the Directors,—three men of no particular talent, undistinguished alike by birth, by services to their country, or even by accidental popularity, and cast, as it were by chance, upon supreme power,—remained by the issue of the struggle still the masters of the bold and ambitious conqueror, who probably already felt his own vocation to be for command rather than obedience.

Napoleon appears by his Memoirs to have regretted the violence with which the victorious Directors prosecuted their personal revenge, which involved many for whom he had respect. He declares his own idea of punishment would have gone no farther than imprisoning some of the most dangerous conspirators, and placing others under the watchful superintendence of the police. He must have taken some painful interest in the fate of Carnot in particular, whom he seems to have regarded as one of his most effective patrons.* Indeed, it is said that he was so much displeased with the Directory even

* In Carnot's Memoirs, the merit of discovering Bonaparte's talents and taking care of his promotion, is attributed to Carnot, rather than to Barras. However this may

prior to the 18th Fructidor, that he refused to remit a sum of money with which he had promised to aid them for the purpose of forwarding that event. Barras's secretary was sent to task him with this contumacy; which he did so unceremoniously, that the general, unused to contradiction, was about to order this agent to be shot; but, on consideration, put him off with some insignificant reply.

It followed, from the doubtful terms on which Bonaparte stood with the Directory, that they must have viewed his return to Paris with some apprehension, when they considered the impression likely to be made on any capital, but especially on that of Paris, by the appearance there of one who seemed to be the chosen favourite of Fortune, and to deserve her favours by the use which he made of them. The mediocrity of such men as Barras never gives them so much embarrassment, as when, being raised to an elevation above their desert, they find themselves placed in comparison with one to whom nature has given the talents which their situation requires in themselves. The higher their condition, their demeanour is the more awkward; for the factitious advantages which they possess cannot raise them to the natural dignity of character, unless in the sense in which a dwarf, by the assistance of crutches, may be said to be as tall as a giant. The Directory had already found Bonaparte, on several occasions, a spirit of the sort which would not be commanded. Undoubtedly they would have been well pleased, had it been possible to have found him employment at a distance; but, as that seemed difficult, they were obliged to look round for the means of employing him at home, or abide the tremendous risk of his finding occupation for himself.

It is surprising that it did not occur to the Directory to make at least the attempt of conciliating Bonaparte, by providing for his future fortune largely and liberally, at the expense of the public. He deserved that attention to his private affairs, for he had himself entirely neglected them. While he drew from the dominions which he conquered or overawed in Italy, immense sums in behalf of the French nation, which he applied in part to the support of the army, and in part remitted to the Directory, he kept no accounts, nor were any demanded of him; but according to his own account, he transmitted fifty millions of francs to Paris, and had not remaining of his own funds, when he returned from Italy, more than three hundred thousand.

It is no doubt true, that, to raise these sums, Bonaparte had pillaged the old states, thus selling to the newly-formed commonwealths their liberty and equality at a very handsome rate, and probably leaving them in very little danger of corruption from that wealth which is said to be the bane of republican virtue. But on the other hand, it must be acknowledged, that if the French general plundered the Italians as Cortez did the Mexicans, he did not reserve any considerable share of the spoil for his own use, though the opportunity was often in his power.

The commissary Salicetti, his countryman, rehebe, it is certain that Napoleon acknowledged great obligations to Carnot, and protested to him perpetual gratitude.—See *Moniteur*, an 5, No. 140.

commended a less scrupulous line of conduct. Soon after the first successes in Italy, he acquainted Napoleon that the Chevalier d'Este, the Duke of Modena's brother and envoy, had four millions of francs, in gold, contained in four chests, prepared for his acceptance. "The Directory and the legislative bodies will never," he said, "acknowledge your services—your circumstances require the money, and the duke will gain a protector."

"I thank you," said Bonaparte; "but I will not for four millions place myself in the power of the Duke of Modena."

The Venetians, in the last agony of their terrors, offered the French general a present of seven millions, which was refused in the same manner. Austria also had made her proffers; and they were nothing less than a principality in the empire, to be established in Napoleon's favour, consisting of two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants at least, a provision which would have put him out of danger of suffering by the proverbial ingratitude of a republic. The general transmitted his thanks to the emperor for this proof of the interest which he took in his fortune, but added, he could accept of no wealth or preferment which did not proceed from the French people, and that he should be always satisfied with the amount of revenue which they might be disposed to afford him.

But, however free from the wish to obtain wealth by any indirect means, Napoleon appears to have expected, that in return for public services of such unusual magnitude, some provision ought to have been made for him. An attempt was made to procure a public grant of the domain of Chambord, and a large hotel in Paris, as an acknowledgment of the national gratitude for his brilliant successes; but the Directory thwarted the proposal.

The proposition respecting Chambord was not the only one of the kind. Malibran, a member of the Council of Five Hundred, made a motion that Bonaparte should be endowed with a revenue, at the public charge, of fifty thousand livres annually, with a reversion to his wife of one half of that sum. It may be supposed that this motion had not been sufficiently considered and preconcerted, since it was very indifferently received, and was evaded by the swaggering declaration of a member, that such glorious deeds could not be rewarded by gold. So that the assembly adopted the reasonable principle, that because the debt of gratitude was too great to be paid in money, therefore he to whom it was due was to be suffered to remain in comparative indigence—an economical mode of calculation, and not unlike that high-sounding doctrine of the civil law, which states that a free man being seized on, and forcibly sold for a slave, shall obtain no damages on that account, because the liberty of a citizen is too transcendently valuable to be put to estimation.

Whatever might be the motives of the Directory, whether they hoped that poverty might depress Bonaparte's ambition, render him more dependent on the government, and oblige him to remain in a private condition for want of means to put himself at the head of a party; or whether they acted with the indistinct and confused motives of little minds, who wish to injure those whom they fear, their conduct

was alike ungracious and impolitic. They ought to have calculated, that a generous mind would have been attached by benefits, and that a selfish one might have been deterred from more doubtful and ambitious projects, by a prospect of sure and direct advantage; but that marked ill-will and distrust must in every case render him dangerous, who has the power to be so.

Their plan, instead of resting on an attempt to conciliate the ambitious conqueror, and soothe him to the repose of a tranquil indulgence of independence and ease, seems to have been that of devising for him new labours, like the wife of Eurystheus for the juvenile Hercules. If he succeeded, they may have privately counted upon securing the advantages for themselves; if he failed, they were rid of a troublesome rival in the race of power and popularity. It was with these views that they proposed to Napoleon to crown his military glories, by assuming the command of the preparations made for the conquest of England.

CHAPTER XXX.

View of the respective situations of Great Britain and France, at the period of Napoleon's return from Italy. —Negotiations at Lille—Broken off, and Lord Malmesbury ordered to quit the Republic.—Army of England decreed, and Bonaparte named to the command—He takes up his residence in Paris.—Description of his personal character and manners.—Madame de Staël.—Public honours paid to Napoleon.—Project of invasion terminated, and the real views of the Directory discovered to be the expedition to Egypt.—Armies of Italy and the Rhine, compared and contrasted.—Napoleon's views and notions in heading the Egyptian expedition—those of the Directory regarding it.—Its actual impolicy.—Curious statement regarding Bonaparte, previous to his departure, given by Miot.—The armament sails from Toulon, on 19th May, 1798.—Napoleon arrives before Malta on the 10th of June.—Proceeds on his course, and, escaping the British squadron, lands at Alexandria on the 1st of July.—Description of the various classes of nations who inhabit Egypt:—1. The Fellahs and Bedouins.—2. The Copts.—3. The Mamelukes.—Napoleon issues a proclamation from Alexandria, against the Mamelukes.—Marches against them on the 7th July.—Mameluke mode of fighting.—Discontent and disappointment of the French troops and their commanders.—Arrive at Cairo.—Battle of the Pyramids on 21st of July, in which the Mamelukes were completely defeated and dispersed.—Cairo surrenders.

It might have been thought, such was the success of the French arms on the land, and of the British upon the sea, that the war must now be near its natural and unavoidable termination, like a fire when there no longer remain any combustibles to be devoured. Wherever water could bear them, the British vessels of war had swept the seas of the enemy. The greater part of the foreign colonies belonging to France and her allies, among whom she now numbered Holland and Spain, were in the possession of the English, nor had France a chance of recovering them. On the contrary, not a musket was seen pointed against France on the Continent; so that it seemed as if the great rival nations, fighting with different weapons and on different ele-

ments, must at length give up a contest, in which it was almost impossible to come to a decisive struggle.

An attempt accordingly was made, by the negotiation of Lille, to bring to a period the war, which appeared now to subsist entirely without an object. Lord Malmesbury, on that occasion, gave in, on the part of Britain, an offer to surrender all the conquests she had made from France and her allies, on condition of the cession of Trinidad, on the part of Spain, and of the Cape of Good Hope, Cochin, and Ceylon, on the part of Holland, with some stipulations in favour of the Prince of Orange and his adherents in the Netherlands. The French commissioners, in reply, declared, that their instructions required that the English should make a complete cession of their conquests, without any equivalent whatsoever; and they insisted, as indispensable preliminaries, that the King of Great Britain should lay aside his titular designation of King of France—that the Toulon fleet should be restored—and that the English should renounce their right to certain mortgages over the Netherlands, for money lent to the emperor. Lord Malmesbury, of course, rejected a sweeping set of propositions, which decided every question against England, even before the negotiation commenced, and solicited the French to offer some modified form of treaty. The 18th Fructidor, however, had in the interim taken place, and the republican party, being in possession of complete authority, broke off the negotiation, if it could be called such, abruptly, and ordered the English ambassador out of the dominions of the Republic with very little ceremony. It was now proclaimed generally, that the existence of the English Carthage in the neighbourhood of the French Rome was altogether inadmissible; that England must be subdued once more, as in the times of William the Conqueror; and the hopes of a complete and final victory over their natural rival and enemy, as the two nations are but overapt to esteem each other, presented so flattering a prospect, that there was scarce a party in France, not even amongst the royalists, which did not enter on what was expected to prove the decisive contest, with the revival of all those feelings of bitter animosity that had distinguished past ages.

Towards the end of October, 1797, the Directory announced that there should be instantly assembled on the shores of the ocean an army, to be called the Army of England, and that the Citizen General Bonaparte was named to the command. The intelligence was received in every part of France with all the triumph which attends the anticipation of certain victory. The address of the Directory numbered all the conquests which France had won, and the efforts she had made, and prepared the French nation to expect the fruit of so many victories and sacrifices when they had punished England for her perfidy and maritime tyranny. "It is at London where the misfortunes of all Europe are forged and manufactured—It is in London that they must be terminated." In a solemn meeting held by the Directory, for the purpose of receiving the treaty of peace with Austria, which was presented to them by Berthier and Monge on the part of Bonaparte, the latter, who had been one of the commissioners

for pillaging Italy of her pictures and statues, and who looked, doubtless, to a new harvest of rarities in England, accepted, on the part of the army and general, the task imposed by the French rulers. "The government of England and the French Republic cannot both continue to exist—you have given the word which shall fall—already our victorious troops brandish their arms, and Scipio is at their head."

While this farce, for such it proved, was acting in Paris, the chief of the intended enterprise arrived there, and took up his abode in the same modest house which he had occupied before becoming the conqueror of palaces. The community of Paris, with much elegance, paid their successful general the compliment of changing the name of the street from Rue Chanteraine to Rue de la Victoire.

In a metropolis where all is welcome that can vary the tedium of ordinary life, the arrival of any remarkable person is a species of holiday; but such an eminent character as Bonaparte—the conqueror—the sage—the politician—the undaunted braver of every difficulty—the invincible victor in every battle, who had carried the banners of the Republic from Genoa till their approach scared the pontiff in Rome and the emperor in Vienna, was no every-day wonder. His youth, too, added to the marvel, and still more the claim of general superiority over the society in which he mingled, though consisting of the most distinguished persons in France—a superiority cloaking itself with a species of reserve which inferred, "You may look upon me, but you cannot penetrate or see through me." Napoleon's general manner in society, during this part of his life, has been described by an observer of first-rate power; according to whom, he was one for whom the admiration which could not be refused to him was always mingled with a portion of fear. He was different in his manner from other men, and neither pleased nor angry, kind nor severe, after the common fashion of humanity. He appeared to live for the execution of his own plans, and to consider others only in so far as they were connected with and could advance or oppose them. He estimated his fellow-mortals no otherwise than as they could be useful to his views; and, with a precision of intelligence which seemed intuitive from its rapidity, he penetrated the sentiments of those whom it was worth his while to study. Bonaparte did not then possess the ordinary tone of light conversation in society; probably his mind was too much burthened or too proud to stoop to adopt that mode of pleasing; and there was a stiffness and reserve of manner, which was perhaps adopted for the purpose of keeping people at a distance. His look had the same character. When he thought himself closely observed, he had the power of discharging from his countenance all expression, save that of a vague and indefinite smile, and presenting to the curious investigator the fixed eyes and rigid features of a bust of marble.

When he talked with the purpose of pleasing, Bonaparte often told anecdotes of his life in a very pleasing manner; when, silent, he had something disdainful in the expression of his face; when disposed to be quite at ease, he was, in Madame de Staël's opinion, rather vulgar. His natural tone of

feeling seemed to be a sense of internal superiority, and of secret contempt for the world in which he lived, the men with whom he acted, and even the very objects which he pursued. His character and manners were, upon the whole, strongly calculated to attract the attention of the French nation, and to excite a perpetual interest even from the very mystery which attached to him, as well as from the splendour of his triumphs. The supreme power was residing in the Luxembourg ostensibly; but Paris was aware that the means which had raised, and which must support and extend, that power, were to be found in the humble mansion of the newly-christened Rue de la Victoire.

Some of these features are perhaps harshly designed, as being drawn *recentibus odiis*. The disagreement between Bonaparte and Madame de Staël, from whom we have chiefly described them, is well known. It originated about this time, when, as a first-rate woman of talent, she was naturally desirous to attract the notice of the Victor of Victors. They appear to have misunderstood each other: for the lady, who ought certainly to know best, has informed us, "that far from feeling her fear of Bonaparte removed by repeated meetings, it seemed to increase, and his best exertions to please could not overcome her invincible aversion for what she found in his character." His ironical contempt of excellence of every kind, operated like the sword in romance, which froze while it wounded. Bonaparte seems never to have suspected the secret and mysterious terror with which he impressed the ingenious author of *Corinne*; on the contrary, Las Cases tells us that she combined all her efforts, and all her means, to make an impression on the general. She wrote to him when distant, and as the count ungallantly expresses it, tormented him when present. In truth, to use an established French phrase, they stood in a false position with respect to each other. Madame de Staël might be pardoned for thinking that it would be difficult to resist her wit and her talent, when exerted with the purpose of pleasing; but Bonaparte was disposed to repel, rather than encourage the advances of one whose views were so shrewd, and her observation so keen, while her sex permitted her to push her inquiries farther than one man might have dared to do in conversing with another. She certainly did desire to look into him "with considerate eyes," and on one occasion put his abilities to the proof, by asking him rather abruptly, in the middle of a brilliant party at Talleyrand's, "Whom he esteemed the greatest woman in the world, alive or dead?"—"Her, madam, that has borne the most children," answered Bonaparte, with much appearance of simplicity. Disconcerted by the reply, she observed, that he was reported not to be a great admirer of the fair sex. "I am very fond of my wife, madam," he replied, with one of those brief and yet piquant observations, which adjourned a debate as promptly as one of his characteristic manœuvres would have ended a battle. From this period there was enmity between Bonaparte and Madame de Staël; and at different times he treated her with a harshness which had some appearance of actual personal dislike, though perhaps rather directed against the female politician

than the woman of literature. After his fall, Madame de Staël relented in her resentment to him; and we remember her, during the campaign of 1814, presaging in society how the walls of Troyes were to see a second invasion and defeat of the Huns, as had taken place in the days of Attila, while the French emperor was to enact the second Theodoric.

In the meantime, while popular feeling and the approbation of distinguished genius were thus seeking to pay court to the youthful conqueror, the Directory found themselves obliged to render to him that semblance of homage which could not have been withheld without giving much offence to general opinion, and injuring those who omitted to pay it, much more than him who was entitled by the unanimous voice to receive it. On the 10th of December, the Directory received Bonaparte in public, with honours which the republican government had not yet conferred on any subject, and which must have seemed incongruous to those who had any recollection of the liberty and equality, once so emphatically pronounced to be the talisman of French prosperity. The ceremony took place in the great court of the Luxembourg Palace, where the Directory, surrounded by all that was officially important or distinguished by talent, received from Bonaparte's hand the confirmed treaty of Campo Formio. The delivery of this document was accompanied by a speech from Bonaparte, in which he told the Directory, that, in order to establish a constitution founded on reason, it was necessary that eighteen centuries of prejudices should be conquered—"The constitution of the year THREE, and you, have triumphed over all these obstacles." The triumph lasted exactly until the year EIGHT, when the orator himself overthrew the constitution, destroyed the power of the rulers who had overcome the prejudices of eighteen centuries, and reigned in their stead.

The French, who had banished religion from their thoughts, and from their system of domestic policy, yet usually preserved some perverted ceremony connected with it, on public solemnities. They had disused the exercises of devotion, and expressly disowned the existence of an object of worship; yet they could not do without altars, and hymns, and rites, upon such occasions as the present. The general, conducted by Barras, the President of the Directory, approached an erection, termed the Altar of the Country, where they went through various appropriate ceremonies, and at length dismissed a numerous assembly, much edified with what they had seen. The two councils, or representative bodies, also gave a splendid banquet in honour of Bonaparte. And what he appeared to receive with more particular satisfaction than these marks of distinction, the Institute admitted him a member of its body in the room of his friend Carnot (who was actually a fugitive, and believed at the time to be dead), while the poet Chénier promulgated his praises, and foretold his future triumphs, and his approaching conquest of England.

There is nothing less philosophical than to attach ridicule to the customs of other nations, merely because they differ from those of our own; yet it marks the difference between England and her conti-

mental neighbour, that the two Houses of Parliament never thought of giving a dinner to Marlborough, nor did the Royal Society chuse his successor in the path of victory a member by acclamation; although the British nation in either case acquitted themselves of the debt of gratitude which they owed their illustrious generals, in the humbler and more vulgar mode of conferring on both large and princely domains.

Meantime the threat of invasion was maintained with unabated earnestness. But it made no impression on the British, or rather it stimulated men of all ranks to bury temporary and party dissensions about politics, and hound themselves, with the whole energy of their national character, to confront and resist the preparations made against them. Their determination was animated by recollections of their own traditional gallantry, which had so often inflicted the deepest wounds upon France, and was not now likely to give up to anything short of the most dire necessity. The benefits were then seen of a free constitution, which permits the venom of party spirit to evaporate in open debate. Those who had differed on the question of peace or war were unanimous in that of national defence; and resistance to the common enemy, and those who appeared in the vulgar eye engaged in unappeasable contention, were the most eager to unite themselves together for these purposes, as men employed in fencing would throw down the foils and draw their united swords, if disturbed by the approach of robbers.

Bonaparte in the meanwhile made a complete survey of the coast of the British Channel, pausing at each remarkable point, and making those remarks and calculations which induced him to adopt at an after period the renewal of the project for a descent upon England. The result of his observations decided his opinion, that in the present case the undertaking ought to be abandoned. The immense preparations and violent threats of invasion were carried into no more serious effect than the landing of about twelve or fourteen hundred Frenchmen, under a General Tate, at Fishguard, in South Wales. They were without artillery, and behaved rather like men whom a shipwreck had cast on a hostile shore, than like an invading enemy, as they gave themselves up as prisoners, without even a show of defence, to Lord Cawdor, who had marched against them at the head of a body of the Welch militia, hastily drawn together on the alarm. The measure was probably only to be considered as experimental, and as such must have been regarded as an entire failure.*

The demonstrations of invasion, however, were ostensibly continued, and everything seemed arranged on either side for a desperate collision between the two most powerful nations in Europe. But the proceedings of politicians resemble those of the Indian traders called Banians, who seem engaged in talking about ordinary and trifling affairs, while, with their hands concealed beneath a shawl that is spread between them, they are secretly debating and adjusting, by signs, bargains of the utmost importance. While all France and England had

their eyes fixed on the fleets and armies destined against the latter country, the Directory and their general had no intention of using these preparations, except as a blind to cover their real object, which was the celebrated expedition to Egypt.

While yet in Italy, Bonaparte had suggested to the Directory (13th September, 1797) the advantage which might be derived from seizing upon Malta, which he represented as an easy prize. The knights, he said, were odious to the Maltese inhabitants, and were almost starving; to augment which state of distress, and increase that incapacity of defence, he had already confiscated their Italian property. He then proceeded to intimate, that being possessed of Corfu and Malta, it was natural to take possession of Egypt. Twenty-five thousand men, with eight or ten ships of the line, would be sufficient for the expedition, which he suggested might depart from the coasts of Italy.

Talleyrand, then minister for foreign affairs (in his answer of 23d September), saw the utmost advantage in the design upon Egypt, which, as a colony, would attract the commerce of India to Europe, in preference to the circuitous route by the Cape of Good Hope. This correspondence proves that, even before Bonaparte left Italy, he had conceived the idea of the Egyptian expedition, though probably only as one of the vast and vague schemes of ambition which success in so many perilous enterprises had tended to foster. There was something of wild grandeur in the idea, calculated to please an ambitious imagination. He was to be placed far beyond the reach of any command superior to his own, and left at his own discretion to the extending conquests, and perhaps founding an empire, in a country long considered as the cradle of knowledge, and celebrated in sacred and profane history as having been the scene of ancient events and distant revolutions, which, through the remoteness of ages, possess a gloomy and mysterious effect on the fancy. The first specimens of early art also were to be found among the gigantic ruins of Egypt, and its time-defying monuments of antiquity. This had its effect upon Bonaparte, who affected so particularly the species of fame which attaches to the protector and extender of science, philosophy, and the fine arts. On this subject he had a ready and willing counsellor at hand. Monge, the artist and virtuoso, was Bonaparte's confidant on this occasion, and, there is no doubt, encouraged him to an undertaking which promised a rich harvest to the antiquarian, among the ruins of temples and palaces, hitherto imperfectly examined.

But although the subject was mentioned betwixt the Directory and their ministers and Bonaparte, yet, before adopting the course which the project opened, the general was probably determined to see the issue of the revolution of the 18th Fructidor; doubting, not unreasonably, whether the conquerors in that struggle could so far avail themselves of the victory which they had obtained over the majority of the national representatives, as to consolidate and establish on a firm foundation their own authority. He knew the Directory themselves were popular with none. The numerous party, who were now inclined to a monarchical government, regarded

* See Appendix, No. 2.—"Descent of the French in South Wales, under General Tate."

them with horror. The army, though supporting them rather than coalesce with the royalists, despised and disliked them; the violent republicans remembered their active share in Robespierre's downfall, and the condemnations which followed the detected conspiracy of Babeuf, and were in no respect better disposed to their domination. Thus despised by the army, dreaded by the royalists, and detested by the republicans, the directorial government appeared to remain standing, only because the factions to whom it was unacceptable were afraid of each other's attaining a superiority in the struggle which must attend its downfall.

This crisis of public affairs was a tempting opportunity for such a character as Bonaparte, whose almost incredible successes, unvaried by a single reverse which deserved that name, naturally fixed the eyes of the multitude, and indeed of the nation at large, upon him, as upon one who seemed destined to play the most distinguished part in any of those new changes, which the mutable state of the French government seemed rapidly preparing.

The people, naturally partial to a victor, followed him everywhere with acclamations, and his soldiers, in their camp-songs, spoke of pulling the *attorneys* out of the seat of government, and installing their victorious general. Even already, for the first time since the commencement of the Revolution, the French, losing their recent habits of thinking and speaking of the nation as a body, began to interest themselves in Napoleon as an individual; and that exclusive esteem of his person had already taken root in the public mind, which afterwards formed the foundation of his throne.

Yet, in spite of these promising appearances, Napoleon, cautious as well as enterprising, saw that the time was not arrived when he could, without great risk, attempt to possess himself of the supreme government in France. The soldiers of Italy were indeed at his devotion, but there was another great and rival army belonging to the Republic, that of the Rhine, which had never been under his command, never had partaken his triumphs, and which naturally looked rather to Moreau than to Bonaparte as their general and hero.

Madame de Staël describes the soldiers from these two armies, as resembling each other in nothing save the valour which was common to both. The troops of the Rhine, returning from hard-fought fields, which, if followed by victory, had afforded but little plunder, exhibited still the severe simplicity which had been affected under the republican model; whereas the Army of Italy had reaped richer spoils than barren laurels alone, and made a display of wealth and enjoyment which showed they had not neglected their own interest while advancing the banners of France.

It was not likely, while such an army as that of the Rhine existed, opposed by rivalry and the jealousy of fame to the troops of Bonaparte, that the latter should have succeeded in placing himself at the head of affairs. Besides, the forces on which he could depend were distant. Fortune had not afforded him the necessary pretext for crossing, as he termed it, the Rubicon, and bringing twenty thousand men to Lyons. Moreau, Jourdan, Kléber,

had all high reputations, scarce inferior to his own; and the troops who had served under them were disposed to elevate them even to an equality with the Conqueror of Italy. Bonaparte also knew that his popularity, though great, was not universal. He was disliked by the middle classes, from recollection of his commanding during the affair of the Sections of Paris; and many of the republicans exclaimed against him for his surrendering Venice to the Austrians. In a word, he was too much elbowed and incommoded by others to permit his taking with full vigour the perilous spring necessary to place him in the seat of supreme authority, though there were not wanting those who would fain have persuaded him to venture on a course so daring. To such counsellors he answered, that "*the fruit was not ripe*,"—a hint which implied that appetite was not wanting, though prudence forbade the banquet.

Laying aside, therefore, the character of General of the Army of England, and adjourning to a future day the conquest of that hostile island; silencing at the same time the internal wishes and the exterior temptations which urged him to seize the supreme power, which seemed escaping from those who held it, Napoleon turned his eyes and thoughts eastward, and meditated in the distant countries of the rising sun, a scene worthy his talents, his military skill, and his ambition.

The Directory, on the other hand, eager to rid themselves of his perilous vicinity, hastened to accomplish the means of his expedition to Egypt, upon a scale far more formidable than any which had yet sailed from modern Europe, for the invasion and subjection of distant and peaceful realms.

It was soon whispered abroad that the invasion of England was to be postponed, until the Conqueror of Italy, having attained a great and national object, by the success of a secret expedition fitted out on a scale of stupendous magnitude, should be at leisure to resume the conquest of Britain.

But Bonaparte did not limit his views to those of armed conquest; he meant that these should be softened by mingling with them schemes of a literary and scientific character, as if he had desired, as some one said, that Minerva should march at the head of his expedition, holding in one hand her dreadful lance, and with the other introducing the sciences and the muses. The various treasures of art which had been transferred to the capital by the influence of his arms, gave the general of the Italian army a right to such distinctions as the French men of literature could confer; and he was himself possessed of deep scientific knowledge as a mathematician. He became apparently much attached to learned pursuits, and wore the uniform of the Institute on all occasions when he was out of military costume. This affectation of uniting the encouragement of letters and science with his military tactics, led to a new and peculiar branch of the intended expedition.

The public observed with astonishment a detachment of no less than one hundred men, who had cultivated the arts and sciences, or, to use the French phrase, *savans*, selected for the purpose of joining this mysterious expedition, of which the ob-

ject still remained a secret; while all classes of people asked each other what new quarter of the world France had determined to colonize, since she seemed preparing at once to subdue it by her arms, and to enrich it with the treasures of her science and literature. This singular department of the expedition, the first of the kind which ever accompanied an invading army, was liberally supplied with books, philosophical instruments, and all means of prosecuting the several departments of knowledge.

Bonaparte did not, however, trust to the superiority of science to insure the conquest of Egypt. He was fully provided with more effectual means. The land forces belonging to the expedition were of the most formidable description. Twenty-five thousand men, chiefly veterans selected from his own Italian army, had in their list of generals subordinate to Bonaparte the names of Kléber, Desaix, Berthier, Rénier, Murat, Lannes, Andréossi, Menon, Belliard, and others well known in the revolutionary wars. Four hundred transports were assembled for the conveyance of the troops. Thirteen ships of the line, and four frigates, commanded by Admiral Brueis, an experienced and gallant officer, formed the escort of the expedition; a finer and more formidable one than which never sailed on so bold an adventure.

We have already touched upon the secret objects of this armament. The Directory were desirous to be rid of Bonaparte, who might become a dangerous competitor in the present unsettled state of the French government. Bonaparte, on his side, accepted the command, because it opened a scene of conquest worthy of his ambition. A separate and uncontrolled command over so gallant an army seemed to promise him the conquest and the sovereignty, not of Egypt only, but of Syria, Turkey, perhaps Constantinople, the Queen of the East; and he himself afterwards more than hinted, that but for controlling circumstances, he would have bent his whole mind to the establishment of an oriental dynasty, and left France to her own destinies. When a subaltern officer of artillery, he had nourished the hope of being King of Jerusalem. In his present situation of dignity and strength, the sovereignty of an Emperor of the universal East, or of a Caliph of Egypt at the least, was a more commensurate object of ambition.

The private motives of the government and of the general are therefore easily estimated. But it is not so easy to justify the Egyptian expedition upon any views of sound national policy. On the contrary, the object to be gained by so much risk, and at the same time by an act of aggression upon the Ottoman Porte, the ancient ally of France, to whom Egypt belonged, was of very doubtful utility. The immense fertility of the alluvial provinces irrigated by the Nile, no doubt renders their sovereignty a matter of great consequence to the Turkish empire, which, from the oppressed state of their agriculture everywhere, and from the rocky and barren character of their Grecian provinces, are not in a condition to supply the capital with grain, did they not draw it from that never-failing land. But France herself, fully supplied from her own resources, had

no occasion to send her best general, and hazard her veteran army, for the purpose of seizing a distant province, merely to facilitate her means of feeding her population. To erect that large country into a French colony, would have required a drain of population, of expense, and of supplies of all sorts, which France, just recovering from the convulsion of her revolution, was by no means fit to encounter. The climate, too, is insalubrious to strangers, and must have been a constant cause of loss, until, in process of time, the colonists had become habituated to its peculiarities. It is farther to be considered, that the most perfect and absolute success in the undertaking must have ended, not in giving a province to the French Republic, but a separate and independent kingdom to her victorious and ambitious general. Bonaparte had paid but slight attention to the commands of the Directory when in Italy. Had he realized his proposed conquests in the East, they would have been sent over the Mediterranean altogether in vain.

Lastly, the state of war with England subjected this attempt to add Egypt to the French dominions, to the risk of defeat, either by the naval strength of Britain interposing between France and her new possessions, or by her land forces from India and Europe, making a combined attack upon the French army which occupied Egypt; both which events actually came to pass.

It is true, that, so far from dreading the English forces which were likely to be employed against them, the French regarded as a recommendation to the conquest of Egypt, that it was to be the first step to the destruction of the British power in India; and Napoleon continued to the last to consider the conquest of Egypt as the forerunner of that of universal Asia. His eye, which, like that of the eagle, saw far and wide, overlooking, however, obstacles, which distance rendered diminutive, beheld little more necessary than the toilsome marches of a few weeks, to achieve the conquests of Alexander the Great. He had already counted the steps by which he was to ascend to oriental monarchy, and has laid before the world a singular reverie on the probabilities of success. "If St Jean d'Acre had yielded to the French arms," said he, "a great revolution would have been accomplished in the East; the general-in-chief would have founded an empire there, and the destinies of France would have undergone different combinations from those to which they were subjected."

In this declaration we recognize one of the peculiarities of Bonaparte's disposition, which refused to allow of any difficulties or dangers save those, of which, having actually happened, the existence could not be disputed. The small British force before Acre was sufficient to destroy his whole plans of conquest; but how many other means of destruction might Providence have employed for the same purpose! The plague—the desert—mutiny among his soldiers—courage and enterprise, inspired, by favourable circumstances into the tribes by whom his progress was opposed—the computation of these, and other chances, ought to have taught him to acknowledge, that he had not been discomfited by the only hazard which could have disconcerted his

enterprise; but that, had such been the will of God, the sands of Syria might have proved as fatal as the snows of Russia, and the scimitars of the Turks as the lances of the Cossacks. In words, a march from Egypt to India is easily described, and still more easily measured off with compasses upon the map of the world. But in practice, and with an army opposed as the French would probably have been at every step, if it had been only from motives of religious antipathy, when the French general arrived at the skirts of British India, with forces thus diminished, he would have had in front the whole British army, commanded by generals accustomed to make war upon a scale almost as enlarged as he himself practised, and accustomed to victories not less decisive.

We should fall into the same error which we censure, did we anticipate what might have been the result of such a meeting. Even while we claim the probability of advantage for the army most numerous, and best provided with guns and stores, we allow the strife must have been dreadful and dubious. But if Napoleon really thought he had only to show himself in India, to insure the destruction of the British empire there, he had not calculated the opposing strength with the caution to have been expected from so great a general. He has been represented, indeed, as boasting of the additions which he would have made to his army, by the co-operation of natives trained after the French discipline. But can it be supposed that these hasty levies could be brought into such complete order as to face the native troops of British India, so long and so justly distinguished for approaching Europeans in courage and discipline, and excelling them perhaps in temperance and subordination?

In a word, the Egyptian expedition, unless considered with reference to the private views of the Directory, and of their general, must have been regarded from the beginning, as promising no results in the slightest degree worthy of the great risk incurred, by draining France of the flower of her army.

Meanwhile, the moment of departure approached. The blockading squadron, commanded by Nelson, was blown off the coast by a gale of wind, and so much damaged that they were obliged to run down to Sardinia. The first and most obvious obstacle to the expedition was thus removed. The various squadrons from Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Bastia, set sail and united with that which already lay at Toulon.

Yet it is said, though upon slender authority, that even at this latest moment Bonaparte showed some inclination to abandon the command of so doubtful and almost desperate an expedition, and wished to take the advantage of a recent dispute between France and Austria, to remain in Europe. The misunderstanding arose from the conduct of Bernadotte, ambassador for the Republic at Vienna, who incautiously displayed the national colours before his hotel, in consequence of which a popular tumult arose, and the ambassador was insulted. In their first alarm, lest this incident should occasion a renewal of the war, the Directory hastily determined to suspend Bonaparte's departure, and

dispatch him to Rastadt, where the congress was still sitting, with full powers to adjust the difference. Bonaparte accepted the commission, and while he affected to deplore the delay or miscarriage of "the greatest enterprise which he had ever meditated," wrote in secret to Count Cobenzel, now minister of foreign affairs at Vienna, inviting him to a conference at Rastadt, and hinting at political changes, by which the difficulties attending the execution of the treaty of Campo Formio might be taken away. The tenor of this letter having become known to the Directory, and it appearing to them that Bonaparte designed to make that mission a pretext for interesting Cobenzel in some change of government in France, in which he deemed it advisable to obtain the concurrence of Austria, they instantly resolved, it is said, to compel him to set sail on the expedition to Egypt. Barras, charged with the commission of notifying to the general this second alteration of his destination, had an interview with Bonaparte in private, and at his own house. The mien of the director was clouded, and, contrary to his custom, he scarcely spoke to Madame Bonaparte. When he retired, Bonaparte shut himself up in his own apartment for a short time, then gave directions for his instant departure from Paris for Toulon. These particulars are given as certain by Miot;* but he alleges no authority for this piece of secret history. There seems, however, little doubt, that the command of the Egyptian expedition was bestowed on Bonaparte by the Directory as a species of ostracism, or honourable banishment from France.

At the moment of departure, Bonaparte made one of those singular harangues, which evince such a mixture of talent and energy with bad taste and bombast. He promised to introduce those who had warred on the mountains and in the plains, to maritime combat; and to a great part of the expedition he kept his word too truly, as Aboukir could witness. He reminded them that the Romans combated Carthage by sea as well as land—he proposed to conduct them, in the name of the Goddess of Liberty, to the most distant regions and oceans, and he concluded by promising to each individual of his army seven acres of land. Whether this distribution of property was to take place on the banks of the Nile, of the Bosphorus, or the Ganges, the soldiers had not the most distant guess, and the commander-in-chief himself would have had difficulty in informing them.

On the 19th of May, 1798, this magnificent armament set sail from Toulon, illuminated by a splendid sunrise, one of those which were afterwards popularly termed the suns of Napoleon. The line of battle ships extended for a league, and the semicircle formed by the convoy was at least six leagues in extent. They were joined on the 8th June, as they swept along the Mediterranean, by a large fleet of transports, having on board the division of General Desaix.

The 10th June brought the armament before Malta, once the citadel of Christendom, and garrisoned by those intrepid knights, who, half warriors and half

* *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des Expéditions en Égypte et en Syrie*: Introduction, p. xx.

priests, opposed the infidels with the enthusiasm at once of religion and of chivalry. But those by whom the Order was now maintained were disunited among themselves, lazy and debauched voluptuaries, who consumed the revenues destined to fit out expeditions against the Turks in cruises for pleasure, not war, and giving balls and entertainments in the seaports of Italy. Bonaparte treated these degenerate knights with a want of ceremony, which, however little it accorded with the extreme strength of their island, and with the glorious defence which it had formerly made against the infidels, was perfectly suited to their present condition. Secure of a party among the French knights, with whom he had been tampering, he landed troops, and took possession of these almost impregnable fortresses with so little opposition, that Caffarelli said to Napoleon, as they passed through the most formidable defences,—“It is well, general, that there was some one within to open the gates to us. We should have had more trouble in entering, if the place had been altogether empty.”

A sufficient garrison was established in Malta, destined by Bonaparte to be an intermediate station between France and Egypt; and on the 19th, the daring general resumed his expedition. On the coast of Candia, while the savans were gazing on the rocks where Jupiter, it is said, was nurtured, and speculating concerning the existence of some vestiges of the celebrated labyrinth, Bonaparte learned that a new enemy, of a different description from the Knights of St John, were in his immediate vicinity. This was the English squadron.

Nelson, to the end as unconquerable on his own element as Bonaparte had hitherto shown himself upon shore, was now in full and anxious pursuit of his renowned contemporary. Reinforced by a squadron of ten ships of the line, a meeting with Napoleon was the utmost wish of his heart, and was echoed back by the meanest sailor on board his numerous fleet. The French had been heard of at Malta, but as the British admiral was about to proceed thither, he received news of their departure; and concluding that Egypt must be unquestionably the object of their expedition, he made sail for Egypt. It singularly happened, that although Nelson anticipated the arrival of the French at Alexandria, and accordingly directed his course thither, yet, keeping a more direct path than Brueis, when he arrived there on the 28th June, he heard nothing of the enemy, who, in the meanwhile, were proceeding to the very same port. The English admiral set sail, therefore, for Rhodes and Syracuse; and thus were the two large and hostile fleets traversing the same narrow sea, without being able to attain any certain tidings of each other's movements. This was in part owing to the English admiral having no frigates with him, which might have been detached to cruise for intelligence; partly to a continuance of thick misty weather, which at once concealed the French fleet from their adversaries, and, obliging them to keep close together, diminished the chance of discovery, which might otherwise have taken place by the occupation of a larger space. On the 26th, according to Denon, Nelson's fleet was actually seen by the French standing to

the westward, although the haze prevented the English from observing their enemy, whose squadron held an opposite direction.

Escaped from the risk of an encounter so perilous, Bonaparte's greatest danger seemed to be over on the 29th June, when the French fleet came in sight of Alexandria, and saw before them the city of the Ptolemies and of Cleopatra, with its double harbour, its Pharos, and its ancient and gigantic monuments of grandeur. Yet at this critical moment, and while Bonaparte contemplated his meditated conquest, a signal announced the appearance of a strange sail, which was construed to be an English frigate, the precursor of the British fleet. “What!” said Napoleon, “I ask but six hours.”—and, Fortune, wilt thou abandon me?” The fickle goddess was then, and for many a succeeding year, true to her votary. The vessel proved friendly.

The disembarkation of the French army took place about a league and a half from Alexandria, at an anchorage called Marabout. It was not accomplished without losing boats and men on the surf, though such risks were encountered with great joy by the troops, who had been so long confined on shipboard. As soon as five or six thousand men were landed, Bonaparte marched towards Alexandria, when the Turks, incensed at this hostile invasion on the part of a nation with whom they were at profound peace, shut the gates, and manned the walls against their reception. But the walls were ruinous, and presented breaches in many places, and the chief weapons of resistance were musketry and stones. The conquerors of Italy forced their passage over such obstacles, but not easily or with impunity. Two hundred French were killed. There was severe military execution done upon the garrison, and the town was abandoned to plunder for three hours; which has been justly stigmatized as an act of unnecessary cruelty, perpetrated only to strike terror, and extend the fame of the victorious French general. But it was Napoleon's object to impress the highest idea of his power upon the various classes of natives, who, differing widely from each other in manners and condition, inhabit Egypt as their common home.

These classes are, first, the Arab race, divided into Fellahs and Bedouins, the most numerous and least esteemed of the population. The Bedouins, retaining the manners of Arabia Proper, rove through the Desert, and subsist by means of their flocks and herds. The Fellahs cultivate the earth, and are the ordinary peasants of the country.

The class next above the Arabs in consideration are the Copts, supposed to be descended from the pristine Egyptians. They profess christianity, are timid and unwarlike, but artful and supple. They are employed in the revenue, and in almost all civil offices, and transact the commerce and the business of the country.

The third class in elevation were the formidable Mamelukes, who held both Copts and Arabs in profound subjection. These are, or we may say were, a corps of professed soldiers, having no trade excepting war. In this they resemble the Janissaries, the

* Miot says *five days*.

Strelitzes, the Prætorian bands, or similar military bodies, which, constituting a standing army under a despotic government, are alternately the protectors and the terror of the sovereign who is their nominal commander. But the peculiar feature of the constitution of the Mamelukes was that their corps was recruited only by the adoption of foreign slaves, particularly Georgians and Circassians. These were purchased when children by the several beys or Mameluke leaders, who, twenty-four in number, occupied each one of the twenty-four departments into which they had divided Egypt. The youthful slave, purchased with a heedful reference to his strength and personal appearance, was carefully trained to arms in the family of his master. When created a Mameluke, he was received into the troop of the bey, and rendered capable of succeeding to him at his death; for these chiefs despised the ordinary connexions of blood, and their authority was, upon military principles, transferred at their death to him amongst the band who was accounted the best soldier. They fought always on horseback; and in their peculiar mode of warfare they might be termed, individually considered, the finest cavalry in the world. Completely armed, and unboundedly confident in their own prowess, they were intrepid, skilful, and formidable in battle; but with their military bravery began and ended the catalogue of their virtues. Their vices were, un pitying cruelty, habitual oppression, and the unlimited exercise of the most gross and disgusting sensuality. Such were the actual lords of Egypt.

Yet the right of sovereignty did not rest with the beys, but with the pacha, or lieutenant—a great officer dispatched from the Porte to represent the Grand Seigneur in Egypt, where it was his duty to collect the tribute in money and grain which Constantinople expected from that rich province, with the additional object of squeezing out of the country as much more as he could by any means secure, for the filling of his own coffers. The pacha maintained his authority sometimes by the assistance of Turkish troops, sometimes by exciting the jealousy of one bey against another. Thus this fertile country was subjected to the oppression of twenty-four pretors, who, whether they agreed among themselves, or with the pacha, or declared war against the representative of the sultan, and against each other, were alike the terror and the scourge of the unhappy Arabs and Copts, the right of oppressing whom by every species of exaction, these haughty slaves regarded as their noblest and most undeniable privilege.

From the moment that Bonaparte conceived the idea of invading Egypt, the destruction of the power of the Mamelukes must have been determined upon as his first object; and he had no sooner taken Alexandria than he announced his purpose. He sent forth a proclamation, in which he professed his respect for God, the Prophet, and the Koran—his friendship for the Sublime Porte, of which he affirmed the French to be the faithful allies—and his determination to make war upon the Mamelukes. He commanded that the prayers should be continued in the mosques as usual, with some slight modifications, and that all true moslems should exclaim—

“Glory to the sultan, and to the French army, his allies! Accursed be the Mamelukes—and good fortune to the land of Egypt!”

Upon the 7th July the army marched from Alexandria against the Mamelukes. Their course was up the Nile, and a small flotilla of gun-boats ascended the river to protect their left flank, while the infantry traversed a desert of burning sands, at a distance from the stream, and without a drop of water to relieve their tormenting thirst. The Army of Italy, accustomed to the enjoyments of that delicious country, were astonished at the desolation they saw around them. “Is this,” they said, “the country in which we are to receive our farms of seven acres each? The general might have allowed us to take as much as we chose—no one would have abused the privilege.” Their officers, too, expressed horror and disgust; and even generals of such celebrity as Murat and Lannes threw their hats on the sand, and trod on their cockades. It required all Bonaparte’s authority to maintain order, so much were the French disgusted with the commencement of the expedition.

To add to their embarrassment, the enemy began to appear around them. Mamelukes and Arabs, concealed behind the hillocks of sand, interrupted their march at every opportunity, and woe to the soldier who straggled from the ranks, were it but fifty yards. Some of these horsemen were sure to dash at him, slay him on the spot, and make off before a musket could be discharged at them. At length, however, the audacity of these incursions was checked by a skirmish of some little importance, near a place called Chebrheis, in which the French asserted their military superiority.

An encounter also took place on the river, between the French flotilla and a number of armed vessels belonging to the Mamelukes. Victory first inclined to the latter, but at length determined in favour of the French, who took, however, only a single galliot.

Meanwhile, the French were obliged to march with the utmost precaution. The whole plain was now covered with Mamelukes, mounted on the finest Arabian horses, and armed with pistols, carabines, and blunderbusses, of the best English workmanship—their plumed turbans waving in the air, and their rich dresses and arms glittering in the sun. Entertaining a high contempt for the French force, as consisting almost entirely of infantry, this splendid barbaric chivalry watched every opportunity for charging them, nor did a single straggler escape the unrelenting edge of their sabres. Their charge was almost as swift as the wind, and as their severe bits enabled them to halt, or wheel their horses at full gallop, their retreat was as rapid as their advance. Even the practised veterans of Italy were at first embarrassed by this new mode of fighting, and lost several men; especially when fatigue caused any one to fall out of the ranks, in which case his fate became certain. But they were soon reconciled to fighting the Mamelukes, when they discovered that each of these horsemen carried about him his fortune, and that it not uncommonly amounted to considerable sums in gold.

During these alarms, the French love of the

ludicrous was not abated by the fatigues or dangers of the journey. The savans had been supplied with asses, the beasts of burden easiest attained in Egypt, to transport their persons and philosophical apparatus. The general had given orders to attend to their personal safety, which were of course obeyed. But as these civilians had little importance in the eyes of the military, loud shouts of laughter used to burst from the ranks, while forming to receive the Mamelukes, as the general of division called out, with military precision, "Let the asses and the savans enter within the square." The soldiers also amused themselves, by calling the asses *demi-savans*. In times of discontent, these unlucky servants of science had their full share of the soldiers' reproaches, who imagined that this unpopular expedition had been undertaken to gratify their passion for researches, in which the military took very slender interest.

Under such circumstances, it may be doubted whether even the literati themselves were greatly delighted, when, after fourteen days of such marches as we have described, they arrived indeed within six leagues of Cairo, and beheld at a distance the celebrated Pyramids, but learned at the same time, that Murad Bey, with twenty-two of his brethren, at the head of their Mamelukes, had formed an entrenched camp at a place called Embabeh, with the purpose of covering Cairo, and giving battle to the French. On the 21st of July, as the French continued to advance, they saw their enemy in the field, and in full force. A splendid line of cavalry, under Murad and the other beys, displayed the whole strength of the Mamelukes. Their right rested on the imperfectly entrenched camp, in which lay twenty thousand infantry, defended by forty pieces of cannon. But the infantry were an undisciplined rabble; the guns, wanting carriages, were mounted on clumsy wooden frames; and the fortifications of the camp were but commenced, and presented no formidable opposition. Bonaparte made his dispositions. He extended his line to the right, in such a manner as to keep out of gunshot of the entrenched camp, and have only to encounter the line of cavalry.

Murad Bey saw this movement, and, fully aware of its consequence, prepared to charge with his magnificent body of horse, declaring he would cut the French up like gourds. Bonaparte, as he directed the infantry to form squares to receive them, called out to his men, "From yonder Pyramids forty centuries behold your actions." The Mamelukes advanced with the utmost speed, and corresponding fury, and charged with horrible yells. They disordered one of the French squares of infantry, which would have been sabred in an instant, but that the mass of this fiery militia was a little behind the advanced guard. The French had a moment to restore order, and used it. The combat then in some degree resembled that which, nearly twenty years afterwards, took place at Waterloo; the hostile cavalry furiously charging the squares of infantry, and trying, by the most undaunted efforts of courage, to break in upon them at every practicable point, while a tremendous fire of musketry, grape-shot, and shells, crossing in various directions, re-

paid their audacity. Nothing in war was ever seen more desperate than the exertions of the Mamelukes. Failing to force their horses through the French squares, individuals were seen to wheel them round and rein them back on the ranks, that they might disorder them by kicking. As they became frantic with despair, they hurled at the immovable phalanxes, which they could not break, their pistols, their poniards, and their carabines. Those who fell wounded to the ground dragged themselves on, to cut at the legs of the French with their crooked sabres. But their efforts were all in vain.

The Mamelukes, after the most courageous efforts to accomplish their purpose, were finally beaten off with great slaughter; and, as they could not form or act in squadron, their retreat became a confused flight. The greater part attempted to return to their camp, from that sort of instinct, as Napoleon termed it, which leads fugitives to retire in the same direction in which they had advanced. By taking this route they placed themselves betwixt the French and the Nile, and the sustained and insupportable fire of the former soon obliged them to plunge into the river, in hopes to escape by swimming to the opposite bank, a desperate effort in which few succeeded. Their infantry at the same time evacuated their camp without a show of resistance, precipitated themselves into the boats, and endeavoured to cross the Nile. Very many of these also were destroyed. The French soldiers long afterwards occupied themselves in fishing for the drowned Mamelukes, and failed not to find money and valuables upon all whom they could recover. Murad Bey, with a part of his best Mamelukes, escaped the slaughter by a more regular movement to the left, and retreated by Gizeh into Upper Egypt.

Thus were in a great measure destroyed the finest cavalry, considered as individual horsemen, that were ever known to exist. "Could I have united the Mameluke horse to the French infantry," said Bonaparte, "I would have reckoned myself master of the world." The destruction of a body hitherto regarded as invincible, struck terror, not through Egypt only, but far into Africa and Asia, wherever the Moslem religion prevailed; and the rolling fire of musketry, by which the victory was achieved, procured for Bonaparte the oriental appellation of Sultan Kebir, or King of Fire.

After this combat, which, to render it more striking to the Parisians, Bonaparte termed the "Battle of the Pyramids," Cairo surrendered without resistance. The shattered remains of the Mamelukes who had swam the Nile and united under Ibrahim Bey, were compelled to retreat into Syria. A party of three hundred French cavalry ventured to attack them at Salahieh, but were severely handled by Ibrahim Bey and his followers, who, having cut many of them to pieces, pursued their retreat without farther interruption. Lower Egypt was completely in the hands of the French, and thus far the expedition of Bonaparte had been perfectly successful. But it was not the will of Heaven, that even the most fortunate of men should escape reverses, and a severe one awaited Napoleon.

CHAPTER XXXI.

French naval squadron—Conflicting statements of Bonaparte and Admiral Gantheaume in regard to it.—Battle of Aboukir on 1st August, 1798.—Number and position of the enemy, and of the English.—Particulars of the action.—The French admiral, Bruéis, killed, and his ship, l'Orient, blown up.—The victory complete, two only of the French fleet, and two frigates, escaping on the morning of the 2d.—Effects of this disaster on the French army.—Means by which Napoleon proposed to establish himself in Egypt.—His administration in many respects useful and praiseworthy—in others, his conduct impolitic and absurd.—He desires to be regarded an envoy of the Deity, but without success.—His endeavours equally unsuccessful to prostrate the Porte.—The Fort of El Arish falls into his hands.—Massacre of Jaffa.—Admitted by Bonaparte himself.—His arguments in its defence.—Replies to them.—General conclusions.—Plague breaks out in the French army.—Napoleon's humanity and courage upon this occasion.—Proceeds against Acre to attack Djezzar Pacha.—Sir Sydney Smith.—His character.—Captures a French convoy, and throws himself into Acre.—French arrive before Acre on 17th March, 1799, and effect a breach on the 28th, but are driven back.—Assaulted by an Army of Moslems of various nations assembled without the walls of Acre, whom they defeat and disperse.—Interesting particulars of the siege.—Personal misunderstanding and hostility betwixt Napoleon and Sir Sydney Smith.—explained and accounted for.—Bonaparte is finally compelled to raise the siege and retreat.

WHEN Bonaparte and his army were safely landed in Egypt, policy seemed to demand that the naval squadron by which they had been escorted should have been sent back to France as soon as possible. The French leader accordingly repeatedly asserts, that he had positively commanded Admiral Bruéis, an excellent officer, for whom he himself entertained particular respect,* either to carry his squadron of men-of-war into the harbour of Alexandria, or, that being found impossible, instantly to set sail for Corfu. The harbour, by report of the Turkish pilots, was greatly too shallow to admit without danger vessels of such a deep draught of water; and it scarce can be questioned that Admiral Bruéis would have embraced the alternative of setting sail for Corfu, had such been in reality permitted by his orders. But the assertion of Bonaparte is pointedly contradicted by the report of Vice-Admiral Gantheaume, who was himself in the battle of Aboukir, escaped from the slaughter with difficulty, and was intrusted by Bonaparte with drawing up the account of the disaster, which he transmitted to the minister of war. "Perhaps it may be said," so the dispatch bears, "that it would have been advisable to have quitted the coast as soon as the disembarkation had taken place. But considering the orders of the commander-in-chief,

and the incalculable force afforded to the land army by the presence of the squadron, the admiral thought it was his duty not to quit these seas."

Looking at the matter more closely—considering the probability of Nelson's return, and the consequent danger of the fleet—considering, too, the especial interest which naval and military officers attach each to their peculiar service, and the relative disregard with which they contemplate the other, we can see several reasons why Bonaparte might have wished, even at some risk, to detain the fleet on the coast of Egypt, but not one which could induce Bruéis to continue there, not only without the consent of the commander-in-chief, but, as Napoleon afterwards alleged, against his express orders. It is one of the cases in which no degree of liberality can enable us to receive the testimony of Bonaparte, contradicted at once by circumstances, and by the positive testimony of Gantheaume.

We now approach one of the most brilliant actions of the English navy, achieved by the admiral whose exploits so indisputably asserted the right of Britain to the dominion of the ocean. Our limits require that we should state but briefly a tale, at which every heart in our islands will long glow; and we are the more willingly concise that our readers possess it at length in one of the best-written popular histories in the English language.*

Although unable to enter the harbour of Alexandria, the French admiral believed his squadron safely moored in the celebrated Bay of Aboukir. They formed a compact line of battle, of a semi-circular form, anchored so close to the shoal-water and surf, that it was thought impossible to get between them and the land; and they concluded, therefore, that they could be brought to action on the starboard side only. On the 1st August the British fleet appeared; and Nelson had no sooner reconnoitred the French position than he resolved to force it at every risk. Where the French ships could ride,* he argued, with instantaneous decision, there must be room for English vessels to anchor between them and the shore. He made signal for attack accordingly. As the vessels approached the French anchorage, they received a heavy and raking fire, to which they could make no return; but they kept their bows to the enemy, and continued to near their line. The squadrons were nearly of the same numerical strength. The French had thirteen ships of the line and four frigates. The English thirteen ships of the line, and one 50 gun ship. But the French had three 80 gun ships, and l'Orient, a superb vessel of 120 guns. All the British were seventy-fours. The van of the English fleet, six in number, rounded successively the French line, and, dropping anchor betwixt them and the shore, opened a tremendous fire. Nelson himself, and his other vessels, ranged along the same French ships on the outer side, and thus placed them betwixt two fires; while the rest of the French line remained far a time unable to take a share in the combat. The

* In a letter published in the *Moniteur*, No. 90, an 6, Bonaparte expresses the highest sense of Admiral Bruéis' firmness and talent, as well as of the high order in which he kept the squadron under his command; and concludes by saying, he had bestowed on him, in the name of the Directory, a spy-glass of the best construction which Italy afforded.

* Mr Southey's "Life of Admiral Nelson;" in which one of the most distinguished men of genius and learning whom our age has produced has recorded the actions of the greatest naval hero that ever existed.

battle commenced with the utmost fury, and lasted till, the sun having set and the night fallen, there was no light by which the combat could be continued, save the flashes of the continuous broadsides. Already, however, some of the French vessels were taken, and the victors, advancing onwards, assailed those which had not yet been engaged.

Meantime a broad and dreadful light was thrown on the scene of action, by the breaking out of a conflagration on board the French admiral's flagship, *l'Orient*. Brueis himself had by this time fallen by a cannon-shot. The flames soon mastered the immense vessel, where the carnage was so terrible as to prevent all attempts to extinguish them; and *l'Orient* remained blazing like a volcano in the middle of the combat, rendering for a time the dreadful spectacle visible.

At length, and while the battle continued as furious as ever, the burning vessel blew up with so tremendous an explosion, that for a while it silenced the fire on both sides, and made an awful pause in the midst of what had been but lately so horrible a tumult. The cannonade was at first slowly and partially resumed, but ere midnight it raged with all its original fury. In the morning the only two French ships who had their colours flying, cut their cables and put to sea, accompanied by two frigates; being all that remained undestroyed and uncaptured, of the gallant navy that so lately escorted Bonaparte and his fortunes in triumph across the Mediterranean.

Such was the victory of Aboukir, for which he who achieved it felt that word was inadequate. He called it a conquest. The advantages of the day, great as they were, might have been pushed much farther, if Nelson had been possessed of frigates and small craft. The store-ships and transports in the harbour of Alexandria would then have been infallibly destroyed. As it was, the results were of the utmost importance, and the destinies of the French army were altered in proportion. They had no longer any means of communicating with the mother-country, but became the inhabitants of an insulated province, obliged to rely exclusively on the resources which they had brought with them, joined to those which Egypt might afford.

Bonaparte, however surprised by this reverse, exhibited great equanimity. Three thousand French seamen, the remainder of nearly six thousand engaged in that dreadful battle, were sent ashore by cartel, and formed a valuable addition to his forces. Nelson, more grieved almost at being frustrated of his complete purpose, than rejoiced at his victory, left the coast, after establishing a blockade on the port of Alexandria.

We are now to trace the means by which Napoleon proposed to establish and consolidate his government in Egypt; and in these we can recognize much that was good and excellent, mixed with such irregularity of imagination, as vindicates the term of *Jupiter Scapin*, by which the Abbé de Pradt distinguished this extraordinary man.

His first care was to gather up the reins of government, such as they were, which had dropt from the hands of the defeated beys. With two classes of the Egyptian nation it was easy to establish his au-

thority. The Fellahs, or peasantry, sure to be squeezed to the last penny by one party or other, willingly submitted to the invaders as the strongest, and the most able to protect them. The Copts, or men of business, were equally ready to serve the party which was in possession of the country. So that the French became the masters of both, as a natural consequence of the power which they had obtained.

But the Turks were to be attached to the conqueror by other means, since their haughty national character, and the intolerance of the mahomedan religion, rendered them alike inaccessible to profit, the hope of which swayed the Copts, and to fear, which was the prevailing argument with the Fellahs. To gratify their vanity, and soothe their prejudices, seemed the only mode by which Napoleon could insinuate himself into the favour of this part of the population. With this view, Bonaparte was far from assuming a title of conquest in Egypt, though he left few of its rights unexercised. On the contrary, he wisely continued to admit the pacha to that ostensible share of authority which was yielded to him by the beys, and spoke with as much seeming respect of the Sublime Porte, as if it had been his intention ever again to permit their having any effective power in Egypt. Their imams, or priests; their ulemats, or men of law; their cadis, or judges; their sheiks, or chiefs; their janissaries, or privileged soldiers, were all treated by Napoleon with a certain degree of attention, and the Sultan Kébir, as they called him, affected to govern, like the Grand Seigneur, by the intervention of a divan.

This general council consisted of about forty sheiks or moslems of distinction by birth or office, who held their regular meetings at Cairo, and from which haly emanated the authority of provincial divans, established in the various departments of Egypt. Napoleon affected to consult the superior council, and act in many cases according to their report of the law of the Prophet. On one occasion, he gave them a moral lesson which it would be great injustice to suppress. A tribe of roving Arabs had slain a peasant, and Bonaparte had given directions to search out and punish the murderers. One of his oriental counsellors laughed at the zeal which the general manifested on so slight a cause.

"What have you to do with the death of this Fellah, Sultan Kébir?" said he, ironically; "was he your kinsman?"

"He was more," said Napoleon; "he was one for whose safety I am accountable to God, who placed him under my government."

"He speaks like an inspired person!" exclaimed the sheiks; who can admire the beauty of a just sentiment, though incapable, from the scope they allow their passions, to act up to the precepts of moral rectitude.

Thus far the conduct of Bonaparte was admirable. He protected the people who were placed under his power, he respected their religious opinions, he administered justice to them according to their own laws, until they should be supplied with a better system of legislation. Unquestionably, his good administration did not amend the radical deficiency of his title; it was still chargeable against him that he

had invaded the dominions of the most ancient ally of France, at a time when there was the most profound peace between the countries. Yet in delivering Egypt from the tyrannical sway of the Mamelukes, and administering the government of the country with wisdom and comparative humanity, the mode in which he used the power which he had acquired might be admitted in some measure to atone for his usurpation. Not contented with directing his soldiers to hold in respect the religious observances of the country, he showed equal justice and policy in collecting and protecting the scattered remains of the great caravan of the Mecca pilgrimage, which had been plundered by the Mamelukes on their retreat. So satisfactory was his conduct to the moslem divines, that he contrived to obtain from the clergy of the Mosque an opinion, declaring that it was lawful to pay tribute to the French, though such a doctrine is diametrically inconsistent with the Koran. Thus far Napoleon's measures had proved rational and successful. But with this laudable course of conduct was mixed a species of artifice, which, while we are compelled to term it impious, has in it, at the same time, something indicrous and almost childish.

Bonaparte entertained the strange idea of persuading the moslems that he himself pertained in some sort to their religion, being an envoy of the Deity, sent on earth, not to take away, but to confirm and complete, the doctrines of the Koran, and the mission of Mahommed. He used, in executing this purpose, the inflated language of the East, the more easily that it corresponded, in its allegorical and amplified style, with his own natural tone of composition; and he hesitated not to join in the external ceremonial of the mahomedan religion, that his actions might seem to confirm his words. The French general celebrated the feast of the Prophet as it recurred, with some sheik of eminence, and joined in the litanies and worship enjoined by the Koran. He affected, too, the language of an inspired follower of the faith of Mecca, of which the following is a curious example.

On entering the sepulchral chamber in the pyramid of Cheops, "Glory be to Allah," said Bonaparte, "there is no God but God, and Mahommed is his prophet." A confession of faith which is in itself a declaration of islamism.

"Thou hast spoken like the most learned of the prophets," said the mufti, who accompanied him.

"I can command a car of fire to descend from heaven," continued the French general, "and I can guide and direct its course upon earth."

"Thou art the great chief to whom Mahommed gives power and victory," said the mufti.

Napoleon closed the conversation with this not very pertinent oriental proverb, "The bread which the wicked seizes upon by force shall be turned to dust in his mouth."

Though the mufti played his part in the above scene with becoming gravity, Bonaparte over-estimated his own theatrical powers, and did too little justice to the shrewdness of the Turks, if he supposed them really edified by his pretended proselytism. With them as with us, a renegade from the religious faith in which he was brought up, is like

a deserter from the standard of his country; and though the services of either may be accepted and used, they remain objects of disregard and contempt, as well with those to whose service they have deserted, as with the party whom they have abandoned.

The Turks and Arabs of Cairo soon afterwards showed Bonaparte, by a general and unexpected insurrection in which many Frenchmen were slain, how little they were moved by his pretended attachment to their faith, and how cordially they considered him as their enemy. Yet, when the insurgents had been quelled by force, and the blood of five thousand moslems had atoned for that of three hundred Frenchmen, Napoleon, in an address to the inhabitants of Cairo, new-modeling the general council, or divan, held still the same language as before of himself and his destinies. "Scherifs," he said, "ulemats, orators of the mosque, teach the people that those who become my enemies shall have no refuge either in this world or the next. Is there any one blind enough not to see that I am the agent of Destiny, or incredulous enough to call in question the power of Destiny over human affairs? Make the people understand that, since the world was a world, it was ordained, that having destroyed the enemies of islamism, and broken down the cross,* I should come from the distant parts of the West to accomplish the task designed for me—show them, that in more than twenty passages of the Koran my coming is foretold. I could demand a reckoning from each of you for the most secret thoughts of his soul, since to me everything is known; but the day will come when all shall know from whom I have my commission, and that human efforts cannot prevail against me."

It is plain from this strange proclamation, that Bonaparte was willing to be worshiped as a superior being, as soon as altars could be built, and worshipers collected together. But the Turks and Arabs were wiser than the Persians in the case of young Ammon. The Sheik of Alexandria, who affected much devotion to Bonaparte's person, came roundly to the point with him. He remarked the French observed no religious worship. "Why not, therefore," he said, "declare yourself moslem at once, and remove the only obstacle betwixt you and the throne of the East?" Bonaparte objected the prohibition of wine, and the external rite which Mahommed adopted from the Jewish religion. The officious sheik proposed to call a council of the moslem sages, and procure for the new proselytes some relaxation of these fundamental laws of the Prophet's faith. According to this hopeful plan, the moslems must have ceased to be such in two principal articles of their ritual, in order to induce the French to become a kind of imperfect renegades, rejecting, in the prohibition of wine, the only peculiar guard which Mahommed assigned to the moral virtue of his followers, while they embraced the degrading doctrine of fatality, the licentious practice of polygamy, and the absurd chimeras of the Koran.

Napoleon appears to have believed the sheik

* Alluding to the capture of the island of Malta, and subjection of the pope, on which he was wont to found as services rendered to the religion of Mahommed.

serious, which is very doubtful, and to have contemplated with eager ambition the extent of views which his conversion to islamism appeared to open. His own belief in predestination recommended the creed of Mahommed, and for the Prophet of Mecca himself he had a high respect, as one of those who had wrought a great and enduring change on the face of the world. Perhaps he envied the power which Mahommed possessed, of ruling over men's souls as well as their bodies, and might thence have been led into the idea of playing a part, to which time and circumstances, the character of his army and his own, were alike opposed. No man ever succeeded in imposing himself on the public as a supernatural personage, who was not to a certain degree the dupe of his own imposture; and Napoleon's calculating and reflecting mind was totally devoid of the enthusiasm which enables a man to cheat himself into at least a partial belief of the deceit which he would impose on others. The French soldiers, on the other hand, bred in scorn of religion of every description, would have seen nothing but ridicule in the pretensions of their leader to a supernatural mission; and in playing the character which Alexander ventured to personate, Bonaparte would have found in his own army many a Clitus, who would have considered his pretensions as being only ludicrous. He himself, indeed, expressed himself satisfied that his authority over his soldiers was so absolute, that it would have cost but giving it out in the order of the day to have made them all become Mahommedans; but, at the same time, he has acquainted us that the French troops were at times so much discontented with their condition in Egypt, that they formed schemes of seizing on their standards, and returning to France by force. What reply, it may be reasonably asked, were they likely to make to a proposal which would have deprived them of their European and French character, and leveled them with Africans and Asiatics, whose persons they despised, and whose country they desired to leave? It is probable, that reflections on the probable consequences prevented his going farther than the vague pretensions which he announced in his proclamations, and in his language to the sheiks. He had gone far enough, however, to show, that the considerations of conscience would have been no hindrance; and that, notwithstanding the strength of his understanding, common sense had less influence than might have been expected, in checking his assertion of claims so ludicrous as well as so profane. Indeed, his disputes with the Ottoman Porte speedily assumed a character, which his taking the turban and professing himself a moslem in all the forms could not have altered to his advantage.

It had been promised to Bonaparte that the abilities of Talleyrand, as minister of foreign affairs, should be employed to reconcile the Grand Seigneur and his counsellors to the occupation of Egypt. But the efforts of that able negotiator had totally failed in a case so evidently hopeless; and if Talleyrand had even proceeded to Constantinople, as Napoleon alleged the Directory had promised, it could only have been to be confined in the Seven Towers. The

Porte had long since declared, that any attack upon Egypt, the road to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, would be considered as a declaration of war, whatsoever pretexts might be alleged. They regarded, therefore, Bonaparte's invasion as an injury equally unprovoked and unjustifiable. They declared war against France, called upon every follower of the Prophet to take the part of his vicegerent upon earth, collected forces, and threatened an immediate expedition, for the purpose of expelling the infidels from Egypt. The success of the British at Aboukir increased their confidence. Nelson was loaded with every mark of honour which the sultan could bestow, and the most active preparations were made to act against Bonaparte, equally considered as enemy to the Porte, whether he professed himself christian, infidel, or renegade.

Meantime, that adventurous and active chief was busied in augmenting his means of defence or conquest, and in acquiring the information necessary to protect what he had gained, and to extend his dominions. For the former purpose, corps were raised from among the Egyptians, and some were mounted upon dromedaries, the better to encounter the perils of the Desert. For the latter, Bonaparte undertook a journey to the isthmus of Suez, the well-known interval which connects Asia with Africa. He subscribed the charter or protection, granted to the Maronite Monks of Sinai, with the greater pleasure, that the signature of Mahommed had already sanctioned that ancient document. He visited the celebrated fountains of Moses, and, misled by a guide, had nearly been drowned in the advancing tides of the Red Sea. This, he observes, would have furnished a text to all the preachers in Europe. But the same Deity, who rendered that gulf fatal to Pharaoh, had reserved for one, who equally defied and disowned his power, the rocks of an island in the midst of the Atlantic.

When Napoleon was engaged in this expedition, or speedily on his return, he learned that two Turkish armies had assembled,—one at Rhodes, and the other in Syria, with the purpose of recovering Egypt. The daring genius, which always desired to anticipate the attempts of the enemy, determined him to march with a strong force for the occupation of Syria, and thus at once to alarm the Turks by the progress which he expected to make in that province, and to avoid being attacked in Egypt, by two Turkish armies at the same time. His commencement was as successful as his enterprise was daring. A body of Mamelukes was dispersed by a night attack. The fort of El Arish, considered as one of the keys of Egypt, fell easily into his hands. Finally, at the head of about ten thousand men, he traversed the Desert, so famous in biblical history, which separates Africa from Asia, and entered Palestine without much loss, but not without experiencing the privations to which the wanderers in those sandy wastes have been uniformly subjected. While his soldiers looked with fear on the howling wilderness which they saw around, there was something in the extent and loneliness of the scene that corresponded with the swelling soul of Napoleon, and accommodated itself to his ideas of immense and boundless space. He was pleased with the flattery, which

derived his christian name from two Greek words, signifying the Lion of the Desert.

Upon his entering the Holy Land, Bonaparte again drove before him a body of Mamelukes, belonging to those who, after the battles of the Pyramids and of Salahieh, had retreated into Syria; and his army occupied without resistance Gaza, anciently a city of the Philistines, in which they found supplies of provisions. Jaffa, a celebrated city during the time of the Crusades, was the next object of attack. It was bravely assaulted, and fiercely defended. But the French valour and discipline prevailed—the place was carried by storm—three thousand Turks were put to the sword, and the town was abandoned to the license of the soldiery, which, by Bonaparte's own admission, never assumed a shape more frightful.* Such, it may be said, is the stern rule of war; and if so, most of our readers will acquiesce in the natural exclamation of the Marshal de Moutluc, "Certes, we soldiers stand in more need of the Divine mercy than other men, seeing that our profession compels us to command and to witness deeds of such cruelty." It was not, however, to the ordinary horrors attending the storm of a town, that the charge against Bonaparte is on this occasion limited. He is accused of having been guilty of an action of great injustice, as well as of especial barbarity. Concerning this we shall endeavour to state, stripped of colouring and exaggeration, first the charge, and then the reply, by Napoleon himself.

After the breach had been stormed, a large part of the garrison, estimated by Bonaparte himself at twelve hundred men, which Miot raises to betwixt two and three thousand, and others exaggerate still more, remained on the defensive, and held out in the mosques, and a sort of citadel to which they had retreated, till, at length, despairing of succour, they surrendered their arms, and were in appearance admitted to quarter. Of this body, the Egyptians were carefully separated from the Turks, Mamelukes, and Arnauts; and while the first were restored to liberty, and sent back to their country, these last were placed under a strong guard. Provisions were distributed to them, and they were permitted to go by detachments in quest of water. According to all appearance, they were considered and treated as prisoners of war. This was on the 7th of March. On the 9th, two days afterwards, this body of prisoners were marched out of Jaffa, in the centre of a large square battalion, commanded by General Bon. Miot assures us that he himself mounted his horse, accompanied the melancholy column, and witnessed the event. The Turks foresaw their fate, but used neither entreaties nor complaints to avert it. They marched on, silent and composed. Some of them, of higher rank, seemed to exhort the others to submit, like servants of the Prophet, to the decree which, according to their belief, was written on their forehead. They were escorted to the sand-hills to the south-east of Jaffa, divided there into small bodies, and put to death by musketry. The execution lasted a considerable time, and the wounded, as in the *fusillades* of the

Revolution, were dispatched with the bayonet. Their bodies were heaped together, and formed a pyramid which is still visible, consisting now of human bones as originally of bloody corpses.

The cruelty of this execution occasioned the fact itself to be doubted, though coming with strong evidence, and never denied by the French themselves. Napoléon, however, frankly admitted the truth of the statement, both to Lord Ebrington and to Dr O'Meara. Well might the author of this cruelty write to the Directory, that the storm of Jaffa was marked by horrors which he had never elsewhere witnessed. Bonaparte's defence was, that the massacre was justified by the laws of war—that the head of his messenger had been cut off by the governor of Jaffa, when sent to summon him to surrender—that these Turks were a part of the garrison of El Ariah, who had engaged not to serve against the French, and were found immediately afterwards defending Jaffa, in breach of the terms of their capitulation. They had incurred the doom of death, therefore, by the rules of war—Wellington, he said, would have in his place acted in the same manner.

To this plea the following obvious answers apply. If the Turkish governor had behaved like a barbarian, for which his country, and the religion which Napoleon meditated to embrace, might be some excuse, the French general had avenged himself by the storm and plunder of the town, with which his revenge ought in all reason to have been satisfied. If some of these unhappy Turks had broken their faith to Bonaparte, and were found again in the ranks which they had sworn to abandon, it could not, according to the most severe construction of the rules of war, authorize the dreadful retaliation of indiscriminate massacre upon a multitude of prisoners, without inquiring whether they had been all equally guilty. Lastly, and admitting them all to stand in the same degree of criminality, although their breach of faith might have entitled Bonaparte to refuse these men quarter while they had arms in their hands, that right was ended when the French general received their submission, and when they had given up the means of defence, on condition of safety for life at least.

This bloody deed must always remain a deep stain on the character of Napoleon. Yet we do not view it as the indulgence of an innate love of cruelty; for nothing in Bonaparte's history shows the existence of that vice, and there are many things which intimate his disposition to have been naturally humane. But he was ambitious, aimed at immense and gigantic undertakings, and easily learned to overlook the waste of human life, which the execution of his projects necessarily involved. He seems to have argued, not on the character of the action, but solely on the effect which it was to produce upon his own combinations. His army was small; it was his business to strike terror into his numerous enemies, and the measure to be adopted seemed capable of making a deep impression on all who should hear of it. Besides, these men, if dismissed, would immediately rejoin his enemies. He had experienced their courage, and to disarm them would have been almost an unavailing precaution.

* See his dispatch to the Directory, on the Syrian campaign.

where their national weapon, the sabre, was so easily attained. To detain them prisoners could have required a stronger force than Napoleon could afford, would have added difficulty and delay to the movement of his troops, and tended to exhaust his supplies. That sort of necessity, therefore, which men fancy to themselves when they are unwilling to forego a favourite object for the sake of obeying a moral precept—that necessity which might be more properly termed a temptation difficult to be resisted—that necessity which has been called the tyrant's plea, was the cause of the massacre at Jaffa, and must remain its sole apology.

It might almost seem that Heaven set its vindictive brand upon this deed of butchery, for about the time it was committed the plague broke out in the army. Bonaparte, with a moral courage deserving as much praise as his late cruelty deserved reprobation, went into the hospitals in person, and while exposing himself, without hesitation, to the infection, diminished the terror of the disease in the opinion of the soldiers generally, and even of the patients themselves, who were thus enabled to keep up their spirits, and gained by doing so the fairest chance of recovery.

Meanwhile, determined to prosecute the conquest of Syria, Bonaparte resolved to advance to St-Jean d'Acre, so celebrated in the wars of Palestine. The Turkish pacha, or governor of Syria, who, like others in his situation, accounted himself almost an independent sovereign, was Achmet, who, by his unrelenting cruelties and executions, had procured the terrible distinction of Djezzar, or the Butcher. Bonaparte addressed this formidable chief in two letters, offering his alliance, and threatening him with his vengeance if it should be rejected. To neither did the pacha return any answer—in the second instance he put to death the messenger. The French general advanced against Acre, vowing revenge. There were, however, obstacles to the success of his enterprise, on which he had not calculated.

The pacha had communicated the approach of Napoleon to Sir Sydney Smith, to whom had been committed the charge of assisting the Turks in their proposed expedition to Egypt, and who, for that purpose, was cruising in the Levant. He hastened to sail for Acre with the *Tigre* and *Theseus*, ships of the line, and arriving there two days ere the French made their appearance, contributed greatly to place the town, the fortifications of which were on the old Gothic plan, in a respectable state of defence.

Sir Sydney Smith, who so highly distinguished himself on this occasion, had been long celebrated for the most intrepid courage, and spirit of enterprise. His character was, besides, marked by those traits of enthusiasm at which cold and vulgar minds are apt to sneer, because incapable of understanding them; yet without which great and honourable actions have rarely been achieved. He had also a talent, uncommon among the English, that of acting easily with foreign, and especially with barbarous troops, and understanding how to make their efforts availing for the service of the common cause, though exerted in a manner different from those of civilized nations. This brave officer having been frequently intrusted with the charge of alarming the French

coast, had been taken on one occasion, and, contrary to the law of nations, and out of a mean spirit of revenge, was imprisoned in the Temple, from which he was delivered by a daring stratagem, effected by the French royalist party. He had not been many hours at Acre, when Providence afforded him a distinguishing mark of favour. The *Theseus*, which had been detached to intercept any French vessels that might be attending on Bonaparte's march, detected a small flotilla stealing under Mount Carmel, and had the good fortune to make prize of seven out of nine of them. They were a convoy from Damietta, bound for Acre, having on board heavy cannon, platforms, ammunition, and other necessary articles. These cannon and military stores, destined to form the siege of Acre, became eminently useful in its defence, and the consequence of their capture was eventually decisive of the struggle. General Philippeaux, a French royalist, and officer of engineers, immediately applied himself to place the cannon thus acquired, to the amount of betwixt thirty and forty, upon the walls which they had been intended to destroy. This officer, who had been Bonaparte's schoolfellow, and the principal agent in delivering Sir Sydney Smith from prison, possessed rare talents in his profession. Thus strangely met under the walls of Acre, an English officer, late a prisoner in the Temple at Paris, and a French colonel of engineers, with the late general of the Army of Italy, the ancient companion of Philippeaux,* and about to become almost the personal enemy of Smith.

On the 17th March the French came in sight of Acre, which is built upon a peninsula advancing into the sea, and so conveniently situated that vessels can lie near the shore and annoy with their fire whatever advances to assault the fortifications. Notwithstanding the presence of two British ships of war, and the disappointment concerning his battering cannon, which were now pointed against him from the ramparts, Bonaparte, with a characteristic perseverance which on such an occasion was pushed into obstinacy, refused to abandon his purpose, and proceeded to open trenches, although the guns which he had to place in them were only twelve-pounders. The point of attack was a large tower which predominated over the rest of the fortifications. A mine at the same time was run under the extreme defences.

By the 28th March a breach was effected, the mine was sprung, and the French proceeded to the assault upon that day. They advanced at the charging step, under a murderous fire from the walls, but had the mortification to find a deep ditch betwixt them and the tower. They crossed it, nevertheless, by help of the scaling-ladders, which they carried with them, and forced their way as far as the tower, from which it is said that the defenders, impressed by the fate of Jaffa, were beginning to fly.

* Philippeaux died during the siege, of a fever brought on by fatigue. Bonaparte spoke of him with more respect than he usually showed to those who had been successful in opposing him. One reason might be, that the merit given to Philippeaux was in some degree subtracted from Sir Sydney Smith. The former was a Frenchman, and dead—the latter alive, and an Englishman.

They were checked by the example of Djézzar himself, who fired his own pistols at the French, and upbraided the moslems who were retreating from the walls. The defences were again manned; the French, unable to support the renewed fire, were checked and forced back; and the Turks falling upon them in their retreat with sabre in hand, killed a number of their best men, and Mailly, who commanded the party. Sorties were made from the place to destroy the French works; and although the cries with which the Turks carry on their military manœuvres gave the alarm to the enemy, yet, assisted by a detachment of British seamen, they did the French considerable damage, reconnoitred the mine which they were forming anew, and obtained the knowledge of its direction necessary to prepare a counter mine.

While the strife was thus fiercely maintained on both sides, with mutual loss and increased animosity, the besiegers were threatened with other dangers. An army of moslem troops of various nations, but all actuated by the same religious zeal, had formed themselves in the mountains of Samaria, and, uniting with them the warlike inhabitants of that country, now called Naplous, formed the plan of attacking the French army lying before Acre on one side, while Djézzar and his allies should assail them upon the other. Kléber, with his division, was dispatched by Bonaparte to disperse this assemblage. But though he obtained considerable advantages over detached parties of the Syrian army, their strength was so disproportioned, that at last, while he held a position near Mount Tabor, with two or three thousand men, he was surrounded by about ten times his own number. But his general-in-chief was hastening to his assistance. Bonaparte left two divisions to keep the trenches before Acre, and penetrated into the country in three columns. Murat, at the head of a fourth, occupied the pass called Jacob's Bridge. The attack, made on various points, was everywhere successful. The camp of the Syrian army was taken; their defeat, almost their dispersion, was accomplished, while their scattered remains fled to Damascus. Bonaparte returned, crowned with laurels, to the siege of Acre.

Here, too, the arrival of thirty heavy pieces of cannon from Jaffa, seemed to promise that success which the French had as yet been unable to attain. It was about this time that, walking on the mount which still retains the name of Richard Cœur-de-Lion, Bonaparte expressed himself to Murat in these terms, as he pointed to St-Jean d'Acre:—"The fate of the East depends upon yonder petty town. Its conquest will insure the main object of my expedition, and Damascus will be the first fruit of it.*" Thus it would seem, that, while engaged in the enterprise, Bonaparte held the same language, which he did many years after its failure when at St Helena.

Repeated and desperate assaults proved, that the consequence which he attached to taking Acre was as great as his words expressed. The assailants suffered severely on these occasions, for they were exposed to the fire of two ravelins, or external for-

tifications, which had been constructed under Philippeaux's directions, and at the same time enfiladed by the fire of the British shipping. At length, employing to the uttermost the heavy artillery now in his possession, Bonaparte, in spite of a bloody and obstinate opposition, forced his way to the disputed tower, and made a lodgment on the second story. It afforded, however, no access to the town; and the troops remained there as in a *cul-de-sac*, the lodgment being covered from the English and Turkish fire by a work constructed partly of packs of cotton, partly of the dead bodies of the slain, built up along with them.

At this critical moment, a fleet, bearing reinforcements long hoped for and much needed, appeared in view of the garrison. They contained Turkish troops under the command of Hassan Bey. Yet, near as they were, the danger was imminent that Acre might be taken ere they could land. To prevent such a misfortune, Sir Sydney Smith in person proceeded to the disputed tower, at the head of a body of British seamen, armed with pikes. They united themselves to a corps of brave Turks, who defended the breach rather with heavy stones than with other weapons. The heap of ruins which divided the contending parties served as a breast-work to both. The muzzles of the muskets touched each other, and the spearheads of the standards were locked together. At this moment one of the Turkish regiments of Hassan's army, which had by this time landed, made a sortie upon the French; and though they were driven back, yet the diversion occasioned the besiegers to be forced from their lodgment.

Abandoning the ill-omened tower, which had cost the besiegers so many men, Bonaparte now turned his efforts towards a considerable breach that had been effected in the curtain, and which promised a more easy entrance. It proved, indeed, but too easy; for Djézzar Pacha opposed to the assault on this occasion a new mode of tactics. Confiding in his superior numbers, he suffered the French, who were commanded by the intrepid General Lannes, to surmount the breach without opposition, by which they penetrated into the body of the place. They had no sooner entered, than a numerous body of Turks mingled among them with loud shouts; and ere they had time or room to avail themselves of their discipline, brought them into that state of close fighting, where strength and agility are superior to every other acquirement. The Turks, wielding the sabre in one hand, and the poniard in the other, cut to pieces almost all the French who had entered. General Rambaud lay a headless corpse in the breach—Lannes was with difficulty brought off, severely wounded. The Turks gave no quarter; and instantly cutting the heads off of those whom they slew, carried them to the pacha, who sat in public distributing money to those who brought him these bloody trophies, which now lay piled in heaps around him. This was the sixth assault upon these tottering and blood-stained ramparts. "Victory," said Napoleon, "is to the most persevering;" and, contrary to the advice of Kléber, he resolved upon another and yet more desperate attack.

On the 21st May the final effort was made. The

* Related by Miot, as communicated to him by Murat.

attack of the morning failed, and Colonel Venoux renewed it at mid-day. "Be assured," said he to Bonaparte,* "Acre shall be yours to-night, or Venoux will die on the breach." He kept his word at the cost of his life. Bon was also slain, whose division had been the executioners of the garrison of Jaffa. The French now retreated, dispirited, and despairing of success. The contest had been carried on at half a musket-shot distance; and the bodies of the dead lying around, putrified under the burning sun, and spread disease among the survivors. An attempt was made to establish a suspension of arms for removing this horrible annoyance. Miot says that the pacha returned no answer to the proposal of the French. According to Sir Sydney Smith's official reports, the armistice for this humane purpose was actually agreed on, but broken off by the French firing upon those who were engaged in the melancholy office, and then rushing on to make their last unsuccessful charge and assault upon the breach. This would have been a crime so useless, and would have tended so much to the inconvenience of the French themselves, that we cannot help suspecting some misunderstanding had occurred, and that the interruption was under a wrong conception of the purpose of the working party.

This is the more probable, as Sir Sydney Smith, who reports the circumstance, was not at this time disposed to put the best construction on any action of Bonaparte's, who, on the other hand, regarded the British seaman with peculiar dislike, and even malignity. The cause of personal quarrel betwixt them was rather singular.

Bonaparte had addressed the subjects of Achmet Djezzar's pachalik, in terms inviting them to revolt, and join the French; yet was much offended when, imitating his own policy, the pacha and Sir Sydney Smith caused letters to be sent into his camp before Acre, urging his soldiers to mutiny and desertion. Sir Sydney also published a proclamation to the Druses, and other inhabitants of the country, calling on them to trust the faith of a christian knight, rather than that of an unprincipled renegade. Nettle at these insults, Bonaparte declared that the English commodore was mad; and, according to his account, Sir Sydney replied by sending him a challenge. The French general scornfully refused this invitation, unless the challenger would bring Marlborough to meet him, but offered to send one of his grenadiers to indulge the Englishman's desire of single combat. The good taste of the challenge may be doubted, if indeed such was ever sent; but the scorn or the reply ought to have been mitigated, considering it was addressed to one, in consequence of whose dauntless and determined opposition Bonaparte's favourite object had failed, and who was presently to compel him for the first time to an inglorious retreat.

Another calumny, circulated by Bonaparte against the English commodore, was, that Sir Sydney Smith had endeavoured to expose his French prisoners to the infection of the plague, by placing them in vessels where that dreadful contagion prevailed. This charge had no other foundation, than in Bonaparte's wish, by spreading such a scandal,

to break off all communication between the commodore and the discontented of his own army. After the heat excited by their angry collision had long subsided, it is amusing to find Napoleon, when in the island of St Helena, declaring, that his opinion of Sir Sydney Smith was altered for the better, since he had become acquainted with the rest of his countrymen, and that he now considered him as a worthy sort of man—for an Englishman.

The siege of Acre had now continued sixty days since the opening of the trenches. The besiegers had marched no less than eight times to the assault, while eleven desperate sallies were evidence of the obstinacy of the defence. Several of the best French generals were killed; among the rest Caffarelli,* for whom Bonaparte had a particular esteem; and the army was greatly reduced by the sword and the plague, which raged at once among their devoted bands. Retreat became inevitable. Yet Bonaparte endeavoured to give it such a colouring as might make the measure seem voluntary. Sometimes he announced that his purpose of going to Acre was sufficiently accomplished when he had battered down the palace of the pacha; at other times he affirmed he had left the whole town a heap of ruins; and finally, he informed the Directory that he could easily have taken the place, but the plague being raging within its walls, and it being impossible to prevent the troops from seizing on infected clothes for part of their booty, he had rather declined the capture of Acre, than run the risk of introducing this horrid malady among his soldiers. What his real feelings must have been, while covering his chagrin with such flimsy pretexts, may be conjectured from the following frank avowal to his attendants in St Helena. Speaking of the dependence of the most important affairs on the most trivial, he remarks that the mistake of the captain of a frigate, who bore away, instead of forcing his passage to the place of his destination, had prevented the face of the world from being totally changed. "Acre," he said, "would otherwise have been taken—the French army would have flown to Damascus and Aleppo—in a twinkling of an eye they would have been on the Euphrates—the Syrian christians would have joined us—the Druses, the Armenians would have united with us."—Some one replied, "we might have been reinforced to the number of a hundred thousand men."—"Say six hundred thousand," said the emperor; "who can calculate the amount? I would have reached Constantinople and the Indies—I would have changed the face of the world."†

* Caffarelli was shot in the elbow, and died of the amputation of the limb. He had before lost a leg, which induced the French soldiers, who disliked him as one of the principal contrivers of the Egyptian expedition, to say, when they saw him hobble past, "He, at least, need care little about the matter—he is sure to have one foot in France." He had some days' delirium before he died, but Count Las Cases reports, that whenever Bonaparte was announced, his presence—nay, his name alone—seemed to cure the wanderings of the patient's spirit, and that this phenomenon was renewed so often as the general made him a visit.

† *Mémoires de St-Hélène*, vol. III, pp. 36-7. The extra-

* Miot says Murat.

CHAPTER XXXI

Discussion concerning the alleged poisoning of the sick in the hospitals at Jaffa—Napoleon acquitted of the charge.—French army re-enter Cairo on the 14th June.—Retrospect of what had taken place in Upper and Lower Egypt during his absence.—Incursion of Murad Bey.—18,000 Turks occupy Aboukir—Attacked and defeated by Bonaparte—This victory terminates Napoleon's career in Egypt—Views of his situation there after that battle.—Admiral Gantheaume receives orders to make ready for sea.—On the 23d August, Napoleon embarks for France, leaving Kléber and Menou first and second in command of the army—Arrives in Ajaccio, in Corsica, on the 30th September, and lands at Fréjus, in France, on the 9th October.

THE retreat from before Acre was conducted with equal skill and secrecy, though Bonaparte was compelled to leave behind his heavy cannon, which he either buried or threw into the sea. But by a rumour which long prevailed in the French army, he was alleged to have taken a far more extraordinary measure of preparation for retreat, by destroying with opium the sick in the hospitals, who could not march along with the army.

This transaction is said to have taken place under the following circumstances. The siege of Acre being raised on the 20th of May, 1799, the French army retreated to Jaffa, where their military hospitals had been established during the siege. Upon the 27th, Bonaparte was under the necessity of continuing his retreat, and in the meantime such of the patients as were convalescent were sent forward on the road to Egypt, under the necessary precautions for their safety. There remained an indefinite number, reaching at the greatest computation to betwixt twenty and thirty, but stated by Bonaparte himself to be only seven, whose condition was desperate. Their disease was the plague, and to carry them onward, seemed to threaten the army with infection; while to leave them behind, was abandoning them to the cruelty of the Turks, by whom all stragglers and prisoners were cruelly murdered, often with protracted torture. It was on this occasion that Bonaparte submitted to Desgenettes, chief of the medical staff, the propriety of ending the victims' misery by a dose of opium. The physician answered, with the heroism belonging to his profession, that his art taught him how to cure men, not how to kill them.

The proposal was agreeable to Bonaparte's extravagance of Napoleon's plan unavoidably reminds us of the vanity of human wishes. The cause to which he ascribes it is the mistake of a captain of a frigate, who, instead of forcing his way to Acre, against the opposition of two ships of the line, was unfortunately taken by them. This is a mode of reasoning which Napoleon was very ready to adopt. The miscarriage of his plans was seldom imputed by him to the successful wisdom or valour of an enemy, but to some accidental circumstance, or blunder, which deranged the scheme which must otherwise have been infallible. Some of his best generals were of a different opinion, and considered the rashness of the attack upon Acre, as involving the certainty of failure. Kléber is reported to have said, that the Turks defended themselves with the skill of christians, and that the French attacked like Turks.

ciples, who, advocating the legality of suicide, naturally might believe, that if a man has a right to relieve himself of intolerable evils by depriving himself of life, a general or a monarch may deal forth that measure to his soldiers or subjects, which he would think it advisable to act upon in his own case. It was consistent, also, with his character, rather to look at results than at the measures which were to produce them, and to consider in many cases the end as an excuse for the means. "I would have desired such a relief for myself in the same circumstances," he said to Mr Warden. To O'Meara he affirmed, "that he would have taken such a step even with respect to his own son." The fallacy of this reasoning is demonstrable; but Bonaparte was saved from acting on it by the resistance of Desgenettes. A rear-guard was left to protect these unhappy men; and the English found some of them alive, who, if Desgenettes had been more compliant, would have been poisoned by their physician. If Bonaparte was guilty of entertaining such a purpose, whether entertained from indifference to human life, or from wild and misdirected ideas of humanity, he met an appropriate punishment in the general belief which long subsisted, that the deed had been actually carried into execution, not in the persons of a few expiring wretches only, but upon several hundred men. Miot says the report was current in the French army.—Sir Robert Wilson found it credited among their officers, when they became the English prisoners,—and Count Las Cases admits it was generally believed by the soldiers. But though popular credulity eagerly receives whatever stories are marked by the horrible and wonderful, history, on the contrary, demands direct evidence, and the existence of powerful motives, for whatever is beyond the ordinary bounds of credibility. The poisoning of five or six hundred men is neither easily managed nor easily concealed; and why should the French leader have had recourse to it, since, like many a retreating general before him, he had only to leave the patients for whom he had not the means of transportation? To poison the sick and helpless, must have destroyed his interest with the remainder of his soldiers; whereas, to have left them to their fate, was a matter too customary, and too much considered as a point of necessity, to create any discontent * among those,

* Miot gives a melancholy, but too true a picture of the indifference with which soldiers, when on a retreat, regard the sufferings of those whose strength does not enable them to keep up with the march. He describes a man, affected by the fear of being left to the cruelties of the Turks, snatching up his knapsack, and staggering after the column to which he belonged, while his glazed eye, uncertain motion, and stumbling pace, excited the fear of some, and the ridicule of others. "His account is made up," said one of his comrades, as he reeled about amongst them like a drunkard. "He will not make a long march of it," said another. And when, after more than one fall, he at length became unable to rise, the observation, that "he had taken up his quarters," was all the moan which it was thought necessary to make. It is in these cases, as Miot justly observes, that indifference and selfishness become universal; and he that would be comfortable must manage to rely on his own exertions, and, above all, to remain in good health.

whose interest, as well as that of their general, consisted in moving on as fast as possible. Again, had such a horrible expedient been had recourse to, it could not have escaped the knowledge of Sir Sydney Smith, who would not have failed to give the horrid fact publicity, were it only to retaliate upon Bonaparte for the scandalous accusations which he had circulated against the English. But though he mentions various complaints which the prisoners made against their general, and though he states himself to have found seven men alive in the hospitals at Jaffa (being apparently the very persons whom it had been proposed to dispatch by opium), he says not a word of what he would doubtless have told not unwillingly, had there been ground for believing it. Neither, among the numerous persons to whom the truth must be known, has any one come forward since Bonaparte's fall, who could give the least evidence to authenticate the report otherwise than as a rumour, that had sprung out of the unjustifiable proposal which had indeed been made by Bonaparte to Desgenettes, but never acted upon. The same patient and impartial investigation, therefore, which compels us to record that the massacre of the Turkish prisoners in cold blood is fully proved, induces us to declare, that the poisoning of the sick at Jaffa has been affirmed without sufficient evidence.

Bonaparte continued his retreat from Syria, annoyed by the natives, who harassed his march, and retaliating the injuries which he received, by plundering and burning the villages which lay in the course of his march. He left Jaffa on the 28th May, and upon the 14th June re-entered Cairo, with a reputation not so much increased by the victory at Mount Tabor, as diminished and sullied for the time by the retreat from Acre.

Lower Egypt, during the absence of Bonaparte, had remained undisturbed, unless by partial insurrections. In one of these an impostor personated that mysterious individual, the Inaam Mohadi, of whom the Orientals believe that he is not dead, but is destined to return and combat Antichrist, before the consummation of all things takes place. This pretender to supernatural power, as well as others who placed themselves at the head of insurrections without such high pretensions, was completely defeated; and the French showed the greatest severity in punishing their followers, and the country which had furnished them with partisans.

In Upper Egypt there had been more obstinate contention. Murad Bey, already mentioned as the ablest chief of the Mamelukes, had maintained himself in that country with a degree of boldness and sagacity, which gave the French much trouble. His fine force of cavalry enabled him to advance or retreat at pleasure, and his perfect acquaintance with the country added much to his advantage.

Desaix, sent against Murad after the battle of the Pyramids, had again defeated the Mameluke chief at Sedinnah, where was once more made evident the superiority of European discipline over the valour of the irregular cavalry of the East. Still the destruction of the enterprising bey was far from complete. Reinforced by a body of cavalry, Desaix, in the month of December, 1798, again attacked him,

and, after a number of encounters, terminating generally to the advantage of the French, the remaining Mamelukes, with their allies the Arabs, were at length compelled to take shelter in the Desert. Egypt seemed entirely at the command of the French; and Cosseir, a seaport on the Red Sea, had been taken possession of by a flotilla, fitted out to command that gulf.

Three or four weeks after Bonaparte's return from Syria, this flattering state of tranquillity seemed on the point of being disturbed. Murad Bey, re-entering Upper Egypt with his Mamelukes and allies, descended the Nile in two bodies, one occupying each bank of the river. Ibrahim Bey, formerly his partner in the government of Egypt, made a corresponding movement towards the frontiers of Syria, as if to communicate with the right-hand division of Murad's army. La Grange was dispatched against the Mamelukes who occupied the right bank, while Murad marched against those who, under the Bey himself, were descending the Nile. The French were entertained at the idea of the two Murads, as they termed them, from the similarity of their names, meeting and encountering each other; but the Mameluke Murad retreated before *le beau sabreur*—the handsome swordsman—of the French army.

Meantime the cause of this incursion was explained by the appearance of a Turkish fleet off Alexandria, who disembarked eighteen thousand men at Aboukir. This Turkish army possessed themselves of the fort, and proceeded to fortify themselves, expecting the arrival of the Mamelukes, according to the plan which had previously been adjusted for expelling the French from Egypt. This news reached Bonaparte near the Pyramids, to which he had advanced in order to insure the destruction of Murad Bey. The arrival of the Turks instantly recalled him to Alexandria, whence he marched to Aboukir to repel the invaders. He joined his army, which had assembled from all points within a short distance of the Turkish camp, and was employed late in the night making preparations for the battle on the next morning. Murad was alone with Bonaparte, when the last suddenly made the oracular declaration, "Go how it will, this battle will decide the fate of the world."

"The fate of this army, at least," replied Murad, who did not comprehend Bonaparte's secret meaning. "But the Turks are without horse, and if ever infantry were charged to the teeth by cavalry, they shall be so charged to-morrow by mine."

Napoleon's meaning, however, referred not to Egypt alone, but to Europe; to which he probably already meditated an unexpected return, which must have been prevented had he not succeeded in obtaining the most complete triumph over the Turks. The leaving his Egyptian army, a dubious step at best, would have been altogether indefensible, had there remained an enemy in their front.

Next morning, being the 25th July, Bonaparte commenced an attack on the advanced posts of the enemy, and succeeded in driving them in upon the main body, which was commanded by Seid Mustapha Pacha. In their first attack, the French were eminently successful, and pursued the fugitive Turks to their entrenchments, doing great execution. But

when the batteries opened upon them from the trenches, while they were at the same time exposed to the fire from the gun-boats in the bay, their impetuosity was checked, and the Turks, rallying out upon them with their muskets slung at their backs, made such havoc among the French with their sabres, poniards, and pistols, as compelled them to retreat in their turn. The advantage was lost by the eagerness of the barbarians to possess themselves of the heads of their fallen enemies, for which they receive a certain reward. They threw themselves confusedly out of the entrenchments to obtain these bloody testimonials, and were in considerable disorder, when the French suddenly rallied, charged them with great fury, drove them back into the works, and scaled the ramparts along with them.

Murat had made good his promise of the preceding evening, and had been ever in the front of the battle. When the French had surmounted the entrenchments, he formed a column which reversed the position of the Turks, and, pressing them with the bayonet, threw them into utter and inextricable confusion. Fired upon and attacked on every point, they became, instead of an army, a confused rabble, who, in the impetuosity of animal terror, threw themselves by hundreds and by thousands into the sea, which at once seemed covered with turbans. It was no longer a battle, but a massacre; and it was only when wearied with slaughter that quarter was given to about six thousand men—the rest of the Turkish army, originally consisting of eighteen thousand, perished on the field or in the waves. Mustapha Pacha was taken, and carried in triumph before Bonaparte. The haughty Turk had not lost his pride with his fortunes. "I will take care to inform the sultan," said the victor, meaning to be courteous, "of the courage you displayed in this battle, though it has been your mishap to lose it."

"Thou mayst save thyself the trouble," answered the prisoner, haughtily; "my master knows me better than thou canst."

Bonaparte returned in triumph to Cairo on the 9th August; having, however, as he continued to represent himself friendly to the Porte, previously set on foot a negotiation for liberation of the Turkish prisoners.

This splendid and most decisive victory of Aboukir concluded Napoleon's career in the East. It was imperiously necessary, ere he could have ventured to quit the command of his army, with the hope of preserving his credit with the public; and it enabled him to plead that he left Egypt for the time in absolute security.

His military views had indeed been uniformly successful; and Egypt was under the dominion of France as completely as the sword could subject it. For two years afterwards, like the strong man in the parable, they kept the house which they had won, until in there came a stronger, by whom they were finally and forcibly expelled.

But though the victory over the Turks afforded the French for the time undisturbed possession of Egypt, the situation of Bonaparte no longer permitted him those brilliant and immense prospects, in which his imagination loved to luxuriate. His troops were considerably weakened, and the miscarriage at Acre

dwelt on the recollection of the survivors. The march upon Constantinople was now an impossibility, that to India an empty dream. To establish a French colony in Egypt, of which Bonaparte sometimes talked, and to restore the Indian traffic to the shores of the Red Sea, thus sapping the sources of British prosperity in India, was a work for the time of peace, when the necessary communication was not impeded by the naval superiority of England. The French general had established, indeed, a Chamber of Commerce; but what commerce could take place from a closely-blockaded harbour? Indeed, even in a more propitious season, the establishment of a pacific colony was no task for the ardent and warlike Napoleon, who, although his active spirit was prompt in striking out commercial schemes, was not possessed of the patience or steadiness necessary to carry them to success. It follows, that if he remained in Egypt, his residence there must have resembled the situation of a governor in a large city, threatened indeed, but as yet in no danger of being besieged, where the only fame which can be acquired is that due to prudent and patient vigilance. This would be a post which no young or ambitious soldier would covet, providing he had the choice of being engaged in more active service. On the other hand, from events which we shall endeavour to trace in the next chapter, there opened a scene of ambition in France, which permitted an almost boundless extent of hopes and wishes. Thus Napoleon had the choice either of becoming a candidate for one of the greatest prizes which the world afforded—the supreme authority in that fine country—or of remaining the governor of a defensive army in Egypt, waiting the arrival of some new invaders—English, Russians, or Turks, to dispute his conquest with him. Had he chosen this latter line of conduct, he might have soon found himself the vassal of Moreau, or some other military adventurer (perhaps from his own Italian army), who, venturing on the course from which he had himself withdrawn, had attained to the government of France, and might soon have been issuing orders from the Luxembourg or the Tuileries to General Bonaparte, in the style of a sovereign to his subject.

There remained to be separated those strong ties which were formed betwixt Napoleon and the army which he had so often led to victory, and who unquestionably thought he had cast his lot to live or die with them. But undoubtedly he might palliate his departure by the consideration, that he left them victorious over their boastful enemy, and without the chance of being speedily summoned to the field; and we can see no reason for supposing, as has been alleged, that anything like fear had an influence in inducing Napoleon's desertion, as it has been termed, of his army. We cannot, indeed, give him credit for the absolute and pure desire of serving and saving France, which is claimed by his more devoted adherents, as the sole motive of his return to Europe; but we have no doubt that some feelings of this kind—to which, as we are powerful in deceiving ourselves, he himself might afford more weight than they deserved—mingled with his more selfish hopes, and that he took this important step with the desire of serving his country, as well as of ad-

vancing his own interest. Nor should it be forgotten, that the welfare even of the Egyptian army, as well as his own ambitious views, required that he should try his fortune at Paris. If he did not personally exert himself there, it seemed highly probable some revolution might take place, in which one of the consequences might be, that the victors of Egypt, deserted by their countrymen, should be compelled to lay down their arms.

The circumstances in which Bonaparte's resolution is said to have originated, as related by himself, were singularly fortuitous. Some intercourse took place with the Turkish fleet, in consequence of his sending the wounded Turks on board, and Sir Sydney Smith, by way of taunting the French general with the successes of the Russians in Italy, sent him a set of newspapers containing an account of Suwarrow's victories, and a deplorable view of the French affairs on the Continent. If we may trust other authorities, however, to be quoted in their proper place, he already knew the state of affairs, both in Italy and France, by his own secret correspondence with Paris, informing him not only of the military reverses which the armies of the latter country had sustained, but of the state of parties and of the public mind,—intelligence of greater utility and accuracy than could have been communicated by the English newspapers.

Howsoever his information was derived, Bonaparte lost no time in acting upon it, with all the secrecy which a matter of such importance required. Admiral Gantheaume, who had been with the army ever since the destruction of the fleet, received the general's orders to make ready for sea, with all possible dispatch, two frigates then lying in the harbour of Alexandria.

Meantime, determined to preserve his credit with the Institute, and to bring evidence of what he had done for the cause of science, Bonaparte commanded Monge, who is said to have suggested the expedition, and the accomplished Denon, who became its historian, with Berthollet, to prepare to accompany him to Alexandria. Of military chiefs, he selected the Generals Berthier, Murat, Lannes, Marmont, Desaix, Andréossi, and Bessières, the best and most attached of his officers. He left Cairo as soon as he heard the frigates were ready and the sea open, making a visit to the Delta the pretext of his tour. Kléber and Menou, whom he meant to leave first and second in command, were appointed to meet him at Alexandria. But he had an interview with the latter only.

Kléber, an excellent soldier, and a man of considerable parts, was much displeased at the hasty and disordered manner in which the command of an important province, and a diminished army, were thrust upon him, and remonstrated, in a letter to the Directory, upon the several points of the public service, which, by his conduct on this occasion, Bonaparte had neglected or endangered. Napoleon afterwards laboured hard to answer the accusations which these remonstrances implied, and to prove, that, in leaving the Egyptian army, he had no intention of abandoning it; on the contrary, that he intended either to return in person, or to send powerful succours. He blamed Gantheaume, at a

later period, for not having made his way from Toulon to Alexandria, with reinforcements and supplies. But Bonaparte, slow to see what contradicted a favourite project, could never be made to believe, unless when in the very act of experiencing it, that the superiority of the British naval power depends upon circumstances totally different from those which can be removed by equal courage, or even equal skill, on the part of the French naval officers, and that until it be removed, it will be at great hazard that France shall ever attempt to retain a province so distant as Egypt.

Napoleon left behind him a short proclamation, apprising the army that news of importance from France had recalled him to Europe, but that they should soon bear tidings of him. He exhorted them in the meantime to have confidence in their new commander, who possessed, he said, his good opinion, and that of the government, and in these terms he bade them farewell. Two frigates, *La Muiron* and *La Carère*, being ready for sea, the general embarked from an unfrequented part of the beach on the 23d August. Menou, who had met him there, came to Denon and others, who had attended the rendezvous without knowing exactly its purpose, as they were gazing in surprise at the unusual sight of two French frigates ready to put to sea, and informed them with agitation that Bonaparte waited for them. They followed as in a dream; but Denon had already secured that mass of measurements, drawings, manuscripts, and objects of antiquarian and scientific curiosity, which afterwards enabled him to complete the splendid work, which now contains the only permanent or useful fruits of the memorable expedition to Egypt.

Ere the frigates were far from land, they were reconnoitred by an English corvette, a circumstance which seemed of evil augury. Bonaparte assured his companions, by his usual allusions to his own destiny. "We will arrive safe," he said; "Fortune will never abandon us—we will arrive safe in despite of the enemy."

To avoid the English cruisers, the vessels coasted the shores of Africa, and the wind was so contrary, that they made but a hundred leagues in twenty days. During this time Bonaparte studied alternately the Bible and the Koran, more solicitous, it seemed, about the history of the countries which he had left behind, than the part which he was to play in that to which he was hastening. At length they ventured to stand northward, and on the 30th September, they entered, by singular chance, the port of Ajaccio in Corsica, and Bonaparte found himself near his native city.* On the 7th October, they again put to sea, but, upon approaching the French coast, they found themselves in the neighbourhood of a squadron of English men-of-war. The admiral would have tacked about, to return to Corsica. "To do so," said Bonaparte, "would be to take the road to England—I am seeking that to France."

* The natives came off in numbers to see their illustrious countryman, but as he does not appear to have landed, his transient presence in the harbour formed no exception to what is said at p. 166, of his not revisiting his own country.

He probably meant that the manœuvre would attract the attention of the English. They kept on their course; but the peril of being captured seemed so imminent, that, though still several leagues from the shore, Gantheaume proposed to man his long-boat, in order that the general might attempt his escape in her. Bonaparte observed, that that measure might be deferred till the case was more desperate.

At length they passed unsuspected and unquestioned, through the hostile squadron, and on the 9th October, at ten in the morning, he on whose fate the world so long seemed to depend, landed at St-Rapheau, near Fréjus. He had departed at the head of a powerful fleet, and a victorious army, on an expedition designed to alter the destinies of the most ancient nations of the world. The result had been far from commensurate to the means employed.—The fleet had perished—the army was blockaded in a distant province, when their arms were most necessary at home. He returned clandestinely, and almost alone; yet Providence designed that, in this apparently deserted condition, he should be the instrument of more extensive and more astonishing changes, than the efforts of the greatest conquerors had ever before been able to effect upon the civilized world.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Retrospect of public events since the departure of Napoleon for Egypt.—Invasion and conquest of Switzerland.—Seizure of Turin.—Expulsion of the pope.—The Neapolitans declare war against France—are defeated—and the French enter Naples.—Disgraceful avarice exhibited by the Directory—particularly in their negotiations with the United States of America—Are unsuccessful, and their shame made public.—Russia comes forward in the general cause—Her strength and resources.—Reverses of the French in Italy, and on the Rhine.—Insurrections in Belgium and Holland against the French.—Anglo-Russian expedition sent to Holland.—The Chouans again in the field.—Great and universal unpopularity of the Directory.—State of parties in France.—Law of Hostages.—Abbé Sieyès becomes one of the Directory—His character and genius.—Description of the constitution proposed by him for the Year Three.—Ducos, Gohier, and Moutins, also introduced into the Directory.—Family of Napoleon strive to keep him in the recollection of the people.—Favourable change in the French affairs.—Holland evacuated by the Anglo-Russian army.—Korsakow defeated by Masséna—and Suwarrow retreats before Lecourbe.

WHEN Napoleon accepted what was to be considered as a doom of honourable banishment, in the command of the Egyptian expedition, he answered to those friends who advised him rather to stay and assert a pre-eminent station in the government at home, "that the fruit was not ripe." The seventeen months, or thereabouts, of his absence, had done much to complete the maturity which was formerly imperfect. The French government had ceased to be invariably victorious, and at times had suffered internal changes, which, instead of restoring the national confidence, had only induced a general expectation of some farther and decisive revo-

lution, that should for ever overthrow the directorial system.

When Bonaparte sailed for Egypt, he left France at peace with Austria, and those negotiations proceeding at Rastadt, which no one then doubted would settle on a pacific footing the affairs of Germany. England alone remained hostile to France, but the former being victorious on the sea, and the latter upon the land, it seemed as if the war must languish and die of itself, unless there had been a third element, of which the rivals might have disputed the possession. But though the interest of France, as well as of humanity, peremptorily demanded peace, her rulers, feeling that their own tottering condition would be rendered still more precarious by the disbanding their numerous armies, resolved to continue the war in a new quarter.

Under the most flimsy and injurious pretexts, they attacked the neutral States of Switzerland, so eminent for their moderation; and the French troops, levied in the name of Freedom, were sent to assail that country which had been so long her mountain fortress. The ancient valour of the Swiss was unable to defend them against the new discoveries in the art of war, by which the strongest defiles can be turned, and therefore rendered indefensible. They fought with their ancient courage, particularly the natives of the mountain cantons, and only gave way before numbers and discipline. But these gallant mountaineers sacrificed more than thrice their own amount, ere they fell in their ranks, as became the countrymen of William Tell. The French affected to give the Swiss a constitution on the model of their own, but this was a mere farce. The arsenals, fortresses, and treasures of the cantons, were seized without scruple or apology, and the Swiss were treated in all respects like a conquered nation. The fate of this ancient and unoffending people excited deep and general fear and detestation, and tended, more perhaps than any other event, to raise the animosity of Europe in general against France, as a country which had how plainly shown, that her ambition could be bounded by no consideration of justice or international law.

The King of Sardinia, who had first acknowledged the superiority of Bonaparte, and purchased his existence as a continental sovereign, by surrendering all his fortresses to France, and permitting her troops to march through his country as their own, had surely some claim to forbearance; but now, without even a pretext for such violence, the French seized upon Turin, the capital of this their vassal monarch, and upon all his continental dominions, sending him and his family to the island of Sardinia.

Another victim there was of the French grasping ambition, in whose fate the catholic world was deeply interested. We have seen already, that Bonaparte, though he despoiled the pope of power and treasure, judged it more prudent to permit him to subsist as a petty prince, than, by depriving him of all temporal authority, to drive him to desperation, and oblige him to use against the Republic those spiritual weapons, to which the public opinion of catholic countries still assigned strength. But the Directory

were of a different opinion; and though the pope had submitted passively to every demand which had been made by the French ambassador, however inconsistent with the treaty of Tolentino, the Directory, with the usual policy of their nation, privately encouraged a party in Rome which desired a revolution. These conspirators arose in arms, and, when dispersed by the guards, fled towards the hotel of Joseph Bonaparte, then the ambassador of the French to the pope. In the scuffle which ensued, the ambassador was insulted, his life endangered, and General Duphot actually killed by his side. This outrage of course sealed the fall of the pope, which had probably long been determined on. Expelled from his dominions, the aged Pius VI. retired to Sienna, more the object of respect and veneration in his condition of a dethroned exile, than when holding the semblance of authority by permission of France. In place of the pontiff's government arose the shadow of a mighty name, the Roman Republic. But the Gauls were in possession of the Capitol, nor did the ancient recollections, connected with the title of the new commonwealth, procure for the Romans more independent authority than was possessed by any of the other ephemeral republican governments.

In the fall of the pope, and the occupation of the Roman territories by a French army, the King of Naples saw the nation whom he feared and hated, and by whom he knew he was considered as a desirable subject of plunder, approach his frontiers, and become his neighbour. War he perceived was unavoidable; and he formed the resolution to be the first in declaring it. The victory of Nelson, and the interest which that distinguished hero acquired at what might be called a female court, with the laurels of the Nile fresh upon his brow, confirmed the Neapolitan government in the resolution. Mack, an Austrian general, who had got the reputation of a great tactician and a gallant soldier, was sent by the emperor to discipline and command the Neapolitan army. Nelson's falcon eye measured the man's worth at once. "General Mack," said he, "cannot move without five carriages—I have formed my opinion—I heartily pray I may be mistaken." He was not mistaken. The Neapolitan army marched to Rome, was encountered by the French, fought just long enough to lose about forty men, then fled, abandoning guns, baggage, arms, and everything besides. "The Neapolitan officers did not lose much honour," said Nelson, "for God knows they had little to lose—but they lost what they had." The prescient eye, which was as accurate by land as by sea, had also foreseen the instant advance of the French to Naples. It took place accordingly, but not unresisted. The naked rabble, called Lazzaroni, showed the most desperate courage. They attacked the French ere they came to the city; and, notwithstanding a murderous defeat, they held out Naples for two days with their irregular musketry only, against regular forces amply supplied with artillery. What can we say of a country, where the rabble are courageous and the soldiers cowards? what, unless that the higher classes, from whom the officers are chosen, must be the parties to be censured.

The royal family fled to Sicily; and in Naples a

new classical-sounding government was created at the command of the French general,—The Parthenopean Republic. The French were now possessed of all Italy, excepting Tuscany, and that was exempted from their authority in name only, and not in effect.

The French people, notwithstanding the success of these several undertakings, were not deceived or flattered by them in a degree equal to what probably their rulers expected. Their vanity was alarmed at the meanness of the motives which the Directory exhibited on almost every occasion. Even the dazzling pride of conquest was sullied by the mercenary views with which war was undertaken. On one occasion the veil was raised, and all Frenchmen who had feelings of decency, not to say of probity or honour, remaining, must have held themselves disgraced by the venal character of their government.

Some disputes existing between France and the United States of America, commissioners were sent by the latter country to Paris, to endeavour to restore a good understanding. They were not publicly acknowledged by France in the character of ambassadors; but were distinctly given to understand, that they could only be permitted to treat, on condition that the States of America should lend to the Republic the sum of a million sterling; to which was added, the unblushing demand of fifty thousand pounds, as a douceur for the private pocket of the Directors. The astonishment of the envoys was extreme at this curious diplomatic proposal, and they could hardly credit their ears when they heard it repeatedly and grossly urged. "The essential part of the treaty," said one of the French agents, "*is il faut de l'argent—il faut beaucoup d'argent*;" and, to render the matter palatable, he told the Americans of other countries which had paid large sums to obtain peace, and reminded them of the irresistible power of France. The Transatlantic republicans, unmoved by these arguments, stoutly answered, "That it belonged only to petty states to purchase independence by payment of tribute—that America was willing and able to protect herself by arms, and would not purchase with money what she possessed by her powerful means of self-defence." They added, "that they had no power whatever to enter into any engagements concerning a loan."

The agents of France lowered their tone so far as to say, that if the commissioners would pay something in the way of fees, they might be permitted to remain in Paris, whilst one of their number returned to America to obtain instructions from their government; but not even to that modification of bribery would the Americans listen. They would not, according to the expression used in incendiary letters, "put five pounds in a certain place." The treaty became public, to the scandal alike of France and of Europe, which joined in regarding a government that made war on such base principles, as standing, in comparison to those who warred in the spirit of conquest, in the relation of footpads to highwaymen. The only attempt made by Talleyrand towards explanation of this singular transaction, was a shuffling denial of the fact, which he strength-

ened by an insinuation, that the statement of the American envoys was a weak invention, suggested to them by the English.

Not to multiply instances, the rapacity and domineering insolence with which the Directory conducted themselves towards the new republics, who were every moment made sensible of their total dependence on the Great Nation—the merciless exactions which they imposed, together with the rapacious speculations of many of their generals and agents, made them lose interest almost as fast as they could acquire territory. Their fair pretexts of extending freedom, and the benefits of a liberal government, to states which had been oppressed by the old feudal institutions, were now valued at no more than their worth; and it was seen, that the only equality which republican France extended to the conquered countries, was to render all classes alike degraded and impoverished. Thus, the successes which we have hastily enumerated rather endangered than strengthened the empire of France, as they rendered her ambition the object of fear and suspicion to all Europe. The catholic nations beheld the degradation of the supreme pontiff with abhorrence—every king in Europe feared a similar fate with the sovereigns of Sardinia and Naples—and, after the fate of Switzerland, no people could rely upon a peaceful, unoffending, and strictly neutral character, as ground sufficient to exempt them from French aggression. Thus a general dread and dislike prepared for a new coalition against France, in which Russia, for the first time, was to become an active co-operator.

The troops of this powerful empire were eminently qualified for encountering with the French; for, added to their hardihood, courage, and discipline, they had a national character—a distinction less known to the Germans, whose subdivision into different states, often at war with each other, has in some degree diminished their natural spirit of patriotism. Accustomed also to warfare on a great scale, and to encounter such an enemy as the Turk, the Russians, while they understood the modern system of tactics, were less servilely bigoted to it than the Austrians. Their ideas more readily went back to the natural and primitive character of war, and they were better prepared either to depart from strict technical rules themselves, or to see them departed from, and calculate the results. These new enemies of France, moreover, were full of confidence in their own character, and unchecked in their military enthusiasm by the frequent recollections of defeat, which clouded the spirit of the Austrians. Above all, the Russians had the advantage of being commanded by Suwarrow, one of the most extraordinary men of his time, who, possessed of the most profound military sagacity, assumed the external appearance of fanatical enthusiasm, as in society he often concealed his perfect knowledge of good breeding under the show of extravagant buffoonery. These peculiarities, which would not have succeeded with a French or English army, gained for him an unbounded confidence among his countrymen, who considered his eccentric conduct, followed, as it almost always was, by brilliant success, as the result of something which approached to inspiration.

The united forces of Austria and Russia, chiefly under the command of this singular character, succeeded, in a long train of bloody battles, to retake and re-occupy those states in the north of Italy, which had been conquered in Bonaparte's first campaigns. It was in vain that Macdonald, whose name stood as high among the republican generals, as his character for honour and rectitude among French statesmen, marched from Naples, traversing the whole length of Italy, to arrest the victorious progress of the allies. After a train of stubborn fighting, it was only by displaying great military talent that he could extricate the remains of his army. At length the decisive and desperate battle of Novi seemed to exclude the French from the possession of those fair Italian provinces, which had been acquired by such expense of life.

On the Rhine, though her defeats were not of such a decided character, France also lost reputation and territory. Jourdan proved no match for the Archduke Charles, who, having no longer, Bonaparte to encounter, asserted his former superiority over inferior French generals. His royal highness finally compelled the French to recross the Rhine, while the Austrian generals Bellegarde and La Hotze, supported by a Russian division under Korsakow, advanced to the line of the Limmat, near Zurich, and waited the junction of Suwarrow to occupy Switzerland, and even to menace France, who, in a great measure despoiled of her foreign conquests, had now reason to apprehend the invasion of her own territory.

In the Netherlands, the French interest seemed equally insecure. Insurrections had already taken place in what they called Belgium, and it seemed that the natives of these populous districts desired but opportunity and encouragement for a general revolt.

Holland, through all its provinces, was equally disaffected; and the reports from that country encouraged England to send to the coast an expedition, consisting of British and Russian forces, to which two divisions of the Dutch fleet delivered up their vessels, hoisting at the same time the colours of the stadtholder. Here was another risk of an imminent and pressing description, which menaced France and its directorial government.

It remains to be added to the tale of these foreign calamities, that the Chouans, or royalists of Bretagne, were again in the field with a number of bands, amounting, it is said, to forty thousand men in all. They had gained several successes, and, though falling short of the chivalrous spirit of the Vendéans, and having no general equal in talents to Charette, were nevertheless sufficiently brave and well commanded, to become extremely formidable, and threaten a renewal of all the evils which had been occasioned by the former civil war.

Amidst these lowering appearances, the dislike and disrespect with which the Directors were regarded, occasioned their being loaded with every species of accusation by the public. It was not forgotten that it was the jealousy of Barras, Rewbel, and the other Directors, which had banished from France the most successful of her generals, at the head of a gallant army, who were now needed to defend the provinces which their valour had gained.

The battle of Aboukir, while it annihilated their fleet, had insulated the land forces, who, now cut off from all communication with their mother country, and shut up in an insalubrious province, daily wasted in encounters with the barbarous tribes that valour, and those lives, which, hazarded on the frontiers of France, might have restored victory to their standards.

To these upbraiding complaints, and general accusations of incapacity, as well as of peculation, the Directors had little to answer. What was a still greater deficiency, they had no party to appeal to, by whom their cause, right or wrong, might have been advocated with the staunch adherence of partisans. They had undergone, as we shall presently show, various changes in their own body, but without any alteration in their principles of administration, which still rested on the principle of *Bascule*, or see-saw,* as it is called in English; the attempt, in short, to govern two contending factions in the state, by balancing the one against the other, without adhering to either. In consequence of this mean and temporising policy, which is always that of weak minds, the measures of the government were considered, not with reference to the general welfare of the state, but as they should have effect upon one or other of the parties by which it was divided. It followed also, that having no certain path and plan, but regulating their movements upon the wish to maintain an equality between the factions, in order that they might preserve their authority over both, the Directors had no personal followers or supporters, save that most sordid class, who regulate their politics on their interest, and who, though faithful adherents of every settled administration, perceive, by instinctive sagacity, the moment that their patrons are about to lose their offices, and desert their cause on such occasions with all convenient speed.

Yet the Directors, had they been men of talent, integrity, and character—above all, had they been united among themselves, and agreed on one steady course of policy, might have governed France with little difficulty. The great body of the nation were exhausted by the previous fury of the revolutionary movements, had supped full with politics, and were much disposed to sit down contented under any government which promised protection for life and property. Even the factions had lost their energy. Those who inclined to a monarchical form were many of them become indifferent by whom the sceptre was wielded, providing that species of government, supposed by them most suitable to the habits and character of the French, should be again adopted. Many who were of this opinion saw great objection to the restoration of the Bourbons, for fear that along with their right might revive all those oppressive feudal claims which the Revolution had swept away, as well as the pretensions of the emi-

grants to resume their property. Those who entertained such sentiments were called *modérés*. The ancient blood-red jacobins could hardly be said to exist. The nation had had a surfeit of blood, and all parties looked back with disgust on the days of Robespierre. But there existed a kind of white jacobins; men who were desirous to retain a large proportion of democratical principle in the constitution, either that they might not renounce the classical name of a republic, or because they confided in their own talents, to "wield at will the fierce democracy;" or because they really believed that a potent infusion of such a spirit in the forms of government was necessary for the preservation of liberty. This party was greatly inferior in numbers to the others; and they had lost their authority over the populace, by means of which they had achieved such changes during the early periods of the Revolution. But they were bold, enterprising, active; and their chiefs, assuming at first the name of the Panthéon, afterwards of the *Manège Club*, formed a party in the state, which, from the character of the leaders, gave great subject of jealousy to the Directory.

The rapacity and insolent bearing of the French government having, as we have seen, provoked a new war with Austria and Russia, the means to which the Directors had recourse for maintaining it were a forced loan imposed on the wealthy, which gave alarm to property, and a conscription of two hundred thousand men, which was alike distressing to poor and rich. Both measures had been submitted to during the reign of Terror; but then a murmur cost the complainer his head. The Directory had no such summary mode of settling grievances. These two last inflictions greatly inflamed the public discontent. To meet the general tendency to insurrection, they had recourse to a measure equally harsh and unpopular. It was called the Law of Hostages, by which the unoffending relatives of emigrants, or royalists, supposed to be in arms, were thrown into prison, and rendered responsible for the acts of their connexions. This unjust law filled the prisons with women, old men, and children,—victims of a government which, because it was not strong enough to subdue insurrection by direct force, visited the consequences of its own weakness on age, childhood, and helpless females.

Meantime the dissensions among the directors themselves, which continued to increase, led to various changes within their own body. When Bonaparte left Europe, the Directory consisted of Barras, Rewbel, Trilhard, Merlin, Réveillère Lépiaux. The opposition attacked them with so much fury in the legislative assemblies, Boulay de la Meurthe, Lucien Bonaparte, François, and other men of talent leading the way, that at length the Directors appear to have become afraid of being made personally responsible by impeachment for the peculations of their agents, as well as for the result of the insolences by which they had exasperated the friends and allies of France. Rewbel, he whose character for talent and integrity stood most fair with the public, was removed from office by the lot which announced him as the Director who was to retire. It has been said some art was used to guide fortune on this occasion. His name in the list

* The term, it is scarcely necessary to say, is derived from the childish amusement, where two boys swing at the opposite ends of a plank, moving up and down, in what Dr Johnson calls a "reciprocating motion," while a third urchin, placed on the centre of motion, regulates their movements.

was succeeded by one celebrated in the Revolution; that of the Abbé Siéyes.

This remarkable statesman had acquired a high reputation, not only by the acuteness of his metaphysical talent, but by a species of mystery in which he involved himself and his opinions. He was certainly possessed of great knowledge and experience in the affairs of France, was an adept in the composition of new constitutions of all kinds, and had got a high character, as possessed of secrets peculiarly his own, for conducting the vessel of the state amidst the storms of revolution. The abbé in fact managed his political reputation as a prudent trader does his stock; and by shunning to venture on anything which could in any degree peril his credit, he extended it in the public opinion, perhaps much farther than his parts justified. A temper less daring in action than bold in metaphysical speculation, and a considerable regard for his own personal safety, accorded well with his affected air of mystery and reserve. In the States-general he had made a great impression, by his pamphlet explaining the nature of the third estate; and he had the principal part in procuring the union of the three separate Estates. A flaming patriot in 1792-3, he voted for the death of the unfortunate Louis; and, as was reported, with brutal levity, using the celebrated expression, "*La mort sans phrase.*" He was no less distinguished for bringing forward the important measure for dividing France into departments, and thus blending together and confounding all the ancient distinctions of provinces. After this period he became passive, and was little heard of during the reign of Terror; for he followed the maxim of Pythagoras, and worshiped the Echo (only found in secret and solitary places), when he heard the tempest blow hard.

After the revolution of 9th Thermidor, Siéyes came in with the moderate party, and had the merit to propose the recall of the members who had been forcibly expelled by the Jacobin faction on the fall of the Girondists. He was one of the committee of eleven, to whom was committed the charge of forming the new constitution, afterwards called that of the year Three. This great metaphysical philosopher and politician showed little desire to share with any colleagues the toil and honour of a task to which he deemed himself exclusively competent; and he produced, accordingly, a model entirely of his own composition, very ingenious, and evincing a wonderfully intimate acquaintance with political doctrines, together with a multitude of nice balances, capacities, and disqualifications, so constituted as to be checks on each other. As strongly characteristic of the genius of the man, we shall here give an account of his great work.

His plan provided that the constitution, with its powers of judicature and of administration, should emanate from the people; but lest, like that unnatural parent the sow, the people should devour their own nine farrow, the functionaries thus invested with power were to be placed, when created, out of the reach of the parents who had given them birth. The mode in which it was proposed to effect

this, was both singular and ingenious. The office-bearers were thus to be selected out of three orders of the state, forming a triple hierarchy. 1. The citizens of each commune were to name one-tenth of their number, to be called the Communal Notables. From these were to be selected the magistrates of the communes, and the justices of peace. 2. The Communal Notables were again to chuse a tenth part of their number, who were called the Departmental Notables. The prefects, judges, and provincial administrators, were selected from this second body. 3. The Departmental Notables, in like manner, were to elect a tenth of their number, computed to amount to about six thousand persons; and from this highest class of citizens were to be filled the most dignified and important situations in the state,—the ministers and members of government, the legislature, the senate or grand jury, the principal judges, ambassadors, and the like. By this system it will be perceived, that instead of equality, three ranks of privileged citizens were to be established, from whose ranks alone certain offices could be filled. But this species of nobility, or, as it was called, notability, was dependent, not on birth, but on the choice of the people, from whom, though more or less directly, all officers without exception received their commissions. The elections were to take place every five years.

To represent the national dignity, power, and glory, there was to be an officer called the Grand Elector, who was to have guards, a revenue, and all the external appendages of royalty; all acts of government, laws, and judicial proceedings, were to run in his name. This species of *roi fainéant* was to possess no part of the royal authority, except the right of naming two consuls, one for peace, and the other for war; and the farther right of selecting, from lists of candidates to be supplied by the three ranks of the hierarchy, the individuals who were to fill official situations as they should become vacant. But having exercised this privilege, the grand elector, or proclaimer general, was *functus officio*, and had no active duties to perform, or power to exercise. The two consuls, altogether uncontrolled by him or each other, were to act each in their own exclusive department of peace or war; and the other functionaries were alike independent of the grand proclaimer, or elector, so soon as he had appointed them. He was to resemble no sovereign ever heard of but the Queen Bee, who has nothing to do but to repose in idleness and luxury, and give being to the active insects by whose industry the business of the hive is carried on.

The government being thus provided for, the Abbé Siéyes's system of legislature was something like that of France in the time of the parliament. There was to be a legislative body of two hundred and fifty deputies, but they were to form rather a tribunal of judges, than a popular and deliberative assembly. Two other bodies, a Council of State on the part of the government, and a Tribunal of one hundred deputies, on the part of the people, were to propose and discuss measures in presence of this legislative council, who then proceeded to adopt or reject them upon scrutiny and by vote, but without any oral delivery of opinions. The Tribu-

* See pp. 26-27.

nate was invested with the right of guarding the freedom of the subject, and denouncing to the Convocative Senate such misconduct of office-bearers, or ill-chosen measures, or ill-advised laws, as should appear to them worthy of reprobation.

But, above all, the Abbé Siéyes piqued himself upon the device of what he termed a Conservative Senate, which, possessing in itself no power of action or legislation of any kind, was to have in charge the preservation of the constitution. To this senate was given the singular power of calling in to become a member of their own body, and reducing of course to their own state of incapacity, any individual occupying another situation in the constitution, whose talents, ambition, or popularity, should render him a subject of jealousy. Even the grand elector himself was liable to this fate of *absorption*, as it was called, although he held his crown of Cœaigu in the common case for life. Any exertion on his part of what might seem to the senate an act of arbitrary authority, entitled them to adopt him a member of their own body. He was thus removed from his palace, guards, and income, and made for ever incapable of any other office than that of a senator. This high point of policy was carrying the system of checks and balances as far as it could well go.

The first glance of this curious model must have convinced a practical politician that it was greatly too complicated and technical to be carried into effect. The utility of laws consists in their being of a character which compels the respect and obedience of those to whom they relate. The very delicacy of such an ingenious scheme rendered it incapable of obtaining general regard, since it was too refined to be understood save by profound philosophers. To the rest of the nation it must have been like a watch to a savage, who, being commanded to regulate his time by it, will probably prefer to make the machine correspond with his inclinations, by putting backward and forward the index at pleasure. A man of ordinary talent and honest disposition might have been disqualified for public life by this doctrine of absorption, just as a man ignorant of swimming would perish if flung into a lake. But a stout swimmer would easily gain the shore, and an individual like Bonaparte would set at defiance the new species of ostracism, and decline to be neutralized by the absorption of the senate. Above all, the plan of the abbé destroyed the true principle of national representation, by introducing a metaphysical election of members of legislation, instead of one immediately derived from the direct vote of the people themselves. In the abbé's alembic, the real and invaluable principle of popular representation was subtilized into smoke.

For these, or other reasons, the commissioners of the year Three did not approve of the plan proposed by Siéyes; and, equally dissatisfied with the constitution which they adopted, he withdrew himself from their deliberations, and accepted the situation of ambassador to Prussia, where he discharged with great ability the task of a diplomatist.

In 1799, Siéyes returned from Berlin to Paris, full of hope to establish his own favourite model on the ruins of the directorial constitution, and, as a

preliminary, obtained, as we have said, Rewbel's seat in the Directory. Merlin and Lépeaux, menaced with impeachments, were induced to send in their resignation. Treilhard had been previously displaced, on pretext of an informality in the choice. Instead of them, were introduced into the Directory Roger Ducos, a modéré, or rather a royalist, with Gohier and Moulins, men of talents too ordinary to throw any opposition in the path of Siéyes. Barras, by his expenses and his luxurious mode of life, his connexion with stock-jobbers, and encouragement of speculation, was too much in danger of impeachment, to permit him to play a manly part. He truckled to circumstances, and allied himself with, or rather subjected himself to, Siéyes, who saw the time approaching when the constitution of the year Three must fall, and hoped to establish his own rejected model in its stead. But the revolution which he meditated could only be executed by force.

The change in the Directory had destroyed the government by bascule, or balance, and that intermediate and trimming influence being removed, the two parties of the modérés and the republicans stood full opposed to each other, and ready to try their strength in a severe struggle. Siéyes, though no royalist, or at least certainly no adherent of the house of Bourbon, stood, nevertheless, at the head of the modérés, and taxed his sagacity for means of insuring their victory. The modérés possessed a majority in the Council of the Ancients; but the Society of the Manège, republicans if not jacobins, had obtained, at the last election, a great superiority of numbers in the Council of Five Hundred. They were sure to be in decided opposition to any change of the constitution of the year Three; and such being the case, those who plotted the new revolution could not attempt it without some external support. To call upon the people was no longer the order of the day. Indeed, it may be supposed that the ancient revolutionary coladins would rather have risen against Siéyes, and in behalf of the Society of the Manège. The proposers of a new change had access, however, to the army, and to that they determined to appeal. The assistance of some military chief of the first reputation was necessary. Siéyes cast his eyes upon Joubert, an officer of high reputation, and one of the most distinguished amongst Bonaparte's generals. He was named by the Directors to the command of the Department of Paris, but shortly after was sent to Italy, with hopes that, acquiring a new fund of glory by checking the progress of Suwarrow, he might be yet more fitted to fill the public eye, and influence the general mind, in the crisis when Siéyes looked for his assistance. Joubert lost his life, however, at the great battle of Novi, fought betwixt him and Suwarrow; and so opportunely did his death make room for the pretensions of Bonaparte, that it has been rumoured, certainly without the least probability, that he did not fall by the fire of the Austrians, but by that of assassins hired by the family of Napoleon, to take out of the way a powerful competitor of their brother. This would have been a gratuitous crime, since they could neither reckon with certainty on the arrival of Bonaparte, nor upon his being adopted by Siéyes in place of Joubert.

Meanwhile, the family of Napoleon omitted no mode of keeping his merits in public remembrance. Reports from time to time appeared in the papers to this purpose, as when, to give him consequence doubtless, they pretended that the Tower guns of London were fired, and public rejoicings made, upon a report that Napoleon had been assassinated. Madame Bonaparte, in the meanwhile, lived at great expense, and with much elegance, collecting around her whatsoever was remarkable for talent and accomplishment, and many of the women of Paris who were best accustomed to the management of political intrigue. Lucien Bonaparte distinguished himself as an orator in the Council of Five Hundred, and although he had hitherto affected republican zeal, he now opposed, with much ability, the reviving influence of the democrats. Joseph Bonaparte, also, a man of talent, and of an excellent character, though much aspersed afterwards in consequence of the part in Spain assigned him by his brother, lived hospitably, saw much company, and maintained an ascendance in Parisian society. We cannot doubt that these near relatives of Bonaparte found means of communicating to him the state of affairs in Paris, and the opening which it afforded for the exercise of his distinguished talents.

The communication betwixt Tonlon and Alexandria was, indeed, interrupted, but not altogether broken off, and we have no doubt that the struggle of parties in the interior, as well as the great disasters on the frontier, had their full influence in determining Bonaparte to his sudden return. Miot, though in no very positive strain, has named a Greek called Bambuki, as the bearer of a letter from Joseph to his brother, conveying this important intelligence. The private Memoirs of Fouché pretend that that minister purchased the secret of Napoleon's return being expected, from Joséphine herself, for the sum of a thousand louis, and that the landing at Fréjus was no surprise to him. Both these pieces of private history may be safely doubted; but it would be difficult to convince us that Bonaparte took the step of quitting Egypt on the vague intelligence afforded by the journals, and without confidential communication with his own family.

To return to the state of the French government. The death of Joubert not only disconcerted the schemes of Siéyes, but exposed him and his party to retaliation. Bernadotte was minister of war, and he, with Jourdan and Augereau, were all warm in the cause of republicanism. Any of these distinguished generals was capable of leading the military force to compel such an alteration in the constitution as might suit the purpose of their party, and thus reversing the project of Siéyes, who, without Joubert, was like the head without the arm that should execute. Already, Jourdan had made in the Council of Five Hundred a speech on the dangers of the country, which, in point of vehemence, might have been pronounced in the ancient hall of the jacobins. He in plain terms threatened the modérés with such a general insurrection as had taken place in the year 1792, and proposed to declare the country in danger. He was answered by Lucien Bonaparte, Chénier, and Boulay, who had great difficulty to parry the impetuosity with which the motion was

nrged forward. Though they succeeded in eluding the danger, it was still far from being over, and the democrats would probably have dared some desperate movement, if any additional reverse had been sustained on the frontier.

But as if the calamities of France, which of late had followed each other in quick succession, had attained their height of tide, the affairs of that country began all of a sudden to assume a more favourable aspect. The success of General Brune in Holland, against the Anglo-Russian army, had obliged the invaders of Holland to retreat, and enter into a convention for evacuation of the country on which they had made their descent. A dispute, or misunderstanding, having occurred between the Emperors of Austria and Russia, the Archduke Charles, in order, it was alleged, to repel an incursion of the French into the countries on the Maine, withdrew a great part of his army from the line of the Limmat, which was taken up by the Russians under Korsakow. Masséna took the advantage of this imprudent step, crossed the Limmat, surprised the Russians, and defeated Korsakow, whilst the formidable Suwarrow, who had already advanced to communicate with that general, found his right flank uncovered by his defeat, and had the greatest difficulty in executing a retrograde movement before General Lecourbe.

The news of these successes induced the republicans to defer their attack upon the moderate party; and on so nice a point do the greatest events hang, that had a longer period intervened between these victories and the arrival of Bonaparte, it is most probable that he would have found the situation of military chief of the approaching revolution, which became vacant on the death of Joubert, filled up by some one of those generals, of whom success had extended the fame. But he landed at the happy crisis, when the presence of a chief of first-rate talents was indispensable, and when no favourite name had yet been found, to fill the public voice with half such loud acclamation as his own.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

General rejoicing on the return of Bonaparte.—He, meanwhile, secludes himself in retirement and literature.—Advances made to him on all sides.—Napoleon coalesces with the Abbé Siéyes.—Revolution of the 18th Brumaire.—Particulars of that event.—Clashing views of the Councils of Ancients, and the Five Hundred.—Barras and his colleagues resign, leaving the whole power in the hands of Napoleon.—Proceedings of the councils on the 18th and 19th.—Sittings removed from Paris to St. Cloud.—Bonaparte visits both on the latter day.—Violent commotion in the Council of Five Hundred.—Napoleon received with great hostility, menaced and assaulted, and, finally, extirpated by his grenadiers, breathless and exhausted.—Lucien Bonaparte, the president, retires from the hall with a similar escort.—Declares the Council of Five Hundred dissolved.—They are then dispersed by military force.—Various rumours stated and dismissed.—Both councils adjourn to the 19th February, 1800, after appointing a Provisional Consular Government, of Bonaparte, Siéyes, and Ducos.

BONAPARTE had caused himself to be preceded by an account of his campaigns in Africa and Asia,

in which the splendid victory over the Turks at Aboukir enabled him to gloss over his bad success in Syria, the total loss of his fleet, and the danger of Malta, which was closely besieged by the English. Still, however, these dispatches could never have led any one to expect the sudden return of a general engaged on a foreign service of the utmost importance, who, without having a better reason to allege, than his own opinion that his talents were more essential to his country in France than in Egypt, left his army to its fate, and came without either order or permission from his government, to volunteer his services where they were not expected, or perhaps wished for. Another in the same circumstances, or perhaps the same general at another period of the Revolution, would have been received by the public with alienated favour, and by the government with severe inquiry, if not with denunciation.

On the contrary, such was the general reliance on the talents of Bonaparte, that, delighted to see him arrive, no one thought of asking wherefore, or by whose authority he had returned. He was received like a victorious monarch re-entering his dominions at his own time and pleasure. Bells were everywhere rung, illuminations made, a delirium of joy agitated the public mind, and the messenger who carried the news of his disembarkation to Paris was received as if he had brought news of a battle gained.

The hall of the Council of Five Hundred re-echoed with cries of victory, while the orator, announcing the victories of Brune over the English, and Masséna over the Russians, dwelt upon the simple fact of Bonaparte's return, as of interest equal to all these successes. He was heard with shouts of "Long live the Republic!" which, as the event proved, was an exclamation but very indifferently adapted to the occasion.

Joséphine, and Joseph Bonaparte, apprised by the government of the arrival of Napoleon, hastened to meet him on the road; and his progress towards Paris was everywhere attended by the same general acclamations which had received him at landing.

The members of government, it must be supposed, felt alarm and anxiety, which they endeavoured to conceal, under the appearance of sharing in the general joy. The arrival of a person so influential by his fame, so decided in his character, engaged with no faction, and pledged to no political system, was likely to give victory to one or the other party who were contending for superiority, as he should himself determine. The eyes of all men were upon Napoleon, while his reserved and retired mode of life prevented any accurate anticipation being formed of the part which he was likely to take in the approaching convulsions of the state. While both parties might hope for his participation and succour, neither ventured to call into question his purpose, or the authority by which he had left his army in Egypt, and appeared thus unexpectedly in the capital. On the contrary, they courted him on either hand as the arbiter, whose decision was likely to have most influence on the state of the nation.

Napoleon, meanwhile, seemed to give his exclusive attention to literature, and, having exchanged

the usual visits of form with the ministers of the Republic, he was more frequently to be found at the Institute, or discussing with the traveler Volney, and other men of letters, the information which he had acquired in Egypt on science and antiquities, than in haunts of politicians, or the society of the leaders of either party in the state. Neither was he to be seen at the places of popular resort—he went into no general company, seldom attended the theatres, and, when he did, took his seat in a private box.

A public entertainment was given in honour of the general in the Church of St-Sulpice, which was attended by both the Legislative Bodies. Moreau shared the same honour, perhaps on that account not the more agreeable to Bonaparte. Jourdan and Augereau did not appear—a cloud seemed to hang over the festival—Napoleon only presented himself for a very short time, and the whole was over in the course of an hour.

To the military, his conduct seemed equally reserved—he held no levees, and attended no reviews. While all ranks contended in offering their tribute of applause, he turned in silence from receiving them.

In all this there was deep policy. No one knew better how much popular applause depends on the gloss of novelty, and how great is the difference in public estimation, betwixt him who appears to hunt and court acclamations, and the wiser and more dignified favourite of the multitude, whose popularity follows after him and seeks him out, instead of being the object of his pursuit and ambition. Yet under this still and apparently indifferent demeanour, Napoleon was in secret employed in collecting all the information necessary concerning the purposes and the powers of the various parties in the state; and as each was eager to obtain his countenance, he had no difficulty in obtaining full explanations on these points.

The violent republicans, who possessed the majority in the Council of Five Hundred, made advances to him; and the Generals Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte, offered to place him at the head of that party, provided he would maintain the democratical constitution of the year Three. In uniting with this active and violent party, Bonaparte saw every chance of instant and immediate success; but, by succeeding in the outset, he would probably have marred the farther projects of ambition which he already nourished. Military leaders, such as Jourdan and Bernadotte, at the head of a party so furious as the republicans, could not have been thrown aside without both danger and difficulty; and it being unquestionably the ultimate intention of Bonaparte to usurp the supreme power, it was most natural for him to seek adherents among those, who, though differing concerning the kind of government which should be finally established, concurred in desiring a change from the republican model.

Barras, too, endeavoured to sound the purposes of the general of the Army of Egypt. He hinted to him a plan of placing at the head of the Directory Hédouville, a man of ordinary talent, then general of what was still termed the Army of England, of retiring himself from power, and of conferring on Napoleon the general command of the republican

forces on the frontiers, which he vainly supposed preferment sufficient to gratify his ambition. Bonaparte would not listen to a hint which went to remove him from the capital, and the supreme administration of affairs—he knew also that Barras's character was contemptible, and his resources diminished—that his subsequent conduct had canceled the merit which he had acquired by the overthrow of Robespierre, and that to unite with him in any degree would be to adopt, in the public opinion, the very worst and most unpopular portion of the directorial government. He rejected the alliance of Barras, therefore, even when, abandoning his own plan, the Director offered to concur in any which Napoleon might dictate.

A union with Siéyès, and the party whom he influenced, promised greater advantages. Under this speculative politician were united for the time all who, though differing in other points, joined in desiring a final change from a revolutionary to a moderate and efficient government, bearing something of a monarchical character. Their number rendered this party powerful. In the Directory it was espoused by Siéyès and Ducos; it possessed a large majority in the Council of Ancients, and a respectable minority in that of the Five Hundred. The greater part of the middle classes throughout France embraced with more or less zeal the principles of moderation; and agreed, that an executive government of some strength was necessary to save them from the evils of combined revolutionary movements. Though the power of the moderates was great, yet their subsequent objects, in case of success, were various. Thus Bonaparte saw himself encouraged to hope for victory over the existing government and the republicans, by the united strength of the moderates of every class, whilst their difference in opinion concerning the ultimate measures to be adopted, afforded him the best opportunity of advancing, during the competition, his own pretensions to the larger share of the spoil.

Napoleon communicated accordingly with Siéyès, upon the understanding that he was to be raised to the principal administration of affairs; that the constitution of the year Three, which he himself had once pronounced "the masterpiece of legislation, which had abolished the errors of eighteen centuries," was entirely to be done away; and that a constitution was to be adopted in its stead, of which he knew nothing more, than that it was ready drawn up, and lay in the portfolio of Siéyès. No doubt, the general mentally reserved the right of altering and adjusting it as should best suit his own views,—a right which he failed not to exercise to a serious extent. When these great preliminaries had been adjusted, it was agreed that it should be executed between the 15th and 20th Brumaire.

In the interim, several men of influence of both councils were admitted into the secret. Talleyrand, who had been deprived of office by the influence of the republicans, brought his talents to the aid of Bonaparte. Fouché, according to Napoleon, was not consulted—the Memoirs which bear his name aver the contrary—it is certain, that in his important capacity of minister of police, he acted in Bonaparte's favour during the Revolution. Some leading

members of both legislative bodies were cautiously intrusted with what was going forward, and others were generally advised to hold themselves in readiness for a great movement.

A sufficient military force was next to be provided; and this was not difficult, for the reputation of Bonaparte insured the conspirators unlimited influence among the soldiery. Three regiments of dragoons were enthusiastically petitioning the honour of being reviewed by Napoleon. The adherence of these troops might be counted upon. The officers of the garrison of Paris were desirous to pay their respects to him; so were the forty adjutants of the National Guard, whom he himself had appointed when general of the troops in the interior. Many other officers, as well reduced as holding commissions, desired to see the celebrated general, that they might express their devotion to his person, and adherence to his fortunes. All these introductions had been artfully postponed.

Two men of more renowned name, Moreau and Macdonald, had made tenders of service to Bonaparte. These both favoured the moderate party, and had no suspicion of the ultimate design of Napoleon, or the final result of his undertaking.

A final resolution on 15th Brumaire determined the 18th (9th November) for the great attempt—an interval was necessary, but the risk of discovery and anticipation made it desirable that it should be as short as possible. The secret was well kept; yet, being unavoidably intrusted to many persons, some floating and vague rumours did get abroad, and gave an alarm to the parties concerned.

Meanwhile, all the generals and officers whom we have named, were invited to repair to Napoleon's house at six o'clock on the morning of the 18th Brumaire, and the three regiments of cavalry already mentioned were appointed to be ready and mounted in the Champs Elysées, to receive the honour of being reviewed by Bonaparte, according to their petition. As an excuse for assigning so unusual an hour of rendezvous, it was said that the general was obliged to set out upon a journey. Many officers, however, understood or guessed what was to be done, and came armed with pistols as well as with swords. Some were without such information or presentiment. Lefebvre, the commandant of the guard of the representative bodies, supposed to be devoted to the Directory, had only received an invitation to attend this military assembly on the preceding midnight. Bernadotte, unacquainted with the project, and attached to the republican faction, was, however, brought to Bonaparte's house by his brother Joseph.

The surprise of some, and the anxious curiosity of all, may be supposed, when they found a military levee so numerous and so brilliantly assembled at a house incapable of containing half of them. Bonaparte was obliged to receive them in the open air.—Leaving them thus assembled, and waiting their cue to enter on the stage, let us trace the political manoeuvres from which the military were to take the signal for action.

Early as Bonaparte's levee had taken place, the Council of Ancients, secretly and hastily assembled, had met still earlier. The ears of all were filled

by a report, generally circulated, that the republican party had formed a daring plan for giving a new popular impulse to the government. It was said, that the resolution was taken at the Hôtel de Salm, amongst the party who still adopted the principles of the old jacobins, to connect the two representative bodies into one National Assembly, and invest the powers of government in a Committee of Public Safety after the model of what was called the Reign of Terror. Circulated hastily, and with such additions to the tale as rumours speedily acquire, the mind of the Council of Ancients was agitated with much fear and anxiety. Cornudet, Lebrun, and Fargues made glowing speeches to the assembly, in which the terror that their language inspired was rendered greater by the mysterious and indefinite manner in which they expressed themselves. They spoke of personal danger—of being overawed in their deliberations—of the fall of liberty, and of the approaching destruction of the Republic.

"You have but an instant to save France," said Cornudet; "permit it to pass away, and the country will be a mere carcase, disputed by the vultures, whose prey it must become." Though the charge of conspiracy was not distinctly defined, the measures recommended to defeat it were sufficiently decisive.

By the 102d, 103d, and 104th articles of the Constitution, it was provided that the Council of Ancients might, if they saw it expedient, alter the place where the legislative bodies met, and convoked them elsewhere; a provision designed doubtless to prevent the exercise of that compulsion, which the Parisians had at one time assumed over the National Assembly and Convention. This power the Council of Ancients now exercised. By one edict the sittings of the two councils were removed to St-Cloud; by another, the council delegated to General Bonaparte full power to see this measure carried into effect, and vested him for that purpose with the military command of the department. A state messenger was sent to communicate to the general these important measures, and require his presence in the Council of Ancients; and this was the crisis which he had so anxiously expected.

A few words determined the numerous body of officers, by whom the messenger found him surrounded, to concur with him without scruple. Even General Lefebvre, who commanded the guard of the legislative bodies, declared his adhesion to Bonaparte.

The Directory had not even yet taken the alarm. Two of them, indeed, Siéyes and Ducos, being in the secret of the conspiracy, were already at the Tuilleries, to second the movement which was preparing. It is said that Barras had seen them pass in the morning, and, as they were both mounted, had been much amused with the awkward horsemanship of Siéyes. He little guessed on what expedition he was bound.

When Bonaparte sallied forth on horseback, and at the head of such a gallant cavalcade of officers, his first movement was to assume the command of the three regiments of cavalry, already drawn up in the Champs Élysées, and to lead them to the Tuilleries, where the Council of Ancients expected

him. He entered their hall, surrounded by his military staff, and by those other generals whose names carried the memory of so many victories. "You are the wisdom of the nation," he said to the council; "I come, surrounded by the generals of the Republic, to promise you their support. I name Lefebvre my lieutenant. Let us not lose time looking for precedents. Nothing in history ever resembled the end of the eighteenth century—nothing in the eighteenth century resembled this moment. Your wisdom has devised the necessary measure, our arms shall put it into execution." He announced to the military the will of the council, and the command with which they had intrusted him; and it was received with loud shouts.

In the meanwhile the three Directors, Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, who were not in the secret of the morning, began too late to take the alarm. Moulins proposed to send a battalion to surround the house of Bonaparte, and make prisoner the general, and whomsoever else they found there. But they had no longer the least influence over the soldiery, and had the mortification to see their own personal guard, when summoned by an aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, march away to join the forces which he commanded, and leave them defenceless.

Barras sent his secretary, Bottot, to expostulate with Bonaparte. The general received him with great haughtiness, and publicly, before a large group of officers and soldiers, upbraided him with the reverses of the country; not in the tone of an ordinary citizen, possessing but his own individual interest in the fate of a great nation, but like a prince, who, returning from a distant expedition, finds that in his absence his deputies have abused their trust, and misruled his dominions. "What have you done," he said, "for that fine France, which I left you in such a brilliant condition? I left you peace, I have found war—I left you the wealth of Italy, I have found taxation and misery. Where are the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I have known?—all of them my companions in glory!—They are dead." It was plain, that even now, when his enterprise was but commenced, Bonaparte had already assumed that tone, which seemed to account every one answerable to him for deficiencies in the public service, and he himself responsible to no one.

Barras, overwhelmed and stunned, and afraid, perhaps, of impeachment for his alleged peculations, belied the courage which he was once supposed to possess, and submitted, in the most abject terms, to the will of the victor. He sent in his resignation, in which he states, "that the weal of the Republic, and his zeal for liberty alone, could have ever induced him to undertake the burden of a public office; and that, seeing the destinies of the Republic were now in the custody of her youthful and invincible general, he gladly resigned his authority." He left Paris for his country-seat, accompanied by a guard of cavalry, which Bonaparte ordered to attend him, as much perhaps to watch his motions as to do him honour, though the last was the ostensible reason. His colleagues, Gohier and Moulins, also resigned their office; Siéyes and Ducos had already set the example; and thus, the whole Constitutional Executive Council was dis-

solved, while the real power was vested in Bonaparte's single person. Cambacérés, minister of justice, Fouché, minister of police, with all the rest of the administration, acknowledged his authority accordingly; and he was thus placed in full possession as well of the civil as the military power.

The Council of Five Hundred, or rather the republican majority of that body, showed a more stubborn temper; and if, instead of resigning, Barras, Coghier, and Moulins, had united themselves to its leaders, they might perhaps have given trouble to Bonaparte, successful as he had hitherto been.

This hostile council only met at ten o'clock on that memorable day, when they received, to their surprise, the message, intimating that the Council of Ancients had changed the place of meeting from Paris to St-Cloud; and thus removed their debates from the neighbourhood of the populace, over whom the old jacobinical principles might have retained influence. The laws, as they stood, afforded the young council no means of evading compliance, and they accordingly adjourned to meet the next day at St-Cloud, with unabated resolution to maintain the democratical part of the constitution. They separated amid shouts of "Long live the Republic and the constitution!" which were echoed by the galleries. The *tricoteuses*,* and other more zealous attendants on their debates, resolved to transfer themselves to St-Cloud also, and appeared there in considerable numbers on the ensuing day, when it was evident the enterprise of Siéyes and of Bonaparte must be either perfected or abandoned.

The contending parties held counsel all the evening, and deep into the night, to prepare for the final contest on the morrow. Siéyes advised that forty leaders of the opposition should be arrested; but Bonaparte esteemed himself strong enough to obtain a decisive victory, without resorting to any such obnoxious violence. They adjusted their plan of operations in both councils, and agreed that the government to be established should be provisionally intrusted to three consuls, Bonaparte, Siéyes, and Ducos. Proper arrangements were made of the armed force at St-Cloud; and the command was confided to the zeal and fidelity of Murat. Bonaparte used some interest to prevent Bernadotte, Jourdan, and Augereau, from attending at St-Cloud the next day, as he did not expect them to take his part in the approaching crisis. The last of these seemed rather hurt at the want of confidence which this caution implied, and said, "What, general! dare you not trust your own little Augereau?" He went to St-Cloud accordingly.

Some preparations were necessary to put the palace of St-Cloud in order, to receive the two councils; the Orangerie being assigned to the Council of Five Hundred; the Gallery of Mars to that of the Ancients.

In the Council of Ancients, the *modérés*, having

the majority, were prepared to carry forward and complete their measures for a change of government and constitution. But the minority, having rallied after the surprise of the preceding day, were neither silent nor passive. The Commission of Inspectors, whose duty it was to convene the council, were inculpated severely for having omitted to give information to several leading members of the minority, of the extraordinary convocation which took place at such an unwonted hour on the morning preceding. The propriety, nay the legality, of the transference of the legislative bodies to St-Cloud, was also challenged. A sharp debate took place, which was terminated by the appearance of Napoleon, who entered the hall, and harangued the members by permission of the president. "Citizens," said he, "you are placed upon a volcano. Let me tell you the truth with the frankness of a soldier. Citizens, I was remaining tranquil with my family, when the commands of the Council of Ancients called me to arms. I collected my brave military companions, and brought forward the arms of the country in obedience to you who are the head. We are rewarded with calumny—they compare me to Cromwell—to Caesar. Had I desired to usurp the supreme authority, I have had opportunities to do so before now. But I swear to you the country has not a more disinterested patriot. We are surrounded by dangers and by civil war. Let us not hazard the loss of those advantages for which we have made such sacrifices—Liberty and Equality."

"And the Constitution!" exclaimed Linget, a democratic member, interrupting a speech which seemed to be designedly vague and inexplicit.

"The Constitution!" answered Bonaparte, giving way to a more natural expression of his feelings, and avowing his object more clearly than he had yet dared to do—"It was violated on the 18th Fructidor—violated on the 22d Floréal—violated on the 30th Prairial. All parties have invoked it—all have disregarded it in turn. It can be no longer a means of safety to any one, since it obtains the respect of no one. Since we cannot preserve the constitution, let us at least save liberty and equality, the foundations on which it is erected." He went on in the same strain to assure them, that for the safety of the Republic he relied only on the wisdom and power of the Council of Ancients, since in the Council of Five Hundred were found those men who desired to bring back the Convention, with its revolutionary committees, its scaffolds, its popular insurrections. "But I," he said, "will save you from such horrors—I and my brave comrades at arms, whose swords and caps I see at the door of the hall; and if any hired orator shall talk of outlawry, I will appeal to the valour of my comrades, with whom I have fought and conquered for liberty."

The assembly invited the general to detail the particulars of the conspiracy to which he had alluded, but he confined himself to a reference to the testimony of Siéyes and Ducos; and again reiterating that the constitution could not save the country, and inviting the Council of Ancients to adopt some course which might enable them to do so, he left them, amid cries of *Vive Bonaparte!* loudly echoed by the military in the court-yard, to

* The women of lower rank who attended the debates of the council, plying the task of knitting while they listened to politics, were so denominated. They were always zealous democrats, and might claim in one sense Shakespeare's description of

The *few* maids, who weave their thread with bones.

try the effect of his eloquence on the more unmanageable Council of Five Hundred.

The deputies of the younger council having found the place designed for their meeting filled with workmen, were for some time in a situation which seemed to resemble the predicament of the National Assembly at Versailles, when they took refuge in a tennis-court. The recollection was of such a nature as inflamed and animated their resolution, and they entered the Orangerie, when at length admitted, in no good humour with the Council of Ancients, or with Bonaparte. Proposals of accommodation had been circulated among them ineffectually. They would have admitted Bonaparte into the Directory, but refused to consent to any radical change in the constitution of the year Three.

The debate of the day, remarkable as the last in which the republican party enjoyed the full freedom of speech in France, was opened on 19th Brumaire, at two o'clock, Lucien Bonaparte being president. Gaudin, a member of the moderate party, began by moving, that a committee of seven members should be formed, to report upon the state of the Republic; and that measures should be taken for opening a correspondence with the Council of Ancients. He was interrupted by exclamations and clamour on the part of the majority.

"The constitution!" "The constitution or death!" was echoed and re-echoed on every side. "Bayonets frighten us not," said Delbreil; "we are free men."

"Down with the dictatorship—no dictators!" cried other members.

Lucien in vain endeavoured to restore order. Gaudin was dragged from the tribune; the voice of other moderates was overpowered by clamour—never had the party of democracy shown itself fiercer or more tenacious than when about to receive the death-blow.

"Let us swear to preserve the constitution of the year Three!" exclaimed Delbreil; and the applause which followed the proposition was so general, that it silenced all resistance. Even the members of the moderate party—nay, even Lucien Bonaparte himself—were compelled to take the oath of fidelity to the constitution, which he and they were leagued to destroy.

"The oath you have just taken," said Bigonnet, "will occupy a place in the annals of history, beside the celebrated vow taken in the tennis-court. The one was the foundation of liberty, the other shall consolidate the structure." In the midst of this fermentation, the letter containing the resignation of Barras was read and received with marks of contempt, as the act of a soldier deserting his post in the time of danger. The moderate party seemed silenced, overpowered, and on the point of coalescing with the great majority of the council, when the clash of arms was heard at the entrance of the apartment. All eyes were turned to that quarter. Bayonets, drawn sabres, the plumed hats of general officers and aides-de-camp, and the caps of grenadiers, were visible without, while Napoleon entered the Orangerie, attended by four grenadiers belonging to the constitutional guard of the councils. The soldiers remained at the bottom of the hall, while he

advanced, with a measured step and uncovered, about one-third up the room.

He was received with loud murmurs. "What! drawn weapons, armed men, soldiers in the sanctuary of the laws!" exclaimed the members, whose courage seemed to rise against the display of force with which they were menaced. All the deputies arose, some rushed on Bonaparte, and seized him by the collar; others called out—"Outlawry—outlawry—let him be proclaimed a traitor!" It is said that Aréna, a native of Corsica like himself, aimed a dagger at his breast, which was only averted by the interposition of one of the grenadiers. The fact seems extremely doubtful, though it is certain that Bonaparte was seized by two or three members, while others exclaimed, "Was it for this you gained so many victories?" and loaded him with reproaches. At this crisis a party of grenadiers rushed into the hall with drawn swords, and extricating Bonaparte from the deputies, bore him off in their arms breathless with the scuffle.

It was probably at this crisis that Angereau's faith in his ancient general's fortune began to totter, and his revolutionary principles to gain an ascendancy over his military devotion. "A fine situation you have brought yourself into," he said to Bonaparte, who answered sternly, "Angereau, things were worse at Arcola—Take my advice—remain quiet, in a short time all this will change." Angereau, whose active assistance and co-operation might have been at this critical period of the greatest consequence to the council, took the hint, and continued passive.* Jourdan and Bernadotte, who were ready to act on the popular side, had the soldiers shown the least hesitation in yielding obedience to Bonaparte, perceived no opening of which to avail themselves.

The council remained in the highest state of commotion, the general voice accusing Bonaparte of having usurped the supreme authority, calling for a sentence of outlawry, or demanding that he should be brought to the bar. "Can you ask me to put the outlawry of my own brother to the vote?" said Lucien. But this appeal to his personal situation and feelings made no impression upon the assembly, who continued clamorously to demand the question. At length Lucien flung on the desk his hat, scarf, and other parts of his official dress. "Let me be rather heard," he said, "as the advocate of him whom you falsely and rashly accuse." But his

* The *Moniteur* is anxious to exculpate Angereau from having taken any part in favour of the routed party on the 19th Brumaire. That officer, it says, did not join in the general oath of fidelity to the constitution of the year Three. The same official paper adds, that on the evening of the 19th, being invited by some of the leading persons of the democratic faction, to take the military command of their partisans, he had asked them by way of reply, "Whether they supposed he would tarnish the reputation he had acquired in the army, by taking command of wretches like them?" Angereau, it may be remembered, was the general who was sent by Bonaparte to Paris to act as military chief on the part of the Directory, in the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, in which the soldiery had willingly followed him (See p. 241). Bonaparte was probably well pleased to keep a man of his military reputation and resolved character out of the combat, if possible.

request only added to the tumult. At this moment a small body of grenadiers, sent by Napoleon to his brother's assistance, marched into the hall.

They were at first received with applause; for the council, accustomed to see the triumph of democratical opinions among the military, did not doubt that they were deserting their general to range themselves on the side of the deputies. Their appearance was but momentary—they instantly left the hall, carrying Lucien in the centre of the detachment.

Matters were now come to extremity on either side. The council, thrown into the greatest disorder by these repeated military incursions, remained in violent agitation, furious against Bonaparte, but without the calmness necessary to adopt decisive measures.

Meantime the sight of Napoleon, almost breathless, and bearing marks of personal violence, excited to the highest the indignation of the military. In broken words he told them, that when he wished to show them the road to lead the country to victory and fame, "they had answered him with daggers."

Cries of resentment arose from the soldiery, augmented when the party sent to extricate the president brought him to the ranks as to a sanctuary. Lucien, who seconded his brother admirably, or rather who led the way in this perilous adventure, mounted on horseback instantly, and called out, in a voice naturally deep and sonorous, "General, and you, soldiers! The President of the Council of Five Hundred proclaims to you, that factious men, with drawn daggers, have interrupted the deliberations of the assembly—He authorizes you to employ force against these disturbers—The Assembly of Five Hundred is dissolved!"

Murat, député by Bonaparte to execute the commands of Lucien, entered the Orangerie with drums beating, at the head of a detachment with fixed bayonets. He summoned the deputies to disperse on their peril, while an officer of the constitutional guard called out, he could be no longer answerable for their safety. Cries of fear became now mingled with vociferations of rage, execrations of abhorrence, and shouts of *Vive la République!* An officer then mounted the president's seat, and summoned the representatives to retire. "The general," said he, "has given orders."

Some of the deputies and spectators began now to leave the hall; the greater part continued firm, and sustained the shouts by which they reprobated this military intrusion. The drums at length struck up, and drowned further remonstrance.

"Forward, grenadiers," said the officer who commanded the party. They leveled their muskets, and advanced as if to the charge. The deputies seem hitherto to have retained a lingering hope that their persons would be regarded as inviolable. They now fled on all sides, most of them jumping from the windows of the Orangerie, and leaving behind them their official caps, scarfs, and gowns. In a very few minutes the apartments were entirely clear; and thus, furnishing, at its conclusion, a striking parallel to the scene which ended the Long Parliament of Charles the First's time, terminated the last democratical assembly of France.

Bonaparte affirms, that one of the general officers in his suite offered to take the command of fifty men, and place them in ambush to fire on the deputies in their flight, which he wisely declined as a useless and gratuitous cruelty.

The result of these violent and extraordinary measures was intimated to the Council of Ancients; the immediate cause of the expulsion of the Five Hundred being referred to the alleged violence on the person of Bonaparte, which was said by one member to have been committed by Aréna, while another exaggerated the charge, by asserting that it was offered in consequence of Bonaparte's having made disclosure of some mal-practices of the Corsican deputy while in Italy. The *Moniteur* soon after improved this story of Aréna and his single poniard, into a party consisting of Aréna, Marquazzi, and other deputies, armed with pistols and daggers. At other times, Bonaparte was said to have been wounded, which certainly was not the case. The effect of the example of Brutus upon a republican, and an Italian to boot, might render the conduct ascribed to Aréna credible enough; but the existence of a party armed with pocket-pistols and daggers, for the purpose of opposing regular troops, is too ridiculous to be believed. Aréna published a denial of the attempt; and among the numbers who witnessed the scene no proof was ever appealed to, save the real evidence of a dagger found on the floor, and the torn sleeve of a grenadier's coat, circumstances which might be accounted for many ways. But having served at the time as a popular apology for the strong measures which had been adopted, the rumour was not allowed to fall asleep. Thomé, the grenadier, was declared to have merited well of his country by the legislative body, entertained at dinner by the general, and rewarded with a salute and a valuable jewel by Joséphine. Other reports were put in circulation concerning the violent purposes of the jacobins. It was said the ancient revolutionist, Santerre, was setting a popular movement on foot in the Faubourg St-Antoine, and that Bonaparte, through the Ex-Director Moulins, had cautioned him against proceeding in his purpose, declaring, that if he did, he would have him shot by martial law.

But the truth is, that although there can be no doubt that the popular party entertained a full purpose of revolutionizing the government anew, and restoring its republican character, yet they were anticipated and surprised by the movement of the 18th and 19th Brumaire, which could not, therefore, in strict language, be justified as a defensive measure. Its excuse must rest on the proposition which seems undoubted, that affairs were come to such extremity that a contest was unavoidable, and that therefore it was necessary for the moderate party to take the advantage of the first blow, though they exposed themselves in doing so to the reproach of being called the aggressors.

The Council of Ancients had expressed some alarm and anxiety about the employment of military force against the other branch of the constitutional representation. But Lucien Bonaparte, having succeeded in rallying around him about a hundred of the Council of the Juniors, assumed the character

and office of that legislative body, now effectually purged of all the dissidents, and, as President of the Five Hundred, gave to the Council of Ancients such an explanation, as they, nothing loth to be convinced, admitted to be satisfactory. Both councils then adjourned till the 19th February, 1800, after each had devolved their powers upon a committee of twenty-five persons, who were instructed to prepare a civil code against the meeting of the legislative bodies. A provisional consular government was appointed, consisting of Bonaparte, Siéyes, and Roger Ducos.

The victory, therefore, of the 18th and 19th Brumaire, was, by dint of sword and bayonet, completely secured. It remained for the conquerors to consider the uses which were to be made of it.*

CHAPTER XXXV.

Effects of the victory of the 18th and 19th Brumaire.—Clemency of the new Consulate.—Beneficial change in the finances.—Law of Hostages repealed.—Religious liberty allowed.—Improvements in the war department.—Submission of the Chouans, and pacification of La Vendée.—Ascendancy of Napoleon in the Consulate.—Disappointment of the Abbé Siéyes.—Committee formed to consider Siéyes' plan of a constitution—Adopted in part—but rejected in essentials.—A new one adopted, monarchical in everything but form.—Siéyes retires from public life on a pension.—General view of the new consular form of government.—Despotic power of the first consul.—Reflections on Bonaparte's conduct upon this occasion.

THE victory obtained over the Directory and the democrats, upon the 18th and 19th Brumaire, was generally acceptable to the French nation. The feverish desire of liberty, which had been the characteristic of all descriptions of persons in the year 1792, was quenched by the blood shed during the reign of Terror; and even just and liberal ideas of freedom had so far fallen into disrepute, from their resemblance to those which had been used as a pretext for the disgusting cruelties perpetrated at that terrible period, that they excited from association a kind of loathing as well as dread. The great mass of the nation sought no longer guarantees for metaphysical rights, but, broken down by suffering, desired repose, and were willing to submit to any government which promised to secure to them the ordinary benefits of civilization.

Bonaparte and Siéyes,—for, though only during a brief space, they may still be regarded as joint authorities,—were enabled to profit by this general acquiescence, in many important particulars. It put it in their power to dispense with the necessity of pursuing and crushing their scattered adversaries; and the French saw a revolution effected in their system, and that by military force, in which not a drop of blood was spilt. Yet, as had been the termination of most recent revolutions, lists of proscription were prepared; and, without previous trial or legal sentence, fifty-nine of those who had chiefly opposed the new Consulate, on the 18th and 19th Brumaire,

were condemned to deportation by the sole fiat of the consuls. Siéyes is said to have suggested this unjust and arbitrary measure, which, bearing a colour of revenge and persecution, was highly unpopular. It was not carried into execution. Exceptions were at first made in favour of such of the condemned persons as showed themselves disposed to be tractable; and at length the sentence was altogether dispensed with, and the more obnoxious partisans of democracy were only placed under the superintendence of the police. This conduct showed at once conscious strength, and a spirit of clemency, than which no attributes can contribute more to the popularity of a new government; since the spirit of the opposition, deprived of hope of success, and yet not urged on by despair of personal safety, gradually becomes disposed to sink into acquiescence. The democrats, or, as they were now termed, the anarchists, became intimidated, or cooled in their zeal; and only a few of the more enthusiastic continued yet to avow those principles, to breathe the least doubt of which had been, within but a few months, a crime worthy of death.

Other and most important decrees were adopted by the consuls, tending to lighten the burdens which their predecessors had imposed on the nation, and which had rendered their government so unpopular. Two of the most oppressive measures of the Directors were repealed without delay.

The first referred to the finances, which were found in a state of ruinous exhaustion, and were only maintained by a system of compulsory and progressive loans, according to rates of assessment on the property of the citizens. The new minister of finance, Gaudin, would not even go to bed, or sleep a single night, until he had produced a substitute for this ruinous resource, for which he levied an additional rise of twenty-five per cent on all contributions, direct and indirect, which produced a large sum. He carried order and regularity into all the departments of finance, improved the collection and income of the funds of the Republic, and inspired so much confidence by the moderation and success of his measures, that credit began to revive, and several loans were attained on easy terms.

The repeal of the Law of Hostages was a measure equally popular. This cruel and unreasonable enactment, which rendered the aged and weak, unprotected females, and helpless children of emigrants, or armed royalists, responsible for the actions of their relatives, was immediately mitigated. Couriers were dispatched to open the prisons; and this act of justice and humanity was hailed as a pledge of returning moderation and liberality.

Important measures were also taken for tranquilizing the religious discord by which the country had been so long agitated. Bonaparte, who had lately professed himself more than half persuaded of the truth of Mahommed's mission, became now—such was the decree of Providence—the means of restoring to France the free exercise of the christian faith. The mummery of Réveillère Lépau's heathenism was by general consent abandoned. The churches were restored to public worship; pensions were allowed to such religious persons as took an oath of fidelity to the government;

* See Appendix, No. 2.—Historical notes on the 18th Brumaire.*

and more than twenty thousand clergymen, with whom the prisons had been filled, in consequence of intolerant laws, were set at liberty upon taking the same vow. Public and domestic rites of worship in every form were tolerated and protected; and the laws of the *décades*, or Theophilanthropic festivals, was abolished. Even the earthly relics of Pope Pius VI., who had died at Valence, and in exile, were not neglected, but received, singular to relate, the rites of sepulture with the solemnity due to his high office, by command of Bonaparte, who had first shaken the papal authority; and in doing so, as he boasted in his Egyptian proclamations, had destroyed the emblem of christian worship.

The part taken by Cambacérès, the minister of justice, in the revolution of Brumaire, had been agreeable to Bonaparte; and his moderation now aided him in the lenient measures which he had determined to adopt. He was a good lawyer, and a man of sense and information, and under his administration means were taken to relax the oppressive severity of the laws against the emigrants. Nine of them, noblemen of the most ancient families in France, had been thrown on the coast near Calais by shipwreck, and the Directors had meditated bringing to trial those whom the winds and waves had spared, as falling under the class of emigrants returned to France without permission, against whom the laws denounced the penalty of death. Bonaparte more liberally considered their being found within the prohibited territory, as an act, not of volition, but of inevitable necessity, and they were dismissed accordingly.

From the same spirit of politic clemency, La Fayette, Latour Maubourg, and others, who, although revolutionists, had been expelled from France for not carrying their principles of freedom sufficiently high and far, were permitted to return to their native country.

It may be easily believed that the military department of the state underwent a complete reform under the authority of Bonaparte. Dubois Crancé, the minister at war under the Directors, was replaced by Berthier; and Napoleon gives a strange picture of the incapacity of the former functionary. He declares he could not furnish a single report of the state of the army—that he had obtained no regular returns of the effective strength of the different regiments—that many corps had been formed in the departments, whose very existence was unknown to the minister at war; and finally, that when pressed for reports of the pay, of the victualing, and of the clothing of the troops, he had replied, that the war department neither paid, clothed, nor victualled them. This may be exaggerated, for Napoleon disliked Dubois Crancé as his personal opponent; but the improvident and corrupt character of the directorial government renders the charge very probable. By the exertions of Berthier, accustomed to Bonaparte's mode of arrangements, the war department soon adopted a very different face of activity.

The same department received yet additional vigour when the consuls called to be its head the celebrated Carnot, who had returned from exile, in consequence of the fall of the Directors. He re-

mained in office but a short time, for, being a democrat in principle, he disapproved of the personal elevation of Bonaparte; but, during the period that he continued in administration, his services in restoring order in the military department, and combining the plans of the campaign with Moreau and Bonaparte, were of the highest importance.

Napoleon showed no less talent in closing the wounds of internal war, than in his other arrangements. The Chouans, under various chiefs, had disturbed the western provinces; but the despair of pardon, which drove so many malcontents to their standard, began to subside, and the liberal and accommodating measures adopted by the new consular government induced most to make peace with Bonaparte. This they did the more readily, that many of them believed the chief consul intended by degrees, and when the opportunity offered, to accomplish the restoration of the Bourbons. Many of the chiefs of the Chouans submitted to him, and afterwards supported his government. Châtillon, Suzannet, d'Autichamp, nobles and chiefs of the royalist army, submitted at Montluçon, and their reconciliation with the government, being admitted on liberal terms, was sincerely observed by them. Bernier, rector of St-Lô, who had great influence in La Vendée, also made his peace, and was afterwards made Bishop of Orleans by Bonaparte, and employed in negotiating the Concordat with the pope.

Count Louis de Frotté, an enterprising and high-spirited young nobleman, refused for a long time to enter into terms with Bonaparte; so did another chief of the Chouans, called Georges Cadoudal, a peasant of the district of Morbihan, raised to the command of his countrymen, because, with great strength and dauntless courage, he combined the qualities of enterprise and sagacity. Frotté was betrayed and made prisoner in the house of Gaidal, commandant at Alençon, who had pretended friendship to him, and had promised to negotiate a favourable treaty on his behalf. He and eight or nine of his officers were tried by a military commission, and condemned to be shot. They marched hand in hand to the place of execution, remained to the last in the same attitude, expressive of their partaking the same sentiments of devotion to the cause in which they suffered, and died with the utmost courage. Georges Cadoudal, left alone, became unable to support the civil war, and laid down his arms for a time. Bonaparte, whose policy it was to unite in the new order of things as many and as various characters as possible, not regarding what parts they had formerly played, provided they now attached themselves to his person, took great pains to gain over a man so resolute as this daring Breton. He had a personal interview with him, which he says Georges Cadoudal solicited; yet why he should have done so it is hard to guess, unless it were to learn whether Bonaparte had any ultimate purpose of serving the Bourbon interest. He certainly did not request the favour in order to drive any bargain for himself, since Bonaparte frankly admits, that all his promises and arguments failed to make any impression upon him; and that he parted with Georges, professing still to entertain opinions for which he had fought so often and so desperately.

In another instance which happened at this period, Bonaparte boasts of having vindicated the insulted rights of nations. The Senate of Hamburg had delivered up to England Napper Tandy, Blackwell, and other Irishmen, concerned in the rebellion which had lately wasted Ireland. Bonaparte took this up in a threatening tone, and expounded to their trembling envoy the rights of a neutral territory, in language, upon which the subsequent tragedy of the Duke d'Enghien formed a singular commentary.

While Bonaparte was thus busied in adopting measures for composing internal discord, and renewing the wasted resources of the country, those discussions were at the same time privately carrying forward, which were to determine by whom and in what way it should be governed. There is little doubt, that when Siéyes undertook the revolution of Brumaire, he would have desired for his military assistant a very different character from Bonaparte. Some general would have best suited him, who possessed no knowledge beyond that of his profession, and whose ambition would have been contented to accept such share of power as corresponded to his limited views and capacity. The wily priest, however, saw, that no other coadjutor save Bonaparte could have availed him, after the return of the latter from Egypt, and was not long of experiencing that Napoleon would not be satisfied with anything short of the lion's share of the spoil.

At the very first meeting of the consuls, the defection of Roger Ducos to the side of Bonaparte convinced Siéyes, that he would be unable to support those pretensions to the first place in the government, to which his friends had expected to see him elevated. He had reckoned on Ducos's vote for giving him the situation of first consul; but Ducos saw better where the force and talent of the Consulate must be considered as reposed. "General," said he to Napoleon, at the first meeting of the consular body, "the presidency belongs to you as a matter of right." Bonaparte took the chair accordingly as a thing of course. In the course of the deliberations, Siéyes had hoped to find that the general's opinions and interference would have been limited to military affairs; whereas, on the contrary, he heard him express distinctly, and support firmly, propositions on policy and finance, religion and jurisprudence. He showed, in short, so little occasion for an independent coadjutor, that Siéyes appears from this, the very first interview, to have given up all hopes of establishing a separate interest of his own, and to have seen that the Revolution was from that moment ended. On his return home, he said to those statesmen with whom he had consulted and acted preceding the 18th Brumaire, as Talleyrand, Boulay, Rœderer, Cabanis, etc.—"Gentlemen, you have a master—give yourself no farther concern about the affairs of the state—Bonaparte can and will manage them all at his own pleasure."

This declaration must have announced to those who heard it, that the direct and immediate advantages proposed by the Revolution were lost; that the government no longer rested on the popular basis, but that, in a much greater degree than could have been said to have been the case during the reign of the Bourbons, the whole measures of state must in

future rest upon the arbitrary pleasure of one man.

It was in the meantime necessary that some form of government should be established without delay, were it only to prevent the meeting of the two councils, who must have resumed their authority, unless superseded by a new constitution previous to the 19th February, 1800, to which day they had been prorogued. As a previous measure, the oath taken by official persons was altered from a direct acknowledgment of the constitution of the year Three, so as to express a more general profession of adherence to the cause of the French nation. How to salve the wounded consciences of those who had previously taken the oath in its primitive form, no care was used, nor does any appear to have been thought necessary.

The three consuls, and the legislative committees, formed themselves into a general committee, for the purpose of organizing a constitution; and Siéyes was invited to submit to them that model, on the preparation of which he used to pique himself, and had been accustomed to receive the flattery of his friends. He appears to have obeyed the call slowly, and to have produced his plan partially, and by fragments; probably because he was aware, that the offspring of his talents would never be accepted in its entire form, but must necessarily undergo such mutilations as might fit it for the purposes and to the pleasure of the dictator, whose supremacy he had been compelled to announce to his party.

On being pressed by his colleagues in the committee, the metaphysical politician at length produced his full plan of the hierarchical representation, whose authority was to emanate from the choice of the people and of a Conservative Senate, which was at once to protect the laws of the commonwealth, and *absorb*, as it was termed, all furious and over-ambitious spirits, by calling them, when they distinguished themselves by any irregular exertion of power, to share the comforts and incapacities of their own body, as they say spirits of old were conjured down, and obliged to abide in the Red Sea. He then brought forward his idea of a Legislative Body, which was to vote and decide, but without debate; and his Tribunal, designed to plead for, or to impeach the measures of government. These general outlines were approved, as being judged likely to preserve more stability and permanence than had been found to appertain to the constitutions, which, since 1792, had in such quick succession been adopted and abandoned.

But the idea which Siéyes entertained of lodging the executive government in a grand elector, who was to be the very model of a King of Lubberland, was the ruin of his plan. It was in vain, that in hopes of luring Bonaparte to accept of this office, he had, while depriving it of all real power, attached to it a large revenue, guards, honours, and rank. The heaping with such distinctions an official person, who had no other duty than to name two consuls, who were to carry on the civil and military business of the state without his concurrence or authority, was introducing into a modern state the evils of a worn-out Asiatic empire, where the sultan, or mogul, or whatever he is called, lies in his harem in obscure luxury, while the state affairs are con-

docted exclusively by his viziers, or lieutenants.

Bonaparte exclaimed against the whole concoction.—“Who,” said he, “would accept an office, of which the only duties were to fatten like a pig upon so many millions yearly?—Or what man of spirit would consent to name ministers, over whom, being named, he was not to exercise the slightest authority?—And your two consuls for war and peace, the one surrounded with judges, churchmen, and civilians—the other with military men and diplomatists,—on what footing of intercourse can they be said to stand respecting each other?—the one demanding money and recruits, the other refusing the supplies? A government, involving such a total separation of offices necessarily connected, would be heterogeneous,—the shadow of a state, but without the efficient authority which should belong to one.”

Siéyes did not possess powers of persuasion, or promptness of speech, in addition to his other talents. He was silenced and intimidated, and saw his favourite elector general, with his two consuls, or rather viziers, rejected, without making much effort in their defence.

Still the system which was actually adopted bore, in point of form, some faint resemblance to the model of Siéyes. Three consuls were appointed; the first to hold the sole power of nominating to public offices, and right of determining on public measures; the other two were to be his indispensable counsellors. The first of these offices was designed to bring back the constitution of France to a monarchical system, while the second and third were added merely to conciliate the republicans, who were not yet prepared for a retrograde movement.

The office of one of these supplementary consuls was offered to Siéyes, but he declined to accept of it, and expressed his wish to retire from public life. His disappointment was probably considerable, at finding himself acting but a second-rate part, after the success of the conspiracy which he had himself schemed; but his pride was not so great as to decline a pecuniary compensation. Bonaparte bestowed on him by far the greater part of the private treasure amassed by the ex-directors. It was said to amount to six hundred thousand francs, which Siéyes called *une poire pour la soif*; in English, a morsel to stay the stomach. He was endowed also with the fine domain and estate of Crosne; and to render the gift more acceptable, and save his delicacy, a decree was issued, compelling him to accept of this manifestation of national gratitude. The office of a senator gave him dignity; and the yearly appointment of twenty-five thousand francs annexed to it, added to the ease of his situation. In short, this celebrated metaphysician disappeared as a political person, and became, to use his own expression, *absorbed* in the pursuit of epicurean indulgences, which he covered with a veil of mystery. There is no doubt that by thus showing the greedy and mercenary turn of his nature, Siéyes, notwithstanding his abilities, lost in a great measure the esteem and reverence of his countrymen; and this was a consequence not probably unforeseen by Bonaparte, when he loaded him with wealth.

To return to the new constitution. Every species

of power and faculty was heaped upon the chief consul, with a liberality which looked as if France, to atone for her long jealousy of those who had been the administrators of her executive power, was now determined to remove at once every obstacle which might stand in the way of Bonaparte to arbitrary power. He possessed the sole right of nominating counsellors of state, ministers, ambassadors, officers, civil and military, and almost all functionaries whatsoever. He was to propose all new laws, and take all measures for internal and external defence of the state. He commanded all the forces, of whatever description, superintended all the national relations at home and abroad, and coined the public money. In these high duties he had the advice of his brother consuls, and also of a Council of State. But he was recognized to be independent of them all. The consuls were to be elected for the space of ten years, and to be re-eligible.

The Abbé Siéyes's plan of dividing the people into three classes, which should each of them declare a certain number of persons eligible to certain gradations of the state, was ostensibly adopted. The lists of these eligible individuals were to be addressed by the various electoral classes to the Conservative Senate, which also was borrowed from the abbé's model. This body, the highest and most august in the state, were to hold their places for life, and had a considerable pension attached to them. Their number was not to exceed eighty, and they were to have the power of supplying vacancies in their own body, by choosing the future senator from a list of three persons; one of them proposed by the chief consul, one by the Legislative Body, and one by the Tribunal. Senators became for ever incapable of any other public duty. Their duty was to receive the national lists of persons eligible for official situations, and to annul such laws or measures as should be denounced to their body, as unconstitutional or impolitic, either by the government or the Tribunal. The sittings of the senate were not public.

The new constitution of France also adopted the Legislative Body and the Tribunal proposed by the Abbé Siéyes. The duty of the Legislative Body was to take into consideration such laws as should be approved by the Tribunal, and pass or refuse them by vote, but without any debate, or even any expression of their opinion.

The Tribunal, on the contrary, was a deliberative body, to whom the chief consul, and his Council of State, with whom alone lay the initiative privilege, were to propose such laws as appeared to them desirable. These, when discussed by the Tribunal, and approved of by the silent assent of the Legislative Body, passed into decrees, and became binding upon the community. The Legislative Body heard the report of the Tribunal, as expressed by a deputation from that body; and by their votes alone, but without any debate or delivery of opinion, refused or confirmed the proposal. Some of the more important acts of government, such as the proclamation of peace or war, could only take place on the motion of the chief consul to the Tribunal, upon their recommending the measure to the Legislative Body; and finally, upon the Legislative Commis-

sions affirming the proposal. But the power of the chief consul was not much checked by this restriction; for the discussion on such subjects was only to take place on his own requisition, and always in secret committee; so that the greatest hindrance of despotism, the weight of public opinion formed upon public debate, was totally wanting.

A very slight glance at this consular form of government is sufficient to show, that Bonaparte selected exactly as much of the ingenious constitution of Siéyes as was applicable to his own object of acquiring supreme and despotic authority, while he got rid of all, the Tribunal alone excepted, which contained, directly or indirectly, any check or balance affecting the executive power. The substitution of lists of eligible persons or candidates, to be made up by the people, instead of the popular election of actual representatives, converted into a metaphysical and abstract idea the real safeguard of liberty. It may be true, that the authority of an official person, selected from the national lists, might be said originally to emanate from the people; because, unless his name had received their sanction, he could not have been eligible. But the difference is inexpressibly great, between the power of naming a single direct representative, and that of naming a thousand persons, any of whom may be capable of being created a representative; and the popular interference in the state, which had hitherto comprehended the former privilege, was now restrained to the latter and more insignificant one. This was the main error in Siéyes's system, and the most fatal blow to liberty, whose constitutional safety can hardly exist, excepting in union with a direct and unfettered national representation, chosen by the people themselves.

All the other balances and checks which the abbé had designed to substitute instead of that which arises from popular election, had been broken and cast away; while the fragments of the scheme that remained were carefully adjusted, so as to form the steps by which Bonaparte was to ascend to an unlimited and despotic throne. Siéyes had proposed that his elector general should be merely a graceful termination to his edifice, like a gilded vane on the top of a steeple—a sovereign without power—a *roi fainéant*, with two consuls to act as joint *maires du palais*. Bonaparte, on the contrary, gave the whole executive power in the state, together with the exclusive right of proposing all new laws, to the chief consul, and made the others mere appendages, to be thrown aside at pleasure.

Neither were the other constitutional authorities calculated to offer effectual resistance to the engrossing authority of this all-powerful officer. All these bodies were, in fact, mere pensioners. The Senate, which met in secret, and the Legislative Body, whose lips were padlocked, were alike removed from influencing public opinion, and being influenced by it. The Tribunal, indeed, consisting of a hundred persons, retained in some sort the right of debate, and of being publicly heard. But the members of the Tribunal were selected by the Senate, not by the people, whom, except in metaphysical mockery, it could not be said to represent, any more than a bottle of distilled liquor can be said

to represent the sheaf of grain which it was originally drawn from. What chance was there that in a hundred men so chosen, there should be courage and independence enough found to oppose that primary power, by which, like a steam-engine, the whole constitution was put in motion? Such tribunals were also in danger of recollecting, that they only held their office for four years, and that the senators had their offices for life; while a transition from the one state to the other was in general thought desirable, and could only be gained by implicit obedience during the candidate's probation in the Tribunal. Yet, slender as was the power of this Tribunal body, Bonaparte showed some jealousy even of this slight appearance of freedom; although, justly considered, the Senate, the Conservative Body, and the Tribunal, were but three different pipes, which, separately or altogether, uttered sound at the pleasure of him who presided at the instrument.

The spirit of France must have been much broken when this arbitrary system was adopted without debate or contradiction; and when we remember the earlier period of 1789, it is wonderful to consider how, in the space of ten years, the race of men, whose love of liberty carried them to such extravagances, seems to have become exhausted. Personal safety was now a principal object with most. They saw no alternative between absolute submission to a military chief of talent and power, and the return to anarchy and new revolutionary excesses.

During the sitting of Bonaparte's Legislative Committee, Madame de Stael expressed, to a representative of the people, her alarms on the subject of liberty. "Oh, madam," he replied, "we are arrived at an extremity in which we must not trouble ourselves about saving the principles of the Revolution, but only the lives of the men by whom the Revolution was effected."

Yet more than one exertion is said to have been made in the committee, to obtain some modification of the supreme power of the chief consul, or at least some remedy in case of its being abused. Several members of the committee which adjusted the new constitution made, it is said, an effort to persuade Bonaparte, that, in taking possession of the office of supreme magistrate, without any preliminary election, he would evince an ambition which might prejudice him with the people; and, entreating him to be satisfied with the office of generalissimo of the armies, with full right of treating with foreign powers, invited him to set off to the frontier and resume his train of victories. "I will remain at Paris," said Bonaparte, biting his nails to the quick, as was his custom when agitated—"I will remain at Paris—I am chief consul."

Chénier hinted at adopting the doctrine of absorption, but was instantly interrupted—"I will have no such mummary," said Bonaparte; "blood to the knees rather." * These expressions may be exaggerated, but it is certain that, whenever there was an attempt to control his wishes, or restrict his power, such a discontented remark as intimated "that he would meddle no more in the business,"

* *Mémoires de Fouché*, vol. I, p. 164-5.

was sufficient to overpower the opposition. The committee saw no option betwixt submitting to the authority of this inflexible chief, or encountering the horrors of a bloody civil war. Thus were lost at once the fruits of the virtues, the crimes, the blood, the treasure, the mass of human misery, which, flowing from the Revolution, had agitated France for ten years; and thus, having sacrificed almost all that men hold dear, the rights of humanity themselves included, in order to obtain national liberty, her inhabitants, without having enjoyed rational freedom, or the advantages which it insures, for a single day, returned to be the vassals of a despotic government, administered by a chief whose right was only in his sword. A few reflections on what might or ought to have been Bonaparte's conduct in this crisis, naturally arise out of the subject.

We are not to expect, in the course of ordinary life, moral any more than physical miracles. There have lived men of a spirit so noble, that, in serving their country, they had no other object beyond the merit of having done so; but such men belong to a less corrupted age than ours, and have been trained in the principles of disinterested patriotism, which did not belong to France, perhaps not to Europe, in the eighteenth century. We may, therefore, take it for granted, that Bonaparte was desirous, in some shape or other, to find his own interest in the service of his country, that his motives were a mixture of patriotism and the desire of self-advancement; and it remains to consider in what manner both objects were to be best obtained.

The first alternative was the re-establishment of the Republic, upon some better and less perishable model than those which had been successively adopted and abandoned by the French, in the several phases of the Revolution. But Bonaparte had already determined against this plan of government, and seemed unalterably convinced, that the various misfortunes and failures which had been sustained in the attempt to convert France into a republic, afforded irrefragable evidence that her natural and proper constitutional government must be monarchical. This important point settled, it remained, 1st, To select the person in whose hand the kingly power was to be intrusted. 2dly, To consider in what degree the monarchical principle should be mingled with, and qualified by, securities for the freedom of the people, and checks against the encroachments of the prince.

Having broken explicitly with the republicans, Bonaparte had it in his power, doubtless, to have united with those who desired the restoration of the Bourbons, who, at this moment, formed a large proportion of the better classes in France. The name of the old dynasty must have brought with it great advantages. Their restoration would have at once restored peace to Europe, and in a great measure reconciled the strife of parties in France. There was no doubt of the possibility of the counter-revolution; for what was done in 1814 might have been still more easily done in 1799. Old ideas would have returned with ancient names, and at the same time security might have been given, that the restored monarch should be placed within such legal restraints as were necessary for the protection of the

freedom of the subject. The principal powers of Europe, if required, would have gladly guaranteed to the French people any class of institutions which might have been thought adequate to this purpose.

But, besides that such a course cut off Bonaparte from any higher reward of his services, than were connected with the rank of a subject, the same objections to the restoration of the Bourbon family still prevailed, which we have before noticed. The extreme confusion likely to be occasioned by the conflicting claims of the restored emigrants, who had left France with all the feelings and prejudices peculiar to their birth and quality, and those of the numerous soldiers and statesmen, who had arisen to eminence during the Revolution, and whose pretensions to rank and office would be urged with jealous vehemence against those who had shared the fortunes of the exiled monarch, was a powerful objection to the restoration. The question concerning the national domains remained as embarrassing as before; for, while the sales which had been made of that property could scarce be canceled without a severe shock to national credit, the restored Bourbons could not, on the other hand, fail to insist upon an indemnification to the spirituality, who had been stripped of their property for adherence to their religious vows, and to the nobles, whose estates had been forfeited for their adherence to the throne. It might also have been found, that, among the army, a prejudice against the Bourbons had survived their predilection for the Republic, and that although the French soldiers might see with pleasure a crown placed on the brow of their favourite general, they might be unwilling to endure the restoration of the ancient race, against whom they had long borne arms.

All these objections against attempting to recal the ancient dynasty, have weight in themselves, and may readily have appeared insuperable to Bonaparte; especially considering the conclusion to be, that if the Bourbons were found ineligible, the crown of France—with a more extended empire, and more unlimited powers—was in that case to rest with Bonaparte himself. There is no doubt that, in preferring the title of the Bourbons, founded on right, to his own, which rested on force and opportunity alone, Bonaparte would have acted a much more noble, generous, and disinterested part, than in availing himself of circumstances to establish his own power; nay, that, philosophically speaking, such a choice might have been wiser and happier. But in the ordinary mode of viewing and acting in this world, the temptation was immense; and Bonaparte was, in some measure, unfettered by the circumstances which might have withheld some of his contemporaries from snatching at the crown that seemed to await his grasp. Whatever were the rights of the Bourbons, abstractedly considered, they were not of a kind to force themselves immediately upon the conscience of Bonaparte. He had not entered public life, was indeed a mere boy, when the general voice of France, or that which appeared such, drove the ancient race from the throne; he had acted during all his life hitherto in the service of the French government *de facto*; and it was hard to require of him, now of a sudden, to sacrifice

the greatest stake which a man ever played for, to the abstract right of the king *de jure*. Candour will therefore allow, that though some spirits, of a heroic pitch of character, might, in his place, have acted otherwise, yet the conduct of Bonaparte, in availing himself, for his own advantage, of the height which he had attained by his own talents, was too natural a course of action to be loaded with censure by any one, who, if he takes the trouble to consider the extent of the temptation, must acknowledge in his heart the difficulty of resisting it.

But though we may acknowledge many excuses for the ambition which induced Bonaparte to assume the principal share of the new government, and although we were even to allow to his admirers that he became first consul purely because his doing so was necessary to the welfare of France, our candour can carry us no farther. We cannot for an instant sanction the monstrous accumulation of authority which engrossed into his own hands all the powers of the state, and deprived the French people, from that period, of the least pretence to liberty, or power of protecting themselves from tyranny. It is in vain to urge, that they had not yet learned to make a proper use of the invaluable privileges of which he deprived them—equally in vain to say, that they consented to resign what it was not in their power to defend. It is a poor apology for theft that the person plundered knew not the value of the gem taken from him; a worse excuse for robbery, that the party robbed was disarmed and prostrate, and submitted without resistance, where to resist would have been to die. In choosing to be the head of a well-regulated and limited monarchy, Bonaparte would have consulted even his own interest better, than by preferring, as he did, to become the sole animating spirit of a monstrous despotism. The communication of common privileges, while they united discordant factions, would have fixed the attention of all on the head of the government, as their mutual benefactor. The constitutional rights which he had reserved for the crown would have been respected, when it was remembered that the freedom of the people had been put in a rational form, and its privileges rendered available by his liberality.

Such checks upon his power would have been as beneficial to himself as to his subjects. If, in the course of his reign, he had met constitutional opposition to the then immense projects of conquest, which cost so much blood and devastation, to that opposition he would have been as much indebted, as a person subject to fits of lunacy is to the bonds by which, when under the influence of his malady, he is restrained from doing mischief. Bonaparte's active spirit, withheld from warlike pursuits, would have been exercised by the internal improvement of his kingdom. The mode in which he used his power would have gilded over, as in many other cases, the imperfect nature of his title, and if he was not, in every sense, the legitimate heir of the monarchy, he might have been one of the most meritorious princes that ever ascended the throne. Had he permitted the existence of a power expressive of the national opinion co-equal with and restrictive of his own, there would have been no occupation of

Spain, no war with Russia, no imperial decrees against British commerce. The people, who first felt the pressure of these violent and ruinous measures, would have declined to submit to them in the outset. The ultimate consequence—the overthrow, namely, of Napoleon himself, would not have taken place, and he might, for aught we can see, have died on the throne of France, and bequeathed it to his posterity, leaving a reputation which could only be surpassed in lustre by that of an individual who should render similar advantages to his country, yet decline the gratification, in any degree, of his personal ambition.

In short, it must always be written down, as Bonaparte's error as well as guilt, that, misusing the power which the 18th Brumaire threw into his hands, he totally destroyed the liberty of France, or, we would say, more properly, the chance which that country had of attaining a free, and, at the same time, a settled government. He might have been a patriot prince; he chose to be a usurping despot—he might have played the part of Washington; he preferred that of Cromwell.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Proceedings of Bonaparte in order to consolidate his power—His great success—Causes that led to it.—Cambacérès and Lebrun chosen second and third consuls.—Talleyrand appointed minister for foreign affairs, and Fouché minister of police—Their characters.—Other ministers nominated.—Various changes made, in order to mark the commencement of a new era.—Napoleon addresses a letter personally to the King of England—Answered by Lord Grenville.—Negotiation for peace, that followed, speedily broken off.—Campaigns in Italy, and on the Rhine—Successes of Moreau—Censured by Napoleon for over-caution.—The charge considered.—The chief consul resolves to bring back, in person, victory to the French standards in Italy—His measures for that purpose.

THE structure of government which Bonaparte had selected out of the broken outlines of the plan of Siéyes, being not only monarchical but despotic, it remained that its offices should be filled with persons favourable to the new order of things; and to this the attention of Bonaparte was especially turned. In order to secure the selection of the official individuals to himself, he eluded entirely the principle by which Siéyes had proposed to elaborate his national representatives out of the various signed lists of eligibility, to be made up by the three classes into which his hierarchy divided the French people. Without waiting for these lists of eligible persons, or taking any other rule but his own pleasure, and that of his counsellors, the two new consuls, Bonaparte named sixty senators; the senators named a hundred tribunes, and three hundred legislators; and thus the whole bodies of the state were filled up, by a choice emanating from the executive government, instead of being vested, more or less directly, in the people.

In availing himself of the privileges which he had usurped, the first consul, as we must now call him, showed a moderation as artful as it was conciliatory. His object was to avoid the odium of appearing to

hold his rank by his military character only. He desired, on the contrary, to assemble round him a party, in which the predominant character of individuals, whatever it had hitherto been, was to be merged in that of the new system; as the statuary throws into the furnace broken fragments of bronze of every various description, without regarding their immediate appearance or form, his purpose being to unite them by fusion, and bestow upon the mass the new shape which his art destines it to present.

With these views, Napoleon said to Siéyes, who reproached the admission of Fouché into office and power, "We are creating a new era. Of the past, we must forget the bad, and only remember the good. Time, habits of business, and experience, have formed many able men, and modified many characters." These words may be regarded as the key-note of his whole system. Bonaparte did not care what men had been formerly, so that they were now disposed to become that which was suitable to his interest, and for which he was willing to reward them liberally. The former conduct of persons of talent, whether in politics or morality, was of no consequence, providing they were willing, now, faithfully to further and adhere to the new order of things. This prospect of immunity for the past, and reward for the future, was singularly well calculated to act upon the public mind, desirous as it was of repose, and upon that of individuals, agitated by so many hopes and fears as the Revolution had set afloat. The consular government seemed a general place of refuge and sanctuary to persons of all various opinions, and in all various predicaments. It was only required of them, in return for the safety which it afforded, that they should pay homage to the presiding deity.

So artfully was the system of Bonaparte contrived, that each of the numerous classes of Frenchmen found something in it congenial to his habits, his feelings, or his circumstances, providing only he was willing to sacrifice to it the essential part of his political principles. To the royalist, it restored monarchical forms, a court, and a sovereign—but he must acknowledge that sovereign in Bonaparte. To the churchman, it opened the gates of the temples, removed the tyranny of the persecuting philosophers—promised in course of time a national church—but by the altar must be placed the image of Bonaparte. The jacobin, dyed double red in murder and massacre, was welcome to safety and security from the aristocratic vengeance which he had so lately dreaded. The regicide was guaranteed against the return of the Bourbons—they who had profited by the Revolution, as purchasers of national domains, were insured against their being resumed. But it was under the implied condition, that not a word was to be mentioned by those ci-devant democrats, of liberty or equality: the principles for which forfeitures had been made, and revolutionary tribunals erected, were henceforth never to be named. To all these parties, as to others, Bonaparte held out the same hopes under the same conditions—"All these things will I give you, if you will kneel down and worship me." Shortly afterwards, he was enabled to place before those to whom the choice was sub-

mitted, the original temptation in its full extent—a display of the kingdoms of the earth, over which he offered to extend the empire of France, providing always he was himself acknowledged as the object of general obedience, and almost adoration.

The system of Bonaparte, as it combined great art with an apparent generosity and liberality, proved eminently successful among the people of France, when subjected to the semblance of popular vote. The national spirit was exhausted by the changes and the sufferings, the wars and the crimes, of so many years; and in France, as in all other countries, parties, exhausted by the exertions and vicissitudes of civil war, are in the very situation where military tyranny becomes the next crisis. The rich favoured Bonaparte for the sake of protection,—the poor for that of relief,—the emigrants, in many cases, because they desired to return to France,—the men of the Revolution, because they were afraid of being banished from it;—the sanguine and courageous crowded round his standard in hope of victory,—the timid covered behind it in the desire of safety. Add to these the vast multitude who follow the opinion of others, and take the road which lies most obvious, and is most trodden, and it is no wonder that the 18th Brumaire, and its consequences, received the general sanction of the people. The constitution of the year Eight, or consular government, was approved by the suffrages of nearly four millions of citizens—a more general approbation than any preceding system had been received with. The vote was doubtless a farce in itself, considering how many constitutions had been adopted and sworn to within so short a space; but still the numbers who expressed assent, more than doubling those votes which were obtained by the constitutions of 1792 and of the year Three, indicate the superior popularity of Bonaparte's system.

To the four millions who expressly declared their adherence to the new consular constitution, must be added the many hundreds of thousands and millions more who were either totally indifferent upon the form of government, provided they enjoyed peace and protection under it, or who, though abstractly preferring other rulers, were practically disposed to submit to the party in possession of the power.

Such and so extended being the principles on which Bonaparte selected the members of his government, he manifested, in choosing individuals, that wonderful penetration by which, more perhaps than any man who ever lived, he was enabled at once to discover the person most capable of serving him, and the means of securing his attachment.—Former crimes or errors made no cause of exclusion; and in several cases the alliance between the first consul and his ministers might have been compared to the marriages between the settlers on the Spanish mainland and the unhappy females, the refuse of great cities, sent out to recruit the colony. "I ask thee not," said the buccaneer to the wife he had selected from the cargo of vice, "what has been thy former conduct; but, henceforth, see thou continue faithful to me, or this," striking his hand on his musket, "shall punish thy want of fidelity."

For second and third consuls Bonaparte chose Cambacérès, a lawyer, and a member of the mode-

rate party, with Lebrun, who had formerly co-operated with the chancellor Maupeou. The former was employed by the chief consul as his organ of communication with the revolutionists, while Lebrun rendered him the same service with the royal party; and although, as Madame de Stael observes, they preached very different sermons on the same texts, yet they were both eminently successful in detaching from their original factions many of either class, and uniting them with this third or government party, which was thus composed of deserters from both. The last soon became so numerous, that Bonaparte was enabled to dispense with the *bascule*, or trimming system, by which alone his predecessors, the Directors, had been enabled to support their power.

In the ministry Bonaparte acted upon the same principle, selecting and making his own the men whose talents were most distinguished, without reference to their former conduct. Two were particularly distinguished as men of the most eminent talents and extensive experience. These were Talleyrand and Fouché. The former, noble by birth, and Bishop of Autun, notwithstanding his high rank in church and state, had been deeply engaged in the Revolution. He had been placed on the list of emigrants, from which his name was erased on the establishment of the directorial government, under which he became minister of foreign affairs. He resigned that office in the summer preceding 18th Brumaire; and Bonaparte, finding him at variance with the Directory, readily passed over some personal grounds of complaint which he had against him, and enlisted in his service a supple and dexterous politician, and an experienced minister, fond, it is said, of pleasure, not insensible to views of self-interest, nor too closely fettered by principle, but perhaps unequalled in ingenuity. Talleyrand was replaced in the situation of minister for foreign affairs, after a short interval assigned for the purpose of suffering the public to forget his prominent share in the scandalous treaty with the American commissioners, and continued for a long tract of time one of the closest sharers of Bonaparte's councils.

If the character of Talleyrand bore no strong traces of public virtue or inflexible morality, that of Fouché was marked with still darker shades. He had been dipt in some of the worst transactions of the reign of Terror, and his name is found among the agents of the dreadful crimes of that unhappy period. In the days of the Directory, he is stated to have profited by the universal speculation which was then practised, and to have amassed large sums by shares in contracts and brokerage in the public funds. To atone for the imperfections of a character stained with perfidy, venality, and indifference to human suffering, Fouché brought to Bonaparte's service a devotion, never like to fail the first consul, unless his fortunes should happen to change, and a perfect experience with all the weapons of revolutionary war, and knowledge of those who were best able to wield them. He had managed, under Barras's administration, the department of police; and, in the course of his agency, had become better acquainted perhaps than any man in France with all the various parties in that

distracted country, the points which they were desirous of reaching, the modes by which they hoped to attain them, the character of their individual leaders, and the means to gain them over or to intimidate them. Formidable by his extensive knowledge of the revolutionary springs, and the address with which he could either put them into motion, or prevent them from operating, Fouché, in the latter part of his life, displayed a species of wisdom which came in place of morality and benevolence.

Loving wealth and power, he was neither a man of ardent passions, nor of a vengeful disposition; and though there was no scruple in his nature to withhold him from becoming an agent in the great crimes which state policy, under an arbitrary government, must often require, yet he had a prudential and constitutional aversion to unnecessary evil, and was always wont to characterise his own principle of action, by saying, that he did as little harm as he possibly could. In his mysterious and terrible office of head of the police, he had often means of granting favours, or interposing lenity in behalf of individuals, of which he gained the full credit, while the harsh measures of which he was the agent, were set down to the necessity of his situation. By adhering to these principles of moderation, he established for himself at length a character totally inconsistent with that belonging to a member of the Revolutionary Committee, and resembling rather that of a timid but well-disposed servant, who, in executing his master's commands, is desirous to mitigate as much as possible their effect on individuals. It is, upon the whole, no wonder, that although Siéyes objected to Fouché, from his want of principle, and Talleyrand was averse to him from jealousy, interference, and personal enmity, Napoleon chose, nevertheless, to retain in the confidential situation of minister of police, the person by whom that formidable office had been first placed on an effectual footing.

Of the other ministers, it is not necessary to speak in detail. Cambacérés retained the situation of minister of justice, for which he was well qualified; and the celebrated mathematician, Laplace, was preferred to that of the Interior, for which he was not, according to Bonaparte's report, qualified at all. Berthier, as we have already seen, filled the war department, and shortly afterwards Carnot; and Gaudin administered the finances with credit to himself. Forfait, a naval architect of eminence, replaced Bourdon in the helpless and hopeless department of the French admiralty.

A new constitution having been thus formed, and the various branches of duty distributed with much address among those best capable of discharging them, other changes were at the same time made, which were designed to mark that a new era was commenced, in which all former prejudices were to be abandoned and done away.

We have noticed that one of the first acts of the Provisional Government had been to new-modify the national oath, and generalize its terms, so that they should be no longer confined to the constitution of the year Three, but should apply to that which was about to be framed, or to any other which

might be produced by the same authority. Two subsequent alterations in the constitution, which passed without much notice, so much was the revolutionary or republican spirit abated, tended to show that farther changes were impending, and that the Consular Republic was speedily to adopt the name, as it already had the essence, of a monarchy. It was scarce three months since the President of the Directory had said to the people, on the anniversary of the taking of the Bastille,—"Royalty shall never raise its head again. We shall no more behold individuals boasting a title from Heaven, to oppress the earth with more ease and security, and who considered France as their private patrimony, Frenchmen as their subjects, and the laws as the expression of their good-will and pleasure." Yet now, in contradiction to this sounding declamation, the national oath, expressing hatred to royalty, was annulled, under the pretext that the Republic, being universally acknowledged, had no occasion for the guard of such disclamations.

In like manner, the public observance of the day on which Louis XVI. had suffered decapitation, was formally abolished. Buonaparte, declining to pass a judgment on the action as just, politic, or useful, pronounced that, in any event, it could only be regarded as a national calamity, and was therefore in a moral, as well as a political sense, an unfit epoch for festive celebration. An expression of the first consul to Siéyes was also current at the same time, which, although Buonaparte may not have used it, has been generally supposed to express his sentiments. Siéyes had spoken of Louis under the established phrase of the Tyrant. "He was no tyrant," Buonaparte replied; "had he been such, I should have been a subaltern officer of artillery, and you, Monsieur l'Abbé, would have been still saying mass."

A third sign of approaching change, or rather of the approaching return to the ancient system of government under a different chief, was the removal of the first consul from the apartments in the Luxembourg Palace, occupied by the Directors, to the royal residence of the Tuileries. Madame de Stael beheld the entrance of this fortunate soldier into the princely residence of the Bourbons. He was already surrounded by a vassal crowd, eager to pay him the homage which the inhabitants of those splendid halls had so long claimed as their due, that it seemed to be consistent with the place, and to become the right of this new inhabitant. The doors were thrown open with a bustle and violence, expressive of the importance of the occasion. But the hero of the scene, in ascending the magnificent staircase, up which a throng of courtiers followed him, seemed totally indifferent to all around, his features bearing only a general expression of indifference to events, and contempt for mankind.

The first measures of Buonaparte's new government, and the expectation attached to his name, had already gone some length in restoring domestic quiet; but he was well aware that much more must be done to render that quiet permanent; that the external relations of France with Europe must be attended to without delay; and that the French expected from him either the conclusion of an

honourable peace, or the restoration of victory to their national banners. It was necessary, too, that advances towards peace should in the first place be made, in order, if they were unsuccessful, that a national spirit should be excited, which might reconcile the French to the renewal of the war with fresh energy.

Hitherto, in diplomacy, it had been usual to sound the way for opening treaties of peace by obscure and almost unaccredited agents, in order that the party willing to make propositions might not subject themselves to a haughty and insulting answer, or have their desire of peace interpreted as a confession of weakness. Buonaparte went into the opposite extreme, and addressed the King of England in a personal epistle. This letter, like that to the Archduke Charles, during the campaign of 1797, intimates Buonaparte's affectation of superiority to the usual forms of diplomacy, and his pretence to a character determined to emancipate itself from rules only designed for mere ordinary men. But the manner of the address was in bad taste, and ill calculated to obtain credit for his being sincere in the proposal of peace. He was bound to know so much of the constitutional authority of the monarch whom he addressed, as to be aware that George III. would not, and could not, contract any treaty personally, but must act by the advice of those ministers whose responsibility was his guarantee to the nation at large. The terms of the letter set forth, as usual, the blessings of peace, and urged the propriety of its being restored; propositions which could not admit of dispute in the abstract, but which admit of much discussion when coupled with unreasonable or inadmissible conditions.

The answer transmitted by Lord Grenville, in the forms of diplomacy, to the minister for foreign affairs, dwelt on the aggressions of France, declared that the restoration of the Bourbons would have been the best security for their sincerity, but disavowed all right to dictate to France in her internal concerns. Some advances were made to a pacific treaty; and it is probable that England might at that period have obtained the same or better terms than she afterwards got by the treaty of Amiens. It may be added, that the moderate principles expressed by the consular government might, in the infancy of his power, and in a moment of considerable doubt, have induced Buonaparte to make sacrifices, to which, triumphant and established, he would not condescend. But the possession of Egypt, which Buonaparte must have insisted on, were it only for his own reputation, was likely to be an insuperable difficulty. The conjuncture also appeared to the English ministers propitious for carrying on the war. Italy had been recovered, and the Austrian army, to the number of 140,000, were menacing Savoy, and mustering on the Rhine. Buonaparte, in the check received before Acre, had been found not absolutely invincible. The exploits of Snarrow over the French were recent, and had been decisive. The state of the interior of France was well known; and it was conceived, that though this successful general had climbed into the seat of supreme power which he found unoccupied, yet that two strong parties, of which the royalists ob-

jected to his person, the republicans to his form of government, could not fail, the one or other, to deprive him of his influence.

The treaty was finally broken off, on the score that there was great reason to doubt Bonaparte's sincerity; and, supposing that were granted, there was at least equal room to doubt the stability of a power so hastily acknowledged, and seeming to contain in itself the principles of decay. There may be a difference of opinion in regard to Bonaparte's sincerity in the negotiation, but there can be none as to the reality of his joy at its being defeated. The voice which summoned him to war was that which sounded sweetest in his ears, since it was always followed by exertion and by victory. He had been personally offended, too, by the allusion to the legitimate rights of the Bourbons, and indulged his resentment by pasquinades in the *Moniteur*. A supposed letter from the last descendant of the Stuart family appeared there, congratulating the King of Britain on his acceding to the doctrine of legitimacy, and summoning him to make good his principles, by an abdication of his crown in favour of the lineal heir.

The external situation of France had, as we before remarked, been considerably improved by the consequences of the battle of Zurich, and the victories of Moreau. But the Republic derived yet greater advantages from the breach between the Emperors of Austria and Russia. Paul, naturally of an uncertain temper, and offended by the management of the last campaign, in which Korsakow had been defeated, and Suwarrow checked, in consequence of their being unsupported by the Austrian army, had withdrawn his troops, so distinguished for their own bravery, as well as for the talents of their leader, from the seat of war. But the Austrians, possessing a firmness of character undismayed by defeat, and encouraged by the late success of their arms under the veteran Melas, had made such gigantic exertions as to counterbalance the loss of their Russian confederates.

Their principal force was in Italy, and it was on the Italian frontier that they meditated a grand effort, by which, supported by the British fleet, they proposed to reduce Genoa, and penetrate across the Var into Provence, where existed a strong body of royalists ready to take arms, under the command of General Willot, an emigrant officer. It was said the celebrated Pichegru, who, escaped from Guiana, had taken refuge in England, was also with this army, and was proposed as a chief leader of the expected insurrection.

To execute this plan, Melas was placed at the head of an army of 140,000 men. This army was quartered for the winter in the plains of Piedmont and waited but the approach of spring to commence operations.

Opposed to them, and occupying the country between Genoa and the Var, lay a French army of 40,000 men, the relics of those who had been repeatedly defeated in Italy by Suwarrow. They were quartered in a poor country, and the English squadron, which blockaded the coast, was vigilant in preventing any supplies from being sent to them. Distress was therefore considerable, and the troops

were in proportion dispirited and disorganized. Whole corps abandoned their position, contrary to orders; and with drums beating, and colours flying, returned into France. A proclamation from Napoleon was almost alone sufficient to remedy these disorders. He called on the soldiers, and particularly those corps who had formerly distinguished themselves under his command in his Italian campaigns, to remember the confidence he had once placed in them. The scattered troops returned to their duty, as war-horses when dispersed are said to rally and form ranks at the mere sound of the trumpet. Masséna, an officer eminent for his acquaintance with the mode of carrying on war in a mountainous country, full of passes and strong positions, was intrusted with the command of the Italian army, which Bonaparte resolved to support in person with the army of reserve.

The French army upon the Rhine possessed as great a superiority over the Austrians, as Melas, on the Italian frontier, enjoyed over Masséna. Moreau was placed in the command of a large army, augmented by a strong detachment from that of General Brune, now no longer necessary for the protection of Holland, and by the army of Helvetia, which, after the defeat of Korsakow, was not farther required for the defence of Switzerland. In bestowing this great charge on Moreau, the first consul showed himself superior to the jealousy which might have dissuaded meaner minds from intrusting a rival, whose military skill was often compared with his own, with such an opportunity of distinguishing himself. But Bonaparte, in this and other cases, preferred the employing and profiting by the public service of men of talents, and especially men of military eminence, to any risk which he could run from their rivalry. He had the just confidence in his own powers, never to doubt his supremacy, and trusted to the influence of discipline, and the love of their profession, which induces generals to accept of command even under administrations of which they disapprove. In this manner he rendered dependent upon himself even those officers, who, averse to the consular form of government, inclined to republican principles. Such were Masséna, Brune, Jordan, Lecourbe, and Championnet. He took care at the same time, by changing the commands intrusted to them, to break off all combinations or connexions which they might have formed for a new alteration of the government.

General Moreau was much superior in numbers to Kray, the Austrian who commanded on the Rhine, and received orders to resume the offensive. He was cautious in his tactics, though a most excellent officer, and was startled at the plan sent him by Bonaparte, which directed him to cross the Rhine at Schaffhausen, and, marching on Ulm with his whole force, place himself in the rear of the greater part of the Austrian army. This was one of those schemes, fraught with great victories or great reverses, which Bonaparte delighted to form, and which often requiring much sacrifice of men, occasioned his being called by those who loved him not, a general at the rate of ten thousand men per day. Such enterprises resemble desperate passes in fencing, and must be executed with the same decisive

resolution with which they are formed. Few even of Bonaparte's best generals could be trusted with the execution of his master-strokes in tactics, unless under his own immediate superintendence.

Moreau invaded Germany on a more modified plan; and a series of marches, countermarches, and desperate battles ensued, in which General Kray, admirably supported by the Archduke Ferdinand, made a gallant defence against superior numbers.

In Bonaparte's account of this campaign he blames Moreau for hesitation and timidity in following up the advantages which he obtained. Yet to a less severe, perhaps to a more impartial judge, Moreau's success might seem satisfactory, since, crossing the Rhine in the end of April, he had his head-quarters at Augsburg upon the 15th July, ready either to co-operate with the Italian army, or to march into the heart of the Austrian territory. Nor can it be denied that, during this whole campaign, Moreau kept in view, as a principal object, the protecting the operations of Bonaparte in Italy, and saving that chief, in his dauntless and desperate invasion of the Milanese territory, from the danger which might have ensued, had Kray found an opportunity of opening a communication with the Austrian army in Italy, and dispatching troops to its support.

It may be remarked of these two great generals, that, as enterprise was the characteristic of Bonaparte's movements, prudence was that of Moreau's; and it is not unusual, even when there occur no other motives for rivals undervaluing each other, that the enterprising judge the prudent to be timid, and the prudent account the enterprising rash.

It is not ours to decide upon professional questions between men of such superior talents; and, having barely alluded to the topic, we leave Moreau at Augsburg, where he finally concluded an armistice with General Kray, as a consequence of that which Bonaparte had established in Italy after the battle of Marengo. Thus much, therefore, is due in justice to Moreau. His campaign was, on the whole, crowned in its results with distinguished success. And when it is considered, that he was to manoeuvre both with reference to the safety of the first consul's operations and his own, it may be doubted whether Bonaparte would, at the time, have thanked him for venturing on more hazardous measures, the result of which might have been either to obtain more brilliant victory for the Army of the Rhine, in the event of success, or, should they have miscarried, to have insured the ruin of the Army of Italy, as well as of that commanded by Moreau himself. There must have been a wide difference between the part which Moreau ought to act as subsidiary to Bonaparte (to whom it will presently be seen he dispatched a reinforcement of from fifteen to twenty thousand men), and that which Bonaparte, in obedience to his daring genius, might have himself thought it right to perform. The commander-in-chief may venture much on his own responsibility, which must not be hazarded by a subordinate general, whose motions ought to be regulated upon the general plan of the campaign.

We return to the operations of Napoleon during one of the most important campaigns of his life, and

in which he added—if that were still possible—to the high military reputation he had acquired.

In committing the charge of the campaign upon the Rhine to Moreau, the first consul had reserved for himself the task of bringing back victory to the French standards, on the fields in which he won his earliest laurels. His plan of victory again included a passage of the Alps, as boldly and unexpectedly as in 1795, but in a different direction. That earlier period had this resemblance to the present, that, on both occasions, the Austrians menaced Genoa; but in 1800, it was only from the Italian frontier and the Col di Tende, whereas, in 1795, the enemy were in possession of the mountains of Savoy, above Genoa. Switzerland too, formerly neutral, and allowing no passage for armies, was now as open to the march of French troops as any of their own provinces, and of this Bonaparte determined to avail himself. He was aware of the Austrian plan of taking Genoa and entering Provence; and he formed the daring resolution to put himself at the head of the army of reserve, surmount the line of the Alps, even where they are most difficult of access, and, descending into Italy, place himself in the rear of the Austrian army, interrupt their communications, carry off their magazines, parks, and hospitals, coop them up betwixt his own army and that of Masséna, which was in their front, and compel them to battle, in a situation where defeat must be destruction. But to accomplish this daring movement, it was necessary to march a whole army over the highest chain of mountains in Europe, by roads which afford but a dangerous passage to the solitary traveler, and through passes where one man can do more to defend, than ten to force their way. Artillery was to be carried through sheep-paths and over precipices impracticable to wheel carriages; ammunition and baggage were to be transported at the same disadvantages; and provisions were to be conveyed through a country poor in itself, and inhabited by a nation which had every cause to be hostile to France, and might therefore be expected prompt to avail themselves of any opportunity which should occur of revenging themselves for her late aggressions.

The strictest secrecy was necessary, to procure even the opportunity of attempting this audacious plan of operations; and to insure this secrecy, Bonaparte had recourse to a singular mode of deceiving the enemy. It was made as public as possible, by orders, decrees, proclamations, and the like, that the first consul was to place himself at the head of the army of reserve, and that it was to assemble at Dijon. Accordingly, a numerous staff was sent to that place, and much apparent bustle took place in assembling six or seven thousand men there, with great pomp and fracas. These, as the spies of Austria truly reported to their employers, were either conscripts, or veterans unfit for service; and caricatures were published of the first consul reviewing troops composed of children and disabled soldiers, which was ironically termed his army of reserve. When an army so composed was reviewed by the first consul himself with great ceremony, it impressed a general belief that Bonaparte was only endeavouring, by making a show of force, to divert the Austrians from their design upon Genoa, and

thus his real purpose was effectually concealed. Bulletins, too, were privately circulated by the agents of police, as if scattered by the royalists, in which specious arguments were used to prove that the French army of reserve neither did, nor could exist—and these also were designed to withdraw attention from the various points on which it was at the very moment collecting.

The pacification of the west of France had placed many good troops at Bonaparte's disposal, which had previously been engaged against the Chouans; the quiet state of Paris permitted several regiments to be detached from the capital. New levies were made with the utmost celerity, and the divisions of the army of reserve were organized separately, and at different places of rendezvous, but ready to form a junction when they should receive the signal for commencing operations.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

The chief consul leaves Paris on 6th May, 1800—Has an interview with Necker at Geneva on 8th—Arrives at Lausanne on the 13th—Various corps put in motion to cross the Alps.—Napoleon, at the head of the main army, marches on the 15th, and ascends Mont St Bernard—Difficulties of the march surmounted.—On the 16th, the van-guard takes possession of Aosta.—Fortress and town of Bard threaten to baffle the whole plan—The town is captured—and Napoleon contrives to send his artillery through it, under the fire of the fort, his infantry and cavalry passing over the Albaro.—Lannes carries Ivrea.—Recapitulation.—Operations of the Austrian general Melas.—At the commencement of the campaign Melas advances towards Genoa—Many actions betwixt him and Masséna.—In March Lord Keith blockades Genoa.—Melas compelled to retreat from Genoa—Enters Nice—Recalled from thence by the news of Napoleon's having crossed Mont St Bernard—Genoa surrenders—Bonaparte enters Milan—Battle of Montebello, and victory of the French—The chief consul is joined by Desaix during the battle.—Great Battle of Marengo on the 14th June, and complete victory of the French—Death of Desaix—Capitulation on the 15th, by which Genoa, etc., are yielded to the French.—Napoleon returns to Paris on the 2d July, and is received with all the acclamations due to a great conqueror.

On the 6th of May, 1800, seeking to renew the fortunes of France, now united with his own, the chief consul left Paris, and, having reviewed the pretended army of reserve at Dijon on the 7th, arrived on the 8th at Geneva. Here he had an interview with the celebrated financier Necker. There was always doomed to be some misunderstanding between Bonaparte and this accomplished family. Madame de Stael believed that Bonaparte spoke to her father with confidence on his future prospects; while the first consul affirms that Necker seemed to expect to be intrusted with the management of the French finances, and that they parted with mutual indifference, if not dislike. Napoleon had a more interesting conversation with general Marescot, dispatched to survey Mont St Bernard, and who had, with great difficulty, ascended as far as the convent of the Chartreux. "Is the route practicable?" said Bonaparte—"It is barely possible to pass," replied

the engineer.—"Let us set forward then," said Napoleon, and the extraordinary march was commenced.

On the 13th, arriving at Lausanne, Bonaparte joined the van of his real army of reserve, which consisted of six effective regiments, commanded by the celebrated Lannes. These corps, together with the rest of the troops intended for the expedition, had been assembled from their several positions by forced marches. Carnot, the minister at war, attended the first consul at Lausanne, to report to him that 15,000, or from that to the number of 20,000 men, detached from Moreau's army, were in the act of descending on Italy by St Gothard, in order to form the left wing of his army. The whole army, in its various divisions, was now united under the command of Berthier nominally, as general-in-chief, though in reality under that of the first consul himself. This was in compliance with a regulation of the constitution, which rendered it inconsistent for the first consul to command in person. It was a form which Bonaparte at present evaded, and afterwards laid aside; thinking truly, that the name, as well as office of generalissimo, was most fittingly vested in his own person, since, though it might not be the loftiest of his titles, it was that which best expressed his power. The army might amount to 60,000 men, but one-third of the number were conscripts.

During the interval between the 15th and 18th of May, all the columns of the French army were put into motion to cross the Alps. Turreau, at the head of 5000 men, directed his march by Mount Cenis, on Exilles and Susa. A similar division, commanded by Chabran, took the route of the Little St Bernard. Bonaparte himself, on the 15th, at the head of the main body of his army, consisting of 30,000 men and upwards, marched from Lausanne to the little village called St Pierre, at which point there ended everything resembling a practicable road. An immense, and apparently inaccessible mountain, reared its head among general desolation and eternal frost; while precipices, glaciers, ravines, and a boundless extent of faithless snows, which the slightest concussion of the air converts into avalanches capable of burying armies in their descent, appeared to forbid access to all living things but the chamois, and his scarce less wild pursuer. Yet foot by foot, and man by man, did the French soldiers proceed to ascend this formidable barrier, which nature had erected in vain to limit human ambition. The view of the valley, emphatically called "of Desolation," where nothing is to be seen but snow and sky, had no terrors for the first consul and his army. They advanced up paths hitherto only practised by hunters, or here and there a hardy pedestrian, the infantry loaded with their arms, and in full military equipment, the cavalry leading their horses. The musical bands played from time to time at the head of the regiments, and, in places of unusual difficulty, the drums beat a charge, as if to encourage the soldiers to encounter the opposition of Nature herself. The artillery, without which they could not have done service, were deposited in trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose. Each was dragged by a hundred men, and the troops, making it a point of honour to bring forward

their guns, accomplished this severe duty, not with cheerfulness only, but with enthusiasm. The carriages were taken to pieces, and harnessed on the backs of mules, or committed to the soldiers, who relieved each other in the task of bearing them with levers; and the ammunition was transported in the same manner. While one half of the soldiers were thus engaged, the others were obliged to carry the muskets, cartridge-boxes, knapsacks, and provisions of their comrades, as well as their own. Each man, so loaded, was calculated to carry from sixty to seventy pounds' weight, up icy precipices, where a man totally without encumbrance could ascend but slowly. Probably no troops save the French could have endured the fatigue of such a march; and no other general than Bonaparte would have ventured to require it at their hand.

He set out a considerable time after the march had begun, alone, excepting his guide. He is described by the Swiss peasant who attended him in that capacity, as wearing his usual simple dress, a grey surcoat, and three-cornered hat. He traveled in silence, save a few short and hasty questions about the country, addressed to his guide from time to time. When these were answered, he relapsed into silence. There was a gloom on his brow, corresponding with the weather, which was wet and dismal. His countenance had acquired, during his eastern campaigns, a swart complexion, which added to his natural severe gravity, and the Swiss peasant who guided him felt fear as he looked on him.* Occasionally his route was stopt by some temporary obstacle occasioned by a halt in the artillery or baggage; his commands on such occasions were peremptorily given, and instantly obeyed, his very look seeming enough to silence all objection, and remove every difficulty.

The army now arrived at that singular convent, where, with courage equal to their own, but flowing from a much higher source, the monks of St Bernard have fixed their dwellings among the everlasting snows, that they may afford succour and hospitality to the forlorn travelers in those dreadful wastes. Hitherto the soldiers had had no refreshment, save when they dipt a morsel of biscuit amongst the snow. The good fathers of the convent, who possess considerable magazines of provisions, distributed bread and cheese, and a cup of wine, to each soldier as he passed, which was more acceptable in their situation, than, according to one who shared their fatigues,† would have been the gold of Mexico.

* Apparently the guide who conducted him from the Grand Chartreux found the chief consul in better humour, for Bonaparte said he conversed freely with him, and expressed some wishes with respect to a little farm, etc. which he was able to gratify. To his guide from Martigny to St Pierre, he was also liberal; but the only specimen of his conversation which the latter remembered, was, when, shaking the rain-water from his hat, he exclaimed—"There, see what I have done in your mountains—spoiled my new hat. Pah! I will find another on the other side." See, for these and other interesting anecdotes, Mr Tennant's *Tour through the Netherlands, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, etc.*

† Joseph Petit, fourrier des grenadiers de la garde, author of *Marengo, ou Campagne d'Italie*: 8vo, au ix.

The descent on the other side of Mount St Bernard was as difficult to the infantry as the ascent had been, and still more so to the cavalry. It was, however, accomplished without any material loss, and the army took up their quarters for the night, after having marched fourteen French leagues. The next morning, 16th May, the van-guard took possession of Aosta, a village of Piedmont, from which extends the valley of the same name, watered by the river Dora, a country pleasant in itself, but rendered delightful by its contrast with the horrors which had been left behind.

Thus was achieved the celebrated passage of Mount St Bernard, on the particulars of which we have dwelt the more willingly, because, although a military operation of importance, they do not involve the unvaried details of human slaughter, to which our narrative must now return.

Where the opposition of Nature to Napoleon's march appeared to cease, that of man commenced. A body of Austrians at Châtillon were overpowered and defeated by Lannes; but the strong fortress of Bard offered more serious opposition. This little citadel is situated upon an almost perpendicular rock, rising out of the river Dora, at a place where the valley of Aosta is rendered so very narrow by the approach of two mountains to each other, that the fort and walled town of Bard entirely close up the entrance. This formidable obstacle threatened for the moment to shut up the French in a valley, where their means of subsistence must have been speedily exhausted. General Lannes made a desperate effort to carry the fort by assault; but the advanced guard of the attacking party were destroyed by stones, musketry, and hand-grenades, and the attempt was relinquished.

Bonaparte in person went now to reconnoitre, and for that purpose ascended a huge rock called Albaredo, being a precipice on the side of one of the mountains which form the pass, from the summit of which he could look down into the town, and into the fortress. He detected a possibility of taking the town by storm, though he judged the fort was too strong to be obtained by a coup-de-main. The town was accordingly carried by escalade; but the French who obtained possession of it had little cover from the artillery of the fort, which fired furiously on the houses where they endeavoured to shelter themselves, and which the Austrians might have entirely demolished but for respect to the inhabitants. Meanwhile, Bonaparte availed himself of the diversion to convey a great part of his army in single files, horse as well as foot, by a precarious path formed by the pioneers over the tremendous Albaredo, and so down on the other side, in this manner avoiding the cannon of Fort Bard.

Still a most important difficulty remained. It was impossible, at least without great loss of time, to carry the French artillery over the Albaredo, while, without artillery, it was impossible to move against the Austrians, and every hope of the campaign must be given up.

In the meantime, the astonished commandant of the fort, to whom the apparition of this large army was like enchantment, dispatched messenger after messenger to warn Melas, then opposed to Suchet,

that a French army of 30,000 men and upwards, descending from the Alps by ways hitherto deemed impracticable for military movements, had occupied the valley of Aosta, and were endeavouring to debouche by a path of steps cut in the Albaredo. But he pledged himself to his commander-in-chief, that not a single gun or ammunition waggon should pass through the town; and as it was impossible to drag these along the Albaredo, he concluded, that, being without his artillery, Bonaparte would not venture to descend into the plain.

But while the commandant of Bard thus argued, he was mistaken in his premises, though right in his inference. The artillery of the French army had already passed through the town of Bard, and under the guns of the citadel, without being discovered to have done so. This important manoeuvre was accomplished by previously laying the street with dung and earth, over which the pieces of cannon, concealed under straw and branches of trees, were dragged by men in profound silence. The garrison, though they did not suspect what was going on, fired nevertheless occasionally upon some vague suspicion, and killed and wounded artillerymen in sufficient number to show it would have been impossible to pass under a severe and sustained discharge from the ramparts. It seems singular that the commandant had kept up no intelligence with the town. Any signal previously agreed upon—a light shown in a window, for example—would have detected such a stratagem.

A division of conscripts, under General Chabran, was left to reduce Fort Bard, which continued to hold out, until, at the expense of great labour, batteries were established on the top of the Albaredo, by which it was commanded, and a heavy gun placed on the steeple of the church, when it was compelled to surrender. It is not fruitless to observe, that the resistance of this small place, which had been overlooked or undervalued in the plan of the campaign, was very nearly rendering the march over Mont St Bernard worse than useless, and might have occasioned the destruction of all the chief consul's army. So little are even the most distinguished generals able to calculate with certainty upon all the chances of war.

From this dangerous pass, the van-guard of Bonaparte now advanced down the valley to Ivrea, where Lannes carried the town by storm, and a second time combated and defeated the Austrian division which had defended it, when reinforced and situated on a strong position at Romano. The roads to Turin and Milan were now alike open to Bonaparte—he had only to decide which he chose to take. Meanwhile he made a halt of four days at Ivrea, to refresh the troops after their fatigues, and to prepare them for future enterprises.

During this space, the other columns of his army were advancing to form a junction with that of the main body, according to the plan of the campaign. Turreau, who had passed the Alps by the route of Mont Cenis, had taken the forts of Susa and La Brunetta. On the other hand, the large corps detached by Carnot from Moreau's army were advancing by Mount St Gothard and the Simplon, to support the operations of the first consul, of whose

army they were to form the left wing. But ere we prosecute the account of Bonaparte's movements during this momentous campaign, it is necessary to trace the previous operations of Melas, and the situation in which that Austrian general now found himself.

It has been already stated, that, at the commencement of this campaign of 1800, the Austrians entertained the highest hopes that their Italian army, having taken Genoa and Nice, might penetrate into Provence by crossing the frontier at the Var, and perhaps make themselves masters of Toulon and Marseilles. To realise these hopes, Melas, having left in Piedmont a sufficient force, as he deemed it, to guard the passes of the Alps, had advanced towards Genoa, which Masséna prepared to cover and defend. A number of severe and desperate actions took place between these generals; but being a war of posts, and fought in a very mountainous and difficult country, it was impossible by any skill of combination to insure on any occasion more than partial success, since co-operation of movements upon a great and extensive scale was prohibited by the character of the ground. There was much hard fighting, however, in which, though more of the Austrians were slain, yet the loss was more severely felt by the French, whose numbers were inferior.

In the month of March, the English fleet, under Lord Keith, appeared, as we have already hinted, before Genoa, and commenced a blockade, which strictly prevented access to the port to all vessels loaded with provisions, or other necessaries, for the besieged city.

On the 6th of April, Melas, by a grand movement, took Vado, and intersected the French line. Suchet, who commanded Masséna's left wing, was cut off from that general, and thrown back on France. Marches, manoeuvres and bloody combats, followed each other in close detail; but the French, though obtaining advantages in several of the actions, could never succeed in restoring the communication between Suchet and Masséna. Finally, while the former retreated towards France, and took up a line on Borghetta, the latter was compelled to convert his army into a garrison, and to shut himself up in Genoa, or at least encamp in a position close under its ramparts. Melas, in the meantime, approached the city more closely, when Masséna, in a desperate sally, drove the Austrians from their advanced posts, forced them to retreat, made prisoners twelve hundred men, and carried off some warlike trophies. But the French were exhausted by their very success, and obliged to remain within, or under the walls of the city, where the approach of famine began to be felt. Men were already compelled to have recourse to the flesh of horses, dogs, and other unclean animals, and it was seen that the place must soon be necessarily obliged to surrender.

Satisfied with the approaching fall of Genoa, Melas, in the beginning of May, left the prosecution of the blockade to General Ott, and moved himself against Suchet, whom he drove before him in disorder, and who, overborne by numbers, retreated towards the French frontier. On the 11th of May, Melas entered Nice, and thus commenced the pur-

posed invasion of the French frontier. On the 14th, the Austrians again attacked Suchet, who now had concentrated his forces upon the Var, in hopes to protect the French territory. Finding this a more difficult task than he expected, Melas next prepared to pass the Var higher up, and thus to turn the position occupied by Suchet.

But on the 21st, the Austrian veteran received intelligence which put a stop to all his operations against Suchet, and recalled him to Italy to face a much more formidable antagonist. Tidings arrived, that the first consul of France had crossed St Bernard, had extricated himself from the valley of Aosta, and was threatening to over-run Piedmont and the Milanese territory. These tidings were as unexpected as embarrassing. The artillery, the equipment, the provisions of Melas, together with his communications with Italy, were all at the mercy of this unexpected invader, who, though his force was not accurately known, must have brought with him an army more than adequate to destroy the troops left to guard the frontier; who, besides, were necessarily divided, and exposed to be beaten in detail. Yet, if Melas marched back into Piedmont against Bonaparte, he must abandon the attack upon Suchet, and raise the blockade of Genoa, when that important city was just on the eve of surrender.

Persevering in the belief that the French army of reserve could not exceed twenty thousand men, or thereabouts, in number, and supposing that the principal, if not the sole object of the first consul's daring irruption, was to raise the siege of Genoa, and disconcert the invasion of Provence, Melas resolved on marching himself against Bonaparte with such forces, as, united with those he had left in Italy, might be of power to face the French army, according to his computation of its probable strength. At the same time, he determined to leave before Genoa an army sufficient to insure its fall, and a corps of observation in front of Suchet, by means of which he might easily resume his plans against that general, so soon as the chief consul should be defeated or driven back.

The corps of observation already mentioned was under the command of General Ellsnitz, strongly posted upon the Roje, and secured by entrenchments. It served at once to watch Suchet, and to cover the siege of Genoa from any attempts to relieve the city, which might be made in the direction of France.

Masséna, in the meantime, no sooner perceived the besieging army weakened by the departure of Melas, than he conceived the daring plan of a general attack on the forces of Ott, who was left to carry on the siege. The attempt was unfortunate. The French were defeated, and Soult, who had joined Masséna, was wounded and made a prisoner. Yet Genoa still held out. An officer had found his way into the place, brought intelligence of Bonaparte's descent upon Piedmont, and inspired all with a new spirit of resistance. Still, however, extreme want prevailed in the city, and the hope of deliverance seemed distant. The soldiers received little food, the inhabitants less, the Austrian prisoners, of whom they had about 8000 in Genoa, almost

none. * At length, the situation of things seemed desperate. The numerous population of Genoa rose in the extremity of their despair, and called for a surrender. Bonaparte, they said, was not wont to march so slowly; he would have been before the walls sooner, if he was to appear at all; he must have been defeated or driven back by the superior force of Melas. They demanded the surrender of the place, therefore, which Masséna no longer found himself in a condition to oppose.

Yet, could that brave general have suspended this measure a few hours longer, he would have been spared the necessity of making it at all. General Ott had just received commands from Melas to raise the blockade with all dispatch, and to fall back upon the Po, in order to withstand Bonaparte, who, in unexpected strength, was marching upon Milan. The Austrian staff-officer, who brought the order, had just received his audience of General Ott, when General Andrieux presented himself on the part of Masséna, announced the French general's desire to surrender the place, if his troops were permitted to march off with their arms. There was no time to debate upon terms; and those granted to Masséna by Melas were so unusually favourable, that perhaps they should have made him aware of the precarious state of the besieging army. He was permitted to evacuate Genoa without laying down his arms, and the convention was signed 5th June, 1800. Meantime, at this agitating and interesting period, events of still greater importance than those which concerned the fate of the once princely Genoa, were taking place with frightful rapidity.

Melas, with about one half of his army, had retired from his operations in the Genoese territory, and retreated on Turin by the way of Coni, where he fixed his head-quarters, expecting that Bonaparte would either advance to possess himself of the capital of Piedmont, or that he would make an effort to relieve Genoa. In the first instance, Melas deemed himself strong enough to receive the first consul; in the second, to pursue him; and in either, to assemble such numerous forces as might harass and embarrass either his advance or his retreat. But Bonaparte's plan of the campaign was different from what Melas had anticipated. He had formed the resolution to pass the rivers Sesia and Tesino, and thus leaving Turin and Melas behind him, to push straight for Milan, and form a junction with the division of about 20,000 men, detached from the right wing of Moreau's army, which, commanded by Moncey, were on their road to join him, having crossed the mountains by the route of St Gothard. It was necessary, however, to disguise his purpose from the sagacious veteran.

With this view, ere Bonaparte broke up from Ivrea, Lannes, who had commanded his van-guard with so much gallantry, victorious at Romano, seemed about to improve his advantage. He had marched

* Napoleon says, that Masséna proposed to General Ott to send in provisions to feed these unhappy men, pledging his honour they should be used to no other purpose, and that General Ott was displeased with Lord Keith for declining to comply with a proposal so utterly unknown in the usages of war. It is difficult to give credit to this story.

on Chiavaso, and, seizing on a number of boats and small vessels, appeared desirous to construct a bridge over the Po at that place. This attracted the attention of Melas. It might be equally a preliminary to an attack on Turin, or a movement towards Genoa. But as the Austrian general was at the same time alarmed by the descent of General Turreau's division from Mont Cenis, and their capture of Susa and La Brunetta, Turin seemed ascertained to be the object of the French; and Melas acted on this idea. He sent a strong force to oppose the establishment of the bridge, and while his attention was thus occupied, Bonaparte was left to take the road to Milan unmolested. Vercelli was occupied by the cavalry under Murat, and the Sesia was crossed without obstacle. The Tesino, a broad and rapid river, offered more serious opposition; but the French found four or five small boats, in which they pushed across an advanced party under General Gérard. The Austrians, who opposed the passage, were in a great measure cavalry, who could not act on account of the woody and impracticable character of the bank of the river. The passage was accomplished; and, upon the second of June, Bonaparte entered Milan, where he was received with acclamations by a numerous class of citizens, who looked for the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic. The Austrians were totally unprepared for this movement. Pavia fell into the hands of the French; Lodi and Cremona were occupied, and Pizzighitone was invested.

Meantime, Bonaparte, fixing his residence in the ducal palace of Milan, employed himself in receiving the deputations of various public bodies, and in reorganizing the Cisalpine government, while he waited impatiently to be joined by Monecy and his division from Mont St Gothard. They arrived at length, but marching more slowly than accorded with the fiery promptitude of the first consul, who was impatient to relieve the blockade of Genoa, which place he concluded still held out. He now issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he described, as the result of the efforts he expected from them, "cloudless glory and solid peace." On the 9th of June his armies were again in motion.

Melas, an excellent officer, had at the same time some of the slowness imputed to his countrymen, or of the irresolution incident to the advanced age of eighty years,—for so old was the opponent of Bonaparte, then in the very prime of human life,—or as others suspect, it may have been orders from Vienna which detained the Austrian general so long at Turin, where he lay in a great measure inactive. It is true, that on receiving notice of Bonaparte's march on Milan, he instantly dispatched orders to General Ott, as we have already stated, to raise the siege of Genoa, and join him with all possible speed; but it seemed that, in the meantime, he might have disquieted Bonaparte's lines of communication, by acting upon the river Dorea, attacking Ivrea, in which the French had left much baggage and artillery, and relieving the fort of Bard. Accordingly, he made an attempt of this kind, by detaching 6000 men to Chiavaso, who were successful in delivering some Austrian prisoners at that place; but Ivrea proved strong enough

to resist them, and the French retaining possession of that place, the Austrians could not occupy the valley of the Dorea, or relieve the besieged fortress of Bard.

The situation of Melas now became critical. His communications with the left, or north bank of the Po, were entirely cut off, and by a line stretching from Fort Bard to Placentia, the French occupied the best and fairest share of the north of Italy, while he found himself confined to Piedmont. The Austrian army, besides, was divided into two parts,—one under Ott, which was still near Genoa, that had so lately surrendered to them,—one with Melas himself, which was at Turin. Neither were agreeably situated. That of Genoa was observed on its right by Suchet, whose army, reinforced with the garrison which, retaining their arms, evacuated that city under Masséna, might soon be expected to renew the offensive. There was, therefore, the greatest risk, that Bonaparte, pushing a strong force across the Po, might attack and destroy either the division of Ott, or that of Melas himself, before they were able to form a junction. To prevent such a catastrophe, Ott received orders to march forward on the Tesino, while Melas, moving towards Alexandria, prepared to resume his communications with his lieutenant-general.

Bonaparte, on his part, was anxious to relieve Genoa; news of the fall of which had not reached him. With this view he resolved to force his passage over the Po, and move against the Austrians, who were found to occupy in strength the villages of Casteggio and Montebello. These troops proved to be the greater part of the very army which he expected to find before Genoa, and which was commanded by Ott, but which had moved westward, in conformity to the orders of Melas.

General Laumes, who led the van-guard of the French, as usual, was attacked early in the morning by a superior force, which he had much difficulty in resisting. The nature of the ground gave advantage to the Austrian cavalry, and the French were barely able to support their charges. At length the division of Victor came up to support Lannes, and the victory became no longer doubtful, though the Austrians fought most obstinately. The fields being covered with tall crops of grain, and especially of rye, the different bodies were frequently hid until they found themselves at the bayonet's point, without having had any previous opportunity to estimate each other's force, a circumstance which led to much close fighting, and necessarily to much slaughter. At length the Austrians retreated, leaving the field of battle covered with their dead, and above 5000 prisoners in the hands of their enemies.

General Ott rallied the remains of his army under the walls of Tortona. From the prisoners taken at the battle of Montebello, as this action was called, Bonaparte learned, for the first time, the surrender of Genoa, which apprised him that he was too late for the enterprise which he had meditated. He therefore halted his army for three days in the position of Stradella, unwilling to advance into the open plain of Marengo, and trusting that Melas would find himself compelled to give him battle in the po-

sition which he had chosen, as most unfavourable for the Austrian cavalry. He dispatched messengers to Suchet, commanding him to cross the mountains by the Col di Cadibona, and march on the river Scrivia, which would place him in the rear of the Austrians.

Even during the very battle of Montebello, the chief consul was joined by Desaix, who had just arrived from Egypt. Landed at Fréjus, after a hundred interruptions, that seemed as if intended to withhold him from the fate he was about to meet, he had received letters from Bonaparte, inviting him to come to him without delay. The tone of the letters expressed discontent and embarrassment. "He has gained all," said Desaix, who was much attached to Bonaparte, "and yet he is not happy." Immediately afterwards, on reading the account of his march over St Bernard, he added, "He will leave us nothing to do. He immediately set out post to place himself under the command of his ancient general, and, as it eventually proved, to encounter an early death. They had an interesting conversation on the subject of Egypt, to which Bonaparte continued to cling, as to a matter in which his own fame was intimately and inseparably concerned. Desaix immediately received the command of the division hitherto under that of Boudet.

In the meanwhile, the head-quarters of Melas had been removed from Turin, and fixed at Alexandria for the space of two days; yet he did not, as Bonaparte had expected, attempt to move forward on the French position at Stradella, in order to force his way to Mantua; so that the first consul was obliged to advance towards Alexandria, apprehensive lest the Austrians should escape from him, and either, by a march to the left flank, move for the Tesino, cross that river, and, by seizing Milan, open a communication with Austria in that direction; or, by marching to the right, and falling back on Genoa, overwhelm Suchet, and take a position, the right of which might be covered by that city, while the sea was open for supplies and provisions, and their flank protected by the British squadron.

Either of these movements might have been attended with alarming consequences; and Napoleon, impatient lest his enemy should give him the slip, advanced his head-quarters on the 12th to Voghera, and on the 13th to St Julian, in the midst of the great plain of Marengo. As he still saw nothing of the enemy, the chief consul concluded that Melas had actually retreated from Alexandria, having, notwithstanding the temptation afforded by the level ground around him, preferred withdrawing, most probably to Genoa, to the hazard of a battle. He was still more confirmed in this belief, when, pushing forward as far as the village of Marengo, he found it only occupied by an Austrian rear-guard, which offered no persevering defence against the French, but retreated from the village without much opposition. The chief consul could no longer doubt that Melas had eluded him, by marching off by one of his flanks, and probably by his right. He gave orders to Desaix, whom he had intrusted with the command of the reserve, to march towards Rivolta, with a view to observe the communications with Genoa; and in this manner the reserve was removed half a

day's march from the rest of the army, which had like to have produced most sinister effects upon the event of the great battle that followed.

Contrary to what Bonaparte had anticipated, the Austrian general, finding the first consul in his front, and knowing that Suchet was in his rear, had adopted, with the consent of a council of war, the resolution of trying the fate of arms in a general battle.—It was a bold but not a rash resolution. The Austrians were more numerous than the French in infantry and artillery; much superior in cavalry, both in point of numbers and of discipline; and it has been already said that the extensive plain of Marengo was favourable for the use of that description of force. Melas, therefore, on the evening of the 13th, concentrated his forces in front of Alexandria, divided by the river Bormida from the purposed field of fight; and Napoleon, undecieved concerning the intentions of his enemy, made with all haste the necessary preparations to receive battle, and failed not to send orders to Desaix to return as speedily as possible and join the army. That general was so far advanced on his way towards Rivolta before these counter orders reached him, that his utmost haste only brought him back after the battle had lasted several hours.

Bonaparte's disposition was as follows:—The village of Marengo was occupied by the divisions of Gardanne and Chambarlhac. Victor, with other two divisions, and commanding the whole, was prepared to support them. He extended his left as far as Castel Ceriolo, a small village which lies almost parallel with Marengo. Behind this first line was placed a brigade of cavalry, under Kellermann, ready to protect the flanks of the line, or to debouche through the intervals, if opportunity served, and attack the enemy. About a thousand yards in the rear of the first line was stationed the second, under Lanues, supported by Champeaux's brigade of cavalry. At the same distance, in the rear of Lannes, was placed a strong reserve, or third line, consisting of the division of Carra St-Cyr, and the Consular Guard, at the head of whom was Bonaparte himself. Thus the French were drawn up on this memorable day in three distinct divisions, each composed of a *corps d'armée*, distant about three quarters of a mile in the rear of each other.

The force which the French had in the field in the commencement of the day was above twenty thousand men; the reserve, under Desaix, upon its arrival, might make the whole amount to thirty thousand. The Austrians attacked with nearly forty thousand troops. Both armies were in high spirits, determined to fight, and each confident in their general—the Austrians in the bravery and experience of Melas, the French in the genius and talents of Bonaparte. The immediate stake was the possession of Italy, but it was impossible to guess how many yet more important consequences the event of the day might involve. Thus much seemed certain, that the battle must be decisive, and that defeat must prove destruction to the party who should sustain it. Bonaparte, if routed, could hardly have accomplished his retreat upon Milan; and Melas, if defeated, had Suchet in his rear. The fine plain on which the French were drawn up

seemed lists formed by nature for such an encounter, when the fate of kingdoms was at issue.

Early in the morning the Austrians crossed the Bormida, in three columns, by three military bridges, and advanced in the same order. The right and the centre columns, consisting of infantry, were commanded by Generals Haddick and Kaine; the left, composed entirely of light troops and cavalry, made a detour round Castel Ceriolo, the village mentioned as forming the extreme right of the French position. About seven in the morning, Haddick attacked Marengo with fury, and Gardanne's division, after fighting bravely, proved inadequate to its defence. Victor supported Gardanne, and endeavoured to cover the village by an oblique movement. Melas, who commanded in person the central column of the Austrians, moved to support Haddick; and by their united efforts, the village of Marengo, after having been once or twice lost and won, was finally carried.

The broken divisions of Victor and Gardanne, driven out of Marengo, endeavoured to rally on the second line, commanded by Lannes. This was about nine o'clock. While one Austrian column manoeuvred to turn Lannes's flank, in which they could not succeed, another, with better fortune, broke through the centre of Victor's division, in a considerable degree disordered them, and thus uncovering Lannes's left wing, compelled him to retreat. He was able to do so in tolerably good order; but not so the broken troops of Victor on the left, who fled to the rear in great confusion. The column of Austrian cavalry, who had come round Castel Ceriolo, now appeared on the field, and threatened the right of Lannes, which alone remained standing firm. Napoleon detached two battalions of the Consular Guard from the third line, or reserve, which, forming squares behind the right wing of Lannes, supported its resistance, and withdrew from it in part the attention of the enemy's cavalry. The chief consal himself, whose post was distinguished by the furred caps of a guard of two hundred grenadiers, brought up Monnier's division, which had but now entered the field at the moment of extreme need, being the advance of Desaix's reserve, returned from their half day's march towards Rivolta. These were, with the guards, directed to support Lannes's right wing, and a brigade detached from them was thrown into Castel Ceriolo, which now became the point of support on Bonaparte's extreme right, and which the Austrians, somewhat unaccountably, had omitted to occupy in force when their left column passed it in the beginning of the engagement. Bonaparte, meantime, by several desperate charges of cavalry, endeavoured in vain to arrest the progress of the enemy. His left wing was put completely to flight; his centre was in great disorder, and it was only his right wing, which, by strong support, had been enabled to stand their ground.

In these circumstances the day seemed so entirely against him, that, to prevent his right wing from being overwhelmed, he was compelled to retreat in the face of an enemy superior in numbers, and particularly in cavalry and artillery. It was, however, rather a change of position, than an absolute

retreat to the rear. The French right, still resting on Castel Ceriolo, which formed the pivot of the manoeuvre, had orders to retreat very slowly, the centre faster, the left at ordinary quick time. In this manner the whole line of battle was changed, and instead of extending diagonally across the plain, as when the fight began, the French now occupied an oblong position, the left being withdrawn as far back as St Juliano, where it was protected by the advance of Desaix's troops. This division, being the sole remaining reserve, had now at length arrived on the field, and, by Bonaparte's directions, had taken a strong position in front of St Juliano, on which the French were obliged to retreat, great part of the left wing in the disorder of utter flight, the right wing steadily, and by intervals fronting the enemy, and sustaining with firmness the attacks made upon them.

At this time, and when victory seemed within his grasp, the strength of General Melas, eighty years old, and who had been many hours on horseback, failed entirely; and he was obliged to leave the field, and retire to Alexandria, committing to General Zach the charge of completing a victory which appeared to be already gained.

But the position of Desaix, at St Juliano, afforded the first consul a rallying point, which he now greatly needed. His army of reserve lay formed in two lines in front of the village, their flanks sustained by battalions *en potence*, formed into close columns of infantry; on the left was a train of artillery; on the right, Kellermann, with a large body of French cavalry, which, routed in the beginning of the day, had rallied in this place. The ground that Desaix occupied was where the high road forms a sort of defile, having on the one hand a wood, on the other a thick plantation of vines.

The French soldier understands better perhaps than any other in the world the art of rallying, after having been dispersed. The fugitives of Victor's division, though in extreme disorder, threw themselves into the rear of Desaix's position, and covered by his troops, renewed their ranks and their courage. Yet, when Desaix saw the plain filled with flying soldiers, and beheld Bonaparte himself in full retreat, he thought all must be lost. They met in the middle of the greatest apparent confusion, and Desaix said, "The battle is lost—I suppose I can do no more for you than secure your retreat."

"By no means," answered the first consul, "the battle is, I trust, gained—the disordered troops whom you see are my centre and left, whom I will rally in your rear—Push forward your column."

Desaix, at the head of the ninth light brigade, instantly rushed forward, and charged the Austrians, wearied with fighting the whole day, and disordered by their hasty pursuit. The moment at which he advanced, so critically favourable for Bonaparte, was fatal to himself. He fell, shot through the head.* But his soldiers continued to attack with

* The *Moniteur* put in the mouth of the dying general a message to Bonaparte, in which he expressed his regret that he had done so little for history, and in that of the chief consul an answer, lamenting that he had no time to weep for Desaix. But Bonaparte himself assures us, that Desaix was shot dead on the spot; nor is it probable that

fury, and Kellermann, at the same time charging the Austrian column, penetrated its ranks, and separated from the rest six battalions, which, surprised and panic-struck, threw down their arms; Zach, who, in the absence of Melas, commanded in chief, being at their head, was taken with them. The Austrians were now driven back in their turn. Bonaparte galloped along the French line, calling on the soldiers to advance. "You know," he said, "it is always my practice to sleep on the field of battle."

The Austrians had pursued their success with incautious hurry, and without attending to the due support which one corps ought, in all circumstances, to be prepared to afford to another. Their left flank was also exposed, by their hasty advance, to Bonaparte's right, which had never lost order. They were, therefore, totally unprepared to resist this general furious and unexpected attack. They were forced back at all points, and pursued along the plain, suffering immense loss; nor were they again able to make a stand until driven back over the Bormida. Their fine cavalry, instead of being drawn up in squadrons to cover their retreat, fled in disorder, and at full gallop, riding down all that was in their way. The confusion at passing the river was inextricable—large bodies of men were abandoned on the left side, and surrendered to the French in the course of the night, or next morning.

It is evident, in perusing the accounts of this battle, that the victory was wrested out of the hands of the Austrians, after they had become, by the fatigues of the day, too weary to hold it. Had they sustained the advance by reserves, their disaster would not have taken place. It seems also certain, that the fate of Bonaparte was determined by the arrival of Desaix at the moment he did, and that in spite of the skilful dispositions by which the chief consul was enabled to support the attack so long, he must have been utterly defeated had Desaix put less dispatch in his counter-march. Military men have been farther of opinion, that Melas was guilty of a great error, in not occupying Castel-Verdolo on the advance; and that the appearances of early victory led the Austrians to be by far too unguarded in their advance on St Julian.

In consequence of a loss which seemed in the circumstances altogether irreparable, Melas resolved to save the remains of his army, by entering upon the 15th June, 1800, into a convention, or rather capitulation, by which he agreed, on receiving permission to retire behind Mantua, to yield up Genoa, and all the fortified places which the Austrians possessed in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations. Bonaparte the more readily granted these terms, that an English army was in the act of arriving on the coast. His wisdom taught him not to drive a powerful enemy to despair, and to be satisfied with the glory of having regained, in the affairs of Montebello and of Marengo, almost all the loss sustained by the French in the disastrous campaign of 1799. Enough had been done to show, that, as the fortunes of France appeared to wane and dwindle

after Bonaparte's departure, so they revived with even more than their original brilliancy, as soon as this Child of Destiny had returned to preside over them. An armistice was also agreed upon, which it was supposed might afford time for the conclusion of a victorious peace with Austria; and Bonaparte extended this truce to the armies on the Rhine, as well as those in Italy.

Two days having been spent in the arrangements which the convention with Melas rendered necessary, Bonaparte, on the 17th of June, returned to Milan, where he again renewed the republican constitution, which had been his original gift to the Cisalpine State. He executed several other acts of authority. Though displeased with Masséna for the surrender of Genoa, he did not the less constitute him commander-in-chief in Italy; and though doubtful of Jourdan's attachment, who, on the 18th Brumaire, seemed ready to espouse the republican interest, he did not on that account hesitate to name him minister of the French Republic in Piedmont, which was equivalent to giving him the administration of that province. These conciliatory steps had the effect of making men of the most opposite parties see their own interest in supporting the government of the first consul.

The presence of Napoleon was now eagerly desired at Paris. He set out from Milan on the 24th June, and, in his passage through Lyons, paused to lay the foundation-stone for rebuilding the Place Bellecour, a splendid square, which had been destroyed by the frantic vengeance of the jacobins when Lyons was retaken by them from the insurgent party of girondins and royalists. Finally, the chief consul returned to Paris upon the 2d of July. He had left it on the 6th of May; yet, in the space of not quite two months, how many hopes had he realised! All that the most sanguine partisans had ventured to anticipate of his success had been exceeded. It seemed that his mere presence in Italy was of itself sufficient at once to obliterate the misfortunes of a disastrous campaign, and restore the fruits of his own brilliant victories, which had been lost during his absence. It appeared as if he was the sun of France—when he was hid from her, all was gloom—when he appeared, light and serenity were restored. All the inhabitants, leaving their occupations, thronged to the Tuileries to obtain a glimpse of the wonderful man, who appeared with the laurel of victory in the one hand, and the olive of peace in the other. Shouts of welcome and congratulation resounded from the gardens, the courts, and the quays, by which the palace is surrounded; high and low illuminated their houses; and there were few Frenchmen, perhaps, that were not for the moment partakers of the general joy.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

Napoleon offers, and the Austrian envoy accepts, a new treaty.—The emperor refuses it, unless England is included.—Negotiations then attempted with England.—They fail, and Austria is encouraged to a renewal of the war.—Reasoning on the policy of this conclusion.—An armistice of forty-five days is followed by the resumption of hostilities.—Battle of Hohenlinden gained by

the tide of battle, then just upon the act of turning, left the consul himself time for set phrases, or sentimental ejaculations.

Moreau on the 3d December, 1800.—Other battles take place, by which the Austrian affairs are made desperate, and they agree to a separate peace.—An armistice takes place, which is followed by the treaty of Lunéville.—Convention between France and the United States.—Explanatory recapitulation.—The Queen of Naples repairs to Petersburg to intercede with the Emperor Paul.—His capricious character: originally a violent anti-Gallican, he grows cold and hostile to the Austrians, and attached to the fame and character of the chief consul.—Receives the Queen of Naples with cordiality, and applies in her behalf to Bonaparte.—His envoy received at Paris with the utmost distinction, and the Royal Family of Naples saved for the present, though on severe conditions.—The Neapolitan general compelled to evacuate the Roman territories.—Rome restored to the authority of the pope.—Napoleon demands of the King of Spain to declare war against Portugal.—Olivenza and Almeida taken.—Bonaparte's conduct towards the Peninsular powers overbearing and peremptory.—The British alone active in opposing the French.—Malta, after a blockade of two years, obliged to submit to the English.

NAPOLEON proceeded to manage with great skill and policy the popularity which his success had gained for him. In war it was always his custom, after he had struck some venturous and apparently decisive blow, to offer such conditions as might induce the enemy to submit, and separate his interest from that of his allies. Upon this system of policy he offered the Count de Saint-Julien, an Austrian envoy, the conditions of a treaty, having for its basis that of Campo Formio, which, after the loss of Italy on the fatal field of Marengo, afforded terms much more favourable than the Emperor of Germany was entitled to have expected from the victors. The Austrian envoy accordingly took upon him to subscribe these preliminaries; but they did not meet the approbation of the emperor, who placed his honour on observing accurately the engagements which he had formed with England, and who refused to accede to a treaty in which she was not included. It was added, however, that Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, had intimated Britain's willingness to be included in a treaty for general pacification.

This proposal occasioned a communication between France and Britain, through Monsieur Otto, commissioner for the care of French prisoners. The French envoy intimated, that as a preliminary to Britain's entering on the treaty, she must consent to an armistice by sea, and suspend the advantages which she received from her naval superiority, in the same manner as the First Consul of France had dispensed with prosecuting his victories by land. This demand would have withdrawn the blockade of the British vessels from the French seaports, and allowed the sailing of reinforcements to Egypt and Malta, which last important place was on the point of surrendering to the English. The British ministers were also sensible that there was, besides, a great difference between a truce betwixt two land armies, stationed in presence of each other, and a suspension of naval hostilities over the whole world; since in the one case, on breaking off the treaty, hostilities can be almost instantly resumed; in the other, the distance and uncertainty of communication may

prevent the war being recommenced for many months; by which chance of delay, the French, as being inferior at sea, were sure to be the gainers. The British statesmen, therefore, proposed some modifications, to prevent the obvious inequality of such armistice. But it was replied on the part of France, that though they would accept of such a modified armistice, if Great Britain would enter into a separate treaty, yet the chief consul would not consent to it if Austria was to be participant of the negotiation.

Here, therefore, the overtures of peace betwixt France and England were shipwrecked, and the Austrian emperor was reduced to the alternative of renewing the war, or entering into a treaty without his allies. He appears to have deemed himself obliged to prefer the more dangerous and more honourable course.

This was a generous resolution on the part of Austria, but by no means politic at the period, when their armies were defeated, their national spirit depressed, and when the French armies had penetrated so far into Germany. Even Pitt himself, upon whose declining health the misfortune made a most unfavourable impression, had considered the defeat of Marengo as a conclusion to the hopes of success against France for a considerable period. "Fold up the map," he said, pointing to that of Europe; "it need not be again opened for these twenty years."

Yet, unwilling to resign the contest, even while a spark of hope remained, it was resolved upon in the British councils to encourage Austria to farther prosecution of the war. Perhaps, in recommending such a measure to her ally, at a period when she had sustained such great losses, and was in the state of dejection to which they gave rise, Great Britain too much resembled an eager and over-zealous second, who urges his principal to continue a combat after his strength is exhausted. Austria, a great and powerful nation, if left to repose, would have in time recruited her strength, and constituted once again a balance against the power of France on the Continent; but if urged to farther exertions in the hour of her extremity, she was likely to sustain such farther losses, as might render her comparatively insignificant for a number of years. Such at least is the conclusion which we, who have the advantage of considering the measure with reference to its consequences, are now enabled to form. At the emergency, things were viewed in a different light. The victories of Snarrow and of the Archduke Charles were remembered, as well as the recent defeats sustained by France in the year 1799, which had greatly tarnished the fame of her arms. The character of Bonaparte was not yet sufficiently estimated. His failure before Acre had made an impression in England which was not erased by the victory of Marengo; the extreme prudence which usually tempered his most venturous undertakings was not yet generally known, and the belief and hope were received, that one who ventured on such new and daring manœuvres as Napoleon employed, was likely to behold them miscarry at length, and thus to fall as rapidly as he had risen.

Influenced by such motives, it was determined in the British cabinet to encourage the emperor, by a loan of two millions, to place himself and his brother, the Archduke John, in command of the principal army, raise the whole national force of his mighty empire, and at the head of the numerous forces which he could summon into the field, either command a more equal peace, or try the fortunes of the most desperate war.

The money was paid, and the emperor joined the army; but the negotiations for peace were not broken off. On the contrary, they were carried on much on the terms which St-Julien had subscribed to, with this additional and discreditable circumstance, that the first consul, as a pledge of the Austrian sincerity, required that the three fortified towns of Ingolstadt, Ulm, and Philipstadt, should be placed temporarily in the hands of the French; a condition to which the Austrians were compelled to submit. But the only advantage purchased by this surrender, which greatly exposed the hereditary dominions of Austria, was an armistice of forty-five days, at the end of which hostilities were again renewed.

In the action of Haag, the Archduke John, whose credit in the army almost rivaled that of his brother Charles, obtained considerable advantages; and, encouraged by them, he ventured on the 3d of December, 1800, two days afterwards, a great and decisive encounter with Moreau. This was the occasion on which that general gained over the Austrians the bloody and most important victory of Hohenlinden, an achievement which did much to keep his reputation for military talents abreast with that of the first consul himself. Moreau pursued his victory, and obtained possession of Salzburg. At the same time Augereau, at the head of the Gallo-Batavian army, pressed forward into Bohemia; and Macdonald, passing from the country of the Grisons into the Valteline, forced a division of his army across the Mincio, and communicated with Masséna and the French army in Italy. The Austrian affairs seemed utterly desperate. The Archduke Charles was again placed at the head of her forces, but they were so totally discouraged, that a retreat on all points was the only measure which could be executed.

Another and a final cessation of arms was now the only resource of the Austrians; and, in order to obtain it, the emperor was compelled to agree to make a peace separate from his allies. Britain, in consideration of the extremity to which her ally was reduced, voluntarily relieved him from the engagement by which he was restrained from doing so without her participation. An armistice shortly afterwards took place, and the Austrians being now sufficiently humbled, it was speedily followed by a peace. Joseph Bonaparte, for this purpose, met with the Austrian minister, Count Cobentzel, at Lunéville, where the negotiations were carried on.

There were two conditions of the treaty, which were peculiarly galling to the emperor. Bonaparte peremptorily exacted the cession of Tuscany, the hereditary dominions of the brother of Francis, which were to be given up to a prince of the house of Parma, while the Archduke was to obtain an in-

demnity in Germany. The French consul demanded, with no less pertinacity, that Francis (though not empowered to do so by the Germanic constitution) should confirm the peace, as well in his capacity of Emperor of Germany, as in that of sovereign of his own hereditary dominions. This demand, from which Bonaparte would on no account depart, involved a point of great difficulty and delicacy. One of the principal clauses of the treaty included the cession of the whole territories on the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic; thereby depriving not only Austria, but Prussia, and various other princes of the German empire, of their possessions in the districts, which were now made over to France. It was provided, that the princes who should suffer such deprivations were to be remunerated by indemnities, as they were termed, to be allotted to them at the expense of the Germanic body in general. Now the emperor had no power to authorize the alienation of these fiefs of the empire, without consent of the diet, and this was strongly urged by his envoy.

Bonaparte was, however, determined to make peace on no other terms than those of the emperor's giving away what was not his to bestow. Francis was compelled to submit, and, as the necessity of the case pleaded its apology, the act of the emperor was afterwards ratified by the diet. Except in these mortifying claims, the submission to which plainly intimated the want of power to resist compulsion, the treaty of Lunéville was not much more advantageous to France than that of Campo Formio; and the moderation of the first consul indicated at once his desire of peace upon the Continent, and considerable respect for the bravery and strength of Austria, though enfeebled by such losses as those of Marengo and Hohenlinden.

We have already noticed the disputes betwixt France and America, and the scandalous turn of the negotiations, by which the French Directory attempted to bully or wheedle the United States out of a sum of money, which, in part at least, was to be dedicated to their own private use. Since that time the aggressions committed by the French on the American navy had been so numerous, that the two republics seemed about to go to war, and the United States actually issued letters of marque for making reprisals on the French. New communications and negotiations, however, were opened, which Bonaparte studied to bring to maturity. His brother Joseph acted as negotiator, and on the 30th of September, 1800, a convention was entered into, to subsist for the space of eight years, agreeing on certain modifications of the right of search, declaring that commerce should be free between the countries, and that the captures on either side, excepting such as were contraband, and destined for an enemy's harbour, should be mutually restored. Thus Bonaparte restored peace between France and the United States, and prevented the latter, in all probability, from throwing themselves into a closer union with Britain, to which their common descent, with the similarity of manners, language, and laws, overcoming the recollection of recent hostilities, might have otherwise strongly inclined them.

Still more important results were derived by

Napoleon, from the address and political sagacity, with which, in accommodating matters with the court of Naples, he contrived to form what finally became a strong and predominating interest in the councils, and even the affections of a monarch, whose amity was, of all others, the most important to his plans. The prince alluded to was the Emperor of Russia, who had been, during the preceding year, the most formidable and successful enemy encountered by France since her revolution. A short resumption of facts is necessary, to understand the circumstances in which the negotiation with Naples originated.

When Bonaparte departed for Egypt, all Italy, excepting Tuscany, and the dominions assigned to Austria by the treaty of Campo Formio, was in the hands of the French; while Naples was governed by the ephemeral Parthenopean Republic, and the city of the popes by that which assumed the superb title of Roman. These authorities, however, were only nominal; the French generals exercised the real authority in both countries. Suddenly, and as if by magic, this whole state of affairs was changed by the military talents of Suwarrow. The Austrians and Russians gained great successes in the north of Italy, and General Macdonald found himself obliged to evacuate Naples, and to concentrate the principal resistance of the French in Lombardy and Piedmont. Cardinal Ruffo, a soldier, churchman, and politician, put himself at the head of a numerous body of insurgents, and commenced war against such French troops as had been left in the south, and in the middle of Italy. This movement was actively supported by the British fleet. Lord Nelson recovered Naples; Rome surrendered to Commodore Trowbridge. Thus, the Parthenopean and Roman republics were extinguished for ever. The royal family returned to Naples, and that fine city and country were once more a kingdom. Rome, the capital of the world, was occupied by Neapolitan troops, generally supposed the most indifferent of modern times.

Replaced in his richest territories by the allies, the King of Naples was bound by every tie to assist them in the campaign of 1800. He accordingly sent an army into the March of Ancona, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, who, with the assistance of insurrectionary forces* among the inhabitants, and a body of Austrians was to clear Tuscany of the French. Undeterred by the battle of Marengo, the Count de Damas marched against the French general Miollis, who commanded in Tuscany, and sustained a defeat by him near Sienna. Retreat became now necessary, the more especially as the armistice which was entered into by General Melas deprived the Neapolitans of any assistance from the Austrians, and rendered their whole expedition utterly hopeless. They were not even included by name in the armistice, and were thus left exposed to the whole vengeance of the French.

* These were, at this period, easily raised in any part of Italy. The exactions of the French had entirely alienated the affections of the natives, who had long since seen through their pretexes of affording them the benefit of a free government.

Damas retreated into the territories of the church, which were still occupied by the Neapolitan forces. The consequence of these events was easily foreseen. The Neapolitan troops, so soon as the French could find leisure to look towards them, must be either destroyed entirely, or driven back upon Naples, and that city must be again forsaken by the royal family, happy if they were once more able to make their escape to Sicily, as on the former occasion.

At this desperate crisis, the Queen of the Two Sicilies took a resolution which seemed almost as desperate, and could only have been adopted by a woman of a bold and decisive character. She resolved, notwithstanding the severity of the season, to repair in person to the court of the Emperor Paul, and implore his intercession with the first consul, in behalf of her husband and his territories.

We have not hitherto mentioned, except cursorily, the powerful prince whose mediation she implored. The son and successor of the celebrated Catherine, far from possessing the prudence and political sagacity of his mother, seemed rather to display the heady passions and imperfect judgment of his unfortunate father. He was capricious in the choice of his objects, pursuing for the time, with uncommon and irregular zeal and pertinacity, projects which he afterwards discarded and abandoned, swelling trifles of dress or behaviour into matters of importance, and neglecting, on the other hand, what was of real consequence;—governed, in short, rather by imagination than by his reasoning qualities, and sometimes affording room to believe that he actually laboured under a partial aberration of mind. Such characters are often to be met with in private society, the restraints of which keep them within such limits, that they pass through life without attracting much notice, unless when creating a little mirth, or giving rise to some passing wonder. But an absolute prince, possessed of such a disposition, is like a giddy person placed on the verge of a precipice, which would try the soundest head, and must overpower a weak one.

The emperor had first distinguished himself by an energetic defence of the rights of sovereigns, and a hatred of whatever belonged to or was connected with the French Revolution, from a political maxim to the shape of a coat or a hat. The brother of Louis XVI., and inheritor of his rights, found a refuge in the Russian dominions; and Paul, fond, as most princes are, of military glory, promised himself that of restoring the Bourbon dynasty by force of arms.

The train of victories acquired by Suwarrow was well calculated to foster these original partialities of the emperor; and, accordingly, while success continued to wait on his banners, he loaded his general with marks of his regard, elevated him to the rank of a prince, and conferred on him the title of Italsky, or Italicus.

The very first and only misfortune which befel Suwarrow seems to have ruined him in the opinion of his capricious master. The defeat of Korsakow by Masséna, near Zurich, had involved Suwarrow in great momentary danger, as he advanced into Switzerland, reckoning on the support of that gene-

ral, whose disaster left his right uncovered. Now, although Suwarrow saved his army on this occasion by a retreat, which required equal talent to that which achieved his numerous victories, yet the bare fact of his having received a check was sufficient to ruin him with his haughty sovereign. Paul was yet more offended with the conduct of the Austrians. The Archduke Charles having left Switzerland, to descend into Germany, had given occasion and opportunity for Masséna to cross the Limmat and surprise Korsakow; and this, notwithstanding every explanation and apology, rankled in the mind of the czar. He recalled his armies from the frontiers of Germany, and treated his veteran and victorious general with such marks of neglect and displeasure, that the old man's heart sunk under them.

In the meanwhile, Paul gathered up farther subjects of complaint against the Austrian government, and complained of their having neglected to provide for some Russian prisoners, under a capitulation which they made in behalf of their own, at the surrender of Ancona to the French.

The Austrians could not afford to lose so powerful and efficient an ally in the day of their adversity. They endeavoured to explain, that the movement of the Archduke Charles was inevitably necessary, in consequence of an invasion of the Austrian territory—they laid the blame of the omission of the Russians in the capitulation upon the commandant Frœlich, and offered to place him under arrest. The Emperor of Austria even proposed, in despite of the natural pride which is proper to his distinguished house, to place Suwarrow at the head of the Austrian armies,—a proffer which, if it had been accepted, might have given rise to an extraordinary struggle betwixt the experience, determination, and warlike skill of the veteran Scythian, and the formidable talents of Bonaparte, and which perhaps contained the only chance which Europe possessed at the time, of opposing to the latter a rival worthy of himself; for Suwarrow had never yet been conquered, and possessed an irresistible influence over the minds of his soldiers. These great generals, however, were not destined ever to decide the fate of the world by their meeting.

Suwarrow, a Russian in all his feelings, broke his heart, and died under the unmerited displeasure of his emperor, whom he had served with so much fidelity. If the memory of his unfortunate sovereign were to be judged of according to ordinary rules, his conduct towards his distinguished subject would have left on it an indelible stigma. As it is, the event must pass as another proof, that the Emperor Paul was not amenable, from the construction of his understanding and temperament, to the ordinary rules of censure.

Meanwhile, the proposals of Austria were in vain. The czar was not to be brought back to his former sentiments. He was like a spoiled child, who, tired of his favourite toy, seems bent to break asunder and destroy what was lately the dearest object of his affection.

When such a character as Paul changes his opinion of his friends, he generally runs into the opposite extreme, and alters also his thoughts of his enemies. Like his father, and others whose imagi-

nation is indifferently regulated, the czar had need of some one of whom to make his idol. The extravagant admiration which the Emperor Peter felt for Frederick of Prussia, could not well be entertained for any one now alive, unless it were the first consul of France; and on him, therefore, Paul was now disposed to turn his eyes with a mixture of wonder, and of a wish to imitate what he wondered at. This extravagance of admiration is a passion natural to some minds (never strong ones), and may be compared to that tendency which others have to be in love all their lives, in defiance of advancing age and other obstacles.

When Paul was beginning to entertain this humour, the arrival of the Queen of Sicily at his court gave him a graceful and even dignified opportunity to approach towards a connexion with Napoleon Bonaparte. His pride, too, must have been gratified by seeing the daughter of the renowned Maria Theresia, the sister of the Emperor of Austria, at his court of St Petersburg, soliciting from the Czar of Russia the protection which her brother was totally unable to afford her; and a successful interference in her behalf would be a kind of insult to the misfortunes of that brother, against whom, as we have noticed, Paul nourished resentful feelings. He therefore resolved to open a communication with France, in behalf of the royal family of Naples. Lewinshoff, Grand Huntsman of Russia, was dispatched to make the overtures of mediation. He was received with the utmost distinction at Paris, and Bonaparte made an instant and graceful concession to the request of the Emperor Paul. The first consul agreed to suspend his military operations against Naples, and to leave the royal family in possession of their sovereignty; reserving to himself, however, the right of dictating the terms under which he was to grant them such an amnesty.

It was time that some effectual interposition should take place in defence of the King of Naples, who, though he had around him a nation individually brave and enthusiastic, was so ill-served, that his regular army was in the worst and most imperfect state of discipline. Murat, to whom Bonaparte had committed the task of executing his vengeance on Naples, had already crossed the Alps, and placed himself at the head of an army of ten thousand chosen men; a force then judged sufficient not only to drive the Neapolitan general Damas out of the Ecclesiastical States, but to pursue him as far as Naples, and occupy that beautiful capital of a prince, whose regular army consisted of more than thirty thousand soldiers, and whose irregular forces might have been increased to any number by the mountaineers of Calabria, who form excellent light troops, and by the numerous Lazzaroni of Naples, who had displayed their valour against Championnet, upon the first invasion of the French. But the zeal of a nation avails little when the spirit of the government bears no proportion to it. The government of Naples dreaded the approach of Murat as that of the Angel of Death; and they received the news that Lewinshoff has joined the French general at Florence, as a condemned criminal might have heard the news of a reprieve. The Russian envoy was received with distinguished honours at Florence.

Murat appeared at the theatre with Lewinshoff, where the Italians, who had so lately seen the Russian and French banners placed in bloody opposition to each other, now beheld them formally united in presence of these dignitaries; in sign, it was said, that the two nations were combined for the peace of the world and general benefit of humanity. Untimely agony! How often after that period did these standards meet in the bloodiest fields history ever recorded; and what a long and desperate struggle was yet in reserve ere the general peace so boldly predicted was at length restored!

The respect paid by the first consul to the wishes of Paul saved for the present the royal family of Naples; but Murat, nevertheless, made them experience a full portion of the bitter cup which the vanquished are generally doomed to swallow. General Damas was commanded in the haughtiest terms to evacuate the Roman States, and not to presume to claim any benefit from the armistice which had been extended to the Austrians. At the same time, while the Neapolitans were thus compelled hastily to evacuate the Roman territories, general surprise was exhibited, when, instead of marching to Rome, and re-establishing the authority of the Roman Republic, Murat, according to the orders which he had received from the first consul, carefully respected the territory of the church, and reinstalled the officers of the pope in what had been long termed the patrimony of St Peter's. This unexpected turn of circumstances originated in high policy on the part of Bonaparte.

We certainly do Napoleon no injustice in supposing, that personally he had little or no influential sense of religion. Some obscure yet rooted doctrines of fatality seem, so far as we can judge, to have formed the extent of his metaphysical creed. We can scarce term him even a deist, and he was an absolute stranger to every modification of christian belief and worship. But he saw and valued the use of a national religion as an engine of state policy. In Egypt, he was desirous of being thought an envoy of Heaven; and though uncircumcised, drinking wine and eating pork, still claimed to be accounted a follower of the law of the Prophet. He had pathetically expostulated with the Turks on their hostility towards him. The French, he said, had ceased to be followers of Jesus; and now that they were almost, if not altogether, moslemah, would the true believers make war on those who had overthrown the cross, dethroned the pope, and extirpated the order of Malta, the sworn persecutors of the moslem faith? On his return to France, all this was to be forgotten, or only remembered as a trick played upon the infidels. He was, as we have said, aware of the necessity of a national faith to support the civil government; and as, while in Egypt, he affected to have destroyed the catholic religion in honour of that of Mhommehd, so, returned to Europe, he was now desirous to become the restorer of the temporal territories of the pope, in order to obtain such a settlement of church affairs in France, as might procure for his own government the countenance of the sovereign pontiff, and for himself an admission into the pale of christian princes. This restitution was in some measure consistent

with his policy in 1798, when he had spared the temporalities of the Holy See. Totally indifferent as Napoleon was to religion in his personal capacity, his whole conduct shows his sense of its importance to the existence of a settled and peaceful state of society.

Besides evacuating the Ecclesiastical States, the Neapolitans were compelled by Murat to restore various paintings, statues, and other objects of art, which they had, in imitation of Bonaparte, taken forcibly from the Romans,—so captivating is the influence of bad example. A French army of about eighteen thousand men was to be quartered in Calabria, less for the purpose of enforcing the conditions of peace, than to save France the expense of supporting the troops, and to have them stationed where they might be embarked for Egypt at the shortest notice. The harbours of the Neapolitan dominions were of course to be closed against the English. A cession of part of the isle of Elba, and the relinquishment of all pretensions upon Tuscany, summed up the sacrifices of the King of Naples, who, considering how often he had braved Napoleon, had great reason to thank the Emperor of Russia for his effectual mediation in his favour.

These various measures respecting foreign relations, the treaty of Lunéville, the acquisition of the good-will of the Emperor Paul, the restoration of Rome to the pope's authority, and the mildness of the penalty inflicted on the King of Naples, seemed all to spring from a sound and moderate system, the object of which was rather the consolidation of Napoleon's government, than any wish to extend its influence or its conquests. His plans, in after times, often exhibited a mixture of the greatest good sense and prudence, with rash and splenetic explosions of an over-eager ambition, or a temper irritated by opposition; but it is to be remembered that Bonaparte was not yet so firm in the authority which he had but just acquired, as to encourage any display of the infirmities of his mind and temper.

His behaviour towards Portugal was, however, of a character deviating from the moderation he had in general displayed. Portugal, the ancient and faithful ally of England, was on that account the especial object of the first consul's displeasure. He, therefore, demanded of the King of Spain, who, since the peace between the countries, had been the submissive vassal of France, to declare war on the Prince Regent of Portugal, although the husband of his daughter. War accordingly was declared, in obedience to the mandate of the first consul, and the Spanish armies, together with an auxiliary army of French under Leclerc, entered Portugal, took Olivenza and Almeida, and compelled the Prince Regent, 6th of June, 1801, to sign a treaty, engaging to shut his ports against the English, and surrendering to Spain Olivenza, and other places on the frontier of the Guadiana. Bonaparte was highly discontented with this treaty, to which he would not accede; and he refused, at the same time, to withdraw from Spain the army of Leclerc. On the 29th September, he condescended to grant Portugal peace under some additional terms, which were not in themselves of much consequence, although the overbearing and peremptory conduct which he exhi-

bited towards the Peninsular powers was a sign of the dictatorial spirit which he was prepared to assume in the affairs of Europe.

The same disposition was manifested in the mode by which Bonaparte was pleased to show his sense of the King of Spain's complaisance. He chose for that purpose to create a kingdom and a king—a king, too, of the house of Bourbon. An Infant of Spain obtained the throne of Tuscany, under the name of Etruria, rent from the house of Austria. Madame de Staël terms this the commencement of the great masquerade of Europe; but it was more properly the second act. The stage, during the first, was occupied by a quadrille of republics who were now to be replaced by an anti-mask of kings. This display of power pleased the national vanity, and an uproar of applause ensued, while the audience at the theatre applied to Bonaparte the well-known line—

J'ai fait des rois, madame, et n'ai pas voulu l'être.

While all the Continent appeared thus willing to submit to one so ready to avail himself of their subjection, Britain alone remained at war; without allies, without, it might seem, a direct object; yet on the grand and unalterable principle, that no partial distress should induce her to submit to the system of degradation, which seemed preparing for all nations under the yoke of France, and which had placed France herself, with all her affected zeal of liberty, under the government of an arbitrary ruler. On every point the English squadrons annihilated the commerce of France, crippled her revenues, blockaded her ports, and prevented those combinations which would have crowned the total conquest of Europe, could the master, as he might now be called, of the land, have enjoyed, at the same time, the facilities which can only be afforded by communication by sea.

It was in vain that Bonaparte, who, besides his natural hardness of perseverance, connected a part of his own glory with the preservation of Egypt, endeavoured by various means to send supplies to that distant province. His convoys were driven back into harbour by the English fleets; and he directed against his admirals, who could not achieve impossibilities, the unavailing resentment natural to one who was so little accustomed to disappointment.

The chance of relieving Egypt was rendered yet more precarious by the loss of Malta, which, after a distressing blockade of two years, was obliged to submit to the English arms on the 5th of September, 1800. The English were thus in possession of a strong, and almost impregnable citadel, in the midst of the Mediterranean, with an excellent harbour, and everything required for a naval station of the first importance; above all, they had obtained the very spot which Bonaparte had fixed upon for maintaining the communication with Egypt, which was now in greater danger than ever.

The capture of Malta was, however, by its consequences, favourable to Napoleon's views in one important respect. The Emperor Paul imagined he had rights upon that island, in consequence of his having declared himself Grand Master of the order of St John; and although, by his deserting the coa-

lition, and abandoning the common cause, he had lost all right to expect that Great Britain should surrender to him an important acquisition made by her own arms, yet, with his usual intemperate indulgence of passion, he conceived himself deeply injured by its being withheld, and nourished from that time an implacable resentment against England and her government, the effects of which are afterwards to be traced.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Internal government of France.—General attachment to the chief consul, though the two factions of republicans and royalists are hostile to him.—Plot of the former to remove him by assassination.—Defeated.—Vain hopes of the royalists, that Napoleon would be the instrument of restoring the Bourbons.—Applications to him for that effect disappointed.—Royalists methodize the plot of the Infernal Machine.—Description of it.—It fails.—Suspicion first falls on the republicans, and a decree of transportation is passed against a great number of their chiefs—but is not carried into execution.—The actual conspirators tried and executed.—Use made by Bonaparte of the conspiracy to consolidate despotism.—Various measures devised for that purpose.—System of the police.—Fouché—His skill, influence, and power.—Napoleon becomes jealous of him, and organizes measures of precaution against him.—Apprehension entertained by the chief consul of the effects of literature, and his efforts against it.—Persecution of Madame de Staël.—The Concordat—Various views taken of that measure.—Plan for a general system of Jurisprudence—Amnesty granted to the emigrants.—Plans of public education.—Other plans of improvement.—Hopes of a general peace.

WE return to the internal government of France under the chief consul.

The events subsequent to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire seemed to work a miraculous change on the French nation. The superior talents of Napoleon, with the policy exercised by Talleyrand and Fouché, and the other statesmen of ability whom he had called into administration, and who desired at all events to put an end to further revolutionary movements—but, above all, the victory of Marengo, had at once created and attached to the person of the chief consul an immense party, which might be said to comprehend all those who, being neither decided royalists nor determined republicans, were indifferent about the form of the government, so they found ease and protection while living under it.

But, on the other hand, the heads of the two factions continued to exist; and, as the power of the first consul became at once more absolute and more consolidated, it grew doubly hateful and formidable to them. His political existence was a total obstruction to the systems of both parties, and yet one which it was impossible to remove. There was no national council left, in which the authority of the first consul could be disputed, or his measures impeached. The strength of his military power bid defiance alike to popular commotions, if the democrats had yet possessed the means of exerting them, and to the scattered hands of the royalist insurgents. What chance remained for ridding themselves of the autocrat, in whom the republicans saw a dictator, the royalists an usurper? None, save

that, being mortal, Napoleon was subject to be taken off by assassination.

The democrats were naturally the first to meditate an enterprise of this nature. The right of taking off a tyrant was, according to their creed, as proper to any private citizen as to those who opposed him armed in the field. The act of Harmodius and Aristogiton—the noble deed of Brutus and his associates—were consecrated in history, and esteemed so congenial to the nature of a free constitution, that the Convention, on the motion of Jean Debry, had at one time determined to raise a legion of assassins, armed with poniards, who should devote themselves to the pious task of exterminating all foreign princes, statesmen, and ministers—in short, all who were accounted the foes of freedom, without pity or distinction. In a party entertaining such principles, there could be no scruple on the score of morality; and where they had been so lately professed by thousands, it seemed natural that, amid the multitude, they must have made a deep impression on some enthusiastic and gloomy disposition, which might be easily provoked to act upon them.

It is no wonder, therefore, that some obscure jacobins should have early nourished the purpose of assassinating Napoleon, as the enemy of his country's freedom, and the destroyer of her liberties; but it is singular, that most of the conspirators against his person were Italians. Aréna, brother of the deputy who was said to have aimed a dagger at Bonaparte in the Council of Five Hundred, was at the head of the conspiracy. He was a Corsican. With him, Ceraschi and Diana, two Italian refugees; a painter, called Topino Lebrun; and two or three enthusiasts of low condition, formed a plot for the purpose of assassinating the chief consul at the Opera-house. Their intention was detected by the police; Ceraschi and Diana were arrested behind the scenes, armed, it was said, and prepared for the attempt, and Napoleon was congratulated by most of the constituted authorities upon having escaped a great danger.

Cassous, President of the Tribunal, made a singular speech on the occasion, which would almost bear a double interpretation. "There had been so many conspiracies," he said, "at so many different periods, and under so many different pretexts, which had never been followed up either by inquiry or punishment, that a great number of good citizens had become sceptical on the subject of their existence. This incredulity was dangerous," he argued; "it was time it should be ended." With this view, Monsieur Cassous recommended, that the persons guilty on the present occasion should be prosecuted and punished with all the solemnity and rigour of the laws.

Bonaparte replied, with military indifference, that he had been in no real danger. "The contemptible wretches," he said, in something like a renewal of his Egyptian vein, "had no power to commit the crime they meditated. Besides the assistance of the whole audience, I had with me a piquet of my brave guard, from whom the wretches could not have borne a look." So ended this singular discourse; and it is remarkable that neither were the circumstances of the plot made public, nor the con-

spirators punished, till the more memorable attempt on Napoleon's life by the royalists.

The royalists, as a party, had far more interest with Bonaparte than the democrats. The former approved of the principles and form of his government,—it was only necessary for their conversion that they should learn to endure his person; whereas the jacobins being equally averse to the office to which he aspired, to his power, and to himself, there were no hopes of their being brought to tolerate either the monarch or the man. Of the latter, therefore, Napoleon entertained equal dislike and distrust; while, from obvious causes, his feelings towards the former were in some measure friendly.

The royalists, too, for some time entertained a good opinion of Bonaparte, and conceived that he intended, in his own time and his own way, to act in behalf of the exiled royal family. The enthusiastic of the party were at a loss to conceive that the throne of France should be again erected, and that any one but a Bourbon should dare to ascend it. It seemed to them impossible that the monarchy should revive without the restoration of the legitimate monarch, and they could not believe that a Corsican soldier of fortune would meditate an usurpation, or that France would be for a moment tolerant of his pretensions. The word liberty had, indeed, misled the people of France for a time, but, that illusion being dissipated, their natural love to the royal race would return like a reviving spring, and again run in its old channel.

So general was the belief among this class, that Bonaparte meditated the restoration of the Bourbons, that several agents of the family made their way so far as to sound his own mind upon the subject. Louis himself, afterwards XVIII., addressed to the first consul a letter of the following tenor:—"You cannot achieve the happiness of France without my restoration, any more than I can ascend the throne which is my right, without your co-operation. Hasten then to complete the good work, which none but you can accomplish, and name the rewards which you claim for your friends."

Bonaparte answered the letter with cold civility. He esteemed the person, he said, and pitied the misfortunes, of his Royal Highness the Count de Provence, and should be glad to assist him, did an opportunity permit. But as his royal highness could not be restored to France, save at the expense of a hundred thousand lives, it was an enterprise in which he, Bonaparte, must decline to aid him.

A less direct, and more artful course, is said to have been attempted, by the mission of the Duchess de Guiche, one of the most beautiful and pleasing women of the time, who, obtaining permission to come to Paris under pretext of her private affairs, was introduced at the Tuileries, and delighted Josephine with the elegance of her manners. Napoleon did not escape the fascination, but the instant she touched on the subject of politics, the interesting duchess received an order to quit Paris.

As soon as the royalists discovered, by the failure of these and similar applications, as well as by the gradual tendency of Bonaparte's measures, that the restoration of the Bourbons was the thing farthest from his purpose, their disappointment exasperated

them against the audacious individual whose single person seemed now the only obstacle to that event. Monarchical power was restored, in spirit at least, if not in form; was it to be endured, the more zealous followers of the Bourbons demanded of each other, that it should become the prize of a military usurper? This party, as well as that of the jacobins, contained, doubtless, many adherents, whom the enthusiasm of their political principles disposed to serve their cause, even at the expense of great crimes. The sentiments of the princes of the royal family upon such a subject were becoming their high rank.* They were resolved to combat Bonaparte's pretensions with open force, such as befitted their pretensions as head of the chivalry of France, but to leave to jacobins the schemes of private assassination. Still there must have been many, among those characters which are found during the miseries and crimes of civil war, who conceived that the assassination of the chief consul would be received as good service when accomplished, although it might not be authorized beforehand. Nay, there may have been partisans zealous enough to take the crime and punishment on themselves, without looking farther than the advantage which their party would receive by the action.

A horrible invention, first hatched, it is said, by the jacobins,† was adopted by certain royalists of a low description, remarkable as actors in the wars of the Chouans, of whom the leaders were named Carbon and St-Régent. It was a machine, consisting of a barrel of gunpowder placed on a cart, to which it was strongly secured, and charged with grape-shot so disposed around the barrel as to be dispersed in every direction by the explosion. The fire was to be communicated by a slow-match. It was the purpose of the conspirators, undeterred by the indiscriminate slaughter which such a discharge must occasion, to place the machine in the street through which the first consul was to go to the Opera, having contrived that it should explode exactly as his carriage should pass the spot; and, strange to say, this stratagem, which seemed as uncertain as it was atrocious, was within a hair's breadth of success.

On the evening of the 24th December, 1800, Bonaparte has informed us that, though he himself felt

a strong desire to remain at home, his wife and one or two intimate friends insisted that he should go to the Opera. He was slumbering under a canopy when they awakened him. One brought his hat, another his sword. He was in a manner forced into his carriage, where he again slumbered, and was dreaming of the danger which he had escaped in an attempt to pass the river Tagliamento some years before. On a sudden he awoke amidst thunder and flame.

The cart bearing the engine, which was placed in the street St-Nicaise, intercepted the progress of the chief consul's coach, which passed it with some difficulty. St-Régent had fired the match at the appointed instant; but the coachman, who chanced to be somewhat intoxicated, driving unusually fast, the carriage had passed the machine two seconds before the explosion took place; and that almost imperceptible fraction of time was enough to save the life which was aimed at. The explosion was terrible. Two or three houses were greatly damaged, twenty persons killed, and about fifty-three wounded—among the latter was the incendiary St-Régent. The report was heard several leagues from Paris. Bonaparte instantly exclaimed to Lannes and Bessières, who were in the carriage, "We are blown up!" The attendants would have stopped the coach, but with more presence of mind he commanded them to drive on, and arrived in safety at the Opera; his coachman during the whole time never discovering what had happened, but conceiving the consul had only received a salute of artillery.

A public officer, escaped from such a peril, became an object of yet deeper interest than formerly to the citizens in general; and the reception of the consul at the Opera and elsewhere was more enthusiastic than ever. Relief was ostentatiously distributed amongst the wounded and the relatives of the slain; and every one, shocked with the wild atrocity of such a reckless plot, became, while they execrated the perpetrators, attached in proportion to the object of their cruelty. A disappointed conspiracy always adds strength to the government against which it is directed; and Bonaparte did not fail to push this advantage to the uttermost.

Notwithstanding that the infernal machine (for so it was not inappropriately termed) had in fact been managed by the hands of royalists, the first suspicion fell on the republicans; and Bonaparte took the opportunity, before the public were undeceived on the subject, of dealing that party a blow, from the effects of which they did not recover during his reign. An arbitrary decree of the Senate was asked and readily obtained, for the transportation beyond seas of nearly one hundred and thirty of the chiefs of the broken faction of the jacobins, among whom were several names which belonged to the celebrated reign of Terror, and had figured in the rolls of the National Convention. These men were so generally hated, as connected with the atrocious scenes during the reign of Robespierre, that the unpopularity of their characters excused the irregularity of the proceedings against them, and their fate was viewed with complacency by many, and with indifference by all. In the end, the first consul became so persuaded of the political insignificance of

* The opinions of the royal family were nobly expressed, in a letter written by the Prince of Condé to the Count d'Artois, at a later period, 24th January, 1802, which will be hereafter quoted at length.

† It is said, in the *Mémoires de Fouché*, that the infernal machine was the invention originally of a jacobin named Chevalier, assisted by Veyer, one of the same party; that they even made an experiment of its power, by exploding an engine of the kind behind the Convent de la Salpêtrière; ** that this circumstance drew on them the attention of the police, and that they were arrested. It does not appear by what means the royalists became privy to the jacobin plot, nor is the story in all its parts very probable; yet it would seem it must be partly true, since the attempt by means of the infernal machine was at first charged upon the Jacobins, in consequence of Chevalier's being known to have had some scheme in agitation, to be executed by similar means, in the course of the previous year.

** *Mémoires de Fouché*, vol. 1, p. 208.

these relics of jacobinism (who, in fact, were as harmless as the fragments of a bomb shell after its explosion), that the decree of deportation was never enforced against them; and Felix Lepelletier, Chaudieu, Talot, and their companions, were allowed to live obscurely in France, watched closely by the police, and under the condition that they should not venture to approach Paris.

The actual conspirators were proceeded against with severity. Chevalier and Veycer, jacobins, said to have constructed the original model of the infernal machine, were tried before a military commission, condemned to be shot, and suffered death accordingly.

Aréna, Ceraschi, Le Brun, and Demerville, were tried before the ordinary court of criminal judicature, and condemned by the voice of a jury; although there was little evidence against them, save that of their accomplice Harel, by whom they had been betrayed. They also were executed.

At a later period, Carbon and St-Régent, royalists, the agents in the actual attempt of 24th December, were also tried, condemned, and put to death. Some persons tried for the same offence were acquitted; and justice seems to have been distributed with an impartiality unusual in France since the Revolution.

But Bonaparte did not design that the consequences of these plots should end with the deaths of the wretches engaged in them. It afforded an opportunity not to be neglected to advance his principal object, which was the erection of France into a despotic kingdom, and the possessing himself of uncontrolled power over the lives, properties, thoughts, and opinions, of those who were born his fellow-subjects, and of whom the very meanest but lately boasted himself his equal. He has himself expressed his purpose respecting the constitution of the year Eight, or consular government, in words dictated to General Gourgaud.

"The ideas of Napoleon were fixed; but the aid of time and events were necessary for their realization. The organization of the Consulate had presented nothing in contradiction to them; it taught unanimity, and that was the first step. This point gained, Napoleon was quite indifferent as to the form and denominations of the several constituted bodies. He was a stranger to the Revolution. It was natural that the will of these men, who had followed it through all its phases, should prevail in questions as difficult as they were abstract. The wisest plan was to go on from day to day—by the polar star by which Napoleon meant to guide the Revolution to the haven he desired."

If there is anything obscure in this passage, it received but too luminous a commentary from the course of Bonaparte's actions; all of which tend to show that he embraced the consular government as a mere temporary arrangement, calculated to prepare the minds of the French nation for his ulterior views of ambition, as young colts are ridden with a light bridle until they are taught by degrees to endure the curb and bit, or as water-fowl taken in a decoy are first introduced within a wider circuit of nets, in order to their being gradually brought within that strict enclosure where they are made absolute

prisoners. He tells us in plain terms, he let the revolutionary sages take their own way in arranging the constitution; determined, without regarding the rules they laid down on the chart, to steer his course by one fixed point to one desired haven. That polar star was his own selfish interest—that haven was despotic power. What he considered as most for his own interest, he was determined to consider as the government most suited for France also. Perhaps he may have persuaded himself that he was actually serving his country as well as himself; and, indeed, justly considered, he was in both instances equally grievously mistaken.

With the views which he entertained, the chief consul regarded the conspiracies against his life as affording a pretext for extending his power too favourable to be neglected. These repeated attacks on the head of the state made it desirable that some mode should be introduced of trying such offences, briefer and more arbitrary than the slow forms required by ordinary jurisprudence. The prompt and speedy justice to be expected from a tribunal freed from the ordinary restraint of formalities and juries, was stated to be more necessary on account of the state of the public roads, infested by bands called *chasseurs*, who stopped the public carriages, intercepted the communications of commerce, and became so formidable, that no public coach was permitted to leave Paris without a military guard of at least four soldiers on the roof. This was used as a strong additional reason for constituting a special Court of Judicature.

Bonaparte could be at no loss for models of such an institution. As hero of the Revolution, he had succeeded to the whole arsenal of revolutionary weapons forged in the name of Liberty, to oppress the dearest rights of humanity. He had but to select that which best suited him, and to mould it to the temper of the times. The country which had so long endured the Revolutionary Tribunal was not likely to wince under any less stern judicature.

The court which government now proposed to establish, was to consist of eight members thus qualified: 1. The president and two judges of the ordinary criminal tribunal. 2. Three military men, bearing at least the rank of captain. 3. Two citizens, to be suggested by government, who should be selected from such as were by the constitution qualified to act as judges. Thus five out of eight judges were directly named by the government for the occasion. The court was to decide without jury, without appeal, and without revision of any kind. As a boon to the accused, the court were to have at least six members present, and there was to be no casting vote; so that the party would have his acquittal, unless six members out of eight, or four members out of six, should unite in finding him guilty; whereas in other courts, a bare majority is sufficient for condemnation.

With this poor boon to public opinion, the special Commission Court was to be the jurisdiction before whom armed insurgents, conspirators, and, in general, men guilty of crimes against the social compact, were to undergo their trial.

The counsellor of state, Portalis, laid this plan before the Legislative Body, by whom it was, accord-

ing to constitutional form, referred to the consideration of the Tribunalate. It was in this body, the only existing branch of the constitution where was preserved some shadow of popular forms and of free debate, that those who continued to entertain free sentiments could have any opportunity of expressing them. Benjamin Constant, Daumon, Chénier, and others, the gleanings as it were of the liberal party, made an honourable but unavailing defence against this invasion of the constitution, studying at the same time to express their opposition in language and by arguments least likely to give offence to the government. To the honour of the Tribunalate, which was the frail but sole remaining barrier of liberty, the project had nearly made shipwreck, and was only passed by a small majority of forty-nine over forty-one. In the Legislative Body there was also a strong minority. It seemed as if the friends of liberty, however deprived of direct popular representation, and of all the means of influencing public opinion, were yet determined to maintain an opposition to the first consul, somewhat on the plan of that of England.

Another law, passed at this time, must have had a cooling effect on the zeal of some of these patriots. It was announced that there were a set of persons, who were to be regarded rather as public enemies than as criminals, and who ought to be provided against rather by anticipating and defeating their schemes than by punishing their offences. These consisted of republicans, royalists, or any others entertaining, or supposed to entertain, opinions inimical to the present state of affairs; and the law now passed entitled the government to treat them as suspected persons, and, as such, to banish them from Paris or from France. Thus was the chief consul invested with full power over the personal liberty of every person whom he chose to consider as the enemy of his government.

Bonaparte was enabled to avail himself to the uttermost of the powers which he had thus extracted from the constitutional bodies, by the frightful agency of the police. This institution may, even in its mildest form, be regarded as a necessary evil; for although, while great cities continue to afford obscure retreats for vice and crimes of every description, there must be men, whose profession it is to discover and bring criminals to justice, as while there are vermin in the animal world, there must be kites and carrion-crows to diminish their number; yet, as the excellence of these guardians of the public depends in a great measure on their familiarity with the arts, haunts, and practices of culprits, they cannot be expected to feel the same horror for crimes, or criminals, which is common to other men. On the contrary, they have a sympathy with them of the same kind which hunters entertain for the game which is the object of their pursuit. Besides, as much of their business is carried on by the medium of spies, they must be able to personate the manners and opinions of those whom they detect; and are frequently induced, by their own interest, to direct, encourage, nay, suggest crimes, that they may obtain the reward due for conviction of the offenders.

Applied to state offences, the agency of such persons, though sometimes unavoidable, is yet more

frightfully dangerous. Moral delinquencies can be hardly with any probability attributed to worthy or innocent persons; but there is no character so pure, that he who bears it may not be supposed capable of entertaining false and exaggerated opinions in politics, and, as such, become the victim of treachery and delation. In France, a prey to so many factions, the power of the police had become overwhelming; indeed the very existence of the government seemed in some measure dependent upon the accuracy of their intelligence; and for this purpose their numbers had been enlarged, and their discipline perfected, under the administration of the sagacious and crafty Fouché. This remarkable person had been an outrageous jacobin, and dipped deep in the horrors of the revolutionary government—an adherent of Barras, and a partaker in the venality and speculation which characterized that period. He was, therefore, totally without principle; but his nature was not of that last degree of depravity, which delights in evil for its own sake, and his good sense told him, that an unnecessary crime was a political blunder. The lenity with which he exercised his terrible office, when left in any degree to his own discretion, while it never prevented his implicit execution of Bonaparte's commands, made the abominable system over which he presided to a certain extent endurable; and thus even his good qualities, while they relieved individual suffering, were of disservice to his country, by reconciling her to bondage.

The *haute police*, as it is called by the French, meaning that department which applies to politics and state affairs, had been unaccountably neglected by the ministers of Louis XVI., and was much disorganized by the consequences of the Revolution. The demagogues of the Convention had little need of a regular system of the kind. Every affiliated club of jacobins supplied them with spies, and with instruments of their pleasure. The Directory stood in a different situation. They had no general party of their own, and maintained their authority, by balancing the moderates and democrats against each other. They, therefore, were more dependent upon the police than their predecessors, and they intrusted Fouché with the superintendence. It was then that, destroying, or rather superseding, the separate offices where the agents of the police pretended to a certain independence of acting, he brought the whole system to concentrate within his own cabinet. By combining the reports of his agents, and of the various individuals with whom under various pretexts he maintained correspondence, the minister of police arrived at so accurate a knowledge of the purpose, disposition, adherents, and tools of the different parties in France, that he could anticipate their mode of acting upon all occasions that were likely to occur, knew what measures were likely to be proposed, and by whom they were to be supported; and when any particular accident took place, was able, from his previous general information, to assign it to the real cause, and the true actors.

An unlimited system of espial, and that stretching through society in all its ramifications, was necessary to the perfection of this system, which had not arrived to its utmost height, till Napoleon ascended

the throne. Still, before his reign, it existed all through France, controlling the most confidential expressions of opinion on public affairs, and, like some mephitic vapour, stifling the breath though it was invisible to the eye, and, by its mysterious terrors, putting a stop to all discussion of public measures, which was not in the tone of implicit approbation.

The expense of maintaining this establishment was immense; for Fouché comprehended amongst his spies and informers persons, whom no ordinary gratuity would have moved to act such a part. But this expense was provided for by the large sums which the minister of police received for the toleration yielded to brothels, gambling-houses, and other places of profligacy, to which he granted licenses, in consideration of their observing certain regulations. His system of espial was also extended, by the information which was collected in these haunts of debauchery; and thus the vices of the capital were made to support the means by which it was subjected to a despotic government. His autobiography contains a boast, that the private secretary of the chief consul was his pensioner, and that the lavish profusion of Joséphine made even her willing to exchange intelligence concerning the chief consul's views and plans. Thus was Fouché not only a spy upon the people in behalf of Bonaparte, but a spy also on Bonaparte himself.

Indeed, the power of the director of this terrible engine was so great, as to excite the suspicion of Napoleon, who endeavoured to counterbalance it by dividing the department of police into four distinct offices. There were established, 1st, The military police of the palace, over which Duroc, the grand master of the household, presided. 2d, The police maintained by the inspector of the gendarmes. 3d, That exercised over the city of Paris by the prefect. 4th, The general police, which still remained under the control of Fouché. Thus, the first consul received every day four reports of police, and esteemed himself secure of learning, through some one of them, information which the others might have an interest in concealing.

The agents of these different bodies were frequently unknown to each other; and it often happened, that when, in the exercise of their office, they were about to arrest some individual who had incurred suspicion, they found him protected against them, by his connexion with other bureaux of police. The system was, therefore, as complicated as it was oppressive and unjust; but we shall have such frequent opportunity to refer to the subject, that we need here only repeat, that, with reference to his real interest, it was unfortunate for Bonaparte that he found at his disposal so ready a weapon of despotism as the organized police, wielded by a hand so experienced as that of Fouché.

It was the duty of the police to watch the progress of public opinion, whether it was expressed in general society, and in confidential communication, or by the medium of the press. Bonaparte entertained a feverish apprehension of the effects of literature on the general mind, and in doing so acknowledged the weak points in his government. The public journals were under the daily and constant superintendence of the police, and their editors were

summoned before Fouché when anything was inserted which could be considered as disrespectful to his authority. Threats and promises were liberally employed on such occasions, and such journalists as proved refractory were soon made to feel that the former were no vain menaces. The suppression of the offensive newspaper was often accompanied by the banishment or imprisonment of the editor. The same measure was dealt to authors, booksellers, and publishers, respecting whom the jealousy of Bonaparte amounted to a species of disease.

No one can be surprised that an absolute government should be disposed to usurp the total management of the daily press, and such other branches of literature as are immediately connected with politics; but the interference of Bonaparte's police went much farther, and frequently required from those authors who wrote only on general topics, some express recognizance of his authority. The ancient christians would not attend the theatre, because it was necessary that, previous to enjoying the beauties of the scene, they should sacrifice some grains of incense to the false deity, supposed to preside over the place. In like manner, men of generous minds in France were often obliged to suppress works on subjects the most alien to politics, because they could not easily obtain a road to the public unless they consented to recognize the right of the individual, who had usurped the supreme authority, and extinguished the liberties of his country. The circumstances which subjected Madame de Stael to a long persecution by the police of Bonaparte may be quoted as originating in this busy desire, of connecting his government with the publications of all persons of genius.

We have been already led to notice, that there existed no cordiality betwixt Bonaparte and the gifted daughter of Necker. Their characters were far from suited to each other. She had manifestly regarded the first consul as a subject of close and curious observation, and Bonaparte loved not that anyone should make him the subject of minute scrutiny. Madame de Stael was the centre also of a distinguished circle of society in France, several of whom were engaged to support the cause of liberty; and the resolution of a few members of the Tribunal, to make some efforts to check the advance of Bonaparte to arbitrary power, was supposed to be taken in her saloon, and under her encouragement. For this she was only banished from Paris. But when she was about to publish her excellent and spirited book on German manners and literature, in which, unhappily, there was no mention of the French nation, or its supreme chief, Madame de Stael's work was seized by the police, and she was favoured with a line from Savary, acquainting her that the air of France did not suit her health, and inviting her to leave it with all convenient speed. While in exile from Paris, which she accounted her country, the worthy Prefect of Geneva suggested a mode by which she might regain favour. An ode on the birth of the King of Rome, was recommended as the means of conciliation. Madame de Stael answered, she should limit herself to wishing him a good nurse; and became exposed to new rigours,

even extending to the friends who ventured to visit her in her exile. So general was the French influence all over Europe, that, to shelter herself from the persecutions by which she was everywhere followed, she was at length obliged to escape to England, by the remote way of Russia. Chénier, formerly the panegyrist of General Bonaparte, became, with other literary persons who did not bend low enough to his new dignity, objects of persecution to the first consul. The childish pertinacity with which Napoleon followed up such unreasonable piques belongs indeed, chiefly, to the history of the emperor, but it showed its blossoms earlier. The power of indulging such petty passions goes, in a great measure, to foster and encourage their progress; and in the case of Bonaparte, this power, great in itself, was increased by the dangerous facilities which the police offered, for gratifying the spleen, or the revenge, of the offended sovereign.

Another support, of a very different kind, and grounded on the most opposite principles, was afforded to the rising power of Napoleon, through the re-establishment of religion in France, by his treaty with the pope, called the Concordat. Two great steps had been taken towards this important point, by the edict opening the churches, and renewing the exercise of the christian religion, and by the restoration of the pope to his temporal dominions, after the battle of Marengo. The further objects to be attained were the sanction of the first consul's government by the pontiff on the one hand, and, on the other, the re-establishment of the rights of the church in France, so far as should be found consistent with the new order of things.

This important treaty was managed by Joseph Bonaparte, who, with three colleagues, held conferences for that purpose with the plenipotentiaries of the pope. The ratifications were exchanged on the 18th of September, 1801; and, when they were published, it was singular to behold how submissively the once proud See of Rome lay prostrated before the power of Bonaparte, and how absolutely he must have dictated all the terms of the treaty. Every article innovated on some of those rights and claims, which the Church of Rome had for ages asserted as the unalienable privileges of her infallible head.

1. It was provided, that the catholic religion should be freely exercised in France, acknowledged as the national faith, and its service openly practised, subject to such regulations of police as the French government should judge necessary. 2. The pope, in concert with the French government, was to make a new division of dioceses, and to require of the existing bishops even the resignation of their sees, should that be found necessary to complete the new arrangement. 3. The sees which should become vacant by such resignation, or by deprivation, in case a voluntary abdication was refused, as also all future vacancies, were to be filled up by the pope, on nominations proceeding from the French government. 4. The new bishops were to take an oath of fidelity to the government, and to observe a ritual, in which there were to be especial forms of prayer for the consuls. 5. The church-livings were to undergo a new division, and the bishops were to

nominate to them, but only such persons as should be approved by the government. 6. The government was to make suitable provision for the national clergy, while the pope expressly renounced all right competent to him and his successors, to challenge or dispute the sales of church property which had been made since the Revolution.

Such was the celebrated compact, by which Pius VII. surrendered to a soldier, whose name was five or six years before unheard of in Europe, those high claims to supremacy in spiritual affairs, which his predecessors had maintained for so many ages against the whole potentates of Europe. A puritan might have said of the Power seated on the Seven Hills—"Babylon is fallen, it is fallen, that great city!" The more rigid catholics were of the same opinion. The Concordat, they alleged, shewed rather the abasement of the Roman hierarchy than the re-erection of the Gallic Church.

The proceedings against the existing bishops of France, most of whom were of course emigrants, were also but little edifying. Acting upon the article of the Concordat already noticed, and caused, as the letter itself states, "by the exigency of the times, which exercises its violence even on us," the pope required of each of these reverend persons, by an especial mandate, to accede to the compact, by surrendering his see, as therein provided. The order was peremptory in its terms, and an answer was demanded within fifteen days. The purpose of this haste was to prevent consultation or combination, and to place before each bishop, individually, the choice of compliance, thereby gaining a right to be provided for in the new hierarchy; or of refusal, in which case the pope would be obliged to declare the see vacant, in conformity to his engagement with Bonaparte.

The bishops in general declined compliance with a request, which, on the part of the pope, was evidently made by compulsion. They offered to lay their resignation at his holiness's feet, so soon as they should be assured that there was regular canonical provision made for filling up their sees; but they declined, by any voluntary act of theirs, to give countenance to the surrender of the rights of the church implied in the Concordat, and preferred exile and poverty to any provision which they might obtain, by consenting to compromise the privileges of the hierarchy. These proceedings greatly increased the unpopularity of the Concordat among the more zealous catholics.

Others of that faith there were, who, though they considered the new system as very imperfect, yet thought it might have the effect of preserving in France some sense of the christian religion, which, under the total disuse of public worship, stood a chance of being entirely extinguished in the minds of the rising generation. They remembered, that though the Jews in the days of Esdras shed tears of natural sorrow when they beheld the inferiority of the second Temple, yet Providence had sanctioned its erection, under the warrant, and by permission, of an unbelieving task-master. They granted, that the countenance shown by Bonaparte to the religious establishment was entirely from motives of self-interest; but still they hoped that God, who

works his own will by the selfish passions of individuals, was now using those of the first consul to recal some sense of religion to France; and they anticipated that religion, as the best friend of all that is good and graceful in humanity, was likely, in course of time, to bring back and encourage a sense of rational liberty.

The revolutionary part of France beheld the Concordat with very different eyes. The christian religion was, as to the Jews and Greeks of old, a stumbling-block to the jacobins, and foolishness to the philosophers. It was a system which they had attacked with a zeal even as eager as that which they had directed against monarchical institutions; and in the restoration of the altar they foresaw the re-erection of the throne. Bonaparte defended himself among the philosophers, by comparing his Concordat to a sort of vaccination of religion, which by introducing a slighter kind into the system of the state, would gradually prepare for its entire extinction.

In the meantime, he proceeded to renew the ancient league betwixt the church and crown, with as much solemnity as possible. Portalis was created minister of religion, a new office, for managing the affairs of the church. He had deserved this preferment, by a learned and argumentative speech to the legislative body, in which he proved to the French statesmen (what in other countries is seldom considered as matter of doubt), that the exercise of religion is congenial to human nature, and worthy of being cherished and protected by the state. The Concordat was inaugurated at Notre Dame with the utmost magnificence. Bonaparte attended in person, with all the badges and pomp of royalty, and in the style resembling as nearly as possible that of the former kings of France. The Archbishop of Aix was appointed to preach upon the occasion, being the very individual prelate who had delivered the sermon upon the coronation of Louis XVI. Some address, it was said, was employed to procure the attendance of the old republican generals. They were invited by Berthier to breakfast, and thence carried to the first consul's levee; after which it became impossible for them to decline attending him to the Church of Notre Dame. As he returned from the ceremony, surrounded by these military functionaries, Bonaparte remarked with complacency, that the former order of things was fast returning. One of his generals boldly answered,—"Yes!—all returns—excepting the two millions of Frenchmen, who have died to procure the proscription of the very system now in the act of being restored."

It is said that Bonaparte, when he found the pope and the clergy less tractable than he desired, regretted having taken the step of re-establishing religion, and termed the Concordat the greatest error of his reign. But such observations could only escape him in a moment of pique or provocation. He well knew the advantage which a government must derive from a national church, which recognizes them in its ritual; and at St Helena, he himself at once acknowledged the advantage of his compact with the pope as a measure of state, and his indifference to it in a religious point of view. "I

never regretted the Concordat," he said. "I must have had either that or something equivalent. Had the pope never before existed, he should have been made for the occasion."

The first consul took care, accordingly, to make his full advantage of the Concordat, by introducing his own name as much as possible into the catechism of the church, which, in other respects, was that drawn up by Bossuet. To honour Napoleon, the catechumen was taught, was the same as to honour and serve God himself—to oppose his will, was to incur the penalty of eternal damnation.

In civil affairs, Bonaparte equally exerted his talents, in connecting the safety and interests of the nation with his own aggrandisement. He had already laughed at the idea of a free constitution. "The only free constitution necessary," he said, "or useful, was a good civil code;" not considering, or chusing to have it considered, that the best system of laws, when held by no better guarantee than the pleasure of an arbitrary prince and his council of state, is as insecure as the situation of a pearl suspended by a single hair. Let us do justice to Napoleon, however, by acknowledging, that he encountered with manly firmness the gigantic labour of forming a code of institutions, which, supplying the immense variety of provincial laws that existed in the different departments of France, and suppressing the partial and temporary regulations made in the various political crises of the Revolution, were designed to be the basis of a uniform national system. For this purpose, an order of the consuls convoked Messrs Portalis, Tronchet, Bigot-Préameneu, and Maleville, juriconsults of the highest character, and associated them with the minister of justice, Cambacérès, in the task of adjusting and reporting a plan for a general system of jurisprudence. The progress and termination of this great work will be hereafter noticed. The chief consul himself took an active part in the deliberations.

An ordinance, eminently well qualified to heal the civil wounds of France, next manifested the talents of Bonaparte, and, as men hoped, his moderation. This was the general amnesty granted to the emigrants. A decree of the senate, 26th April, 1801, permitted the return of these unfortunate persons to France, providing they did so, and took the oath of fidelity to government, within a certain period. There were, however, five classes of exceptions, containing such as seemed too deeply and strongly pledged to the house of Bourbon, ever to reconcile themselves to the government of Bonaparte. Such were, 1st, Those who had been chiefs of bodies of armed royalists;—2d, Who had held rank in the armies of the allies;—3d, Who had belonged to the household of the princes of the blood;—4th, Who had been agents or encouragers of foreign or domestic war;—5th, The generals and admirals, together with the representatives of the people, who had been guilty of treason against the Republic, together with the prelates, who declined to resign their sees in terms of the Concordat. It was at the same time declared, that not more than five hundred in all should be excepted from the amnesty. Bonaparte truly judged, that the mass of emigrants, thus winnowed and purified from all who had been leaders, exhausted in for-

tune, and wearied out by exile, would in general be grateful for permission to return to France, and passive, nay, contented and attached subjects of his dominion; and the event in a great measure, if not fully, justified his expectations. Such part of their property as had not been sold was directed to be restored to them; but they were subjected to the special superintendence of the police for the space of ten years after their return.

With similar and most laudable attention to the duties of his high office, Bonaparte founded plans of education, and particularly, with Monge's assistance, established the Polytechnic School, which has produced so many men of talent. He inquired anxiously into abuses, and was particularly active in correcting those which had crept into the prisons during the Revolution, where great tyranny was exercised by monopoly of provisions, and otherwise. In amending such evils, Bonaparte, though not of kingly birth, showed a mind worthy of the rank to which he had ascended. It is only to be regretted, that in what interfered with his personal wishes or interest, he uniformly failed to manifest the sound and correct views, which on abstract questions he could form so clearly.

Other schemes of a public character were beld out as occupying the attention of the chief consul. Like Augustus, whose situation his own in some measure resembled, Napoleon endeavoured, by the magnificence of his projects for the improvement of the state, to withdraw attention from his inroads upon public freedom. The inland navigation of Languedoc was to be completed, and a canal, joining the river Yonne to the Saône, was to connect the south part of the Republic so completely with the north, as to establish a communication by water between Marseilles and Amsterdam. Bridges were also to be built, roads to be laid out and improved, museums founded in the principal towns of France, and many other public labours undertaken, on a scale which should put to shame even the boasted days of Louis XIV. Bonaparte knew the French nation well, and was aware that he should best reconcile them to his government, by indulging his own genius for bold and magnificent undertakings, whether of a military or a civil character.

But although these splendid proposals filled the public ear, and flattered the national pride of France, commerce continued to languish, under the effects of a constant blockade; provisions became dear, and discontent against the Consulate began to gain ground over the favourable sentiments which had hailed its commencement. The effectual cure for these heart-burnings was only to be found in a general peace; and a variety of events, some of them of a character very unpleasant to the first consul, seemed gradually preparing for this desirable event.

CHAPTER XL.

Return to the external relations of France.—Her universal ascendancy.—Napoleon's advances to the Emperor Paul.—Plan of destroying the British power in India.—Right of search at sea.—Death of Paul.—Its effects on Bonaparte.—Affairs of Egypt.—Assassination of Kitcher.—Menou appointed to succeed him.—British army lands

in Egypt.—Battle and victory of Alexandria.—Death of Sir Ralph Abercrombie.—General Hutchinson succeeds him.—The French general Belliard, capitulates—as does Menou.—War in Egypt brought to a victorious conclusion.

HAVING thus given a glance at the internal affairs of France during the commencement of Bonaparte's domination, we return to her external relations, which, since the peace of Lunéville, had assumed the appearance of universal ascendancy, so much had the current of human affairs been altered by the talents and fortunes of one man. Not only was France in secure possession, by the treaty of Lunéville, of territories extending to the banks of the Rhine, but the surrounding nations were, under the plausible names of protection or alliance, as submissive to her government as if they had made integral parts of her dominions. Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, were all in a state of subjection to her will; Spain, like a puppet, moved but at her signal; Austria was broken-spirited and dejected; Prussia still remembered her losses in the first revolutionary war; and Russia, who alone could be considered as unmoved by any fear of France, was yet in a situation to be easily managed, by flattering and cajoling the peculiar temper of the Emperor Paul.

We have already observed, that Bonaparte had artfully availed himself of the misunderstanding between Austria and Russia, to insinuate himself into the good graces of the czar. The disputes between Russia and England gave him still further advantages over the mind of that incautious monarch.

The refusal of Britain to cede the almost impregnable fortress of Malta, and with it the command of the Mediterranean, to a power who was no longer friendly, was aggravated by her declining to admit Russian prisoners into the cartel of exchange between the French and British. Bonaparte contrived to make his approaches to the czar in a manner calculated to bear upon both these subjects of grievance. He presented to Paul, who affected to be considered as the Grand Master of the Order of St John of Jerusalem, the sword given by the pope to the heroic John de la Valette, who was at the head of the order during the celebrated defence of Malta against the Turks. With the same view of placing his own conduct in a favourable contrast with that of Great Britain, he new-clothed and armed eight or nine thousand Russian prisoners, and dismissed them freely, in token of his personal esteem for the character of the emperor.

A more secret and scandalous mode of acquiring interest is said to have been attained, through the attachment of the unfortunate prince to a French actress of talents and beauty, who had been sent from Paris for the express purpose of acquiring his affections. From these concurring reasons, Paul began now openly to manifest himself as the warm friend of France, and the bitter enemy of Britain. In the former capacity, he had the weak and unworthy complaisance to withdraw the hospitality which he had hitherto afforded to the relics of the Royal Family of Bourbon, who were compelled to remove from Mittau, where they had been hitherto permitted to reside.

To gratify his pique against England, Paul gave hearing at least to a magnificent scheme by which Bonaparte proposed to accomplish the destruction of the British power in India, which he had in vain hoped to assail by the possession of Egypt. The scheme was now to be effected by the union of the French and Russian troops, which were to force their way to British India overland, through the kingdom of Persia; and a plan of such a campaign was seriously in agitation. Thirty-five thousand French were to descend the Danube into the Black Sea; and then, being wafted across that sea and the sea of Azof, were to march by land to the banks of the Volga. Here they were again to be embarked, and descend the river to Astracan, and from thence were to cross the Caspian Sea to Astrabad, where they were to be joined by a Russian army, equal in force to their own. It was thought that, marching through Persia by Herat, Ferah, and Candahar, the Russo-Gallic army might reach the Indus in forty-five days from Astrabad. This gigantic project would scarce have been formed by any less daring genius than Napoleon; nor could any prince, with a brain less infirm than Paul's, have agreed to become his tool in so extraordinary an undertaking, from which France was to derive all the advantage.

A nearer mode of injuring the interests of England, than this overland march to India, was in the power of the Emperor of Russia. A controversy being in dependence betwixt England and the northern courts, afforded the pretext for throwing his weight into the scale against her at this dangerous crisis.

The right of search at sea, that is, the right of stopping a neutral or friendly vessel, and taking out of her the goods belonging to an enemy, is acknowledged in the earliest maritime codes. But England, by her naval superiority, had been enabled to exert this right so generally, that it became the subject of much heart burning to neutral powers. The association of the Northern States in 1780, known by the name of the Armed Neutrality, had for its object to put down this right of search, and establish the maxim that free bottoms made free goods; in other words, that the neutral character of the vessel should protect whatever property she might have on board. This principle was now anxiously reclaimed by France, as the most effective argument for the purpose of irritating the neutral powers against Great Britain, whose right of search, which could not be exercised without vexation and inconvenience to their commerce, must necessarily be unpopular amongst them. Forgetting that the danger occasioned by the gigantic power of France was infinitely greater than any which could arise from the maritime claims of England, the northern courts became again united on the subject of what they termed the freedom of the seas. Indeed, the Emperor Paul, even before the offence arising out of his disappointment respecting Malta, had proceeded so far as to sequester all British property in his dominions, in resentment of her exercising the right of search. But upon the fresh provocation which he conceived himself to have received, the emperor became outrageous, and took the most violent measures for seizing the persons and property of the

English, that ever were practised by an angry and unreasonable despot.

Prussia, more intent on her own immediate aggrandisement, than mindful of the welfare of Europe in general, took advantage of the universal ill-will against England, to seize upon the king's continental dominions of Hanover, with peculiar breach of public faith, as she herself had guaranteed the neutrality of that country.

The consequences, with regard to the northern powers, are well known. The promptitude of the administration sent a strong fleet to the Baltic; and the well-contested battle of Copenhagen detached Denmark from the Northern Confederacy. Sweden had joined it unwillingly; and Russia altered her course of policy in consequence of the death of Paul. That unhappy prince had surmounted the patience of his subjects, and fell a victim to one of those conspiracies, which in arbitrary monarchies, especially such as partake of the oriental character, supply all the checks of a moderate and free constitution, where the prerogative of the crown is limited by laws. In these altered circumstances, the cause of dispute was easily removed, by the right of search being subjected to equitable regulations and modifications.

Bonaparte received the news of Paul's death with much more emotion than he was usually apt to testify. It is said, that, for the first time in his life, a passionate exclamation of "*Mon Dieu!*" escaped him in a tone of sorrow and surprise. With Paul's immense power, and his disposition to place it at the disposal of France, the first consul doubtless reckoned upon the accomplishment of many important plans which his death disconcerted. It was natural, also, that Napoleon should be moved by the sudden and violent end of a prince, who had manifested so much admiration of his person and his qualities. He is said to have dwelt so long on the strangeness of the incident, that Fouché was obliged to remind him, that it was a mode of changing a chief magistrate, or a course of administration, which was common to the empire in which it took place.*

The death of Paul, so much regretted by Bonaparte, was nevertheless the means of accelerating a peace between France and Great Britain, which, if it could have been established on a secure basis, would have afforded him the best chance of maintaining his power, and transmitting it to his posterity. While the czar continued to be his observant ally, there was little prospect that the first consul would be moderate enough in the terms which he might have proffered, to permit the British ministry to treat with him.

Another obstacle to peace was at this time removed, in a manner not more acceptable to Bonaparte than was the death of the Emperor Paul. The possession of Egypt by the French was a point which the first consul would have insisted upon from strong personal feeling. The Egyptian expedition was intimately connected with his own personal glory, nor was it likely that he would have sacrificed its results to his desire of peace with Great Britain.

* * *Que voulez-vous? c'est un mode de destitution propre à ce pays-là.*

On the other hand, there was no probability that England would accede to any arrangement, which should sanction the existence of a French colony, settled in Egypt with the express purpose of destroying our Indian commerce. But this obstacle to peace was removed by the fate of arms.

Affairs in Egypt had been on the whole unfavourable to the French, since that army had lost the presence of the commander-in-chief. Kléber, on whom the command devolved, was discontented both at the uncereemonious and sudden manner in which the duty had been imposed upon him, and with the scarcity of means left to support his defence. Perceiving himself threatened by a large Turkish force, which was collecting for the purpose of avenging the defeat of the vizier at Aboukir, he became desirous of giving up a settlement which he despaired of maintaining. He signed accordingly a convention with the Turkish plenipotentiaries, and Sir Sydney Smith, on the part of the British, by which it was provided that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that Kléber and his army should be transported to France in safety, without being molested by the British fleet. When the British government received advice of this convention, they refused to ratify it, on the ground that Sir Sydney Smith had exceeded his powers in entering into it. The Earl of Elgin having been sent out as plenipotentiary to the Porte, it was asserted that Sir Sydney's ministerial powers were superseded by his appointment. Such was the alleged informality on which the treaty fell to the ground; but the truth was, that the arrival of Kléber and his army in the south of France, at the very moment when the successes of Suwarrow gave strong hopes of making some impression on her frontier, might have had a most material effect upon the events of the war. Lord Keith, therefore, who commanded in the Mediterranean, received orders not to permit the passage of the French Egyptian army, and the treaty of El Arish was in consequence broken off.

Kléber, disappointed of this mode of extricating himself, had recourse to arms. The Vizier Jonsseff Pacha, having crossed the Desert, and entered Egypt, received a bloody and decisive defeat from the French general, near the ruins of the ancient city of Heliopolis, on the 20th of March, 1800. The measures which Kléber adopted after this victory were well calculated to maintain the possession of the country, and reconcile the inhabitants to the French government. He was as moderate in the imposts as the exigencies of his army permitted, greatly improved the condition of the troops, and made, if not peace, at least an effectual truce with the restless and enterprising Murad Bey, who still continued to be at the head of a considerable body of Mamelukes. Kléber also raised among the Greeks a legion of fifteen hundred or two thousand men; and with more difficulty succeeded in levying a regiment of Copts.

While busied in these measures—he was cut short by the blow of an assassin. A fanatic Turk, called Soliman Haleby, a native of Aleppo, imagined he was inspired by Heaven to slay the enemy of the Prophet and the Grand Seigneur. He concealed himself in a cistern, and springing out on Kléber when

there was only one man in company with him, stabbed him dead. The assassin was justly condemned to die by a military tribunal; but the sentence was executed with a barbarity which disgraced those who practised it. Being impaled alive, he survived for four hours in the utmost tortures, which he bore with an indifference which his fanaticism perhaps alone could have bestowed.

The Baron Menou, on whom the command now devolved, was an inferior person to Kléber. He had made some figure amongst the nobles who followed the revolutionary cause in the Constituent Assembly, and was the same general whose want of decision at the affair of the Sections had led to the employment of Bonaparte in his room, and to the first rise, consequently, of the fortunes which had since swelled so high. Menou altered for the worse several of the regulations of Kléber, and, carrying into literal execution what Bonaparte had only written and spoken of, he became an actual Mahomedan, married a native Turkish woman, and assumed the name of Abdallah Menou. This change of religion exposed him to the ridicule of the French, while it went in no degree to conciliate the Egyptians.

The succours from France, which Bonaparte had promised in his farewell address to the Egyptian army, arrived slowly, and in small numbers and quantity. This was not the fault of the chief consul, who had commanded Ganteaume to put to sea with a squadron, having on board four or five thousand men; but, being pursued by the English fleet, that admiral was glad to regain the harbour of Toulon. Other efforts were made with the same indifferent success. The French ports were too closely watched to permit the sailing of any expedition on a large scale, and two frigates, with five or six hundred men, were the only reinforcements that reached Egypt.

Meantime, the English cabinet had adopted the daring and manly resolution of wresting from France this favourite colony by force. They had for a length of time confined their military efforts to partial and detached objects, which, if successful, could not have any effect on the general results of the war, and which, when they miscarried, as was the case before Cadiz, Ferrol, and elsewhere, tended to throw ridicule on the plans of the ministry, and, however undeservedly, even upon the character of the forces employed on the service. It was by such ill-considered and imperfect efforts that the war was maintained on our part, while our watchful and formidable enemy combined his mighty means to effect objects of commensurate importance. We, like puny fencers, offered doubtful and uncertain blows, which could only affect the extremities; he never aimed, save at the heart, nor thrust, but with the determined purpose of plunging his weapon to the hilt.

The consequence of these partial and imperfect measures was, that even while our soldiers were in the act of gradually attaining that perfection of discipline by which they are now distinguished, they ranked—most unjustly—lower in the respect of their countrymen, than at any other period in our history. The pre-eminent excellence of our sailors had been

shown in a thousand actions; and it became too usual to place it in contrast with the failure of our expeditions on shore. But it was afterwards found that our soldiers could assume the same superiority, whenever the plan of the campaign offered them a fair field for its exercise. Such a field of action was afforded by the Egyptian expedition.

This undertaking was the exclusive plan of an ill-reputed statesman, the late Lord Melville, who had difficulty in obtaining even Mr Pitt's concurrence in a scheme, of a character so much more daring than Britain had lately entertained. The expedition was resolved upon by the narrowest possible majority in the cabinet; and his late majesty interposed his consent in terms inferring a solemn protest against the risk about to be incurred. "It is with the utmost reluctance, (such, or nearly such, were the words of George III.) that I consent to a measure, which sends the flower of my army upon a dangerous expedition against a distant province." * The event, however, showed, that in arduous circumstances, the daring game, if previously well considered, is often the most successful.

On the 8th of March, 1801, General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, at the head of an army of seventeen thousand men, landed in Egypt, in despite of the most desperate opposition by the enemy. The excellence of the troops was displayed by the extreme gallantry and calmness with which, landing through a heavy surf, they instantly formed and advanced against the enemy. On the 21st of March, a general action took place. The French cavalry attempted to turn the British flank, and made a desperate charge for that purpose, but failed in their attempt, and were driven back with great loss. The French were defeated, and compelled to retreat on Alexandria, under the walls of which they hoped to maintain themselves. But the British suffered an irreparable loss in their lamented commander, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who was mortally wounded in the course of this action. In this gallant veteran his country long regretted one of the best generals, and one of the worthiest and most amiable men, to whom she ever gave birth.

The command descended on General Hutchinson, who was soon joined by the Capitan Pacha, with a Turkish army. The recollections of Abonkir and Heliopolis, joined to the remonstrances and counsels of their English allies, induced the Turks to avoid a general action, and confine themselves to skirmishes, by which system the French were so closely watched, and their communications so effectually destroyed, that General Belliard, shut up in a fortified camp in Cairo, cut off from Alexandria, and threatened with insurrection within the place, was compelled to capitulate, under condition that his*

* At an after period, the good king made the following acknowledgment of his mistake. When Lord Melville was out of power, his majesty did him the honour to visit him at Wimbledon, and partook of some refreshment. On that occasion the king took an opportunity to fill a glass of wine, and having made the company do the same, he gave as his toast, "The health of the courageous minister, who, against the opinion of many of his colleagues, and even the remonstrances of his king, had dared to conceive and carry through the Egyptian expedition."

troops should be safely transported to France, with their arms and baggage. This was on the 28th of June, and the convention had scarce been signed, when the English army was reinforced in a manner which showed the bold and successful combination of measures under which the expedition had been undertaken.

An army of seven thousand men, of whom two thousand were sepoys, or native Indian troops, were disembarked at Cosseir, on the Red Sea, and, detached from the Indian settlements, now came to support the European part of the English invasion. The Egyptians saw, with the extremity of wonder, native troops, many of them moslemah, who worshipped in the mosques, and observed the ritual enjoined by the Prophet, perfectly accomplished in the European discipline. The lower class were inclined to think, that this singular reinforcement had been sent to them in consequence of Mahomed's direct and miraculous interposition; only their being commanded by English officers did not favour this theory.

In consequence of these reinforcements, and his own confined situation under the walls of Alexandria, Menou saw himself constrained to enter into a convention for surrendering up the province of Egypt. He was admitted to the same terms of composition which had been granted to Belliard; and thus the war in that quarter was, on the part of Great Britain, triumphantly concluded.

The conquest of this disputed kingdom, excited a strong sensation both in France and Britain; but the news of the contest being finally closed by Menou's submission, are believed to have reached the former country some time before the English received them. Bonaparte, on learning the tidings, is reported to have said, "Well, there remains now no alternative but to make the descent on Britain." But it seems to have occurred to him presently afterwards, that the loss of this disputed province might, instead of being an argument for carrying the war to extremity, be considered as the removal of an obstacle to a treaty of peace.

CHAPTER XLI.

Preparations made for the Invasion of Britain.—Nelson put in command of the sea.—Attack of the Boulogne Flotilla.—Pitt leaves the ministry.—succeeded by Mr Addington.—Negotiations for peace.—Just punishment of England, in regard to the conquered settlements of the enemy.—Forced to restore them all, save Ceylon and Trinidad.—Malta is placed under the guarantee of a neutral power.—Preliminaries of peace signed.—Joy of the English populace, and doubts of the better classes.—Treaty of Amiens signed.—The ambitious projects of Napoleon, nevertheless, proceed without interruption.—Extension of his power in Italy.—He is appointed consul for life, with the power of naming his successor.—His situation at this period.

As the words of the first consul appeared to intimate, preparations were resumed on the French coast for the invasion of Great Britain. Boulogne, and every harbour along the coast, was crowded with flat-bottomed boats, and the shores covered with camps of the men designed apparently to fill

them. We need not at present dwell on the preparations for attack, or those which the English adopted in defence, as we shall have occasion to notice both, when Bonaparte, for the last time, threatened England with the same measure. It is enough to say, that, on the present occasion, the menaces of France had their usual effect in awakening the spirit of Britain.

The most extensive arrangements were made for the reception of the invaders, should they chance to land, and, in the meanwhile, our natural barrier was not neglected. The naval preparations were very great, and what gave yet more confidence than the number of vessels and guns, Nelson was put into command of the sea, from Orfordness to Beachy-head. Under his management, it soon became the question, not whether the French flotilla was to invade the British shores, but whether it was to remain in safety in the French harbours. Boulogne was bombarded, and some of the small craft and gun-boats destroyed, the English admiral generously sparing the town; and not satisfied with this partial success, Nelson prepared to attack them with the boats of the squadron. The French resorted to the most unusual and formidable preparations for defence. Their flotilla was moored close to the shore in the mouth of Boulogne harbour, the vessels secured to each other by chains, and filled with soldiers. The British attack in some degree failed, owing to the several divisions of boats missing each other in the dark; some French vessels were taken, but they could not be brought off; and the French chose to consider this result as a victory, on their part, of consequence enough to balance the loss at Aboukir;—though it amounted at best to ascertaining, that although their vessels could not keep the sea, they might, in some comparative degree of safety, lie under close cover of their own batteries. Meantime, the changes which had taken place in the British administration, were preparing public expectation for that peace which all the world now longed for.

Mr Pitt, as is well known, left the ministry, and was succeeded in the office of first minister of state by Mr Addington, now Lord Sidmouth. The change was justly considered as friendly to pacific measures; for, in France especially, the gold of Pitt had been by habit associated with all that was prejudicial to their country. The very massacres of Paris, nay, the return of Bonaparte from Egypt, were imputed to the intrigues of the English minister; he was the scape-goat on whom were charged, as the ultimate cause, all the follies, crimes, and misfortunes of the Revolution.

A great part of his own countrymen, as well as of the French, entertained a doubt of the possibility of concluding a peace under Mr Pitt's auspices; while those who were most anti-Gallican in their opinions, had little wish to see his lofty spirit stoop to the task of arranging conditions of treaty on terms so different from what his hopes had once dictated. The worth, temper, and talents of his successor seemed to qualify him to enter into a negotiation, to which the greater part of the nation were now inclined, were it but for the sake of experiment.

Bonaparte himself was at this time disposed to peace. It was necessary to France, and no less

necessary to him, since he otherwise must remain pledged to undertake the hazardous alternative of invasion, in which chances stood incalculably against his success; while a failure might have, in its consequences, inferred the total ruin of his power. All parties were, therefore, in a great degree inclined to treat with sincerity; and Bonaparte was with little difficulty brought to consent to the evacuation of Egypt, there being every reason to believe that he was already possessed of the news of the convention with Menou. At any rate, the French cause in Egypt had been almost desperate ever since the battle of Alexandria, and the first consul was conscious that in this sacrifice he only resigned that which there was little chance of his being able to keep. It was also stipulated that the French should evacuate Rome and Naples; a condition of little consequence, as they were always able to re-occupy these countries when their interest required it. The Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope was to be restored to the Batavian Republic, and declared a free port.

In respect of the settlements which the British arms had conquered, England underwent a punishment not unmerited. The conquest of the enemies' colonies had been greatly too much an object of the English ministry; and thus the national force had been frittered away upon acquisitions of comparatively petty importance, which, from the insalubrity of the climate, cost us more men to maintain them than would have been swept off by many a bloody battle. All the conquests made on this peddling plan of warfare were now to be returned, without any equivalent. Had the gallant soldiers, who perished miserably for the sake of these sugar-islands, been united in one well-concerted expedition, to the support of Charette, or La Roche-Jacquelin, such a force might have embled these chiefs to march to Paris; or, if sent to Holland, might have replaced the stadtholder in his dominions. And now, these very sugar-islands, the pitiful compensation which Britain had received for the blood of her brave children, were to be restored to those from whom they had been wrested. The important possessions of Ceylon in the East, and Trinidad in the West Indies, were the only part of her conquests which England retained. The integrity of her ancient ally, Portugal, was, however, recognized, and the independence of the Ionian Islands was stipulated for and guaranteed. Britain restored Porto Ferrajo, and what other places she had occupied in the isle of Elba, or on the Italian coast; but the occupation of Malta for some time threatened to prove an obstacle to the treaty. The English considered it as of the last consequence that this strong island should remain in their possession, and intimated that they regarded the pertinacious resistance which the first consul testified to this proposal, as implying a private and unavowed desire of renewing, at some future opportunity, his designs on Egypt, to which Malta might be considered as in some measure a key. After much discussion, it was at length agreed that the independence of the island should be secured by its being garrisoned by a neutral power, and placed under its guarantee and protection.

The preliminaries of peace were signed 10th Oc-

tober, 1801. General Law de Lauriston, the school companion and first aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, brought them over from Paris to London, where they were received with the most extravagant joy by the populace, to whom novelty is a sufficient recommendation of almost anything. But amidst the better classes, the sensation was much divided. There was a small but energetic party, led by the celebrated Windham, who, adopting the principles of Burke to their utmost extent, considered the act of treating with a regicide government as indelible meanness, and as a dereliction, on the part of Great Britain, of those principles of legitimacy, upon which the social compact ought to rest. More moderate anti-Gallicans, while they regretted that our efforts in favour of the Bourbons had been totally unavailing, contended, with reason, that we were not so closely leagued to their cause as to be bound to sacrifice our own country, in a vain attempt to restore the exiled family to the throne of France. This was the opinion entertained by Pitt himself, and the most judicious among his followers. Lastly, there was the professed opposition, who, while rejoicing that we had been able to obtain peace on any terms, might now exult in the fulfilment of their predictions of the bad success of the war. Sheridan summed up what was perhaps the most general feeling in the country, with the observation, "that it was a peace which all men were glad of, and no man could be proud of."

Amiens was appointed for the meeting of commissioners, who were finally to adjust the treaty of pacification, which was not ended till five months after the preliminaries had been agreed on. After this long negotiation, the treaty was at length signed, 27th March, 1802. The isle of Malta, according to this agreement, was to be occupied by a garrison of Neapolitan troops, while, besides Britain and France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia, were to guarantee its neutrality. The Knights of St John were to be the sovereigns, but neither French nor English were in future to be members of that order. The harbours were to be free to the commerce of all nations, and the Order was to be neutral towards all nations save the Algerines and other piratical states.

Napoleon, had he chosen to examine into the feelings of the English, must have seen plainly that this treaty, unwillingly acceded to by them, and only by way of experiment, was to have a duration long or short, in proportion to their confidence in, or doubt of, his own good faith. His ambition, and the little scruple which he showed in gratifying it, was, he must have been sensible, the terror of Europe; and until the fears he had excited were disarmed by a tract of peaceful and moderate conduct on his part, the suspicions of England must have been constantly awake, and the peace between the nations must have been considered as precarious as an armed truce. Yet these considerations could not induce him to lay aside, or even postpone, a train of measures, tending directly to his own personal aggrandisement, and confirming the jealousies which his character already inspired. These measures were partly of a nature adapted to consolidate and prolong his own power in France; partly to

extend the predominating influence of that country over her continental neighbours.

By the treaty of Lunéville, and by that of Tolentino, the independent existence of the Cisalpine and Helvetic Republics had been expressly stipulated; but this independence, according to Bonaparte's explanation of the word, did not exclude their being reduced to mere satellites, who depended on, and whose motions were to be regulated by France, and by himself, the chief governor of France and all her dependencies. When, therefore, the Directory was overthrown in France, it was not his purpose that a directorial form of government should continue to subsist in Italy. Measures were on this account to be taken, to establish in that country something resembling the new consular model adopted in Paris.

For this purpose, in the beginning of January, 1802, a convention of 450 deputies from the Cisalpine States arrived at Lyons (for they were not trusted to deliberate within the limits of their own country), to contrive for themselves a new political system. In that period, when the modeling of constitutions was so common, there was no difficulty in drawing up one; which consisted of a president, a deputy-president, a legislative council, and three electoral colleges, composed, 1st, of proprietors; 2d, of persons of learning; and, 3d, of commercial persons. If the Italians had been awkward upon the occasion, they had the assistance of Talleyrand, and soon after, the arrival of Bonaparte himself at Lyons gave countenance to their operations. His presence was necessary for the exhibition of a most singular farce.

A committee of thirty of the Italian convention, to whom had been intrusted the principal duty of suggesting the new model of government, gave in a report, in which it was stated, that, from the want of any man of sufficient influence amongst themselves to fill the office of president, upon whom devolved all the executive duties of the state, the new system could not be considered as secure, unless Bonaparte should be prevailed upon to fill that situation, not, as it was carefully explained, in his character of head of the French government, but in his individual capacity. Napoleon graciously inclined to their suit. He informed them that he concurred in the modest opinion they had formed, that their republic did not at present possess an individual sufficiently gifted with talents and impartiality to take charge of their affairs, which he should, therefore, retain under his own chief management, while circumstances required him to do so.

Having thus established his power in Italy as firmly, as in France, Bonaparte proceeded to take measures for extending his dominions in the former country and elsewhere. By a treaty with Spain, now made public, it appeared that the Duchy of Parma was to devolve on France, together with the island of Elba, upon the death of the present duke, — an event at no distant date to be expected. The Spanish part of the province of Louisiana, in North America, was to be ceded to France by the same treaty. Portugal, too, though the integrity of her dominions had been guaranteed by the preliminaries of the peace with England, had been induced, by a

treaty kept studiously private from the British court, to cede her province of Guiana to France. These stipulations served to show, that there was no quarter of the world in which France and her present ruler did not entertain views of aggrandizement, and that questions of national faith would not be considered too curiously when they interfered with their purpose.

While Europe was stunned and astonished at the spirit of conquest and accumulation manifested by this insatiable conqueror, France was made aware that he was equally desirous to consolidate and to prolong his power, as to extend it over near and distant regions. He was all, and more than all, that sovereign had ever been; but he still wanted the title and the permanence which royalty requires. To attain these was no difficult matter, when the first consul was the prime mover of each act, whether in the Senate or Tribunal; nor was he long of discovering proper agents eager to gratify his wishes.

Chabot de l'Allier took the lead in the race of adulation. Arising in the Tribunal, he pronounced a long eulogium on Bonaparte, enhancing the gratitude due to the hero, by whom France had been preserved and restored to victory. He, therefore, proposed that the Tribunal should transmit to the Conservative Senate a resolution, requesting the Senate to consider the manner of bestowing on Napoleon Bonaparte a splendid mark of the national gratitude.

There was no misunderstanding this hint. The motion was unanimously adopted, and transmitted to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the consuls.

The Senate conceived they should best meet the demand now made upon them, by electing Napoleon first consul for a second space of ten years, to commence when the date of the original period, for which he was named by the constitution, should expire.

The proposition of the Senate being reduced into the form of a decree, was intimated to Bonaparte, but fell short of his wishes; as it assigned to him, however distant it was, a period at which he must be removed from authority. It is true, that the space of seventeen years, to which the edict of the Senate proposed to extend his power, seemed to guarantee a very ample duration; and, in point of fact, before the term of its expiry arrived, he was prisoner at Saint Helena. But still there was a termination, and that was enough to mortify his ambition.

He thanked the Senate, therefore, for this fresh mark of their confidence, but eluded accepting it in express terms, by referring to the pleasure of the people. Their suffrages, he said, had invested him with power, and he could not think it right to accept of the prolongation of that power but by their consent. It might have been thought that there was now nothing left but to present the decree of the Senate to the people. But the second and third consuls, Bonaparte's colleagues at a humble distance, took it upon them, though the constitution gave them no warrant for such a manoeuvre, to alter the question of the Senate, and to propose to the people one more acceptable to Bonaparte's ambition, requesting their judgment, whether the chief consul should

retain his office, not for ten years longer, but for the term of his life. By this juggling, the proposal of the Senate was set aside, and that assembly soon found it wisest to adopt the more liberal views suggested by the consuls, to whom they returned thanks, for having taught them (we suppose) how to appreciate a hint.

The question was sent down to the departments. The registers were opened with great form, as if the people had really some constitutional right to exercise. As the subscriptions were received at the offices of the various functionaries of government, it is no wonder, considering the nature of the question, that the ministers with whom the registers were finally deposited were enabled to report a majority of three millions of citizens who gave votes in the affirmative. It was much more surprising, that there should have been an actual minority of a few hundred determined republicans, with Carnot at their head, who answered the question in the negative. This statesman observed, as he signed his vote, that he was subscribing his sentence of deportation; from which we may conjecture his opinion concerning the fairness of this mode of consulting the people. He was mistaken notwithstanding. Bonaparte found himself so strong, that he could afford to be merciful, and to assume a show of impartiality, by suffering those to go unpunished who had declined to vote for the increase of his power.

He did not, however, venture to propose to the people another innovation, which extended beyond his death the power which their liberal gift had continued during his life. A simple decree of the Senate assigned to Bonaparte the right of nominating his successor, by a testamentary deed. So that Napoleon might call his children or relatives to the succession of the empire of France, as to a private inheritance; or, like Alexander, he might leave it to the most favoured of his lieutenant-generals. To such a pass had the domination of a military chief, for the space of betwixt two and three years, reduced the fierce democracy and stubborn loyalty of the two factions, which seemed before that period to combat for the possession of France. Napoleon had stooped on them both, like the hawk in the fable.

The period at which we are now arrived, was a most important one in Napoleon's life, and seemed a crisis on which his fate, and that of France, depended. Britain, his most inveterate and most successful enemy, had seen herself compelled by circumstances to resort to the experiment of a doubtful peace, rather than continue a war which seemed to be waged without an object. The severe checks to national prosperity, which arose from the ruined commerce and blockaded ports of France, might now, under the countenance of the first consul, be exchanged for the wealth that waits upon trade and manufactures. Her navy, of which few vestiges were left save the Brest fleet, might now be recruited, and resume by degrees that acquaintance with the ocean from which they had long been debarred. The restored colonies of France might have added to the sources of her national wealth, and she might have possessed—what Bonaparte on a remarkable occasion declared to be the principal

objects he desired for her—ships, colonies, and commerce.

In his personal capacity, the first consul possessed all the power which he desired, and a great deal more than, whether his own or the country's welfare was regarded, he ought to have wished for. His victories over the foes of France had, by their mere fame, enabled him to make himself master of her freedom. It remained to show—not whether Napoleon was a patriot, for to that honourable name he had forfeited all title when he first usurped unlimited power—but whether he was to use the power which he had wrongfully acquired, like Trajan or like Domitian. His strangely-mingled character showed traits of both these historical portraits, strongly opposed as they are to each other. Or rather, he might seem to be like Socrates in the allegory, alternately influenced by a good and a malevolent demou; the former marking his course with actions of splendour and dignity; while the latter, mastering human frailty by means of its prevailing foible, the love of self, debased the history of a hero, by actions and sentiments worthy only of a vulgar tyrant.

CHAPTER XLII.

Different views entertained by the English ministers and the chief consul of the effects of the treaty of Amiens.—Napoleon, misled by the shouts of a London mob, misunderstands the feelings of the people of Great Britain.—His continued encroachments on the independence of Europe.—His conduct to Switzerland.—Interferes in their politics, and sets himself up, uninvited, as mediator in their concerns.—His extraordinary manifesto addressed to them.—Ney enters Switzerland at the head of 40,000 men.—The patriot, Reding, disbands his forces, and is imprisoned.—Switzerland is compelled to furnish France with a subsidiary army of 16,000 troops.—The chief consul adopts the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic.

THE eyes of Europe were now fixed on Bonaparte, as master of the destinies of the civilized world, which his will could either maintain in a state of general peace, or replunge into all the miseries of renewed and more inveterate war. Many hopes were entertained, from his eminent personal qualities, that the course in which he would direct them might prove as honourable to himself as happy for the nations over whom he now possessed such unbounded influence. The shades of his character were either lost amid the lustre of his victories, or excused from the necessity of his situation. The massacre of Jaffa was little known, was acted afar off, and might present itself to memory as an act of military severity, which circumstances might palliate, if not excuse.

Napoleon, supposing him fully satiated with martial glory, in which he had never been surpassed, was expected to apply himself to the arts of peace, by which he might derive fame of a more calm, yet not less honourable character. Peace was all around him, and, to preserve it, he had only to will that it should continue; and the season seemed eminently propitious for taking the advice of Cineas to the King of Epirus, and reposing himself after his labours.

But he was now beginning to show that, from the times of Pyrrhus to his own, ambition has taken more pleasure in the hazards and exertions of the chase than in its successful issue. All the power which Bonaparte already possessed seemed only valuable in his eyes, as it afforded him the means of getting as much more; and, like a sanguine and eager gamester, he went on doubling his stakes at every throw, till the tide of fortune, which had so long run in his favour, at length turned against him, and his ruin was total. His ruling and predominating vice was ambition—we would have called it his only one, did not ambition, when of a character intensely selfish, include so many others.

It seems the most natural course, in continuing our history, first to trace those events which disappointed the general expectations of Europe, and, after a jealous and feverish armistice of little more than a year, again renewed the horrors of war. We shall then resume the internal history of France and her ruler.

Although the two contracting powers had been able to agree upon the special articles of the peace of Amiens, they possessed extremely different ideas concerning the nature of a state of pacification in general, and the relations which it establishes between two independent states. The English minister, a man of the highest personal worth and probity, entertained no doubt that peace was to have its usual effect, of restoring all the ordinary amicable intercourse betwixt France and England; and that, in matters concerning their mutual allies, and the state of the European republic in general, the latter country, on sheathing the sword, had retained the right of friendly counsel and remonstrance. Mr Addington could not hope to restore the balance of Europe, for which so much blood had been spilled in the 18th century. The scales and beams of that balance were broken into fragments, and lay under the feet of Bonaparte. But Britain did not lie prostrate. She still grasped in her hand the trident of the ocean, and had by no event, in the late contest, been reduced to surrender the right of remonstrating against violence and injustice, and of protecting the feeble, as far as circumstances would still permit.

But Bonaparte's idea of the effects of the treaty of Amiens was very different. It was, according to his estimation, a treaty, containing everything that Britain was entitled to expect on the part of herself and her allies, and the accepting of which excluded her from all farther right of interference in the affairs of Europe. It was like a bounding charter, which restricts the right of the person to whom it is granted to the precise limits therein described, and precludes the possibility of his making either claim or acquisition beyond them. All Europe, then, was to be at the disposal of France, and states created, dissolved, changed, and re-changed at her pleasure, unless England could lay her finger on the line in the treaty of Amiens, which prohibited the proposed measure. "England," said the *Moniteur*, in an official tone, "shall have the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens!" In this manner the treaty was, so far as England was concerned, understood to decide,

and that in favour of France, all questions which could possibly arise in the course of future time between the two countries; while, in ordinary candour, and in common sense, it could be only considered as settling the causes of animosity between the parties, as they existed at the date of the pacification.

The insular situation of England was absurdly alleged as a reason why she should not interfere in continental politics; as if the relations of states to each other were not the same, whether divided by an ocean or a line of mountains. The very circumstance had been founded upon eloquently and justly by one of her own poets, for claiming for Britain the office of an umpire,* because less liable to be agitated by the near vicinity of continental war, and more likely to decide with impartiality concerning contending claims, in which she herself could have little interest. It was used by France in the sense of another poet, and made a reason for thrusting England out of the European world, and allowing her no vote in its most important concerns.†

To such humiliation it was impossible for Britain to submit. It rendered the treaty of Amiens, thus interpreted, the counterpart of the terms which the Cyclops granted to Ulysses, that he should be the last devoured. If Britain were compelled to remain, with fettered hands and padlocked lips, a helpless and inactive witness, while France completed the subjection of the Continent, what other doom could she expect than to be finally subdued? It will be seen afterwards that disputes arose concerning the execution of the treaty. These, it is possible, might have been accommodated, had not the general interpretation, placed by the first consul on the whole transaction, been inconsistent with the honour, safety, and independence of Great Britain.

It seems more than probable, that the extreme rejoicing of the rabble of London at signing the preliminaries, their dragging about the carriage of Lauriston, and shouting "Bonaparte for ever!" had misled the ruler of France into an opinion that peace was indispensably necessary to England; for, like other foreigners, misapprehending the nature of our popular government, he may easily enough have mistaken the cries of a London mob for the voice of the British people. The ministers also seemed to keep their ground in Parliament on condition of their making and maintaining peace; and as they showed a spirit of frankness and concession, it might be misconstrued by Bonaparte into a sense of weakness. Had he not laboured under some such impression, he would probably have postponed, till the final pacification of Amiens, the gigantic steps towards further aggrandizement, which he hesitated not to take after signing the preliminaries, and during the progress of the congress.

We have specified, in the last chapter, Napoleon's acceptance of the Presidency of the Cisalpine Republic, on which he now bestowed the name of Italian, as if it was designed at a future time to comprehend the whole peninsula of Italy. By a

secret treaty with Portugal, he had acquired the province of Guiana, so far as it belonged to that power. By another with Spain, he had engrossed the Spanish part of Louisiana, and, what was still more ominous, the reversion of the Duchy of Parma, and of the island of Elba, important as an excellent naval station.

In the German Diet, for settling the indemnities to be granted to the various princes of the empire who had sustained loss of territory in consequence of late events, and particularly of the treaty of Lunéville, the influence of France predominated in a manner which threatened entire destruction to that ancient confederation. It may be in general observed, that towns, districts, and provinces, were dealt from hand to hand like cards at a gaming-table; and the powers of Europe once more, after the partition of Poland, saw with scandal the government of freemen transferred from hand to hand, without regard to their wishes, aptitudes, and habits, any more than those of cattle. This evil imitation of an evil precedent was fraught with mischief, as breaking every tie of affection betwixt the governor and governed, and loosening all attachments which bind subjects to their rulers, excepting those springing from force on the one side, and necessity on the other.

In his transfer of territories and jurisdictions, the King of Prussia obtained a valuable compensation for the Duchy of Clèves, and other provinces transferred to France, as lying on the left bank of the Rhine. The neutrality of that monarch had been of the last service to France during her late bloody campaigns, and was now to be compensated. The smaller princes of the empire, especially those on the right bank of the Rhine, who had virtually placed themselves under the patronage of France, were also gratified with large allotments of territory; whilst Austria, whose pertinacious opposition was well remembered, was considered as yet retaining too high pretensions to power and independence, and her indemnities were as much limited as those of the friends of France were extended.

The various advantages and accessions of power and influence which we have hitherto alluded to, as attained by France, were chiefly gained by address in treating, and diplomatic skill. But shortly after the treaty of Amiens had been signed, Bonaparte manifested to the world, that where intrigue was unsuccessful, his sword was as ready as ever to support and extend his aggressions.

The attack of the Directory on the Swiss Cantons had been always considered as a coarse and gross violation of the law of nations, and was regarded as such by Bonaparte himself. But he failed not to maintain the military possession of Switzerland by the French troops; nor, however indignant under the downfall of her ancient fame and present liberties, was it possible for that country to offer any resistance, without the certainty of total destruction.

The eleventh article of the treaty of Lunéville seemed to afford the Swiss a prospect of escaping from this thralldom, but it was in words only. That treaty was declared to extend to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. "The

* Thrice happy Britain, from the kingdoms rent,
To sit the Guardian of the Continent.

ADDISON.

† — penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.

contracting parties guarantee the *independence* of the said republics," continues the treaty, "and the right of the people who inhabit them, to adopt what form of government they please." We have seen how far the Cisalpine Republic profited by this declaration of independence; the proceedings respecting Switzerland were much more glaring.

There was a political difference of opinion in the Swiss cantons, concerning the form of government to be adopted by them; and the question was so solemnly agitated in a diet held at Berne. The majority inclined for a constitution framed on the principle of their ancient government by a federative league, and the plan of such a constitution was accordingly drawn up and approved of. Aloys Reding, renowned for wisdom, courage, and patriotism, was placed at the head of this system. He saw the necessity of obtaining the countenance of France, in order to the free enjoyment of the constitution which his countrymen had chosen, and betook himself to Paris to solicit Bonaparte's consent to it. This consent was given, upon the Swiss government agreeing to admit to their deliberations six persons of the opposite party, who, supported by the French interest, desired that the constitution should be one and indivisible, in imitation of that of the French Republic.

This coalition, formed at the first consul's request, terminated in an act of treachery, which Bonaparte had probably foreseen. Availing themselves of an adjournment of the diet for the Easter holidays, the French party summoned a meeting, from which the other members were absent, and adopted a form of constitution which totally subverted the principles of that under which the Swiss had so long lived in freedom, happiness, and honour. Bonaparte congratulated them on the wisdom of their choice. It was, indeed, sure to meet his approbation, for it was completely subversive of all the old laws and forms, and so might receive any modification which his policy should dictate; and it was to be administered of course by men, who, having risen under his influence, must necessarily be pliant to his will. Having made his compliments on their being possessed of a free and independent constitution, he signified his willingness to withdraw the troops of France, and did so accordingly. For this equitable measure much gratitude was expressed by the Swiss, which might have been saved, if they had known that Bonaparte's policy rather than his generosity dictated his proceedings. It was, in the first place, his business to assume the appearance of leaving the Swiss in possession of their freedom; secondly, he was sure that events would presently happen, when they should be left to themselves, which would afford a plausible pretext to justify his armed interference.

The aristocratic cantons of the ancient Swiss League were satisfied with the constitution finally adopted by the French party of their country; but not so the democratic, or small cantons, who, rather than submit to it, declared their resolution to withdraw from the general league, as new-modeled by the French, and to form under their own ancient laws a separate confederacy. This was to consist of the cantons of Schwytz, Uri, and Unterwalden,

forest and mountain regions, in which the Swiss have least degenerated from the simple and hardy manners of their ancestors. A civil war immediately broke out, in the course of which it was seen, that in popularity, as well as patriotism, the usurping Helvetic government, established by French interest, was totally inferior to the gallant foresters. These last were guided chiefly by the patriotic Reding, who strove, with undaunted though ultimately with vain resolution, to emancipate his unfortunate country. The intrusive government were driven from Berne, their troops everywhere routed, and the federative party were generally received with the utmost demonstrations of joy by their countrymen, few adhering to the usurpers, excepting those who were attached to them by views of emolument.

But while Reding and the Swiss patriots were triumphing in the prospect of restoring their ancient constitution, with all its privileges and immunities, the strong grasp of superior power was extended to crush their patriotic exertions.

The fatal tidings of the proposed forcible interference of France were made known by the sudden arrival of Rapp, aide-de-camp of Bonaparte, with a letter addressed to the eighteen Swiss cantons. This manifesto was of a most extraordinary nature. Bonaparte upbraided the Swiss with their civil discords of three years' standing, forgetting that these discords would not have existed but for the invasion of the French. He told them that, when he, as a boon granted, had been pleased to withdraw his troops from their country, they had immediately turned their arms against each other. These are singular propositions enough to be found in a proclamation addressed by one independent nation to another. But what follows is still more extraordinary. "You have disputed three years, without understanding one another; if left to yourselves, you will kill each other for three years more, without coming to any better result. Your history shows that your intestine wars cannot be terminated without the efficacious intervention of France. It is true, I had resolved not to intermeddle with your affairs, having always found that your various governments have applied to me for advice which they never meant to follow, and have sometimes made a bad use of my name to favour their own private interests and passions. But I cannot remain insensible to the distress of which I see you the prey—I recal my resolution of neutrality—I consent to be the mediator of your differences. But my mediation shall be effectual, as becomes the great nation in whose name I address you."

This insulting tone, with which, uninvited, and as if granting a favour, the chief consul took upon him, as a matter of course, to exercise the most arbitrary power over a free and independent people, is equally remarkable at the close of the manifesto. The proclamation commands, that a deputation be sent to Paris, to consult with the chief consul; and concludes with an assertion of Bonaparte's "right to expect that no city, community, or public body, should presume to contradict the measures which it might please him to adopt." To support the reasoning of a manifesto which every schoolboy might have

confuted, Ney, with an army of forty thousand men, entered Switzerland at different points.

As the presence of such an overpowering force rendered resistance vain, Aloys Reding, and his gallant companions, were compelled to dismiss their forces after a touching address to them. The Diet of Schwitz also dissolved itself, in consequence of the interference, as they stated, of an armed force of foreigners, whom it was impossible, in the exhausted state of the country, to oppose.

Switzerland was thus, once more, occupied by the French soldiers. The patriots, who, had distinguished themselves in asserting her rights, were sought after and imprisoned. Aloys Reding was urged to conceal himself, but he declined to do so; and when upbraided by the French officer who came to arrest him, as being the head of the insurrection, he answered nobly, "I have obeyed the call of conscience and my country—do you execute the commands of your master." He was imprisoned in the Castle of Aarsburg.

The resistance of these worthy patriots, their calm, dignified, and manly conduct, their simple and affecting pleas against over-mastering violence, though they failed to procure the advantages which they hoped for their country, were not lost to the world, or to the cause of freedom. Their pathetic complaints, when perused in many a remote valley, excited detestation of French usurpation, in bosoms which had hitherto contented themselves with regarding the victories of the republic with wonder, if not with admiration. For other aggressions, the hurry of revolution, the extremity of war, the strong compulsion of necessity might be pleaded; but that upon Switzerland was as gratuitous and unprovoked as it was nefariously unjust. The name of the cantons, connected with so many recollections of ancient faith and bravery, hardy simplicity, and manly freedom, gave additional interest to the sufferings of such a country; and no one act of his public life did Bonaparte so much injury throughout Europe, as his conduct towards Switzerland.

The dignified resistance of the Swiss, their renown for courage, and the policy of not thwarting them too far, had some effect on the chief consul himself; and in the final act of mediation, by which he saved them the farther trouble of taking thought about their own constitution, he permitted federalism to remain as an integral principle. By a subsequent defensive treaty, the cantons agreed to refuse all passage through the country to the enemies of France, and engaged to maintain an army of a few thousand men to guarantee this engagement. Switzerland also furnished France with a subsidiary army of sixteen thousand men, to be maintained at the expense of the French government. But the firmness which these mountaineers showed in the course of discussing this treaty was such, that it saved them from having the conscription imposed on them, as in other countries under the dominion of France.

Notwithstanding these qualifications, however, it was evident that the voluntary and self-elected Mediator of Switzerland was in fact sovereign of that country, as well as of France and the north of Italy; but there was no voice to interdict this formidable accumulation of power. England alone interfered,

by sending an envoy (Mr Moore) to the Diet of Schwitz, to inquire by what means she could give assistance to their claims of independence; but, ere his arrival, the operations of Ney had rendered all farther resistance impossible. A remonstrance was also made by England to the French government upon this unprovoked aggression on the liberties of an independent people. But it remained unanswered and unnoticed, unless in the pages of the *Moniteur*, where the pretensions of Britain to interfere with the affairs of the Continent were held up to ridicule and contempt. After this period, Bonaparte adopted, and continued to bear, the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic, in token, doubtless, of the right which he had assumed, and effectually exercised, of interfering in their affairs whenever it suited him to do so.

CHAPTER XLIII.

Increasing jealousies betwixt France and England—Additional encroachments and offences on the part of the former.—Singular instructions given by the first consul to his commercial agents in British ports.—Orders issued by the English ministers, for the expulsion of all persons acting under them.—Violence of the press on both sides of the Channel.—Peltier's celebrated royalist publication, l'Ambigu.—Bonaparte answers through the Moniteur.—Monsieur Otto's note of remonstrance.—Lord Hawkesbury's reply.—Peltier tried for a libel against the first consul—found guilty—but not brought up for sentence.—Napoleon's continued displeasure.—Angry discussions respecting the treaty of Amiens—Malta.—Offensive report of General Sebastiani.—Resolution of the British government in consequence.—Conferences betwixt Bonaparte and Lord Whitworth.—The king sends a message to parliament, demanding additional aid.—Bonaparte quarrels with Lord Whitworth at a levee.—Particulars.—Resentment of England upon this occasion.—Farther discussions concerning Malta.—Reasons why Bonaparte might desire to break off negotiations.—Britain declares war against France on 18th May, 1803.

THESE advances towards universal empire, made during the very period when the pacific measures adopted by the preliminaries, and afterwards confirmed by the treaty of Amiens, were in the act of being carried into execution, excited the natural jealousy of the people of Britain. They had not been accustomed to rely much on the sincerity of the French nation; nor did the character of its present chief, so full of ambition, and so bold and successful in his enterprises, incline them to feelings of greater security. On the other hand, Bonaparte seems to have felt as matter of personal offence the jealousy which the British entertained; and instead of soothing it, as policy dictated, by concessions and confidence, he showed a disposition to repress, or at least to punish it, by measures which indicated anger and irritation. There ceased to be any cordiality of intercourse betwixt the two nations, and they began to look into the conduct of each other for causes of offence, rather than for the means of removing it.

The English had several subjects of complaint against France, besides the general encroachments which she had continued to make on the liberties of Europe. A law had been made during the times of

the wildest jacobinism, which condemned to forfeiture every vessel under a hundred tons burthen, carrying British merchandise, and approaching within four leagues of France. It was now thought proper, that the enforcing a regulation of so hostile a character, made during a war of unexampled bitterness, should be the first fruits of returning peace. Several British vessels were stopped, their captains imprisoned, their cargoes confiscated, and all restitution refused. Some of these had been driven on the French coast unwillingly, and by stress of weather; but the necessity of the case created no exemption. An instance there was, of a British vessel in ballast, which entered Charente, in order to load with a cargo of brandy. The plates, knives, forks, etc. used by the captain, being found to be of British manufacture, the circumstance was thought a sufficient apology for seizing the vessel. These aggressions, repeatedly made, were not, so far as appears, remedied on the most urgent remonstrances, and seemed to argue that the French were already acting on the vexatious and irritating principle which often precedes a war, but very seldom immediately follows a peace. The conduct of France was felt to be the more unreasonable and ungracious, as all restrictions on her commerce, imposed during the war, had been withdrawn on the part of Great Britain so soon as the peace was concluded. In like manner, a stipulation of the treaty of Amiens, providing that all sequestrations imposed on the property of French or of English, in the two contending countries, should be removed, was instantly complied with in Britain, but postponed and dallied with on the part of France.

The above were vexatious and offensive measures, intimating little respect for the government of England, and no desire to cultivate her good-will. They were perhaps adopted by the chief consul, in hopes of inducing Britain to make some sacrifices in order to obtain from his favour a commercial treaty, the advantages of which, according to his opinion of the English nation, was a boon calculated to make them quickly forgive the humiliating restrictions from which it would emancipate their trade. If this were any part of his policy, he was ignorant of the nature of the people to whom it was applied. It is the sluggish ox alone that is governed by a goad. But what gave the deepest offence and most lively alarm to Britain, was, that while Bonaparte declined affording the ordinary facilities for English commerce, it was his purpose, nevertheless, to establish a commercial agent in every port of the British dominions, whose ostensible duty was to watch over that very trade which the first consul showed so little desire to encourage, but whose real business resembled that of an accredited and privileged spy. These official persons were not only, by their instructions, directed to collect every possible information on commercial points, but also to furnish a plan of the ports of each district with all the soundings, and to point out with what wind vessels could go out and enter with most ease, and at what draught of water the harbour might be entered by ships of burthen. To add to the alarming character of such a set of agents, it was found that those invested with the office were military men and engineers.

Consuls thus nominated had reached Britain, but had not, in general, occupied the posts assigned to them, when the British government, becoming informed of the duties they were expected to perform, announced to them that any one who might repair to a British seaport under such a character, should be instantly ordered to quit the island. The secrecy with which these agents had been instructed to conduct themselves was so great, that one Fauvelet, to whom the office of commercial agent at Dublin had been assigned, and who had reached the place of his destination before the nature of the appointment was discovered, could not be found out by some persons who desired to make an affidavit before him as Consul of France. It can be no wonder that the very worst impression was made on the public mind of Britain respecting the further projects of her late enemies, when it was evident that they availed themselves of the first moments of returning peace to procure, by an indirect and most suspicious course of proceeding, that species of information which would be most useful to France, and most dangerous to Britain, in the event of a renewed war.

While these grievances and circumstances of suspicion agitated the English nation, the daily press, which alternately acts upon public opinion, and is reacted upon by it, was loud and vehement. The personal character of the chief consul was severely treated; his measures of self-aggrandizement arraigned, his aggressions on the liberty of France, of Italy, and especially of Switzerland, held up to open day; while every instance of petty vexation and oppression practised upon British commerce or British subjects, was quoted as expressing his deep resentment against the only country which possessed the will and the power to counteract his acquiring the universal dominion of Europe.

There was at this period in Britain a large party of French royalists, who, declining to return to France, or falling under the exceptions to the amnesty, regarded Bonaparte as their personal enemy, as well as the main obstacle to the restoration of the Bourbons, to which, but for him only, the people of France seemed otherwise more disposed than at any time since the commencement of the Revolution. These gentlemen found an able and active advocate of their cause in Monsieur Peltier, an emigrant, a determined royalist, and a man of that ready wit and vivacity of talent which is peculiarly calculated for periodical writing. He had opposed the democrats during the early days of the Revolution, by a publication termed the *Acts of the Apostles*; in which he held up to ridicule and execration the actions, pretensions, and principles of their leaders, with such success as induced Brissot to assert, that he had done more harm to the republican cause than all the allied armies. At the present crisis, he commenced the publication of a weekly paper in London, in the French language, called *l'Ambigu*. The decoration at the top of the sheet was a head of Bonaparte, placed on the body of a Sphinx. This ornament being objected to after the first two or three numbers, the Sphinx appeared with the neck truncated; but, being still decked with the consular emblems, continued to intimate

emblematically the allusion at once to Egypt, and to the ambiguous character of the first consul. The columns of this paper were dedicated to the most severe attacks upon Bonaparte and the French government; and as it was highly popular, from the general feelings of the English nation towards both, it was widely dispersed and generally read.

The torrent of satire and abuse poured forth from the English and Anglo-Gallican periodical press, was calculated deeply to annoy and irritate the person against whom it was chiefly aimed. In England we are so much accustomed to see characters the most unimpeachable, nay, the most venerable, assailed by the daily press, that we account the individual guilty of folly, who, if he be innocent of giving cause to the scandal, takes it to heart more than a passenger would mind the barking of a dog, that yelps at every passing sound. But this is a sentiment acquired partly by habit, partly by our knowledge, that unsubstantiated scandal of this sort makes no impression on the public mind. Such indifference cannot be expected on the part of foreigners, who, in this particular, resemble horses introduced from neighbouring counties into the precincts of forest districts, that are liable to be stung into madness by a peculiar species of gad-fly, to which the race bred in the country are from habit almost totally indifferent.

If it be thus with foreigners in general, it must be supposed that from natural impatience of censure, as well as rendered susceptible and irritable by his course of uninterrupted success, Napoleon Bonaparte must have winced under the animated and sustained attacks upon his person and government, which appeared in the English newspapers, and Peltier's *Ambigu*. He attached at all times, as we have already had occasion to remark, much importance to the influence of the press, which in Paris he had taken under his own especial superintendence, and for which he himself often condescended to compose or correct paragraphs. To be assailed, therefore, by the whole body of British newspapers, almost as numerous as their navy, seems to have provoked him to the extremity of his patience; and resentment of these attacks aggravated the same hostile sentiments against England, which, from causes of suspicion already mentioned, had begun to be engendered in the British public against France and her ruler.

Napoleon, in the meantime, endeavoured to answer in kind, and the columns of the *Moniteur* had many an angry and violent passage directed against England. Answers, replies, and rejoinders passed rapidly across the Channel, inflaming and augmenting the hostile spirit, reciprocally entertained by the two countries against each other. But there was this great disadvantage on Bonaparte's side, that while the English might justly throw the blame of this scandalous warfare on the license of a free press, the chief consul could not transfer the responsibility of the attack on his side; because it was universally known, that the French periodical publications being under the most severe regulations, nothing could appear in them except what had received the previous sanction of the government. Every attack upon England, therefore, which was

published in the French papers, was held to express the personal sentiments of the chief consul, who thus, by destroying the freedom of the French press, had rendered himself answerable for every such license as it was permitted to take.

It became speedily plain, that Bonaparte could reap no advantage from a contest in which he was to be the defendant in his own person, and to maintain a literary warfare with anonymous antagonists. He had recourse, therefore, to a demand upon the British government, and, after various representations of milder import, caused his envoy, Monsieur Otto, to state in an official note the following distinct grievances:—First, the existence of a deep and continued system to injure the character of the first consul, and prejudice the effect of his public measures, through the medium of the press: Secondly, the permission of a part of the princes of the house of Bourbon, and their adherents, to remain in England, for the purpose (it was alleged) that they might hatch and encourage schemes against the life and government of the chief consul. It was therefore categorically demanded, 1st, That the British government do put a stop to the publication of the abuse complained of, as affecting the head of the French government. 2d, That the emigrants residing in Jersey be dismissed from England—that the bishops who had declined to resign their sees be also sent out of the country—that Georges Caudoual be transported to Canada—that the princes of the house of Bourbon be advised to repair to Warsaw, where the head of their family now resided—and, finally, that such emigrants who continued to wear the ancient badges and decorations of the French court, be also compelled to leave England. Lest the British ministers should plead, that the constitution of their country precluded them from gratifying the first consul in any of these demands, Monsieur Otto forestalled the objection, by reminding them that the Alien Act gave them full power to exclude any foreigners from Great Britain at their pleasure.

To this peremptory mandate, Lord Hawkesbury, then minister for foreign affairs, instructed the British agent, Mr Merry, to make a reply, at once firm and conciliatory; avoiding the tone of pique and ill temper which is plainly to be traced in the French note, yet maintaining the dignity of the nation he represented. It was observed, that, if the French government had reason to complain of the license of the English journals, the British government had no less right to be dissatisfied with the retorts and recriminations which had been poured out from those of Paris; and that there was this remarkable feature of difference betwixt them, that the English ministry neither had, could have, nor wished to have, any control over the freedom of the British press; whereas the *Moniteur*, in which the abuse of England had appeared, was the official organ of the French government. But, finally upon this point, the British monarch, it was said, would make no concession to any foreign power, at the expense of the freedom of the press. If what was published was libelous or actionable, the printers and publishers were open to punishment, and all reasonable facilities would be afforded for prosecuting them.

To the demands so peremptorily urged, respecting the emigrants, Lord Hawkesbury replied, by special answers applying to the different classes, but summed up in the general argument, that his majesty neither encouraged them in any scheme against the French government, nor did he believe there were any such in existence; and that while these unfortunate princes and their followers lived in conformity to the laws of Great Britain, and without affording nations with whom she was at peace any valid or sufficient cause of complaint, his majesty would feel it inconsistent with his dignity, his honour, and the common laws of hospitality, to deprive them of that protection, which individuals resident within the British dominions could only forfeit by their own misconduct.

To render these answers, being the only reply which an English minister could have made to the demands of France, in some degree acceptable to Bonaparte, Peltier was brought to trial for a libel against the first consul, at the instance of the attorney-general. He was defended by Mr Mackintosh (now Sir James), in one of the most brilliant speeches ever made at bar or in forum, in which the jury were reminded, that every press on the Continent was enslaved, from Palermo to Hamburg, and that they were now to vindicate the right we had ever asserted, to speak of men both at home and abroad, not according to their greatness, but their crimes.

The defendant was found guilty; but his cause might be considered as triumphant.* Accordingly, every part of the proceedings gave offence to Bonaparte. He had not desired to be righted by the English law, but by a vigour beyond the law. The publicity of the trial, the wit and eloquence of the advocate, were ill calculated to soothe the feelings of Bonaparte, who knew human nature, and the character of his usurped power, too well, to suppose that public discussion could be of service to him. He had demanded darkness, the English government had answered by giving him light; he had wished, like those who are conscious of flaws in their conduct, to suppress all censure of his measures, and by Peltier's trial, the British ministers had made the investigation of them a point of legal necessity. The first consul felt the consciousness that he himself, rather than Peltier, was tried before the British public, with a publicity which could not fail to blase abroad the discussion. Far from conceiving himself obliged by the species of atonement which had been offered him, he deemed the offence of the original publication was greatly aggravated, and placed it now directly to the account of the English ministers, of whom he could never be made to understand, that they had afforded him the only remedy in their power.

The paragraphs hostile to England in the *Moniteur* were continued; an English paper called *The Argus*, conducted by Irish refugees, was printed at Paris, under permission of the government, for the purpose of assailing Britain with additional abuse,

* He was never brought up to receive sentence, our quarrel with the French having soon afterwards come to an absolute rupture.

while the fire was returned from the English side of the Channel, with double vehemence and tenfold success. These were ominous precursors to a state of peace, and more grounds of misunderstanding were daily added.

The new discussions related chiefly to the execution of the treaty of Amiens, in which the English government showed no promptitude. Most of the French colonies, it is true, had been restored; but the Cape, and the other Batavian settlements, above all, the island of Malta, were still possessed by the British forces. At common law, if the expression may be used, England was bound instantly to redeem her engagement, by ceding these possessions, and thus fulfilling the articles of the treaty. In equity, she had a good defence; since in policy, for herself and Europe, she was bound to decline the cession at all risks.

The recent acquisitions of France on the Continent afforded the plea of equity to which we have alluded. It was founded on the principle adopted at the treaty of Amiens, that Great Britain should, out of her conquests over the enemy's foreign settlements, retain so much as to counterbalance, in some measure, the power which France had acquired in Europe. This principle being once established, it followed that the compact at Amiens had reference to the then existing state of things; and since, after that period, France had extended her sway over Italy and Piedmont, England became thereby entitled to retain an additional compensation, in consequence of France's additional acquisitions. This was the true and simple position of the case; France had innovated upon the state of things which existed when the treaty was made, and England might, therefore, in justice, claim an equitable right to innovate upon the treaty itself, by refusing to make surrender of what had been promised in other and very different circumstances. Perhaps it had been better to fix upon this obvious principle, as the ground of declining to surrender such British conquests as were not yet given up, unless France consented to relinquish the power which she had usurped upon the Continent. This, however, would have produced instant war; and the ministers were naturally, loth to abandon the prospect of prolonging the peace which had been so lately established, or to draw their pen through the treaty of Amiens, while the ink with which it was written was still moist. They yielded, therefore, in a great measure. The Cape of Good Hope and the Dutch colonies were restored, Alexandria was evacuated, and the ministers confined their discussions with France to the island of Malta only; and, condescending still farther, declared themselves ready to concede even this last point of discussion, providing a sufficient guarantee should be obtained for this important citadel of the Mediterranean being retained in neutral hands. The order itself was in no respect adequate to the purpose; and as to the proposed Neapolitan garrison (none of the most trust-worthy in any case), France, by her encroachments in Italy, had become so near and so formidable a neighbour to the King of Naples, that, by a threat of invasion of his capital, she might have compelled him to deliver up Malta upon a very brief notice. All this was urged on the part of Britain.

The French ministry, on the other hand, pressed for literal execution of the treaty. After some diplomatic evasions had been resorted to, it appeared as if the cession could be no longer deferred, when a publication appeared in the *Moniteur*, which roused to a high pitch the suspicions, as well as the indignation, of the British nation.

The publication alluded to was a report of General Sébastiani. This officer had been sent as the emissary of the first consul, to various Mahomedan courts in Asia and Africa, in all of which it seems to have been his object, not only to exalt the greatness of his master, but to misrepresent and degrade the character of England. He had visited Egypt, of which, with its fortresses, and the troops that defended them, he had made a complete survey. He then waited upon Djézzar Pacha, and gives a flattering account of his reception, and of the high esteem in which Djézzar held the first consul, whom he had so many reasons for wishing well to. At the Ionian Islands, he harangued the natives, and assured them of the protection of Bonaparte. The whole report is full of the most hostile expressions towards England, and accuses General Stuart of having encouraged the Turks to assassinate the writer. Wherever Sébastiani went, he states himself to have interfered in the factions and quarrels of the country; he inquired into its forces; renewed old intimacies, or made new ones with leading persons; enhanced his master's power, and was liberal in promises of French aid. He concludes, that a French army of six thousand men would be sufficient to conquer Egypt, and that the Ionian Islands were altogether attached to the French interest.

The publication of this report, which seemed as if Bonaparte were blazing forth to the world his unaltered determination to persist in his eastern projects of colonization and conquest, would have rendered it an act of treason in the English ministers, if, by the cession of Malta, they had put into his hand, or at least placed within his grasp, the readiest means of carrying into execution those gigantic schemes of ambition, which had for their ultimate, perhaps their most desired object, the destruction of the Indian commerce of Britain.

As it were by way of corollary to the gasconading journal of Sébastiani, an elaborate account of the forces and natural advantages of France was published at the same period, which, in order that there might be no doubt concerning the purpose of its appearance at this crisis, was summed up by the express conclusion, "that Britain was unable to contend with France single-handed." This tone of defiance, officially adopted at such a moment, added not a little to the resentment of the English nation, not accustomed to decline a challenge or endure an insult.

The court of Britain, on the appearance of this Report on the State of France, together with that of Sébastiani, drawn up and subscribed by an official agent, containing insinuations totally void of foundation, and disclosing intrigues inconsistent with the preservation of peace, and the objects for which peace had been made, declared that the king would enter into no farther discussion on the subject of

Malta, until his majesty had received the most ample satisfaction for this new and singular aggression.

While things were thus rapidly approaching to a rupture, the chief consul adopted the unusual resolution, of himself entering personally into conference with the British ambassador. He probably took this determination upon the same grounds which dictated his contempt of customary forms, in entering, or attempting to enter, into direct correspondence with the princes whom he had occasion to treat with. Such a deviation from the established mode of procedure seemed to mark his elevation above ordinary rules, and would afford him, he might think, an opportunity of bearing down the British ambassador's reasoning, by exhibiting one of those bursts of passion, to which he had been accustomed to see most men give way.

It would have been more prudent in Napoleon to have left the conduct of the negotiation to Talleyrand. A sovereign cannot enter in person upon such conferences, unless with the previous determination of adhering precisely and finally to whatever ultimatum he has to propose. He cannot, without a compromise of dignity, chaffer or capitulate, or even argue, and of course is incapable of wielding any of the usual, and almost indispensable weapons of negotiators. If it was Napoleon's expectation, by one stunning and emphatic declaration of his pleasure, to beat down all arguments, and confound all opposition, he would have done wisely to remember, that he was not now, as in other cases, a general upon a victorious field of battle, dictating terms to a defeated enemy; but was treating upon a footing of equality with Britain, mistress of the seas, possessing strength as formidable as his own, though of a different character, and whose prince and people were far more likely to be incensed than intimidated by any menaces which his passion might throw out.

The character of the English ambassador was as unfavourable for the chief consul's probable purpose, as that of the nation he represented. Lord Whitworth was possessed of great experience and sagacity. His integrity and honour were undoubted; and, with the highest degree of courage, he had a calm and collected disposition, admirably calculated to give him the advantage in any discussion with an antagonist, of a fiery, impatient, and overbearing temper.

We will make no apology for dwelling at unusual length on the conferences betwixt the first consul and Lord Whitworth, as they are strikingly illustrative of the character of Bonaparte, and were in their consequences decisive of his fate, and that of the world.

Their first interview of a political nature took place in the Tuileries, 17th February, 1803. Bonaparte, having announced that this meeting was for the purpose of "making his sentiments known to the King of England in a clear and authentic manner," proceeded to talk incessantly for the space of nearly two hours, not without considerable incoherence, his temper rising as he dwelt on the alleged causes of complaint which he preferred against England, though not so much or so incautiously as to make

him drop the usual tone of courtesy to the ambassador.

He complained of the delay of the British in evacuating Alexandria and Malta; cutting short all discussion on the latter subject, by declaring he would as soon agree to Britain's possessing the suburb of St-Antoine as that island. He then referred to the abuse thrown upon him by the English papers, but more especially by those French journals published in London. He affirmed that Georges and other Chouan chiefs, whom he accused of designs against his life, received relief or shelter in England; and that two assassins had been apprehended in Normandy, sent over by the French emigrants to murder him. This, he said, would be publicly proved in a court of justice. From this point he diverged to Egypt, of which he affirmed he could make himself master whenever he had a mind; but that he considered it too paltry a stake to renew the war for. Yet, while on this subject, he suffered it to escape him, that the idea of recovering this favourite colony was only postponed, not abandoned. "Egypt," he said, "must sooner or later belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish government, or in consequence of some agreement with the Porte." In evidence of his peaceable intentions, he asked, what he should gain by going to war, since he had no means of acting offensively against England, except by a descent, of which he acknowledged the hazard in the strongest terms. The chances, he said, were a hundred to one against him; and yet he declared that the attempt should be made if he were now obliged to go to war. He extolled the power of both countries. The army of France, he said, should be soon recruited to four hundred and eighty thousand men; and the fleets of England were such as he could not propose to match within the space of ten years at least. United, the two countries might govern the world, would they but understand each other. Had he found, he said, the least cordiality on the part of England, she should have had indemnities assigned her upon the Continent, treaties of commerce, all that she could wish or desire. But he confessed that his irritation increased daily, "since every gale that blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him."

He then made an excursive digression, in which, taking a review of the nations of Europe, he contended that England could hope for assistance from none of them in a war with France. In the total result, he demanded the instant implement of the treaty of Amiens, and the suppression of the abuse in the English papers. War was the alternative.

During this excursive piece of declamation, which the first consul delivered with great rapidity, Lord Whitworth, notwithstanding the interview lasted two hours, had scarcely time to slide in a few words in reply or explanation. As he endeavoured to state the new grounds of mistrust which induced the King of England to demand more advantageous terms, in consequence of the accession of territory and influence which France had lately made, Napoleon interrupted him—"I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland—they are trifling occurrences, which must have been foreseen while

the negotiation was in dependence. You have no right to incur to them at this time of day." To the hint of indemnities which might be allotted to England out of the general spoil of Europe, if she would cultivate the friendship of Bonaparte, Lord Whitworth nobly answered, that the King of Britain's ambition led him to preserve what was his, not to acquire that which belonged to others. They parted with civility, but with a conviction on Lord Whitworth's part, that Bonaparte would never resign his claim to the possession of Malta.

The British ministry were of the same opinion; for a message was sent down by his majesty to the House of Commons, stating, that he had occasion for additional aid to enable him to defend his dominions, in case of an encroachment on the part of France. A reason was given, which injured the cause of the ministers, by placing the vindication of their measures upon simulated grounds;—it was stated, that these apprehensions arose from naval preparations in the different ports of France. No such preparations had been complained of during the intercourse between the ministers of France and England,—in truth, none such existed to any considerable extent,—and in so far, the British ministers gave the advantage to the French, by not resting the cause of their country on the just and true grounds. All, however, were sensible of the real merits of the dispute, which were grounded on the grasping and inordinate ambition of the French ruler, and the sentiments of dislike and irritation with which he seemed to regard Great Britain.

The charge of the pretended naval preparations being triumphantly refuted by France, Talleyrand was next employed to place before Lord Whitworth the means which, in case of a rupture, France possessed of wounding England, not directly, indeed, but through the sides of those states of Europe whom she would most wish to see, if not absolutely independent, yet unoppressed by military exactions. "It was *natural*," a note of this statesman asserted, "that Britain being armed in consequence of the king's message, France should arm also—that she should send an army into Holland—form an encampment on the frontiers of Hanover—continue to maintain troops in Switzerland—march others to the south of Italy, and, finally, form encampments upon the coast." All these threats, excepting the last, referred to distant and to neutral nations, who were not alleged to have themselves given any cause of complaint to France; but who were now to be subjected to military occupation and exaction, because Britain desired to see them happy and independent, and because harassing and oppressing them must be in proportion displeasing to her. It was an entirely new principle of warlike policy, which introduced the oppression of unoffending and neutral neighbours as a legitimate mode of carrying on war against a hostile power, against whom there was little possibility of using measures directly offensive.

Shortly after this note had been lodged, Bonaparte, incensed at the message of the king to parliament, seems to have formed the scheme of bringing the protracted negotiations betwixt France

and England to a point, in a time, place, and manner, equally extraordinary. At a public court held at the Tuileries, on the 13th March, 1803, the chief consul came up to Lord Whitworth in considerable agitation, and observed aloud, and within hearing of the circle,—"You are then determined on war?"—and, without attending to the disclamations of the English ambassador, proceeded,—“We have been at war for fifteen years—you are determined on hostility for fifteen years more—and you force me to it.” He then addressed Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azzara—"The English wish for war; but if they draw the sword first, I will be the last to return it to the scabbard. They do not respect treaties, which henceforth we must cover with black crape!" He then again addressed Lord Whitworth—"To what purpose are these armaments?—Against whom do you take these measures of precaution? I have not a single ship of the line in any port in France—But if you arm, I too will take up arms—if you fight, I will fight—you may destroy France, but you cannot intimidate her."

"We desire neither the one nor the other," answered Lord Whitworth, calmly.—“We desire to live with her on terms of good intelligence."

"You must respect treaties then," said Bonaparte, sternly. "Woe to those by whom they are not respected! They will be accountable for the consequences to all Europe."

So saying, and repeating his last remark twice over, he retired from the levee, leaving the whole circle surprised at the want of decency and dignity which had given rise to such a scene.

This remarkable explosion may be easily explained, if we refer it entirely to the impatience of a fiery temper, rendered, by the most extraordinary train of success, morbidly sensitive to any obstacle which interfered with a favourite plan; and, doubtless, it is not the least evil of arbitrary power, that he who possesses it is naturally tempted to mix up his own feelings of anger, revenge, or mortification, in affairs which ought to be treated under the most calm and impartial reference to the public good exclusively. But it has been averred by those who had best opportunity to know Bonaparte, that the fits of violent passion which he sometimes displayed, were less the bursts of unrepresed and constitutional irritability, than means previously calculated upon to intimidate and astound those with whom he was treating at the time. There may, therefore, have been policy amid the first consul's indignation, and he may have recollected, that the dashing to pieces Cobentzel's china jar in the violent scene which preceded the signing of the treaty of Campo Formio,* was completely successful in its issue. But the condition of Britain was very different from that of Austria, and he might have broken all the porcelain at St-Cloud without making the slightest impression on the equanimity of Lord Whitworth. This "angry parole," therefore, went for nothing, unless in so far as it was considered as cutting off the faint remaining hope of peace, and expressing the violent and obstinate temper of the individual, upon whose pleasure, whether originating in judg-

ment or caprice, the fate of Europe at this important crisis unhappily depended. In England, the interview at the Tuileries, where Britain was held to be insulted in the person of her ambassador, and that in the presence of the representatives of all Europe, greatly augmented the general spirit of resentment.

Talleyrand,* to whom Lord Whitworth applied for an explanation of the scene which had occurred, only answered, that the first consul, publicly affronted, as he conceived himself, desired to exculpate himself in presence of the ministers of all the powers of Europe. The question of peace or war came now to turn on the subject of Malta. The retention of this fortress by the English could infer no danger to France; whereas, if parted with by them under an insecure guarantee, the great probability of its falling into the hands of France, was a subject of the most legitimate jealousy to Britain, who must always have regarded the occupation of Malta as a preliminary step to the recapture of Egypt. There seemed policy, therefore, in Napoleon's conceding this point, and obtaining for France that respite, which, while it regained her colonies and recruited her commerce, would have afforded her the means of renewing a navy, which had been almost totally destroyed during the war, and consequently of engaging England, at some future and propitious time, on the element which she called peculiarly her own. It was accordingly supposed to be Talleyrand's opinion, that, by giving way to England on the subject of Malta, Napoleon ought to lull her suspicions to sleep.

Yet there were strong reasons, besides the military character of Bonaparte, which might induce the first consul to break off negotiation. His empire was founded on the general opinion entertained of his inflexibility of purpose, and of his unvaried success, alike in political objects as in the field of battle. Were he to concede the principle which England now contested with him in the face of Europe, it would have in a certain degree derogated from the pre-eminence of the situation he claimed, as autocrat of the civilized world. In that character he could not recede an inch from pretensions which he had once asserted. To have allowed that his encroachment on Switzerland and Piedmont rendered it necessary that he should grant a compensation to England by consenting to her retention of Malta, would have been to grant that Britain had still a right to interfere in the affairs of the Continent, and to point her out to nations disposed to throw off the French yoke, as a power to whose mediation he still owed some deference. These reasons were not without force in themselves, and, joined to the natural impetuosity of Bonaparte's temper, irritated and stung by the attacks in the English papers, had their weight probably in inducing him to give way to that sally of resentment, by which he endeavoured to cut short the debate, as he would have brought up his guard in person to decide the fate of a long-disputed action.

Some lingering and hopeless attempts were made to carry on negotiations. The English ministry

* See page 236.

* See Appendix, No. 4.—"Instructions by Napoleon to Talleyrand, Prince of Beneventum."

lowered their claim of retaining Malta in perpetuity, to the right of holding it for ten years. Bonaparte, on the other hand, would listen to no modification of the treaty of Amiens, but offered, as the guarantee afforded by the occupation of Neapolitan troops was objected to, that the garrison should consist of Russians or Austrians. To this proposal Britain would not accede. Lord Whitworth left Paris, and, on the 18th May, 1803, Britain declared war against France.

Before we proceed to detail the history of this eventful struggle, we must cast our eyes backwards, and review some events of importance which had happened in France since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens.

CHAPTER XLIV.

Retrospect.—St Domingo.—The Negroes, victorious over the Whites and Mulattoes, split into parties under different chiefs—Toussaint Louverture the most distinguished of these—His plans for the amelioration of his subjects—Appoints, in imitation of France, a consular government.—France sends an expedition against St Domingo, under General Leclerc, in December, 1801, which is successful, and Toussaint submits—After a brief interval, he is sent to France, where he dies under the hardships of confinement.—The French, visited by yellow fever, are assailed by the Negroes, and war is carried on of new with dreadful fury.—Leclerc is cut off by the distemper, and is succeeded by Rochambeau.—The French finally obliged to capitulate to an English squadron, on 1st December, 1803.—Bonaparte's scheme to consolidate his power at home.—The Consular Guard augmented to 6,000 men—Description of it.—Legion of Honour—Account of it.—Opposition formed, on the principle of the English one, against the consular government.—They oppose the establishment of the Legion of Honour, which, however, is carried.—Application to the Count de Provence (Louis XVIII.) to resign the crown—Rejected.

WHEN the treaty of Amiens appeared to have restored peace to Europe, one of Bonaparte's first enterprises was to attempt the recovery of the French possessions in the large, rich, and valuable colony of St Domingo, the disasters of which island form a terrible episode in the history of the war.

The convulsions of the French Revolution had reached St Domingo, and, catching like fire to combustibles, had bred a violent feud between the white people in the island, and the mulattoes, the latter of whom demanded to be admitted into the privileges and immunities of the former; the newly established rights of men, as they alleged, having no reference to the distinction of colour. While the whites and the people of colour were thus engaged in a civil war, the negro slaves, the most oppressed and most numerous class of the population, arose against both parties, and rendered the whole island one scene of bloodshed and conflagration. The few planters who remained invited the support of the British arms, which easily effected a temporary conquest. But the European soldiery perished so fast through the influence of the climate, that in 1798, the English were glad to abandon an island, which had proved the grave of so many of their best and

bravest, who had fallen without a wound, and void of renown.

The negroes, left to themselves, divided into different parties, who submitted to the authority of chiefs, more or less independent of each other, many of whom displayed considerable talent. Of these the principal leader was Toussaint Louverture, who, after waging war like a savage, appears to have used the power which victory procured him with much political skill. Although himself a negro, he had the sagacity to perceive how important it was for the civilization of his subjects, that they should not be deprived of the opportunities of knowledge, and examples of industry, afforded them by the white people. He, therefore, protected and encouraged the latter, and established, as an equitable regulation, that the blacks, now freemen, should nevertheless continue to labour the plantations of the white colonists, while the produce of the estate should be divided in certain proportions betwixt the white proprietor and the sable cultivator.

The least transgressions of these regulations he punished with African ferocity. On one occasion, a white female, the owner of a plantation, had been murdered by the negroes by whom it was laboured, and who had formerly been her slaves. Toussaint marched to the spot at the head of a party of his horse-guards, collected the negroes belonging to the plantation, and surrounded them with his black cavalry, who, after a very brief inquiry, received orders to charge and cut them to pieces; of which order our informant witnessed the execution. His unrelenting rigour, joined to his natural sagacity, soon raised Toussaint to the chief command of the island; and he availed himself of the maritime peace, to consolidate his authority by establishing a constitution on the model most lately approved of in France, which, being that of the year Eight, consisted of a consular government. Toussaint failed not, of course, to assume the supreme government to himself, with power to name his successor. The whole was a parody on the procedure of Bonaparte, which, doubtless, the latter was not highly pleased with; for there are many cases in which an imitation by others, of the conduct we ourselves have held, is a matter not of compliment, but of the most severe satire. The constitution of St Domingo was instantly put in force, although, with an ostensible deference to France, the sanction of her government had been ceremoniously required. It was evident that the African, though not unwilling to acknowledge some nominal degree of sovereignty on the part of France, was determined to retain in his own hands the effective government of the colony. But this in no respect consisted with the plans of Bonaparte, who was impatient to restore to France those possessions of which the British naval superiority had so long deprived her—colonies, shipping, and commerce.

A powerful expedition was fitted out at the harbours of Brest, Lorient, and Rochefort, destined to restore St Domingo in full subjection to the French empire. The fleet amounted to thirty-four ships bearing forty guns and upwards, with more than twenty frigates and smaller armed vessels. They had on board above twenty thousand men, and Ge-

neral Leclerc, the brother-in-law of the first consul was named commander-in-chief of the expedition, having a staff composed of officers of acknowledged skill and bravery.

It is said that Bonaparte had the art to employ a considerable proportion of the troops which composed the late army of the Rhine, in this distant expedition to an insalubrious climate. But he would not permit it to be supposed, that there was the least danger; and he exercised an act of family authority on the subject, to prove that such were his real sentiments. His sister, the beautiful Pauline, afterwards the wife of Prince Borghese, showed the utmost reluctance to accompany her present husband, General Leclerc, upon the expedition, and only went on board when actually compelled to do so by the positive orders of the first consul, who, although she was his favourite sister, was yet better contented that she should share the general risk, than, by remaining behind, leave it to be inferred that he himself augured a disastrous conclusion to the expedition.

The armament set sail on the 14th of December, 1801, while an English squadron of observation, uncertain of their purpose, waited upon and watched their progress to the West Indies. The French fleet presented themselves before Cape François on the 29th of January, 1802.

Toussaint, summoned to surrender, seemed at first inclined to come to an agreement, terrified probably by the great force of the expedition, which time and the climate could alone afford the negroes any chance of resisting. A letter was delivered to him from the first consul, expressing esteem for his person; and General Leclerc offered him the most favourable terms, together with the situation of lieutenant-governor. Ultimately, however, Toussaint could not make up his mind to trust the French, and he determined upon resistance, which he managed with considerable skill. Nevertheless, the well-concerted military operations of the whites soon overpowered for the present the resistance of Toussaint and his followers. Chief after chief surrendered, and submitted themselves to General Leclerc. At length, Toussaint Louverture himself seems to have despaired of being able to make further or more effectual resistance. He made his formal submission, and received and accepted Leclerc's pardon, under the condition that he should retire to a plantation at Gonaïves, and never leave it without permission of the commander-in-chief.

The French had not long had possession of the colony, ere they discovered, or supposed they had discovered, symptoms of a conspiracy amongst the negroes, and Toussaint was, on very slight grounds, accused as encouraging a revolt. Under this allegation, the only proof of which was a letter, capable of an innocent interpretation, their unfortunate chief was seized upon, with his whole family, and put on board of a vessel bound to France. Nothing official was ever learned concerning his fate, further than that he was imprisoned in the castle of Joux, in Franche-Comté, where the unhappy African fell a victim to the severity of an Alpine climate, to which he was unaccustomed, and the privations of a close confinement. The deed has been often

quoted and referred to as one of the worst actions of Bonaparte, who ought, if not in justice, in generosity at least, to have had compassion on a man, whose fortunes bore in many respects a strong similarity to his own. It afforded but too strong a proof, that though humanity was often in Napoleon's mouth, and sometimes displayed in his actions, yet its maxims were seldom found sufficient to protect those whom he disliked or feared, from the fate which tyranny most willingly assigns to its victims, that of being silently removed from the living world, and inclosed in their prison as in a tomb, from which no complaints can be heard, and where they are to await the slow approach of death, like men who are literally buried alive.

The perfidy with which the French had conducted themselves towards Toussaint was visited by early vengeance. That scourge of Europeans, the yellow fever, broke out among their troops, and in an incredibly short space of time swept off General Leclerc, with many of his best officers and bravest soldiers. The negroes, incensed at the conduct of the governor towards Toussaint, and encouraged by the sickly condition of the French army, rose upon them in every quarter. A species of war ensued, of which we are thankful it is not our task to trace the deplorable and ghastly particulars. The cruelty which was perhaps to be expected in the savage Africans, just broke loose from the bondage of slavery, communicated itself to the civilized French. If the former tore out their prisoners' eyes with corkscrews, the latter drowned their captives by hundreds, which imitation of Carrier's republican baptism they called "deportation into the sea." On other occasions, numerous bodies of negroes were confined in hulks, and there smothered to death with the fumes of lighted sulphur. The issue of this hellish warfare was, that the cruelty of the French enraged instead of terrifying their savage antagonists; and at length, that the numbers of the former, diminished by disease and constant skirmishing, became unequal to the defence even of the garrison-towns of the island, much more so to the task of reconquering it. General Rochambeau, who succeeded Leclerc as commander-in-chief, was finally obliged to save the poor wreck of that fine army, by submitting at discretion to an English squadron, 1st December, 1803. Thus was the richest colony in the West Indies finally lost to France. Remaining entirely in the possession of the black population, St Domingo will show, in process of time, how far the natives of Africa, having European civilization within their reach, are capable of forming a state, governed by the usual rules of polity.

While Bonaparte made these strong efforts for repossessing France of this fine colony, it was not to be supposed that he was neglecting the establishment of his own power upon a more firm basis. His present situation was—like every other in life—considerably short of what he could have desired, though so infinitely superior to all that his most unreasonable wishes could at one time have aspired to. He had all the real power of royalty, and, since the settlement of his authority for life, he had daily assumed more of the pomp and circumstance with which sovereignty is usually invested. The Tuileries

were once more surrounded with guards without, and filled by levees within. The ceremonial of a court was revived, and Bonaparte, judging of mankind with accuracy, neglected no minute observance by which the princes of the earth are wont to enforce their authority. Still there remained much to be done. He held the sovereignty only in the nature of a life-rent. He could, indeed, dispose of it by will, but the last will of kings have been frequently set aside; and, at any rate, the privilege comes short of that belonging to an hereditary crown, which descends by the right of blood from one possessor to another, so that in one sense it may be said to confer on the dynasty a species of immortality. Bonaparte knew also the virtue of names. The title of chief consul did not necessarily infer sovereign rights—it might signify everything, or it might signify nothing—in common language it inferred alike one of the annual executive governors of the Roman Republic, whose *fascies* awayed the world, or the petty resident who presides over commercial affairs in a foreign seaport. There were no precise ideas of power or rights necessarily and unalienably connected with it. Besides, Bonaparte had other objections to his present title of dignity. The title of first consul implied, that there were two others,—far, indeed, from being co-ordinate with Napoleon, but yet who occupied a higher rank on the steps of the throne, and approached his person more nearly, than he could have desired. Again, the word reminded the hearer, even by the new mode of its application, that it belonged to a government of recent establishment, and of revolutionary origin, and Napoleon did not wish to present such ideas to the public mind; since that which was but lately erected might be easily destroyed, and that which last arose out of the revolutionary cauldron might, like the phantoms which had preceded it, give place in its turn to an apparition more potent. Policy seemed to recommend to him, to have recourse to the ancient model which Europe had been long accustomed to reverence; to adopt the form of government best known and longest established through the greater part of the world; and, assuming the title and rights of a monarch, to take his place among the ancient and recognized authorities of Europe.

It was necessary to proceed with the utmost caution in this innovation, which, whenever accomplished, must necessarily involve the French people in the notable inconsistency, of having murdered the descendant of their old princes, committed a thousand crimes, and suffered under a mass of misery, merely because they were resolved not to permit the existence of that crown, which was now to be placed on the head of a soldier of fortune. Before, therefore, he could venture on this bold measure, in which, were it but for very shame's sake, he must be certain of great opposition, Bonaparte endeavoured, by every means in his power, to strengthen himself in his government.

The army was carefully new-modelled, so as to make it as much as possible his own; and the French soldiers, who regarded the power of Bonaparte as the fruit of their own victories, were in general devoted to his cause, notwithstanding the

fame of Moreau, to whom a certain part of their number still adhered. The Consular Guard, a highly-privileged body of selected forces, was augmented to the number of six thousand men. These formidable legions, which included troops of every species of arms, had been gradually formed and increased upon the plan of the corps of guides which Bonaparte introduced during the first Italian campaign,* for immediate attendance on his person, and for preventing such accidents as once or twice had like to have befallen him, by unexpected encounters with flying parties of the enemy. But the guards, as now increased in numbers, had a duty much more extended. They were chosen men, taught to consider themselves as superior to the rest of the army, and enjoying advantages in pay and privileges. When the other troops were subject to privations, care was taken that the guards should experience as little of them as possible, and that by every possible exertion they should be kept in the highest degree of readiness for action. They were only employed upon service of the utmost importance, and seldom in the beginning of an engagement, when they remained in reserve under the eye of Napoleon himself. It was usually by means of his guard that the final and decisive exertion was made which marked Bonaparte's tactics, and so often achieved victory at the very crisis when it seemed inclining to the enemy. Regarding themselves as considerably superior to the other soldiers, and accustomed also to be under Napoleon's immediate command, his guards were devotedly attached to him; and a body of troops of such high character might be considered as a formidable bulwark around the throne which he meditated ascending.

The attachment of these chosen legions, and of his soldiers in general, formed the foundation of Bonaparte's power, who, of all sovereigns that ever mounted to authority, might be said to reign by dint of victory and of his sword. But he surrounded himself by another species of partisans. The Legion of Honour was destined to form a distinct and particular class of privileged individuals, whom, by honours and bounties bestowed on them, he resolved to bind to his own interest.

This institution, which attained considerable political importance, originated in the custom which Napoleon had early introduced, of conferring on soldiers, of whatever rank, a sword, sash, or other military weapon, in the name of the state, as acknowledging and commemorating some act of peculiar gallantry. The influence of such public rewards was of course very great. They encouraged those who had received them to make every effort to preserve the character which they had thus gained, while they awakened the emulation of hundreds and thousands who desired similar marks of distinction. Bonaparte now formed the project of embodying the persons who had merited such rewards into an association, similar in many respects to those orders, or brotherhoods of chivalry, with which, during the middle ages, the feudal sovereigns of Europe surrounded themselves, and which subsist to this day.

* See p. 197.

though in a changed and modified form. These, however, have been uniformly created on the feudal principles, and the honour they confer limited, or supposed to be limited, to persons of some rank and condition; but the scheme of Bonaparte was to extend this species of honourable distinction through all ranks, in the quality proper to each, as medals to be distributed among various classes of the community are struck upon metals of different value, but are all stamped with the same dye. The outlines of the institution were these:—

The Legion of Honour was to consist of a great Council of Administration and fifteen cohorts, each of which was to have its own separate headquarters, in some distinguished town of the Republic. The Council of Administration was to consist of the three consuls, and four other members; a senator, namely, a member of the Legislative Body, a member of the Tribunate, and one of the Council of State, each to be chosen by the body to which he belonged. The order might be acquired by distinguished merit, either of a civil or a military nature; and various rules were laid down for the mode of selecting the members.

The first consul was, in right of his office, Captain-general of the Legion, and President of the Council of Administration. Every cohort was to consist of seven grand officers, twenty commanders, thirty subaltern officers, and three hundred and fifty legionaries. Their nomination was for life, and their appointments considerable. The grand officers enjoyed a yearly pension of 5000 francs; the commanders 2500; the officers 1000 francs; the privates, or legionaries, 250. They were to swear upon their honour to defend the government of France, and maintain the inviolability of her empire; to combat, by every lawful means, against the re-establishment of the feudal institutions; and to concur in maintaining the principles of liberty and equality.

Notwithstanding these last words, containing, when properly understood, the highest political and moral truth, but employed in France originally to cover the most abominable cruelties, and used more lately as mere words of course, the friends of liberty were not to be blinded, regarding the purpose of this new institution. Their number was now much limited; but amidst their weakness they had listened to the lessons of prudence and experience, and abandoning these high-swollen, illusory, and absurd pretensions, which had created such general disturbance, seem to have set themselves seriously, and at the same time moderately to work, to protect the cause of practical and useful freedom, by such resistance as the constitution still permitted them to offer, by means of the Tribunate and the Legislative Body.

Among the statesmen who associated to form an opposition, which, on the principle of the constitutional opposition of England, were to act towards the executive government rather as to an erring friend, whom they desired to put right, than as an enemy, whom they meant to destroy, were Benjamin Constant, early distinguished by talent and eloquence, Chénier, Savoye-Rollin, Chauvelin, and others, among whose names that of Carnot was

most distinguished. These statesmen had learned, apparently, that it is better in human affairs to aim at that minor degree of good which is practicable, than to aspire to a perfection which is unattainable. In the opinion of most of them, the government of Bonaparte was a necessary evil, without which, or something of the same strength, to control the factions by which she was torn to pieces, France must have continued to be a prey to a succession of such anarchical governments as had already almost ruined her. They, therefore, entertained none of the usual views of conspirators. They considered the country as in the condition of a wounded warrior, compelled for a short time to lay aside her privileges, as he his armour; but they hoped, when France had renewed her strength and spirit by an interval of repose, they might see her, under better auspices than before, renew and assert her claims to be free from military law. Meantime they held it their duty, professing, at the same time, the highest respect to the government and its head, the first consul, to keep alive, as far as was permitted, the spirit of the country, and oppose the encroachments of its ruler. They were not long allowed to follow the practical and useful path which they had sketched out; but the French debates were never so decently or respectably conducted as during this period.

The opposition, as they may be called, had not objected to the re-appointment of Bonaparte to the consulate for life. Probably they were reluctant to have the appearance of giving him personal offence, were aware they would be too feebly supported, and were sensible, that struggling for a point which could not be attained, was unlikely to lead to any good practical results. The institution of the Legion of Honour offered a better chance to try their new opposition tactics.

Rœderer, the orator, by whom the measure was proposed to the Tribunate, endeavoured to place it in the most favourable light. It was founded, he said, upon the eighty-seventh article of the Constitutional Declaration, which provided that national recompenses should be conferred on those soldiers who had distinguished themselves in their country's service. He represented the proposed order as a moral institution, calculated to raise to the highest the patriotism and gallantry of the French people. It was a coin, he said, of a value different from, and far more precious than that which was issued from the treasury—a treasure of a quality which could not be debased, and of a quantity which was inexhaustible, since the mine consisted in the national sense of honour.

To this specious argument, it was replied by Rollin and others, that the law was of a nature dangerous to public liberty. It was an abuse, they said, of the constitutional article, on which it was alleged to be founded, since it exhausted at once, by the creation of a numerous corps, the stock of rewards which the article referred to held in frugal reserve to recompense great actions as they should occur. If everything was given to remunerate merits which had been already ascertained, what stock, it was asked, remained for compensating future actions of gallantry, excepting the chance of a tardy admission

into the corps as vacancies should occur? But especially it was pleaded, that the establishment of a military body, distinguished by high privileges and considerable pay, yet distinct and differing from all the other national forces, was a direct violation of the sacred principles of equality. Some reprobated the intermixture of the civil officers of the state in a military institution. Others were of opinion that the oath proposed to be taken was superfluous, if not ridiculous; since, how could the members of the Legion of Honour be more bound to serve the state, or watch over the constitution, than any other citizens; or, in what manner was it proposed they should exert themselves for that purpose? Other arguments were urged, but that which all felt to be the most cogent, was rather understood than even hinted at. This was the immense additional strength which the first consul must attain, by having at his command the distribution of the new honours, and being thus enabled to form a body of satellites entirely dependent upon himself, and carefully selected from the bravest and ablest within the realm.

The institution of the Legion of Honour was at length carried in the Tribunal, by a majority of fifty-six voices over thirty-eight, and sanctioned in the Legislative Body by one hundred and sixty-six over a hundred and ten. The strong divisions of the opposition on this trying question, showed high spirit in those who composed that party; but they were placed in a situation so insulated and separated from the public, so utterly deprived of all constitutional guarantees for the protection of freedom, that their resistance, however honourable to themselves, was totally ineffectual, and without advantage to the nation.

Meanwhile Bonaparte was deeply engaged in intrigues of a different character, by means of which he hoped to place the sovereign authority which he had acquired, on a footing less anomalous, and more corresponding with that of the other monarchs in Europe, than it was at present. For this purpose an overture was made by the Prussian minister Haugwitz, through the medium of Monsieur de Meyer, President of the Regency of Warsaw, proposing to the Count de Provence (since Louis XVIII.), that he should resign his rights to the crown of France to the successful general who occupied the throne, in which case the exiled princes were to be invested with dominions in Italy, and restored to a brilliant existence. The answer of Louis was marked at once by moderation, sense, and that firmness of character which corresponded with his illustrious birth and high pretensions. "I do not confound Monsieur Bonaparte," said the exiled monarch, "with those who have preceded him; I esteem his bravery and military talents; I owe him good-will for many acts of his government, for the good which is done to my people I will always esteem done to me. But he is mistaken if he thinks that my rights can be made the subjects of bargain and composition. The very step he is now adopting would go to establish them, could they be otherwise called in question. I know not what may be the designs of God for myself and my family, but I am not ignorant of the duties imposed on me by the rank in which it was his pleasure I should be

born. As a christian, I will fulfil those duties to my last breath. As a descendant of Saint Louis, I will know by his example how to respect myself, even were I in fetters. As the successor of Francis the First, I will at least have it to say with him, 'We have lost all excepting our honour!'"

Such is the account which has been uniformly given by the princes of the house of Bourbon, concerning this communication, which is said to have taken place on the 26th February, 1803. Bonaparte has indeed denied that he was accessory to any such transaction, and has said truly enough, that an endeavour to acquire an interest in the Bourbons' title by compromise, would have been an admission on his part that his own, flowing, as he alleged, from the people, was imperfect, and needed repairs. Therefore, he denied having taken any step which could, in its consequences, have inferred such an admission.

But, in the first place, it is not to be supposed that such a treaty would have been published by the Bourbon family, unless it had been proposed by Meyer; and it is equally unlikely that either Haugwitz or Meyer would have ventured on such a negotiation, excepting at the instigation of Bonaparte, who alone could make good the terms proposed on the one side, or derive advantage from the concessions stipulated on the other. Secondly, without stopping to inquire how far the title which Bonaparte pretended to the supreme authority, was of a character incapable of being improved by a cession of the Count de Provence's rights in his favour, it would still have continued an object of great political consequence to have obtained a surrender of the claims of the house of Bourbon, which were even yet acknowledged by a very considerable party within the kingdom. It was, therefore, worth while to venture upon a negotiation which might have had the most important results, although, when it proved fruitless, we can see strong reasons for Napoleon concealing and disowning his accession to a step, which might be construed as implying some sense of deficiency of his own title, and some degree of recognition of that of the exiled prince.

It may be remarked, that, up to this period, Napoleon had manifested no particular spleen towards the family of Bourbon. On the contrary, he had treated their followers with lenity, and spoken with decency of their own claims. But the rejection of the treaty with Monsieur Bonaparte, however moderately worded, has been reasonably supposed to have had a deep effect on his mind, and may have been one remote cause of a tragedy, for which it is impossible to find an adequate one—the murder, namely, of the Duke d'Enghien. But before we approach this melancholy part of Napoleon's history, it is proper to trace the events which succeeded the renewal of the war.

CHAPTER XLV.

Mutual feelings of Napoleon and the British nation, on the renewal of the war.—First hostile measures on both sides.—England lays an embargo on French vessels in her ports.—Napoleon retaliates by detaining British subjects in France.—Effects of this unprecedented measure.

—Hanover and other places occupied by the French.—
 Scheme of invasion renewed.—Nature and extent of Na-
 poleon's preparations.—Defensive measures of England.
 —Reflections.

THE bloody war which succeeded the short peace of Amiens originated, to use the words of the satirist, in high words, jealousies, and fears. There was no special or determinate cause of quarrel, which could be removed by explanation, apology, or concession.

The English nation were jealous, and from the strides which Bonaparte had made towards universal power, not jealous without reason, of the farther purposes of the French ruler, and demanded guarantees against the encroachments which they apprehended; and such guarantees he deemed it beneath his dignity to grant. The discussion of these adverse claims had been unusually violent and intemperate; and as Bonaparte conceived the English nation to be his personal enemies, so they, on the other hand, began to regard his power as totally incompatible with the peace of Europe, and independence of Britain. To Napoleon, the English people, tradesmen and shopkeepers as he chose to qualify them, seemed assuming a consequence in Europe, which was, he conceived, far beyond their due. He was affected by feelings similar to those with which Haman beheld Mordecai sitting at the king's gate;—all things availing him nothing, while Britain held such a high rank among the nations, without deigning to do him reverence or worship. The English people, on the other hand, regarded him as the haughty and proud oppressor, who had the will at least, if not the power, to root Britain out from among the nations, and reduce them to a state of ignominy and bondage.

When, therefore, the two nations again arose to the contest, it was like combatants whose anger against each other has been previously raised to the highest pitch by mutual invective. Each had recourse to the measures by which their enemy could be most prejudiced.

England had at her command the large means of annoyance arising out of her immense naval superiority, and took her measures with the decision which the emergency required. Instant orders were dispatched to prevent the cession of such colonies as yet remained to be given up, according to the treaty of Amiens, and to seize by a *coup-de-main* such of the French settlements as had been ceded, or were yet occupied by her. France, on the other hand, in consequence of her equally great superiority by land, assembled upon her extensive line of sea-coast a very numerous army, with which she appeared disposed to make good her ruler's threats of invasion. At the same time, Bonaparte occupied without ceremony the territory of Naples, Holland, and such other states as Britain must have seen in his hands with feelings of keen apprehension, and thus made good the previous menaces of Talleyrand in his celebrated note.

But besides carrying to the utmost extent all the means of annoyance which the ordinary rules of hostility afford, Napoleon, going beyond these, had recourse to strange and unaccustomed reprisals, unknown as yet to the code of civilized nature, and

tending only to gratify his own resentment, and extend the evils of war, already sufficiently numerous.

The English had, as is the universal custom, laid an embargo on all French vessels in their ports, at the instant the war was proclaimed, and the loss to France was of course considerable. Bonaparte took a singular mode of retaliating, by seizing on the persons of the English of every description, who chanced to be at Paris, or traveling in the dominions of France, who, trusting to the laws of good faith hitherto observed by all civilized nations, expected nothing less than an attack upon their personal freedom. The absurd excuse at first set up for this extraordinary violation of humanity, at once, and of justice, was, that some of these individuals might be liable to serve in the English militia, and were therefore to be considered as prisoners of war. But this flimsy pretext could not have excused the seizing on the English of all ranks, conditions, and ages. The measure was adopted without the participation of the first consul's ministers; at least we must presume so, since Talleyrand himself encouraged some individuals to remain after the British ambassador had left Paris, with an assurance of safety which he had it not in his power to make good. It was the vengeful start of a haughty temper, rendered irritable, as we have often stated, by uninterrupted prosperity, and resenting, of consequence, resistance and contradiction, with an acuteness of feeling approaching to frenzy.

The individuals who suffered under this capricious and tyrannical act of arbitrary power, were treated in all respects like prisoners of war, and confined to prison as such, unless they gave their parole to abide in certain towns assigned them, and keep within particular limits.

The mass of individual evil occasioned by this cruel measure was incalculably great. Twelve years, a large proportion of human life, were cut from that of each of these *détenus*, as they were called, so far as regarded settled plan, or active exertion. Upon many, the interruption fell with fatal influence, blighting all their hopes and prospects; others learned to live only for the passing day, and were thus deterred from habitual study or useful industry. The most tender bonds of affection were broken asunder by this despotic sentence of imprisonment; the most fatal inroads were made on family feelings by this long separation between children, and husbands, and wives—all the nearest and dearest domestic relations. In short, if it was Bonaparte's desire to inflict the highest degree of pain on a certain number of persons, only because they were born in Britain, he certainly attained his end. If he hoped to gain anything farther, he was completely baffled; and when he hypocritically imputes the sufferings of the *détenus* to the obstinacy of the English ministry, his reasoning is the same with that of a captain of Italian banditti, who murders his prisoner, and throws the blame of the crime on the friends of the deceased, who failed to send the ransom at which he had rated his life. Neither is his vindication more reasonable, when he pretends to say that the measure was taken in order to prevent England, on future occasions, from seizing, according to ancient usage, on the shipping in her ports. This outrage must therefore

be recorded as one of those acts of wanton wilfulness in which Bonaparte indulged his passion, at the expense of his honour, and, if rightly understood, of his real interest.

The detention of civilians, unoffending and defenceless, was a breach of those courtesies which ought to be sacred, as mitigating the horrors of war. The occupation of Hanover was made in violation of the Germanic Constitution. This patrimony of our kings had in former wars been admitted to the benefit of neutrality; a reasonable distinction being taken betwixt the Elector of Hanover, as one of the grand feudatories of the empire, and the same person in his character of King of Great Britain; in which latter capacity only he was at war with France. But Bonaparte was not disposed to recognize these metaphysical distinctions; nor were any of the powers of Germany in a condition to incur his displeasure, by asserting the constitution and immunities of the empire. Austria had paid too deep a price for her former attempts to withstand the power of France, to permit her to extend her opposition beyond a feeble remonstrance; and Prussia had too long pursued a temporizing and truckling line of politics, to allow her to break short with Napoleon, by endeavouring to merit the title her monarch once claimed,—of protector of the North of Germany.

Every thing in Germany being thus favourable to the views of France, Mortier, who had already assembled an army in Holland, and on the frontiers of Germany, moved forward on Hanover. A considerable force was collected for resistance, under his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, and General Walmoden. It soon appeared, however, that, left to their own resources, and absolutely unsupported either by England or the forces of the empire, the Electorate was incapable of resistance; and that any attempt at an ineffectual defence would only serve to aggravate the distresses of the country, by subjecting the inhabitants to the extremities of war. In compassion, therefore, to the Hanoverians, the Duke of Cambridge was induced to leave the hereditary dominions of his father's house; and General Walmoden had the mortification to find himself obliged to enter into a convention, by which the capital of the Electorate, and all its strong-holds, were to be delivered up to the French, and the Hanoverian army were to retire behind the Elbe, on condition not to serve against France and her allies till previously exchanged.

The British government having refused to ratify this convention of Sahlingen, as it was termed, the Hanoverian army were summoned to surrender as prisoners of war;—hard terms, which, upon the determined resistance of Walmoden, were only thus far softened, that these tried and faithful troops were to be disbanded, and deliver up their arms, artillery, horses, and military stores. In a letter to the first consul, Mortier declares that he granted these mitigated terms from respect to the misfortunes of a brave enemy; and mentions, in a tone of creditable feeling, the distress of General Walmoden, and the despair of the fine regiment of Hanoverian guards, when dismounting from their horses to surrender them up to the French.

At the same time that they occupied Hanover,

the French failed not to make a further use of their invasion of Germany, by laying forced loans on the Hanseatic towns, and other encroachments.

The Prince Royal of Denmark was the only sovereign who showed an honourable sense of these outrages, by assembling in Holstein an army of thirty thousand men; but, being unsupported by any other power, he was soon glad to lay aside the attitude which he had assumed. Austria accepted, as current payment, the declaration of France, that by her occupation of Hanover she did not intend any act of conquest, or annexation of territory, but merely proposed to retain the Electorate as a pledge for the isle of Malta, which the English, contrary, as was alleged, to the faith of treaties, refused to surrender. Prussia, naturally dissatisfied at seeing the aggressions of France extend to the neighbourhood of her own territories, was nevertheless obliged to rest contented with the same excuse.

The French ruler did not confine himself to the occupation of Hanover. Tarentum, and other seaports of the King of Naples's dominions, were seized upon, under the same pretext of their being a pledge for the restoration of Malta. In fact, by thus quartering his troops upon neutral territories, by whom he took care that they should be paid and clothed, Napoleon made the war support itself, and spared France the burthen of maintaining a great proportion of his immense army; while large exactions, not only on the commercial towns, but on Spain, Portugal, and Naples, and other neutral countries, in the name of loans, filled his treasury, and enabled him to carry on the expensive plans which he meditated.

Any one of the separate manoeuvres which we have mentioned would, before this eventful war, have been considered as a sufficient object for a long campaign. But the whole united was regarded by Bonaparte only as side-blows, affecting Britain indirectly through the occupation of her monarch's family dominions, the embarrassment offered to her commerce, and the destruction of such independence as had been left to the continental powers. His great and decisive game remained to be played—that scheme of invasion to which he had so strongly pledged himself in his angry dialogue with Lord Whitworth. Here, perhaps, if ever in his life, Bonaparte, from considerations of prudence, suffered the period to elapse which would have afforded the best chance for execution of his venturesome project.

It must be in the memory of most who recollect the period, that the kingdom of Great Britain was seldom less provided against invasion than at the commencement of this second war; and that an embarkation from the ports of Holland, if undertaken instantly after the war had broken out, might have escaped our blockading squadrons, and have at least shown what a French army could have done on British ground, at a moment when the alarm was general, and the country in an unprepared state. But it is probable that Bonaparte himself was as much unprovided as England for the sudden breach of the treaty of Amiens, an event brought about more by the influence of passion than of policy; so that its consequences were as unexpected in his calculations as in those of Great Britain. Besides, he had not

diminished to himself the dangers of the undertaking, by which he must have staked his military renown, his power, which he held chiefly as the consequence of his reputation, perhaps his life, upon a desperate game, which, though he had already twice contemplated it, he had not yet found hardihood enough seriously to enter upon.

He now, however, at length bent himself, with the whole strength of his mind, and the whole force of his empire, to prepare for this final and decisive undertaking. The gun-boats in the Bay of Gibraltar, where calms are frequent, had sometimes in the course of the former war been able to do considerable damage to the English vessels of war, when they could not use their sails. Such small craft, therefore, were supposed the proper force for covering the intended descent. They were built in different harbours, and brought together by crawling along the French shore, and keeping under the protection of the batteries, which were now established on every cape, almost as if the sea-coast of the Channel on the French side had been the lines of a besieged city, no one point of which could with prudence be left undefended by cannon. Boulogne was pitched upon as the centre port, from which the expedition was to sail. By incredible exertions, Bonaparte had rendered its harbour and roads capable of containing two thousand vessels of various descriptions. The smaller seaports of Vimereux, Ambleteuse, and Étapes, Dieppe, Havre, St-Valery, Caen, Gravelines, and Dunkirk, were likewise filled with shipping. Flushing and Ostend were occupied by a separate flotilla. Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, were each the station of as strong a naval squadron as France had still the means to send to sea.

A land army was assembled of the most formidable description, whether we regard the high military character of the troops, the extent and perfection of their appointments, or their numerical strength. The coast, from the mouth of the Seine to the Texel, was covered with forces; and Soult, Ney, Davoust, and Victor, names that were then the pride and the dread of war, were appointed to command the Army of England (for that menacing title was once more assumed), and execute those manœuvres, planned and superintended by Bonaparte, the issue of which was to be the blotting out of Britain from the rank of independent nations.

Far from being alarmed at this formidable demonstration of force, England prepared for her resistance with an energy becoming her ancient rank in Europe, and far surpassing in its efforts any extent of military preparation before heard of in her history. To nearly one hundred thousand troops of the line, were added eighty thousand and upwards of militia, which scarce yielded to the regulars in point of discipline. The volunteer force, by which every citizen was permitted and invited to add his efforts to the defence of the country, was far more numerous than during the last war, was better officered also, and rendered every way more effective. It was computed to amount to three hundred and fifty thousand men, who, if we regard the shortness of the time and the nature of the service, had attained considerable practice in the use and manage-

ment of their arms. Other classes of men were embodied, and destined to act as pioneers, drivers of waggons, and in the like services. On a sudden, the land seemed converted to an immense camp, the whole nation into soldiers, and the good old king himself into a general-in-chief. All peaceful considerations appeared for a time to be thrown aside; and the voice, calling the nation to defend their dearest rights, sounded not only in parliament, and in meetings convoked to second the measures of defence, but was heard in the places of public amusement, and mingled even with the voice of devotion—not unbecomingly surely, since to defend our country is to defend our religion.

Beacons were erected in conspicuous points, corresponding with each other, all around and all through the island; and morning and evening, one might have said, every eye was turned towards them to watch for the fatal and momentous signal. Partial alarms were given in different places, from the mistakes to which such arrangements must necessarily be liable; and the ready spirit which animated every species of troops where such signals called to arms, was of the most satisfactory description, and afforded the most perfect assurance, that the heart of every man was in the cause of his country.

Amidst her preparations by land, England did not neglect or relax her precautions on the element she calls her own. She covered the ocean with five hundred and seventy ships of war of various descriptions. Divisions of her fleet blocked up every French port in the Channel; and the army destined to invade our shores might see the British flag flying in every direction on the horizon, waiting for their issuing from the harbour, as birds of prey may be seen floating in the air above the animal which they design to pounce upon. Sometimes the British frigates and sloops of war stood in, and cannonaded or threw shells into Havre, Dieppe, Granville, and Boulogne itself. Sometimes the seamen and marines landed, cut out vessels, destroyed signal-posts, and dismantled batteries. Such events were trifling, and it was to be regretted that they cost the lives of gallant men; but although they produced no direct results of consequence, yet they had their use in encouraging the spirits of our sailors, and damping the confidence of the enemy, who must at length have looked forward with more doubt than hope to the invasion of the English coast, when the utmost vigilance could not prevent their experiencing insults upon their own.

During this period of menaced attack and arranged defence, Bonaparte visited Boulogne, and seemed active in preparing his soldiers for the grand effort. He reviewed them in an unusual manner, teaching them to execute several manœuvres by night; and experiments were also made upon the best mode of arranging the soldiers in the flat-bottomed boats, and of embarking and disembarking them with celerity. Omens were resorted to for keeping up the enthusiasm which the presence of the first consul naturally inspired. A Roman battle-axe was said to be found when they removed the earth to pitch Bonaparte's tent or barrack; and medals of William the Conqueror were produced, as having been dug

up upon the same honoured spot. These were pleasant bodings, yet perhaps did not altogether, in the minds of the soldiers, counterbalance the sense of insecurity impressed on them by the prospect of being packed together in these miserable chaloupes, and exposed to the fire of an enemy so superior at sea, that during the chief consul's review of the fortifications, their frigates stood in shore with composure, and fired at him and his suite as at a mark. The men who had braved the perils of the Alps and of the Egyptian deserts might yet be allowed to feel alarm at a species of danger which seemed so inevitable, and which they had no adequate means of repelling by force of arms.

A circumstance which seemed to render the expedition in a great measure hopeless, was the ease with which the English could maintain a constant watch upon their operations within the port of Boulogne. The least appearance of stir or preparation, to embark troops, or get ready for sea, was promptly sent by signal to the English coast, and the numerous British cruisers were instantly on the alert to attend their motions. Nelson had, in fact, during the last war, declared the sailing of a hostile armament from Boulogne to be a most formidable undertaking, on account of cross tides and other disadvantages, together with the certainty of the flotilla being lost if there were the least wind west-north-west. "As for rowing," he adds, "that is impossible.—It is perfectly right to be prepared for a mad government," continued this incontestible judge of maritime possibilities; "but with the active force which has been given me, I may pronounce it almost impracticable."

Bonaparte himself continued to the last to affirm that he was serious in his attempts to invade Great Britain, and that the scheme was very practicable. He did not, however, latterly, talk of forcing his way by means of armed small craft and gun-boats, while the naval forces on each side were in their present degree of comparative strength, the allowed risk of miscarriage being as ten to one to that of success;—this bravado, which he had uttered to Lord Whitworth, involved too much uncertainty to be really acted upon. At times, long after, he talked slightly to his attendants of the causes which prevented his accomplishing his project of invasion;* but when speaking seriously and in detail, he shows plainly that his sole hope of effecting the invasion was, by assembling such a fleet as should give him the temporary command of the Channel. This fleet was to consist of fifty vessels, which, dispatched from the various ports of France and Spain, were to rendezvous at Martinique, and, returning from thence to the British Channel, protect the flotilla, upon which were to embark one hundred and sixty thousand men.† Napoleon was disappointed in his combinations respecting the shipping; for, as it happened, Admiral Cornwallis

lay before Brest; Pellew observed the harbours of Spain; Nelson watched Toulon and Genoa; and it would have been necessary for the French and Spanish navy to fight their way through these impediments, in order to form a union at Martinique.

It is wonderful to observe how incapable the best understandings become of forming a rational judgment, where their vanity and self-interest are concerned, in slurring over the total failure of a favourite scheme. While talking of the miscarriage of this plan of invasion, Napoleon gravely exclaimed to Las Cases, "And yet the obstacles which made me fail were not of human origin—they were the work of the elements. In the south, the sea undid my plans; in the north, it was the conflagration of Moscow, the snows and ice that destroyed me. Thus, water, air, fire, all nature in short, have been the enemies of a universal regeneration, commanded by nature herself. The problems of Providence are inscrutable."⁷²

Independent of the presumptuousness of expressions, by which an individual being, of the first-rate talents doubtless, but yet born of a woman, seems to raise himself above the rest of his species, and deem himself unconquerable save by elemental resistance, the inaccuracy of the reasoning is worth remarking. Was it the sea which prevented his crossing to England, or was it the English ships and sailors? He might as well have affirmed that the hill of Mount St John, and the wood of Soignes, and not the army of Wellington, were the obstacles which prevented him from marching to Brussels.

Before quitting the subject, we may notice, that Bonaparte seems not to have entertained the least doubts of success, could he have succeeded in disembarking his army. A single general action was to decide the fate of England. Five days were to bring Napoleon to London, where he was to perform the part of William the Third; but with more generosity and disinterestedness. He was to call a meeting of the inhabitants, restore them what he calls their rights, and destroy the oligarchical faction. A few months would not, according to his account, have elapsed, ere the two nations, late such determined enemies, would have been identified by their principles, their maxims, their interests. The full explanation of this gibberish (for it can be termed no better, even proceeding from the lips of Napoleon) is to be found elsewhere, when he spoke a language more genuine than that of the *Moniteur* and the bulletins. "England," he said, "must have ended, by becoming an appendage to the France of my system. Nature has made it one of our islands, as well as Oleron and Corsica."⁷³

It is impossible not to pursue the train of reflections which Bonaparte continued to pour forth to the companion of his exile, on the rock of St Helena. When England was conquered, and identified with France in maxims and principles, according to one form of expression, or rendered an appendage and dependency, according to another phrase, the reader may suppose that Bonaparte would have considered his mission as accomplished. Alas! it was not

* * Si de légers dérangemens n'avaient mis obstacle à mon entreprise de Boulogne, que pourrais-tu tirer l'Angleterre aujourd'hui?—*Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. III, p. 439.

† *Mémoires écrits à Ste-Hélène sous la dictée de l'Empereur*, par le Général Comte de Montholon, vol. II, p. 232.

* *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. II, p. 261—2.

† *Ibid.* vol. III, p. 439.

much more than commenced. "I would have departed from thence (from subjugated Britain) to carry the work of European regeneration (that is, the extension of his own arbitrary authority) from south to north, under the republican colours, for I was then chief consul, in the same manner which I was more lately on the point of achieving it under the monarchical forms."* When we find such ideas retaining hold of Napoleon's imagination, and arising to his tongue after his irretrievable fall, it is impossible to avoid exclaiming, Did ambition ever conceive so wild a dream, and had so wild a vision ever a termination so disastrous and humiliating!

It may be expected that something should be here said, upon the chances which Britain would have had of defending herself successfully against the army of invaders. We are willing to acknowledge that the risk must have been dreadful; and that Bonaparte, with his genius and his army, must have inflicted severe calamities upon a country which had so long enjoyed the blessings of peace. But the people were unanimous in their purpose of defence, and their forces composed of materials to which Bonaparte did more justice when he came to be better acquainted with them. Of the three British nations, the English have since shown themselves possessed of the same steady valour which won the fields of Cressy and Azincourt, Blenheim and Minden—the Irish have not lost the fiery enthusiasm which has distinguished them in all the countries of Europe—nor have the Scots degenerated from the stubborn courage with which their ancestors for two thousand years maintained their independence against a superior enemy. Even if London had been lost, we would not, under so great a calamity, have despaired of the freedom of the country; for the war would in all probability have assumed that popular and national character which sooner or later wears out an invading army. Neither does the confidence with which Bonaparte affirms the conviction of his winning the first battle, appear so certainly well-founded. This, at least, we know, that the resolution of the country was fully bent up to the hazard; and those who remember the period will bear us witness, that the desire that the French would make the attempt was a general feeling through all classes, because they had every reason to hope that the issue might be such as for ever to silence the threat of invasion.

CHAPTER XLVI.

Disaffection begins to arise against Napoleon among the soldiery.—Purpose of setting up Moreau against him.—Character of Moreau.—Causes of his estrangement from Bonaparte.—The Duke d'Enghien.—Georges Cadoudal, Picquero, and other royalists, landed in France.—Desperate enterprise of Georges.—Defeated.—Arrest of Moreau.—of Picquero.—and Georges.—Captain Wright.—Duke d'Enghien seized at Ettenheim—hurried to Paris—transferred to Vincennes—Tried by a Military Commission.—Condemned.—and executed.—Universal horror of France and Europe.—Bonaparte's vindication of his conduct.—His defence considered.—Picquero found dead in his prison.—Attempt to explain his death by charging him with suicide.—Captain Wright found with

his throat cut.—A similar attempt made.—Georges and other conspirators tried.—Condemned.—and executed.—Royalists silenced.—Moreau sent into exile.

WHILE Bonaparte was meditating the regeneration of Europe, by means of conquering first Britain, and then the Northern Powers, a course of opposition to his government, and disaffection to his person, was beginning to arise even among the soldiers themselves. The acquisition of the consulate for life was naturally considered as a death-blow to the Republic; and to that name many of the principal officers of the army, who had advanced themselves to promotion by means of the Revolution, still held a grateful attachment. The dissatisfaction of these military men was the more natural, as some of them might see in Bonaparte nothing more than a successful adventurer, who had raised himself high above the heads of his comrades and now exacted their homage. As soldiers, they quickly passed from murmurs to threats; and at a festive meeting, which was prolonged beyond the limits of sobriety, a colonel of hussars proposed himself as the Brutus to remove this new Cæsar. Being expert at the use of the pistol, he undertook to hit his mark at fifty yards' distance, during one of those reviews which were perpetually taking place in presence of the first consul. The affair became known to the police, but was hushed up as much as possible by the address of Fouché, who saw that Bonaparte might be prejudiced by the bare act of making public that such a thing had been agitated, however unthinkingly.

The discontent spread wide, and was secretly augmented by the agents of the house of Bourbon; and, besides the constitutional opposition, whose voice was at times heard in the Legislative Body and the Tribunal, there existed malcontents without doors, composed of two parties, one of whom considered Bonaparte as the enemy of public liberty, whilst the other regarded him as the sole obstacle to the restoration of the Bourbons; and the most eager partisans of both began to meditate on the practicability of removing him by any means, the most violent and the most secret not excepted. Those among the furious republicans, or enthusiastic royalists, who entertained such sentiments, excused them doubtless to their conscience, by Napoleon's having destroyed the liberties, and usurped the supreme authority, of the country; thus palliating the complexion of a crime which can never be vindicated.

These zealots, however, bore no proportion to the great body of Frenchmen, who, displeased with the usurpation of Bonaparte, and disposed to overthrow it, if possible, held themselves yet obliged to refrain from all crooked and indirect practices against his life. Proposing to destroy his power in the same way in which it had been built, the first and most necessary task of the discontented party was to find some military chief, whose reputation might bear to be balanced against that of Napoleon; and no one could claim such distinction excepting Moreau. If his campaigns were inferior to those of his great rival in the lightning-like brilliancy and celerity of their operations, and in the boldness of combination on which they were founded, they were

* *Mémoires de St.-Hélène*, vol. II, p. 361.

executed at smaller loss to his troops, and were less calculated to expose him to disastrous consequences if they chanced to miscarry. Moreau was no less celebrated for his retreat through the defiles of the Black Forest, in 1796, than for the splendid and decisive victory of Hohenlinden.

Moreau's natural temper was mild, gentle, and accessible to persuasion—a man of great abilities certainly, but scarcely displaying the bold and decisive character which he ought to possess, who, in such times as we write of, aspires to place himself at the head of a faction in the state. Indeed, it rather would seem that he was forced into that situation of eminence by the influence of general opinion, joined to concurring circumstances, than that he deliberately aspired to place himself there. He was the son of a lawyer of Bretagne, and in every respect a man who had risen by the Revolution. He was not, therefore, naturally inclined towards the Bourbons; yet when Pichegru's communications with the exiled family, in 1796, became known to him by the correspondence which he intercepted, Moreau kept the secret until some months after, when Pichegru had, with the rest of his party, fallen under the revolution of 18th Fructidor, which installed the Directory of Barras, Rewbel, and La Réveillère. After this period, Moreau's marriage, with a lady who entertained sentiments favourable to the Bourbons, seems to have gone some length in deciding his own political opinions.

Moreau had lent Bonaparte his sword and countenance on the 18th Brumaire; but he was soon dissatisfied with the engrossing ambition of the new ruler of France, and they became gradually estranged from each other. This was not the fault of Bonaparte, who, naturally desirous of attaching to himself so great a general, showed him considerable attention, and complained that it was received with coldness. On one occasion, a most splendid pair of pistols had been sent to the first consul. "They arrive in a happy time," he said, and presented them to Moreau, who at that instant entered his presence-chamber. Moreau received the civility as one which he would willingly have dispensed with. He made no other acknowledgment than a cold bow, and instantly left the levee.

Upon the institution of the Legion of Honour, one of the Grand Crosses was offered to him. "The fool!" said Moreau, "does he not know that I have belonged to the ranks of honour for these twelve years?" Another pleasantry on this topic, upon which Bonaparte was very sensitive, was a company of officers, who dined together with Moreau, voting a sancepan of honour to the general's cook, on account of his merits in dressing some particular dish. Thus, living estranged from Bonaparte, Moreau came to be gradually regarded as the head of the disaffected party in France; and the eyes of all those who disliked Napoleon or his government, were fixed upon him, as the only individual whose influence might be capable of balancing that of the chief consul.

Meantime the peace of Amiens being broken, the British government, with natural policy, resolved once more to avail themselves of the state of public feeling in France, and engage the partisans of royalty

in a fresh attack upon the consular government. They were probably in some degree deceived concerning the strength of that party, which had been much reduced under Bonaparte's management, and had listened too implicitly to the promises and projects of agents, who, themselves sanguine beyond what was warranted, exaggerated even their own hopes in communicating them to the British ministers. It seems to have been acknowledged, that little success was to be hoped for, unless Moreau could be brought to join the conspiracy. This, however, was esteemed possible; and notwithstanding the disagreement, personal as well as political, which had subsisted betwixt him and Pichegru, the latter seems to have undertaken to become the medium of communication betwixt Moreau and the royalists. Escaped from the deserts of Cayenne, to which he had been exiled, Pichegru had for some time found refuge and support in London, and there openly professed his principles as a royalist, upon which he had for a long time acted in secret.

A scheme was in agitation for raising the royalists in the west, where the Duke de Berri was to make a descent on the coast of Picardy, to favour the insurrection. The Duke d'Eughien, grandson of the Prince of Condé, fixed his residence under the protection of the Margrave of Baden, at the château of Ettenheim, with the purpose, doubtless, of being ready to put himself at the head of the royalists in the east of France, or, if occasion should offer, in Paris itself. This prince of the house of Bourbon, the destined inheritor of the name of the great Condé, was in the flower of youth, handsome, brave, and high-minded. He had been distinguished for his courage in the emigrant army, which his grandfather commanded. He gained by his valour the battle of Bortstein; and when his army, to whom the French republicans showed no quarter, desired to execute reprisals on their prisoners, he threw himself among them to prevent their violence. "These men," he said, "are Frenchmen—they are unfortunate—I place them under the guardianship of your honour and your humanity." Such was the princely youth, whose name must now be written in bloody characters in this part of Napoleon's history.

Whilst the French princes expected on the frontier the effect of commotions in the interior of France, Pichegru, Georges Cadoudal, and about thirty other royalists of the most determined character, were secretly landed in France, made their way to the metropolis, and contrived to find lurking-places invisible to the all-seeing police. There can be no reason to doubt that a part of those agents, and Georges in particular, saw the greatest obstacle of their enterprise in the existence of Bonaparte, and were resolved to commence by his assassination. Pichegru, who was constantly in company with Georges, cannot well be supposed ignorant of this purpose, although better befitting the fierce chief of a band of Chouans than the Conqueror of Holland.

In the meantime, Pichegru effected the desired communication with Moreau, then, as we have said, considered as the chief of the discontented military men, and the declared enemy of Bonaparte. They

met at least twice; and it is certain that on one of these occasions Pichegru carried with him Georges Cadoudal, at whose person and plans Moreau expressed horror, and desired that Pichegru would not again bring that irrational savage into his company. The cause of his dislike we must naturally suppose to have been the nature of the measures Georges proposed, being the last to which a brave and loyal soldier like Moreau would willingly have resorted; but Bonaparte, when pretending to give an exact account of what passed betwixt Moreau and Pichegru, represents the conduct of the former in a very different point of view. Moreau, according to this account, informed Pichegru, that while the first consul lived, he had not the slightest interest in the army, and that not even his own aide-de-camp would follow him against Napoleon; but, were Napoleon removed, Moreau assured them, all eyes would be fixed on himself alone—that he would then become first consul—that Pichegru should be second; and was proceeding to make farther arrangements, when Georges broke in on their deliberations with fury, accused the generals of scheming their own grandeur, not the restoration of the king, and declared that, to chuse betwixt *blue* and *blue* (a phrase by which the Vendéans distinguished the republicans), he would as soon have Bonaparte as Moreau at the head of affairs, and concluded by stating his own pretensions to be third consul at least. According to this account, therefore, Moreau was not shocked at the atrocity of Georges' enterprise, of which he himself had been the first to admit the necessity, but only disgusted at the share which the Chouan chief assorted to himself in the partition of the spoil. But we give no credit whatever to this story. Though nothing could have been so important to the first consul at the time as to produce proof of Moreau's direct accession to the plot on his life, no such proof was ever brought forward; and therefore the statement, we have little doubt, was made up afterwards, and contains what Bonaparte might think probable, and desire that others should believe, not what he knew from certain information, or was able to prove by credible testimony.

The police was speedily alarmed, and in action. Notice had been received that a band of royalists had introduced themselves into the capital, though it was for some time very difficult to apprehend them. Georges, meanwhile, prosecuted his attempt against the chief consul, and is believed at one time to have insinuated himself in the disguise of a menial into the Tuileries, and even into Bonaparte's apartment; but without finding any opportunity to strike the blow, which his uncommon strength and desperate resolution might otherwise have rendered decisive. All the barriers were closed, and a division of Bonaparte's guards maintained the closest watch, to prevent any one escaping from the city. By degrees sufficient light was obtained to enable the government to make a communication to the public upon the existence and tendency of the conspiracy, which became more especially necessary, when it was resolved to arrest Moreau himself. This took place on the 15th February, 1804. He was seized without difficulty or resistance, while

residing quietly at his country-house. On the day following, an order of the day, signed by Murat, then governor of Paris, announced the fact to the citizens, with the additional information, that Moreau was engaged in a conspiracy with Pichegru, Georges, and others, who were closely pursued by the police.

The news of Moreau's imprisonment produced the deepest sensation in Paris; and the reports which were circulated on the subject were by no means favorable to Bonaparte. Some disbelieved the plot entirely, while others, less sceptical, considered the chief consul as making a pretext of the abortive attempt of Pichegru and Georges for the purpose of sacrificing Moreau, who was at once his rival in military fame, and the declared opponent of his government. It was even asserted that secret agents of Bonaparte in London had been active in encouraging the attempts of the original conspirators, for the sake of implicating a man whom the first consul both hated and feared. Of this there was no proof; but these and other dark suspicions pervaded men's minds, and all eyes were turned with anxiety upon the issue of the legal investigations which were about to take place.

Upon the 17th February, the grand judge of police, by a report which was communicated to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunal, denounced Pichegru, Georges, and others, as having returned to France from their exile, with the purpose of overthrowing the government, and assassinating the chief consul, and implicated Moreau as having held communication with them. When the report was read in the Tribunal, the brother of Moreau arose, and recalling the merits and services of his relative, complained of the cruelty of calumniating him without proof, and demanded for him the privilege of an open and public trial.

"This is a fine display of sensibility," said Curée, one of the tribunes, in ridicule of the sensation naturally produced by this affecting incident.

"It is a display of indignation," replied the brother of Moreau, and left the assembly.

The public bodies, however, did what was doubtless expected of them, and carried to the foot of the consular throne the most exaggerated expressions of their interest in the life and safety of him by whom it was occupied.

Meanwhile the vigilance of the police, and the extraordinary means employed by them, accomplished the arrest of almost all the persons concerned in the plot. A false friend, whom Pichegru had trusted to the highest degree, betrayed his confidence for a large bribe, and introduced the gendarmes into his apartment while he was asleep. They first secured the arms which lay beside him, and then his person, after a severe struggle. Georges Cadoudal, perhaps a yet more important capture, fell into the hands of the police soon after. He had been traced so closely, that at length he dared not enter a house, but spent many hours of the day and night in driving about Paris in a cabriolet. On being arrested, he shot one of the gendarmes dead, mortally wounded another, and had nearly escaped from them all. The other conspirators, and those accused of countenancing their enterprise, were arrested to the

number of forty persons, who were of very different characters and condition; some followers or associates of Georges, and others belonging to the ancient nobility. Among the latter were Messrs Armand and Jules Polignac, Charles de la Rivière, and other royalists of distinction. Chance had also thrown into Bonaparte's power a victim of another description. Captain Wright, the commander of a British brig of war, had been engaged in putting ashore on the coast of Normandy, Pichegru and some of his companions. Shortly afterwards, his vessel was captured by a French flotilla of superior force. Under pretence that his evidence was necessary to the conviction of the French conspirators, he was brought up to Paris, committed to the Temple, and treated with a rigour which became a prelude to the subsequent tragedy.

It might have been supposed, that among so many prisoners, enough of victims might have been selected to atone with their lives for the insurrection which they were accused of meditating; nay, for the attempt which was alleged to be designed against the person of the first consul. Most unhappily for his fame, Napoleon thought otherwise; and, from causes which we shall hereafter endeavour to appreciate, sought to give a fuller scope to the gratification of his revenge, than the list of his captives, though containing several men of high rank, enabled him to accomplish.

We have observed, that the residence of the Duke d'Enghein upon the French frontier was to a certain degree connected with the enterprise undertaken by Pichegru, so far as concerned the proposed insurrection of the royalists in Paris. This we infer from the duke's admission, that he resided at Ettenheim in the expectation of having soon a part of importance to play in France.* This was perfectly vindicated by his situation and connexions. But that the duke participated in, or countenanced in the slightest degree, the meditated attempt on Bonaparte's life, has never even been alleged, and is contrary to all the proof led in the case, and especially to the sentiments impressed upon him by his grandfather, the Prince of Condé.†

* The passage alluded to is in the Duke of Rovigo's (Savary's) vindication of his own conduct. At the same time, no traces of such an admission are to be found in the interrogations, as printed elsewhere. It is also said, that when the duke (then at Ettenheim) first heard of the conspiracy of Pichegru, he alleged that it must have been only a pretended discovery. "Had there been such an intrigue in reality," he said, "my father and grandfather would have let me know something of the matter, that I might provide for my safety." It may be added, that if he had been really engaged in that conspiracy, it is probable that he would have retired from the vicinity of the French territory on the scheme being discovered.

† A remarkable letter from the Prince of Condé to the Count d'Artois, dated 24th January, 1802, contains the following passage, which we translate literally:—"The Chevalier de Roll will give you an account of what has passed here yesterday. A man of a very simple and gentle exterior arrived the night before, and having traveled, as he affirmed, on foot, from Paris to Calais, had an audience of me about eleven in the forenoon, and distinctly offered to rid us of the usurper by the shortest method possible. I

He lived in great privacy, and amused himself principally with hunting. A pension allowed him by England was his only means of support.

On the evening of the 14th March, a body of French soldiers and gendarmes, commanded by Colonel Ordenner, acting under the direction of Caulaincourt, afterwards called Duke of Vicenza, suddenly entered the territory of Baden, a power with whom France was in profound peace, and surrounded the château in which the unfortunate prince resided. The descendant of Condé sprang to his arms, but was prevented from using them by one of his attendants, who represented the force of the assailants as too great to be resisted. The soldiers rushed into the apartment, and, presenting their pistols, demanded to know which was the Duke d'Enghein. "If you desire to arrest him," said the duke, "you ought to have his description in your warrant."—"Then we must seize on you all," replied the officer in command; and the prince, with his little household, was arrested and carried to a mill at some distance from the house, where he was permitted to receive some clothes and necessaries. Being now recognized, he was transferred, with his attendants, to the citadel of Strasburg, and presently afterwards separated from the gentlemen of his household, with the exception of his aide-de-camp, the Baron de St-Jacques. He was allowed to communicate with no one. He remained a close prisoner for three days; but on the 18th, betwixt one and two in the morning, he was obliged to rise and dress himself hastily, being only informed that he was about to commence a journey. He requested the attendance of his valet-de-chambre; but was answered that it was unnecessary. The linen which he was permitted to take with him amounted to two shirts only, so nicely had his worldly wants been calculated and ascertained. He was transported with the utmost speed and secrecy towards Paris, where he arrived on the 20th, and, after having been committed for a few hours to the Temple, was transferred to the ancient Gothic castle of Vincennes, about four miles from the city, long used as a state prison, but whose walls never

did not give him time to finish the details of his project, but rejected the proposal with horror, assuring him that you, if present, would do the same. I told him, we should always be the enemies of him who had arrogated to himself the power and the throne of our sovereign, until he should make restitution: that we had combated the usurper by open force, and would do so again if opportunity offered; but that we would never employ that species of means which only became the jacobin party; and if that faction should meditate such a crime, assuredly we would not be their accomplices." This discourse the prince renewed to the secret agent in the presence of the Chevalier de Roll, as a confidential friend of the Count d'Artois, and, finally, advised the man instantly to leave England, as, in case of his being arrested, the prince would afford him no countenance or protection. The person to whom the Prince of Condé addressed sentiments so worthy of himself and of his great ancestor, afterwards proved to be an agent of Bonaparte, dispatched to sound the opinions of the princes of the house of Bourbon, and, if possible, to implicate them in such a nefarious project as should justly excite public indignation against them.

received a more illustrious or a more innocent victim. There he was permitted to take some repose; and, as if the favour had only been granted for the purpose of being withdrawn, he was awaked at midnight, and called upon to sustain an interrogatory on which his life depended, and to which he replied with the utmost composure. On the ensuing night, at the same dead hour, he was brought before the pretended court. The law enjoined that he should have had a defender appointed to plead his cause. But none such was allotted him.*

The inquisitors before whom he was hurried formed a military commission of eight officers, having General Hulín as their president. They were, as the proceedings express it, named by Bonaparte's brother-in-law, Murat, then governor of Paris. Though necessarily exhausted with fatigue and want of rest, the Duke d'Enghien performed in this melancholy scene a part worthy of the last descendant of the great Condé. He avowed his name and rank, and the share which he had taken in the war against France, but denied all knowledge of Pichegru or of his conspiracy. The interrogations ended by his demanding an audience of the chief consul. "My name," he said, "my rank, my sentiments, and the peculiar distress of my situation, lead me to hope that my request will not be refused."

The military commissioners paused and hesitated—nay, though selected doubtless as fitted for the office, they were even affected by the whole behaviour, and especially by the intrepidity, of the unhappy prince. But Savary, then chief of the police, stood behind the president's chair, and controlled their sentiments of compassion. When they proposed to further the prisoner's request of an audience of the first consul, Savary cut the discussion short, by saying, that was inexpedient. At length they reported their opinion, that the Duke d'Enghien was guilty of having fought against the Republic, intrigued with England, and maintained intelligence in Strasburg, for the purpose of seizing the place;—great part of which allegations, and especially the last, was in express contradiction to the only proof adduced, the admission, namely, of the prisoner himself. The report being sent to Bonaparte, to know his farther pleasure, the court received for answer their own letter, marked with the emphatic words, "Condemned to death." Napoleon was obeyed by his satraps with Persian devotion. The sentence was pronounced, and the prisoner received it with the same intrepid gallantry which distinguished him through the whole of the bloody scene. He requested the aid of a confessor. "Would you die like a monk?" is said to have been the insulting reply. The duke, without noticing the insult, knelt down for a minute, and seemed absorbed in profound devotion.

"Let us go," he said, when he arose from his knees. All was in readiness for the execution; and, as if to stamp the trial as a mere mockery, the grave had been prepared ere the judgment of the court was pronounced.† Upon quitting the

apartment in which the pretended trial had taken place, the prince was conducted by torch-light down a winding stair, which seemed to descend to the dungeons of the ancient castle.

"Am I to be immured in an oubliette?" he said, naturally recollecting the use which had sometimes been made of those tombs for the living.—"No, Monseigneur," answered the soldier he addressed, in a voice interrupted by sobs, "be tranquil on that subject." The stair led to a postern, which opened into the castle ditch, where, as we have already said, a grave was dug, beside which were drawn up a party of the gendarmes d'élite. It was near six o'clock in the morning, and day had dawned. But as there was a heavy mist on the ground, several torches and lamps mixed their pale and ominous light with that afforded by the heavens,—a circumstance which seems to have given rise to the inaccurate report, that a lantern was tied to the button of the victim, that his slayers might take the more certain aim. Savary was again in attendance, and had taken his place upon a parapet which commanded the place of execution. The victim was placed, the fatal word was given by the future Duke de Rovigo, the party fired, and the prisoner fell. The body, dressed as it was, and without the slightest attention to the usual decencies of sepulture, was huddled into the grave with as little ceremony as common robbers use towards the carcasses of the murdered.

Paris learned with astonishment and fear the singular deed which had been perpetrated so near her walls. No act had ever excited more universal horror, both in France and in foreign countries, and none has left so deep a stain on the memory of Napoleon. If there were further proof necessary of the general opinion of mankind on the subject, the anxiety displayed by Savary, Hulín, and the other subaltern agents in this shameful transaction, to diminish their own share in it, or transfer it to others, would be sufficient evidence of the deep responsibility to which they felt themselves subjected.

There is but justice, however, in listening to the defence which Bonaparte set up for himself when in St Helena, especially as it appeared perfectly convincing to Las Cases, his attendant, who, though reconciled to most of his master's actions, had continued to regard the Duke d'Enghien's death as so great a blot upon his escutcheon, that he blushed even when Napoleon himself introduced the subject.*

His exculpation seems to have assumed a different and inconsistent character, according to the audience to whom it was stated. Among his intimate friends and followers, he appears to have represented the whole transaction as an affair not of his own device, but which was pressed upon him by surprise by his ministers. "I was seated," he

The illegal arrest—the precipitation of the mock trial—the disconformity of the sentence from the proof—the hurry of the execution—all prove that the unfortunate prince was doomed to die long before he was brought before the military commission.

* The reasoning and sentiments of Bonaparte on this subject are taken from the work of Las Cases, vol. VII, pp. 427–40, where they are given at great length.

* See Appendix, No 5.—* Further particulars concerning the arrest, trial, and death of the Duke d'Enghien.*

† Savary has denied this. It is not of much consequence.

said, "alone, and engaged in finishing my coffee, when they came to announce to me the discovery of some new machination. They represented it was time to put an end to such horrible attempts, by washing myself in the blood of one amongst the Bourbons; and they suggested the Duke d'Enghien as the most proper victim." Bonaparte proceeds to say, that he did not know exactly who the Duke d'Enghien was, far less that he resided so near France as to be only three leagues from the Rhine. This was explained. "In that case," said Napoleon, "he ought to be arrested." His prudent ministers had foreseen this conclusion. They had the whole scheme laid, and the orders ready drawn up for Bonaparte's signature; so that, according to this account, he was hurried into the enormity by the zeal of those about him, or perhaps in consequence of their private views and mysterious intrigues. He also charged Talleyrand with concealing from him a letter, written by the unfortunate prisoner, in which he offered his services to Bonaparte, but which was intercepted by the minister. If this had reached him in time, he intimates that he would have spared the prince's life. To render this statement probable, he denies generally that Josephine had interested herself to the utmost to engage him to spare the duke; although this has been affirmed by the testimony of such as declared, that they received the fact from the empress's own lips.

It is unfortunate for the truth of this statement, and the soundness of the defence which it contains, that neither Talleyrand, nor any human being save Bonaparte himself, could have the least interest in the death of the Duke d'Enghien. That Napoleon should be furious at the conspiracies of Georges and Pichegru, and should be willing to avenge the personal dangers he incurred; and that he should be desirous to intimidate the family of Bourbon, by "washing himself," as he expresses it, "in the blood of one of their house," was much in character. But that the sagacious Talleyrand should have hurried on a cruel proceeding, in which he had no earthly interest, is as unlikely, as that, if he had desired to do so, he could have been able to elicit from Bonaparte the powers necessary for an act of so much consequence, without his master having given the affair, in all its bearings, the most full and ample consideration. It may also be noticed, that besides transferring a part at least of the guilt from himself, Bonaparte might be disposed to gratify his revenge against Talleyrand, by stigmatising him, from St Helena, with a crime the most odious to his new sovereigns of the house of Bourbon. Lastly, the existence of the letter above-mentioned has never been proved, and it is inconsistent with every thought and sentiment of the Duke d'Enghien. It is besides said to have been dated from Strasburg; and the duke's aide-de-camp, the Baron de St-Jacques, has given his testimony that he was never an instant separated from his patron during his confinement in that citadel; and that the duke neither wrote a letter to Bonaparte nor to any one else. But, after all, if Bonaparte had actually proceeded in this bloody matter upon the instigation of Talleyrand, it cannot be denied, that, as a man

knowing right from wrong, he could not hope to transfer to his counsellor the guilt of the measures which he executed at his recommendation. The murder, like the rebellion of Absalom, was not less a crime, even supposing it recommended and facilitated by the unconscientious counsels of a modern Achitophel.

Accordingly, Napoleon has not chosen to trust to this defence; but, inconsistently with his pretence of being hurried into the measure by Talleyrand, he has, upon other occasions, broadly and boldly avowed that it was in itself just and necessary; that the Duke d'Enghien was condemned by the laws, and suffered execution accordingly under their sanction.

It is an easy task to show, that even according to the law of France, jealous and severe as it was in its application to such subjects, there existed no right to take the life of the duke. It is true he was an emigrant, and the law denounced the penalty of death against such of these as should return to France with arms in their hands. But the duke did not so return—nay, his returning at all was not an act of his own, but the consequence of violence exercised on his person. He was in a more favourable case than even those emigrants whom storms had cast on their native shore, and whom Bonaparte himself considered as objects of pity, not of punishment. He had indeed borne arms against France; but as a member of the house of Bourbon, he was not, and could not be accounted, a subject of Bonaparte, having left the country before his name was heard of; nor could he be considered as in contumacy against the state of France, for he, like the rest of the royal family, was specially excluded from the benefits of the amnesty which invited the return of the less distinguished emigrants. The act by which he was trepanned, and brought within the compass of French power, not of French law, was as much a violation of the rights of nations, as the precipitation with which the pretended trial followed the arrest, and the execution the trial, was an outrage upon humanity. On the trial no witnesses were produced, nor did any investigation take place, saving by the interrogation of the prisoner. Whatever points of accusation, therefore, are not established by the admission of the duke himself, must be considered as totally unproved. Yet this unconscientious tribunal not only found their prisoner guilty of having borne arms against the Republic, which he readily admitted, but of having placed himself at the head of a party of French emigrants in the pay of England, and carried on machinations for surprising the city of Strasburg; charges which he himself positively denied, and which were supported by no proof whatsoever.

Bonaparte, well aware of the total irregularity of the proceedings in this extraordinary case, seems, on some occasions, to have wisely renounced any attempt to defend what he must have been convinced was indefensible, and has vindicated his conduct upon general grounds, of a nature well worthy of notice. It seems that, when he spoke of the death of the Duke d'Enghien among his attendants, he always chose to represent it as a case falling under the ordinary forms of law, in which all re-

gularity was observed, and where, though he might be accused of severity, he could not be charged with violation of justice. This was safe language to hearers from whom he was sure to receive neither objection nor contradiction, and is just an instance of an attempt, on the part of a consciously guilty party, to establish, by repeated asseverations, an innocence which was inconsistent with fact. But with strangers, from whom replies and argument might be expected, Napoleon took broader grounds. He alleged the death of the Duke d'Enghien to be an act of self-defence, a measure of state policy, arising out of the natural rights of humanity, by which a man, to save his own life, is entitled to take away that of another. "I was assailed," he said, "on all hands by the enemies whom the Bourbons raised up against me; threatened with air-guns, infernal machines, and deadly stratagems of every kind. I had no tribunal on earth to which I could appeal for protection, therefore I had a right to protect myself; and by putting to death one of those whose followers threatened my life, I was entitled to strike a salutary terror into the others."

We have no doubt that, in this argument, which is in the original much extended, Bonaparte explained his real motives; at least we can only add to them the stimulus of obstinate resentment, and implacable revenge. But the whole resolves itself into an allegation of that state necessity, which has been justly called the tyrant's plea, and which has always been at hand to defend, or rather to palliate, the worst crimes of sovereigns. The prince may be lamented, who is exposed, from civil disaffection, to the dagger of the assassin, but his danger gives him no right to turn such a weapon, even against the individual person by whom it is pointed at him. Far less could the attempt of any violent partisans of the house of Bourbon authorize the first consul to take, by a suborned judgment, and the most precipitate procedure, the life of a young prince, against whom the accession to the conspiracies of which Napoleon complained had never been alleged, far less proved. In every point of view, the act was a murder; and the stain of the Duke d'Enghien's blood must remain indelibly upon Napoleon Bonaparte.

With similar sophistry, he attempted to daub over the violation of the neutral territory of Baden, which was committed for the purpose of enabling his emissaries to seize the person of his unhappy victim. This, according to Bonaparte, was a wrong which was foreign to the case of the Duke d'Enghien, and concerned the Sovereign of Baden alone. As that prince never complained of this violation, "the plea," he contended, "could not be used by any other person." This was merely speaking as one who has power to do wrong. To whom was the Duke of Baden to complain, or what reparation could he expect by doing so? He was in the condition of a poor man, who suffers injustice at the hands of a wealthy neighbour, because he has no means to go to law, but whose acquiescence under the injury cannot certainly change its character, or render that invasion just which is in its own character distinctly otherwise. The passage may be marked as showing Napoleon's unhappy predilection to consider public measures not according to

the immutable rules of right and wrong, but according to the opportunities which the weakness of one kingdom may afford to the superior strength of another.

It may be truly added, that even the pliant argument of state necessity was far from justifying this fatal deed. To have retained the Duke d'Enghien a prisoner, as a hostage who might be made responsible for the royalists' abstaining from their plots, might have had in it some touch of policy; but the murder of the young and gallant prince, in a way so secret and so savage, had a deep moral effect upon the European world, and excited hatred against Bonaparte wherever the tale was told. In the well-known words of Fouché, the duke's execution was worse than a moral crime—it was a political blunder. It had this consequence most unfortunate for Bonaparte, that it seemed to stamp his character as bloody and unforgiving; and in so far prepared the public mind to receive the worst impressions, and authorized the worst suspicions, when other tragedies of a more mysterious character followed that of the last of the race of Condé.

The Duke d'Enghien's execution took place on the 21st March; on the 7th April following General Pichegru was found dead in his prison. A black handkerchief was wrapped round his neck, which had been tightened by twisting round a short stick inserted through one of the folds. It was asserted that he had turned this stick with his own hands, until he lost the power of respiring, and then, by laying his head on the pillow, had secured the stick in its position. It did not escape the public, that this was a mode of terminating life far more likely to be inflicted by the hands of others than those of the deceased himself. Surgeons were found, but men, it is said, of small reputation, to sign a report upon the state of the body, in which they affirm that Pichegru had died by suicide; yet as he must have lost animation and sense so soon as he had twisted the stick to the point of strangulation, it seems strange he should not have then unclosed his grasp on the fatal tourniquet, which he used as the means of self-destruction. In that case the pressure must have relaxed, and the fatal purpose have remained unaccomplished. No human eye could see into the dark recesses of a state prison, but there were not wanting many who entertained a total disbelief of Pichegru's suicide. It was argued that the first consul did not dare to bring before a public tribunal, and subject to a personal interrogatory, a man of Pichegru's boldness and presence of mind—it was said, also, that his evidence would have been decisively favourable to Moreau—that the citizens of Paris were many of them attached to Pichegru's person—that the soldiers had not forgotten his military fame—and, finally, it was reported that, in consideration of these circumstances, it was judged most expedient to take away his life in prison. Public rumour went so far as to name, as the agents in the crime, four of those Mamelukes, of whom Bonaparte had brought a small party from Egypt, and whom he used to have about his person as matter of parade. This last assertion had a strong impression on the multitude, who are accustomed to think, and love to talk, about the mores and

bowstrings of eastern despotism. But with well-informed persons, its improbability threw some discredit on the whole accusation. The state prisons of France must have furnished from their officials, enough of men as relentless and dexterous in such a commission as those eastern strangers, whose unwonted appearance in these gloomy regions must have at once shown a fatal purpose, and enabled every one to trace it to Bonaparte.

A subsequent catastrophe, of nearly the same kind, increased by its coincidence the dark suspicions which arose out of the circumstances attending the death of Pichegru.

Captain Wright, from whose vessel Pichegru and his companions had disembarked on the French coast, had become, as we have said, a prisoner of war, his ship being captured by a much superior force, and after a most desperate defence. Under pretext that his evidence was necessary to the conviction of Pichegru and Georges, he was brought to Paris, and lodged a close prisoner in the Temple. It must also be mentioned, that Captain Wright had been an officer under Sir Sydney Smith, and that the mind of Bonaparte was tenaciously retentive of animosity against those who had aided to withstand a darling purpose, or diminish, and obscure the military renown, which was yet more dear to him. The treatment of Captain Wright was—must have been severe, even if it extended no further than solitary imprisonment; but reports went abroad, that torture was employed to bring the gallant seaman to such confessions as might suit the purposes of the French government. This belief became very general, when it was heard that Wright, like Pichegru, was found dead in his apartment, with his throat cut from ear to ear, the result, according to the account given by government, of his own impatience and despair. This official account of the second suicide committed by a state prisoner, augmented and confirmed the opinions entertained concerning the death of Pichegru, which it so closely resembled. The unfortunate Captain Wright was supposed to have been sacrificed, partly perhaps to Bonaparte's sentiments of petty vengeance, but chiefly to conceal, within the walls of the Temple, the evidence which his person would have exhibited in a public court of justice, of the dark and cruel practices by which confession was sometimes extorted.

Bonaparte always alleged his total ignorance concerning the fate of Pichegru and Wright, and affirmed upon all occasions, that they perished, so far as he knew, by their own hands, and not by those of assassins. No proof has ever been produced to contradict his assertion; and so far as he is inculpated upon these heads, his crime can be only matter of strong suspicion. But it was singular that this rage for suicide should have thus infected the state prisons of Paris, and that both these men, determined enemies of the emperor, should have adopted the resolution of putting themselves to death, just when that event was most convenient to their oppressor. Above all, it must be confessed, that, by his conduct towards the Duke d'Enghien, Bonaparte had lost that fairness of character to which he might otherwise have appealed, as in itself

an answer to the presumptions formed against him. The man who, under pretext of state necessity, ventured on such an open violation of the laws of justice, ought not to complain if he is judged capable, in every case of suspicion, of sacrificing the rights of humanity to his passions or his interest. He himself has affirmed, that Wright died long before it was announced to the public, but has given no reason why silence was preserved with respect to the event. The Duke de Rovigo, also denying all knowledge of Wright's death, acknowledges that it was a dark and mysterious subject, and intimates his belief that Fouché was at the bottom of the tragedy. In Fouché's real or pretended Memoirs, the subject is not mentioned. We leave, in the obscurity in which we found it, a dreadful tale, of which the truth cannot, in all probability, be known, until the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open.

Rid of Pichegru, by his own hand or his jailer's, Bonaparte's government was now left to deal with Georges and his comrades, as well as with Moreau. With the first it was an easy task, for the Chouan chief retained, in the court of criminal justice before which he was conveyed, the same fearless tone of defiance which he had displayed from the beginning. He acknowledged that he came to Paris for the sake of making war personally on Napoleon, and seemed only to regret his captivity, as it had disconcerted his enterprise. He treated the judges with cool contempt, and amused himself by calling Thuriot, who conducted the process, and who had been an old jacobin, by the name of Monsieur Tue-Roi. There was no difficulty in obtaining sentence of death against Georges and nineteen of his associates; amongst whom was Armand de Polignac, for whose life his brother affectionately tendered his own. Armand de Polignac, however, with seven others, were pardoned by Bonaparte; or rather banishment in some cases, and imprisonment in others, were substituted for a capital punishment. Georges and the rest were executed, and died with the most determined firmness.

The discovery and suppression of this conspiracy seems to have produced, in a great degree, the effects expected by Bonaparte. The royal party became silent and submissive, and, but that their aversion to the reign of Napoleon showed itself in lampoons, satires, and witticisms, which were circulated in their evening parties, it could hardly have been known to exist. Offers were made to Bonaparte to rid him of the remaining Bourbons, in consideration of a large sum of money; but with better judgment than had dictated his conduct of late, he rejected the proposal. His interest, he was now convinced, would be better consulted by a line of policy which should reduce the exiled family to a state of insignificance, than by any rash and violent proceedings which must necessarily draw men's attention, and, in doing so, were likely to interest them in behalf of the sufferers, and animate them against their powerful oppressor. With this purpose, the names of the exiled family were, shortly after this period, carefully suppressed in all periodical publications, and with one or two exceptions, little allusion to their existence can be traced in the pages of the official journal of France; and

unquestionably, the policy was wisely adopted towards a people so light, and animated so intensely with the interest of the moment, as the French, to whom the present is a great deal, the future much less, and the past nothing at all.

Though Georges' part of the conspiracy was disposed of thus easily, the trial of Moreau involved a much more dangerous task. It was found impossible to procure evidence against him, beyond his own admission that he had seen Pichegru twice; and this admission was coupled with a positive denial that he had engaged to be participant in his schemes. A majority of the judges seemed disposed to acquit him entirely, but were cautioned by the president Hémar, that, by doing so, they would force the government upon violent measures. Adopting this hint, and willing to compromise matters, they declared Moreau guilty, but not to the extent of a capital crime. He was subjected to imprisonment for two years; but the soldiers continuing to interest themselves in his fate, Fouché, who about this time was restored to the administration of police, interceded warmly in his favour, and seconded the applications of Madame Moreau, for a commutation of her husband's sentence. His doom of imprisonment was therefore exchanged for that of exile; a mode of punishment safer for Moreau, considering the late incidents in the prisons of state; and more advantageous for Bonaparte, as removing entirely from the thoughts of the republican party, and of the soldiers, a leader, whose military talents brooked comparison with his own, and to whom the public eye would naturally be turned when any cause of discontent with their present government might incline them to look elsewhere. Bonaparte thus escaped from the consequences of this alarming conspiracy; and, like a patient whose disease is brought to a favourable crisis by the breaking of an imposthume, he attained additional strength by the discomfiture of those secret enemies.

CHAPTER XLVII.

General indignation of Europe in consequence of the murder of the Duke d'Enghien.—Russia complains to Talleyrand of the violation of Baden; and, along with Sweden, remonstrates in a note laid before the German Diet—but without effect.—Charges brought by Bonaparte against Mr Drake, and Mr Spencer Smith—who are accordingly dismissed from the courts of Munich and Stuttgart.—Seizure—imprisonment—and dismissal of Sir George Rumbold, the British envoy at Lower Saxony.—Treachery attempted against Lord Elgin, by the agents of Bonaparte.—Details.—Defeated by the exemplary prudence of that nobleman.—These charges brought before the House of Commons, and peremptorily denied by the chancellor of the exchequer.

BONAPARTE, as we have seen, gained a great accession of power by the event of Pichegru's conspiracy. But this was in some measure counterbalanced by the diminution of character which attached to the kidnapping and murdering the Duke d'Enghien, and by the foul suspicions arising from the mysterious fate of Pichegru and Wright. He possessed no longer the respect which might be claimed by a victor and legislator, but had distinctly

shown that either the sudden tempest of ungoverned passion, or the rankling feelings of personal hatred, could induce him to take the readiest means of wreaking the basest, as well as the bloodiest vengeance. Deep indignation was felt through every country on the Continent, though Russia and Sweden alone ventured to express their dissatisfaction with a proceeding so contrary to the law of nations. The court of St Petersburg went into state mourning for the Duke d'Enghien, and while the Russian minister at Paris presented a note to M. Talleyrand, complaining of the violation of the Duke of Baden's territory, the Russian resident at Ratisbon was instructed to lay before the Diet of the Empire a remonstrance to the same effect. The Swedish minister did the same. The answer of the French minister was hostile and offensive. He treated with scorn the pretensions of Russia to interfere in the affairs of France and Germany, and accused that power of being desirous to rekindle the flames of war in Europe. This correspondence tended greatly to inflame the discontents already subsisting betwixt France and Russia, and was one main cause of again engaging France in war with that powerful enemy.

The Russian and Swedish remonstrance to the diet produced no effect. Austria was too much depressed, Prussia was too closely leagued with France, to be influenced by it; and there were none of the smaller powers who could be expected to provoke the displeasure of the first consul, by seconding the complaint of the violation of the territory of Baden. The blood of the Duke d'Enghien was not, however, destined to sleep unavenged in his obscure dwelling. The Duke of Baden himself requested the matter might be left to silence and oblivion; but many of the German potentates felt as men, what they dared not, in their hour of weakness, resent as princes. It was a topic repeatedly and efficaciously resumed whenever an opportunity of resistance against the universal conqueror presented itself; and the perfidy and cruelty of the whole transaction continued to animate new enemies against him, until, in the issue, they became strong enough to work his overthrow. From the various and inconsistent pleas which Bonaparte set up in defence of his conduct, now attempting to justify, now to apologize for, now to throw on others, a crime which he alone had means and interest to commit, it is believed that he felt the death of the Duke d'Enghien to be the most reprehensible as well as the most impolitic act in his life.

Already aware of the unpopularity which attached to his late cruel proceedings, Bonaparte became desirous to counterbalance it by sifting the public mind with a terrific idea of the schemes of England, which, in framing and encouraging attempts upon his life, drove him to those unusual and extraordinary acts, which he desired to represent as measures of retaliation. Singular manoeuvres were resorted to for the purpose of confirming the opinions which he was desirous to impress upon the world. The imprudence—so at least it seems—of Mr Drake, British resident at Munich, enabled Bonaparte to make his charges against England with some speciousness. This agent of the British government

had maintained a secret correspondence with a person of infamous character, called Mehée de la Touche, who, affecting the sentiments of a royalist and enemy of Bonaparte, was in fact employed by the first consul to trepan Mr Drake into expressions which might implicate the English ministers, his constituents, and furnish grounds for the accusations which Bonaparte made against them. It certainly appears that Mr Drake endeavoured, by the medium of De la Touche, to contrive the means of effecting an insurrection of the royalists, or other enemies of Bonaparte, with whom this country was then at war; and in doing so, he acted according to the practice of all belligerent powers, who, on all occasions, are desirous to maintain a communication with such malcontents as may exist in the hostile nation. But, unless by the greatest distortion of phrase and expression, there arises out of the letters not the slightest room to believe that Mr Drake encouraged the party with whom he supposed himself to be in correspondence, to proceed by the mode of assassination, or any others than are compatible with the law of nations, and acknowledged by civilized governments. The error of Mr Drake seems to have been that he was not sufficiently cautious respecting the sincerity of the person with whom he maintained his intercourse. Mr Spencer Smith, the British envoy at Stuttgart, was engaged in a similar intrigue, which appears also to have been a snare spread for him by the French government.

Bonaparte failed not to make the utmost use of these pretended discoveries, which were promulgated with great form by Régnier, who held the office of grand judge. He invoked the faith of nations, as if the Duke d'Enghien had been still residing in peaceable neutrality at Ettenheim, and exclaimed against assassination, as if his state dungeons could not have whispered of the death of Pichegru. The complaisant sovereigns of Munich and Stuttgart readily ordered Drake and Smith to leave their courts; and the latter was forced to depart on foot, and by cross-roads, to avoid being kidnapped by the French gendarmes.

The fate which Mr Drake dreaded, and perhaps narrowly escaped, actually befel Sir George Rumbold, resident at the free German city of Hamburg, in the capacity of his British Majesty's envoy to the Circle of Lower Saxony. On the night of the 25th October, he was seized, in violation of the rights attached by the law of nations to the persons of ambassadors, as well as to the territories of neutral countries, by a party of the French troops, who crossed the Elbe for that purpose. The envoy, with his papers, was then transferred to Paris in the capacity of a close prisoner, and thrown into the fatal Temple. The utmost anxiety was excited even amongst Bonaparte's ministers, lest this imprisonment should be intended as a prelude to further violence; and both Fouché and Talleyrand exerted what influence they possessed over the mind of Napoleon, to prevent the proceedings which were to be apprehended. The King of Prussia also extended his powerful interposition; and the result was that Sir George Rumbold, after two days' imprisonment, was dismissed to England, on giving his parole not to return to Hamburg. It seems probable, although the

Moniteur calls this gentleman the worthy associate of Drake and Spencer Smith, and speaks of discoveries amongst his papers which were to enlighten the public on the policy of England, that nothing precise was alleged against him, even to palliate the outrage which the French ruler had committed.

The tenor of Bonaparte's conduct in another instance, towards a British nobleman of distinction, though his scheme was rendered abortive by the sagacity of the noble individual against whom it was directed, is a striking illustration of the species of intrigue practised by the French police, and enables us to form a correct judgment of the kind of evidence upon which Bonaparte brought forward his calumnious accusation against Britain and her subjects.

The Earl of Elgin, lately ambassador of Great Britain at the Porte, had, contrary to the usage among civilized nations, been seized upon with his family as he passed through the French territory; and, during the period of which we are treating, he was residing upon his parole near Pau, in the south of France, as one of the *détenus*. Shortly after the arrest of Moreau, Georges, etc., an order arrived for committing his lordship to close custody, in reprisal, it was said, of severities exercised in England on the French general Boyer. The truth was, that the affair of General Boyer had been satisfactorily explained to the French government. In the Parisian papers, on the contrary, his lordship's imprisonment was ascribed to barbarities which he was said to have instigated against the French prisoners of war in Turkey—a charge totally without foundation. Lord Elgin was, however, transferred to the strong castle of Lourde, situated on the descent of the Pyrenees, where the commandant received him, though a familiar acquaintance, with the reserve and coldness of an entire stranger. Attempts were made by this gentleman and his lieutenant to exasperate the feelings which most naturally agitate the mind of a man torn from the bosom of his family, and committed to close custody in a remote fortress, where the accommodation was as miserable as the castle itself was gloomy, strong, and ominously secluded from the world. They failed, however, in extracting from their prisoner any expressions of violence or impatience, however warranted by the usage to which he was subjected.

After a few days' confinement, a sergeant of the guard delivered to Lord Elgin a letter, the writer of which informed him, that, being his fellow-prisoner, and confined in a secluded dungeon, he regretted he could not wait on his lordship, but that when he walked in the court-yard, he could have conversation with him at the window of his room. Justly suspecting this communication, Lord Elgin destroyed the letter; and while he gave the sergeant a louis-d'or, told him, that if he or any of his comrades should again bring him any secret letter or message, he would inform the commandant of the circumstance. Shortly afterwards, the commandant of the fortress, in conversation with Lord Elgin, spoke of the prisoner in question as a person whose health was suffering for want of exercise; and next day his lordship saw the individual walking in the court-yard before his window. He manifested

every disposition to engage his lordship in conversation, which Lord Elgin successfully avoided.

A few weeks afterwards, and not till he had been subjected to several acts of severity and vexation, Lord Elgin was permitted to return to Pau. But he was not yet extricated from the nets in which it was the fraudulent policy of the French government to involve him. The female, who acted as portress to his lordship's lodgings, one morning presented him with a packet, which she said had been left by a woman from the country, who was to call for an answer. With the same prudence which distinguished his conduct at Lourde, Lord Elgin detained the portress in the apartment, and found that the letter was from the state prisoner already mentioned; that it contained an account of his being imprisoned for an attempt to burn the French fleet; and detailed his plan as one which he had still in view, and which he held out in the colours most likely, as he judged, to interest an Englishman. The packet also covered letters to the Count d'Artois, and other foreigners of distinction, which Lord Elgin was requested to forward with his best convenience. Lord Elgin thrust the letters into the fire in presence of the portress, and kept her in the room till they were entirely consumed; explaining to her, at the same time, that such letters to him as might be delivered by any other channel than the ordinary post, should be at once sent to the governor of the town. His lordship judged it his farther duty to mention to the prefect the conspiracy detailed in the letter, under the condition, however, that no steps should be taken in consequence, unless the affair became known from some other quarter.

Some short time after these transactions, and when Bonaparte was appointed to assume the imperial crown (at which period there was hope of a general act of grace, which should empty the prisons), Lord Elgin's fellow-captive at Lourde, being, it seems, a real prisoner, as well as a spy, in hopes of meriting a share in this measure of clemency, made a full confession of all which he had done or designed to do against Napoleon's interest. Lord Elgin was naturally interested in this confession, which appeared in the *Moniteur*, and was a good deal surprised to see that a detail, otherwise minute, bore no reference to, or correspondence regarding, the plan of burning the Brest fleet. He lost no time in writing an account of the particulars we have mentioned to a friend at Paris, by whom they were communicated to Monsieur Fargues, senator of the district of Béarn, whom these plots particularly interested as having his *sénatorie* for their scene. When Lord Elgin's letter was put into his hand, the senator changed countenance, and presently after expressed his high congratulation at what he called Lord Elgin's providential escape. He then intimated, with anxious hesitation, that the whole was a plot to entrap Lord Elgin; that the letters were written at Paris, and sent down to Béarn by a confidential agent, with the full expectation that they would be found in his lordship's possession. This was confirmed by the commandant of Lourde, with whom Lord Elgin had afterwards an unreserved communication, in which he laid aside the jailer,

and resumed the behaviour of a gentleman. He imputed Lord Elgin's liberation to the favourable report which he himself and his lieutenant had made of the calm and dignified manner in which his lordship had withstood the artifices which they had been directed to use, with a view of working on his feelings, and leading him into some intemperance of expression against France or her ruler, which might have furnished a pretext for treating him with severity, and for implicating the British government, in the imprudence of one of her nobles, invested with a diplomatic character.*

The above narrative forms a singularly luminous commentary on the practices imputed to Messrs Drake and Smith, and subsequently to Sir George Rambold; nor is it a less striking illustration of the detention of the unfortunate Captain Wright. With one iota less of prudence and presence of mind, Lord Elgin must have been entangled in the snare which was so treacherously spread for him. Had he even engaged in ten minutes' conversation with the villainous spy and incendiary, it would have been in the power of such a wretch to represent the import after his own pleasure. Or had his lordship retained the packet of letters even for half an hour in his possession, which he might have most innocently done, he would probably have been seized with them upon his person; and it must in that case have been impossible for him to repel such accusations, as Bonaparte would have no doubt founded on a circumstance so suspicious.

While Napoleon used such perfidious means, in order to attach, if possible, to a British ambassador of such distinguished rank, the charge of carrying on intrigues against his person, the British ministers, in a tone the most manly and dignified, disclaimed the degrading charges which had been circulated against them through Europe. When the topic was introduced by Lord Morpeth into the British House of Commons, by a motion respecting the correspondence of Drake, the chancellor of the exchequer replied, "I thank the noble lord for giving me an opportunity to repel, openly and courageously, one of the most gross and most atrocious calumnies ever fabricated in one civilized nation to the prejudice of another. I affirm, that no power has been given, no instruction has been sent, by this government to any individual, to act in a manner contrary to the law of nations. I again affirm, as well in my own name as in that of my colleagues, that we have not authorized any human being to conduct himself in a manner contrary to the honour of this country, or the dictates of humanity."

This explicit declaration, made by British ministers in a situation where detected falsehood would have proved dangerous to those by whom it was practised, is to be placed against the garbled correspondence of which the French possessed themselves by means violently subversive of the law of nations; and which correspondence was the result of intrigues that would never have existed but for the treacherous suggestions of their own agents.

* This account is abstracted from the full details which Lord Elgin did us the honour to communicate in an authenticated manuscript.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

Napoleon meditates a change of title from chief consul to emperor.—A motion to this purpose brought forward in the Tribunal.—Opposed by Carnot.—Adopted by the Tribunal and Senate.—Outline of the new system.—Coldly received by the people.—Napoleon visits Boulogne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Frontiers of Germany, where he is received with respect.—The coronation.—Pius VII. is summoned from Rome to the ceremony at Paris.—Details.—Reflections.—Changes that took place in Italy.—Napoleon appointed Sovereign of Italy, and crowned at Milan.—Genoa annexed to France.

THE time seemed now propitious for Bonaparte to make the last remaining movement in the great game, which he had hitherto played with equal skill, boldness, and success. The opposing factions of the state lay in a great measure prostrate before him. The death of the Duke d'Enghien and of Pichegru had intimidated the royalists, while the exile of Moreau had left the republicans without a leader.

These events, while they greatly injured Bonaparte's character as a man, extended, in a like proportion, the idea of his power, and of his determination to employ it to the utmost extremity against whosoever might oppose him. This moment, therefore, of general submission and intimidation, was the fittest to be used for transmuting the military baton of the first consul into a sceptre, resembling those of the ancient and established sovereignties of Europe; and it only remained, for one who could now dispose of France as he listed, to dictate the form and fashion of the new emblem of his sway.

The title of king most obviously presented itself; but it was connected with the claims of the Bourbons, which it was not Bonaparte's policy to recal to remembrance. That of emperor implied a yet higher power of sovereignty, and there existed no competitor who could challenge a claim to it. It was a novelty also, and flattered the French love of change; and though, in fact, the establishment of an empire was inconsistent with the various oaths taken against royalty, it was not, in terms, so directly contradictory to them. As the re-establishment of a kingdom, so far it was agreeable to those who might seek, not indeed how to keep their vows, but how to elude, in words at least, the charge of having broken them. To Napoleon's own ear, the word king might sound as if it restricted his power within the limits of the ancient kingdom; while that of emperor might comprise dominions equal to the wide sweep of ancient Rome herself, and the bounds of the habitable earth alone could be considered as circumscribing their extent.

The main body of the nation being passive or intimidated, there was no occasion to stand upon much ceremony with the constitutional bodies, the members of which were selected and paid by Bonaparte himself, held their posts at his pleasure, had every species of advancement to hope if they promoted his schemes, and every evil, of which the least would be deprivation of office, to expect, should they thwart him.

On the 30th of April, 1804, Carée, an orator of no

great note (and who was perhaps selected on that very account, that his proposal might be disavowed should it meet with unexpected opposition), took the lead in this measure, which was to destroy the slight and nominal remains of a free constitution which France retained under her present form of government. "It was time to bid adieu," he said, "to political illusions. The internal tranquillity of France had been regained, peace with foreign states had been secured by victory. The finances of the country had been restored, its code of laws renovated and re-established. It was time to ascertain the possession of these blessings to the nation in future, and the orator saw no mode of doing this, save rendering the supreme power hereditary in the person and family of Napoleon, to whom France owed such a debt of gratitude. This," he stated, "was the universal desire of the army and of the people. He invited the Tribunal, therefore, to give effect to the general wish, and hail Napoleon Bonaparte by the title of emperor, as that which best corresponded with the dignity of the nation."

The members of the Tribunal contended with each other who should most enhance the merits of Napoleon, and prove, in the most logical and rhetorical terms, the advantages of arbitrary power over the various modifications of popular or limited governments. But one man, Carnot, was bold enough to oppose the full tide of sophistry and adulation. This name is unhappily to be read among the colleagues of Robespierre in the Revolutionary Committee, as well as amongst those who voted for the death of the misused and unoffending Louis XVI.; yet his highly honourable conduct in the urgent crisis now under discussion, shows that the zeal for liberty which led him into such excesses, was genuine and sincere; and that, in point of firmness and public spirit, Carnot equalled the ancient patriots whom he aspired to imitate. His speech was as temperate and expressive as it was eloquent: Bonaparte, he admitted, had saved France, and saved it by the assumption of absolute power; but this he contended was only the temporary consequence of a violent crisis of the kind to which republics were subject, and the evils of which could only be stemmed by a remedy equally violent. The present head of the government, he allowed, a dictator; but in the same sense in which Fabius, Camillus, and Cincinnatus, were so of yore, who retired to the condition of private citizens when they had accomplished the purpose for which temporary supremacy had been intrusted to them. The like was to be expected from Bonaparte, who, on entering on the government of the state, had invested it with republican forms, which he had taken a solemn oath to maintain, and which it was the object of Curée's motion to invite him to violate. He allowed that the various republican forms of France had been found deficient in stability, which he contended was owing to the tempestuous period in which they had been adopted, and the excited and irritable temper of men fired with political animosity, and incapable at the moment of steady or philosophical reflection; but he appealed to the United States of America, as an example of a democratical government, equally wise, vigorous, and permanent. He admitted the

virtues and talents of the present governor of France, but contended that these attributes could not be rendered hereditary along with the throne. He reminded the Tribunate that Domitian had been the son of the wise Vespasian, Caligula of Germanicus, and Commodus of Marcus Aurelius. Agnès asked, whether it was not wronging Bonaparte's glory to substitute a new title to that which he had rendered so illustrious, and to invite and tempt him to become the instrument of destroying the liberties of the very country to which he had rendered such inestimable services? He then announced the undeniable proposition, that what services soever an individual might render to the state of which he was a member, there were bounds to public gratitude prescribed by honour as well as reason. If a citizen had the means of operating the safety, or restoring the liberty of his country, it could not be termed a becoming recompense to surrender to him that very liberty, the re-establishment of which had been his own work. Or what glory, he asked, could accrue to the selfish individual, who should claim the surrender of his country's independence in requital of his services, and desire to convert the state which his talents had preserved into his own private patrimony?

Carnot concluded his manly and patriotic speech by declaring, that though he opposed on grounds of conscience the alteration of government which had been proposed, he would, nevertheless, should it be adopted by the nation, give it his unlimited obedience. He kept his word accordingly, and retired to a private station, in poverty most honourable to a statesman who had filled the highest offices of the state, and enjoyed the most unlimited power of amassing wealth.

When his oration was concluded, there was a contention for precedence among the time-serving speakers, who were each desirous to take the lead in refuting the reasoning of Carnot. It would be tedious to trace them through their sophistry. The leading argument turned upon the talents of Bonaparte, his services rendered to France, and the necessity there was for acknowledging them by something like a proportionate act of national gratitude. Their eloquence resembled nothing so nearly as the pleading of a wily procuress, who endeavours to persuade some simple maiden, that the services rendered to her by a liberal and gallant admirer can only be rewarded by the sacrifice of her honour. The speaking (for it could neither be termed debate nor deliberation) was prolonged for three days, after which the motion of Curée was adopted by the Tribunate, without one negative voice excepting that of the inflexible Carnot.

The Senate, to whom the Tribunate hastened to present their project of establishing despotism under its own undisguised title, hastened to form a *senatus-consultum*, which established the new constitution of France. The outline,—for what would it serve to trace the minute details of a design sketched in the sand, and obliterated by the tide of subsequent events,—was as follows:—

1st, Napoleon Bonaparte was declared hereditary Emperor of the French nation. The empire was made hereditary, first in the male line of the em-

peror's direct descendants. Failing these, Napoleon might adopt the sons or grandsons of his brothers, to succeed him in such order as he might point out. In default of such adoptive heirs, Joseph and Louis Bonaparte were, in succession, declared the lawful heirs of the empire. Lucien and Jérôme Bonaparte were excluded from this rich inheritance, as they had both disobliged Napoleon by marrying without his consent.

2d, The members of the imperial family were declared Princes of the Blood, and by the decree of the Senate, the offices of Grand Elector, Archchancellor of the Empire, Archchancellor of State, High Constable, and Grand Admiral of the Empire, were established as necessary appendages of the empire. These dignitaries, named of course by the emperor himself, consisting of his relatives, connexions, and most faithful adherents, formed his grand council. The rank of Marshal of the Empire was conferred upon seventeen of the most distinguished generals, comprehending Jourdan, Augereau, and others, formerly zealous republicans. Duroc was named Grand Marshal of the Palace; Caulaincourt, Master of the Horse; Berthier, Grand Huntsman; and the Count de Ségur, a nobleman of the old court, Master of Ceremonies.

Thus did republican forms, at length and finally, give way to those of a court; and that nation, which no moderate or rational degree of freedom would satisfy, now contentedly, or at least passively, assumed the yoke of a military despot. France, in 1792, had been like the wild elephant in his fits of fury, when to oppose his course is death; in 1804, she was like the same animal tamed and trained, who kneels down and suffers himself to be mounted by the soldier, whose business is to drive him into the throng of the battle.

Measures were taken, as on former occasions, to preserve appearances, by obtaining, in show at least, the opinion of the people, on this radical change of their system. Government, however, were already confident of their approbation, which, indeed, had never been refused to any of the various constitutions, however inconsistent, that had succeeded each other with such rapidity. Secure on this point, Bonaparte's accession to the empire was proclaimed with the greatest pomp, without waiting to inquire whether the people approved of his promotion or otherwise. The proclamation was coldly received, even by the populace, and excited little enthusiasm. It seemed, according to some writers, as if the shades of D'Enghein and Pichegru had been present invisibly, and spread a damp over the ceremony. The emperor was recognized by the soldiery with more warmth. He visited the encampments at Boulogne, with the intention, apparently, of receiving such an acknowledgment from the troops as was paid by the ancient Franks to their monarchs, when they elevated them on their bucklers. Seated on an iron chair, said to have belonged to King Dagobert, he took his place between two immense camps, having before him the Channel and the hostile coasts of England. The weather, we have been assured, had been tempestuous, but no sooner had the emperor assumed his seat, to receive the homage of his shouting host,

than the sky cleared, and the wind dropt, retaining just breath sufficient gently to wave the banners. Even the elements seemed to acknowledge the imperial dignity, all save the sea, which rolled as carelessly to the feet of Napoleon as it had formerly done towards those of Canute the Dane.

The emperor, accompanied with his empress, who bore her honours both gracefully and meekly, visited Aix-la-Chapelle, and the frontiers of Germany. They received the congratulations of all the powers of Europe, excepting England, Russia, and Sweden, upon their new exaltation; and the German princes, who had everything to hope and fear from so powerful a neighbour, hastened to pay their compliments to Napoleon in person, which more distant sovereigns offered by their ambassadors.

But the most splendid and public recognition of his new rank was yet to be made, by the formal act of coronation, which, therefore, Napoleon determined should take place with circumstances of solemnity, which had been beyond the reach of any temporal prince, however powerful, for many ages. His policy was often marked by a wish to revive, imitate, and connect his own titles and interest with some ancient observance of former days; as if the novelty of his claims could have been rendered more venerable by investing them with antiquated forms, or as men of low birth, when raised to wealth and rank, are sometimes desirous to conceal the obscurity of their origin under the blaze of heraldic honours. Pope Leo, he remembered, had placed a golden crown on the head of Charlemagne, and proclaimed him Emperor of the Romans. Pius VII., he determined, should do the same for a successor to much more than the actual power of Charlemagne; but though Charlemagne had repaired to Rome to receive inauguration from the hands of the pontiff of that day, Napoleon resolved that he who now owned the proud, and in protestant eyes profane, title of Vicar of Christ should travel to France to perform the coronation of the successful chief, by whom the See of Rome had been more than once humbled, pillaged, and impoverished, but by whom also her power had been re-erected and restored, not only in Italy, but in France itself.

Humiliating as the compliance with Bonaparte's request must have seemed to the more devoted catholics, Pius VII. had already sacrificed to obtain the Concordat, so much of the power and privileges of the Roman See, that he could hardly have been justified if he had run the risk of losing the advantages of a treaty so dearly purchased, by declining to incur some personal trouble, or, it might be termed, some direct self-abasement. The pope, and the cardinals whom he consulted, implored the illumination of Heaven upon their councils; but it was the stern voice of necessity which assured them, that, except at the risk of dividing the church by a schism, they could not refuse to comply with Bonaparte's requisition. The pope left Rome on the 5th November. He was everywhere received on the road with the highest respect, and most profound veneration; the Alpine precipices themselves had been secured by parapets wherever they could expose the holy Father of the Catholic Church to danger, or even apprehension. Upon the 25th No-

vember, he met Bonaparte at Fontainebleau; and the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon was as studiously respectful towards him, as that of Charlemagne, whom he was pleased to call his predecessor, could have been towards Leo.

On the 2d December, the coronation took place in the ancient cathedral of Notre Dame, with the addition of every ceremony which could be devised to add to its solemnity. Yet we have been told that the multitude did not participate in the ceremonial with that eagerness which characterises the inhabitants of all capitals, but especially those of Paris, upon similar occasions. They had, within a very few years, seen so many exhibitions, processions, and festivals, established on the most discordant principles, which, though announced as permanent and unchangeable, had successively given way to newer doctrines, that they considered the splendid representation before them as an unsubstantial pageant, which would fade away in its turn. Bonaparte himself seemed absent and gloomy, till recalled to a sense of his grandeur by the voice of the numerous deputies and functionaries sent up from all the several departments of France, to witness the coronation. These functionaries had been selected with due attention to their political opinions; and many of them holding offices under the government, or expecting benefits from the emperor, made up, by the zealous vivacity of their acclamations, for the coldness of the good citizens of Paris.

The emperor took his coronation oath, as usual on such occasions, with his hands upon the Scripture, and in the form in which it was repeated to him by the pope. But in the act of coronation itself, there was a marked deviation from the universal custom, characteristic of the man, the age, and the conjuncture. In all other similar solemnities, the crown had been placed on the sovereign's head by the presiding spiritual person, as representing the Deity, by whom princes rule. But not even from the head of the catholic church would Bonaparte consent to receive as a boon the golden symbol of sovereignty, which he was sensible he owed solely to his own unparalleled train of military and civil successes. The crown having been blessed by the pope, Napoleon took it from the altar with his own hands, and placed it on his brows. He then put the diadem on the head of his empress, as if determined to show that his authority was the child of his own actions. *Te Deum* was sung; the heralds (for they also had again come into fashion) proclaimed, "that the thrice glorious and thrice august Napoleon, Emperor of the French, was crowned and installed." Thus concluded this remarkable ceremony. Those who remember having beheld it, must now doubt whether they were waking, or whether fancy had framed a vision so dazzling in its appearance, so extraordinary in its origin and progress, and so ephemeral in its endurance.

The very day before the ceremony of coronation (that is, on the 1st of December), the Senate had waited upon the emperor with the result of the votes collected in the departments, which, till that time, had been taken for granted. Upwards of three millions five hundred thousand citizens had given their votes on this occasion; of whom only

about three thousand five hundred had declared against the proposition. The vice-president, Neufchâteau, declared, "this report was the unbiassed expression of the people's choice. No government could plead a title more authentic."

This was the established language of the day; but when the orator went farther, and mentioned the measure now adopted as enabling Bonaparte to guide into port the vessel of the *Republic*, one would have thought there was more irony than compliment in the expression.

Napoleon replied, by promises to employ the power which the unanimous consent of the Senate, the people, and the army, had conferred upon him, for the advantage of that nation which he himself, writing from fields of battle, had first saluted with the title of the Great. He promised, too, in name of his dynasty, that his children should long preserve the throne, and be at once the first soldiers in the army of France, and the first magistrates among her citizens.

As every word on such an occasion was scrupulously sifted and examined, it seemed to some that this promise, which Napoleon volunteered in behalf of children who had as yet no existence, intimated a meditated change of consort, since from his present empress he had no longer any hope of issue. Others censured the prophetic tone in which he announced what would be the fate and conduct of unborn beings, and spoke of a reign, newly commenced, under the title of a dynasty, which is usually applied to a race of successive princes.

We pause for a moment to consider the act of popular accession to the new government, because there, if anywhere, we are to look for something like a legal right, in virtue of which Napoleon might claim obedience. He himself, when pleading his own cause after his fall, repeatedly rests his right to be considered and treated as a legitimate monarch, upon the fact that he was called to the crown by the voice of the people.

We will not stop to inquire how the registers, in which the votes of the citizens were enrolled, were managed by the functionaries who had the charge of them;—it is only necessary to state in passing, that these returning officers were in general accessible to the influence of government, and that there was no possibility of instituting any scrutiny into the authenticity of the returns. Neither will we repeat, that instead of waiting for the event of the popular vote, he had accepted of the empire from the Senate, and had been proclaimed emperor accordingly. Waiving those circumstances entirely, let it be remembered, that France is usually reckoned to contain upwards of thirty millions of inhabitants, and that three millions five hundred thousand, only, gave their votes. This was not a third part, dedneting women and children, of those who had a title to express their opinion, where it was to be held decisive of the greatest change which the state could undergo; and it must be allowed that the authority so limited a portion of the people is far too small to bind the remainder. We have heard it indeed argued, that the question having been formally put to the nation at large, every one was under an obligation to make a specific reply; and they who did

not vote, must be held to have acquiesced in the opinion expressed by the majority of such as did. This argument, being directly contrary to the presumption of law in all similar cases, is not more valid than the defence of the soldier, who, accused of having stolen a necklace from an image of the Virgin, replied to the charge, that he had first asked the Madonna's permission, and, receiving no answer, had taken silence for consent.

In another point of view, it must be remembered that this vote, by which Napoleon claimed the absolute and irredeemable cession of the liberties of France in his favour, was not a jot more solemn than those by which the people had previously sanctioned the constitutional monarchy of 1791, the Republic of 1792, the Directory of 1795, and the consular government of 1799. Now, either the vote upon all those occasions was binding and permanent, or it was capable of being denied and recalled at the pleasure of the people. If the former was the case, then the people had no right, in 1804, to resume the votes they had given, and the oaths they had sworn, to the first form of government in 1791. The others which they sanctioned in its stead, were, in consequence, mere usurpations, and that now attempted the most flagrant of all, since three constitutions, each resting on the popular consent, were demolished, and three sets of oaths broken and discarded, to make room for the present model. Again, if the people, in swearing to one constitution, retained inalienably the right of substituting another whenever they thought proper, the Imperial Constitution remained at their mercy as much as those that preceded it; and then on what could Bonaparte rest the inviolability of his authority, guarded with such jealous precaution, and designed to descend to his successors, without any future appeal to the people? The dynasty which he supposed himself to have planted was in that case not the oak tree which he conceived it, but, held during the good pleasure of a fickle people, rather resembled the thistle, whose unsubstantial crest rests upon the stalk only so long as the wind shall not disturb it.

But we leave these considerations; nor do we stop to inquire how many, amid the three millions and upwards of voters, gave an unwilling signature, which they would have refused if they had dared, nor how many more attached no greater consequence to the act than to a piece of formal complaisance, which every government expected in its turn, and which bound the subject no longer than the ruler had means to enforce his obedience. Another and more formidable objection remains behind, which pervaded the whole pretended surrender by the French nation of their liberties, and rendered it void, null, and without force or effect whatsoever. It was, from the commencement, what jurists call a *pactum in illicito*:—the people gave that which they had no right to surrender, and Bonaparte accepted that which he had no title to take at their hands. In most instances of despotic usurpation—we need only look at the case of Cæsar—the popular party have been made the means of working out their own servitude; the government being usurped by some demagogue who acted in their name, and had the art to make their own hands the framers of their own chains.

But though such consent on the part of the people, elicited from an excess of partial confidence or of gratitude, may have rendered such encroachments on the freedom of the state more easy, it did not and could not render it in any case more legal. The rights of a free people are theirs to enjoy, but not theirs to alienate or surrender. The people are in this respect like minors, to whom law assures their property, but invests them with no title to give it away or consume it; the national privileges are an estate entailed from generation to generation, and they can neither be the subject of gift, exchange, nor surrender, by those who enjoy the usufruct or temporary possession of them. No man is lord even of his person, to the effect of surrendering his life or limbs to the mercy of another; the contract of the Merchant of Venice would now be held null from the beginning in any court of justice in Europe. But far more should the report of 1804, upon Bonaparte's election, be esteemed totally void, since it involved the cession on the part of the French people of that which ought to have been far more dear to them, and held more inalienable, than the pound of flesh nearest the heart, or the very heart itself.

As the people of France had no right to resign their own liberties, and that of their posterity, for ever, so Bonaparte could not legally avail himself of their prodigal and imprudent cession. If a blind man give a piece of gold by mistake instead of a piece of silver, he who receives it acquires no legal title to the surplus value. If an ignorant man enter unwittingly into an illegal compact, his signature, though voluntary, is not binding upon him. It is true, that Bonaparte had rendered the highest services to France, by his Italian campaigns in the first instance, and afterwards by that wonderful train of success which followed his return from Egypt. Still, the services yielded by a subject to his native land, like the duty paid by a child to a parent, cannot render him creditor of the country, beyond the amount which she has legal means of discharging. If France had received the highest benefits from Bonaparte, she had in return raised him as high as any subject could be advanced, and had, indeed, in her reckless prodigality of gratitude, given, or suffered him to assume, the very despotic authority, which this compact of which we treat was to consolidate and sanction under its real name of empire. Here, therefore, we close the argument; concluding the pretended vote of the French people to be totally null, both as regarding the subjects who yielded their privileges, and the emperor who accepted of their surrender. The former could not give away rights which it was not lawful to resign, the latter could not accept an authority which it was unlawful to exercise.

An apology, or rather a palliation, of Bonaparte's usurpation, has been set up by himself and his more ardent admirers, and we are desirous of giving to it all the weight which it shall be found to deserve. They have said, and with great reason, that Bonaparte, viewed in his general conduct, was no selfish usurper, and that the mode in which he acquired his power was gilded over by the use which he made of it. This is true; for we will not underrate the merits which Napoleon thus acquired, by ob-

serving that shrewd politicians have been of opinion, that sovereigns who have only a questionable right to their authority, are compelled, were it but for their own sakes, to govern in such a manner as to make the country feel its advantage in submitting to their government. We grant willingly, that in much of his internal administration Bonaparte showed that he desired to have no advantage separate from that of France; that he conceived her interests to be connected with his own glory; that he expended his wealth in ornamenting the empire, and not upon objects more immediately personal to himself. We have no doubt that he had more pleasure in seeing treasures of art added to the Museum, than in hanging them on the walls of his own palace; and that he spoke truly, when asserting that he grudged Joséphine the expensive plants with which she decorated her residence at Malmaison, because her taste interfered with the prosperity of the public botanical garden of Paris. We allow, therefore, that Bonaparte fully identified himself with the country which he had rendered his patrimony; and that while it should be called by his name, he was desirous of investing it with as much external splendour, and as much internal prosperity, as his gigantic schemes were able to compass. No doubt it may be said, so completely was the country identified with its ruler, that as France had nothing but what belonged to its emperor, he was in fact improving his own estate when he advanced her public works, and could no more be said to lose sight of his own interest, than a private gentleman does, who neglects his garden to ornament his park. But it is not fair to press the motives of human nature to their last retreat, in which something like a taint of self-interest may so often be discovered. It is enough to reply, that the selfishness which embraces the interests of a whole kingdom is of a kind so liberal, so extended, and so refined, as to be closely allied to patriotism; and that the good intentions of Bonaparte towards that France, over which he ruled with despotic sway, can be no more doubted, than the affections of an arbitrary father, whose object it is to make his son prosperous and happy, to which he annexes as the only condition, that he shall be implicitly obedient to every tittle of his will. The misfortune is, however, that arbitrary power is in itself a faculty, which, whether exercised over a kingdom, or in the bosom of a family, is apt to be used with caprice rather than judgment, and becomes a snare to those who possess it, as well as a burthen to those over whom it extends. A father, for example, seeks the happiness of his son, while he endeavours to assure his fortunes, by compelling him to enter into a mercenary and reluctant marriage; and Bonaparte conceived himself to be benefiting as well as aggrandising France, when, preferring the splendour of conquest to the blessings of peace, he led the flower of her young men to perish in foreign fields, and finally was the means of her being delivered up, drained of her population, to the mercy of the foreign invaders, whose resentment his ambition had provoked.

Such are the considerations which naturally rise out of Napoleon's final and avowed assumption of the absolute power, which he had in reality possess-

ed and exercised ever since he had been created first consul for life. It was soon after made manifest, that France, enlarged and increased in strength as she had been under his auspices, was yet too narrow a sphere for his domination. Italy afforded the first illustration of his grasping ambition.

The northern states of Italy had followed the example of France through all her change of models. They had become republican in a directorial form, when Napoleon's sword conquered them from the Austrians; had changed to an establishment similar to the consular, when that was instituted in Paris by the 18th Brumaire; and were now destined to receive, as a king, him who had lately accepted and exercised with regal authority the office of their president.

The authorities of the Italian (late Cisalpine) Republic had a prescient guess of what was expected of them. A deputation appeared at Paris, to declare the absolute necessity which they felt, that their government should assume a monarchical and hereditary form. On the 17th March, they obtained an audience of the emperor, to whom they intimated the unanimous desire of their countrymen, that Napoleon, founder of the Italian Republic, should be monarch of the Italian Kingdom. He was to have power to name his successor, such being always a native of France or Italy. With an affection of jealous independence, however, the authors of this "humble petition and advice" stipulated, that the crowns of France and Italy should never, save in the present instance, be placed on the head of the same monarch. Napoleon might, during his life, devolve the sovereignty of Italy on one of his descendants, either natural or adopted; but it was anxiously stipulated, that such delegation should not be made during the period while France continued to occupy the Neapolitan territories, the Russians Corfu, and the British Malta.

Bonaparte granted the petition of the Italian States, and listened with indulgence to their jealous scruples. He agreed with them, that the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, which might be useful to their descendants, would be in the highest degree dangerous to themselves; and therefore he consented to bear the additional burthen which their love and confidence imposed, at least until the interest of his Italian subjects should permit him to place the crown on a younger head, who, animated by his spirit, should, he engaged, "be ever ready to sacrifice his life for the people over whom he should be called to reign, by Providence, by the constitution of the country, and by the will of Napoleon." In announcing this new acquisition to the French Senate, Bonaparte made use of an expression so singularly audacious, that to utter it required almost as much courage as to scheme one of his most daring campaigns. "The power and majesty of the French empire," he said, "are surpassed by the moderation which presides over her political transactions."

Upon the 11th April, Napoleon, with his empress, set off to go through the form of coronation, as King of Italy. The ceremony almost exactly resembled that by which he had been inaugurated emperor. The ministry of the pope, however, was not em-

ployed on this second occasion, although, as Pius VII. was then on his return to Rome, he could scarcely have declined officiating, if he had been requested by Bonaparte to take Milan in his route for that purpose. Perhaps it was thought too harsh to exact from the pontiff the consecration of a King of Italy, whose very title implied a possibility that his dominion might be one day extended, so as to include the patrimony of St Peter. Perhaps, and we rather believe it was the case, some cause of dissatisfaction had already occurred betwixt Napoleon and Pius VII. However this may be, the ministry of the Archbishop of Milan was held sufficient for the occasion, and it was he who blessed the celebrated iron crown, said to have girded the brows of the ancient kings of the Lombards. Bonaparte, as in the ceremony at Paris, placed the ancient emblem on his head with his own hands, assuming and repeating aloud the haughty motto attached to it by its ancient owners, *Dieu me la donne; gare à qui la touche*.*

The new kingdom was, in all respects, modeled on the same plan with the French empire. An order, called "of the Iron Crown," was established on the footing of that of the Legion of Honour. A large French force was taken into Italian pay, and Eugène Beauharnais, the son of Joséphine by her former marriage, who enjoyed and merited the confidence of his father-in-law, was created viceroy, and appointed to represent, in that character, the dignity of Napoleon.

Napoleon did not leave Italy without farther extension of his empire. Genoa, once the proud and the powerful, resigned her independence, and her doge presented to the emperor a request that the Ligurian Republic, laying down her separate rights, should be considered in future as a part of the French nation. It was but lately that Bonaparte had declared to the listening Senate, that the boundaries of France were permanently fixed, and should not be extended for the comprehension of future conquests. It is farther true, that, by a solemn alliance with France, Genoa had placed her arsenals and harbours at the disposal of the French government; engaged to supply her powerful ally with six thousand sailors, and ten sail of the line, to be equipped at her own expense; and that her independence, or such a nominal share of that inestimable privilege as was consistent with her connexion with this formidable power, had been guaranteed by France. But neither the charge of inconsistency with his own public declarations, nor consideration of the solemn treaty acknowledging the Ligurian Republic, prevented Napoleon from availing himself of the pretext afforded by the petition of the doge. It was convenient to indulge the city and government of Genoa in their wish to become an integral part of the Great Nation. Bonaparte was well aware that, by recognizing them as a department of France, he was augmenting the jealousy of Russia and Austria, who had already assumed a threatening front towards him; but, as he visited the splendid city of the Dorians, and saw its streets of marble palaces, ascend-

* God has given it me; Let him beware who would touch it.

ing from and surrounding its noble harbours, he was heard to exclaim, that such a possession was well worth the risks of war. The success of one mighty plan only induced him to form another; and while he was conscious that he was the general object of jealousy and suspicion to Europe, Napoleon could not refrain from encroachments, which necessarily increased and perpetuated such hostile sentiments towards him.

CHAPTER XLIX.

Napoleon addresses a second letter to the King of England personally.—The folly and inconvenience of this innovation discussed.—Answered by the British secretary of state to Talleyrand.—Alliance formed betwixt Russia and England.—Prussia keeps aloof, and the Emperor Alexander visits Berlin.—Austria prepares for war, and marches an army into Bavaria.—Her impolicy in prematurely commencing hostilities, and in her conduct to Bavaria.—Unsoldierlike conduct of the Austrian general, Mack.—Bonaparte is joined by the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the Duke of Baden.—Skillful manœuvres of the French generals, and successive losses of the Austrians.—Napoleon violates the neutrality of Prussia, by marching through Anspach and Bareuth.—Further losses of the Austrian leaders, and consequent disunion among them.—Mack is cooped up in Ulm.—Issues a formidable declaration on the 16th October.—and surrenders on the following day.—Fatal results of this man's poltroonery, want of skill, and probable treachery.

BONAPARTE, consul, had affected to give a direct testimony of his desire to make peace, by opening a communication immediately and personally with the King of Great Britain. Bonaparte, emperor, had, according to his own interpretation of his proceedings, expiated by his elevation all the crimes of the Revolution, and wiped out for ever the memory of those illusory visions of liberty and equality, which had alarmed such governments as continued to rest their authority on the ancient basis of legitimacy. He had, in short, according to his own belief, preserved in his system all that the Republic had produced of good, and done away all the memory of that which was evil.

With such pretensions, to say nothing of his absolute power, he hastened to claim admission among the acknowledged princes of Europe; and a second time (27th January, 1805), by a letter addressed to King George III., personally, under the title of "Sir, my brother," endeavoured to prove, by a string of truisms,—on the preference of a state of peace to war, and on the reciprocal grandeur of France and England, both advanced to the highest pitch of prosperity,—that the hostilities between the nations ought to be ended.

We have already stated the inconveniences which must necessarily attach to a departure from the usual course of treating between states, and to the transference of the discussions usually intrusted to inferior and responsible agents, to those who are themselves at the head of the nation. But if Napoleon had been serious in desiring peace, and saw any reason for directly communicating with the English king rather than with the English government, he ought to have made his proposal something more specific than a

string of general propositions, which, affirmed on the one side, and undisputed on the other, left the question between the belligerent powers as undecided as formerly. The question was, not whether peace was desirable, but on what terms it was offered, or could be obtained. If Bonaparte, while stating, as he might have been expected to do, that the jealousies entertained by England of his power were unjust, had agreed, that, for the tranquillity of Europe, the weal of both nations, and the respect in which he held the character of the monarch whom he addressed, Malta should remain with Britain in perpetuity, or for a stipulated period, it would have given a serious turn to his overture, which was at present as vague in its tendency, as it was unusual in the form.

The answer to his letter, addressed by the British secretary of state to Talleyrand, declared, that Britain could not make a precise reply to the proposal of peace intimated in Napoleon's letter, until she had communicated with her allies on the Continent, and in particular with the Emperor of Russia.

These expressions indicated, what was already well known to Bonaparte, the darkening of another continental storm, about to be directed against his power. On this occasion, Russia was the soul of the confederacy. Since the death of the unfortunate Paul had placed that mighty country under the government of a wise and prudent prince, whose education had been sedulously cultivated, and who had profited in an eminent degree by that advantage, her counsels had been dignified, wise, and moderate. She had offered her mediation betwixt the belligerent powers, which, accepted willingly by Great Britain, had been somewhat haughtily declined by France, whose ruler was displeased, doubtless, to find that power in the hands of a sharp-sighted and sagacious sovereign, which, when lodged in those of Paul, he might reckon upon as at his own disposal, through his influence over that weak and partial monarch.

From this time there was coldness betwixt the French and Russian governments. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien increased the misunderstanding. The Emperor of Russia was too high-spirited to view this scene of perfidy and violence in silence; and as he not only remonstrated with Bonaparte himself, but appealed to the German Diet on the violation of the territories of the empire, Napoleon, unused to have his actions censured and condemned by others, how powerful soever, seems to have regarded the Emperor Alexander with personal dislike. Russia and Sweden, and their monarchs, became the subjects of satire and ridicule in the *Moniteur*; and, as every one knew, such arrows were never discharged without Bonaparte's special authority. The latter prince withdrew his ambassador from Paris, and in a public note, delivered to the French envoy at Stockholm, expressed his surprise at the "indecent and ridiculous insolencies which Monsieur Napoleon Bonaparte had permitted to be inserted in the *Moniteur*." Gustavus was, it is true, of an irregular and violent temper, apt to undertake plans, to the achievement of which the strength of his kingdom was inadequate; yet he would scarcely have expressed himself with so little veneration for

the most formidable authority in Europe, had he not been confident in the support of the czar. In fact, on the 10th of January, 1805, the King of Sweden had signed a treaty of close alliance with Russia; and, as a necessary consequence, on the 31st of October following, he published a declaration of war against France, in terms personally insulting to Napoleon.

Russia and England, in the meantime, had engaged in an alliance, the general purpose of which was to form a league upon the Continent, to compel the French government to consent to the re-establishment of the balance of Europe. The objects proposed were briefly the independence of Holland and Switzerland; the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany by the French troops; the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia; and the complete evacuation of Italy by the French.

These were gigantic schemes, for which suitable efforts were to be made. Five hundred thousand men were to be employed; and Britain, besides affording the assistance of her forces by sea and land, was to pay large subsidies for supporting the armies of the coalition.

Great Britain and Russia were the animating sources of this new coalition against France; but it was impossible, considering the insular situation of the first of those powers, and the great distance of the second from the scene of action, that they alone, without the concurrence of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, should be able to assail France with any prospect of making a successful impression. Every effort, therefore, was used to awaken those states to a sense of the daily repeated encroachments of Bonaparte, and of the extreme danger to which they were respectively exposed by the rapidly increasing extent of his empire.

But since the unsuccessful campaign of the year 1792, Prussia had observed a cautious and wary neutrality. She had seen, not perhaps without secret pleasure, the humiliation of Austria, her natural rival in Germany, and she had taken many opportunities to make acquisition of petty objects of advantage, in consequence of the various changes upon the Continent; so that she seemed to find her own interest in the successes of France. It is imagined, also, that Bonaparte had found some of her leading statesmen not altogether inaccessible to influence of a different kind, by the liberal exercise of which he was enabled to maintain a strong interest in the Prussian councils. But the principles of these ministers were far from being shared by the nation at large. The encroachments on the German empire intimately concerned the safety of Prussia, and the nation saw, in the decay of the Austrian influence, the creation and increase of a strong German party in favour of France, to whom Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and almost all the petty princes upon the Rhine and its vicinity, began now to look up with the devotion and reverence which had hitherto been paid to the great states of Austria and Prussia. The subjects of the great Frederick also remembered his numerous victories, and, proud of the army which he had created and bequeathed to his successor, felt neither apprehension nor unwillingness at the thought of measuring forces with the Dictator

of Europe. The councils, therefore, of Prussia were divided; and though those which were favourable to France prevailed so far as to prevent her immediately becoming a member of the coalition, yet, by increasing her army to the war establishment, and marching forces towards the country which appeared about to become the scene of hostilities, Prussia gave plain intimation that the continuance of her neutrality depended upon the events of war.

To animate her councils, if possible, with a more decided spirit, Alexander visited the court of Berlin in person. He was received with the utmost distinction, and both the King of Prussia and his beautiful and interesting queen, gave manifest tokens of the share they took personally in the success of the alliance. An oath was taken by the two sovereigns at the tomb of the great Frederick, by which they are said to have devoted themselves to the liberation of Germany,—a vow which, though at a distant period, they amply redeemed. Still, whatever might be the personal opinions of the King of Prussia, the counsels of Haugwitz continued to influence his cabinet; and the emperor withdrew from Berlin, to place himself at the head of his troops, while the Prussian monarch, assembling an army of observation, assumed the menacing air of a neutral who feels himself able to turn the scale in favour of either of the belligerent powers at his pleasure. This was not the moment for Bonaparte to take offence at these demonstrations, as the doing so might convert a doubtful friend into an avowed and determined enemy. But the dubious policy of Prussia was not forgotten,—it was carefully treasured in Napoleon's memory, as that for which she was to be called to account at a future period. In the meantime he had the full advantage of her hesitating councils and doubtful neutrality.

Austria was more accessible to the application of the allies. Notwithstanding the disasters of the last two wars, the loss of a large portion of Italy, the disasters of Bellegarde, Alvinzi, and Wurmer, and the disastrous defeats of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the extent and military character of her population, amongst whom a short interval of peace was sufficient to recruit the losses of the most bloody war,—above all, the haughty determination of a cabinet remarkable for the tenacity with which they retain and act upon the principles which they have once adopted, induced her government to accede to the alliance betwixt Russia and Great Britain. She had not forgotten the successes which her generals and armies had obtained when fighting by the side of Suwarrow, and might hope to see once more renewed the victories of Trebia and of Novi. She therefore increased her force in every quarter; and while the Archduke Charles took the command of eighty thousand men in Italy, on which country Austria always kept a wishful eye, eighty thousand more, destined to act upon the Lech, and it was hoped upon the Rhine, were placed under the charge of General Mack, whose factitious and ill-merited reputation had, unfortunately for Austria, remained unabated, notwithstanding his miserable Neapolitan campaign in 1799. The Archduke Ferdinand, a prince of great courage and hopes, was the nominal commander of the last-mentioned army,

while the real authority was lodged in this old and empty professor of tactics. To conclude this detail of preparation, the Archduke John was appointed to command in the Tyrol.

It remained only to try the event of negotiation, ere finally proceeding to military extremities. It was not difficult to state the causes of the war, which was now about to break out anew. By the peace of Lunéville, finally concluded between Austria and France, the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian republics had been stipulated; but instead of such terms being complied with, Napoleon, rendering himself Grand Mediator of Switzerland and King of Italy, had at the same time filled Holland with troops, and occupied the whole three countries in such a manner, as made them virtually, and almost avowedly, the absolute dependencies of France.

Complaints on these heads, warmly urged by Austria, were sharply answered by France, who in her turn accused Austria of want of confidence, and of assuming arms in the midst of peace. The Emperor of Russia interfered, and sent a special ambassador to Paris, with the purpose of coming, if possible, to an amicable accommodation, which might even yet preserve the tranquillity of Europe. But ere Novosiltzoff had reached his place of destination, the union of Genoa with the French empire was announced; an encroachment, which, joined to Napoleon's influence in Switzerland, rendered the whole north-western frontier of Italy completely open for the march of French armies, and precluded the possible hope of that fine country assuming any character of independence, even if, at a future time, its crown should be vested in a person different from the ruler of France.

Upon hearing of this new usurpation, made at the very time when Napoleon's steps towards the aggrandisement of his power were under challenge, Russia countermanded her ambassador; and Austria, after the exchange of some more angry notes, began her daring enterprise by marching a large army upon Bavaria. It would have been better, probably, had the Emperor Francis suspended this decisive measure, and continued to protract, if possible, the negotiation, until the Russian auxiliary armies, two in number, of fifty thousand men each, could have advanced to the assistance of their allies; or until a sense of the approaching crisis had removed the indecision in the Prussian councils, and induced the king to join the coalition. Either of these events, and more especially both, might have given a very different turn to this disastrous campaign.

But Austria was not to be blamed only for precipitating the war—she exposed herself to censure by the mode in which she conducted it. Occupying Bavaria with numerous forces, the elector was required to join the confederacy. Maximilian of Bavaria was not disinclined to unite his forces with those which proposed for their object the defence of Germany; but he pleaded that his son, now traveling in France, would be made responsible, should he join the coalition. "On my knees," he said, in a letter to the Emperor Francis, "I implore you for permission to remain neutral." His reasonable request was rejected, and the elector was required

to join the confederacy with a violence of urgency, both unjust and impolitic. He was further given to understand, that his troops would not be permitted to remain as a separate army, but must be incorporated with those of Austria. These were terms so harsh, as to render even the precarious alliance of France preferable to submission. Maximilian, retreating from his capital of Munich to Wurtzburg, and withdrawing his army into Franconia, again endeavoured to negotiate for neutrality. It was again imperiously refused; and while the Austrian government insisted that the elector should join them with his whole forces, the Austrian troops were permitted to conduct themselves as in an enemy's country; requisitions were raised, and other measures resorted to, tending to show that the invaders remembered the ancient grudge which had so long subsisted between Bavaria and Austria. It was natural that the Bavarian prince, incensed at this treatment, should regard the allies as enemies, and wait the arrival of the French as liberators.

The military manoeuvres of the Austrian army were not more able, than her conduct towards the neutral state of Bavaria was politic or just. There are two errors, equally fatal, into which a general of middling or inferior talent is apt to fall, when about to encounter with an adversary of genius. If he mixes presumption with his weakness of parts, he will endeavour to calculate the probable motions of his antagonist; and having, as he supposes, ascertained what they are likely to be, will attempt to anticipate and interrupt them, and thereby expose himself to some signal disaster, by mistaking the principle on which his enemy designs to act. Or, if intimidated by the reputation of the commander opposed to him, such a general is apt to remain passive and irresolute, until the motions of the enemy make his purpose evident, at a time when it is probably impossible to prevent his attaining it. It was left for General Mack, within the space of a very brief campaign, to unite both characters; and fall first into errors of rashness and presumption, afterwards into those of indecision and cowardice.

It required little experience to know, that, after two singularly unfortunate wars, every precaution should have been taken to bring the Austrian troops into contact with their enemy, under such advantages of position and numbers as might counterbalance the feelings of discouragement with which the bravest soldiers must be affected, in consequence of a course of defeat and disaster so uniform, that there seemed to be a fate in it. In this point of view, the Austrian armies ought to have halted on their own territories, where the river Inn forms a strong and excellent line of defence, extending betwixt the Tyrol and the Danube, into which the Inn empties itself at Passau. Supposing Mack's large force concentrated, with this formidable barrier in front, it seems as if the Austrians might have easily maintained a defensive position until the armies of Russia appeared to support them.

If, determined upon the imperious and unjust aggression on Bavaria, Mack found it necessary to advance more to the westward than the line of the Inn, in order to secure the country of the elector, the Lech, in its turn, offered him a position in which

he might have awaited the Russians, though their junction must necessarily have been protracted, in proportion to the extent of his advance. But it was the choice of this unlucky tactician to leave Bavaria also behind him, and, approaching the frontiers of France, to take possession of Ulm, Memmingen, and the line of the Iller and Danube, where he fortified himself with great care, as if to watch the defiles of the Black Forest. It can only be thought by those who judge most favourably of Mack's intentions, that, as the passes of that celebrated forest had been frequently the route by which the French invaded Germany, he had concluded it must therefore be by that road, and no other, that their approach on the present occasion was to be expected. Knowing with whom he had to contend, the Austrian general ought to have suspected the direct contrary; for Bonaparte's manoeuvres were not more distinguished by talent, than by novelty and originality of design.

It is not to be supposed that this great confederacy took at unawares one who had so many reasons for being alert. The Austrian forces, though they had commenced the campaign so hastily, were not more early ready for the field, than were the immense armies of the French empire. The camps at Boulogne, so long assembled on the shores of the Channel, were now to be relieved from their inactivity; and, serious as the danger was in which their assistance was required, Bonaparte was perhaps not displeased at finding a fair pretext to withdraw from the invasion to which he had hastily pledged himself. This formidable assemblage of troops, laying aside the appellation of the Army of England, was hereafter distinguished by that of the Grand Army. At the same time, the armies maintained in Holland, and in the north of Germany, were put into motion.

In this remarkable campaign Bonaparte commenced, for the first time, the system of issuing official bulletins, for the purpose of announcing to the French nation his accounts of success, and impressing upon the public mind what truths he desired them to know, and, at the same time, what falsehoods he was desirous they should believe. In every country, such official accounts will naturally have a partial character, as every government must desire to represent the result of its measures in as favourable a light as possible. Where there is a free press, however, the deception cannot be carried to extremity; imposture cannot be attempted, on a grand scale at least, where it can be contrasted with other sources of information, or refuted by arguments derived from evidence. But Bonaparte had the unlimited and exclusive privilege of saying what he pleased, without contradiction or commentary, and he was liberal in using a license which could not be checked. Yet his bulletins are valuable historical documents, as well as the papers in the *Moniteur*, which he himself frequently composed or superintended. Much correct information there certainly is; and that which is less accurate is interesting, since it shows, if not actual truths, at least what Napoleon desired should be received as such, and so throws considerable light both on his schemes and on his character.

Bonaparte communicated to the Senate the ap-

proach of war, by a report, dated 22d September, in which, acquainting them with the cause of quarrel betwixt himself and the allied powers, he asked, and of course obtained, two decrees; one for ordering eighty thousand conscripts to the field, another for the organization of the National Guard. He then put himself at the head of his forces, and proceeded to achieve the destruction of Mack's army, not as that of Melas at Marengo, by one great general battle, but by a series of grand manoeuvres, and a train of partial actions necessary to execute them, which rendered resistance and retreat alike impossible. These manoeuvres we can only indicate, nor can they perhaps be well understood without the assistance of the map.

While Mack expected the approach of the French upon his front, Bonaparte had formed the daring resolution to turn the flank of the Austrian general, cut him off from his country and his resources, and reduce him to the necessity, either of surrender, or of giving battle without a hope of success. To execute this great conception, the French army was parted into six grand divisions. That of Bernadotte, evacuating Hanover, which it had hitherto occupied, and traversing Hesse, seemed as if about to unite itself to the main army, which had now reached the Rhine on all points. But its real destination was soon determined, when, turning towards the left, Bernadotte ascended the river Maine, and at Wurtzburg formed a junction with the Elector of Bavaria, who, with the troops which had followed him into Franconia, immediately declared for the French cause.

The Elector of Wirtemberg and the Duke of Baden followed the same line of politics; and thus Austria had arrayed against her those very German princes, whom a moderate conduct towards Bavaria might perhaps have rendered neutral; France, at the outset of the contest, scarce having the power to compel them to join her standard. The other five columns of French troops, under Ney, Soult, Davoust, Vandamme, and Marmont, crossed the Rhine at different points, and entered Germany to the northward of Mack's position; while Murat, who made his passage at Kehl, approaching the Black Forest, manoeuvred in such a manner as to confirm Mack in his belief that the main attack was to come from that quarter. But the direction of all the other divisions intimated that it was the object of the French Emperor to move round the right wing of the Austrians, by keeping on the north or left side of the Danube, and then, by crossing that river, to put themselves in the rear of Mack's army, and interpose betwixt him and Vienna. For this purpose, Soult, who had crossed at Spire, directed his march upon Augsburg; while, to interrupt communication betwixt that city and Ulm, the Austrian head-quarters, Murat and Lannes had advanced to Wertingen, where a smart action took place. The Austrians lost all their cannon, and it was said four thousand men—an ominous commencement of the campaign. The action would have been termed a battle, had the armies been on a smaller scale; but where such great numbers were engaged on either side, it did not rank much above a skirmish.

With the same purpose of disquieting Mack in

his head-quarters, and preventing him from attending to what passed on his left wing and rear, Ney, who advanced from Stutzgard, attacked the bridges over the Danube at Guntzburg, which were gallantly but fruitlessly defended by the Archduke Ferdinand, who had advanced from Ulm to that place. The Archduke lost many guns, and nearly three thousand men.

In the meantime, an operation took place, which marked in the most striking manner the inflexible and decisive character of Napoleon's counsels, compared with those of the ancient courts of Europe. To accomplish the French plan, of interposing betwixt Mack and the supplies and reinforcements, both Austrian and Russian, which were in motion towards him, it was necessary that all the French divisions should be directed upon Nördlingen, and particularly that the division under Bernadotte, which now included the Bavarian troops, should accomplish a simultaneous movement in that direction. But there was no time for the last-mentioned general to get into the desired position, unless by violating the neutrality of Prussia, and taking the straight road to the scene of operations, by marching through the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, belonging to that power. A less daring general, a more timid politician than Napoleon, would have hesitated to commit such an aggression at such a moment. Prussia, undecided in her counsels, was yet known to be, in point of national spirit, hostilely disposed towards France; and a marked outrage of this nature was likely to raise the indignation of the people in general to a point which Haugwitz and his party might be unable to stem. The junction of Prussia with the allies, at a moment so critical, might be decisive of the fate of the campaign, and well if the loss ended there.

Yet with these consequences before his eyes, Napoleon knew, on the other hand, that it was not want of pretexts to go to war which prevented Prussia from drawing the sword, but diffidence in the power of the allies to resist the arms and fortune of France. If, therefore, by violating the territory of Prussia, he should be able to inflict a sudden and terrible blow upon the allies, he reckoned truly that the court of Berlin would be more astounded at his success, than irritated at the means which he had taken to obtain it. Bernadotte received, therefore, the emperor's commands to march through the territory of Anspach and Bareuth, which were only defended by idle protests and reclamations of the rights of neutrality. The news of this aggression gave the utmost offence at the Prussian court; and the call for war, which alone could right their injured honour, became almost unanimous through the nation. But while the general irritation, which Bonaparte of course foresaw, was thus taking place on the one side, the success which he had achieved over the Austrians acted on the other as a powerful sedative.

The spirit of enterprise had deserted Mack as soon as actual hostilities commenced. With the usual fault of Austrian generals, he had extended his position too far, and embraced too many points of defence, rendering his communications difficult, and offering facilities for Bonaparte's favourite tac-

tics, of attacking and destroying in detail the divisions opposed to him. The defeat at Guntzburg induced Mack at length to concentrate his army around Ulm: but Bavaria and Suabia were now fully in possession of the French and Bavarians; and the Austrian general Spangenberg, surrounded in Memmingen, was compelled to lay down his arms with five thousand men. The French had crossed the Rhine about the 26th September; it was now the 13th October, and they could scarcely be said to have begun the campaign, when they had made, on various points, not fewer than twenty thousand prisoners. Napoleon, however, expected that resistance from Mack's despair which no other motive had yet engaged him to offer; and he announced to his army the prospect of a general action. He called on his soldiers to revenge themselves on the Austrians for the loss of the plunder of London, of which, but for this new continental war, they would have been already in possession. He pointed out to them, that, as at Marengo, he had cut the enemy off from his reserves and resources, and he summoned them to signalize Ulm by a battle, which should be yet more decisive.

No general action, however, took place, though several sanguinary affairs of a partial nature were fought, and terminated uniformly to the misfortune of the Austrians. In the meantime, disunion took place among their generals. The Archduke Ferdinand, Schwartzenberg, afterwards destined to play a remarkable part in this changeful history, with Collowrath and others, seeing themselves invested by toils which were daily narrowed upon them, resolved to leave Mack and his army, and cut their way into Bohemia at the head of the cavalry. The archduke executed this movement with the greatest gallantry, but not without considerable loss. Indeed, the behaviour of the Austrian princes of the blood throughout these wars was such, as if Fate had meant to mitigate the disasters of the Imperial house, by showing forth the talents and bravery of their ancient race, and proving, that although Fortune frowned on them, Honour remained faithful to their line. Ferdinand, after much fighting, and considerable damage done and received, at length brought six thousand cavalry in safety to Egra, in Bohemia.

Meanwhile, Mack found himself, with the remains of his army, cooped up in Ulm, as Wurmser had been in Mantua. He published an order of the day, which intimated an intention to imitate the persevering defence of that heroic veteran. He forbade the word surrender to be used by any one—he announced the arrival of two powerful armies, one of Austrians, one of Russians, whose appearance would presently raise the blockade—he declared his determination to eat horse-flesh rather than listen to any terms of capitulation. This bravado appeared on the 16th October, and the conditions of surrender were subscribed by Mack on the next day, having been probably in the course of adjustment when he was making these notable professions of resistance.

The course of military misconduct which we have traced, singular as it is, might be perhaps referred to folly or incapacity on the part of Mack, though it must be owned it was of that gross kind which

civilians consider as equal to fraud. But another circumstance remains to be told, which goes far to prove that this once celebrated and trusted general had ingrafted the traitor upon the fool. The terms of capitulation, as subscribed on the 17th October, bore, that there should be an armistice until 26th October at midnight; and that if, during this space, an Austrian or Russian army should appear to raise the blockade, the army at Ulm should have liberty to join them, with their arms and baggage. This stipulation allowed the Austrian soldiers some hope of relief, and in any event it was sure to interrupt the progress of Bonaparte's successes, by detaining the principal part of his army in the neighbourhood of Ulm, until the term of nine days was expired. But Mack consented to a revision of these terms, a thing which would scarcely have been proposed to a man of honour, and signed on the 19th a second capitulation, by which he consented to evacuate Ulm on the day following; thus abridging considerably, at a crisis when every minute was precious, any advantage, direct or contingent, which the Austrians could have derived from the delay originally stipulated. No reason has ever been alleged for this concession. Bonaparte, indeed, had given Mack an audience previous to the signing of this additional article of capitulation, and what arguments he then employed must be left to conjecture.

The effects of Mack's politeness, want of skill, and probable treachery, were equal to the results of a great victory. Artillery, baggage, and military stores, were given up to an immense extent. Eight general officers surrendered upon parole, upwards of 20,000 men became prisoners of war, and were marched into France. The numbers of the prisoners taken in this campaign were so great, that Bonaparte distributed them amongst the agriculturists, that their work in the fields might make up for the absence of the conscripts, whom he had withdrawn from such labour. The experiment was successful; and from the docile habits of the Germans, and the good-humour of their French employers, this new species of servitude suited both parties, and went some length to soften the hardships of war. For not the field of battle itself, with its wounded and dead, is a more distressing sight to humanity and reflection, than prison-barracks and hulks, in which hundreds and thousands of prisoners are delivered up to idleness, and all the evils which idleness is sure to introduce, and not unfrequently to disease and death. Bonaparte meditated introducing this alteration into the usages of war upon a great scale, and thought of regimenting his prisoners for the purpose of labouring on public works. His jurists objected to the proposal as contrary to the law of nations. This scruple might have been avoided, by employing only volunteers, which would also have prevented the appearance of retrograding towards those barbarous times, when the captive of the sword became the slave of his victor. But national character would, in most instances, render the scheme impracticable. Thus, an attempt was afterwards made to dispose of the Spanish prisoners in a similar way, who in most cases made their escape, and in some rose upon and destroyed their taskmasters. A French soldier would, in like manner,

make an indifferent serf to an English farmer; an English prisoner a still more intractable assistant to a French agriculturist. The advantages of comparative freedom would be in both cases counterbalanced, by a feeling of degradation in the personal subjection experienced.

When the general officers of the Austrians were admitted to a personal interview with the French Emperor, he behaved with courtesy to Klenau and others of reputation, whose character had become known to him in the Italian campaigns. But he complained of the politics of their court, which he said had forced him into war when he knew not what he was fighting for. He prophesied the fall of the house of Austria, unless his brother the emperor hastened to make peace, and reprobated the policy which brought the uncivilized Russians to interfere in the decision of more cultivated countries than their own. Mack* had the impudence to reply, that the Emperor of Austria had been forced into the war by Russia. "Then," said Napoleon, "you no longer exist as an independent power." The whole conversation appeared in the bulletin of the day, which also insinuates, with little probability, that the Austrian officers and soldiers concurred generally in blaming the alliance between their own emperor and Alexander. From this we infer, that the union between those two powerful sovereigns was, even in the moment of this great success, a subject of apprehension to Bonaparte; whose official notes are sometimes expressed with generosity towards the vanquished, who had ceased to struggle, but always with an eager tone of reproach and offence towards those from whom an animated resistance was to be apprehended.

CHAPTER I.

Position of the French armies.—Napoleon advances towards Vienna.—The Emperor Francis leaves his capital.—French enter Vienna on the 13th November.—Review of the French successes in Italy and the Tyrol.—Schemes of Napoleon to force on a general battle.—He succeeds.—Battle of Austerlitz is fought on the 2d December, and the combined Austro-Russian armies completely defeated.—Interview betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon.—The Emperor Alexander retreats towards Russia.—Treaty of Presburg signed on the 27th December.—Its conditions.—Fate of the King of Sweden—and of the Two Sicilies.

THE tide of war now rolled eastward, having surmounted and utterly demolished the formidable barrier which was opposed to it. Napoleon placed himself at the head of his central army. Ney, upon his right, was ready to repel any descent which might be made from the passes of the Tyrol. Murat, on his left, watched the motions of the Austrians, under the Archduke Ferdinand, who, refusing to join in the unworthy capitulation of Ulm, had cut

* It will be unnecessary again to mention this man's name, of which our readers are doubtless as much tired as we ourselves are. He was committed to a state prison, in a remote part of the Austrian dominions; and whether he died in captivity, or was set at liberty, we have not learned, nor are we anxious to know.

their way into Bohemia, and there united themselves with other forces, either stationed in that kingdom, or who had, like themselves, escaped thither. Lastly, the division of Augereau (who had recently advanced from France at the head of an army of reserve), occupying part of Suabia, served to protect the rear of the French army against any movement from the Vorarlberg; and at the same time menaced the Prussians, in case, acting upon the offence given by the violation of their territory, they should have crossed the Danube, and engaged in the war.

If, however, the weight of Prussia had been thrown into the scale with sufficient energy at this decisive moment, it would not probably have been any resistance which Augereau could have offered that could have saved Napoleon from a perilous situation, since the large armies of the new enemy would have been placed in his rear, and, of course, his communications with France entirely cut off. It was a crisis of the same kind which opened to Austria in the year 1813; but she was then taught wisdom by experience, and availed herself of the golden opportunity which Prussia now suffered to escape. Bonaparte had reckoned with accuracy upon the timid and fluctuating councils of that power. The aggression on their territories of Aaspach and Bareuth was learned at Berlin; but then the news of the calamity sustained by the Austrians at Ulm succeeded these tidings almost instantly, and while the first article of intelligence seemed to urge instant hostilities, the next was calculated to warn them against espousing a losing cause.

Thus trusting to the vacillating and timid policy of Prussia, Napoleon, covered on his flank and rear as we have stated, continued to push forward with his central forces towards Vienna, menaced repeatedly in the former wars, but whose fate seemed decided after the disaster of Ulm. It is true, that an army, partly consisting of Russians and partly of Austrians, had pressed forward to prevent that disgraceful calamity, and, finding that the capitulation had taken place, were now retreating step by step in front of the advancing French; but not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they were unable to make any effectual stand upon the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, or in any other position which might have covered Vienna. They halted, indeed, repeatedly, made a considerable show of resistance, and fought some severe though partial actions; but always ended by continuing their retreat, which was now directed upon Moravia, where the grand Russian army had already assembled, under the command of the Emperor Alexander, and were expecting still further reinforcements under General Buxhowden.

Some attempts were made to place Vienna in a state of defence, and the inhabitants were called upon to rise in mass for that purpose. But as the fortifications were ancient and in disrepair, an effort at resistance could only have occasioned the destruction of the city. The Emperor Francis saw himself, therefore, under the necessity of endeavouring to provide for the safety of his capital by negotiation, and for that of his person by leaving it. On the 7th of November, accordingly, he departed from Vienna for Brunn in Moravia, in order to

place himself under the protection of the Russian forces.

On the same day, but late in the evening, Count Giulay arrived at Bonaparte's head-quarters, then established at Lintz, with a proposal for an armistice, previous to a general negotiation for peace. Napoleon refused to listen to the proposal, unless Venice and the Tyrol were put into his hands. These terms were too hard to be accepted, Vienna, therefore, was left to its fate; and that proud capital of the proud house of Austria remained an unresisting prize to the invader.

On the 13th November the French took possession of Vienna, where they obtained an immense quantity of military stores, arms, and clothing; a part of which spoils were bestowed by Napoleon on his ally the Elector of Bavaria, who now witnessed the humiliation of the Imperial house which had of late conducted itself so haughtily towards him. General Clarke was appointed Governor of Vienna; and by a change as rapid as if it had taken place on the stage, the new Emperor of France occupied Schœnbrunn, the splendid palace of the long-descended Emperor of Austria. But though such signal successes had crowned the commencement of the campaign, it was necessary to defeat the haughty Russians, in whose aid the Emperor of Austria still confided, before the object of the war could be considered as attained. The broken and shattered remnant of the Austrian forces had rallied from different quarters around the yet untouched army of Alexander; and although the latter retreated from Brunn towards Olmutz, it was only with the purpose of forming a junction with Buxhowden, before they hazarded a general battle.

In the meantime, the French army following close on their back into Moravia, fought one or two partial actions, which, though claimed as victories, were so severely disputed as to make Napoleon aware that he had to do with a more obstinate enemy than he had of late encountered in the dispirited Austrians. He waited, therefore, until the result of his skilful combinations should have drawn around him the greatest force he could expect to collect, ere venturing upon an engagement, of which, if he failed to obtain a decisive victory, the consequences were likely to be fatal to him.

At this period, success had smiled on the French in Italy, and in the Tyrol, as well as in Germany. In the former country, it may be remembered, that the Archduke Charles, at the head of seventy-five or eighty thousand men, exclusive of garrisons, was opposed to Masséna, whose forces considerably exceeded that amount. The prince occupied the left bank of the Adige, with the purpose of maintaining a defensive warfare, until he should hear news of the campaign in Germany. Masséna, however, after some fighting, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river at Verona, and in occupying the town of St Michael. This was on the 30th October. Soon afterwards, the account of the surrender at Ulm reached the Frenchman, and determined him on a general attack along the whole Austrian line, which was strongly posted near Caldiero. The assault took place on the 30th October, and was followed by a very desperate action, for the Austrians, con-

sident in the presence of their favourite commander, fought with the greatest courage. They were, however, defeated; and a column of five thousand men, under General Hellinger, detached for the purpose of attacking the French in the rear, failed in their purpose, and, being themselves surrounded, were obliged to lay down their arms. The victors were joined by General St-Cyr, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, who had evacuated the kingdom of Naples, upon a treaty of neutrality entered into with the king, and now came to join their countrymen in Lombardy.

In the midst of his own misfortunes, the Archduke Charles received the fatal intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm, and that the French were advancing in full march towards Vienna. To cover his brother's capital became a matter of more pressing necessity than to attempt to continue the defence of Italy, which circumstances rendered almost hopeless. He commenced his retreat, therefore, on the night of the 1st of November, determining to continue it through the mountain passes of Carinthia, and so on into Hungary. If he had marched by the Tyrol, he would have found Angereau in his front, with Ney and Marmont threatening his flanks, while Masséna, before whom he was now retreating, pressed on his rear.

The archduke commenced this dispiriting and distressing movement, over nearly the same ground which he had passed while retreating before Bonaparte himself in 1797. He did not, however, as on that occasion, avail himself of the Tagliamento, or Palma Nova. His purpose was retreat, not defence; and, though pursued closely by Masséna, he halted no longer at these strong posts than was necessary to protect his march, and check the vivacity of the French advance. He effected at length his retreat upon Laybach, where he received tidings from his brother the Archduke John, whose situation on the Tyrol was not more agreeable than his own in Italy; and who, like Charles himself, was desirous to escape into the vicinity of Hungary with what forces remained to him.

The distress of the Archduke John was occasioned by an army of French and Bavarians, commanded by Ney, who had penetrated into the Tyrol by paths deemed impracticable; taken the forts of Schwatz, Neustadt, and Innspruch itself, and placed the archduke's army in the most precarious situation. Adopting a determination worthy of his birth, the Austrian prince resolved at all risks to effect a junction with his brother, and, though hard pressed by the enemy, he accomplished his purpose. Two considerable corps of Austrians, being left in an insulated situation by these movements of the two princes, were obliged to surrender. These were the divisions of Jelachich, in the Vorarlberg, and of the Prince of Rohan, in Lombardy. The whole of the north of Italy, with the Tyrol and all its passes, was left to the undisturbed and unresisted occupation of the French.

The army of the royal brothers had, however, become formidable by their junction, and was daily growing stronger. They were in communication with Hungary, the brave inhabitants of which warlike country were universally rising in arms. They were also joined by volunteers from Croatia, the Tyrol,

and all those wild and mountainous countries, which have so long supplied the Austrian army with the finest light troops in the world.

It might seem to counterbalance these advantages, that Masséna had also entered into communications with the French army of Germany at Clagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia. But having left great part of his troops in Italy, he had for the time ceased to be formidable to the Austrian princes, who now meditated advancing on the French grand army, which the audacity of its leader had placed in a situation extremely perilous to any other than French troops acting under the eye of their emperor.

Nothing, it is true, could be more admirably conceived and satisfactorily accomplished than the succession of grand manoeuvres, which, distinguishing the opening of the campaign, had produced the great, yet cheaply-purchased success of Ulm, and the capture of Vienna. Nor was the series of combination less wonderful, by which, clearing the Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, and the north of Italy of the enemy, Napoleon had placed almost all the subordinate divisions of his own army at his disposal, ready to assist him in the grand enterprise against the Austro-Russian forces. But he has been considered by military critics as having trusted too great a risk upon the precarious event of battle, when he crossed the Danube, and plunged into Moravia, where a defeat, or even a check, might have been attended with the most fatal consequences. The position of the Archdukes Charles and John; the organization of the Hungarian insurrection, which proceeded rapidly; the success of the Archduke Ferdinand, in raising a similar general levy in Bohemia, threatened alarming operations in the French rear; while Prussia, with the sword drawn in her hand, and the word *war* upon her lips, watched but the slightest waning of Bonaparte's star, to pronounce the word, and to strike a blow at the same moment.

Napoleon accordingly, though he had dared the risk, was perfectly sensible that as he had distinguished the earlier part of this campaign by some of the most brilliant manoeuvres which military history records, it was now incumbent upon him, without delay, to conclude it by a great and decisive victory over a new and formidable enemy. He neglected, therefore, no art by which success could be insured. In the first place, it was necessary to determine the allies to immediate battle; for situated in the heart of an enemy's country, with insurrection spreading wide and wider around him, an immediate action was as desirable on his part, as delay would have been advantageous to his opponents.

Some attempts at negotiation were made by the Austrians, to aid which Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, made his appearance in the French camp with the offer of his master's mediation, but with the alternative of declaring war in case it was refused. To temporize with Prussia was of the last consequence, and the French Emperor found a willing instrument in Haugwitz. "The French and Austrian outposts," said Napoleon, "are engaged; it is a prelude to the battle which I am about to fight!—Say nothing of your errand to me at present—I wish to remain in ignorance of it. Return to Vienna, and

wait the events of war." Haugwitz, to use Napoleon's own expression, was no novice, and returned to Vienna without waiting for another hint; and doubtless the French Emperor was well pleased to be rid of his presence.

Napoleon next sent Savary to the Russian camp, under pretence of compliment to the Emperor Alexander, but in reality as a spy upon that monarch and his generals. He returned, having discovered, or affected to discover, that the Russian sovereign was surrounded by counsellors, whom their youth and rank rendered confident and presumptuous, and who, he concluded, might be easily misguided into some fatal act of rashness.

Bonaparte acted on the hint, and upon the first movement of the Austro-Russian army in advance, withdrew his forces from the position they had occupied. Prince Dolgorucki, aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, was dispatched by him to return the compliments which had been brought him. He too was, doubtless, expected to use his powers of observation, but they were not so acute as those of the old officer of police. Bonaparte, as if the interior of his camp displayed scenes which he did not desire Dolgorucki to witness, met the prince at the outposts, which the soldiers were in the act of hastily covering with field-works, like an army which seeks to shelter conscious weakness under entrenchments. Encouraged by what he thought he saw of the difficulties in which the French seemed to be placed, Dolgorucki entered upon politics, and demanded in plain terms the cession of the crown of Italy. To this proposal Bonaparte listened with a patience which seemed to be the effect of his present situation. In short, Dolgorucki carried back to his Imperial master the hastily-conceived opinion, that the French Emperor was retreating, and felt himself in a precarious posture. On this false ground the Russian council of war determined to act. Their plan was to extend their own left wing, with the purpose of turning the right of the French army, and taking them upon the flank and rear.

It was upon the 1st December at noon that the Russians commenced this movement, by which, in confidence of success, they abandoned a chain of heights where they might have received an attack with great advantage, descended into ground more favourable to the enemy, and, finally, placed their left wing at too great a distance from the centre. The French general no sooner witnessed this rash manœuvre, than he exclaimed, "Before to-morrow is over, that army is my own." In the meantime, withdrawing his outposts, and concentrating his forces, he continued to intimate a conscious inferiority, which was far from existing.

The two armies seem to have been very nearly of the same strength. For though the bulletin, to enhance the victory, makes the opposite army amount to 100,000 men, yet there were not actually above 50,000 Russians, and about 25,000 Austrians, in the field of battle. The French army might be about the same force. But they were commanded by Napoleon, and the Russians by Kutousoff; a veteran soldier, indeed, full of bravery and patriotism, and accustomed to war as it was waged against the Turks; but deficient in general talent, as well as in

the alertness of mind necessary to penetrate into and oppose the designs of his adversary, and, as is not unusual, obstinate in proportion to the narrowness of his understanding, and the prejudices of his education.

Meanwhile, Bonaparte, possessed of his enemy's plan by the demonstrations of the preceding day, passed the night in making his arrangements. He visited the posts in person, and apparently desired to maintain an incognito which was soon discovered. As soon as the person of the emperor was recognized, the soldiers remembered that next day (2d December) was the anniversary of his coronation. Bunches of lighted hay, placed on the end of poles, made an extempore illumination, while the troops, with loud acclamations, protested they would present him on the following day with a bouquet becoming the occasion; and an old grenadier, approaching his person, swore that the emperor should only have to combat with his eyes, and that, without his exposing his person, the whole colours and artillery of the Russian army should be brought to him to celebrate the festival of the morrow.

In the proclamation which Napoleon, according to his custom, issued to the army, he promises that he will keep his person out of the reach of fire; thus showing the full confidence, that the assurance of his personal safety would be considered as great an encouragement to the troops, as the usual protestation of sovereigns and leaders, that they will be in the front, and share the dangers of the day. This is perhaps the strongest proof possible of the complete and confidential understanding which subsisted between Napoleon and his soldiers. Yet there have not been wanting those, who have thrown the imputation of cowardice on the victor of a hundred battles, and whose reputation was so well established amongst those troops who must be the best judges, that his attention to the safety of his person was requested by them, and granted by him, as a favour to his army.

The battle of Austerlitz, fought against an enemy of great valour but slender experience, was not of a very complicated character. The Russians, we have seen, were extending their line to surround the French flank. Marshal Davoust, with a division of infantry, and another of dragoons, was placed behind the convent of Raygern, to oppose the forces destined for this manœuvre, at the moment when they should conceive the point carried. Soult commanded the right wing; Lannes conducted the left, which last rested upon a fortified position called Santon, defended by twenty pieces of cannon. Bernadotte led the centre, where Murat and all the French cavalry were stationed. Ten battalions of the Imperial Guard, with ten of Oudinot's division, were kept in reserve in the rear of the line, under the eye of Napoleon himself, who destined them, with forty field-pieces, to act wherever the fate of battle should render their services most necessary. Such were the preparations for this decisive battle, where three emperors, each at the head of his own army, strove to decide the destinies of Europe. The sun rose with unclouded brilliancy; it was that sun of Austerlitz which Napoleon upon so many succeeding occasions apostrophised, and recalled to the mind of his

soldiers. As its first beams rose above the horizon, Bonaparte appeared in front of the army, surrounded by his marshals, to whom he issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their different posts.

The column detached from the left of the Austro-Russian army was engaged in a false manoeuvre, and it was ill executed. The intervals between the regiments of which it consisted were suffered to become irregular, and the communications between this attacking column itself and the main body were not maintained with sufficient accuracy. When the Russians thought themselves on the point of turning the right flank of the French, they found themselves suddenly, and at unawares engaged, with Davoust's division, of whose position behind the convent of Raygern, they had not been aware. At the same time, Soult, at the head of the French right wing, rushed forward upon the interval between the Austro-Russian centre and left, caused by the march of the latter upon Raygern, and, completely intersecting their line, severed the left wing entirely from the centre.

The Emperor of Russia perceived the danger, and directed a desperate attempt to be made upon Soult's division by the Russian Guards, for the purpose of restoring the communication with his left. The French infantry were staggered by this charge, and one regiment completely routed. But it was in such a crisis that the genius of Bonaparte triumphed. Bessieres had orders to advance with the Imperial Guard, while the Russians were disordered with their own success. The encounter was desperate, and the Russians displayed the utmost valour before they at length gave way to the discipline and steadiness of Bonaparte's veterans. Their artillery and standards were lost, and Prince Constantine, the emperor's brother, who fought gallantly at their head, was only saved by the speed of his horse.

The centre of the French army now advanced to complete the victory, and the cavalry of Murat made repeated charges with such success, that the Emperors of Russia and Austria, from the heights of Austerlitz, beheld their centre and left completely defeated. The fate of the right wing could no longer be protracted, and it was disastrous even beyond the usual consequences of defeat. They had been actively pressed during the whole battle by Lannes, but now, the troops on their left being routed, they were surrounded on all sides, and, unable to make longer resistance, were forced down into a hollow, where they were exposed to the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. Many attempted to escape across a lake, which was partially frozen; but the ice proving too weak, gave way under them, or was broken by the hostile cannonade. This fatality renewed, according to Bonaparte's description, the appearance of the battle with the Turks at Aboukir, where so many thousand men, flying from the battle, perished by drowning. It was with the greatest difficulty, that, rallying the remains of their routed forces around them, and retiring in the best manner they could, the emperors effected their personal retreat. Only the devoted bravery of the Russians, and the loyalty of the Austrian cavalry, who charged repeatedly to protect the retrograde movement, could have ren-

dered it possible, since the sole passage to the rear lay along a causeway, extending between two lakes. The retreat was, however, accomplished, and the emperors escaped without sustaining the loss in the pursuit which might have been expected. But in the battle, at least 20,000 men had remained, killed, wounded, and prisoners; and forty standards, with a great proportion of the hostile artillery, were the trophies of Napoleon, whose army had thus simply redeemed their pledge. It was, however, at a high rate, that they had purchased the promised bouquet. Their own ranks had lost probably 5000 men, though the bulletin diminishes the numbers to two thousand five hundred.

The Austrian Emperor considered his last hope of successful opposition to Napoleon as extinguished by this defeat, and conceived, therefore, that he had nothing remaining save to throw himself upon the discretion of the victor. There were, indeed, some, who accused his councils of pusillanimity. It was said, that the levies of Prince Charles in Hungary, and of Prince Ferdinand in Bohemia, were in great forwardness—that the emperors had still a considerable army under their own command—and that Prussia, already sufficiently disposed for war, would certainly not permit Austria to be totally overwhelmed. But it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that the new levies, however useful in a partisan war, could not be expected to redeem the loss of such a battle as Austerlitz—that they were watched by French troops, which, though inferior in number, were greatly more formidable in discipline—and that, as for Prussia, it was scarce rational to expect that she would interfere by arms, to save, in the hour of distress, those to whom she had given no assistance, when such would probably have been decisive of the contest, and that in favour of the allies.

The influence of the victory on the Prussian councils was indeed soon made evident; for Count Haugwitz, who had been dismissed to Vienna till the battle should take place, now returned to Bonaparte's head-quarters, having changed the original message of defiance of which he was the bearer, into a handsome compliment to Napoleon upon his victory. The answer of Napoleon intimated his full sense of the duplicity of Prussia.—“This,” he said, “is a compliment designed for others, but Fortune had transferred the address to me.” It was, however, still necessary to conciliate a power, which had a hundred and fifty thousand men in the field; and a private treaty with Haugwitz assigned the Electorate of Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for Anspach, or rather as the price of her neutrality at this important crisis. Thus all hopes of Prussian interference being over, the Emperor Francis must be held justified in yielding to necessity, and endeavouring to secure the best terms which could be yet obtained, by submitting at discretion. His ally, Alexander, refused indeed to be concerned in a negotiation, which in the circumstances could not fail to be humiliating.

A personal interview took place betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon, to whose camp Francis resorted almost in the guise of a suppliant. The defeated prince is represented as having

thrown the blame of the war upon the English. "They are a set of merchants," he said, "who would set the Continent on fire, in order to secure to themselves the commerce of the world." The argument was not very logical, but the good prince in whose mouth it is placed, is not to be condemned for holding at such a moment the language which might please the victor. When Bonaparte welcomed him to his military hut, and said it was the only palace he had inhabited for nearly two months, the Austrian answered with a smile, "You have turned your residence, then, to such good account, that you ought to be content with it."

The Emperor of Austria, having satisfied himself that he would be admitted to terms of greater or less severity, next stipulated for that which Alexander had disclaimed to request in his own person—the un molested retreat of the Russians to their own country.

"The Russian army is surrounded," said Napoleon; "not a man can escape me. But I wish to oblige their emperor, and will stop the march of my columns, if your majesty promises me that these Russians shall evacuate Germany, and the Austrian and Prussian parts of Poland."

"It is the purpose of the Emperor Alexander to do so."

The arrangement was communicated by Savary to the Russian Emperor, who acquiesced in the proposal to return with his army to Russia by regular marches. No other engagement was required of Alexander than his word; and the respectful manner in which he is mentioned in the bulletins, indicates Bonaparte's desire to cultivate a good understanding with this powerful and spirited young monarch. On the other hand, Napoleon has not failed to place in the czar's mouth such compliments to himself as the following:—"Tell your master," said he to Savary, "that he did miracles yesterday—that this bloody day has augmented my respect for him—He is the predestined of Heaven—it will take a hundred years ere my army equals that of France." Savary is then stated to have found Alexander, despite of his reverse of fortune, a man of heart and head. He entered into details of the battle.

"You were inferior to us on the whole," he said "yet we found you superior on every point of action."

"That," replied Savary, "arises from warlike experience, the fruit of sixteen years of glory. This is the fortieth battle which the emperor has fought."

"He is a great soldier," said Alexander; "I do not pretend to compare myself with him—this is the first time I have been under fire. But it is enough. I came hither to the assistance of the Emperor of Austria—he has no farther occasion for my services—I return to my capital."

Accordingly, he commenced his march towards Russia, in pursuance of the terms agreed upon. The Russian arms had been unfortunate; but the behaviour of their youthful emperor, and the marked deference shown towards him by Bonaparte, made a most favourable impression upon Europe at large.

The Austrian monarch, left to his fate, obtained

from Bonaparte an armistice—a small part of the price was imposed in the shape of a military contribution of a hundred millions of francs, to be raised in the territories occupied by the French armies. The cessation of hostilities was to endure while Talleyrand on the one side, and Prince John of Lichtenstein on the other, adjusted the terms of a general pacification. Bonaparte failed not to propitiate the Austrian negotiator by the most extravagant praises in his bulletins, and has represented the Emperor of Austria as asking, "Why, possessing men of such distinguished talent, should the affairs of my cabinet be committed to knaves and fools?" Of this question we can only say, that if really asked by Francis, which we doubt, he was himself the only person by whom it could have been answered.

The compliments to the Prince John of Lichtenstein, were intended to propitiate the public in favour of the treaty of peace, negotiated by a man of such talents. Some of his countrymen, on the other hand, accused him of selfish precipitation in the treaty, for the purpose of removing the scene of war from the neighbourhood of his own family estates. But what could the wisdom of the ablest negotiator, or the firmness of the most stubborn patriot, have availed, when France was to dictate terms, and Austria to receive them? The treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville, though granted to Austria by Napoleon in the hour of victory, were highly advantageous compared to that of Presburg, which was signed on the 27th of December, 1805, about three weeks after the battle of Austerlitz. By this negotiation, Francis ceded to Bavaria the oldest possession of his house, the mountains of Tyrol and of the Vorarlberg, filled with the best, bravest, and most attached of his subjects, and which, by their geographical situation, had hitherto given Austrian influence at once in Germany and Italy. Venice, Austria's most recent possession, and which had not been very honourably obtained, was also yielded up and added to the kingdom of Italy. She was again reduced to the solitary seaport of Trieste, in the Adriatic.

By the same treaty, the Germanic allies of Bonaparte were to be remunerated. Württemberg, as well as Bavaria, received large additions at the expense of Austria and of the other Princes of the Empire, and Francis consented that both the electors should be promoted to the kingly dignity, in reward of their adherence to the French cause. Other provisions there were, equally inconsistent with the immunities of the Germanic body, for which scarcely a shadow of respect was retained, save by an illusory clause, or species of protest, by which Austria declared, that all the stipulations to which she consented were under reservation of the rights of the empire. By the treaty of Presburg, Austria is said to have lost upwards of 20,000 square miles of territory, two millions and a half of subjects, and a revenue to the amount of ten millions and a half of florins. And this momentous surrender was made in consequence of one unfortunate campaign, which lasted but six months, and was distinguished by only one general action.

There were two episodes in this war, of little

consequence in themselves, but important considered with reference to the alterations they produced in two of the ancient kingdoms of Europe, which they proved the proximate cause of re-modeling according to the new form of government which had been introduced by Bonaparte, and sanctioned by the example of France.

The King of Sweden had been an ardent and enthusiastic member of the anti-Gallican league. He was brave, enterprising, and chivalrous, and ambitious to play the part of his namesake and progenitor, Gustavus Adolphus, or his predecessor, Charles XII.; without, however, considering, that since the time of these princes, and partly in consequence of their wars and extensive undertakings, Sweden had sunk into a secondary rank in the great European family; and without reflecting, that when great enterprises are attempted without adequate means to carry them through, valour becomes quixotic, and generosity ludicrous. He had engaged to join in a combined effort for the purpose of freeing Hanover, and the northern parts of Germany, from the French, by means of an army of English, Russians, and Swedes. Had Prussia acceded to the confederacy, this might have been easily accomplished; especially as Saxony, Hesse, and Brunswick, would, under her encouragement, have willingly joined in the war. Nay, even without the accession of Prussia, a diversion in the north, ably conducted and strongly supported, might have at least found Bernadotte sufficient work in Hanover, and prevented him from materially contributing, by his march to the Danube, to the disasters of the Austrian army at Ulm. But by some of those delays and misunderstandings, which are so apt to disappoint the objects of a coalition, and disconcert enterprises attempted by troops of different nations, the forces designed for the north of Europe did not assemble until the middle of November, and then only in strength sufficient to undertake the siege of the Hanoverian fortress of Hamelen, in which Bernadotte had left a strong garrison. The enterprise, too tardy in its commencement, was soon broken off by the news of the battle of Austerlitz, and its consequences, and, being finally abandoned, the unfortunate King of Sweden returned to his own dominions, where his subjects received with unwillingness and terror a prince, who on many accounts had incurred the fatal and persevering resentment of Bonaparte. Machinations began presently to be agitated for removing him from the kingdom, as one with whom Napoleon could never be reconciled, and averting from Sweden, by such sacrifice, the punishment which must otherwise fall on the country, as well as on the king.

While the trifling attempt against Hamelen, joined to other circumstances, was thus preparing the downfall of the ancient dynasty of Sweden, a descent made by the Russians and English on the Neapolitan territories afforded a good apology to Bonaparte for depriving the King of the Two Sicilies of his dominions, so far as they lay open to the power of France. Governed entirely by the influence of the queen, the policy of Naples had been of a fickle and insincere character. Repeatedly saved from the greatest hazard of dethronement, the king of his

royal consort had never omitted an opportunity to resume arms against France, under the conviction, perhaps, that their ruin would no longer be deferred than whilst political considerations induced the French Emperor to permit their possession of their power. The last interference in their behalf had been at the instance of the Emperor Paul. After this period we have seen that their Italian dominions were occupied by French troops, who held Otranto, and other places in Calabria, as pledges (so they pretended) for the restoration of Malta.

But upon the breaking out of the war of 1805, it was agreed, by a convention entered into at Paris 21st of September, and ratified by the King of Naples on the 8th of October, that the French should withdraw their forces from the places which they occupied in the Neapolitan territories, and the king should observe a strict neutrality. Neither of the contracting parties was quite sincere. The French troops, which were commanded by St-Cyr, were, as we have seen, withdrawn from Naples, for the purpose of reinforcing Masséna, in the beginning of the campaign of Austerlitz. Their absence would probably have endured no longer than the necessity which called them away. But the court of Naples was equally insincere; for no sooner had St-Cyr left the Neapolitan territories to proceed northward, than the king, animated by the opportunity which his departure afforded, once more raised his forces to the war establishment, and received with open arms an army, consisting of 12,000 Russian troops from Corfu, and 8000 British from Malta, who disembarked in his dominions.

Had this armament occupied Venice at the commencement of the war, they might have materially assisted in the campaign of the Archduke Charles against Masséna. The sending them in November to the extremity of the Italian peninsula, only served to seal the fate of Ferdinand the Fourth. On receiving the news of the armistice at Austerlitz, the Russians and the British re-embarked, and not long after their departure, a large French army, commanded by Joseph Bonaparte, approached, once more to enforce the doom passed against the royal family of Naples, that they should cease to reign. The king and queen fled from the storm which they had provoked. Their son, the prince royal, in whose favour they had abdicated, only made use of his temporary authority to surrender Gaeta, Pescara, and Naples itself, with its castles, to the French general. In Calabria, however, whose wild inhabitants were totally disinclined to the French yoke, Count Roger de Damas and the Duke of Calabria attempted to make a stand. But their hasty and undisciplined levies were easily defeated by the French under General Régnier, and, nominally at least, almost the whole Neapolitan kingdom was subjected to the power of Joseph Bonaparte.

One single trait of gallantry illuminated the scene of universal pusillanimity. The Prince of Hesse Philipsthal, who defended the strong fortress of Gaeta in name of Ferdinand IV., refused to surrender it in terms of the capitulation. "Tell your general," said he, in reply to the French summons, "that Gaeta is not Ulm, nor the Prince of Hesse General Mack!" The place was defended with a

gallantry corresponding to these expressions, nor was it surrendered until the 17th July, 1806, after a long siege, in which the brave governor was wounded. This heroic young prince only appeared on the public scene to be withdrawn from it by an untimely death, which has been ascribed to poison. His valour, however honourable to himself, was of little use to the royal family of Naples, whose deposition was determined on by Bonaparte, in order to place upon the throne one of his own family.

CHAPTER LI.

Relative situations of France and England.—Hostilities commenced with Spain, by the stoppage, by Commodore Moore, of four Spanish galleons, when three of their escort were taken, and one blew up.—Napoleon's plan of invasion stated and discussed.—John Clerk of Eldin's great system of breaking the line, explained.—Whether it could have been advantageously used by France?—The French admiral, Villeneuve, forms a junction with the Spanish fleet under Gravina—Attacked and defeated by Sir Robert Calder, with the loss of two ships of the line.—Nelson appointed to the command in the Mediterranean.—Battle of Trafalgar fought on the 21st October, 1805.—Particulars of the force on each side, and details of the battle.—Death of Nelson.—Behaviour of Napoleon on learning the intelligence of this signal defeat.—Villeneuve commits suicide.—Address of Bonaparte to the Legislative Body.—Statement of Monsieur de Champagny on the internal improvements of France.—Elevation of Napoleon's brothers, Louis and Joseph, to the thrones of Holland and Naples.—Principality of Lucca conferred on Elisa, the eldest sister of Bonaparte, and that of Guastalla on Pauline, the youngest.—Other alliances made by his family.—Reflections.—Napoleon appoints a new hereditary nobility.—The policy of this measure considered.—Converts from the old noblesse anxiously sought for and liberally rewarded.—Confederation of the Rhine established, and Napoleon appointed Protector.—The Emperor Francis lays aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, retaining only the title of Emperor of Austria.—Vacillating and impolitic conduct of Prussia.

THE triumphs of Napoleon had been greater at this period of his reign, than had ever before been recorded in history as achieved by a single man. Yet even these, like everything earthly, had their limit. Fate, while she seemed to assign him complete domination over the land, had vested in other hands the empire of the seas; and it frequently happened, that when his victorious eagles were flying their highest pitch upon the Continent, some conspicuous naval disaster warned the nations, that there was another element, where France had a rival and a superior.

It is true, that the repeated success of England, resembling almost that of the huntsman over his game, had so much diminished the French navy, and rendered so cautious such seamen as France had remaining, that the former country, unable to get opportunities of assailing the French vessels, was induced to have recourse to strange, and, as it proved, ineffectual means of carrying on hostilities. Such was the attempt at destroying the harbour of Boulogne, by sinking in the roads ships loaded with stones, and another scheme to blow up the French ships, by means of detonating machines to be af-

fixed to them under water. The one, we believe, only furnished the inhabitants of Boulogne with a supply of useful building-stone; the other, from the raft on which the machines were conveyed, was much ridiculed under the name of the catamaran expedition.*

Bonaparte, meanwhile, never lost sight of that combination of naval manœuvres, through means of which, by the time that the subjugation of Austria should permit the Grand Army to resume its destination for England, he hoped to assemble in the Channel such a superior fleet, as might waft his troops in safety to the devoted shores of Britain. The unbounded influence which he exercised over the court of Spain, seemed likely to facilitate this difficult enterprise. Yet, as from Spain the French Emperor derived large supplies of treasure, it would have been convenient for him, that, for a time at least, she should retain the mask of neutrality, while, in fact, she was contributing to serve France, and prejudice England, more effectually than if she had been in a state of avowed hostility with the latter power.

The British government determined to bring this state of things to a decided point, by stopping four galleons, or vessels loaded with treasure, proceeding under an escort from the South Sea, and destined for Cadiz. The purpose of the English was only to detain these ships, as a pledge for the sincerity of the government of Spain, in observing a more strict neutrality than hitherto. But unhappily the British force, under Commodore Moore, amounted only to four frigates. Spanish honour rendered the admiral unwilling to strike the national flag to an equal strength, and an action ensued, in which three of the Spanish vessels were taken, and one unfortunately blew up; an accident greatly to be regretted. Mr Southey observes, with his usual sound sense and humanity, "Had a stronger squadron been sent (against the Spaniards), this deplorable catastrophe might have been saved—a catastrophe which excited not more indignation in Spain, than it did grief in those who were its unwilling instruments, in the British people, and in the British government."

This action took place on the 5th of October, 1804; and as hostilities were of course immediately commenced betwixt Spain and Britain, Bonaparte, losing the advantages he derived from the neutrality of the former power, had now only to use the naval and military means which she afforded for the advancement of his own purposes. The Court of Spain devoted them to his service, with a passive complaisance of which we shall hereafter see the reward.

Napoleon persisted to the last in asserting, that he saw clearly the means of utterly destroying the English superiority at sea. This he proposed to achieve by evading the blockades of the several

* These implements of destruction were afterwards used against the British cruisers in America, and were judged formidable. But such desperate courage is necessary to attach the machine to the destined vessel, and the fate of the engineer, if discovered, is so certainly fatal, that, like fire-ships, petards, and similar inventions, liable to the same inconvenience, they do not appear likely to get into general use.

ports of France and Spain, which, while weather permitted, were each hermetically sealed by the presence of a British squadron, and by finally assembling in the Channel that overwhelming force, which, according to his statement, was to reduce England to a dependency on France, as complete as that of the Isle of Oleron. But men of the greatest talents must necessarily be liable to error, when they apply the principles of a science with which they are well acquainted upon one element, to the operations which are to be carried on by means of another. It is evident that he erred, when calculating his maritime combinations, in not sufficiently considering two most material differences betwixt them, and those which had exalted his glory upon land.

In the first place, as a landsman, Napoleon did not make sufficient allowance for the action of contrary winds and waves; as indeed it was perhaps his fault, even in land operations, where their influence is less essential, to admit too little consequence to the opposition of the elements. He complained, when at St Helena, that he could never get a seaman sufficiently emancipated from the technicality of his profession, to execute or enter into any of his schemes. "If I proposed," he said, "any new idea, I had Gantheaume and all the marine department to contend with—Sir, that is impossible—Sir, the winds—the calms—the currents, will not permit it; and thus I was stopped short." We believe little dread could have been entertained of the result of naval combinations, in which the influence of the winds and waves was not previously and accurately calculated; and that British seamen would have desired nothing more ardently, than that their enemies should have acted upon a system in which these casualties were neglected, even if that system had been derived from the genius of Napoleon.

But, secondly, there was this great difference betwixt the land and the sea service, to which (the vehemence of his wishes, doubtless, overpowering his judgment) Bonaparte did not give sufficient weight. Upon land, the excellence of the French troops, their discipline, and the enthusiasm arising from uninterrupted success, might be safely reckoned upon as likely to bear down any obstacle which they might unexpectedly meet with, in the execution of the movements which they were commanded to undertake. The situation of the French seamen was diametrically the contrary. Their only chance of safety consisted in their being able to elude a rencontre with a British squadron, even of very inferior force. So much was this the case at the period of which we treat, that Linois, their admiral in the East Indian seas, commanding an eighty-four gunship, and at the head of a considerable squadron of ships of war, was baffled and beaten off in the Straits of Malacca by a squadron of merchant vessels belonging to the British East India Company, although built of course for traffic, and not for war, and, as usual in war time, very imperfectly manned.

Yet, notwithstanding the great and essential difference which we have pointed out between the French navy and their land forces, and that the former was even more inferior to that of England than the continental troops in general were to the

French soldiers, it is evident that Bonaparte, when talking of ships of the line, was always thinking of battalions. Thus he imagines that the defeat of the Nile might have been prevented, had the headmost vessels of the French line, instead of remaining at anchor, slipped their cables, and borne down to the assistance of those which were first attacked by the British. But in urging this, the leading principle of the manœuvre of breaking the line, had totally escaped the French Emperor. It was the boast of the patriotic sage,* who illustrated and recommended this most important system of naval tactics, that it could serve the purpose of a British fleet only. The general principle is briefly this: By breaking through the line, a certain number of ships are separated from the rest, which the remainder must either abandon to their fate by sailing away, or endeavour to save by bearing down, or doubling, as it were, upon the assailants, and engaging in a close and general engagement. Now, this last alternative is what Bonaparte recommends,—what he would certainly have practised on land,—and what he did practise, in order to extricate his right wing, at Marengo. But the relative superiority of the English navy is so great, that, while it is maintained, a close engagement with an enemy in the least approaching to equality, is equivalent to a victory; and to recommend a plan of tactics which should render such a battle inevitable, would be, in other words, advising a French admiral to lose his whole fleet, instead of sacrificing those ships which the English manœuvre had cut off, and crowding sail to save such as were yet unengaged.

Under this consciousness of inferiority, the escape of a Spanish or French squadron, when a gale of wind forced from the port in which they lay, the British blockading vessels, was a matter, the ultimate success of which depended not alone on the winds and waves, but still more upon the chance of their escaping any part of the hostile navy, with whom battle, except with the most exorbitant superiority on their side, was certain and unavoidable defeat. Their efforts to comply with the wishes of the Emperor of France, were therefore so partially conducted, so insulated, and so ineffectual, that they rather resembled the children's game of Hide and Seek, than anything like a system of regular combination. A more hasty and less cautious compliance with Napoleon's earnest wishes to assemble a

* The late John Clerk of Eldon; a name never to be mentioned by Britons without respect and veneration, since, until his systematic *Essay upon Naval Tactics* appeared, the breaking of the line (whatever professional jealousy may allege to the contrary) was never practised on decided and defined principle. His suavity, nay, simplicity of manner, equalled the originality of his genius. This trifling tribute is due from one, who, honoured with his regard from boyhood, has stood by his side, while he was detailing and illustrating the system which taught British seamen to understand and use their own force, at an age so early, that he can remember having been guilty of abstraction from the table some of the little cork models by which Mr Clerk exemplified his manœuvres; unchecked but by his good humoured raillery, when he missed a supposed line-of battle ship, and complained that the demonstration was crippled by its absence.

predominant naval force, would have only occasioned the total destruction of the combined fleets at an earlier period than when it actually took place.

Upon this desultory principle, and seizing the opportunity of the blockading squadron being driven by weather from the vicinity of their harbour, a squadron of ten French vessels escaped from Rochefort on the 11th of January, 1805; and another, under Villeneuve, got out of Toulon on the 18th by a similarly favourable opportunity. The former, after rendering some trifling services in the West Indies, was fortunate enough to regain the port from which they had sailed, with the pride of a party who have sallied from a besieged town, and returned into it without loss. Villeneuve also regained Toulon without disaster, and, encouraged by his success, made a second sortie upon the 18th of March, having on board a large body of troops, designed, it was supposed, for a descent upon Ireland or Scotland. He made, however, towards Cadiz, and formed a junction there with the Spanish fleet under Gravina. They sailed for the West Indies, where the joint squadrons were able to possess themselves of a rock called Diamond, which is scarce to be discovered on the map; and with this trophy, which served at least to show they had been actually out of harbour, they returned with all speed to Europe. As for executing manœuvres, and forming combinations, as Napoleon's plans would lead us to infer was the purpose of their hurried expedition, they attempted none, save of that kind which the hare executes when the hound is at his heels. Nelson, they were aware, was in full pursuit of them, and to have attempted anything which involved a delay, or gave a chance of his coming up with them, was to court destruction. They were so fortunate as to escape him, though very narrowly, yet did not reach their harbours in safety.

On the 22d July, the combined fleets fell in with Sir Robert Calder, commanding a British squadron. The enemy amounted to twenty sail of the line, three fifty-gun ships, and four frigates, and the British to fifteen sail of the line, and two frigates only. Under this disparity of force, nevertheless, the English admiral defeated the enemy, and took two ships of the line; yet such was the opinion in both countries of the comparative superiority of the British navy, that the French considered their escape as a kind of triumph. Bonaparte alone grumbled against Villeneuve, for not having made use of his advantages, for so it pleased him to term an engagement in which two ships of the line were lost; whilst the English murmured at the inadequate success of Sir Robert Calder, against an enemy of such superior strength, as if he had performed something less than his duty. A court-martial ratified, to a certain extent, the popular opinion; though it may be doubted whether impartial posterity will concur in the justice of the censure which was passed upon the gallant admiral. At any other period of our naval history, the action of the 22d of July would have been rated as a distinguished victory.

The combined fleets escaped into Vigo, where they refitted; and, venturing to sail from that port, they proceeded to Ferrol, united themselves with the squadron which was lying there, and continued their

course for Cadiz, which they entered in safety. This did not consist with the plans of Bonaparte, who would have had the whole naval force united at Brest, to be in readiness to cover the descent upon England. "General terror was spread," he said, "throughout that divided nation, and never was England so near to destruction." Of the general terror, few of the British, we believe, remember anything, and of the imminent danger we were not sensible. Had the combined fleets entered the British Channel, instead of the Mediterranean, they would have found the same admiral, the same seamen, nay, in many instances, the same ships, to which Villeneuve's retreat into Cadiz gave the trouble of going to seek him there.

When the certainty was known that the enemy's fleets were actually in Cadiz, Nelson was put at the head of the British naval force in the Mediterranean, which was reinforced with an alertness and secrecy that did the highest honour to the admiralty. Villeneuve, in the meantime, had, it is believed, his master's express orders to put to sea; and if he had been censured for want of zeal in the action off Cape Finisterre with Calder, he was likely, as a brave man, to determine on running some risk to prove the injustice of his emperor's reproaches. Cadiz also, being strictly blockaded by the English, the fleets of France and Spain began to be in want of necessaries. But what principally determined the French admiral on putting to sea, was his ignorance of the reinforcements received by the English, which, though they left Nelson's fleet still inferior to his own, yet brought them nearer to an equality than had he been aware of it, would have rendered their meeting at all desirable to Villeneuve. It was another and especial point of encouragement, that circumstances led him to disbelieve the report that Nelson commanded the British fleet. Under the influence of these united motives, and confiding in a plan of tactics which he had formed for resisting the favourite mode of attack practised by the English, the French admiral sailed from Cadiz on the 19th October, 1805, in an evil hour for himself and for his country.

The hostile fleets were not long of meeting, and the wind never impelled along the ocean two more gallant armaments. The advantage of numbers was greatly on the side of Villeneuve. He had thirty-three sail of the line, and seven large frigates; Nelson only twenty-seven line-of-battle ships, and three frigates. The inferiority of the English in number of men and guns was yet more considerable. The combined fleet had four thousand troops on board, many of whom, excellent rifle-men, were placed in the tops. But all odds were compensated by the quality of the British sailors, and the talents of Nelson.

Villeneuve showed no inclination to shun the eventful action. His disposition was singular and ingenious. His fleet formed a double line, each alternate ship being about a cable's length to the windward of her second ahead and a-stern, and thus the arrangement represented the chequers of a draught-board, and seemed to guard against the operation of cutting the line, as usually practised by the British. But Nelson had determined to prac-

tise the manœuvre in a manner as original as the mode of defence adopted by Villeneuve. His order for sailing was in two lines, and this was also the order for battle. An advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-deckers, was to cut off three or four of the enemies' line, a-head of their centre; the second in command, Admiral Collingwood, was to break in upon the enemy about the twelfth ship from the rear, and Nelson himself determined to bear down on the centre. The effect of these manœuvres must of course be a close and general action; for the rest, Nelson knew he could trust to the determination of his officers and seamen. To his admirals and officers he explained in general, that his object was a close and decisive engagement; and that if, in the confusion and smoke of the battle, signals should not be visible, the captain would never do wrong who laid his ship alongside of the enemy.

With such dispositions on either side, the two gallant fleets met on the memorable 21st of October. Admiral Collingwood, who led the van, went down on the enemy with all his sails set, and, disdaining to furl them in the usual manner, cut the sheets, and let his canvas fly loose in the wind, as if he needed it no longer after it had borne him amidst the thickest of the enemy. Nelson ran his vessel, the *Victory*, on board the French *Redoutable*; the *Téméraire*, a second British ship, fell on board the same vessel on the other side; another enemy's ship fell on board of the *Téméraire*, and the action was fiercely maintained betwixt these four vessels, which lay as close as if they had been moored together in some friendly harbour. While the *Victory* thus engaged the *Redoutable* on the starboard, she maintained from her larboard guns an incessant fire on the *Boucentaur* and the colossal *Santa Trinidad*, a vessel of four decks. The example of the admiral was universally followed by the British captains; they broke into the enemy's line on every side, engaged two or three ships at the same time, and maintained the battle at the very muzzles of the cannon. The superiority which we have claimed for our countrymen was soon made manifest. Nineteen ships of the line were captured, two were first-rate vessels, none were under seventy-four guns. Four ships of the line were taken, in a subsequent action, by Sir Richard Strachan. Seven out of the vessels which escaped into Cadiz were rendered unserviceable. The whole combined fleet was almost totally destroyed.

It is twenty years and upwards since that glorious day. But the feelings of deep sorrow, mingled with those of exultation, with which we first heard the tidings of the battle of Trafalgar, still agitate our bosoms, as we record, that Nelson, the darling of Britain, bought with his life this last and decided triumph over his country's enemies. A Briton himself in every word and thought, the discharge of a sailor's duty, according to his idea, was a debt involving every feat which the most exalted bravery could perform, and every risk which the extremity of danger could present. The word to which he attached such an unlimited meaning, was often in his mouth; the idea never, we believe, absent from his mind. His last signal intimated that England

expected every man to do his *duty*. His first words on entering the action were, "I thank the great Disposer of events for this great opportunity of doing my *duty*;" and with his last departing breath, he was distinctly heard to repeat the same pious and patriotic sentiment, "I thank God I have done my *duty*.*" That *DUTY* was indeed performed, even to the utmost extent of his own comprehensive interpretation of the phrase. The good servant of his country slept not before his task was fulfilled; for, by the victory in which he fell, the naval force of the enemy was altogether destroyed, and the threat of invasion silenced for ever.

It is a remarkable coincidence, that Mack's surrender having taken place on the 20th October, Napoleon was probably entering Ulm in triumph upon the very day, when the united remains of his maritime force, and the means on which, according to his own subsequent account, he relied for the subjugation of England, were flying, striking, and sinking, before the banners of Nelson. What his feelings may have been on learning the news, we have no certain means of ascertaining. The Memoirs of Fouché say, upon the alleged authority of Rerthier, that his emotion was extreme, and that his first exclamation was, "I cannot be everywhere!" implying, certainly, that his own presence would have changed the scene. The same idea occurs in his conversations with Las Cases. It may be greatly doubted, however, whether Napoleon would have desired to have been on board the best ship in the French navy on that memorable occasion; and it seems pretty certain, that his being so could have had no influence whatever on the fate of the day. The unfortunate Villeneuve dared not trust to his master's forgiveness. "He ought," so Bonaparte states it, "to have been victorious, and he was defeated." For this, although the mishap which usually must attend one out of the two commanders who engage in action, Villeneuve felt there was no apology to be accepted, or even offered, and the brave but unfortunate seaman committed suicide. Bonaparte, on all occasions, spoke with disrespect of his memory; nor was it a sign of his judgment in nautical matters, that he preferred to this able, but unfortunate admiral, the gasconading braggart, Latouche Treville.†

* See, for these and other particulars of the battle of Trafalgar, Southey's *Life of Nelson*, a work already repeatedly quoted. It is the history of a hero, in the narrative of which are evinced at once the judgment and fidelity of the historian, with the imagination of the poet. It well deserves to be, what already it is, the text book of the British navy.

† This admiral commanded at Toulon in 1804, and having stolen out of harbour with a strong squadron, when the main body of the English fleet was out of sight, had the satisfaction to see three vessels, under Rear-Admiral Campbell, retreat before his superior force. This unusual circumstance so elated Monsieur Latouche Treville, that he converted the affair into a general pursuit of the whole British fleet, and of Nelson himself, who, he pretended fled before him. Nelson was so much nettled at his effrontery, that he wrote to his brother, "You will have seen Latouche's letter, how he chased me and how I run. I keep it, and if I take him, by God, he shall eat it." Latouche escaped this punishment by dying of the fatigue

The unfortunate event of the battle of Trafalgar was not permitted to darken the brilliant picture, which the extraordinary campaign of Ulm and Anstertitz enabled the victor to present to the empire which he governed, and which detailed his successes in the full-blown pride of conquest. "His armies," he said, addressing the Legislative Body, the session of which he opened with great pomp on 2d March, 1806, "had never ceased to conquer, until he commanded them to cease to combat. His enemies were humbled and confounded—the royal house of Naples had ceased to reign *for ever*—(the term was too comprehensive)—the entire peninsula of Italy now made a part of the Great Empire—his generosity had permitted the return of the defeated Russians to their own country, and had re-established the throne of Austria, after punishing her by the privation of a part of her dominions." Trafalgar was then touched upon. "A tempest," he said, "had deprived him of some few vessels, after a combat imprudently entered into;"—and thus he glossed over a calamitous and decisive defeat, in which so many of his hopes were shipwrecked.

When a sovereign has not sufficient greatness of mind to acknowledge his losses, we may, without doing him wrong, suspect him of exaggerating his successes. Those of France, in her external relations, were indeed scarcely capable of being overestimated. But when Monsieur de Champagny, on the 5th March following, made a relation of the internal improvements of France under the government of Bonaparte, he seems to have assumed the merit of those which only existed upon paper, and of others which were barely commenced, as well as of some that were completed. All was of course ascribed to the inspiring genius of the emperor, to whose agency France was indebted for all her prosperity. The credit of the good city of Paris was restored, and her revenue doubled—agriculture was encouraged, by the draining of immense morasses—mendicity was abolished. Beneficial results, apparently inconsistent with each other, were produced by his regulations—the expenses of legal proceedings were abridged, and the appointments of the judges were raised. Immense and most expensive improvements, which, in other countries, or rather under other sovereigns, are necessarily reserved for times of peace, were carried on by Napoleon during the most burdensome wars against entire Europe. Forty millions had been expended on public works, of which eight great canals were quoted with peculiar emphasis, as opening all the departments of the empire to the influence of internal navigation. To conclude, the emperor had established three hundred and seventy schools—had restored the rites of religion—reinforced public credit by supporting the Bank—reconciled jarring factions—diminished the public imposts—and ameliorated the condition of every existing Frenchman. To judge from the rapturous expressions of Monsieur de Champagny, the emperor was already the subject of deserved adoration; for he was walking so often up to the signal post at Sestet, to watch for the momentary absence of the blockading squadron, which he pretended dared not face him. This man Bonaparte considered as the boast of the French navy.

ration: it only remained to found temples and raise altars.

Much of this statement was unquestionably the exaggeration of flattery, which represented everything as commenced as soon as it had been resolved upon by the sovereign, everything finished as soon as it was begun. Other measures there were, which, like the support afforded to the Bank, merely repaired injuries which Napoleon himself had inflicted. The credit of this commercial establishment had been shaken, because in setting off for the campaign, Napoleon had stripped it of the reserve of specie laid up to answer demands; and it was restored, because his return with victory had enabled him to replace what he had borrowed. Considering that there was no small hazard of his being unable to remedy the evil which he had certainly occasioned, his conduct on the occasion scarcely deserves the name of a national benefit.

Some part of this exaggeration might even deceive Napoleon. It is one of the great disadvantages of despotism, that the sovereign himself is liable to be imposed upon by false representations of this nature; as it is said the Empress Catherine was flattered by the appearance of distant villages and towns in the desert places of her empire, which were, in fact, no more than painted representations of such objects, upon the plan of those that are exhibited on the stage, or are erected as points of view in some fantastic pleasure gardens. It was a part of Bonaparte's character to seize with ready precision upon general ideas of improvement. Wherever he came, he formed plans of important public works, many of which never existed but in the bulletin. Having issued his general orders, he was apt to hold them as executed. It was impossible to do all himself, or even to overlook with accuracy those to whom the details were committed. There were, therefore, many magnificent schemes commenced, under feelings of the moment, which were left unfinished for want of funds, or perhaps because they only regarded some points of local interest, and there were many adopted that were forgotten amid the hurry of affairs, or postponed till the moment of peace, which was never to appear during his reign.

But with the same frankness with which history is bound to censure the immeasurable ambition of this extraordinary man, she is bound also to record that his views towards the improvement of his empire were broad, clear-sighted, and public-spirited; and we think it probable, that, had his passion for war been a less predominant point of his character, his care, applied to the objects of peace, would have done as much for France, as Augustus did for Rome. Still it must be added, that, having bereft his country of her freedom, and proposing to transmit the empire, like his own patrimony, to his heirs, the evil which he had done to France was as permanent as his system of government, while the benefits which he had conferred on her, to whatever extent they might have been realized, must have been dependent upon his own life, and the character of his successor.

But as such reflections had not prevented Napoleon from raising the fabric of supreme power, to the summit of which he had ascended, so they did not

now prevent him from surrounding and strengthening it with such additional bulwarks as he could find materials for erecting, at the expense of the foes whom he subdued. Sensible of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of retaining all power in his own hands, he now bent himself so to modify and organize the governments of the countries adjacent, that they should always be dependent upon France; and to insure this point, he determined to vest immediate relations of his own with the supreme authority in those states, which, under the name of allies, were to pay to France the same homage in peace, and render her the same services in war, which ancient Rome exacted from the countries which she had subdued. Germany, Holland, and Italy, were each destined to furnish an appanage to the princes born of the Imperial blood of Napoleon, or connected with it by matrimonial alliances. In return for these benefits, Bonaparte was disposed to subject his brothers to the ordinary monarchical restrictions, which preclude princes nearly connected with the throne, from forming marriages according to their own private inclinations, and place them in this respect entirely at the devotion of the monarch, and destined to form such political alliances as may best suit his views. They belonged, he said, in the decree creating them, entirely to the country, and must therefore lay aside every sentiment of individual feeling, when the public weal required such a sacrifice.

Two of Napoleon's brothers resisted this species of authority. The services which Lucien had rendered him, upon the 18th Brumaire, although without his prompt assistance that daring adventure might have altogether failed, had not saved him from falling under the Imperial displeasure. It is said that he had disapproved of the destruction of the Republic, and that, in remonstrating against the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, he had dared to tell his brother, that such conduct would cause the people to cast himself and his kindred into the common sewer, as they had done the corpse of Marat. But Lucien's principal offence consisted in his refusing to part with his wife, a beautiful and affectionate woman, for the purpose of forming an alliance more suited to the views of Napoleon. He remained, therefore, long in a private situation, notwithstanding the talent and decision which he had evinced on many occasions during the Revolution, and was only restored to his brother's favour and countenance, when, after his return from Elba, his support became again of importance. Jérôme, the youngest brother of the family, incurred also for a time his brother's displeasure, by having formed a matrimonial connexion with an American lady of beauty and accomplishments. Complying with the commands of Napoleon, he was at a later period restored to his favour, but at present he too was in disgrace. Neither Lucien nor Jérôme were therefore mentioned in the species of entail, which, in default of Napoleon's naming his successor, destined the French empire to Joseph and Louis in succession; nor were the former called upon to partake in the splendid provisions, which, after the campaign of Austerlitz, Napoleon was enabled to make for the other members of his family.

Of these establishments, the most princely were the provinces of Holland, which Napoleon now converted into a kingdom, and conferred upon Louis Bonaparte. This transmutation of a republic, whose independence was merely nominal, into a kingdom, which was completely and absolutely subordinate, was effected by little more than an expression of the French Emperor's will that such an alteration should take place. The change was accomplished without attracting much attention; for the Batavian Republic was placed so absolutely at Bonaparte's mercy, as to have no power whatever to dispute his pleasure. They had followed the French Revolution through all its phases; and under their present constitution, a Grand Pensionary, who had the sole right of presenting new laws for adoption, and who was accountable to no one for the acts of his administration, corresponded to the first consul of the French consular government. This office-bearer was now to assume the name of King, as his prototype had done that of Emperor; but the king was to be chosen from the family of Bonaparte.

On the 18th March, 1806, the secretary of the Dutch legation at Paris arrived at the Hague, bearing a secret commission. The States-general were convoked—the Grand Pensionary was consulted—and finally, a deputation was sent to Paris, requesting that the Prince Louis Napoleon should be created hereditary King of Holland. Bonaparte's assent was graciously given, and the transaction was concluded.

It is indeed probable, that though the change was in every degree contradictory of their habits and opinions, the Dutch submitted to it as affording a prospect of a desirable relief from the disputes and factions which then divided their government. Louis Bonaparte was of a singularly amiable and gentle disposition. Besides his near relationship to Napoleon, he was married to Hortensia, the daughter of Joséphine, step-child of course to the emperor, and who was supposed to share a great proportion of his favour. The conquered States of Holland, no longer the High and Mighty, as they had been accustomed to style themselves, hoped, in adopting a monarch so nearly and intimately connected with Bonaparte, and received from his hand, that they might be permitted to enjoy the protection of France, and be secured against the subaltern oppression exercised over their commerce and their country. The acceptance of Louis as their king, they imagined, must establish for them a powerful protector in the councils of that autocrat, at whose disposal they were necessarily placed. Louis Bonaparte was therefore received as King of Holland. How far the prince and his subjects experienced fulfilment of the hopes which both naturally entertained, belongs to another page of this history.

Germany also was doomed to find more than one appanage for the Bonaparte family. The effect of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz had been almost entirely destructive of the influence which the house of Austria had so long possessed in the south-west districts of Germany. Stripped of her dominions in the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, as she had formerly been of the larger portion of the Netherlands, she was flung far back from that portion of

Germany bordering on the right of the Rhine, where she had formerly exercised so much authority, and often, it must be confessed, with no gentle hand.

Defeated and humbled, the Emperor of Austria was no longer able to offer any opposition to the projects of aggrandizement which Napoleon meditated in those confines of the empire which lay adjacent to the Rhine and to France, of which that river had been declared the boundary; nor indeed to his scheme of entirely new-modeling the empire itself.

Prussia, however, remained a party interested, and too formidable, from her numerous armies and high military reputation, to be despised by Napoleon. He was indeed greatly dissatisfied with her conduct during the campaign, and by no means inclined either to forget or to forgive the menacing attitude which the Court of Berlin had assumed, although finally determined by the course of events to abstain from actual hostility. Yet notwithstanding these causes of irritation, Napoleon still esteemed it more politic to purchase Prussia's acquiescence in his projects by a large sacrifice to her selfish interests, than to add her to the number of his avowed enemies. She was therefore to be largely propitiated at the expense of some other state.

We have already noticed the critical arrival of Haugwitz, the prime minister of Prussia, at Vienna, and how the declaration of war against France, with which he was charged, was exchanged for a friendly congratulation to Napoleon by the event of the battle of Austerlitz. Napoleon was no dupe to the versatility of the Prussian cabinet; but the Archduke Ferdinand had rallied a large army in Bohemia—his brother Charles was at the head of a yet larger in Hungary—Alexander, though defeated, refused to enter into any treaty, and retained a menacing attitude, and, victor as he was, Bonaparte could not wish to see the great and highly-esteemed military force of Prussia thrown into the scale against him. He entered, therefore, into a private treaty with Haugwitz, by which Prussia was to cede to France, or rather to place at her disposal, the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, and, by way of indemnification, was to have the countenance of France in occupying Hanover, from which the French troops had been withdrawn to join the Grand Army.

The conduct of the Prussian minister,—for with him, rather than with his court, the fault lay,—was at once mean-spirited and unprincipled. He made his country surrender to France that very territory which the French armies had so recently violated; and he accepted as an indemnification the provinces belonging to the King of Britain, with whom Prussia was so far from having any quarrel, that she had been on the point of making common cause with her against the aggressions of France; and which provinces had been seized by France in violation of the rights of neutrality claimed by the Elector of Hanover, as a member of the Germanic Body. Such gross and complicated violations of national law and justice have often carried with them their own punishment, nor did they fail to do so in the present instance.

These states, Anspach and Bareuth, were united to Bavaria; that kingdom was also aggrandized by

the Tyrol, at the expense of Austria; and it ceded the Grand Duchy of Berg, which, with other lordships, Napoleon erected into a Grand Duchy, and conferred as an appanage upon Joachim Murat. Originally a soldier of fortune, and an undaunted one, Murat had raised himself to eminence in the Italian campaigns. On the 18th Brumaire, he commanded the party which drove the Council of Five Hundred out of their hall. In reward for this service, he obtained the command of the Consular Guard, and the hand of Caroline, the sister of Napoleon. Murat was particularly distinguished as a cavalry officer; his handsome person, accomplished horsemanship, and daring bravery at the head of his squadrons, procured him the title of *le beau sabreur*. Out of the field of battle he was but a weak man, liable to be duped by his own vanity, and the flattery of those around him. He affected a theatrical foppiness in dress, which rather evinced a fantastic love of finery than good taste; and hence he was sometimes called King Franconi, from the celebrated mountebank of that name. His wife Caroline was an able woman, and well versed in political intrigue. It will presently be found that they arose to higher fortunes than the Grand Duchy of Berg. Meantime, Murat was invested with the hereditary dignity of Grand Admiral of France; for it was the policy of Bonaparte to maintain the attachment of the new princes to the Great Nation, were it but by wearing some string or tassel of his own imperial livery.

The fair territories of Naples and Sicily were conferred upon Joseph, the former in possession, the latter in prospect. He was a good man, who often strove to moderate the fits of violence to which his brother gave way. In society, he was accomplished and amiable, fond of letters, and, though not possessed of anything approaching his brother's high qualifications, had yet good judgment as well as good inclinations. Had he continued King of Naples, it is probable he might have been as fortunate as Louis, in conciliating the respect of his subjects; but his transference to Spain was fatal to his reputation. In conformity with the policy which we have noticed, the King of Naples was to continue a high feudatory of the empire, under the title of the Vice-Grand Elector.

The principality of Lucca had been already conferred on Elisa, the eldest sister of Bonaparte, and was now augmented by the districts of Massa-Carrara and Gafagnana. She was a woman of a strong and masculine character, which did not, however, prevent her giving way to the feminine weakness of encouraging admirers, who, it is said, did not sigh in vain.

The public opinion was still less favourable to her younger sister Pauline, who was one of the most beautiful women in France, and perhaps in Europe. Leclerc, her first husband, died in the fatal expedition to St Domingo, and she was afterwards married to the Prince Borghese. Her encouragement of the fine arts was so little limited by the ordinary ideas of decorum, that the celebrated Canova was permitted to model from her person a naked Venus, the most beautiful, it is said, of his works.* Scandal went the horrible length of im-

* It is said, that being asked by a lady how she could

puting to Pauline an intrigue with her own brother; which we willingly reject as a crime too hideous to be even mentioned, far less imputed to any one, without the most satisfactory evidence. The gross and guilty enormities practised by the ancient Roman emperors do not belong to the character of Bonaparte, though such foul aspersions have been cast upon him by those who were willing to represent him as in all respects the counterpart of Tiberius or Caligula. Pauline Borghese received the principality of Guastalla, in the distribution of honours among the family of Napoleon.

At this period, also, Bonaparte began first to display a desire of engrafting his own family upon the ancient dynasties of Europe, with whom he had been so long at war, and the ruin of most of whom had contributed to his elevation. The Elector of Bavaria had to repay the patronage which raised him to the rank of king, and enlarged his territories with the fine country of the Tyrol, by forming an alliance which should mix his ancient blood with that of the family connexions of the fortunate soldier. Eugène Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, the son of Joséphine by her first husband, and now the adopted son of Napoleon, was wedded to the eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria. Eugène was deservedly favoured by his father-in-law, Napoleon. He was a man of talents, probity, and honour, and displayed great military skill, particularly during the Russian campaign of 1812. Stéphanie Beauharnais, the niece of Joséphine, was married about the same time to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, son to the reigning duke, the neutrality of whose territories had been violated in the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien.

These various kingdoms and principalities, erected in favour of his nearest relations, imposed on the mind a most impressive image of Bonaparte's unlimited authority, who distributed crowns among his kins-folks as ordinary men give vails to their domestics. But the sound policy of his conduct may be greatly doubted. We have elsewhere stated the obvious objections to the transference of cities and kingdoms from hand to hand, with as little ceremony as the circulation of a commercial bill payable to the holder. Authority is a plant of a slow growth, and to obtain the full veneration which renders it most effectual, must have risen by degrees in the place which it overshadows and protects. Suddenly transferred to new regions, it is apt to pine and to perish. The theoretical evils of a long-established government are generally mitigated by some practical remedy, or those who suffer by them have grown callous from habit. The reverse is the case with a newly-established domination, which has no claim to the veneration due to antiquity, and to which the subjects are not attached by the strong though invisible chains of long habit.

Fox, in his own nervous language, has left his protest against the principle adopted at this time in Europe, of transferring the subjects of one prince

to another by way of equivalents, and under the pretext of general arrangement. "The wildest schemes," he remarked, "that were ever before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established government, as this new practice. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no government could exist. The system, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation."

These observations apply generally to violent alterations upon the European system; but other and more special objections arise to Bonaparte's system of erecting thrones in Holland, in Naples, and all through Europe, for the members of his own family. It was particularly impolitic, as marking too strongly his determination to be satisfied with nothing less than the dominion of the world; for while he governed France in his own person, the disposing of other countries to his brothers and near relations, feudatories of France, and his dependents as well by blood as by allegiance, what else could be expected than that the independence of such kingdoms must be merely nominal, and their monarchs bound to act in every respect as the agents of Bonaparte's pleasure? This, indeed, was their most sacred duty, according to his own view of the matter, and he dilated upon it to Las Cases while at St Helena. The following passage contains an express avowal of the principles on which he desired and expected his brothers to regulate the governments intrusted to them:—

"At another time the emperor recurred to the subject of his relations, the little aid he had received from them, the embarrassment and mischief which they had caused him. He dwelt especially on that false idea upon their part, that when once placed at the head of a state, they ought to identify themselves with it to such an extent, as to prefer its interests to those of the common country. He agreed, that the source of this sentiment might be in some degree honourable, but contended that they made a false and hurtful application of it, when, in their whims of absolute independence, they considered themselves as in an isolated posture, not observing that they made only parts of a great system, the movements of which it was their business to aid, and not to thwart."*

This is explaining in few words the principle on which Napoleon established these subsidiary monarchies, which was not for the benefit of the people of whom they were respectively composed, but for the service of France; or more properly of himself, the sole moving principle by which France was governed. In devolving the crown of Holland on the son of Louis, after the abdication of Louis, he repeats the same principle as a fundamental condition of its tenure. "Never forget," he said, "that in the situation to which my political system, and the interest of my empire have called you, your first duty is towards ME, your second towards France. All your other duties, even those towards the people whom I have called you to govern, rank after these."

* *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. VII, pp. 194-5.

submit to such an exposure of her person, she conceived that the question only related to physical inconvenience, and answered it by assuring her friend that the apartment was properly aired.

When Napoleon censures his delegate princes for preferring the interest of the kingdoms which he had assigned them, instead of sacrificing it to him and his government, he degrades them into mere puppets, which might indeed bear regal titles and attendance, but, entirely dependent on the will of another, had no choice save to second the views of an ambition, the most insatiable certainly that ever reigned in a human breast.

This secret did not remain concealed from the Dutch, from the Neapolitans, or other foreigners, subjected to these pageant monarchs; and as it naturally incensed them against Napoleon's government, so it prevented the authority which he had delegated from obtaining either affection or reverence, and disposed the nations who were subjected to it to take the first opportunity of casting the yoke aside.

The erection of these kindred monarchies was not the only mode by which Napoleon endeavoured to maintain an ascendancy in the countries which he had conquered, and which he desired to retain in dependence upon France, though not nominally or directly making parts of the French empire. Bonaparte had already proposed to his council the question, whether the creation of Grapdees of the Empire, a species of nobility whose titles were to depend, not on their descent, but on their talents and services to the state, was to be considered as a violation of the laws of liberty and equality. He was universally answered in the negative; for, having now acquired a hereditary monarch, it seemed a natural, if not an indispensable consequence, that France should have peers of the kingdom, and great officers of the crown. Such an establishment, according to Bonaparte's view, would at once place his dignity on the same footing with those of the other courts of Europe (an assimilation to which he attached a greater degree of consequence than was consistent with policy), and by blending the new nobles of the empire with those of the ancient kingly government, would tend to reconcile the modern state of things with such relics of the old court as yet existed.

From respect, perhaps, to the republican opinions which had so long predominated, the titles and appanages of these grand feudatories were not chosen within the bounds of France herself, but from provinces which had experienced the sword of the ruler. Fifteen dukedoms, grand fiefs, not of France, but of the French empire, which extended far beyond France itself, were created by the fiat of the emperor. The income attached to each amounted to the fifteenth part of the revenue of the province which gave title to the dignitary. The emperor invested with these endowments those who had best served him in war and in state affairs. Princedoms also were erected, and while marshals and ministers were created dukes, the superior rank of prince was bestowed on Talleyrand, Bernadotte, and Berthier, by the titles of Braventum, Ponte-Corvo, and Neuchâtel.

The transformation of republican generals and ancient jacobins into the peerage of a monarchical government, gave a species of incongruity to this splendid masquerade, and more than one of the

personages showed not a little awkwardness in supporting their new titles. It is true, the high degree of talent annexed to some of the individuals thus promoted, the dread inspired by others, and the fame in war which many had acquired, might bear them out against the ridicule which was unsparingly heaped upon them in the saloons frequented by the ancient noblesse; but, whatever claims these dignitaries had to the respect of the public, had been long theirs, and received no accession from their new honours and titles.

In this, and on similar occasions, Napoleon over-shot his aim, and diminished to a certain extent his reputation, by seeming to set a value upon honours, titles, and ceremonies, which, if matters of importance to other courts, were certainly not such as he ought to have rested his dignity upon. Ceremonial is the natural element of a long-established court, and etiquette and title are the idols which are worshiped there. But Bonaparte reigned by his talents and his sword. Like Mezentius in the *Æneid*, he ought to have acknowledged no other source of his authority.* It was imprudent to appear to attach consequence to points, which even his otherwise almost boundless power could not attain, since his nobility and his court-ceremonial must still retain the rawness of novelty, and could no more possess that value, which, whether real or imaginary, has been generally attached to ancient institutions and long descent, than the emperor could, by a decree of his complaisant Senate, have given his modern coinage the value which antiquaries attach to ancient medals. It was imprudent to descend to a strife in which he must necessarily be overcome; for where power rests in a great measure on public opinion, it is diminished in proportion to its failure in objects aimed at, whether of greater or less consequence. This half-feudal, half-oriental establishment of grand feudatories, with which Bonaparte now began to decorate the structure of his power, may be compared to the heavy Gothic devices with which modern architects sometimes overlay the front of their buildings, where they always encumber what they cannot ornament, and sometimes overload what they are designed to support.

The system of the new noblesse was settled by an imperial edict of Napoleon himself, which was communicated to the Senate 30th March, 1806, not for the purpose of deliberation or acceptance, but merely that, like the old Parliament of Paris, they might enter it upon their register.

The court of Bonaparte now assumed a character of the strictest etiquette, in which these important trifles, called by a writer on the subject the "Superstitions of Gentlemen Ushers," were treated as matters of serious import, and sometimes occupied the thoughts of Napoleon himself, and supplied the place of meditated conquest, and the future destruction or erection of kingdoms.

The possessors of ancient titles, tempted by revival of the respect paid to birth and rank, did not

* *Dextra mihi deus, et telum, quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint—*

Æneidos Lib. X.

fail to mingle with those whose nobility rested on the new creation. The emperor distinguished these ancient minions of royalty with considerable favour, as, half-blushing for their own apostasy in doing homage to Bonaparte in the palace of the Bourbons, half-sneering at the maladroit and awkward manners of their new associates, they mingled among the men of new descent, and paid homage to the monarch of the day, "because," as one of them expressed himself to Madame de Staël, "one must serve some one or other." Bonaparte encouraged these nobles of the ancient ante-chambers, whose superior manners seemed to introduce among his courtiers some traits of the former court, so inimitable for grace and for address, and also because he liked to rank among his retainers, so far as he could, the inheritors of those superb names which ornamented the history of France in former ages. But then he desired to make them exclusively his own; nothing less than complete and uncompromising conversion to his government would give satisfaction. A baron of the old noblesse, who had become a counsellor of state, was in 1810 summoned to attend the emperor at Fontainebleau.

"What would you do," said the emperor, "should you learn that the Count de Lille was this instant at Paris?"

"I would inform against him, and have him arrested," said the candidate for favour; "the law commands it."

"And what would you do if appointed a judge on his trial?" demanded the emperor again.

"I would condemn him to death," said the unhesitating noble; "the law denounces him."

"With such sentiments you deserve a prefecture," said the emperor; and the catechumen, whose respect for the law was thus absolute, was made Prefect of Paris.

Such converts were searched for, and, when found, were honoured, and rewarded, and trusted. For the power of recompensing his soldiers, statesmen, and adherents, the conquered countries were again the emperor's resource. National domains were reserved to a large amount throughout those countries, and formed funds, out of which gratifications and annuities were, at Napoleon's sole pleasure, assigned to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the French army; who might in this way be said to have all Europe for their paymaster. Thus every conquest increased his means of rewarding his soldiers; and that army, which was the most formidable instrument of his ambition, was encouraged and maintained at the expense of those states which had suffered most from his arms.

We have not yet concluded the important changes introduced into Europe by the consequences of the fatal campaign of Austerlitz. The Confederation of the Rhine, which withdrew from the German empire so large a portion of its princes, and, transferring them from the influence of Austria, placed them directly and avowedly under the protection of France, was an event which tended directly to the dissolution of the Germanic League, which had subsisted since the year 800, when Charlemagne received the Imperial Crown from Pope Leo the Third.

By the new Federation of the Rhine, the courts of Württemberg and Bavaria, of Hesse Darmstadt, with some petty princes of the right bank of the Rhine, formed among themselves an alliance offensive and defensive, and renounced their dependence upon the Germanic Body, of which they declared they no longer recognized the constitution. The reasons assigned for this league had considerable weight. It was urged that the countries governed by these princes were, in every case of war betwixt France and Austria, exposed to all the evils of invasion, from which the Germanic Body had no longer power to defend them. Therefore, being obliged to seek for more effectual protection from so great an evil, they placed themselves directly under the guardianship of France. Napoleon, on his part, did not hesitate to accept the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. It is true, that he had engaged to his subjects that he would not extend the limits of his empire beyond that river, which he acknowledged as the natural boundary of France; but this engagement was not held to exclude the sort of seigniorie attached to the new protectorate, in virtue of which he plunged the German states who composed the confederacy into every war in which France herself engaged, and at pleasure carried their armies against other German states, their brethren in language and manners, or transferred them to more distant climates, to wage wars in which they had no interest, and to which they had received no provocation. It was also a natural consequence, that a number of inferior members of the empire, who had small tenures under the old constitutions, having no means of defence excepting their ancient rights, were abolished in their capacity of imperial feudatories, and reduced from petty sovereigns to the condition of private nobles. This, though certainly unjust in the abstract principle, was not in practice an inconvenient result of the great change introduced.

The military contingents, which the Confederation placed, not perhaps in words, but certainly in fact, at the disposal of their protector, not less than sixty thousand men, were of a character and in a state of military organization very superior to those which they had formerly furnished to the Germanic Body. These last, much fewer in number, were seldom in a complete state of equipment, and were generally very inferior in discipline. But Napoleon not only exacted that the contingents furnished under this new federation should be complete in numbers, and perfect in discipline and appointments, but, imparting to them, and to their officers, a spark of his own military ardour, he inspired them with a spirit of bravery and confidence which they had been far from exhibiting when in the opposite ranks. No troops in his army behaved better than those of the Confederacy of the Rhine. But the strength which the system afforded to Napoleon was only temporary, and depended on the continuance of the power by which it was created. It was too arbitrary, too artificial, and too much opposed both to the interests and national prejudices of the Germans, not to bear within it the seeds of dissolution. When the tide of fortune turned against Bonaparte after the battle of Leipzig, Bavaria hastened to join the allies for the

purpose of completing his destruction, and the example was followed by all the other princes of the Rhine. It fared with Napoleon and the German Confederation, as with a necromancer and the demon whom for a certain term he has bound to his service, and who obeys him with fidelity during the currency of the obligation; but, when that is expired, is the first to tear his employer to pieces.

Francis of Austria, seeing the empire, of which his house had been so long the head, going to pieces like a parting wreck, had no other resource than to lay aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, and to declare that league dissolved which he now saw no sufficient means of enforcing. He declared the ties dissevered which bound the various princes to him as emperor, to each other as allies; and although he reserved the Imperial title, it was only as the sovereign of Austria, and his other hereditary states.

France became therefore in a great measure the successor to the influence and dignity of the Holy Roman Empire, as that of Germany had been proudly styled for a thousand years; and the Empire of Napoleon gained a still nearer resemblance to that of Charlemagne. At least France succeeded to the Imperial influence exercised by Austria and her empire over all the south-western provinces of that powerful district of Europe. In the eastern districts, Austria, stunned by her misfortunes and her defeats, was passive and unresisting. Prussia, in the north of Germany, was halting between two very opposite sets of counsellors; one of which, with too much confidence in the military resources of the country, advised war with France, for which the favourable opportunity had been permitted to escape; while the other recommended, that, like the jackall in the train of the lion, Prussia should continue to avail herself of the spoils which Napoleon might permit her to seize upon, without presuming to place herself in opposition to his will. In either case, the course recommended was sufficiently perilous; but to vacillate, as the cabinet of Berlin did, betwixt the one and the other, inferred almost certain ruin.

While Napoleon thus reveled in augmented strength, and increased honours, Providence put it once more, and for the last time, in his power, to consolidate his immense empire by a general peace, maritime as well as upon the Continent.

CHAPTER LII

Death of Pitt.—He is succeeded by Fox as prime minister.

—Circumstances which led to Negotiation with France.

—The Earl of Lauderdale is sent to Paris as the British negotiator.—Negotiation is broken off in consequence

of the refusal of England to cede Sicily to France, and

Lord Lauderdale leaves Paris.—Reasonings on the stability

of peace, had peace been obtained.—Prussia—her

temporizing policy.—She takes alarm.—An attempt made

by her to form a confederacy in opposition to that of

the Rhine, is defeated by the machinations of Napoleon.

—Strong and general disposition of the Prussians to

war.—Legal murder of Palm, a bookseller, by authority

of Bonaparte, aggravates this feeling.—The Emperor

Alexander again visits Berlin.—Prussia begins to

arm in August, 1806, and, after some negotiation, takes

the field in October, under the Duke of Brunswick.—

Impolicy of the plans of the campaign.—Details.—Action fought, and lost by the Prussians, at Saalfeld.—Followed by the decisive defeat of Auerstadt, or Jena, on the 14th October.—Particulars of the battle.—Duke of Brunswick mortally wounded.—Consequences of this total defeat.—All the strong places in Prussia given up without resistance.—Bonaparte takes possession of Berlin on the 24th.—Explanation of the different situations of Austria and Prussia after their several defeats.—Reflections on the fall of Prussia.

THE death of William Pitt was accelerated by the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz, as his health had been previously injured by the defeat of Marengo. Great as he was as a statesman, ardent in patriotism, and comprehensive in his political views, it had been too much the habit of that great minister to trust, for some re-establishment of the balance of power on the Continent, to the exertions of the ancient European governments, whose efforts had gradually become fainter and fainter, and their spirits more and more depressed, when opposed to the power of Bonaparte, whose blows, like the thunderbolt, seemed to inflict inevitable ruin wherever they burst. But, while resting too much hope on coalitions, placing too much confidence in foreign armies, and too little considering, perhaps, what might have been achieved by our own, had sufficient numbers been employed on adequate objects, Pitt maintained with unabated zeal the great principle of resistance to France, unless France should be disposed to show, that, satisfied with the immense power which she possessed, her emperor was willing to leave to the rest of Europe such precarious independence, as his victorious arms had not yet bereft them of.

The British prime minister was succeeded, upon his death, by the statesman to whom, in life, he had waged the most uniform opposition. Charles Fox, now at the head of the British government, had uniformly professed to believe it possible to effect a solid and lasting peace with France, and, in the ardour of debate, had repeatedly thrown on his great adversary the blame that such had not been accomplished. When he himself became possessed of the supreme power of administration, he was naturally disposed to realize his predictions; if Napoleon should be found disposed to admit a treaty upon anything like equal terms. In a visit to Paris during the peace of Amiens, Mr Fox had been received with great distinction by Napoleon. The private relations betwixt them were therefore of an amicable nature, and gave an opening for friendly intercourse.

The time, too, appeared favourable for negotiation; for whatever advantages had been derived by France from her late triumphant campaign on the Continent were, so far as Britain was concerned, neutralized and offset by the destruction of the combined fleets. All possibility of invasion, which appears before this event to have warmly engrossed the imagination of Napoleon, seemed at an end and for ever. The delusion which represented a united navy of fifty sail of the line triumphantly occupying the British Channel, and escorting an overpowering force to the shores of England, was dispelled by the cannon of 21st October. The gay

dreams, which painted a victorious army marching to London, reforming the state of England by the destruction of her aristocracy, and reducing her to her natural condition, as Napoleon termed it, of such a dependency on France as the island of Oléron or of Corsica, were gone. After the battle of Trafalgar, all hopes were extinguished that the fair provinces of England could in any possible event have been cut up into new fiefs of the French empire. It was no longer to be dreamed, that *Dotations*, as they were termed, might be formed upon the royal exchange for the payment of annuities by hundreds of thousands, and by millions, for rewarding the soldiers of the Great Nation. To work purses for the French officers, that they might be filled with British gold, had of late been a favourite amusement among the fair ladies of France; but it was now evident that they had laboured in vain. All these hopes and projects were swallowed up in the billows which entombed the wrecks of Trafalgar.

In a word, if Austria had fallen in the contest of 1805, Britain stood more pre-eminent than ever; and it might have been rationally expected, that the desire of war on the part of Napoleon should have ended, when every prospect of bringing that war to the conclusive and triumphant termination which he meditated, had totally disappeared. The views of the British cabinet, also, we have said, were now amicable, and an incident occurred for opening a negotiation, under circumstances which seemed to warrant the good faith of the English ministers.

A person pretending to be an adherent of the Bourbons, but afterwards pretty well understood to be an agent of the French government, acting upon the paltry system of espionage which had infected both their internal and exterior relations, obtained an audience of Mr Fox, for the purpose, as he pretended, of communicating to the British minister a proposal for the assassination of Bonaparte. It had happened, that Mr Fox, in conversation with Napoleon, while at Paris, had indignantly repelled a charge of this kind, which the latter brought against some of the English ministry. "Clear your head of that nonsense," was said to be his answer, with more of English bluntness than of French politeness. Perhaps Bonaparte was desirous of knowing whether his practice would keep pace with his principles, and on this principle had encouraged the spy. Fox, as was to be expected, not only repelled with abhorrence the idea suggested by this French agent, but caused it to be communicated to the French Emperor; and this gave rise to a negotiation for peace. Lord Yarmouth, and afterwards Lord Lauderdale, acted for the British government; Champagny and General Clarke for the Emperor of France. Napoleon, who, like most foreigners, had but an inaccurate idea of the internal structure of the British constitution, had expected to find a French party in the bosom of England, and was surprised to find that a few miscreants of the lowest rank, whom he had been able to bribe, were the only English who were accessible to foreign influence; and that the party which had opposed the war with France in all its stages were nevertheless incapable of desiring to

see it cease on such terms as were dishonourable to the country.

The French commissioners made several concessions, and even intimated, in verbal conference with Lord Yarmouth, that they would be content to treat upon the principle of *uti possidetis*, that is, of allowing each party to retain such advantages as she had been able to gain by her arms during the war. But when the treaty was farther advanced, the French negotiators resisted this rule, and showed themselves disposed to deny that they had ever assented to it.

They were indeed willing to resign a long-contested point, and consented that the island of Malta, with the Cape of Good Hope, and other possessions in the East and West Indies, should remain under the dominion of Great Britain. But then they exacted the surrender of Sicily and Naples, proposing that Ferdinand should be indemnified at the expence of Spain by the cession of the Balearic Isles. Britain could not implicitly consent to this last proposition, either in policy, or in justice to her unfortunate ally. Naples was indeed occupied by the French, and had received Joseph Bonaparte as her king; but the insular situation of Sicily rendered it easy for Britain to protect that rich island, which was still in the possession of its legitimate monarch. The principle of *uti possidetis* was therefore in favour of the English, so far as Sicily was concerned, as it was in that of the French in the case of Naples. The English envoy, for this reason, refused an ultimatum, in which the cession of Sicily was made an indispensable article. Lord Lauderdale, at the same time, demanded his passports, which, however, he did not receive for several days, as if there had been some hopes of renewing the treaty.

Bonaparte was put to considerable inconvenience by the shrewdness and tenacity of the noble negotiator, and had not forgotten them when, in 1815, he found himself on board the Bellerophon, commanded by a relation of the noble earl. It is indeed probable, that had Mr Fox lived, the negotiation might have been renewed. That eminent statesman, then in his last illness, was desirous to accomplish two great objects—peace with France, and the abolition of the slave trade. But although Bonaparte's deference for Fox might have induced him to concede some of the points in dispute, and although the British statesman's desire of peace might have made him relinquish others on the part of England, still, while the two nations retained their relative power and positions, the deep jealousy and mutual animosity which subsisted between them would probably have rendered any peace which could have been made, a mere suspension of arms—a hollow and insincere truce, which was almost certain to give way on the slightest occasion. Britain could never have seen with indifference Bonaparte making one stride after another towards universal dominion; and Bonaparte could not long have borne with patience the neighbourhood of our free institutions and our free press; the former of which must have perpetually reminded the French of the liberty they had lost, while the latter was sure to make the emperor, his government, and his policy, the daily subject of the most severe and unsparring

criticism. Even the war with Prussia and Russia, in which Napoleon was soon afterwards engaged, would in all probability have renewed the hostilities between France and England, supposing them to have been terminated for a season by a temporary peace. Yet Napoleon always spoke of the death of Fox as one of the fatalities on which his great designs were shipwrecked; which makes it the more surprising that he did not resume intercourse with the administration formed under his auspices, and who might have been supposed to be animated by his principles even after his decease. That he did not do so may be fairly received in evidence to show, that peace, unless on terms which he could dictate, was not desired by him.

As the conduct of Prussia had been fickle and versatile during the campaign of Austerlitz, the displeasure of Napoleon was excited in proportion against her. She had, it is true, wrenched from him an unwilling acquiescence in her views upon Hanover. By the treaty which Haugwitz had signed at Vienna, after the battle of Austerlitz, it was agreed that Prussia should receive the electoral dominions of the King of England, his ally, instead of Anspach, Bareuth, and Neufchâtel, which she was to cede to France. The far superior value of Hanover was to be considered as a boon to Prussia, in guerdon of her neutrality. But Napoleon did not forgive the hostile disposition which Prussia had manifested, and it is probable he waited with anxiety for the opportunity of inflicting upon her condign chastisement. He continued to maintain a large army in Swabia and Franconia, and, by introducing troops into Westphalia, intimated, not obscurely, an approaching rupture with his ally. Meantime, under the influence of conflicting councils, Prussia proceeded in a course of politics which rendered her odious for her rapacity, and contemptible for the short-sighted views under which she indulged it.

It was no matter of difficulty for the Prussian forces to take possession of Hanover, which, when evacuated by Bernadotte and his army, lay a prey to the first invader, with the exception of the fortress of Hameln, still occupied by a French garrison. The electorate, the hereditary dominions of the King of Great Britain, with whom Prussia was at profound peace, was accordingly seized upon, and her cabinet pretended to justify that usurpation by alleging, that Hanover, having been transferred to France by the rights of war, had been ceded to the Prussian government in exchange for other districts. At the same time, an order of the Prussian monarch shut his ports in the Baltic against the admission of British vessels. These measures, taken together, were looked upon by England as intimating determined and avowed hostility; and Fox described, in the House of Commons, the conduct of Prussia, as a compound of the most hateful rapacity with the most contemptible servility. War was accordingly declared against her by Great Britain; and her flag being banished from the ocean by the English cruisers, the mouth of the Elbe and the Prussian seaports were declared in a state of blockade, and her trade was subjected to a corresponding degree of distress.

Meantime, it was the fate of Prussia to find, that

she held by a very insecure tenure that very electorate, the price of her neutrality at Austerlitz, and which was farther purchased at the expense of war with England. Her ministers, while pressing France to confirm the cession of Hanover, had the mortification to discover that Napoleon, far from regarding the Prussian right in it as indefeasible, was in fact negotiating for a general peace, upon the condition, amongst others, that the electorate should be restored to the King of England, its hereditary sovereign. While the disclosure of this double game showed Frederick William upon what insecure footing he held the premium assigned to Prussia by the treaty of Vienna, farther discovery of the projects of France seemed to impel him to change the pacific line of his policy.

Hitherto the victories of Napoleon had had for their chief consequences the depression of Austria, and the diminution of that power which was the natural and ancient rival of the house of Brandenburg. But now, when Austria was thrust back to the eastward, and deprived of her influence in the south-west of Germany, Prussia saw with just alarm that France was assuming that influence herself, and that, unless opposed, she was likely to become as powerful in the north of Germany, as she had rendered herself in the south-western circles. Above all, Prussia was alarmed at the Confederacy of the Rhine, an association which placed under the direct influence of France so large a proportion of what had been lately component parts of the Germanic Empire. The dissolution of the Germanic Empire itself was an event no less surprising and embarrassing; for, besides all the other important points, in which the position of Prussia was altered by the annihilation of that ancient confederacy, she lost thereby the prospect of her own monarch being, upon the decline of Austria, chosen to wear the imperial crown, as the most powerful member of the federation.

One way remained to balance the new species of power which France had acquired by these innovations on the state of Europe. It was possible, by forming the northern princes of the German empire into a league of the same character with the Confederacy of the Rhine, having Prussia instead of France for its protector, to create such an equilibrium as might render it difficult or dangerous for Bonaparte to use his means, however greatly enlarged, to disturb the peace of the north of Europe. It was, therefore, determined in the Prussian cabinet to form a league on this principle.

This proposed Northern Confederacy, however, could not well be established without communication with France; and Bonaparte, though offering no direct opposition to the formation of a league, sanctioned by the example of the Rhine, started such obstacles to the project in detail, as were likely to render its establishment on an effectual footing impossible. It was said by his ministers, that Napoleon was to take the Hanseatic towns under his own immediate protection; that the wise prince who governed Saxony showed no desire to become a member of the proposed confederacy; and that France would permit no power to be forced into such a measure. Finally, the Landgrave of Hesse-

Cassel, who was naturally reckoned upon as an important member of the proposed northern league, was tampered with to prevail upon him to join the Confederacy of the Rhine, instead of that which was proposed to be formed under the protectorate of Prussia. This prince, afraid to decide which of these powerful nations he should adhere to, remained in a state of neutrality, notwithstanding the offers of France; and, by doing so, incurred the displeasure of Napoleon, from which in the sequel he suffered severely.

By this partial interruption and opposition, Napoleon rendered it impossible for Prussia to make any effectual efforts for combining together those remaining fragments of the German empire, over which her military power and geographical position gave her natural influence. This disappointment, with the sense of having been outwitted by the French government, excited feelings of chagrin and resentment in the Prussian cabinet, which corresponded with the sentiments expressed by the nation at large. In the former, the predominant feeling was, despite for disappointed hopes, and a desire of revenge on the sovereign and state by whom they had been overreached; in the latter, there prevailed a keen and honourable sense that Prussia had lost her character through the truckling policy of her administration.

Whatever reluctance the cabinet of Berlin had shown to enter into hostilities with France, the court and country never appear to have shared that sensation. The former was under the influence of the young, beautiful, and high-spirited queen, and of Louis of Prussia, a prince who felt with impatience the decaying importance of that kingdom, which the victories of the Great Frederick had raised to such a pitch of glory. These were surrounded by a numerous band of noble youths, impatient for war, as the means of emulating the fame of their fathers; but ignorant how little likely were even the powerful and well-disciplined forces of Frederick, unless directed by his genius, to succeed in opposition to troops not inferior to themselves, and conducted by a leader who had long appeared to chain victory to his chariot wheels. The sentiments of the young Prussian noblesse were sufficiently indicated, by their going to sharpen their sabres on the threshold of La Forêt, the ambassador of Napoleon, and the wilder frolic of breaking the windows of the ministers supposed to be in the French interest. The queen appeared frequently in the uniform of the regiment which bore her name, and sometimes rode herself at their head, to give enthusiasm to the soldiery. This was soon excited to the highest pitch; and had the military talents of the Prussian generals borne any correspondence to the gallantry of the officers and soldiers, an issue to the campaign might have been expected far different from that which took place. The manner in which the characters of the queen, the king, and Prince Louis were treated in the *Moniteur*, tended still more to exasperate the quarrel; for Napoleon's studious and cautious exclusion from the government paper of such political articles as had not his own previous approbation, rendered him in reason accountable for all which appeared there.

The people of Prussia at large were clamorous for war. They, too, were sensible that the late versatile conduct of their cabinet had exposed them to the censure, and even the scorn of Europe; and that Bonaparte, seeing the crisis ended, in which the firmness of Prussia might have preserved the balance of Europe, retained no longer any respect for those whom he had made his dupes, but treated with total disregard the remonstrances, which, before the advantages obtained at Ulm and Austerlitz, he must have listened to with respect and deference.

Another circumstance of a very exasperating character took place at this time. One Palm, a bookseller at Nuremberg, had exposed to sale a pamphlet, containing remarks on the conduct of Napoleon, in which the emperor and his policy were treated with considerable severity. The bookseller was seized upon for this offence by the French gendarmes, and transferred to Braunau, where he was brought before a military commission, tried for a libel on the Emperor of France, found guilty, and shot to death in terms of his sentence. The murder of this poor man, for such it literally was, whether immediately flowing from Bonaparte's mandate, or the effect of the furious zeal of some of his officers, excited deep and general indignation.

The constitution of many of the states in Germany is despotic; but nevertheless, the number of independent principalities, and the privileges of the free towns, have always insured to the nation at large the blessings of a free press, which, much addicted as they are to literature, the Germans value as it deserves. The cruel effort now made to fetter this unshackled expression of opinion was, of course, most unfavourable to his authority by whom it had been commanded. The thousand presses of Germany continued on every possible opportunity to dwell on the fate of Palm; and, at the distance of six or seven years from his death, it might be reckoned among the leading causes which ultimately determined the popular opinion against Napoleon. It had not less effect at the time when the crime was committed; and the eyes of all Germany were turned upon Prussia, as the only member of the late Holy Roman League by whom the progress of the public enemy of the liberties of Europe could be arrested in its course.

Amidst the general ferment of the public mind, Alexander once more appeared in person at the court of Berlin, and, more successful than on the former occasion, prevailed on the King of Prussia at length to unsheathe the sword. The support of the powerful hosts of Russia was promised; and, defeated by the fatal field of Austerlitz in his attempt to preserve the south-east of Germany from French influence, Alexander now stood forth to assist Prussia as the Champion of the North. An attempt had indeed been made through means of d'Oubril, a Russian envoy at Paris, to obtain a general peace for Europe, in concurrence with that which Lord Landerdale was endeavouring to negotiate on the part of Britain; but the treaty entirely miscarried.

While Prussia thus declared herself the enemy of France, it seemed to follow as a matter of course, that she should become once more the friend of Britain, and, indeed, that power lost no time in

manifesting an amicable disposition on her part, by recalling the order which blockaded the Prussian ports, and annihilated her commerce. But the cabinet of Berlin evinced, in the moment when about to commence hostilities, the same selfish insincerity which had dictated all their previous conduct. While sufficiently desirous of obtaining British money to maintain the approaching war, they showed great reluctance to part with Hanover, an acquisition made in a manner so unworthy; and the Prussian minister, Lucchesini, did not hesitate to tell the British ambassador, Lord Morpeth, that the fate of the electorate would depend upon the event of arms.

Little good could be argued from the interposition of a power, who, pretending to arm in behalf of the rights of nations, refused to part with an acquisition which she herself had made, contrary to all the rules of justice and good faith. Still less was a favourable event to be hoped for, when the management of the war was intrusted to the same incapable or faithless ministers, who had allowed every opportunity to escape of asserting the rights of Prussia, when, perhaps, her assuming a firm attitude might have prevented the necessity of war altogether. But the resolution which had been delayed, when so many favourable occasions were suffered to escape unemployed, was at length adopted with an imprudent precipitation, which left Prussia neither time to adopt the wisest warlike measures, nor to look out for those statesmen and generals by whom such measures could have been most effectually executed.

About the middle of August, Prussia began to arm. Perhaps there are few examples of a war declared with the almost unanimous consent of a great and warlike people, which was brought to an earlier and more unhappy termination. On the first of October, Knobelsdorff, the Prussian envoy, was called upon by Talleyrand to explain the cause of the martial attitude assumed by his state. In reply, a paper was delivered, containing three propositions, or rather demands. First, That the French troops which had entered the German territory should instantly re-cross the Rhine. Secondly, that France should desist from presenting obstacles to the formation of a league in the northern part of Germany, to comprehend all the states, without exception, which had not been included in the Confederation of the Rhine. Thirdly, that negotiations should be immediately commenced, for the purpose of detaching the fortress of Wesel from the French empire, and for the restitution of three abbeys, which Murat had chosen to seize upon as a part of his Duchy of Berg. With this manifesto was delivered a long explanatory letter, containing severe remarks on the system of encroachment which France had acted upon. Such a text and commentary, considering their peremptory tone, and the pride and power of him to whom they were addressed in such unqualified terms, must have been understood to amount to a declaration of war. And yet, although Prussia, in common with all Europe, had just reason to complain of the encroachments of France, and her rapid strides to universal empire, it would appear that the two first articles in the king's declaration, were sub-

jects rather of negotiation than grounds of an absolute declaration of war, and that the fortress of Wesel, and the three abbeys, were scarce of importance enough to plunge the whole empire into blood for the sake of them.

Prussia, indeed, was less actually aggrieved than she was mortified and offended. She saw she had been outwitted by Bonaparte in the negotiation of Vienna; that he was juggling with her in the matter of Hanover; that she was in danger of beholding Saxony and Hesse withdrawn from her protection, to be placed under that of France; and under a general sense of these injuries, though rather apprehended than really sustained, she hurried to the field. If negotiations could have been protracted till the advance of the Russian armies, it might have given a different face to the war; but in the warlike ardour which possessed the Prussians, they were desirous to secure the advantages which, in military affairs, belong to the assailants, without weighing the circumstances which, in their situation, rendered such precipitation fatal.

Besides, such advantages were not easily to be obtained over Bonaparte, who was not a man to be amused by words when the moment of action arrived. Four days before the delivery of the Prussian note to his minister, Bonaparte had left Paris, and was personally in the field collecting his own immense forces, and urging the contribution of those contingents which the Confederate Princes of the Rhine were bound to supply. His answer to the hostile note of the King of Prussia was addressed, not to that monarch, but to his own soldiers. "They have dared to demand," he said, "that we should retreat at the first sight of their army. Fools! could they not reflect how impossible they found it to destroy Paris, a task incomparably more easy than to tarnish the honour of the Great Nation. Let the Prussian army expect the same fate which they encountered fourteen years ago, since experience has not taught them, that while it is easy to acquire additional dominions and increase of power, by the friendship of France, her enmity, on the contrary, which will only be provoked by those who are totally destitute of sense and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean."

The King of Prussia had again placed at the head of his armies the Duke of Brunswick. In his youth, this general had gained renown under his uncle Prince Ferdinand. But it had been lost in the retreat from Champagne in 1792, where he had suffered himself to be out-manœuvred by Dumourier and his army of conscripts.* He was seventy-two years old, and is said to have added the obstinacy of age to others of the infirmities which naturally attend it. He was not communicative, nor accessible to any of the other generals, excepting Mollendorf; and this generated a disunion of councils in the Prussian camp, and the personal dislike of the army to him by whom it was commanded.

The plan of the campaign, formed by this ill-fated prince, seems to have been singularly injudicious, and the more so, as it is censurable on exactly the same grounds as that of Austria in the late war.

* See p. 90.

Prussia could not expect to have the advantage of numbers in the contest. It was therefore her obvious policy to procrastinate and lengthen out negotiation, until she could have the advantage of the Russian forces. Instead of this, it was determined to rush forward towards Franconia, and oppose the Prussian army alone to the whole force of France, commanded by their renowned emperor.

The motive, too, was similar to that which had determined Austria to advance as far as the banks of the Iller. Saxony was in the present campaign, as Bavaria in the former, desirous of remaining neuter; and the hasty advance of the Prussian armies was designed to compel the Elector Augustus to embrace their cause. It succeeded accordingly; and the Sovereign of Saxony united his forces, though reluctantly, with the left wing of the Prussians, under Prince Hohenloe. The conduct of the Prussians towards the Saxons bore the same ominous resemblance to that of the Austrians to the Bavarians. Their troops behaved in the country of Saxony more as if they were in the land of a tributary than an ally, and while the assistance of the good and peaceable prince was sternly exacted, no efforts were made to conciliate his good-will, or soothe the pride of his subjects. In their behaviour to the Saxons in general, the Prussians showed too much of the haughty spirit that goes before a fall.

The united force of the Prussian army, with its auxiliaries, amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand men, confident in their own courage, in the rigid discipline which continued to distinguish their service, and in the animating recollections of the victorious career of the Great Frederick. There were many generals and soldiers in their ranks who had served under him; but, amongst that troop of veterans, Blücher alone was destined to do distinguished honour to the school.

Notwithstanding these practical errors, the address of the Prussian king to his army was in better taste than the vaunting proclamation of Bonaparte, and concluded with a passage, which, though its accomplishment was long delayed, nevertheless proved at last prophetic:—"We go," said Frederick William, "to encounter an enemy, who has vanquished numerous armies, humiliated monarchs, destroyed constitutions, and deprived more than one state of its independence, and even of its very name. He has threatened a similar fate to Prussia, and proposes to reduce us to the dominion of a strange people, who would suppress the very name of Germans. The fate of armies, and of nations, is in the hands of the Almighty; but constant victory, and durable prosperity, are never granted save to the cause of justice."

While Bonaparte assembled in Franconia an army considerably superior in number to that of the Prussians, the latter occupied the country in the vicinity of the river Saale, and seemed, in doing so, to renounce all the advantage of making the attack on the enemy ere he had collected his forces. Yet to make such an attack was, and must have been, the principal motive of their hasty and precipitate advance, especially after they had secured its primary object, the accession of Saxony to the campaign. The position which the Duke of Brunswick occupied

was indeed very strong as a defensive one, but the means of supporting so large an army were not easily to be obtained in such a barren country as that about Weimar; and their magazines and dépôts of provisions were injudiciously placed, not close in the rear of the army, but at Naumburg, and other places, upon their extreme left, and where they were exposed to the risk of being separated from them. It might be partly owing to the difficulty of obtaining forage and subsistence, that the Prussian army was extended upon a line by far too much prolonged to admit of mutual support. Indeed, they may be considered rather as disposed in cantonments than as occupying a military position; and as they remained strictly on the defensive, an opportunity was gratuitously afforded to Bonaparte to attack their divisions in detail; of which he did not fail to avail himself with his usual talent. The head-quarters of the Prussians, where were the king and Duke of Brunswick, were at Weimar; their left, under Prince Hohenloe, were at Schleitz; and their right extended as far as Muhlhausen, leaving thus a space of ninety miles betwixt the extreme flanks of their line.

Bonaparte, in the meantime, commenced the campaign, according to his custom, by a series of partial actions fought on different points, in which his usual combinations obtained his usual success; the whole tending to straiten the Prussians in their position, to interrupt their communications, separate them from their supplies, and compel them to fight a decisive battle from necessity, not choice, in which dispersed troops, under baffled and outwitted generals, were to encounter with soldiers who had already obtained a foretaste of victory, and who fought under the most renowned commanders, the combined efforts of the whole being directed by the master spirit of the age.

Upon the 8th October, Bonaparte gave vent to his resentment in a bulletin, in which he complained of having received a letter of twenty pages, signed by the King of Prussia, being, as he alleged, a sort of wretched pamphlet, such as England engaged hiring authors to compose at the rate of five hundred pounds sterling a year. "I am sorry," he said, "for my brother, who does not understand the French language, and has certainly never read that rhapsody." The same publication contained much in ridicule of the queen and Prince Louis. It bears evident marks of Napoleon's own composition, which was as singular, though not so felicitous, as his mode of fighting; but it was of little use to censure either the style or the reasoning of the lord of so many legions. His arms soon made the impression which he desired upon the position of the enemy.

The French advanced, in three divisions, upon the dislocated and extended disposition of the large but ill-arranged Prussian army. It was a primary and irretrievable fault of the Duke of Brunswick, that his magazines, and reserves of artillery and ammunition, were placed at Naumburg, instead of being close in the rear of his army, and under the protection of his main body. This ill-timed separation rendered it easy for the French to interpose betwixt the Prussians and their supplies, providing they were able to clear the course of the Saale.

With this view the French right wing, commanded by Soult and Ney, marched upon Hof. The centre was under Bernadotte and Davoust, with the guard commanded by Murat. They moved on Saalburg and Schilitz. The left wing was led by Augereau against Coburg and Saalfeld. It was the object of this grand combined movement to overwhelm the Prussian left wing, which was extended farther than prudence permitted; and, having beaten this part of the army, to turn their whole position, and possess themselves of their magazines. After some previous skirmishes, a serious action took place at Saalfeld, where Prince Louis of Prussia commanded the advanced guard of the Prussian left wing.

In the ardour and inexperience of youth, the brave prince, instead of being contented with defending the bridge on the Saale, quitted that advantageous position, to advance with unequal forces against Lannes, who was marching upon him from Graffensthal. If bravery could have atoned for imprudence, the battle of Saalfeld would not have been lost. Prince Louis showed the utmost gallantry in leading his men when they advanced, and in rallying them when they fled. He was killed fighting hand to hand with a French subaltern, who required him to surrender, and, receiving a sabre-wound for reply, plunged his sword into the prince's body. Several of his staff fell around him.

The victory of Saalfeld opened the course of the Saale to the French, who instantly advanced on Naumburg. Bonaparte was at Gera, within half a day's journey from the latter city, whence he sent a letter to the King of Prussia, couched in the language of a victor (for victorious he already felt himself by his numbers and position), and seasoned with the irony of a successful foe. He regretted his good brother had been made to sign the wretched pamphlet which had borne his name, but which he protested he did not impute to him as his composition. Had Prussia asked any practicable favour of him, he said he would have granted it; but she had asked his dishonour, and ought to have known there could be but one answer. In consideration of their former friendship, Napoleon stated himself to be ready to restore peace to Prussia and her monarch; and, advising his good brother to dismiss such counsellors as recommended the present war and that of 1792, he bade him heartily farewell.

Bonaparte neither expected nor received any answer to this missive, which was written under the exulting sensations experienced by the angler, when he feels the fish is hooked, and about to become his secure prey. Naumburg and its magazines were consigned to the flames, which first announced to the Prussians that the French army had gotten completely into their rear, had destroyed their magazines, and, being now interposed betwixt them and Saxony, left them no alternative save that of battle, which was to be waged at the greatest disadvantage with an alert enemy, to whom their supineness had already given the choice of time and place for it. There was also this ominous consideration, that in case of disaster, the Prussians had neither principle, nor order, nor line of retreat. The enemy were betwixt them and Magdeburg, which

ought to have been their rallying point; and the army of the Great Frederick was, it must be owned, brought to combat with as little reflection or military science, as a herd of schoolboys might have displayed in a mutiny.

Too late considered to make some exertion to clear their communications to the rear, the Duke of Brunswick, with the King of Prussia in person, marched with great part of their army to the recovery of Naumburg. Here Davoust, who had taken the place, remained at the head of a division of six-and-thirty thousand men, with whom he was to oppose nearly double the number. The march of the Duke of Brunswick was so slow, as to lose the advantage of this superiority. He paused on the evening of the thirteenth on the heights of Auerstadt, and gave Davoust time to reinforce the troops with which he occupied the strong defile of Koesen. The next morning, Davoust, with strong reinforcements, but still unequal in numbers to the Prussians, marched towards the enemy, whose columns were already in motion. The van-guard of both armies met, without previously knowing that they were so closely approaching each other, so thick lay the mist upon the ground.

The village of Hassen-Hausen, near which the opposite armies were first made aware of each other's proximity, became instantly the scene of a severe conflict, and was taken and retaken repeatedly. The Prussian cavalry, being superior in numbers to that of the French, and long famous for its appointments and discipline, attacked repeatedly, and was as often resisted by the French squares of infantry, whom they found it impossible to throw into disorder, or break upon any point. The French having thus repelled the Prussian horse, carried at the point of the bayonet some woods and the village of Spielberg, and remained in undisturbed possession of that of Hassen-Hausen. The Prussians had by this time maintained the battle from eight in the morning till eleven, and being now engaged on all points, with the exception of two divisions of the reserve, had suffered great loss. The generalissimo, Duke of Brunswick, wounded in the face by a grape-shot, was carried off; so was General Schmettau, and other officers of distinction. The want of an experienced chief began to be felt, when, to increase the difficulties of their situation, the King of Prussia received intelligence that General Mollendorf, who commanded his right wing, stationed near Jena, was in the act of being defeated by Bonaparte in person. The king took the generous but perhaps desperate resolution, of trying, whether in one general charge he could not redeem the fortune of the day, by defeating that part of the French with which he was personally engaged. He ordered the attack to be made along all the line, and with all the forces which he had in the field; and his commands were obeyed with gallantry enough to vindicate the honour of the troops, but not to lead to success. They were beaten off, and the French resumed the offensive in their turn.

Still the Prussian monarch, who seems now to have taken the command upon himself, endeavouring to supply the want of professional experience by courage, brought up his last reserves, and encou-

raged his broken troops rather to make a final stand for victory, than to retreat in face of a conquering army. This effort also proved in vain. The Prussian line was attacked everywhere at once; centre and wings were broken through by the French at the bayonet's point; and the retreat, after so many fruitless efforts, in which no division had been left unengaged, was of the most disorderly character. But the confusion was increased tenfold, when, as the defeated troops reached Weimar, they fell in with the right wing of their own army, fugitives like themselves, and who were attempting to retreat in the same direction. The disorder of two routed armies meeting in opposing currents, soon became inextricable. The roads were choked up with artillery and baggage waggons; the retreat became a hurried flight; and the king himself, who had shown the utmost courage during the battle of Auerstadt, was at length, for personal safety, compelled to leave the high-roads, and escape across the fields, escorted by a small body of cavalry.

While the left of the Prussian army were in the act of combating Davoust at Auerstadt, their right, as we have hinted, were with equally bad fortune engaged at Jena. This second action, though the least important of the two, has always given the name to the double battle, because it was at Jena that Napoleon was engaged in person.

The French Emperor had arrived at this town, which is situated upon the Saale, on the 13th of October, and had lost no time in issuing those orders to his marshals, which produced the demonstrations of Davoust, and the victory of Auerstadt. His attention was not less turned to the position he himself occupied, and in which he had the prospect of fighting Mollendorf, and the right of the Prussians, on the next morning. With his usual activity, he formed or enlarged, in the course of the night, the roads by which he proposed to bring up his artillery on the succeeding day, and, by hewing the solid rock, made a path practicable for guns to the plateau, or elevated plain in the front of Jena, where his centre was established. The Prussian army lay before them, extended on a line of six leagues, while that of Napoleon, extremely concentrated, showed a very narrow front, but was well secured both in the flanks and in the rear. Bonaparte, according to his custom, slept in the bivouac, surrounded by his guards. In the morning he harangued his soldiers, and recommended to them to stand firm against the charges of the Prussian cavalry, which had been represented as very redoubtable. As before Ulm he had promised his soldiers a repetition of the battle of Marengo, so now he pointed out to his men that the Prussians, separated from their magazines, and cut off from their country, were in the situation of Mack at Ulm. He told them that the enemy no longer fought for honour and victory, but for the chance of opening a way to retreat; and he added, that the corps which should permit them to escape would lose their honour. The French replied with loud shouts, and demanded instantly to advance to the combat. The emperor ordered the columns destined for the attack to descend into the plain. His centre consisted of the Imperial Guard, and two divisions of Lannes. Angereau commanded the

right, which rested on a village and a forest; and Soult's division, with a part of Ney's, were upon the left.

General Mollendorf advanced on his side, and both armies, as at Auerstadt, were hid from each other by the mist, until suddenly the atmosphere cleared, and showed them to each other within the distance of half cannon-shot. The conflict instantly commenced. It began on the French right, where the Prussians attacked with the purpose of driving Angereau from the village on which he rested his extreme flank. Lannes was sent to support him, by whose succour he was enabled to stand his ground. The battle then became general; and the Prussians showed themselves such masters of discipline, that it was long impossible to gain any advantage over men, who advanced, retired, or moved to either flank, with the regularity of machines. Soult at length, by the most desperate efforts, dispossessed the Prussians opposed to him of the woods from which they had annoyed the French left; and at the same conjuncture the division of Ney, and a large reserve of cavalry, appeared upon the field of battle. Napoleon, thus strengthened, advanced the centre, consisting in a great measure of the Imperial Guard, who, being fresh and in the highest spirits, compelled the Prussian army to give way. Their retreat was at first orderly; but it was a part of Bonaparte's tactics to pour attack after attack upon a worsted enemy, as the billows of a tempestuous ocean follow each other in succession, till the last waves totally disperse the fragments of the bulwark which the first have breached. Murat, at the head of the dragoons and the cavalry of reserve, charged, as one who would merit, as far as bravery could merit, the splendid destinies which seemed now opening to him. The Prussian infantry were unable to support the shock, nor could their cavalry protect them. The rout became general. Great part of the artillery was taken, and the broken troops retreated in disorder upon Weimar, where, as we have already stated, their confusion became inextricable, by their encountering the other tide of fugitives from their own left, which was directed upon Weimar also. All leading and following seemed now lost in this army, so lately confiding in its numbers and discipline. There was scarcely a general left to issue orders, scarcely a soldier disposed to obey them; and it seems to have been more by a sort of instinct, than any resolved purpose, that several broken regiments were directed, or directed themselves, upon Magdeburg, where Prince Hohenloe endeavoured to rally them.

Besides the double battle of Jena and Auerstadt, Bernadotte had his share in the conflict, as he worsted at Apolda, a village betwixt these two points of general action, a large detachment. The French accounts state that 20,000 Prussians were killed and taken in the course of this fatal day; that three hundred guns fell into their power, with twenty generals, or lieutenant-generals, and standards and colours to the number of sixty.

The mismanagement of the Prussian generals in these calamitous battles, and in all the manœuvres which preceded them, amounted to infatuation. The troops also, according to Bonaparte's evidence,

scarcely maintained their high character, oppressed probably by a sense of the disadvantages under which they combated. But it is unnecessary to dwell on the various causes of a defeat, when the vanquished seem neither to have formed one combined and general plan of attack in the action, nor maintained communication with each other while it endured, nor agreed upon any scheme of retreat when the day was lost. The Duke of Brunswick, too, and General Schmettau, being mortally wounded early in the battle, the several divisions of the Prussian army fought individually, without receiving any general orders, and consequently without regular plan or combined manœuvres. The consequences of the defeat were more universally calamitous than could have been anticipated, even when we consider, that no mode of retreat having been fixed on, or general rallying-place appointed, the broken army resembled a covey of heath-fowl, which the sportsman marks down and destroys in detail and at his leisure.

Next day after the action, a large body of the Prussians, who, under the command of Mollendorf, had retired to Erfurt, were compelled to surrender to the victors, and the marshal, with the Prince of Orange Fulda, became prisoners. Other relics of this most unhappy defeat met with the same fate. General Kalkreuth, at the head of a considerable division of troops, was overtaken and routed in an attempt to cross the Hartz mountains. Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg commanded an untouched body of sixteen thousand men, whom the Prussian general-in-chief had suffered to remain at Memmingen, without an attempt to bring them into the field. Instead of retiring when he heard all was lost, the prince was rash enough to advance towards Halle, as if to put the only unbroken division of the Prussian army in the way of the far superior and victorious hosts of France. He was accordingly attacked and defeated by Bernadotte.

The chief point of rallying, however, was Magdeburg, under the walls of which strong city Prince Hohenloe, though wounded, contrived to assemble an army amounting to fifty thousand men, but wanting everything, and in the last degree of confusion. But Magdeburg was no place of rest for them. The same improvidence, which had marked every step of the campaign, had exhausted that city of the immense magazines which it contained, and taken them for the supply of the Duke of Brunswick's army. The wrecks of the field of Jena were exposed to famine as well as the sword. It only remained for Prince Hohenloe to make the best escape he could to the Oder, and, considering the disastrous circumstances in which he was placed, he seems to have displayed both courage and skill in his proceedings. After various partial actions, however, in all of which he lost men, he finally found himself, with the advanced guard and centre of his army, on the heights of Prenzlau, without provisions, forage, or ammunition. Surrender became unavoidable; and at Prenzlau and Passewalk, nearly twenty thousand Prussians laid down their arms.

The rear of Prince Hohenloe's army did not immediately share this calamity. They were at Bort-

zenberg when the surrender took place, and amounted to about ten thousand men, the relics of the battle in which Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg had engaged near Weimar, and were under the command of a general whose name hereafter was destined to sound like a war-trumpet—the celebrated Blücher.

In the extremity of his country's distresses, this distinguished soldier showed the same indomitable spirit, the same activity in execution, and daringness of resolve, which afterwards led to such glorious results. He was about to leave Bortzenberg on the 29th, in consequence of his orders from Prince Hohenloe, when he learned that general's disaster at Prenzlau. He instantly changed the direction of his retreat, and, by a rapid march towards Strelitz, contrived to unite his forces with about ten thousand men, gleanings of Jena and Auerstadt, which, under the Dukes of Weimar and of Brunswick Oels, had taken their route in that direction. Thus reinforced, Blücher adopted the plan of passing the Elbe at Lauenburg, and reinforcing the Prussian garrisons in Lower Saxony. With this view he fought several sharp actions, and made many rapid marches. But the odds were too great to be balanced by courage and activity. The division of Soult, which had crossed the Elbe, cut him off from Lauenburg, that of Murat interposed between him and Stralsund, while Bernadotte pressed upon his rear. Blücher had no resource but to throw himself and his diminished and dispirited army into Lubeck. The pursuers came soon up, and found him like a stag at bay. A battle was fought on the 6th of November, in the streets of Lubeck, with extreme fury on both sides, in which the Prussians were overpowered by numbers, and lost many slain, besides four thousand prisoners. Blücher fought his way out of the town, and reached Schwerin. But he had now retreated as far as he had Prussian ground to bear him, and to violate the neutrality of the Danish territory, would only have raised up new enemies to his unfortunate master.

On the 7th November, therefore, he gave up his good sword, to be resumed under happier auspices, and surrendered with the few thousand men which remained under his command. But the courage which he had manifested, like the lights of St Elmo amid the gloom of the tempest, showed that there was at least one pupil of the great Frederick worthy of his master, and afforded hopes, on which Prussia long dwelt in silence, till the moment of action arrived.

The total destruction, for such it might almost be termed, of the Prussian army, was scarcely so wonderful, as the facility with which the fortresses which defend that country, some of them ranking among the foremost in Europe, were surrendered by their commandants, without shame, and without resistance, to the victorious enemy. Strong towns, and fortified places, on which the engineer had exhausted his science, provided too with large garrisons, and ample supplies, opened their gates at the sound of a French trumpet, or the explosion of a few bombs. Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, Hamelen, were each qualified to have arrested the march of invaders for months, yet were all surrendered on little more than

a summons. In Magdeburg was a garrison of twenty-two thousand men, two thousand of them being artillerymen; and nevertheless this celebrated city capitulated with Marshal Ney at the first flight of shells. Hameln was garrisoned by six thousand troops, amply supplied with provisions, and every means of maintaining a siege. The place was surrendered to a force scarcely one-third in proportion to that of the garrison. These incidents were too gross to be imputed to folly and cowardice alone. The French themselves wondered at their conquests, yet had a shrewd guess at the manner in which they were rendered so easy. When the recreant governor of Magdeburg was insulted by the students of Halle for treachery as well as cowardice, the French garrison of the place sympathised, as soldiers, with the youthful enthusiasm of the scholars, and afforded the sordid old coward but little protection against their indignation. From a similar generous impulse, Schoels, the commandant of Hameln, was nearly destroyed by the troops under his orders. In surrendering the place, he had endeavoured to stipulate, that in case the Prussian provinces should pass by the fortune of war to some other power, the officers should retain their pay and rank. The soldiers were so much incensed at this stipulation, which carried desertion in its front, and a proposal to shape a private fortune to himself amid the ruin of his country, that Schoels only saved himself by delivering up the place to the French before the time stipulated in the articles of capitulation.

It is believed that, on several of these occasions, the French constructed a golden key to open these iron fortresses, without being themselves at the expense of the precious metal which composed it. Every large garrison has of course a military chest, with treasure for the regular payment of the soldiery; and it is said that more than one commandant was unable to resist the proffer, that, in case of an immediate surrender, this deposit should not be inquired into by the captors, but left at the disposal of the governor, whose accommodating disposition had saved them the time and trouble of a siege.

While the French army made this uninterrupted progress, the new King of Holland, Louis Bonaparte, with an army partly composed of Dutch and partly of Frenchmen, possessed himself with equal ease of Westphalia, great part of Hanover, Emden, and East Friesland.

To complete the picture of general disorder which Prussia now exhibited, it is only necessary to add, that the unfortunate king, whose personal qualities deserved a better fate, had been obliged after the battle to fly into East Prussia, where he finally sought refuge in the city of Königsberg. L'Estocq, a faithful and able general, was still able to assemble out of the wreck of the Prussian army a few thousand men, for the protection of his sovereign. Bonaparte took possession of Berlin on the 25th October, eleven days after the battle of Jena. The mode in which he improved his good fortune we reserve for future consideration.

The fall of Prussia was so sudden and so total, as to excite the general astonishment of Europe. Its prince was compared to the rash and inexpe-

rienced gambler, who risks his whole fortune on one desperate cast, and rises from the table totally ruined. That power had for three quarters of a century ranked among the most important of Europe; but never had she exhibited such a formidable position as almost immediately before her disaster, when, holding in her own hand the balance of Europe, she might, before the day of Austerlitz, have inclined the scale to which side she would. And now she lay at the feet of the antagonist whom she had rashly and in ill time defied, not fallen merely, but totally prostrate, without the means of making a single effort to arise. It was remembered that Austria, when her armies were defeated, and her capital taken, had still found resources in the courage of her subjects, and that the insurrections of Hungary and Bohemia had assumed, even after Bonaparte's most eminent successes, a character so formidable, as to aid in procuring peace for the defeated emperor on moderate terms. Austria, therefore, was like a fortress repeatedly besieged, and as often breached and damaged, but which continued to be tenable, though diminished in strength, and deprived of important outworks. But Prussia seemed like the same fortress swallowed up by an earthquake, which leaves nothing either to inhabit or defend, and where the fearful agency of the destroyer reduces the strongest bastions and bulwarks to crumbled masses of ruins and rubbish.

The cause of this great distinction between two countries which have so often contended against each other for political power, and for influence in Germany, may be easily traced.

The empire of Austria combines in itself several large kingdoms, the undisturbed and undisputed dominions of a common sovereign, to whose sway they have been long accustomed, and towards whom they nourish the same sentiments of loyalty which their fathers entertained to the ancient princes of the same house. Austria's natural authority therefore rested, and now rests, on this broad and solid base, the general and rooted attachment of the people to their prince, and their identification of his interests with their own.

Prussia had also her native provinces, in which her authority was hereditary, and where the affection, loyalty, and patriotism of the inhabitants were natural qualities, which fathers transmitted to their sons. But a large part of her dominions consist of late acquisitions, obtained at different times by the arms or policy of the great Frederick; and thus her territories, made up of a number of small and distant states, want geographical breadth, while their disproportioned length stretches, according to Voltaire's well-known simile, like a pair of garters across the map of Europe. It follows, as a natural consequence, that a long time must intervene betwixt the formation of such a kingdom, and the amalgamation of its component parts, differing in laws, manners, and usages, into one compact and solid monarchy, having respect and affection to their king, as the common head, and regard to each other as members of the same community. It will require generations to pass away, ere a kingdom, so artificially composed, can be cemented into unity and strength; and the tendency to remain dissuited, is

greatly increased by the disadvantages of its geographical situation.

These considerations alone might explain, why, after the fatal battle of Jena, the inhabitants of the various provinces of Prussia contributed no important personal assistance to repel the invader; and why, although almost all trained to arms, and accustomed to serve a certain time in the line, they did not display any readiness to exert themselves against the common enemy. They felt that they belonged to Prussia only by the right of the strongest, and therefore were indifferent when the same right seemed about to transfer their allegiance elsewhere. They saw the approaching ruin of the Prussian power, not as children view the danger of a father, which they are bound to prevent at the hazard of their lives, but as servants view that of a master, which concerns them no otherwise than as leading to a change of their employers.

There were other reasons, tending to paralyse any effort at popular resistance, which affected the hereditary states of Prussia, as well as her new acquisitions. The power of Prussia had appeared to depend almost entirely upon her standing army, established by Frederick, and modeled according to his rules. When, therefore, this army was at once annihilated, no hope of safety was entertained by those who had so long regarded it as invincible. The Prussian peasant, who would gladly have joined the ranks of his country while they continued to keep the field, knew, or thought he knew, too much of the art of war, to have any hope in the efforts which might be made in a desultory guerilla warfare;—which, however, the courage, devotion, and perfidy of an invaded people have rendered the most formidable means of opposition even to a victorious army.

The ruin of Prussia, to whatever causes it was to be attributed, seemed, in the eyes of astonished Europe, not only universal, but irremediable. The king, driven to the extremity of his dominions, could only be considered as a fugitive, whose precarious chance of restoration to the crown depended on the doubtful success of his ally of Russia, who now, as after the capture of Vienna, had upon his hands, strong as those hands were, not the task of aiding an ally, who was in the act of resistance to the common enemy, but the far more difficult one of raising from the ground a prince who was totally powerless and prostrate. The French crossed the Oder—Glogau and Breslau were taken. Their defence was respectable; but it seemed not the less certain that their fall involved almost the last hopes of Prussia, and that a name, raised so high by the reign of one wise monarch, was like to be blotted from the map of Europe by the events of a single day.

Men looked upon this astonishing calamity with various sentiments, according as they considered it with relation to the Prussian administration alone, or as connected with the character of the king and kingdom, and the general interests of Europe. In the former point of view, the mind could not avoid acknowledging, with a feeling of embittered satisfaction, that the crooked and selfish policy of Prussia's recent conduct,—as short-sighted as it was

grasping and unconscientious,—had met in this present hour of disaster with no more than merited chastisement. The indifference with which the Prussian cabinet had viewed the distresses of the house of Austria, which their firm interposition might probably have prevented—the total want of conscience and decency with which they accepted Hanover from France, at the moment when they meditated war with the power at whose hand they received it—the shameless rapacity with which they proposed to detain the electorate from its legal owner, at the very time when they were negotiating an alliance with Britain,—intimated that contempt of the ordinary principles of justice, which, while it renders a nation undeserving of success, is frequently a direct obstacle to their attaining it. Their whole procedure was founded on the principles of a felon, who is willing to betray his accomplice, providing he is allowed to retain his own share of the common booty. It was no wonder, men said, that a government setting such an example to its subjects, of greediness and breach of faith in its public transactions, should find among them, in the hour of need, many who were capable of preferring their own private interests to that of their country. And if the conduct of this wretched administration was regarded in a political instead of a moral point of view, the disasters of the kingdom might be considered as the consequence of their incapacity, as well as the just remuneration of their profligacy. The hurried and presumptuous declaration of war, after every favourable opportunity had been suffered to escape, and indeed the whole conduct of the campaign, showed a degree of folly not far short of actual imbecility, and which must have arisen either from gross treachery, or something like infatuation. So far, therefore, as the ministers of Prussia were concerned, they reaped only the reward due to their political want of morality, and their practical want of judgment.

Very different, indeed, were the feelings with which the battle of Jena and its consequences were regarded, when men considered that great calamity in reference not to the evil counsellors by whom it was prepared, but to the prince and nation who were to pay the penalty. "We are human, and," according to the sentiment of the poet, on the extinction of the state of Venice, "must mourn even when the shadow of that which has once been great passes away." But the apparent destruction of Prussia was not like the departure of the aged man, whose life is come to the natural close, or the fall of a ruined tower, whose mouldering arches can no longer support the incumbent weight. These are viewed with awe indeed, and with sympathy, but they do not excite astonishment or horror. The seeming fate of the Prussian monarchy resembled the agonizing death of him who expires in the flower of manhood. The fall of the house of Brandenburg was as if a castle, with all its trophied turrets strong and entire, should be at once hurled to the earth by a super-human power. Men, alike stunned with the

* Men are we, and must grieve even when the shade
Of that which once was great is passed away.

WORDSWORTH.

extent and suddenness of the catastrophe, were moved with sympathy for those instantly involved in the ruin, and struck with terror at the demolition of a bulwark, by the destruction of which all found their own safety endangered. The excellent and patriotic character of Frederick William, on whose rectitude and honour even the misconduct of his ministers had not brought any stain; the distress of his interesting, high-spirited, and beautiful consort; the general sufferings of a brave and proud people, accustomed to assume and deserve the name of Protectors of the Protestant Faith and of the Liberties of Germany, and whose energies, corresponding with the talents of their leader, had enabled them in former times to withstand the combined force of France, Austria, and Russia,—excited deep and general sympathy.

Still wider did that sympathy extend, and more thrilling became its impulse, when it was remembered that in Prussia fell the last state of Germany, who could treat with Napoleon in the style of an equal; and that to the exorbitant power which France already possessed in the south of Europe, was now to be added an authority in the north almost equally arbitrary and equally extensive. The prospect was a gloomy one; and they who felt neither for the fallen authority of a prince, nor the destroyed independence of a kingdom, trembled at the prospect likely to be entailed on their own country by a ruin, which seemed as remediless as it was extensive and astounding.

But yet the end was not.—

Providence, which disappoints presumptuous hopes by the event, is often mercifully pleased to give aid when human aid seems hopeless. Whatever may be thought of the doctrine of an intermediate state of sufferance and purification in an after state of existence, it is evident from history, that in this world, kingdoms, as well as individuals, are often subjected to misfortunes arising from their own errors, and which prove in the event conducive to future regeneration. Prussia was exposed to a long and painful discipline in the severe school of adversity, by which she profited in such a degree as enabled her to regain her high rank in the republic of Europe, with more honour perhaps to her prince and people, than if she had never been thrust from her lofty station. Her government, it may be hoped, have learned to respect the rights of other nations, from the sufferings which followed the destruction of their own—her people have been taught to understand the difference between the dominion of strangers and the value of independence. Indeed the Prussians showed in the event, by every species of sacrifice, how fully they had become aware, that the blessing of freedom from foreign control is not to be secured by the efforts of a regular army only, but must be attained and rendered permanent by the general resolution of the nation, from highest to lowest, to dedicate their united exertions to the achievement of the public liberty at every risk, and by every act of self-devotion. Their improvement under the stern lessons which calamity taught them, we shall record in a brighter page. For the time, the cloud of misfortune sunk hopelessly dark over

Prussia, of which not merely the renown, but the very national existence, seemed in danger of being extinguished for ever.

CHAPTER LIII.

Ungenerous conduct of Bonaparte to the Duke of Brunswick.—The approach of the French troops to Brunswick compels the dying prince to cause himself to be carried to Altona, where he expires.—Oath of revenge taken by his son.—At Potsdam and Berlin, the proceedings of Napoleon are equally cruel and vindictive.—His clemency towards the Prince of Hatzfeld.—His treatment of the lesser powers.—Jérôme Bonaparte.—Seizure of Hamburg.—Celebrated Berlin Decrees against British commerce.—Reasoning as to their justice.—Napoleon rejects all application from the continental commercial towns to relax or repeal them.—Commerce, nevertheless, flourishes in spite of them.—Second anticipation called for of the conscription for 1807.—The King of Prussia applies for an armistice, which is clogged with such harsh terms that he refuses them.

THE will of Napoleon seemed now the only law, from which the conquered country, that so late stood forth as the rival of France, was to expect her destiny; and circumstances indicated, that, with more than the fortune of Cæsar or Alexander, the conqueror would not emulate their generosity or clemency.

The treatment of the ill-fated Duke of Brunswick did little honour to the victor. After receiving a mortal wound on the field of battle, he was transported from thence to Brunswick, his hereditary capital. Upon attaining his native dominions, in the government of which his conduct had been always patriotic and praiseworthy, he wrote to Napoleon, representing that, although he had fought against him as a general in the Prussian service, he nevertheless, as a Prince of the Empire, recommended his hereditary principality to the moderation and clemency of the victor. This attempt to separate his two characters, or to appeal to the immunities of a league which Napoleon had dissolved, although natural in the duke's forlorn situation, formed a plea not likely to be attended to by the conqueror. But, on other and broader grounds, Bonaparte, if not influenced by personal animosity against the duke, or desirous to degrade, in his person, the father-in-law of the heir of the British crown, might have found reasons for treating the defeated general with the respect due to his rank and his misfortunes. The Duke of Brunswick was one of the oldest soldiers in Europe, and his unquestioned bravery ought to have recommended him to his junior in arms. He was a reigning prince, and Bonaparte's own aspirations towards confirmation of aristocratical rank should have led him to treat the vanquished with decency. Above all, the duke was defenceless, wounded, dying; a situation to command the sympathy of every military man, who knows on what casual circumstances the fate of battle depends. The answer of Napoleon was, nevertheless, harsh and insulting in the last degree. He reproached the departing general with his celebrated proclamation against France in 1792, with the result of his unhappy campaign in that country, with the recent

summons by which the French had been required to retreat beyond the Rhine. He charged him as having been the instigator of a war which his counsels ought to have prevented. He announced the right which he had acquired, to leave not one stone standing upon another in the town of Brunswick; and summed up his ungenerous reply by intimating, that though he might treat the subjects of the duke like a generous victor, it was his purpose to deprive the dying prince and his family of their hereditary sovereignty.

As if to fulfil these menaces, the French troops approached the city of Brunswick, and the wounded veteran, dreading the further resentment of his ungenerous victor, was compelled to cause himself to be removed to the neutral town of Altona, where he expired. An application from his son, requesting permission to lay his father's body in the tomb of his ancestors, was rejected with the same sternness, which had characterized Bonaparte's answer to the attempt of the duke, when living, to soften his enmity. The successor of the duke vowed, it is believed, to requite these insults with mortal hatred,—did much to express it during his life,—and bequeathed to his followers the legacy of revenge, which the Black Brunswickers had the means of amply discharging upon the 18th of June, 1815.

Some have imputed this illiberal conduct of Bonaparte to an ebullition of spleen against the object of his personal dislike; others have supposed that his resentment was, in whole or part, affected, in order to ground upon it his resolution of confiscating the state of Brunswick, and uniting it with the kingdom of Westphalia, which, as we shall presently see, he proposed to erect as an appanage for his brother Jérôme. Whether arising from a burst of temperament, or a cold calculation of interested selfishness, his conduct was equally unworthy of a monarch and a soldier.

At Potsdam and at Berlin, Napoleon showed himself equally as the sworn and implacable enemy, rather than as the generous conqueror. At Potsdam he seized on the sword, belt, and hat of the Great Frederick, and at Berlin he appropriated and removed to Paris the monument of Victory, erected by the same monarch, in consequence of the defeat of the French at Rosbach. The finest paintings and works of art in Prussia were seized upon for the benefit of the French National Museum.

The language of the victor corresponded with his actions. His bulletins and proclamations abounded with the same bitter sarcasms against the king, the queen, and those whom he called the war faction of Prussia. Ascribing the war to the unrepented audacity of the young nobility, he said, in one of those proclamations, he would permit no more rioting in Berlin, no more breaking of windows; and, in addressing the Count Neale, he threatened, in plain terms, to reduce the nobles of Prussia to beg their bread. These, and similar expressions of irritated spleen, used in the hour of conquest, level the character of the great victor with that of the vulgar Englishman in the farce, who cannot be satisfied with beating his enemy, but must scold him also. Napoleon's constant study of the poetry ascribed to Ossian, might have taught him that wrath

should fly on eagles' wings from a conquered foe. The soldiers, and even the officers, caught the example of their emperor, and conceived they met his wishes by behaving more imperiously in quarters, and producing more distress to their hosts, than had been their custom in the Austrian campaigns. Great aggressions, perhaps, were rarely perpetrated, and would have been punished, as contrary to military discipline; but a grinding, constant, and unremitting system of vexation and requisition, was bitterly felt by the Prussians at the time, and afterwards sternly revenged.

It is but justice, however, to record an act of clemency of Napoleon amid these severities. He had intercepted a letter containing some private intelligence respecting the motions of the French, sent by Prince Hatzfeld, late the Prussian governor of Berlin, to Prince Hohenloe, then still at the head of an army. Napoleon appointed a military commission for the trial of Hatzfeld; and his doom, for continuing to serve his native prince after his capital had been occupied by the enemy, would have been not less certain than severe. His wife, however, threw herself at Napoleon's feet, who put into her hands the fatal document which contained evidence of what was called her husband's guilt, with permission to throw it into the fire. The French emperor is entitled to credit for the degree of mercy he showed on this occasion; but it must be granted at the same time, that to have proceeded to sentence and execution upon such a charge, would have been an act of great severity, it not of actual atrocity. If, as has been alleged, the correspondence of Prince Hatzfeld was dated before, not after the capitulation of Berlin, his death would have been an unqualified murder.

The victor, who had all at his disposal, was now to express his pleasure concerning those satellites of Prussia, which, till her fall, had looked up to her as their natural protector and ally. Of these, Saxony and Hesse-Cassel were the principal; and, in his proceedings towards them, Bonaparte regarded the train of his own policy much more than the merits which the two electors might have respectively pleaded towards France.

Saxony had joined her arms to those of Prussia—forced, as she said, by the arguments which a powerful neighbour can always apply to a weaker—still she *had* joined her, and fought on her side at the battle of Jena. The apology of compulsion was admitted by Bonaparte; the Saxon troops were dismissed upon their parole, and their prince raised to the rank of a king, shortly afterwards admitted as a member of the Confederacy of the Rhine, and treated by Bonaparte with much personal consideration. The Dukes of Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Gotha also were permitted to retain their dominions, on acknowledging a similar vassalage to the French empire.

The Landgrave, or Elector, of Hesse-Cassel, might have expected a still more favourable acceptance in the eyes of the victor, for he had refused to join Prussia, and, in spite of threats and persuasions, had observed neutrality during the brief contest. But Napoleon remembered, to the prejudice of the landgrave, that he had resisted all previous tempta-

tions to enter into the Confederation of the Rhine. He imputed his neutrality to fear, not choice. He alleged, that it had not been strictly observed; and, treating the inaction of Hesse, whose inclinations were with Prussia, as a greater crime than the actual hostilities of Saxony, whose will was with France, he declared, according to his usual form of dethronement, that the house of Hesse-Cassel had ceased to reign. The doom was executed even before it was pronounced. Louis Bonaparte, with Marshal Mortier, had possessed himself of Hesse-Cassel by the 1st of November. The army of the landgrave made no resistance—a part of them passed under the banners of France, the rest were disbanded.

The real cause of seizing the territories of an unoffending prince, who was totally helpless, unless in so far as right or justice could afford him protection, was Bonaparte's previous resolution, already hinted at, to incorporate Hesse-Cassel with the adjacent territories, for the purpose of forming a kingdom to be conferred on his youngest brother Jérôme. This young person bore a gay and dissipated character; and, though such men may at times make considerable sacrifices for the indulgence of transient passion, they are seldom capable of retaining for a length of time a steady affection for an object, however amiable. Jérôme Bonaparte had married an American young lady, distinguished for her beauty and her talents, and had thus lost the countenance of Napoleon, who maintained the principle, that, segregated as his kindred were from the nation at large by their connexion with him, his rank, and his fortunes, they were not entitled to enter into alliances according to the dictates of their own feelings, but were bound to form such as were most available to his policy. Jérôme was tempted by ambition finally to acquiesce in this reasoning, and sacrificed the connexion which his heart had chosen, to become the tool of his brother's ever-extending schemes of ambition. The reward was the kingdom of Westphalia, to which was united Hesse-Cassel, with the various provinces which Prussia had possessed in Franconia; Westphalia Proper, and Lower Saxony; as also the territories of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick. Security could be scarcely supposed to attend upon a sovereignty, where the materials were acquired by public rapine, and the crowns purchased by domestic infidelity.

About the middle of November, Mortier formally re-occupied Hanover in the name of the emperor, and, marching upon Hamburg, took possession of that ancient free town, so long the emporium of commerce for the north of Europe. Here, as formerly at Leipzig, the strictest search was made for British commodities and property, which were declared the lawful subject of confiscation. The *Moniteur* trumpeted forth, that these rigorous measures were accompanied with losses to British commerce which would shake the credit of the nation. This was not true. The citizens of Hamburg had long foreseen that their neutrality would be no protection, and, in spite of the fraudulent assurances of the French envoy, designed to lull them into security, the merchants had availed themselves of the

last two years to dispose of their stock, call in their capital, and wind up their trade; so that the rapacity of the French was in a great measure disappointed. The strict search after British property, and the confiscation which was denounced against it at Hamburg and elsewhere, were no isolated acts of plunder and spoliation, but made parts of one great system for destroying the commerce of England, which was shortly after laid before the world by the celebrated decrees of Berlin.

It was frequently remarked of Bonaparte, that he studied a sort of theatrical effect in the mode of issuing his decrees and proclamations, the subject matter of which formed often a strange contrast with the date; the latter, perhaps, being at the capital of some subdued monarch, while the matter promulgated respected some minute regulation affecting the municipality of Paris. But there was no such discrepancy in the date and substance of the Berlin decrees against British enterprise. It was when Bonaparte had destroyed the natural bulwark which protected the independence of the north of Germany, and had necessarily obtained a corresponding power on the shores of the Baltic, that he seriously undertook to promulgate his sweeping plan of destroying the commerce of his island foe.

When slight inconveniences, according to Bonaparte's expression, put an end to his hopes of invading Britain, or when, as at other times he more candidly admitted, the defeat at Trafalgar induced him "to throw helve after hatchet," and resign all hope of attaining any success by means of his navy, he became desirous of sapping and undermining the bulwark, which he found it impossible to storm; and by directing his efforts to the destruction of British commerce, he trusted gradually to impair the foundations of her national wealth and prosperity. He erred, perhaps, in thinking, that, even if his object could have been fully attained, the full consequences would have followed which his animosity anticipated. Great Britain's prosperity mainly rests on her commerce, but her existence as a nation is not absolutely dependent upon it; as those foreigners are apt to imagine, who have only seen the numerous vessels with which she covers the ocean and fills foreign ports, but have never witnessed the extent of her agricultural and domestic resources. But, entertaining the belief which Napoleon did, in regard to the indispensable connexion betwixt British commerce and British power, the policy of his war upon the former cannot be denied. It was that of the Abyssinian hunter, who, dreading to front the elephant in his fury, draws his sabre along the animal's heel-joint, and waits until the exertions of the powerful brute burst the injured sinews, and he sinks prostrate under his own weight.

The celebrated decrees of Berlin appeared on the 21st November, 1806, interdicting all commerce betwixt Great Britain and the Continent; which interdiction was declared a fundamental law of the French empire, until the English should consent to certain alterations in the mode of conducting hostilities by sea, which should render her naval superiority less useful to herself, and less detrimental to the enemy. This measure was justified upon the following grounds:—That England had either in-

introduced new customs into her maritime code, or revived those of a barbarous age—that she seized on merchant vessels, and made their crews prisoners, just as if they had been found on board ships of war—declared harbours blockaded which were not so in reality—and extended the evils of war to the peaceful and unarmed citizen.

This induction to the celebrated project, afterwards called the Continental System of the Emperor, was false in the original proposition, and sophistical in those by which it was supported. It was positively false that Great Britain had introduced into her maritime law, either by new enactment, or by the revival of obsolete and barbarous customs, any alteration by which the rights of neutrals were infringed, or the unarmed citizen prejudiced, more than necessarily arose out of the usual customs of war. The law respecting the blockade of ports, and the capture of vessels at sea, was the same on which every nation had acted for three centuries past, France herself not excepted. It is true, that the maritime code seemed at this period to be peculiarly that of England, because no nation save herself had the means of enforcing them; but she did not in this respect possess any greater advantage by sea than Napoleon enjoyed by land.

The reasoning of the Emperor Napoleon upon the inequality and injustice of the maritime mode of exercising war, compared with the law of hostilities by land, was not more accurate than his allegation, that Britain had innovated upon the former for the purpose of introducing new, or reviving old severities. This will appear plain from the following considerations:—

At an early period of society, the practice of war was doubtless the same by land or sea; and the savage slaughtered or enslaved his enemy whether he found him in his hut or in his canoe. But when centuries of civilization began to mitigate the horrors of barbarous warfare, the restrictive rules introduced into naval hostilities were different from those adopted in the case of wars by land, as the difference of the services obviously dictated. A land army has a precise object, which it can always attain if victorious. If a general conquer a town, he can garrison it; he can levy contributions; nay, he may declare that he will appropriate it to himself in right of sovereignty. He can afford to spare the property of private individuals, when he is at liberty to seize, if he is so minded, upon all their public rights, and now-mould them at his pleasure. The seaman, on the other hand, seizes on the merchant vessel and its cargo, by the same right of superior force, in virtue of which the victor by land has seized upon castles, provinces, and on the very haven, it may be, which the vessel belongs to. If the maritime conqueror had no right to do this, he would gain nothing by his superiority except blows, when he met with vessels of force, and would be cut off from any share of the spoils of war, which form the reward of victory. The innocent and unarmed citizen, perhaps the neutral stranger, suffers in both cases; but a state of war is of course a state of violence, and its evils, unhappily, cannot be limited to those who are actually engaged in hostilities. If the spirit of philanthropy affected in the peroration

to Bonaparte's decrees had been real, he might have attained his pretended purpose of softening the woes of war, by proposing some relaxation of the rights of a conqueror by land, in exchange for restrictions to be introduced into the practice of hostilities by sea. Instead of doing so, he, under the pretext of exercising the right of reprisals, introduced the following decrees, unheard of hitherto among belligerent powers, and tending greatly to augment the general distress, which must, under all circumstances, attend a state of war.

1. The British isles were declared in a state of blockade.
2. All commerce and correspondence with England was forbidden. All English letters were to be seized in the post-houses.
3. Every Englishman, of whatever rank or quality, found in France, or the countries allied with her, was declared a prisoner of war.
4. All merchandize, or property of any kind, belonging to English subjects, was declared lawful prize.
5. All articles of English manufacture, and articles produced in her colonies, were in like manner declared contraband and lawful prize.
6. Half of the produce of the above confiscations was to be employed in the relief of those merchants, whose vessels had been captured by the English cruisers.
7. All vessels coming from England, or the English colonies, were to be refused admission into any harbour. Four additional articles provided the mode of promulgating and enforcing the decree, and directed that it should be communicated to the allies of France.

This was the first link of a long chain of arbitrary decrees and ordinances, by which Napoleon, aiming at the destruction of British finance, interrupted the whole commerce of Europe, and destroyed for a season, and as far as lay in his power, that connexion between distant nations which unites them to each other by the most natural and advantageous means, the supply of the wants of the one country by the superfluous produce of the other. The extent of public inconvenience and distress, which was occasioned by the sudden suppression of commercial communication with England, may be judged of by reflecting, how many of the most ordinary articles of consumption are brought from foreign countries,—in how many instances the use of these articles has brought them into the list of necessities,—and how, before an ordinary mechanic or peasant sits down to breakfast, distant climes must be taxed to raise the coffee and sugar which he consumes.

—The painful embarrassment of those deprived of their habitual comforts was yet exceeded by the clamour and despair of the whole commercial world on the Continent, who were thus, under pretext of relieving them from the vexation of the English cruisers, threatened with a total abrogation of their profession. Hamburg, Bordeaux, Nantes, and other continental towns, solicited, by petitions and deputations, some relaxation of decrees which inferred their general ruin. They pleaded the prospect of universal bankruptcy, which this prohibitory system must occasion. "Let it be so," answered the emperor; "the more insolvency on the Continent, the greater will be the distress of the merchants in London. The fewer traders in Hamburg, the less will be the temptation to carry on commerce with England."

Britain must be humbled, were it at the expense of throwing civilization back for centuries, and returning to the original mode of trading by barter."

But great as was Bonaparte's power, he had overrated it in supposing that, by a mere expression of his will, he could put an end to an intercourse, in the existence of which the whole world possessed an interest. The attempt to annihilate commerce resembled that of a child who tries to stop with his hand the stream of an artificial fountain, which escapes in a hundred partial jets from under his palm and between his fingers. The Genius of Commerce, like a second Proteus, assumed every variety of shape, in order to elude the imperial interdiction, and all manner of evasions was practiced for that purpose. False papers, false certificates, false bills of lading, were devised, and these frauds were overlooked in the seaports, by the very agents of the police, and custom-house officers, to whom the execution of the decrees was committed. Douaniers, magistrates, generals, and prefects, nay, some of the kindred princes of the house of Napoleon, were well pleased to listen to the small still voice of their interest, rather than to his authoritative commands; and the British commerce, though charged with heavy expenses, continued to flourish in spite of the continental system. The new, and still more violent measures, which Napoleon had recourse to for enforcing his prohibitions, will require our notice hereafter. Meantime, it is enough to say, that such acts of increasing severity had the natural consequence of rendering his person and power more and more unpopular; so that, while he was sacrificing the interests and the comforts of the nations under his authority to his hope of destroying England, he was in fact digging a mine under his own feet, which exploded to his destruction long before the security of England was materially affected.

Napoleon had foreseen that, in order to enforce the decrees by which, without possession of any naval power, he proposed to annihilate the naval supremacy of England, it would be necessary to augment to a great extent the immense superiority of land forces which France already possessed. It was necessary, he was aware, that to enable him to maintain the prohibitions which he had imposed upon general commerce, as well as to prosecute the struggle in which he was about to be engaged with Russia, a large draught should be made on the population of France. He had, accordingly, by a requisition addressed to the Senate, dated from Bamberg, 7th of October, required a second anticipation of the conscription of 1807, amounting to a levy of eighty thousand men.

The measure was supported in the Senate by the oratory of Regnault de St-Jean d'Angely, an ancient republican. This friend of freedom saw nothing inconsistent in advocating a measure, which the absolute monarch recommended as the necessary step to a general peace. The conscripts who had first marched had secured victory; those who were now to be put in motion were to realize the prospect of peace, the principal object of their brethren's success. The obsequious Senate readily admitted these arguments, as they would have done any which had been urged in support of a request which they

dared not deny. The sole purpose of Regnault's eloquence was to express in decent amplification the simple phrase, "Napoleon so wills it."

A deputation of the Senate, carrying to Napoleon in person their warm acquiescence in the proposed measure, received in gerdon the honourable task of conveying to Paris the spoils of Potsdam and Berlin, with three hundred and forty-six stand of colours, the trophies of the war against Prussia,—with the task of announcing the celebrated decrees, by which the general commerce of Europe and of France itself was annihilated, to secure it from the aggressions of the British naval force. The military trophies were received—the decrees were recorded; and no one dared undertake the delicate task of balancing the victories of the emperor against the advantage which his dominions were likely to derive from them.

In the meanwhile, the unfortunate Frederick William, whose possession of his late flourishing kingdom was reduced to such territories as Prussia held beyond the Oder, sent an embassy to Berlin, for the purpose of learning upon what terms he might be yet admitted to treat for peace with the victor, who had hold of his capital and the greater part of his dominions. The Marquis Lucchesini was employed on this mission, a subtle Italian, who, being employed in negotiations at Paris, had been accustomed to treat with France on a footing of equality. But these times were passed since the battle of Jena; and the only terms to which Prussia could be now admitted, were to be so dearly purchased, that even a mere temporary armistice was to cost the surrender of Graudenz, Dantzic, Colberg,—in short, all the fortresses yet remaining to Prussia, and still in a state of defence. As this would have been placing himself entirely at the mercy of Bonaparte, and in as bad circumstances as he could be reduced to even by the most unsuccessful military operations, the king refused to acquiesce in such severe terms, and determined to repose his fate in the chance of war, and in the support of the auxiliary army of Russia, which was now hastily advancing to his assistance.

CHAPTER LIV.

Retrospect of the partition of Poland.—Napoleon receives addresses from Poland, which he evades.—He advances into Poland, Bennigsen retreating before him.—Character of the Russian soldiery.—The Cossacks.—Engagement at Pultusk, on 26th December, terminating to the disadvantage of the French.—Bennigsen continues his retreat.—The French go into winter quarters.—Bennigsen appointed Commander-in-chief in the place of Kaminsky, who shows symptoms of insanity.—He resumes offensive operations.—Battle of Eylau, fought on 8th February, 1807.—Claimed as a victory by both parties.—The loss on both sides amounts to 50,000 men killed, the greater part Frenchmen.—Bennigsen retreats upon Königsberg.—Napoleon offers favourable terms for an armistice to the King of Prussia, who refuses to treat, save for a general peace.—Napoleon falls back to the line of the Vistula.—Dantzic is besieged and surrenders.—Russian army is poorly recruited.—The French powerfully.—Actions during the summer.—Battle of Heilsberg, and retreat of the Russians.—Battle of Friedland

on 14th June, and defeat of the Russians, after a hard-fought day.—An armistice takes place on the 23d.

NAPOLEON was politically justified in the harsh terms which he was desirous to impose on Prussia, by having now brought his victorious armies to the neighbourhood of Poland, in which he had a good right to conceive himself sure to find numerous followers and a friendly reception.

The partition of this fine kingdom by its powerful neighbours, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, was the first open and audacious transgression of the law of nations, which disgraced the annals of civilized Europe. It was executed by a combination of three of the most powerful states of Europe, against one too unhappy in the nature of its constitution, and too much divided by factions, to offer any effectual resistance. The kingdom subjected to this aggression had appealed in vain to the code of nations for protection against an outrage, to which, after a desultory and uncombined, and therefore a vain defence, she saw herself under a necessity of submitting. The Poles retained, too, a secret sense of their fruitless attempt to recover freedom in 1791, and an animated recollection of the violence by which it had been oppressed by the Russian arms. They waited with hope and exultation the approach of the French armies; and candour must allow, that, unlawfully subjected as they had been to a foreign yoke, they had a right to avail themselves of the assistance, not only of Napoleon, but of Mahomet, or of Satan himself, had he proposed to aid them in regaining the independence of which they had been oppressively and unjustly deprived.

This feeling was general among the middling classes of the Polish aristocracy, who recollected with mortified pride the diminution of their independent privileges, the abrogation of their Diets, and the suppression of the *Liberum Veto*, by which a private gentleman might render null the decision of a whole assembly, unless unanimity should be attained, by putting the dissentient to death upon the spot.* But the higher order of nobility, gratified

* Most readers must be so far acquainted with the ancient form of Polish Diets as to know, that their resolutions were not legally valid if there was one dissenting voice, and that in many cases the most violent means were resorted to, to obtain unanimity. The following instance was related to our informer, a person of high rank. On some occasion, a provincial diet was convened for the purpose of passing a resolution which was generally acceptable, but to which it was apprehended one noble of the district would oppose his *veto*. To escape this interruption, it was generally resolved to meet exactly at the hour of summons, to proceed to business upon the instant, and thus to elude the anticipated attempt of the individual to defeat the purpose of their meeting. They accordingly met at the hour, with most accurate precision, and shut and bolted the doors of their place of meeting. But the dissentient arrived a few minutes afterwards, and entrance being refused, under the excuse that the diet was already constituted, he climbed upon the roof of the hall, and, it being summer time when no fires were lighted, descended through the vent into the stove by which, in winter, the apartment was heated. Here he lay perdu, until the vote was called, when, just as it was about to be recorded as unanimous in favour of the proposed measure, he thrust his head out

by the rank they held, and the pleasures they enjoyed at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, and especially St Petersburg, preferred in general the peaceful enjoyment of their immense estates to the privileges of a stormy independence, which raised the most insignificant of the numerous aristocracy to a rank and importance nearly resembling their own. They might, too, with some justice, distrust the views of Napoleon, though recommended by the most specious promises. The dominion of Russia in particular, from similarity of manners, and the particular attention paid to their persons and interests, was not so unpopular among the higher branches of the aristocracy as might have been expected, from the unjust and arbitrary mode in which she had combined to appropriate so large a part of their once independent kingdom. These did not, therefore, so generally embrace the side of France as the minor nobles or gentry had done. As for the ordinary mass of the population, being almost all in the estate of serfage, or villanage, which had been general over Europe during the prevalence of the feudal system, they followed their respective lords, without pretending to entertain any opinion of their own.

While Russia was marching her armies hastily forward, not only to support, or rather raise up once more, her unfortunate ally the King of Prussia, but to suppress any ebullition of popular spirit in Poland, Bonaparte received addresses from that country, which endeavoured to prevail on him to aid them in their views of regaining their independence. Their application was of a nature to embarrass him considerably. To have declared himself the patron of Polish independence might have, indeed, brought large forces to his standard—might have consummated the disasters of Prussia, and greatly embarrassed even Russia herself; and so far policy recommended to Napoleon to encourage their hopes of her restored independence. But Austria had been a large sharer in the various partitions of Poland, and Austria, humbled as she had been, was still a powerful state, whose enmity might have proved formidable, if, by bereaving her of her Polish dominions, or encouraging her subjects to rebel, Bonaparte had provoked her to hostilities, at the time when he himself and the best part of his forces were engaged in the north of Europe. The

of the stove, like a turtle protruding his neck from his shell, and pronounced the fatal *veto*. Unfortunately for himself, instead of instantly withdrawing his head, he looked round for an instant with exultation, to remark and enjoy the confusion which his sudden appearance and interruption had excited in the assembly. One of the nobles, who stood by, unsheathed his sabre, and severed at one blow the head of the dissentient from his body. Our noble informer, expressing some doubt of a story so extraordinary, was referred for its confirmation to Prince Sobieski, afterwards King of Poland, who not only bore testimony to the strange scene, as what he had himself witnessed, but declared that the head of the diet rolled over on his own foot, almost as soon as he heard the word *veto* uttered. Such a constitution required much amelioration; but that formed no apology for the neighbouring states, who dismembered and appropriated to themselves an independent kingdom, with the faults or advantages of whose government they had not the slightest title to interfere.

same attempt would have given a very different character to the war, which Russia at present waged only in the capacity of the auxiliary of Prussia. The safety and integrity of the Russian empire, south of the Volga, depends almost entirely upon the preservation of those territories which she has acquired in Poland; and, if she had engaged in the war as a principal, Bonaparte was scarcely yet prepared to enter upon a contest with the immense power of that empire, which must be waged upon the very frontier of the enemy, and as near to their resources as he was distant from his own. It might have been difficult, also, to have stated any consistent grounds, why he, who had carved out so many new sovereignties in Europe with the point of his sword, should reprobate the principle of the partition of Poland. Influenced by these motives, the modern setter-up and puller-down of kings abstained from re-establishing the only monarchy in Europe, which he might have new-modeled to his mind, in the character not of a conqueror, but a liberator.

While Napoleon declined making any precise declaration, or binding himself by any express stipulations to the Polish delegates, the language he used to them was cautiously worded, so as to keep up their zeal, and animate their exertions. Dombrowski, a Polish exile in the French army, was employed to raise men for Napoleon's service, and the enthusiasm of those who entered, as well as the expectations of the kingdom at large, were excited by such oracular passages as the following, which appeared in the 30th bulletin:—"Is the throne of Poland to be re-established, and will that great nation regain her existence and independence? Will she be recalled to life, as if summoned to arise from the tomb?—God only, the great disposer of events, can be the arbiter of this great political problem."

The continuance of war was now to be determined upon; a war to be waged with circumstances of more than usual horror, as it involved the sufferings of a winter-campaign in the northern latitudes. The French, having completely conquered the Prussian estates to the east of the Oder, had formed the sieges of Great Glogau, of Breslau, and of Graudentz, and were at the same time pushing westward to occupy Poland. The Russian general, Bennigsen, had on his side pressed forward for the purpose of assisting the Prussians, and had occupied Warsaw. But finding that their unfortunate allies had scarcely the remnant of an army in the field, the Russian general retreated after some skirmishes, and recrossed the Vistula, while the capital of Poland, thus evacuated, was entered on the 28th November by Murat, at the head of the French vanguard.

About the 25th, Napoleon, leaving Berlin, had established himself at Posen, a central town of Poland, which country began to manifest an agitation, partly the consequence of French intrigues, partly arising from the animating prospect of restored independence. The Poles resumed in many instances their ancient national dress and manners, and sent deputies to urge the decision of Bonaparte in their favour. The language in which they entreated his interposition resembled that of oriental

idolatry. "The Polish nation," said Count Radyminski, the Palatine of Gnesna, "presents itself before your majesty, groaning still under the yoke of German nations, and salutes with the purest joy the regenerator of their dear country, the legislator of the universe. Full of submission to your will, they adore you, and repose on you with confidence all their hopes, as upon him who has the power of raising empires and destroying them, and of humbling the proud." The address of the President of the Judicial Council-Chamber of the Regency of Poland was not less energetic. "Already," he said, "we see our dear country saved; for in your person we adore the most just and the most profound Solon. We commit our fate and our hopes into your hands, and we implore the mighty protection of the most august Cæsar."

Not even these eastern hyperboles could extort anything from Bonaparte more distinctly indicative of his intentions, than the obscure hints we have already mentioned.

In the meanwhile, Warsaw was put into a state of defence, and the auxiliary forces of Saxony and the new confederates of the Rhine were brought up by forced marches, while strong reinforcements from France repaired the losses of the early part of the campaign.

The French army at length advanced in full force, and crossed successively the rivers Vistula and Bug, forcing a passage wherever it was disputed. But it was not the object of Bennigsen to give battle to forces superior to his own, and he therefore retreated behind the Wkra, and was joined by the large bodies of troops commanded by Generals Buxhowden and Kaminskoy. The latter took the general command. He was a contemporary of Suwarrow, and esteemed an excellent officer, but more skilled in the theory than the practice of war. "Kaminskoy," said Suwarrow, "knows war, but war does not know him—I do not know war, but war knows me." It appears also, that during this campaign Kaminskoy was afflicted with mental alienation.

On the 23d December, Napoleon arrived in person upon the Wkra, and ordered the advance of his army in three divisions. Kaminskoy, when he saw the passage of this river forced, determined to retreat behind the Niemen, and sent orders to his lieutenants accordingly. Bennigsen, therefore, fell back upon Poltusk, and Prince Galitzin upon Golymin, both pursued by large divisions of the French army. The Russian generals Buxhowden and d'Anrep also retreated in different directions, and apparently without maintaining a sufficiently accurate communication either with Bennigsen, or with Galitzin. In their retrograde movements the Russians sustained some loss, which the bulletins magnified to such an extent, as to represent their army as entirely disorganized, their columns wandering at hazard in unimaginable disorder, and their safety only caused by the shortness of the days, the difficulties of a country covered with woods and intersected with ravines, and a thaw which had filled the roads with mud to the depth of five feet. It was, therefore, predicted, that although the enemy might possibly escape from the position in which he had placed

himself, it must necessarily be effected at the certain loss of his artillery, his carriages, and his baggage.

These were exaggerations calculated for the meridian of Paris. Napoleon was himself sensible, that he was approaching a conflict of a different kind from that which he had maintained with Austria, and more lately against Prussia. The common soldier in both those services was too much leveled into a mere moving piece of machinery, the hundred-thousandth part of the great machine called an army, to have any confidence in himself, or zeal beyond the mere discharge of the task intrusted to him according to the word of command. These troops, however highly disciplined, wanted that powerful and individual feeling, which in armies possessing a strong national character (by which the Russians are peculiarly distinguished), induces the soldier to resist to the last moment, even when resistance can only assure him of revenge. They were still the same Russians, of whom Frederick the Great said, "that he could kill, but could not defeat them;"—they were also strong of constitution, and inured to the iron climate in which Frenchmen were now making war for the first time;—they were accustomed from their earliest life to spare nourishment and hardship;—in a word, they formed then, as they do now, the sole instance in Europe of an army, the privates of which are semi-barbarians, with the passions, courage, love of war, and devotion to their country, which is found in the earlier periods of society, while the education received by their superior officers places them on a level with those of any other nation. That of the inferior regimental officers is too much neglected; but they are naturally brave, kind to the common soldier, and united among themselves like a family of brothers,—attributes which go far to compensate the want of information. Among the higher officers, are some of the best-informed men in Europe.

The Russian army was at this period deficient in its military staff, and thence imperfect in the execution of combined movements; and their generals were better accustomed to lead an army in the day of actual battle, than to prepare for victory by a skilful combination of previous manoeuvres. But this disadvantage was balanced by their zealous and unhesitating devotion to their emperor and their country. There scarcely existed a Russian, even of the lowest rank, within the influence of bribery; and an officer, like the Prussian commandant of Hamelen, who began to speculate upon retaining his rank in another service, when surrendering the charge intrusted to him by his sovereign, would have been accounted in Russia a prodigy of unexampled villany. In the mode of disciplining their forces, the Russians proceeded on the system most approved in Europe. Their infantry was confessedly excellent, composed of men in the prime of life, and carefully selected as best qualified for military service. Their artillery was of the first description, so far as the men, guns, carriages, and appointments were concerned; but the rank of general of artillery had not the predominant weight in the Russian army, which ought to be possessed by those particularly dedicated to the direction of that arm, by which, according to Napoleon, modern battles must

be usually decided. The direction of their guns was too often intrusted to general officers of the line. The service of cavalry is less natural to the Russian than that of the infantry, but their horse regiments are nevertheless excellently trained, and have uniformly behaved well.

But the Cossacks are a species of force belonging to Russia exclusively; and although subsequent events have probably rendered every reader in some degree acquainted with their national character, they make too conspicuous a figure in the history of Napoleon, to be passed over without a brief description here.

The natives on the banks of the Don and the Volga hold their lands by military service, and enjoy certain immunities and prescriptions, in consequence of which each individual is obliged to serve four years in the Russian armies. They are trained from early childhood to the use of the lance and sword, and familiarized to the management of a horse peculiar to the country; far from handsome in appearance, but tractable, hardy, swift, and sure-footed, beyond any breed perhaps in the world. At home, and with his family and children, the Cossack is kind, gentle, generous, and simple; but when in arms, and in a foreign country, he resumes the predatory, and sometimes the ferocious habits of his ancestors, the roving Scythians. As the Cossacks receive no pay, plunder is generally their object; and as prisoners were esteemed a needless encumbrance, they granted no quarter, until Alexander promised a ducat for every Frenchman whom they brought in alive. In the actual field of battle, their mode of attack is singular. Instead of acting in line, a body of Cossacks about to charge, disperse at the word of command, very much in the manner of a fan suddenly flung open, and, joining in a loud yell or *Aourra*, rush, each acting individually, upon the object of attack, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, to all of which they have been in this wild way of fighting formidable assailants. But it is as light cavalry that the Cossacks are perhaps unrivaled. They and their horses have been known to march one hundred miles in twenty-four hours without halting. They plunge into woods, swim rivers, thread passes, cross deep morasses, and penetrate through deserts of snow, without undergoing material loss, or suffering from fatigue. No Russian army, with a large body of Cossacks in front can be liable to surprise; nor, on the other hand, can an enemy surrounded by them ever be confident against it. In covering the retreat of their own army, their velocity, activity, and courage, render pursuit by the enemy's cavalry peculiarly dangerous; and in pursuing a flying enemy, these qualities are still more redoubtable. In the campaign of 1806-7, the Cossacks took the field in great numbers, under their celebrated Hettimau, or Attaman, Platow, who, himself a Cossack, knew their peculiar capacity for warfare, and raised their fame to a pitch which it had not attained in former European wars.

The Russians had also in their service Tartar tribes, who in irregularity resembled the Cossacks, but were not to be compared with them in discipline or courage, being, in truth, little better than hordes of roving savages.

It remains only to be mentioned, that at this time the Russian commissariat was very indifferent, and, above all, deficient in funds. The funds of the Imperial treasury were exhausted, and an aid, amounting only to eighty thousand pounds, was obtained from England with difficulty. In consequence of these circumstances, the Russians were repeatedly, during the campaign, obliged to fight at disadvantage for want of provisions.—We return to the progress of the war.

On the 25th of December, the Russian army of Bennigsen, closely concentrated, occupied a position behind Pultusk; their left, commanded by Count Ostermann, resting upon the town, which is situated on the river Narew. A corps occupied the bridge, to prevent any attack from that point. The right, under Barclay de Tolly, was strongly posted in a wood, and the centre was under the orders of General Sacken. A considerable plain extended between the town of Pultusk and the wood, which formed the right of the Russian position. They had stationed a powerful advanced guard, had occupied the plain with their cavalry, and established a strong reserve in their rear. On the 26th, the Russian position was attacked by the French divisions of Lannes and Davoust, together with the French guards. After skirmishing some time in the centre, without making the desired impression, the battle appeared doubtful, when, suddenly assembling a great strength on their own left, the French made a decisive effort to overwhelm the Russians, by turning their right wing. The attack prevailed to a certain extent. The accumulated and superior weight of fire, determined Barclay de Tolly to retreat on his reserves, which he did without confusion, while the French seized upon the wood, and took several Russian guns. But Bennigsen, in spite of Kaminsky's order to retreat, was determined to abide the brunt of battle, and to avail himself of the rugged intrepidity of the troops which he commanded. Ordering Barclay de Tolly to continue his retreat, and thus throwing back his right wing, he enticed the French, confident in victory, to pursue their success, until the Russian cavalry, which had covered the manœuvre, suddenly withdrawing, they found themselves under a murderous and well-directed fire from one hundred and twenty guns, which, extending along the Russian front, played on the French advancing columns with the utmost success. The Russian line at the same time advanced in turn, and pushing the enemy before them, recovered the ground from which they had been driven. The approach of night ended the combat, which had been both obstinate and bloody. The French lost near eight thousand men, killed and wounded, including General Lannes and five other general officers among the latter. The Russian loss amounted to five thousand. The French retreated after night-fall with such rapidity, that on the next day the Cossacks could not find a rear-guard in the vicinity of Pultusk.

The action of Pultusk raised the reputation of Bennigsen, and the character as well as the spirits of the Russian army; but its moral effect on the soldiers was its only important consequence. Had Bennigsen been joined during the action by the

division of Buxhowden or d'Anrep, of whom the former was only eight miles distant, the check might have been converted into a victory, highly influential on the issue of the campaign. But either the orders of Kaminsky, or some misunderstanding, prevented either of these corps from advancing to support the efforts of Bennigsen. It became impossible for him, therefore, notwithstanding the advantages he had obtained, to retain his position at Pultusk, where he must have been surrounded. He accordingly fell back upon Ostrolenka, where he was joined by Prince Galitzin, who had been engaged in action at Golymin upon the day of the battle of Pultusk, had like Bennigsen driven back the enemy, and like him had retreated, for the purpose of concentrating his forces with those of the grand army. The French evinced a feeling of the unusual and obstinate nature of the contest in which they had been engaged at Pultusk and Golymin. Instead of pressing their operations, they retreated into winter quarters; Napoleon withdrawing his guard as far as Warsaw, while the other divisions were cantoned in the towns to the eastward, but without attempting to realize the prophecies of the bulletins concerning the approaching fate of the Russian army.

The conduct of Kaminsky began now to evince decided tokens of insanity. He was withdrawn from the supreme command, which, with the general approbation of the soldiers, was conferred upon Bennigsen. This general was not equal in military genius to Suwarow, but he seems to have been well fitted to command a Russian army. He was active, hardy, and enterprising, and showed none of that peculiarly fatal hesitation, by which officers of other nations opposed to the French generals, and to Bonaparte in particular, seem often to have been affected, as with a sort of moral palsy, which disabled them for the combat at the very moment when it seemed about to commence. On the contrary, Bennigsen, finding himself in the supreme command of ninety thousand men, was resolved not to wait for Bonaparte's onset, but determined to anticipate his motions; wisely concluding, that the desire of desisting from active operations, which the French Emperor had evinced by cantoning his troops in winter quarters, ought to be a signal to the Russians again to take the field.

The situation of the King of Prussia tended to confirm that determination. This unfortunate monarch—well surely did Frederick William then deserve that epithet—was cooped up in the town of Königsberg, only covered by a small army of a few thousand men, and threatened by the gradual approach of the divisions of Ney and Bernadotte; so that the king's personal safety appeared to be in considerable danger. Grawentz, the key of the Vistula, continued indeed to hold out, but the Prussian garrison was reduced to distress, and the hour of surrender seemed to be approaching. To relieve this important fortress, therefore, and at the same time protect Königsberg, were motives added to the other reasons which determined Bennigsen to resume offensive operations. A severe and doubtful skirmish was fought near Mohringen, in which the French sustained considerable loss. The Cossacks spread abroad over the country, making nu-

merous prisoners; and the scheme of the Russian general succeeded so well, as to enable the faithful l'Estocq to relieve Graudenz with reinforcements and provisions.

By these daring operations, Bonaparte saw himself forced into a winter campaign, and issued general orders for drawing out his force, with the purpose of concentrating them at Willenberg, in the rear of the Russians (then stationed at Mohringen), and betwixt them and their own country. He proposed, in short, to force his enemies eastward towards the Vistula, as at Jena he had compelled the Prussians to fight with their rear turned to the Rhine. Bernadotte had orders to engage the attention of Bennigsen upon the right, and detain him in his present situation, or rather, if possible, induce him to advance eastward towards Thorn, so as to facilitate the operation he meditated.

The Russian general learned Bonaparte's intention from an intercepted dispatch, and changed his purpose of advancing on Ney and Bernadotte. Marches and counter-marches took place, through a country at all times difficult, and now covered with snow. The experience and dexterity of the French secured some advantages, but these were fully counterbalanced by the daily annoyance and loss which they in turn sustained from Platon and his Cossacks. In cases where the French retreated, the Scythian lances were always on their rear; and when the Russians retired in turn, and were pursued by the French, with the same venturesome spirit which they had displayed against others, the latter seldom failed to suffer for their presumption. There was found in the spearmen of the Don and Volga a natural and instinctive turn for military stratagem, ambuscade, and sudden assault, which compelled the French light troops to adopt a caution, very different from their usual habits of audacity.

Bennigsen was aware that it was the interest of Russia to protract the campaign in this manner. He was near his reinforcements, the French were distant from theirs—every loss, therefore, told more in proportion to the enemy, than on his army. On the other hand, the Russian army, impatient of protracted hostilities, became clamorous for battle; for the hardships of their situation were such as to give them every desire to bring the war to a crisis. We have noticed the defects of the Russian commissariat. They were especially manifest during those campaigns, when the leader was obliged more than once, merely from want of provisions, to peril the fate of the war upon a general battle, which prudence would have induced him to avoid. In those northern latitudes, and in the month of February, the troops had no resource but to prow about, and dig for the boards of provisions concealed by the peasants. This labour, added to their military duty, left them scarcely time to lie down; and when they did so, they had no bed but the snow, no shelter but the wintry heaven, and no covering but their rags.* The distresses of the army were so extreme, that it induced General Bennigsen, against his judgment, to give battle at all risks, and for this pur-

pose to concentrate his forces at Preuss-Eylan, which was pitched on as the field on which he proposed to await Bonaparte.

In marching through Landsberg to occupy the selected ground, the Russian rear-guard was exposed to a serious attack by the French, and was only saved from great loss by the gallantry of Prince Bagration, who redeemed, by sheer dint of fighting, the loss sustained by want of conduct in defiling through the streets of a narrow village, while pursued by an enterprising enemy. The Russian army lost 3000 men. On the 7th February, the same gallant prince, with the Russian rear-guard, gained such decided advantages over the French van as nearly balanced the loss at Landsberg, and gave time for the whole army to march through the town of Preuss-Eylan, and to take up a position behind it. It had been intended to maintain the town itself, and a body of troops had been left for that purpose; but in the confusion attending the movement of so large an army, the orders issued had been misunderstood, and the division designed for this service evacuated the place so soon as the rear-guard had passed through it.

A Russian division was hastily ordered to re-occupy Preuss-Eylan. They found the French already in possession, and, although they dislodged them, were themselves driven out in turn by another division of French, to whom Bonaparte had promised the plunder of the town. A third division of Russians was ordered to advance; for Bennigsen was desirous to protract the contest for the town until the arrival of his heavy artillery, which joined him by a different route. When it came up, he would have discontinued the struggle for possession of Preuss-Eylan, but it was impossible to control the ardour of the Russian columns, who persevered in advancing with drums beating, rushed into the town, and, surprising the French in the act of sacking it, put many of them to the bayonet, even in the acts of license which they were practising. Preuss-Eylan, however, proved no place of shelter. It was protected by no works of any kind; and the French, advancing under cover of the hillocks and broken ground which skirt the village, threw their fire upon the streets, by which the Russians sustained some loss. General Barclay de Tolly was wounded, and his forces again evacuated the town, which was once more and finally occupied by the French. Night fell, and the combat ceased, to be renewed with treble fury on the next day.

The position of the two armies may be easily described. That of Russia occupied a space of uneven ground, about two miles in length and a mile in depth, with the village of Serpallen on their left; in the front of their army lay the town of Preuss-Eylan, situated in a hollow, and in possession of the French. It was watched by a Russian division; which, to protect the Russian centre from being broken by an attack from that quarter, was strongly reinforced, though by doing so the right wing was considerably weakened. This was thought of the less consequence, that l'Estocq, with his division of Prussians, was hourly expected to join the Russians on that point. The French occupied Eylau with their left, while their centre and right lay parallel to

* Sir Robert Wilson's *Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland*, in 1806-7, p. 94.

the Russians, upon a chain of heights which commanded in a great measure the ground possessed by the enemy. They also expected to be reinforced by the division of Ney, which had not come up, and which was destined to form on the extreme left.

The space betwixt the hostile armies was open and flat, and intersected with frozen lakes. They might trace each other's position by the pale glimmer of the watch-lights upon the snow. The difference of numerical force was considerably to the advantage of the French. Sir Robert Wilson rates them at 90,000 men, opposed to 60,000 only; but the disproportion is probably considerably overrated.

The eventful action commenced with daybreak on the 8th of February. Two strong columns of the French advanced, with the purpose of turning the right, and storming the centre, of the Russians, at one and the same time. But they were driven back in great disorder by the heavy and sustained fire of the Russian artillery. An attack on the Russian left was equally unsuccessful. The Russian infantry stood like steeple ramparts—they repulsed the enemy—their cavalry came to their support, pursued the retiring assailants, and took standards and eagles. About mid-day, a heavy storm of snow began to fall, which the wind drove right in the face of the Russians, and which added to the obscurity caused by the smoke of the burning village of Serpallen, that rolled along the line.

Under cover of the darkness, six columns of the French advanced with artillery and cavalry, and were close on the Russian position ere they were opposed. Bennigsen, at the head of his staff, brought up the reserves in person, who, uniting with the first line, bore the French back at the point of the bayonet. Their columns, partly broken, were driven again to their own position, where they rallied with difficulty. A French regiment of cuirassiers, which, during this part of the action, had gained an interval in the Russian army, were charged by the Cossacks, and found their defensive armour no protection against the lance. They were all slain except eighteen.

At the moment when victory appeared to declare for the Russians, it was on the point of being wrested from them. Davoust's division had been manoeuvring since the beginning of the action to turn the left, and gain the rear, of the Russian line. They now made their appearance on the field of battle with such sudden effect, that Serpallen was lost, the Russian left wing, and a part of their centre, were thrown into disorder, and forced to retire and change their front, so as to form almost at right angles with the right, and that part of the centre which retained their original position.

At this crisis, and while the French were gaining ground on the rear of the Russians, l'Estocq, so long expected, appeared in his turn suddenly on the field, and, passing the left of the French and the right of the Russians, pushed down in three columns to redeem the battle on the Russian centre and rear. The Prussians, under that loyal and gallant leader, regained in this bloody field their ancient military reputation. They never fired till within a few paces of the enemy, and then used the bayonet with readiness and courage. They redeemed the ground

which the Russians had lost, and drove back in their turn the troops of Davoust and Bernadotte, who had been lately victorious.

Ney, in the meanwhile appeared on the field, and occupied Schloditten, a village on the road to Königsberg. As this endangered the communication of the Russians with that town, it was thought necessary to carry it by storm; a gallant resolution, which was successfully executed. This was the last act of that bloody day. It was ten o'clock at night, and the combat was ended.

Fifty thousand men perished in this dreadful battle—the best contested in which Bonaparte had yet engaged, and by far the most unsuccessful. He retired to the heights from which he had advanced in the morning, without having gained one point for which he had struggled, and after having suffered a loss considerably greater than that which he had inflicted on the enemy. But the condition of the Russian army was also extremely calamitous. Their generals held a council of war upon the field of battle, and without dismounting from their horses. The general sentiment which prevailed among them was, a desire to renew the battle on the next day, at all hazards. Tolstoy undertook to move forward on the French lines—l'Estocq urged the same counsel. They offered to pledge their lives, that, would Bennigsen advance, Napoleon must necessarily retire; and they urged the moral effect which would be produced, not on their army only, but on Germany and on Europe, by such an admission of weakness on the part of him who had never advanced but to victory. But Bennigsen conceived that the circumstances of his army did not permit him to encounter the hazard of being cut off from Königsberg, and endangering the person of the King of Prussia; or that of risking a second general action, with an army diminished by at least 20,000 killed and wounded, short of ammunition, and totally deprived of provisions. The Russians accordingly commenced their retreat on Königsberg that very night. The division of Count Ostermann did not move till the next morning, when it traversed the field in front of Preuss-Eylau, without the slightest interruption from the French, who still occupied the town.

The battle of Preuss-Eylau was claimed as a victory by both parties, though it was very far from being decided in favour of either. Bennigsen had it to boast, that he had repelled the attacks of Bonaparte along the whole of his line, and that the fighting terminated unfavourably to the French. He could also exhibit the unusual spectacle of twelve imperial eagles of France, taken in one action. For many days after the battle, also, the Cossacks continued to scour the country, and bring into Königsberg great numbers of French prisoners. On the other hand, the subsequent retreat of the Russians was interpreted by the French into an acknowledgment of weakness, and they appealed to their own possession of the field of battle, with the dead and wounded, as the usual testimonials of victory.

But there were two remarkable circumstances, by which Napoleon virtually acknowledged that he had received an unusual check. On the 13th February, four days after the battle, a message was dispatched to the King of Prussia by Bonaparte,

proposing an armistice, on grounds far more favourable to the prince than those Frederick William might have been disposed to accept, or which Bonaparte would have been inclined to grant, after the battle of Jena. It was even intimated, that in case of agreeing to make a separate peace, the Prussian King might obtain from the French Emperor the restoration of his whole dominions. True to his ally, the Emperor of Russia, Frederick William, even in the extremity of his distress, refused to accede to any save a general peace. The proposal of an armistice was also peremptorily refused, and the ground on which it was offered was construed to indicate Bonaparte's conscious weakness.

Another decisive proof of the loss which Napoleon had sustained in the battle of Preuss-Eylau, was his inactivity after the battle. For eight days he remained without making any movement, excepting by means of his cavalry, which were generally worsted, and on the 16th February he evacuated the place, and prepared himself to retreat upon the Vistula, instead of driving the Russians, as he had threatened, behind the Pregel. Various actions took place during his retreat with different fortunes, but the Russian Cossacks and light troops succeeded in making numbers of prisoners, and collecting much spoil.

The operations of Napoleon, when he had again retired to the line of the Vistula, intimated caution, and the sense of a difficult task before him. He appeared to feel, that the advance into Poland had been premature, while Dantzig remained in the hands of the Prussians, from whence the most alarming operations might take place in his rear, should he again advance to the Vistula without subduing it. The siege of Dantzig was therefore to be formed without delay. The place was defended by General Kalkreuth to the last extremity. After many unsuccessful attempts to relieve it, Dantzig finally surrendered in the end of May, 1807, after trenches had been opened before it for fifty-two days. If the season of the year had admitted, a British expedition to Dantzig might, if ably conducted, have operated in the rear of the Emperor Napoleon the relief of Prussia, and perhaps effected the liberation of Europe.

The utmost care was also taken, to supply the loss which Napoleon's armies had sustained in these hard-fought campaigns. He raised the siege of Colberg, drew the greater part of his forces out of Silesia, ordered a new levy in Switzerland, urged the march of bodies of troops from Italy, and, to complete his means, demanded a new conscription of the year 1808, which was instantly complied with by the Senate as a matter of course. At length, as summer approached, the surrender of Dantzig enabled him to unite the besieging division, twenty-five thousand strong, to his main army, and to prepare to resume offensive operations. A large levy of Poles was made at the same time; and they, with other light troops of the French, were employed in making strong reconnaissances, with various fortune, but never without the exchange of hard blows. It became evident to all Europe, that, whatever might be the end of this bloody conflict, the French Emperor was contending with a general and troops,

against whom it was impossible to gain those overpowering and irresistible advantages, which characterized his campaigns in Italy and Germany. The bulletins, it is true, announced new successes from day to day; but as the geographical advance upon the Polish territory was by no means in proportion to the advantages claimed, it was plain that Napoleon was as often engaged in parrying as in pushing, in repairing losses as in improving victories. The Russian generals composed plans with skill, and executed them with activity and spirit, for cutting off separate divisions, and disturbing the French communications.

The Russian army had received reinforcements; but they were deficient in numerical amount, and only made up their strength, at the utmost, to their original computation of 90,000 men. This proved unpardonable negligence in the Russian government, considering the ease with which men can there be levied to any extent by the mere will of the emperor, and the vital importance of the war which they were now waging. It is said, however, that the poverty of the Russian administration was the cause of this failure to recruit their forces; and that the British being applied to, to negotiate a loan of six millions, and advance one million to account, had declined the transaction, and thereby given great offence to the Emperor Alexander.

Napoleon, so much more remote from his own territories, had already, by exertions unparalleled in the history of Europe, assembled two hundred and eighty thousand men between the Vistula and Memel, including the garrison of Dantzig. With such unequal forces the war recommenced.

The Russians were the assailants, making a combined movement on Ney's division, which was stationed at Gutstadt, and in the vicinity. They pursued him as far as Deppen, where there was some fighting; but upon the 8th of June, Napoleon advanced in person to extricate his marshal, and Bennigsen was obliged to retreat in his turn. He was hardly pressed on the rear by the Grand Army of France. But even in this moment of peril, Platow, with his Cossacks, made a charge, or, in their phrase, a *hourra*, upon the French, with such success, that they not only dispersed the skirmishers of the French van-guard, and the advanced troops destined to support them, but compelled the infantry to form squares, endangered the personal safety of Napoleon, and occupied the attention of the whole French cavalry, who bore down on them at full speed. Musketry and artillery were all turned on them at once, but to little or no purpose; for, having once gained the purpose of checking the advance, which was all they aimed at, the cloud of Cossacks dispersed over the field, like mist before the sun, and united behind the battalions whom their demonstration had protected.

By this means Platow and his followers had got before the retreating division of the Russian army under Bagration, which they were expected to support, and had reached first a bridge over the Aller. The Cossacks were alarmed by the immense display of force demonstrated against them, and showed a disposition to throw themselves confusedly on the bridge, which must certainly have been attended

with the most disastrous consequences to the rear-guard, who would thus have been impeded in their retreat by the very troops appointed to support them. The courage and devotion of Platow prevented that great misfortune. He threw himself from his horse. "Let the Cossack that is base enough," he exclaimed, "desert his bettmann!" The children of the wilderness halted around him, and he disposed them in perfect order to protect the retreat of Bagration and the rear-guard, and afterwards achieved his own retreat with trifling loss.

The Russian army fell back upon Heilsberg, and there concentrating their forces, made a most desperate stand. A very hard-fought action here took place. The Russians, overpowered by superior numbers, and forced from the level ground, continued to defend with fury their position on the heights, which the French made equally strenuous efforts to carry by assault. The combat was repeatedly renewed, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery; but without the fiery valour of the assailants making any effectual impression on the iron ranks of the Russians. The battle continued, till the approach of midnight, upon terms of equality; and when the morning dawned, the space of ground between the position of the Russians and that of the French, was not merely strewn, but literally sheeted over, with the bodies of the dead and wounded. The Russians retired unmolested after the battle of Heilsberg, and, crossing the river Aller, placed that barrier betwixt them and the army of Bonaparte, which, though it had suffered great losses, had, in consequence of the superiority of numbers, been less affected by them than the Russian forces. In the condition of Bennigsen's army, it was his obvious policy to protract the war, especially as reinforcements, to the number of thirty thousand men, were approaching the frontier from the interior of the empire. It was probably with this view that he kept his army on the right bank of the Aller, with the exception of a few bodies of cavalry, for the sake of observation and intelligence.

On the 14th, the Russian army reached Friedland, a considerable town on the west side of the Aller, communicating with the eastern, or right bank of the river, by a long wooden bridge. It was the object of Napoleon to induce the Russian general to pass by this narrow bridge to the left bank, and then to decoy him into a general action, in a position where the difficulty of defiling through the town, and over the bridge, must render retreat almost impossible. For this purpose he showed such a proportion only of his forces, as induced General Bennigsen to believe that the French troops on the western side of the Aller consisted only of Oudinot's division, which had been severely handled in the battle of Heilsberg, and which he now hoped altogether to destroy. Under this deception he ordered a Russian division to pass the bridge, defile through the town, and march to the assault. The French took care to offer no such resistance as should intimate their real strength. Bennigsen was thus led to reinforce this division with another—the battle thickened, and the Russian general at length transported all his army, one division excepted, to the left bank of the Aller, by means of the wooden

bridge and three pontoons, and arrayed them in front of the town of Friedland, to overpower, as he supposed, the crippled division of the French, to which alone he believed himself opposed.

But no sooner had he taken this irretrievable step than the mask was dropped. The French skirmishers advanced in force; heavy columns of infantry began to show themselves; batteries of cannon were got into position; and all circumstances concurred, with the report of prisoners, to assure Bennigsen, that he, with his enfeebled forces, was in presence of the grand French army. His position, a sort of plain, surrounded by woods and broken ground, was difficult to defend; with the town and a large river in his rear, it was dangerous to attempt a retreat, and to advance was prevented by the inequality of his force. Bennigsen now became anxious to maintain his communication with Wehlau, a town on the Pregel, which was the original point of retreat, and where he hoped to join with the Prussians under General l'Estocq. If the enemy should seize the bridge at Allerberg, some miles lower down the Aller than Friedland, this plan would become impossible, and he found himself therefore obliged to diminish his forces, by detaching six thousand men to defend that point. With the remainder of his force he resolved to maintain his present position till night.

The French advanced to the attack about ten o'clock. The broken and wooded country which they occupied, enabled them to maintain and renew their efforts at pleasure, while the Russians, in their exposed situation, could not make the slightest movement without being observed. Yet they fought with such obstinate valour, that about noon the French seemed sickening of the contest, and about to retire. But this was only a feint, to repose such of their forces as had been engaged, and to bring up reinforcements. The cannonade continued till about half past four, when Bonaparte brought up his full force in person, for the purpose of one of those desperate and generally irresistible efforts to which he was wont to trust the decision of a doubtful day. Columns of enormous power, and extensive depth, appeared partially visible among the interstices of the wooded country, and seen from the town of Friedland, the hapless Russian army looked as if surrounded by a deep semicircle of glittering steel. The attack upon all the line, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery, was general and simultaneous, the French advancing with shouts of assured victory; while the Russians, weakened by the loss of at least twelve thousand killed and wounded, were obliged to attempt that most dispiriting and dangerous of movements—a retreat through encumbered defiles, in front of a superior enemy. The principal attack was on the left wing, where the Russian position was at length forced. The troops which composed it streamed into the town, and crowded the bridge and pontoons; the enemy thundered on their rear, and, without the valour of Alexander's Imperial Guard, the Russians would have been utterly destroyed. These brave soldiers charged with the bayonet the corps of Ney, who led the French van-guard, disordered his column, and, though they were overpowered by numbers, prevented the total ruin of the left wing.

Meanwhile, the bridge and pontoons were set on fire, to prevent the French, who had forced their way into the town, from taking possession of them. The smoke, rolling over the combatants, increased the horror and confusion of the scene; yet a considerable part of the Russian infantry escaped through a ford close by the town, which was discovered in the moment of defeat. The Russian centre and right, who remained on the west bank of the Aller, effected a retreat by a circuitous route, leaving on the right the town of Friedland, with its burning bridges, no longer practicable for friend or foe, and passing the Aller by a ford considerably farther down the river. This also was found out in the very moment of extremity,—was deep and dangerous,—took the infantry up to the breast, and destroyed what ammunition was left in the tambrils.

Thus were the Russians once more united on the right bank of the Aller, and enabled to prosecute their march towards Wehlau. Amid the calamities of defeat, they had saved all their cannon except seventeen, and preserved their baggage. Indeed, the stubborn character of their defence seems to have paralyzed the energies of the victor, who, after carrying the Russian position, showed little of that activity in improving his success, which usually characterized him upon such occasions. He pushed no troops over the Aller in pursuit of the retreating enemy, but suffered Bennigsen to rally his broken troops without interruption. Neither, when in possession of Friedland, did he detach any force down the left bank, to act upon the flank of the Russian centre and right, and cut them off from the river. In short, the battle of Friedland, according to the expression of a French general, was a battle gained, but a victory lost.

Yet the most important consequences resulted from the action, though the French success had been but partially improved. Königsberg, which had been so long the refuge of the King of Prussia, was evacuated by his forces, as it became plain his Russian auxiliaries could no longer maintain the war in Poland. Bennigsen retreated to Tilsit, towards the Russian frontiers. But the moral consequences of the defeat were of far greater consequence than could have been either the capture of guns and prisoners, or the acquisition of territory. It had the effect, evidently desired by Napoleon, of disposing the Emperor Alexander to peace. The former could not but feel that he was engaged with a more obstinate enemy in Russia, than any he had yet encountered. After so many bloody battles, he was scarce arrived on the frontiers of an immense empire, boundless in its extent, and almost inexhaustible in resources; while the French, after suffering extremely in defeating an army that was merely auxiliary, could scarce be supposed capable of undertaking a scheme of invasion so gigantic, as that of plunging into the vast regions of Muscovy.

Such an enterprise would have been peculiarly hazardous in the situation in which the French Emperor now stood. The English expedition to the Baltic was daily expected. Gustavus was in Swedish Pomerania, at the head of a considerable army, which had raised the siege of Stralsund. A spirit of resistance was awakening in Prussia, where the

resolute conduct of Blücher had admirers and imitators, and the nation seemed to be reviving from the consternation inflicted by the defeat of Jena. The celebrated Schill, a partisan of great courage and address, had gained many advantages, and was not unlikely, in a nation bred to arms, to acquire the command of a numerous body of men. Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick, and the other provinces of Germany, deprived of their ancient princes, and subjected to heavy exactions by the conquerors, were ripe for insurrection. All these dangers were of a nature from which little could be apprehended while the Grand Army was at a moderate distance; but were it to advance into Russia, especially were it to meet with a check there, these sparks of fire, left in the rear, might be expected to kindle a dreadful conflagration.

Moved by such considerations, Napoleon had fully kept open the door for reconciliation betwixt the czar and himself, abstaining from all those personal reflections against him, which he usually showered upon those who thwarted his projects, and intimating more than once, by different modes of communication, that a peace, which should enable Russia and France to divide the world betwixt them, should be placed within Alexander's reach so soon as he was disposed to accept it.

The time was now arrived when the Emperor of Russia was disposed to listen to terms of accommodation with France. He had been for some time dissatisfied with his allies. Against Frederick William, indeed, nothing could be objected, save his bad fortune; but what is it that so soon deprives us of our friends as a constant train of bad luck, rendering us always a burthen more than an aid to them? The King of Sweden was a feeble ally at best, and had become so unpopular with his subjects, that his dethronement was anticipated; and it was probably remembered, that the Swedish province of Finland extended so near to St Petersburg, as to be a desirable acquisition, which, in the course of a treaty with Bonaparte, might be easily attained.

The principal ally of the czar had been Britain. But he was displeased, as we have already noticed, with the economy of the English cabinet, who had declined, in this instance, the loans and subsidies, of which they used to be liberal to allies of far less importance. A subsidy of about eighty thousand pounds was all which he had been able to extract from them. England had, indeed, sent an army into the north to join the Swedes, in forming the siege of Stralsund; but this was too distant an operation to produce any effect upon the Polish campaign. Alexander was also affected by the extreme sufferings of his subjects. His army had been to him, as to most young sovereigns, a particular object of attention; and he was justly proud of his noble regiment of guards, which, maltreated as they had been in the desperate actions of which we have given some account, remained scarce the shadow of themselves, in numbers and appearance. His fame, moreover, suffered little in withdrawing from a contest in which he was engaged as an auxiliary only; and Alexander was no doubt made to comprehend, that he might do more in behalf of the King of Prussia, his

ally, by negotiation than by continuation of the war. The influence of Napoleon's name, and the extraordinary splendour of his talents and his exploits, must also have had an effect upon the youthful imagination of the Russian emperor. He might be allowed to feel pride (high as his own situation was) that the destined victor, who had subdued so many princes, was willing to acknowledge an equality in his case; and he might not yet be so much aware of the nature of ambition, as to know that it holds the world as inadequate to maintain two co-ordinate sovereigns.)

The Russian emperor's wish of an armistice was first hinted at by Bennigsen, on the 21st June, was ratified on the 23d of the same month, and was soon afterwards followed, not only by peace with Russia and Prussia, on a basis which seemed to preclude the possibility of future misunderstanding, but by the formation of a personal intimacy and friendship between Napoleon and the only sovereign in Europe who had the power necessary to treat with him on an equal footing.

The negotiation for this important pacification was not conducted in the usual style of diplomacy, but in that which Napoleon had repeatedly shown a desire to substitute for the conferences of inferior agents, by the intervention, namely, of the high-contracting parties in person.

The armistice was no sooner agreed upon, than preparations were made for a personal interview betwixt the two emperors. It took place upon a raft prepared for the purpose, and moored in the midst of the river Niemen, which bore an immense tent or pavilion. At half past nine, 25th June, 1807, the two emperors, in the midst of thousands of spectators, embarked at the same moment from the opposite banks of the river. Bonaparte was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt; Alexander, by his brother the Archduke Constantine, Generals Bennigsen and Oubarow, with the Count de Lieven, one of his aides-de-camp. Arriving at the raft, they disembarked and embraced amid the shouts and acclamations of both armies, and, entering the pavilion which had been prepared, held a private conference of two hours. Their officers, who remained at a distance during the interview, were then reciprocally introduced, and the fullest good understanding seemed to be established between the sovereigns, who had at their disposal so great a portion of the universe. It is not to be doubted, that on this momentous occasion Napoleon exerted all those personal powers of attraction, which, exercised on the part of one otherwise so distinguished, rarely failed to acquire the good-will of all with whom he had intercourse, when he was disposed to employ them.* He pos-

* The impression which Bonaparte's presence and conversation, aided by the preconceived ideas of his talents, made on all who approached his person, was of the most striking kind. The captain of a British man-of-war, who was present at his occupying the island of Elba, disturbed on that occasion the solemnity and gravity of a levee, at which several British functionaries attended, by bearing a homely, but certainly a striking testimony to his powers of attraction, while he exclaimed, that "Boney was a d—d good fellow, after all!"

seased also, in an eminent degree, the sort of eloquence which can make the worse appear the better reason, and which, turning into ridicule the arguments derived from general principles of morality or honesty, which he was accustomed to term idiosyncrasy, makes all reasoning rest upon existing circumstances. Thus, all the maxims of truth and honour might be plausibly parried by those arising out of immediate convenience; and the direct interest, or what seemed the direct interest, of the party whom he wished to gain over, was put in immediate opposition to the dictates of moral sentiment, and of princely virtue. In this manner he might plausibly represent, in many points, that the weal of Alexander's empire might require him to strain some of the maxims of truth and justice, and to do a little wrong in order to attain a great national advantage.

The town of Tilsit was now declared neutral. Entertainments of every kind followed each other in close succession, and the French and Russian, nay, even the Prussian officers, seemed so delighted with each other's society, that it was difficult to conceive that men, so courteous and amiable, had been for so many months drenching trampled snows and muddy wastes with each other's blood. The two emperors were constantly together in public and in private, and on those occasions their intimacy approached to the character of that of two young men of rank, who are comrades in sport or frolic, as well as accustomed to be associates in affairs, and upon occasions, of graver moment. They are well known to have had private and confidential meetings, where gaiety and even gallantry seemed to be the sole purpose, but where politics were not entirely forgotten.

Upon the more public occasions, there were guests at the imperial festivities, for which they contained small mirth. On the 28th, the unfortunate King of Prussia arrived at Tilsit, and was presented to his formidable victor. Bonaparte did not admit him to the footing of equality on which he treated the Emperor Alexander, and made an early intimation, that it would only be for the purpose of obliging his brother of the North, that he might consent to relax his grasp on the Prussian territories. Those in the king's own possession were reduced to the petty territory of Memel, with the fortresses of Colberg and Graudentz. It was soon plain, that the terms on which he was to be restored to a part of his dominions would deprive Prussia of almost all the accessions which had been made since 1773, under the system and by the talents of the Great Frederick, and reduce her at once from a first-rate power in Europe to one of the second class.

The beautiful and unfortunate queen, whose high spirit had hastened the war, was anxious, and, it is possible, to interfere with such weight as female intercession might use, to diminish the calamities of the peace. It was but on the first day of the foregoing April, that when meeting the Emperor Alexander at Königsberg, and feeling the full difference betwixt that interview, and those at Berlin which preceded the war, Alexander and Frederick William had remained locked for a time in each other's arms; the former shedding tears of compassion, the latter of grief. On

the same occasion, the queen, as she saluted the emperor, could only utter amidst her tears the words, "Dear cousin!" intimating at once the depth of their distress, and their affectionate confidence in the magnanimity of their ally. This scene was melancholy, but that which succeeded it at Tilait was more so, for it was embittered by degradation. The queen, who arrived at the place of treaty some days after her husband, was now not only to support the presence of Napoleon, in whose official prints she was personally abused, and who was the author of all the misfortunes which had befallen her country; but if she would in any degree repair these misfortunes, it could only be by exciting his compassion, and propitiating his favour. "Forgive us," she said, "this fatal war—the memory of the Great Frederick deceived us—we thought ourselves his equals because we are his descendants—alas, we have not proved such!" With a zeal for the welfare of Prussia, which must have cost her own feelings exquisite pain, she used towards Napoleon those arts of insinuation, by which women possessed of high rank, great beauty, wit, and grace, frequently exercise an important influence. Desirous to pay his court, Napoleon on one occasion offered her a rose of uncommon beauty. The queen at first seemed to decline receiving the courtesy—then accepted it, adding the stipulation—"At least with Magdeburg." Bonaparte, as he boasted to Joséphine, was proof against these lady-like artifices, as wax-cloth is against rain. "Your majesty will be pleased to remember," he said, "that it is I who offer, and that your majesty has only the task of accepting."

It was discourteous to remind the unfortunate princess how absolutely she was at the mercy of the victor, and unchivalrous to dispute that a lady, accepting a courtesy, has a right to conceive herself as conferring an obligation, and is therefore entitled to annex a condition. But it is true, on the other hand, as Napoleon himself urged, that it would have been playing the gallant at a high price, if he had exchanged towns and provinces in return for civilities. It is not believed that the Queen of Prussia succeeded to any extent in obtaining a modification of the terms to which her husband was subjected; and it is certain, that she felt so deeply the distress into which her country was plunged, that her sense of it brought her to an untimely grave. The death of this interesting and beautiful queen, not only powerfully affected the mind of her husband and family, but the Prussian nation at large; who regarding her as having died a victim to her patriotic sorrow for the national misfortunes, recorded her fate as one of the many injuries, for which they were to call France and Napoleon to a severe accounting.

The terms imposed on Prussia by the treaty of Tilait were briefly these:—

That portion of Poland acquired by Prussia in the partition of 1772 was disunited from that kingdom, and erected into a separate territory, to be called the Great Duchy of Warsaw. It was to be held by the King of Saxony, under the character of Grand Duke; and it was stipulated that he was to have direct communication with this new acquisition by means of a military road across Silesia, a privilege likely to occasion constant jealousy betwixt the courts of Berlin

and Warsaw. Thus ended the hope of the Poles to be restored to the condition of an independent nation. They merely exchanged the dominion of one German master for another—Prussia for Saxony, Frederick William for Augustus—the only difference being, that the latter was descended from the ancient kings of Poland. They were, however, subjected to a milder and more easy yoke than that which they had hitherto borne; nor does it appear that the king (as he had been created) of Saxony derived any real addition of authority and consequence from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It seems indeed probable, that the erection of this sovereignty was the effect of a composition between the emperors; Napoleon, on the one hand, renouncing all attempts at the liberation of Poland, which he could not have persevered in without continuing the war with Russia, and perhaps with Austria also; and Alexander consenting that Prussia should be deprived of her Polish dominions, under the stipulation that they were to be transferred to Saxony, from whose vicinity his empire could apprehend little danger.

The constitution arranged for the Grand Duchy, also, was such as was not liable to lead to disturbances among those provinces of Poland which were united with Austria and Russia. Slavery was abolished, and the equality of legal rights among all ranks of citizens was acknowledged. The Grand Duke held the executive power. A Senate, or Upper House, of eighteen members, and a Lower House of Nuncios, or Deputies, amounting to a hundred, passed into laws, or rejected at their pleasure, such propositions as the duke laid before them. But the Diets, the *Pospolite*, the *Liberum Veto*, and all the other turbulent privileges of the Polish nobles, continued abolished, as they had been under the Prussian government.

Bonaparte made it his boast that he had returned the Prussian territories not to the house of Brandenburg, but to Alexander; so that if Frederick William yet reigned, it was only, he said, by the friendship of Alexander,—“a term,” he added, “which he himself did not recognize in the vocabulary of sovereigns, under the head of state affairs.” Alexander, however, was not altogether so disinterested, as Bonaparte, with something like a sneer, thus seemed to insinuate. There was excepted from the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and added to the territory of Russia at the expense of Prussia, the province of Bialystock, serving materially to improve the frontier of the empire. Thus the czar, in some degree, profited by the distress of his ally. The apology for his conduct must rest, first, on the strength of the temptation to stretch his empire towards the Vistula, as a great natural boundary; secondly, on the plea, that if he had declined the acquisition from a point of delicacy, Saxony, not Prussia, would have profited by his self-denial, as the territory of Bialystock would in that event have gone to augment the Duchy of Warsaw. Russia ceded the lordship of Iever to Holland, as an ostensible compensation for her new acquisition.

Dantzic, with a certain surrounding territory, was by the treaty of Tilait recognized as a free city, under the protection of Prussia and Saxony. There can be little doubt, that the further provision, that France should occupy the town until the conclusion

of a maritime peace, was intended to secure for the use of Napoleon a place of arms, so important in case of a new breach betwixt him and Russia.

It followed, as a matter of course, that the Emperor Alexander, and the King of Prussia, ratified all the changes which Napoleon had wrought on Europe, acknowledged the thrones which he had erected, and recognized the leagues which he had formed. On the other hand, out of deference to the emperor, Bonaparte consented that the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, German princes connected with Alexander, should remain in possession of their territories, the French, however, continuing to occupy the seaports of the two countries last named, until a final peace betwixt France and England.

While these important negotiations were proceeding, a radical change took place in the councils of the British nation; what was called the Fox and Grenville administration being dissolved, and their place supplied by one formed under the auspices of the Duke of Portland, and comprehending Lords Liverpool, Castlereagh, Mr Canning, and other statesmen, professing the principles of the late William Pitt. It was an anxious object with the new cabinet to reconcile the czar to the alliance of England, and atone for the neglect with which he considered himself as having been treated by their predecessors. With this purpose, Lord Leveson Gower (now Lord Viscount Granville) was dispatched with power to make such offers of conciliation as might maintain or renew an amicable intercourse between Britain and Russia. But the Emperor Alexander had taken his part, at least for the present; and, being predetermined to embrace the course recommended by his new ally, Bonaparte, he avoided giving audience to the British ambassador, and took his measures at Tilsit, without listening to the offers of accommodation which Lord Gower was empowered to propose.

By the treaty of Tilsit, so far as made public, Russia offered her mediation betwixt Britain and France, on condition that the first-named kingdom should accept the proffer of her interference within a month. So far, therefore, the czar appeared to a certain extent careful of the interests of his late ally. But it is now perfectly well understood, that among other private articles of this memorable treaty, there existed one, by which the emperor bound himself, in case of Britain's rejecting the proposed mediation, to recognize and enforce what Bonaparte called the continental system, by shutting his ports against British vessels, and engaging the northern courts in a new coalition, having for its object the destruction of English maritime superiority. In a word, the armed Northern Neutrality, originally formed under the auspices of Catherine, and in an evil hour adopted by the unfortunate Paul, was again to be established under the authority of Alexander. Denmark, smarting under the recollections of the battle of Copenhagen, only waited, it was thought, the signal to join such a coalition, and would willingly consent to lend her still powerful navy to its support; and Sweden was in too weak and distracted a state to resist the united will of France and Russia, either regarding

war with Britain, or any other stipulations which it might be intended to impose upon her. But as there is no country of Europe to which the commerce of England is so beneficial as Russia, whose gross produce she purchases almost exclusively, it was necessary to observe strict secrecy upon these further objects. The ostensible proposal of mediation was therefore resorted to, less in the hope, perhaps, of establishing peace betwixt France and England, than in the expectation of affording a pretext, which might justify in the eye of the Russian nation a rupture with the latter power. But in spite of every precaution which could be adopted, the address of the British ambassador obtained possession of the secret article which France and Russia deemed it so important to conceal; and Lord Gower was able to transmit to his court an exact account of this secret article, and particularly of the two emperors having resolved to employ the Danish fleet in the destruction of the maritime rights of Britain, which had been so lately put upon a footing, that, to Alexander at least, had, till his recent fraternization with Bonaparte, seemed entirely satisfactory.

There were, no doubt, other secret articles named in the treaty of Tilsit, by which it seems to have been the object of these two great emperors, as they loved to term themselves, of the North and of the South, to divide the civilized world between them. It may be regarded as certain, that Bonaparte opened to Alexander the course of unprincipled policy which he intended to pursue respecting the kingdom of Spain, and procured his acquiescence in that daring usurpation. And it has been affirmed, that he also stipulated for the aid of Russia to take Gibraltar, to recover Malta and Egypt, and to banish the British flag from the Mediterranean. All these enterprises were more or less directly calculated to the depression, or rather the destruction of Great Britain, the only formidable enemy who still maintained the strife against France, and so far the promised co-operation of Russia must have been in the highest degree grateful to Napoleon. But Alexander, however much he might be Bonaparte's personal admirer, did not follow his father's simplicity in becoming his absolute dupe, but took care, in return for his compliance with the distant, and in some degree visionary projects of Bonaparte's ambition, to exact his countenance and co-operation in gaining certain acquisitions of the highest importance to Russia, and which were found at a future period to have added powerfully to her means of defence, when she once more matched her strength with that of France. To explain this, we must look back to the ancient policy of France and of Europe, when, by supporting the weaker states, and maintaining their dependence, it was the object to prevent the growth of any gigantic and overbearing power, who might derange the balance of the civilized world.

The growing strength of Russia used in former times to be the natural subject of jealousy to the French government, and they endeavoured to counterbalance these apprehensions by extending the protection of France to the two weaker neighbours of Russia, the Porte and the kingdom of Sweden, with which powers it had always been the policy of

France to connect herself, and which connexion was not only honourable to that kingdom, but useful to Europe. But at the treaty of Tilsit, and in Bonaparte's subsequent conduct relating to these powers, he lost sight of this national policy, or rather sacrificed it to his own personal objects.

One of the most important private articles of the treaty of Tilsit seems to have provided, that Sweden should be despoiled of her provinces of Finland in favour of the czar, and be thus, with the consent of Bonaparte, deprived of all effectual means of annoying Russia. A single glance at the map will show, how completely the possession of Finland put a Swedish army, or the army of France as an ally of Sweden, within a short march of St Petersburg; and how, by consenting to Sweden's being stripped of that important province, Napoleon relinquished the grand advantage to be derived from it, in case of his ever being again obliged to contend with Russia upon Russian ground. Yet there can be no doubt, that at the treaty of Tilsit he became privy to the war which Russia shortly after waged against Sweden, in which Alexander deprived that ancient kingdom of her frontier province of Finland, and thereby obtained a covering territory of the last and most important consequence to his own capital.

The Porte was no less made a sacrifice to the inordinate anxiety, which, at the treaty of Tilsit, Bonaparte seems to have entertained, for acquiring at any price the accession of Russia to his extravagant desire of destroying England. By the public treaty, indeed, some care seems to have been taken of the interests of Turkey, since it provides that Turkey was to have the benefit of peace under the mediation of France, and that Russia was to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, for the acquisition of which she was then waging an unprovoked war. But by the secret agreement of the two emperors, it was unquestionably understood, that Turkey in Europe was to be placed at the mercy of Alexander, as forming naturally a part of the Russian empire, as Spain, Portugal, and perhaps Great Britain, were, from local position, destined to become provinces of France. At the subsequent congress betwixt the emperors at Erfurt, their measures against the Porte were more fully adjusted.

It may seem strange, that the shrewd and jealous Napoleon should have suffered himself to be so much overreached in his treaty with Alexander, since the benefits stipulated for France, in the treaty of Tilsit, were in a great measure vague, and subjects of hope rather than certainty. The British naval force was not easily to be subdued—Gibraltar and Malta are as strong fortresses as the world can exhibit—the conquest of Spain was at least a doubtful undertaking, if the last war of the Succession was carefully considered. But the Russian objects were nearer, and were within her grasp. Finland was seized on with little difficulty, nor did the conquest even of Constantinople possess anything very difficult to a Russian army, if unopposed save by the undisciplined forces of the Turkish empire. Thus it is evident, that Napoleon exchanged, for distant and contingent prospects, his acquiescence in the Russian objects, which were near, essential, and, in comparison, of easy attainment. The effect

of this policy we shall afterwards advert to. Meanwhile, the two most ancient allies of France, and who were of the greatest political importance to her in case of a second war with Russia, were most unwisely abandoned to the mercy of that power, who failed not to despoil Sweden of Finland, and, but for intervening causes, would probably have seized upon Constantinople with the same ease.

If the reader should wonder how Bonaparte, able and astutious as he was, came to be overreached in the treaty of Tilsit, we believe the secret may be found in a piece of private history. Even at that early period, Napoleon nourished the idea of fixing, as he supposed, the fate of his own family, or dynasty, by connecting it by marriage with the blood of one of the established monarchies of Europe. He had hopes, even then, that he might obtain the hand of one of the Archduchesses of Russia, nor did the emperor throw any obstacle in the way of the scheme. It is well known that his suit was afterwards disappointed by the Empress Mother, who pleaded the difference of religion; but at the time of the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon was actually encouraged, or deceived himself into an idea that he received encouragement, to form a perpetual family-connexion with Russia. This induced him to deal easily with Alexander in the matters which they had to discuss together, and to act the generous, almost the prodigal friend. And this also seems to have been the reason why Napoleon frequently complained of Alexander's insincerity, and often termed him *The Greek*, according to the Italian sense of the name, which signifies a trickster, or deceiver.

But we must return from the secret articles of the Tilsit treaty, which opened such long vistas in futurity, to the indisputable and direct consequences of that remarkable measure.

The treaty betwixt Russia and France was signed upon the 7th—that betwixt France and Prussia on the 9th July. Frederick William published upon the 24th of the same month one of the most dignified, and at the same time the most affecting proclamations, that ever expressed the grief of an unfortunate sovereign.

"Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns," said this most interesting document, "my arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relics of my army have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundaries of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice, and sign a peace, no choice remained for me save to follow his example. That peace was necessarily purchased upon terms corresponding to imperious circumstances. It has imposed on me, and on my house—it has imposed upon the whole country, the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocities of love and duty, the work of ages, have been broken asunder. My efforts have proved in vain. Fate ordains it, and a father parts from his children. I release you completely from your allegiance to myself and to my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereign. Be to him what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever efface the remembrance of you from my heart."

To trace the triumphant return of the victor is a

singular contrast to those melancholy effusions of the vanquished monarch. The treaty of Tilsit had ended all appearance of opposition to France upon the Continent. The British armament, which had been sent to Pomerania too late in the campaign, was re-embarked, and the King of Sweden, evacuating Stralsund, retired to the dominions which he was not very long destined to call his own. After having remained together for twenty days, during which they daily maintained the most friendly intercourse, and held together long and secret conferences, the two emperors at last separated, with demonstrations of the highest personal esteem, and each heaping upon the other all the honours which it was in his power to bestow. The congress broke up on the 9th July; and on his return to France, Napoleon visited Saxony, and was there met at Bautzen (doomed for a very different reason to be renowned in his history) by King Augustus, who received him with the honours due to one who had, in outward appearance at least, augmented the power which he might have overthrown.

On 29th July, Napoleon, restored to his palace at St-Cloud, received the homage of the Senate and other official and constitutional bodies. The celebrated naturalist, Lacépède, as the organ of the former body, made a pompous enumeration of the miracles of the campaign; and avowed that the accomplishment of such wonderful actions as would seemingly have required ages was but to Napoleon the work of a few months; while at the same time his ruling genius gave motion to all the domestic administration of his vast empire, and, although four hundred leagues distant from the capital, was present with and observant of the most complicated as well as extensive details. "We cannot," concludes the orator, "offer to your majesty praises worthy of you. Your glory is too much raised above us. It will be the task of posterity, removed at a distance from your presence, to estimate with greater truth its real degree of elevation. Enjoy, sire, the recompense the most worthy of the greatest of monarchs, the happiness of being beloved by the greatest of nations, and may our great-grandchildren be long happy under your majesty's reign."

So spoke the President of the French Senate; and who, that wished to retain the name of a rational being, dared have said, that, within the period of seven years, the same Senate would be carrying to the downfallen and dejected King of Prussia their congratulations on his share in the overthrow of the very man, whom they were now adoring as a demigod!

The fortunes and fame of Napoleon were, indeed, such as to excite in the highest degree the veneration with which men look upon talents and success. All opposition seemed to sink before him, and Fortune appeared only to have looked doubtfully upon him during a part of the last campaign, in order to render still brighter the auspicious aspect under which she closed it. Many of his most confirmed enemies, who, from their proved attachment to the house of Bourbon, had secretly disavowed the authority of Bonaparte, and doubted the continuance of his success, when they saw Prussia lying at his feet, and Russia clasping his hand in

friendship, conceived they should be struggling against the decrees of Providence, did they longer continue to resist their predestined master. Austerlitz had shaken their constancy; Tilsit destroyed it: and with few and silent exceptions, the vows, hopes, and wishes of France, seemed turned on Napoleon as her heir by destiny. Perhaps he himself, only, could finally have disappointed their expectations. But he was like the adventurous climber on the Alps, to whom the surmounting the most tremendous precipices, and ascending to the most towering peaks, only shows yet dizzier heights and higher points of elevation.

CHAPTER LV.

British expedition to Calabria, under Sir John Stuart.—Character of the people.—Opposed by General Rigny.—Battle of Maida, 4th July, 1806.—Defeat of the French.—Calabria evacuated by the British.—Erroneous commercial views, and military plans, of the British ministry.—Unsuccessful attack on Buenos Ayres.—General Whitelocke.—Is cashiered.—Expedition against Turkey, and its dependencies.—Admiral Duckworth's squadron sent against Constantinople.—Passes and repasses the Dardanelles, without accomplishing anything.—Expedition against Alexandria.—It is occupied by General Fraser.—Rosetta attacked.—British troops defeated, and withdrawn from Egypt, September, 1807.—Curaçoa and Cape of Good Hope taken by England.—Assumption of more energetic measures on the part of the British government.—Expedition against Copenhagen.—Its causes and objects.—Its citadel, forts, and fleet, surrendered to the British.—Effects of this proceeding upon France—and Russia.—Coalition of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, against British commerce.

THE treaty of Tilsit is an important point in the history of Napoleon. At no time did his power seem more steadfastly rooted, more feebly assailed. The canker-worm by which it was ultimately to be destroyed was, like that of the forest-tree, entrenched and hidden in the bosom of him whom it was destined to sap and consume. It is a fitting time, therefore, to take a general survey of the internal character of his government, when the arrangements seemed to be at his own choice, and ere misfortune, hitherto a stranger, dictated his course of proceeding, which had before experienced no control save his own will. We propose, therefore, in the next chapter, to take a brief review of the character of Bonaparte's government during this the most flourishing period of his power.

But, ere doing so, we must shortly notice some circumstances, civil and military, which, though they had but slight immediate effect upon the general current of events, yet serve to illustrate the character of the parties concerned, and to explain future incidents which were followed by more important consequences. These we have hitherto omitted, in order to present, in a continuous and uninterrupted form, the history of the momentous warfare, in the course of which Prussia was for the time subjugated, and Russia so far tamed by the eventful struggle, as to be willing to embrace the relation of an ally to the conqueror, whose course she had proposed to stem and to repel.

Among these comparatively minor incidents, must be reckoned the attempt made by the British government to rescue the Calabrian dominions of the Neapolitan Bourbons from the intrusive government of Joseph Bonaparte. The character of the inhabitants of that mountainous country is well-known. Bigots in their religion, and detesting a foreign yoke, as is usual with natives of a wild and almost lawless region; sudden in their passions, and readily having recourse to the sword, in revenge whether of public or private injury; enticed also by the prospect of occasional booty, and retaining a wild species of attachment to Ferdinand, whose manners and habits were popular with the Italians, and especially with those of the inferior order, the Calabrians were readily excited to take arms by the agents sent over to practise among them by the Sicilian court. Lawless at the same time, cruel in their mode of conducting war, and incapable of being subjected to discipline, the bands which they formed amongst themselves, acted rather in the manner, and upon the motives, of banditti, than of patriots. They occasionally, and individually, showed much courage, and even a sort of instinctive skill, which taught them how to chuse their ambushes, defend their passes, and thus maintain a sort of predatory war, in which the French sustained considerable losses. Yet if their efforts remained unassisted by some regular force, it was evident that these insurrectionary troops must be destroyed in detail by the disciplined and calculated exertions of the French soldiers. To prevent this, and to gratify, at the same time, the anxious wishes of the court of Palermo, Sir John Stuart, who commanded the British troops which had been sent to defend Sicily, undertook an expedition to the neighbouring shore of Italy, and disembarked in the Gulf of St Euphemia, near the frontier of Lower Calabria, in the beginning of July, 1806, with something short of five thousand men.

The disembarkation was scarce made, ere the British commander learned that General Régnier, who commanded for Joseph Bonaparte in Calabria, had assembled a force nearly equal to his own, and had advanced to Maida, a town about ten miles distant from St Euphemia, with the purpose of giving him battle. Sir John Stuart lost no time in moving to meet him, and Régnier, confident in the numbers of his cavalry, the quality of his troops, and his own skill in tactics, abandoned a strong position on the farther bank of the river Amata, and on the 4th July came down to meet the British in the open plain. Of all Bonaparte's generals, an Englishman would have desired, in especial, to be opposed to this leader, who had published a book on the evacuation of Egypt, in which he denied every claim, on the part of the British, to skill or courage, and imputed the loss of the province exclusively to the incapacity of Menon, under whom Régnier, the author, had served as second in command. He was now to try his own fate with the enemy, for whom he had expressed so much contempt.

At nine in the morning, the two lines were opposite to each other, when the British light infantry brigade, forming the right of the advanced line, and the 1er Léger on the French left, a favourite regiment, found themselves confronted. As if by mu-

tual consent, when at the distance of about one hundred yards, the opposed corps threw in two or three close fires reciprocally, and then rushed on to charge each other with the bayonet. The British commanding-officer, perceiving that his men were embarrassed by the blankets which they carried at their backs, halted the line that they might throw them down. The French saw the pause, and taking it for the hesitation of fear, advanced with a quickened pace and loud acclamations. An officer, our informer, seeing their veteran appearance, moustached countenances, and regularity of order, could not forbear a feeling of anxiety as he glanced his eye along the British line, which consisted in a great measure of young and beardless recruits. But embarrassed of their load, and receiving the order to advance, they cheered, and in their turn hastened towards the enemy with a rapid pace and leveled bayonets. The French officers were now seen encouraging their men, whose courage began to falter when they found they were to be the assailed party, not the assailants. Their line halted; they could not be brought to advance by the utmost efforts of their officers, and when the British were within bayonet's length, they broke and ran; but too late for safety, for they were subjected to the most dreadful slaughter. An attempt made by Régnier to redeem the day with his cavalry was totally unsuccessful. He was beaten on all points, and in such a manner as left it indisputable, that the British soldier, man to man, has a superiority over his enemy, similar to that which the British seaman possesses upon his peculiar element.

It would be in vain to inquire whether this superiority, which we do not hesitate to say has been made manifest, with very few exceptions, wherever the British have met foreign troops upon equal terms, arises from a stronger conformation of body, or a more determined turn of mind; but it seems certain that the British soldier, inferior to the Frenchman in general intelligence, and in individual acquaintance with the trade of war, has a decided advantage in the bloody shock of actual conflict, and especially when maintained by the bayonet, body to body. It is remarkable, also, that the charm is not peculiar to any one of the three united nations, but is common to the natives of all, different as they are in habits and education. The Guards, supplied by the city of London, may be contrasted with a regiment of Irish recruited among their rich meadows, or a body of Scotch from their native wildernesses; and while it may be difficult to assign the palm to either over the other two, all are found to exhibit that species of dogged and desperate courage, which, without staying to measure force or calculate chances, rushes on the enemy as the bull-dog upon the bear. This great moral encouragement was the chief advantage derived from the battle of Maida; for such was the tumultuous, sanguinary, and unmanageable character of the Calabrian insurgents, that it was judged impossible to continue the war with such assistants. The malaria was also found to affect the British troops; and Sir John Stuart, re-embarking his little army, returned to Sicily, and the efforts of the British were confined to the preservation of that island. But the battle of Maida was valuable

as a corollary to that of Alexandria. We have not learned whether General Régnier ever thought it equally worthy of a commentary.

The eyes of the best informed men in Britain were now open to the disadvantageous and timid policy, of conducting this momentous war by petty expeditions and experimental armaments, too inadequate to the service to be productive of anything but disappointment. The paltry idea of making war for British objects, as it was called, that is, withholding from the general cause those efforts which might have saved our allies, and going in search of some petty object in which Britain might see an individual interest, was now universally acknowledged; although it became more difficult than ever to select points of attack where our limited means might command success. It was also pretty distinctly seen, that the plan of opening a market for British manufactures, by conquering distant and unhealthy provinces, was as idle as immoral. In the latter quality, it somewhat resembled the proceedings of the surgeon mentioned in *Le Sage's* satirical novel, who converted passengers into patients by a stroke of his poniard, and then hastened, in his medical capacity, to cure the wounds he had inflicted. In point of profit, we had frequently to regret, that the colonists, whom we proposed to convert by force of arms into customers for British goods, were too rude to want, and too poor to pay for them. Nothing deceives itself so willingly as the love of gain. Our principal merchants and manufacturers, among other commercial visions, had imagined to themselves an unlimited market for British commodities, in the immense plains surrounding Buenos Ayres, which are in fact peopled by a sort of christian savages called Guachos, whose principal furniture is the skulls of dead horses, whose only food is raw beef and water, whose sole employment is to catch wild cattle, by hampering them with a Guacho's noose, and whose chief amusement is to ride wild horses to death.* Unfortunately, they were found to prefer their national independence to cottons and muslins.

Two several attempts were made on this miserable country, and neither redounded to the honour or advantage of the British nation. Buenos Ayres was taken possession of by a handful of British troops on the 27th June, 1806, who were attacked by the inhabitants and by a few Spanish troops, and, surrounded in the market-place of the town, under a general and galling fire, were compelled to lay down their arms, and surrender prisoners of war. A small remnant of the invading forces retained possession of a town on the coast, called Maldonado. In October, 1806, an expedition was sent out to reinforce this small body, and make some more material impression upon the continent of South America, which the nation were under the delusion of considering as a measure extremely to the advantage of British trade. Monte Video was taken, and a large body of troops, under command of General Whitelocke, a man of factitious repentance, and who had risen high in the army without

having seen much service, marched against Buenos Ayres. This person proved both fool and coward. He pushed his columns of attack into the streets of Buenos Ayres, knowing that the flat roofs and terraces were manned by excellent though irregular marksmen; and, that the British might have no means of retaliation, they were not permitted to load their muskets,—as if stone walls could have been carried by the bayonet. One of the columns was obliged to surrender; and although another had, in spite of desperate opposition, possessed themselves of a strong position, and that a few shells might have probably ended the sort of defence which had been maintained, Whitelocke thought it best to conclude a treaty with the enemy for recovery of the British prisoners, and so to renounce all further attempts on the colony. For this misconduct he was cashiered by the sentence of a court-martial.

An expedition against Turkey, and its dependencies, was as little creditable to the councils of Britain, and eventually to her arms, as were her attempts on South America. It arose out of a war betwixt England and the Porte, her late ally against France; for, so singular had been the turns of chance in this extraordinary conflict, that allies became enemies, and enemies returned to a state of close alliance, almost before war or peace could be proclaimed between them. The time was long past when the sublime Ottoman Porte could regard the quarrels and wars of christian powers, with the contemptuous indifference with which men look on the strife of the meanest and most unclean animals.* She was now in such close contact with them, as to feel a thrilling interest in their various revolutions.

The invasion of Egypt excited the Porte against France, and disposed them to a close alliance with Russia and England, until Bonaparte's assumption of the Imperial dignity; on which occasion the Turks, overawed by the pitch of power to which he had ascended, sent an embassy to congratulate his succession, and expressed a desire to cultivate his friendship.

Napoleon, whose eyes were sometimes almost involuntarily turned to the east, and who besides desired, at that period, to break off the good understanding betwixt the Porte and the cabinet of St Petersburg, dispatched Sébastiani as his envoy to Constantinople; a man well known for his skill in oriental intrigues, as was displayed in the celebrated report which had so much influence in breaking through the peace of Amiens.

The effect of this ambassador's promises, threats, and intrigues, was soon apparent. The Turks had come under an engagement that they would not change the Hospodars, or governors, of Moldavia and Wallachia. Sébastiani easily alarmed Turkish pride on the subject of this stipulation, and induced them to break through it. The two Hospodars were removed, in defiance of the agreement made to the

* See the very extraordinary account of the Pampas, published by Captain Head of the Engineers.

* In the time of Louis the XIV., when the French envoy at the court of Constantinople came, in a great hurry, to intimate, as important intelligence, some victory of his master over the Prussians, "Can you suppose it of consequence to his serene highness," said the grand vizier, with infinite contempt, "whether the dog bites the hog, or the hog bites the dog?"

contrary; and although the Turks became aware of the risk to which they had exposed themselves, and offered to replace the governors whom they had dismissed, Russia, with precipitate resentment, declared war, and invaded the two provinces in question. They overran and occupied them, but to their own cost; as an army of fifty thousand men, thus rashly engaged against the Turks, might have been of the last consequence in the fields of Eylau, Heilsberg, or Friedland.

In the meanwhile, Great Britain sent a squadron, under Sir Thomas Duckworth, to compel the Porte to dismiss the French ambassador, and return to the line of politics which Sebastiani had induced them to abandon. Admiral Duckworth passed the Dardanelles, in spite of the immense cannon by which they are guarded, and which hurled from their enormous muzzles massive fragments of marble instead of ordinary bullets. But if ever it was intended to act against the Turks by any other means than intimidation, the opportunity was suffered to escape; and an intercourse by message and billet was permitted to continue until the Turks had completed a line of formidable fortifications, while the state of the weather was too unfavourable to allow even an effort at the destruction of Constantinople, which had been the alternative submitted to the Turks by the English admiral. The English repassed the Dardanelles in no very creditable manner, hated for the threats which they had uttered, and despised for not having attempted to make their menaces good.

Neither was a subsequent expedition to Alexandria more favourable in its results. Five thousand men, under General Fraser, were disembarked, and occupied the town with much ease. But a division, dispatched against Rosetta, was the cause of renewing in a different part of the world the calamity of Buenos Ayres. The detachment was, incautiously and unskillfully on our part, decoyed into the streets of an oriental town, where the enemy, who had manned the terraces and the flat roofs of their houses, slaughtered the assailants with much ease and little danger to themselves. Some subsequent ill-combined attempts were made for reducing the same place, and after sustaining a loss of more than a fifth of their number, by climate and combat, the British troops were withdrawn from Egypt on the 23d of September, 1807.

It was no great comfort, under these repeated failures, that the British were able to secure the Dutch island of Curaçoa. But the capture of the Cape of Good Hope was an object of deep importance; and the more so, as it was taken at a small expense of lives. Its consequence to our Indian trade is so great, that we may well hope it will be at no future time given up to the enemy. Upon the whole, the general policy of England was, at this period, of an irresolute and ill-combined character. Her ministers showed a great desire to do something, but as great a doubt what that something was to be. Thus, they either mistook the importance of the objects which they aimed at, or, undertaking them without a sufficient force, failed to carry them into execution. If the wealth and means, more especially the brave troops, frittered away in the attempts at Cala-

bria, Buenos Ayres, Alexandria, and elsewhere, had been united with the forces sent to Stralsund, and thrown into the rear of the French army before the fatal battle of Friedland, Europe might, in all probability, have escaped that severe, and, for a time, decisive blow.

The evil of this error, which had pervaded our continental efforts from the beginning of the original war with France down to the period of which we are treating, began now to be felt from experience. Britain gained nothing whatever by her partial efforts, not even settlements or sugar-islands. The enemy maintained against her revenues and commerce a constant and never-ceasing war—her resistance was equally stubborn, and it was evident that the strife on both sides was to be mortal. Ministers were, therefore, called upon for bolder risks, the nation for greater sacrifices, than had yet been demanded; and it became evident to every one, that England's hope of safety lay in her own exertions, not for petty or selfish objects, but such as might have a decided influence on the general events of the war. The urgent pressure of the moment was felt by the new administration, whose principles being in favour of the continuance of the war, their efforts to conduct it with energy began now to be manifest.

The first symptoms of this change of measures were exhibited in the celebrated expedition to Copenhagen, which manifested an energy and determination not of late visible in the military operations of Britain on the Continent. It can hardly be made matter of serious doubt, that one grand object by which Bonaparte meant to enforce the continental system, and thus reduce the power of England without battle or invasion, was the re-establishment of the great alliance of the Northern Powers, for the destruction of Britain's maritime superiority. This had been threatened towards the conclusion of the American war, and had been again acted upon in 1801, when the unnatural compact was dissolved by the cannon of Nelson, and the death of the Emperor Paul. The treaty of Tilsit, according to the information which the British ambassador had procured, certainly contained an article to this purpose, and ministers received from other quarters the most positive information of what was intended. Indeed, the Emperor Alexander had shown, by many indications, that in the new friendship which he had formed with the Emperor of the West, he was to embrace his resentment, and further his plans, against England. The unfortunate Gustavus of Sweden could scarce be expected voluntarily to embrace the proposed northern alliance, and his ruin was probably resolved upon. But the accession of Denmark was of the utmost consequence. That country still possessed a fleet, and the local situation of the island of Zealand gave her the key of the Baltic. Her confessed weakness could not have permitted her for an instant to resist the joint influence of Russia and France, even if her angry recollection of the destruction of her fleet by Nelson, had not induced her inclinations to lean in that direction. It was evident that Denmark would only be permitted to retain her neutrality, till it suited the purposes of the more powerful parties to compel her to throw it off. In this case, and finding the French troops approaching Holstein,

Jutland, and Funen, the British government, acting on the information which they had received of the purpose of their enemies, conceived themselves entitled to require from Denmark a pledge as to the line of conduct which she proposed to adopt on the approach of hostilities, and some rational security that such a pledge, when given, should be redeemed.

A formidable expedition was now fitted out, humanely, as well as politically, calculated on a scale of such magnitude, as, it might be expected, would render impossible the resistance which the Danes, as a high-spirited people, might offer to such a harsh species of expostulation. Twenty-seven sail of the line, and twenty thousand men, under the command of Lord Cathcart, were sent to the Baltic, to support a negotiation with Denmark, which it was still hoped might terminate without hostilities. The fleet was conducted with great ability through the intricate passages called the Belts, and was disposed in such a manner, that ninety pendants flying round Zealand, entirely blockaded the shores of that island.

Under these auspices the negotiation was commenced. The British envoy, Mr Jackson, had the delicate task of stating to the Crown Prince, in person, the expectation of England that his royal highness should explain unequivocally his sentiments, and declare the part which he meant to take between her and France. The unpleasant condition was annexed, that, to secure any protestation which might be made of friendship or neutrality, it was required that the fleet and naval stores of the Danes should be delivered into the hands of Great Britain, not in right of property, but to be restored so soon as the state of affairs, which induced her to require possession of them, should be altered for more peaceful times. The closest alliance, and every species of protection which Britain could afford, was proffered, to obtain compliance with these proposals. Finally, the Crown Prince was given to understand, that so great a force was sent in order to afford him an apology to France, should he chuse to urge it, as having been compelled to submit to the English demands; but at the same time it was intimated, that the forces would be actually employed to compel the demands, if they should be refused.

In the ordinary intercourse betwixt nations, these requisitions, on the part of Britain, would have been, with respect to Denmark, severe and unjustifiable. The apology arose out of the peculiar circumstances of the times. The condition of England was that of an individual, who, threatened by the approach of a superior force of mortal enemies, sees close beside him, and with arms in his hand, one, of whom he had a right to be suspicious, as having co-operated against him on two former occasions, and who, he has the best reason to believe, is at the very moment engaged in a similar alliance to his prejudice. The individual, in the case supposed, would certainly be warranted in requiring to know this third party's intention, nay, in disarming him, if he had strength to do so, and retaining his weapons, as the best pledge of his neutrality.

However this reasoning may be admitted to justify the British demands, we cannot wonder that it failed to enforce compliance on the part of the Crown

Prince. There was something disgraceful in delivering up the fleet of the nation under a menace that violence would otherwise be employed; and although, for the sake of his people and his capital, he ought, in prudence, to have forborne an ineffectual resistance, yet it was impossible to blame a high-minded and honourable man for making the best defence in his power.

So soon as the object of the Danes was found to be delay and evasion, while they made a hasty preparation for defence, the soldiers were disembarked, batteries erected, and a bombardment commenced which occasioned a dreadful conflagration. Some forces which had been collected in the interior of the island were dispersed by the troops under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a name already famous in India, but now for the first time heard in European warfare. The unavailing defence was at last discontinued, and upon the 8th September the citadel and forts of Copenhagen were surrendered to the British general. The Danish ships were fitted out for sea with all possible dispatch, together with the naval stores, to a very large amount; which, had they fallen into the hands of the French, must have afforded them considerable facility in fitting out a fleet.

As the nature and character of the attack upon Copenhagen were attended by circumstances which were very capable of being misrepresented, France—who, through the whole war, had herself showed the most total disregard for the rights of neutral nations, with her leader Napoleon, the invader of Egypt, when in profound peace with the Porte; of Hanover, when in amity with the German empire; and who was at this very moment meditating the appropriation of Spain and Portugal—France was filled with extreme horror at the violence practised on the Danish capital. Russia was also offended, and to a degree which showed that a feeling of disappointed schemes mingled with her affection of zeal for the rights of neutrality. But the daring and energetic spirit with which England had formed and accomplished her plan, struck a wholesome terror into other nations, and showed neutrals, that if, while assuming that character, they lent their secret countenance to the enemies of Great Britain, they were not to expect that it was to be done with impunity. This was indeed no small hardship upon the lesser powers, many of whom would no doubt have been well contented to have observed a strict neutrality, but for the threats and influence of France, against whom they had no means of defence; but the furious conflict of such two nations as France and England is like the struggle of giants, in which the smaller and more feeble, who have the misfortune to be in the neighbourhood, are sure to be borne down and trodden upon by one or both parties.

The extreme resentment expressed by Bonaparte, when he received intelligence of this critical and decisive measure, might serve to argue the depth of his disappointment at such an unexpected anticipation of his purposes. He had only left to him the comfort of railing against Britain in the *Moniteur*; and the breach of peace, and of the law of nations, was gravely imputed to England as an inexplicable

crime, by one, who never suffered his regard either for his own word, or the general good faith observed amongst nations, to interfere with any wish or interest he had ever entertained.

The conduct of Russia was more singular. An English officer of literary celebrity was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the emperor's expressions of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt, at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France, by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the czar, as with a prince, who, though obliged to give way to circumstances, was, nevertheless, as much attached as ever to the cause of European independence. Thus invited, the British cabinet entered into an explanation of their views for establishing a counterbalance to the exorbitant power of France, by a northern confederacy of an offensive and defensive character. It was supposed that Sweden would enter with pleasure into such an alliance, and that Denmark would not decline it if encouraged by the example of Russia, who was proposed as the head and soul of the coalition.

Such a communication was accordingly made to the Russian ministers, but was received with the utmost coldness. It is impossible now to determine, whether there had been some over-confidence in the agent; whether the communication had been founded on some hasty and fugitive idea of a breach with France, which the emperor had afterwards abandoned; or finally, whether, as is more probable, it originated in a wish to fathom the extent of Great Britain's resources, and the purposes to which she meant to devote them. It is enough to observe, that the countenance with which Russia received the British communication, was so different from that with which she had invited the confidence of her ministers, that the negotiation proved totally abortive.

Alexander's ultimate purpose was given to the world, so soon as Britain had declined the offered mediation of Russia in her disputes with France. In a proclamation, or manifesto, sent forth by the emperor, he expressed his repentance for having entered into agreements with England, which he had found prejudicial to the Russian trade; he complained (with justice) of the manner in which Britain had conducted the war by petty expeditions, conducive only to her own selfish ends; and the attack upon Denmark was treated as a violation of the rights of nations. He therefore annulled every convention entered into between Russia and Britain, and especially that of 1801; and he avowed the principles of the armed neutrality which he termed a monument of the wisdom of the Great Catherine. In November, 1806, a ukase, or imperial decree, was issued, imposing an embargo on British vessels and property. But, by the favour of the Russian nation, and even of the officers employed by government, the ship-masters were made aware of the impending arrest; and not less than eighty vessels, setting sail with a favourable wind, reached Britain with their cargoes in safety.

Austria and Prussia found themselves under the necessity of following the example of Russia, and declaring war against British commerce; so that Bonaparte had now made an immense stride towards his principal object, of destroying every species of intercourse which could unite England with the Continent.

CHAPTER LVI.

View of the internal government of Napoleon at the period of the peace of Tilsit.—The Tribunate abolished.—Council of State.—Prefectures—Their nature and objects described.—The Code Napoleon—Its provisions—Its merits and defects—Comparison betwixt that code and the jurisprudence of England.—Laudable efforts of Napoleon to carry it into effect.

AT this period of Bonaparte's elevation, when his power seemed best established, and most permanent, it seems proper to take a hasty view, not indeed of the details of his internal government, which is a subject that would exhaust volumes; but at least of its general character, of the means by which his empire was maintained, and the nature of the relations which it established betwixt the sovereign and his subjects.

The ruling, almost the sole principle on which the government of Bonaparte rested, was the simple proposition upon which despotism of every kind has founded itself in every species of society; namely, that the individual who is to exercise the authority and power of the state shall, on the one hand, dedicate himself and his talents exclusively to the public service of the empire, while, on the other, the nation subjected to his rule shall require this self-devotion on his part by the most implicit obedience to his will. Some despots have rested this claim to universal submission upon family descent, and upon their right, according to Filmer's doctrine, of representing the original father of the tribe, and becoming the legitimate inheritors of a patriarchal power. Others have strained Scripture and abused common sense, to establish in their own favour a right through the especial decree of Providence. To the hereditary title Bonaparte could of course assert no claim; but he founded not a little on the second principle, often holding himself out to others, and no doubt occasionally considering himself, in his own mind, as an individual destined by Heaven to the high station which he held, and one who could not therefore be opposed in his career, without an express struggle being maintained against Destiny, who, leading him by the hand, and at the same time protecting him with her shield, had guided him by paths as strange as perilous, to the post of eminence which he now occupied. No one had been his tutor in the lessons which led the way to his preferment—no one had been his guide in the dangerous ascent to power—scarce any one had been of so much consequence to his promotion, as to claim even the merit of an ally, however humble. It seemed as if Napoleon had been wafted on to this stupendous pitch of grandeur by a power more effectual than that of any human assistance, nay, which surpassed what could have been expected from his own great

talents, unassisted by the especial interposition of Destiny in his favour. Yet it was not to this principle alone that the general acquiescence in the unlimited power which he asserted is to be imputed. Bonaparte understood the character of the French nation so well, that he could offer them an acceptable indemnification for servitude, first, in the height to which he proposed to raise their national preeminence; secondly, in the municipal establishments, by means of which he administered their government; and which, though miserably defective in all which would have been demanded by a nation accustomed to the administration of equal and just laws, afforded a protection to life and property that was naturally most welcome to those who had been so long, under the republican system, made the victims of cruelty, rapacity, and the most extravagant and unlimited tyranny, rendered yet more odious as exercised under the pretext of liberty.

To the first of these arts of government we have often adverted; and it must be always recalled to mind whenever the sources of Bonaparte's power over the public mind in France come to be treated of. He himself gave the solution in a few words, when censuring the imbecility of the Directors, to whose power he succeeded. "These men," he said, "know not how to work upon the imagination of the French nation." This idea, which, in phraseology, is rather Italian than French, expresses the chief secret of Napoleon's authority. He held himself out as the individual upon whom the fate of France depended—of whose hundred decisive victories France enjoyed the glory. It was he whose sword, hewing down obstacles which her bravest monarchs had accounted insurmountable, had cut the way to her now undeniable supremacy over Europe. He alone could justly claim to be absolute monarch of France, who, raising that nation from a perilous condition, had healed her discords, reconciled her factions, turned her defeats into victory, and, from a disunited people, about to become the prey to civil and external war, had elevated her to the situation of Queen of Europe. This had been all accomplished upon one condition; and, as we have stated elsewhere, it was that which the Tempter offered in the wilderness, after his ostentatious display of the kingdoms of the earth—"All these will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me."

Napoleon had completed the boastful promise, and it flattered a people more desirous of glory than of liberty; and so much more pleased with bearing of national conquests in foreign countries, than of enjoying the freedom of their own individual thoughts and actions, that they reluctantly surrendered the latter in order that their vanity might be flattered by the former.

Thus did Napoleon avail himself of, or, to translate his phrase more literally, play upon the imagination of the French people. He gave them public festivals, victories, and extended dominion; and, in return, claimed the right of carrying their children in successive swarms to yet more distant and yet more extended conquests, and of governing, according to his own pleasure, the bulk of the nation which remained behind.

To attain this purpose, one species of idolatry was

gradually and ingeniously substituted for another, and the object of the public devotion was changed, while the worship was continued. France had been formerly governed by political maxims—she was now ruled by the name of an individual. Formerly the Republic was everything—La Fayette, Dumas, or Pichegru, were nothing. Now, the name of a successful general was of more influence than the whole code of the Rights of Man. France had submitted to murder, spoliation, revolutionary tribunals, and every species of cruelty and oppression, while they were gilded by the then talismanic expressions, "Liberty and equality—Fraternization—the public welfare, and the happiness of the people." She was now found equally compliant, when the watchword was, "The honour of his imperial and royal majesty—the interests of the Great Empire—the splendours of the imperial throne." It must be owned that the sacrifices under the last form were less enormous; they were limited to taxes at the imperial pleasure, and a perpetual anticipation of the conscription. The republican tyrants claimed both life and property; the emperor was satisfied with a title of the latter, and the unlimited disposal of that portion of the family who could best support the burden of arms, for augmenting the conquests of France. Such were the terms on which this long-distracted country attained once more, after its Revolution, the advantage of a steady and effective government.

The character of that government, its means and principles of action, must now be briefly traced.

It cannot be forgotten that Bonaparte, the heir of the Revolution, appropriated to himself the forms and modifications of the directorial government, altered in some degree by the ingenuity of Siéyès; but they subsisted as forms only, and were carefully divested of all effectual impulse on the government. The Senate and legislative bodies became merely passive and pensioned creatures of the emperor's will, whom he used as a medium for promulgating the laws which he was determined to establish. The Tribunato had been instituted for the protection of the people against all acts of arbitrary power, whether by imprisonment, exile, assaults on the liberty of the press, or otherwise; but after having gradually undermined the rights and authority of this body, after having rendered its meetings partial and secret, and having deprived it of its boldest members, Bonaparte suppressed it entirely, on account, as he alleged, of the expense which it occasioned to the government. It had indeed become totally useless; but this was because its character had been altered, and because, originating from the Senate, and not from popular election, the Tribunato never consisted of that class of persons, who are willing to encounter the frown of power when called upon to impeach its aggressions. Yet, as the very name of this body, while it subsisted, recalled some ideas of republican freedom, the emperor thought fit altogether to abolish it.

The deliberative council of the emperor existed in his own personal Council of State, of whose consultations, in which he himself presided, he made frequent use during the course of his reign. Its functions were of an anomalous character comprehending

political legislation, or judicial business, according to the order of the day. It was, in short, Bonaparte's resource, when he wanted the advice, or opinion, or information, of others in aid of his own; and he often took the assistance of the Council of State, in order to form those resolutions which he afterwards executed by means of his ministers. Monsieur de Las Cases, himself a member of it, has dwelt with complaisance upon the freedom which Bonaparte permitted to their debates, and the good humour with which he submitted to contradiction, even when expressed with obstinacy or vivacity, and would have us consider the council as an important barrier afforded to the citizens against the arbitrary will of the sovereign. What he has said, however, only amounts to this,—that Bonaparte, desirous to have the advice of his counsellors, tolerated their freedom of speech, and even of remonstrance. Mahmoud, or Amurath, seated in their divan, must have done the same, and yet would not have remained the less absolutely masters of the lives of those who stood around them. We have no doubt that Bonaparte, on certain occasions, permitted his counsellors to take considerable freedoms, and that he sometimes yielded up his opinion to theirs without being convinced; in such cases, at least, where his own passions or interest were no way concerned.* But we further read of the emperor's using, to extremely stubborn persons, such language as plainly intimated that he would not suffer contradiction beyond a certain point. "You are very obstinate," he said to such a disputant; "what if I were to be as much so as you? You are wrong to push the powerful to extremity—you should consider the weakness of humanity." To another he said, after a scene of argumentative violence, "Pray, pay some attention to accommodate yourself a little more to my humour. Yesterday, you carried it so far as to oblige me to scratch my temple. That is a great sign with me—take care in future not to drive me to such an extremity."

Such limits to the freedom of debate in the Imperial Council of State, correspond with those laid down in the festive entertainments of Sans-Souci, where the Great Frederick professed to support and encourage every species of familiar raillery, but, when it attained a point that was too personal, used to hint to the facetious guests, that he heard the

* Ségur† gives example of a case in which Bonaparte deferred his own opinion to that of the Council. A female of Amsterdam, tried for a capital crime, had been twice acquitted by the Imperial Courts, and the Court of Appeal claimed the right to try her a third time. Bonaparte alone contended against the whole Council of State, and claimed for the poor woman the immunity which, in justice, she ought to have obtained, considering the prejudices that must have been excited against her. He yielded, at length, to the majority, but protesting he was silenced and not convinced. To account for his complaisance, it may be remarked, first, that Bonaparte was no way personally interested in the decision of the question; and, secondly, if it concerned him at all, the fate of the female was in his hands, since he had only to grant her a pardon if she was condemned by the Court of Appeal.

† The same fact is mentioned in Count Las Cases's *Mémoires de St. Hélène*.

king's step in the gallery. There were occasions accordingly, when, not satisfied with calling their attention to the distant murmurs of the inappreciable thunder, Napoleon launched its bolts in the midst of his trembling counsellors. Such a scene was that of Portalis. This statesman, a man of talent and virtue, had been eminently useful, as we have seen, in bringing about the Concordat, and had been created, in recompense, minister of religious affairs, and counsellor of state. In the subsequent disputes betwixt the pope and Bonaparte, a relation of the minister had been accused of circulating the bulls, or spiritual admonitions of the pope; and Portalis had failed to intimate the circumstance to the emperor. On this account, Napoleon, in full council, attacked him in the severest terms, as guilty of having broken his oath as a counsellor and minister of state, deprived him of both offices, and expelled him from the assembly, as one who had betrayed his sovereign.* If any of the members of the Council of State had ventured, when this sentence rung in their ears, to come betwixt the dragon and his wrath, for the purpose of stating that a hasty charge ought not instantly to be followed with immediate censure and punishment; that it was possible M. Portalis might have been misled by false information, or by a natural desire to screen the offence of his cousin; or, finally, that his conduct might have been influenced by views of religion, which, if erroneous, were yet sincere and conscientious,—we should then have believed that the Council of State of Bonaparte formed a body; in which the accused citizen might receive some protection against the despotism of the government. But when, or in what country, could the freedom of the nation be intrusted to the keeping of the immediate counsellors of the throne? It can only be safely lodged in some body, the authority of which emanates directly from the nation, and whom the nation therefore will protect and support, in the existence of their right of opposition or remonstrance.

The deliberations of the Council of State, or such resolutions as Bonaparte chose to adopt without communication with them (for it may be easily supposed that they were not admitted to share his more secret political discussions), were, as in other countries, adjusted with and executed by the ostensible ministers.

But that part of the organization of the Imperial government, upon which Bonaparte most piqued himself, was the establishment of the prefectures, which certainly gave facilities for the most effectual agency of despotism, that was ever exercised. There is no mistaking the object and tendency of this arrangement, since Bonaparte himself, and his most bitter opponents, hold up the same picture, one to the admiration, the other to the censure, of the world. These prefects, it must be understood, were each the supreme governor of a department, answering to the old lieutenants and governors of counties, and representing the Imperial person within the limits of the several prefectures. The individuals

* It was the son of the Portalis, above alluded to, who thus incurred the displeasure of Napoleon; that minister being dead at the time of this occurrence. *Ed.*

were carefully selected, as persons whose attachment was either to be secured or rewarded. They received large and in some cases exorbitant salaries, some amounting to fifteen, twenty, and even thirty thousand francs. This heavy expense Napoleon stated to be the consequence of the depraved state of moral feeling in France, which made it necessary to attach men by their interests rather than their duties; but it was termed by his enemies one of the leading principles of his government, which treated the public good as a chimera, and erected private and personal interest into the paramount motive upon which alone the state was to be served by efficient functionaries. The prefects were chosen in the general case, as men whose birth and condition were totally unconnected with that of the department in which each was to preside; *les dépayser*, to place them in a country to which they were strangers, being an especial point of Napoleon's policy. They were entirely dependent on the will of the emperor, who removed or cashiered them at pleasure. The administration of the departments was intrusted to these important officers.

"With the authority and local resources placed at their disposal," said Bonaparte, "the prefects were themselves emperors on a limited scale; and as they had no force excepting through the impulse which they received from the throne, as they owed their whole power to their immediate commission, and as they had no authority of a personal character, they were of as much use to the crown as the former high agents of government, without any of the inconveniences which attached to their predecessors."* It was by means of the prefects, that an impulse, given from the centre of the government, was communicated without delay to the extremities of the kingdom, and that the influence of the crown, and the execution of its commands, were transmitted, as if by magic, through a population of forty millions. It appears that Napoleon, while describing with self-complacency this terrible engine of unlimited power, felt that it might not be entirely in unison with the opinions of those favourers of liberal institutions, whose sympathy at the close of life he thought worthy of soliciting. "My creating that power," he said, "was on my part a case of necessity. It was a dictator, called to that office by force of circumstances. There was a necessity that the filaments of the government which extended over the state, should be in complete harmony with the key-note which was to influence them. The organization which I had extended over the empire required to be maintained at a high degree of tension, and to possess a prodigious force of elasticity, to enable it to resist the terrible blows directed against it without cessation."† His defence amounts to this. "The men of my time were extravagantly fond of power, exuberantly attached to place and wealth. I therefore bribed them to become my agents by force of places and pensions. But I was educating the succeeding race to be influenced by better motives. My son would have been surrounded by youths sensible to the influence of justice, honour, and virtue; and

those who were called to execute public duty would have considered their doing so as its own reward."

The freedom of France was therefore postponed till the return of a Golden Age, when personal aggrandisement and personal wealth should cease to have any influence upon regenerated humanity. In the meanwhile, she had the dictatorship and the prefects.

The *impulse*, as Napoleon terms it, by which the crown put in action these subordinate agents in the departments, was usually given by means of a circular letter or proclamation, communicating the particular measure which government desired to be enforced. This was subscribed by the minister to whose department the affair belonged, and concluded with an injunction upon the prefect, to be active in forwarding the matter enjoined, as he valued the favour of the emperor, or wished to show himself devoted to the interests of the crown. Thus conjured, the prefect transmitted the order to the sub-prefect and mayors of the communities within his department, who, stimulated by the same motives that had actuated their principal, endeavoured each to distinguish himself by his active compliance with the will of the emperor, and thus merit a favourable report, as the active and unhesitating agent of his pleasure.

It was the further duty of the prefects, to see that all honour was duly performed towards the head of the state, upon the days appointed for public rejoicings, and to remind the municipal authorities of the necessity of occasional addresses to the government, declaring their admiration of the talents, and devotion to the person, of the emperor. These effusions were duly published in the *Moniteur*, and, if examined closely, would afford some of the most extraordinary specimens of composition which the annals of flattery can produce. It is sufficient to say, that a mayor, we believe of Amiens, affirmed, in his ecstacy of loyal adoration, that the Deity, after making Bonaparte, must have reposed, as after the creation of the universe. This, and similar flights of rhetoric, may appear both impious and ridiculous, and it might have been thought that a person of Napoleon's sense and taste would have softened or suppressed them. But he well knew the influence produced on the public mind, by ringing the changes to different time on the same unvaried subject. The ideas which are often repeated in all variety of language and expression, will at length produce an effect on the public mind, especially if no contradiction is permitted to reach it. A uniform which may look ridiculous on a single individual, has an imposing effect when worn by a large body of men; and the empiric, whose extravagant advertisements we ridicule upon the first perusal, often persuades us, by sheer dint of repeating his own praises, to make trial of his medicine. Those who practise calumny know, according to the vulgar expression, that if they do but throw dirt sufficient, some part of it will adhere; and acting on the same principle, for a contrary purpose, Bonaparte was well aware, that the repetition of his praises in these adulatory addresses was calculated finally to make an impression on the nation at large, and to obtain a degree of credit as an expression of public opinion.

* *Mémorial de St-Hélène*, vol. VII, p. 229.

† *Ibid.* vol. VII, pp. 229-30.

Puber, an author too impassioned to obtain unlimited credit, has given several instances of ignorance amongst the prefects; many of whom, being old generals, were void of the information necessary for the exercise of a civil office, and all of whom, having been, upon principle, nominated to a sphere of action with the local circumstances of which they were previously unacquainted, were sufficiently liable to error. But the same author may be fully trusted, when he allows that the prefects could not be accused of depredation or rapine, and that such of them as improved their fortune during the date of their office, did so by economising upon their legitimate allowances.

Such was the outline of Napoleon's provincial administration, and of the agency by which it was carried on, without check or hesitation, in every province of France at the same moment. The machinery has been in a great measure retained by the royal government, to whom it appeared preferable, doubtless, to the violent alterations which an attempt to restore the old appointments, or create others of a different kind, must necessarily have occasioned.

But a far more important change, introduced by the emperor, though not originating with him, was the total alteration of the laws of the kingdom of France, and the introduction of that celebrated code to which Napoleon assigned his name, and on the execution of which his admirers have rested his claim to be considered as a great benefactor to the country which he governed. Bacon has indeed informed us, that when laws have been heaped upon laws, in such a state of confusion as to render it necessary to revise them, and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such an heroic task have a good right to be named amongst the legislators and benefactors of mankind. It had been the reproach of France before the Revolution, and it was one of the great evils which tended to produce that immense and violent change, that the various provinces, towns, and subordinate divisions of the kingdom, having been united in different periods to the general body of the country, had retained in such union the exercise of their own particular laws and usages; to the astonishment, as well as to the great annoyance of the traveler, who, in journeying through France, found that, in many important particulars, the system and character of the laws to which he was subjected, were altered almost as often as he changed his post-horses. It followed from this discrepancy of laws and subdivision of jurisdiction, that the greatest hardships were sustained by the subjects, more especially when, the district being of small extent, those authorities who acted there were likely neither to have experience, nor character sufficient for exercise of the trust reposed in them.

The evils attending such a state of things had been long felt, and, at various periods before the Revolution, it had been proposed repeatedly to institute a uniform system of legislation for the whole kingdom. But so many different interests were compromised, and such were, besides, the pressing occupations of the successive administrations of Louis XVI., and his grandfather, that the project

was never seriously adopted or entered upon. When, however, the whole system of provinces, districts, and feudal jurisdictions, great and small, had fallen at the word of the Abbé Siéyes, like an enchanted castle at the dissolution of a spell, and their various laws, whether written or consuetudinary, were buried in the ruins, all France, now united into one single and integral nation, lay open to receive any legislative code which the National Assembly might dictate. But the revolutionary spirit was more fitted to destroy than to establish; and was more bent upon the pursuit of political objects, than upon affording the nation the protection of just and equal laws. Under the Directory, two or three attempts towards classification of the laws had been made in the Council of Five Hundred, but never had gone farther than a preliminary and general report. Cambacérés, an excellent lawyer and enlightened statesman, was one of the first to solicit the attention of the state to this great and indispensable duty. The various successive authorities had been content with passing such laws as affected popular subjects of the day, and which (like that which licensed universal divorce) partook of the extravagance that gave them origin. The project of Cambacérés, on the contrary, embraced a general classification of jurisprudence through all its branches, although too much tainted, it is said, with the prevailing revolutionary opinions of the period, to admit its being taken for a basis, when Bonaparte, after his elevation, determined to supersede the republican by monarchical forms of government.

After the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, Napoleon saw no way more certain of assuring the popularity of that event, and connecting his own authority with the public interests of France, than to resume a task which former rulers of the Republic had thought too heavy to be undertaken, and thus, at once, show a becoming confidence in the stability of his own power, and a laudable desire of exercising it for the permanent advantage of the nation. An order of the consuls, dated 24th Thermidor, in the year VIII., directed the minister of justice, with a committee of lawyers of eminence, to examine the several projects, four in number, which had been made towards compiling the civil code of national law, to give their opinion on the plan most desirable for accomplishing its formation, and to discuss the bases upon which legislation in civil matters ought to be rested.

The preliminary discourse upon the first project of the civil code is remarkable for the manner in which the reporters consider and confute the general and illusory views entertained by the uninformed part of the public, upon the nature of the task to which they had been called. It is the common and vulgar idea, that the system of legislation may be reduced and simplified into a few general maxims of equity, sufficient to lead any judge of understanding and integrity, to a just decision of all questions which can possibly occur betwixt man and man. It follows, as a corollary to this proposition, that the various multiplications of authorities, exceptions, particular cases, and especial provisions, which have been introduced among civilized nations, by the address of those of the legal profession, are just

so many expedients to embarrass the simple course of justice with arbitrary modifications and refinements, in order to procure wealth and consequence to those educated to the law, whose assistance must be used as its interpreters, and who became rich by serving litigants as guides through the labyrinth of obscurity which had been raised by themselves and their predecessors.

Such were the ideas of the law and its professors, which occurred to the Parliament of Praise-God Bazebones, when they proposed to Cromwell to abrogate the whole common law of England, and dismiss the lawyers, as drones who did but enumber the national hive. Such was also the opinion of many of the French statesmen, who, as rash in judging of jurisprudence as in politics, imagined that a system of maxims, modified on the plan of the twelve tables of the ancient Romans, might serve all the purposes of a civil code in modern France. They who thought in this manner had entirely forgotten, how soon the laws of these twelve tables became totally insufficient for Rome herself—how, in the gradual change of manners, some laws became obsolete, some inapplicable—how it became necessary to provide for emerging cases, successively by the decrees of the senate, the ordinances of the people, the edicts of the consuls, the regulations of the prætors, the answers or opinions of learned juriconsults, and finally, by the rescripts, edicts, and novels of the emperors, until such a mass of legislative matter was assembled, as scarcely the efforts of Theodosius or Justinian were adequate to bring into order, or reduce to principle.—But this, it may be said, was the very subject complained of. The simplicity of the old laws, it may be urged, was gradually corrupted; and hence, by the efforts of interested men, not by the natural progress of society, arose the complicated system, which is the object of such general complaint.

The answer to this is obvious. So long as society remains in a simple state, men have occasion for few and simple laws. But when that society begins to be subdivided into ranks; when duties are incurred, and obligations contracted, of a kind unknown in a ruder or earlier period, these new conditions, new duties, and new obligations, must be regulated by new rules and ordinances, which accordingly are introduced as fast as they are wanted, either by the course of long custom, or by precise legislative enactment. There is no doubt one species of society in which legislation may be much simplified; and that is, where the whole law of the country, with the power of enforcing it, is allowed to reside in the bosom of the king, or of the judge who is to administer justice. Such is the system of Turkey, where the cadi is bound by no laws nor former precedents, save what his conscience may discover from perusing the Koran. But no apt are mankind to abuse unlimited power, and indeed so utterly unfit is human nature to possess it, that in all countries where the judge is possessed of such arbitrary jurisdiction, he is found accessible to bribes, or liable to be moved by threats. He has no distinct course prescribed, no beacon on which to direct his vessel, and trims, therefore, his sails to the pursuit of his own profit.

The French legislative commissioners, with these views, wisely judged it their duty to produce their civil code, upon such a system as might afford, as far as possible, protection to the various kinds of rights known and acknowledged in the existing state of society. Less than this they could not do; nor, in our opinion, is their code as yet adequate to attain that principal object. By the implied social contract, an individual surrenders to the community his right of protecting and avenging himself, under the reserved and indispensable condition that the public law shall defend him, or punish those by whom he has sustained injury. As revenge has been said by Bacon to be a species of wild justice, so the individual pursuit of justice is often a modified and legitimate pursuit of revenge, which ought, indeed, to be qualified by the moral and religious sentiments of the party, but to which law is bound to give free way, in requital for the bridle which she imposes on the indulgence of man's natural passions. The course of litigation, therefore, cannot be stopt; it can only be diminished, by providing before-hand as many regulations as will embrace the greater number of cases likely to occur, and trusting to the authority of the judges acting upon the spirit of the law, for the settlement of such as cannot be decided according to its letter.

The organization of this great national work was proceeded in with the caution and deliberation which the importance of the subject eminently deserved. Dividing the subjects of legislation according to the usual distinctions of juriconsults, the commissioners commenced by the publication and application of the laws in general; passed from that preliminary subject to the consideration of personal rights under all their various relations; then to rights respecting property; and, lastly, to those legal forms of procedure, by which the rights of citizens, whether arising out of personal circumstances, or as connected with property, are to be followed forth, explicated, and ascertained. Thus adopting the division, and in some degree the forms, of the Institutes of Justinian, the commission proceeded, according to the same model, to consider each subdivision of this general arrangement, and adopt respecting each such maxims or brocards of general law, as were to form the future basis of French jurisprudence. Their general principles being carefully connected and fixed, the ingenuity of the commissioners was exerted in deducing from them such a number of corollaries and subordinate maxims, as might provide, so far as human ingenuity could, for the infinite number of questions that were likely to emerge on the practical application of the general principles to the varied and intricate transactions of human life. It may be easily supposed, that a task so difficult gave rise to much discussion among the commissioners; and as their report, when fully weighed among themselves, was again subjected to the Council of State, before it was proposed to the Legislative Body, it must be allowed, that every means which could be devised were employed in maturely considering and revising the great body of national law, which finally, under the name of the Code Napoléon, was adopted by France, and continues, under the title of the Civil Code, to be the law

by which her subjects still possess and enforce their civil rights.

It would be doing much injustice to Napoleon, to suppress the great personal interest which, amid so many calls upon his time, he nevertheless took in the labours of the commission. He frequently attended their meetings, or those of the Council of State, in which their labours underwent revision; and, though he must be supposed entirely ignorant of the complicated system of jurisprudence as a science, yet his acute, calculating, and argumentative mind enabled him, by the broad views of genius and good sense, often to get rid of those subtleties by which professional persons are occasionally embarrassed; and to treat as cobwebs difficulties of a technical or metaphysical character, which, to the *jurisconsults*, had the appearance of bonds and fetters.

There were times, however, on the other hand, when Napoleon was led, by the obvious and vulgar views of a question, to propose alterations which would have been fatal to the administration of justice, and the gradual enlargement and improvement of municipal law. Such was his idea, that advocates and solicitors ought only to be paid in the event of the cause being decided in favour of their client; a regulation which, had he ever adopted it, would have gone far to close the gates of justice; since, what practitioner would have forfeited at once one large portion of the means of his existence, and consented to rest the other upon the uncertainty of a gambling transaction? A lawyer is no more answerable for not gaining his cause, than a horse-jockey for not winning the race. Neither can foretell with any certainty the event of the struggle, and each, in justice, can only be held liable for the utmost exertion of his skill and abilities. Napoleon was not aware, that litigation is not to be checked by preventing law-suits from coming into court, but by a systematic and sage course of trying and deciding points of importance, which, being once settled betwixt two litigants, cannot, in the same shape, or under the same circumstances, be again the subject of dispute among others.

The Civil Code of Napoleon is accompanied by a code of procedure in civil cases, and a code relating to commercial affairs, which may be regarded as supplemental to the main body of municipal law. There is, besides, a Penal Code, and a code respecting the procedure against persons accused under it. The whole forms a grand system of jurisprudence, drawn up by the most enlightened men of the age, having access to all the materials which the past and the present times afford; and it is not surprising that it should have been received as a great boon by a nation, who, in some sense, may be said, previous to its establishment, to have been without any fixed or certain municipal law since the date of the Revolution.

But, while we admit the full merit of the Civil Code of France, we are under the necessity of observing, that the very symmetry and theoretical consistency, which form at first view its principal beauty, render it, when examined closely, less fit for the actual purposes of jurisprudence, than a system of national law, which, having never under-

gone the same operation of compression, and abridgment, and condensation, to which that of France was necessarily subjected, spreads through a multiplicity of volumes, embraces an immense collection of precedents, and, to the eye of inexperience, seems, in comparison of the compact size and regular form of the French code, a labyrinth to which no clue is afforded. It is of the greater importance to give this subject some consideration, because it has of late been fashionable to draw comparisons between the jurisprudence of England and that of France, and even to urge the necessity of new-modeling the former upon such a concise and systematic plan as the latter exhibits.

In arguing this point, we suppose it will be granted, that that code of institutions is the most perfect, which most effectually provides for every difficult case as it emerges, and therefore averts as far as possible the occurrence of doubt, and, of course, of litigation, by giving the most accurate and certain interpretation to the general rule, when applied to cases as they arise. Now, in this point, which comprehends the very essence and end of all jurisprudence,—the protection, namely, of the rights of the individual,—the English law is preferable to the French in an incalculable degree; because each principle of English law has been the subject of illustration for many ages, by the most learned and wise judges, acting upon pleadings conducted by the most acute and ingenious men of each successive age. This current of legal judgments has been flowing for centuries; deciding, as they occurred, every question of doubt which could arise upon the application of general principles to particular circumstances; and each individual case, so decided, fills up some point which was previously dispendable, and, becoming a rule for similar questions, tends to that extent to diminish the debateable ground of doubt and argument with which the law must be surrounded, like an unknown territory, when it is first partially discovered.

It is not the fault of the French *jurisconsults*, that they did not possess the mass of legal authority arising out of a regular course of decisions by a long succession of judges competent to the task, and proceeding, not upon hypothetical cases supposed by themselves, and subject only to the investigation of their own minds, but upon such as then actually occurred in practice, and had been fully canvassed and argued in open court. The French lawyers had not the advantage of referring to such a train of decisions; each settling some new point, or ascertaining and confirming some one which had been considered as questionable. By the Revolution the ancient French courts had been destroyed, together with their records; their proceedings only served as matter of history or tradition, but could not be quoted in support or explanation of a code which had no existence until after their destruction. The commissioners endeavoured, we have seen, to supply this defect in their system, by drawing from their general rules such a number of corollary propositions, as might so far as possible serve for their application to special and particular cases. But rules, founded in imaginary cases, can never have the same weight with precedents emerging in actual practice, where

the previous exertions of the lawyers have put the case in every possible light, and where the judge comes to the decision, not as the theorist, whose opinion relates only to an ideal hypothesis of his own mind, but as the solemn arbiter of justice betwixt man and man, after having attended to, and profited by, the collision and conflict of opposite opinions, urged by those best qualified to state and to illustrate them. The value of such discussion is well known to all who have experience of courts of justice, where it is never thought surprising to hear the wisest judge confess that he came into court with a view of the case at issue wholly different from that which he was induced to form after having given the requisite attention to the debate before him. But this is an advantage which can never be gained, unless in the discussion of a real case; and therefore the opinion of a judge, given *tota re cognita*, must always be a more valuable precedent, than that which the same learned individual could form upon an abstract and hypothetical question.

It is, besides, to be considered, that the most fertile ingenuity with which any legislator can be endued is limited within certain bounds; and that when he has racked his brain to provide for all the ideal cases which his prolific imagination can supply, it will be found that he has not anticipated or provided for the hundredth part of the questions which are sure to occur in actual practice. To make a practical application of what we have stated, to the relative jurisprudence of France and England, it may be remarked, that the Title V. of the 1st Book of the Civil Code, upon the subject of marriage, contains only one hundred and sixty-one propositions respecting the rights of parties, arising in different circumstances out of that contract, the most important known in civilized society. If we deduce from this gross amount the great number of rules which are not doctrinal, but have only reference to the forms of procedure, the result will be greatly diminished. The English law, on the other hand, besides its legislative enactments, is guarded, as appears from Roper's Index, by no less than a thousand decided cases, or precedents, each of which affords ground to rule any other case in similar circumstances. In this view, the certainty of the law of England, compared to that of France, bears the proportion of ten to one.

It is, therefore, a vulgar, though a natural and pleasing error, to prefer the simplicity of an ingenious and philosophic code of jurisprudence, to a system which has grown up with a nation, augmented with its wants, extended according to its civilization, and only become cumbrous and complicated, because the state of society to which it applies has itself given rise to a complication of relative situations, to all of which the law is under the necessity of adapting itself. In this point of view, the Code of France may be compared to a warehouse built with much attention to architectural uniformity, showy in the exterior, and pleasing from the simplicity of its plan, but too small to hold the quantity of goods necessary to supply the public demand; while the Common Law of England resembles the vaults of some huge Gothic building, dark indeed, and ill arranged, but containing

an immense store of commodities, which those acquainted with its recesses seldom fail to be able to produce to such as have occasion for them. The practises, or adjudged cases, in fact form a breakwater, as it were, to protect the more formal bulwark of the statute law; and although they cannot be regularly jointed or dovetailed together, each independent decision fills its space on the mound, and offers a degree of resistance to innovation, and protection to the law, in proportion to its own weight and importance.

The certainty of the English jurisprudence (for, in spite of the ordinary opinion to the contrary, it has acquired a comparative degree of certainty) rests upon the multitude of its decisions. The views which a man is disposed to entertain of his own rights, under the general provisions of the law, are usually controlled by some previous decision on the case; and a reference to precedents, furnished by a person of skill, saves, in most instances, the expense and trouble of a law-suit, which is thus stifled in its very birth. If we are rightly informed, the number of actions at common law, tried in England yearly, does not exceed betwixt five-and-twenty and thirty, on an average, from each county; an incredibly small number, when the wealth of the kingdom is considered, as well as the various and complicated transactions incident to the advanced and artificial state of society in which we live.

But we regard the multitude of precedents in English law as eminently favourable, not only to the certainty of the law, but to the liberty of the subject; and especially as a check upon any judge, who might be disposed to innovate either upon the rights or liberties of the lieges. If a general theoretical maxim of law be presented to an unscrupulous or partial judge; he may feel himself at liberty, by exerting his ingenuity, to warp the right cause the wrong way. But if he is bound down by the decisions of his wise and learned predecessors, that judge would be venturesome indeed, who should attempt to tread a different and more devious path, than that which is marked by the venerable traces of their footsteps; especially, as he well knows that the professional persons around him, who might be blinded by the glare of his ingenuity in merely theoretical argument, are perfectly capable of observing and condemning every departure from precedent.* In such a case he becomes sensible, that, fettered as he is by previous decisions, the law is in his hands, to be administered indeed, but not to be altered or tampered with; and that if the evidence be read in the court, there are and must be many present, who know as well as himself, what must, according to precedent, be the verdict, or the decision. These are considerations which never can restrain or fetter a judge, who is only called upon to give his own explanation of the general principle briefly expressed in a short code, and susceptible therefore of a variety of interpretations, from which he may at pleasure select that which may be most

* The intelligent reader will easily be aware, that we mean not to say that every decision of their predecessors is necessarily binding on the judges of the day. Laws themselves become obsolete, and so do the decisions which have maintained and enforced them.

favourable to his unconscionable or partial purposes.

It follows, also, from the paucity of laws afforded by a code constructed not by the growth of time, but suggested by the ingenuity of theorists suddenly called to the task, and, considering its immense importance, executing it in haste, that many provisions, most important for the exercise of justice, must, of course, be neglected in the French code. For example, the whole law of evidence, the very key and corner-stone of justice between man and man, has been strangely overlooked in the French jurisprudence. It is plain, that litigation may proceed for ever, unless there be some previous adjustment (called technically an *issue*) betwixt the parties, at the sight of the judge, tending to ascertain their averments in point of fact, as also the relevancy of those averments to the determination of the cause. In England, chiefly during the course of last century, the law of evidence has grown up to a degree of perfection, which has tended, perhaps more than any other cause, at once to prevent and to shorten litigation. If we pass from the civil to the penal mode of procedure in France, the British lawyer is yet more shocked by a course, which seems in his view totally to invert and confound every idea which he has received upon the law of evidence. Our law, it is well known, is in nothing so scrupulous as in any conduct towards the prisoner, which may have the most indirect tendency to entrap him into bearing evidence against himself. Law sympathizes in such a case with the frailties of humanity, and, aware of the consequence which judicial inquiries must always have on the mind of the timid and ignorant, never pushes the examination of a suspected person farther than he himself, in the natural hope of giving such an account of himself as may procure his liberty, shall chuse to reply to it.

In France, on the contrary, the whole trial sometimes resolves into a continued examination and cross-examination of the prisoner, who is not only under the necessity of giving his original statement of the circumstances on which he founds his defence, but is confronted repeatedly with the witnesses, and repeatedly required to reconcile his own statement of the case with that which these have averred. With respect to the character of evidence, the same looseness of practice exists. No distinction seems to be made between that which is hearsay and that which is direct; that which is spontaneously given, and that which is extracted, or perhaps suggested, by leading questions. All this is contrary to what we are taught to consider as the essence of justice towards the accused. The use of the rack is, indeed, no longer admitted to extort the confession, but the mode of judicial examination seems to us a species of moral torture, under which a timid and ignorant, though innocent man, is very likely to be involved in such contradictions and inextricable confusion, that he may be under the necessity of throwing away his life by not knowing how to frame his defence.

We shall not protract these remarks on the Code Napoléon; the rather that we must frankly confess, that the manners and customs of a country make the

greatest difference with respect to its laws, and that a system may work well in France, and answer all the purposes of jurisprudence, which in England would be thought very inadequate to the purpose. The humane institution which allows the accused the benefit of counsel, is a privilege which the English law does not permit to the accused, and may have its own weight in counterbalancing some of the inconveniences to which he is subjected in France. It seems also probable, that the deficiencies in the code, arising from its recent origin and compressed form, must be gradually remedied as in England, by the course of decisions pronounced by intelligent and learned judges; and that what we now state as an objection to the system will gradually disappear under the influence of time.

Considered as a production of human science, and a manual of legislative sagacity, the code may challenge general admiration for the clear and wise manner in which the axioms are drawn up and expressed. There are but few peculiarities making a difference betwixt its principles and those of the Roman law, which has in most contracts claimed to be considered as the mother of judicial regulation. The most remarkable occurs, perhaps, in the articles regulating what is called the Family Council; a subject which does not seem of importance sufficient to claim much attention.

The Civil Code being thus ascertained, provision was made for its regular administration by suitable courts; the judges of which did not, as before the Revolution, depend for their emoluments upon fees payable by the litigants, but were compensated by suitable salaries at the expense of the public. As France does not supply that class of persons who form what is called in England the unpaid magistracy, the French justices of peace received a small salary of from 800 to 1800 francs. Above them in rank came judges in the first instance, whose salaries amounted to 3000 francs at the utmost. The judges of the supreme tribunals enjoyed about four or five thousand francs; and those of the High Court of Cassation had not more than ten thousand francs, which scarcely enabled them to live and keep some rank in the metropolis. But, though thus underpaid, the situation of the French judges was honourable in the eyes of the country, and they maintained its character by activity and impartiality in their judicial functions.

The system of juries had been introduced in criminal cases, by the acclamation of the Assembly. Bonaparte found them, however, scrupulously restrictive and troublesome. There may be some truth in the charge, that they were averse from conviction, where a loophole remained for acquitting the criminal; and that many audacious crimes remained unpunished, from the punctilious view which the juries took of their duty. But it was from other motives than those of the public weal that Napoleon made an early use of his power, for the purpose of forming special tribunals, invested with a half-military character, to try all such crimes as assumed a political complexion, with power to condemn without the suffrage of a jury. We have already alluded to this infringement of the most valuable political rights of the subject, in giving some account of the

trials of Georges, Pichegru, and Moreau. No jury would ever have brought in a verdict against the latter, whose sole crime was his communication with Pichegru; a point of suspicion certainly, but no proof whatever of positive guilt. Political causes being out of the field, the trial by jury was retained in the French code, so far as regarded criminal questions; and the general administration of justice seems to have been very well calculated for protecting the right, and punishing that which is wrong.

The fiscal operations of Bonaparte were those of which the subjects complained the most, as indeed these are generally the grievance to which the people in every country are the most sensible. High taxes were imposed on the French people, rendered necessary by the expenses of the government, which, with all its accompaniments, were very considerable; and although Bonaparte did all in his power to throw the charge of the eternal wars which he waged upon the countries which he overran or subdued, yet so far does the waste of war exceed any emolument which the armed hand can wrest from the sufferers, so imperfect a proportion do the gains of the victor bear to the losses of the vanquished, that after all the revenue which was derived from foreign countries, the continual campaigns of the emperor proved a constant and severe drain upon the produce of French industry. So rich, however, is the soil of France, such is the extent of her resources, such the patience and activity of her inhabitants, that she is qualified, if not to produce at once the large capitals which England can raise upon her national credit, yet to support the payment of a train of heavy annual imposts for a much longer period, and with less practical inconvenience. The agriculture of France had been extremely improved since the breaking up of the great estates into smaller portions, and the abrogation of those feudal burdens which had pressed upon the cultivators; and it might be considered as flourishing, in spite of war taxes, and, what was worse, the conscription itself. Under a fixed and secure, though a severe and despotic government property was protected, and agriculture received the best encouragement, namely, the certainty conferred on the cultivator of reaping the crop which he had sowed.

It was far otherwise with commerce, which the maritime war, carried on so long and with such unmitigated severity, had very much injured, and the utter destruction of which was in a manner perfected by Bonaparte's adherence to the continental system. This, indeed, was the instrument by which in the long run he hoped to ruin the commerce of his rival, but the whole weight of which fell in the first instance on that of France, whose seaports showed no other shipping save coasters and fishing-vessels; while the trade of Marseilles, Bordeaux, Nantes, and other great commercial towns, had in a great measure ceased to exist. The government of the emperor was proportionally unpopular in those cities; and although men kept silence, because surrounded by the spies of a jealous and watchful despotism, their dislike to the existing state of things could not entirely be concealed.

On the other hand, capitalists, who had sums invested in the public funds, or who were concerned

with the extensive and beneficial contracts for the equipment and supply of Napoleon's large armies, with all the numerous and influential persons upon whom any part of the gathering in or expenditure of the public money devolved, were necessarily devoted to a government, under which, in spite of the emperor's vigilance, immense profits were often derived, even after those by whom they were made had rendered to the ministers, or perhaps the generals, by whom they were protected, a due portion of the spoil. Economist and calculator as he was, to a most superior degree of excellence, Napoleon seems to have been utterly unable, if he really sincerely desired, to put an end to the speculations of those whom he trusted with power. He frequently, during his conversations at St Helena, alludes to the venality and corruption of such as he employed in the highest offices, but whose sordid practices seem never to have occurred to him in the way of objection to his making use of their talents. Fouché, Talleyrand, and others, are thus stigmatized; and as we well know how long, and upon how many different occasions, he employed those statesmen, we cannot but suppose that whatever may have been his sentiments as to the *men*, he was perfectly willing to compound with their peculation, in order to have the advantage of their abilities. Even when practices of this kind were too gross to be passed over, Napoleon's mode of censuring and repressing them was not adapted to show a pure sense of morality on his own part, or any desire to use extraordinary rigour in preventing them in future. This conclusion we form from the following anecdote, which he communicated to Las Cases:—

Speaking of generals, and praising the disinterestedness of some, he adds, Masséna, Augereau, Brune, and others, were undaunted depredators. Upon one occasion, the rapacity of the first of these generals had exceeded the patience of the emperor. His mode of punishing him was peculiar. He did not dispossess him of the command, of which he had rendered himself unworthy by such an unsoldier-like vice—he did not strip the depredator by judicial sentence of his ill-won gains, and restore them to those from whom they were plundered—but, in order to make the general sensible that he had proceeded too far, Bonaparte drew a bill upon the banker of the delinquent, for the sum of two or three million of francs, to be placed to Masséna's debit and the credit of the drawer. Great was the embarrassment of the banker, who dared not refuse the Imperial order, while he humbly hesitated, that he could not safely honour it without the authority of his principal. "Pay the money," was the emperor's reply, "and let Masséna refuse to give you credit at his peril." The money was paid accordingly, and placed to that general's debit, without his venturing to start any objections. This was not punishing peculation, but partaking in its gains; and the spirit of the transaction approached nearly to that described by Le Sage, where the Spanish minister of state insists on sharing the bribes given to his secretary.

Junot, in like manner, who, upon his return from Portugal, gave general scandal by the display of diamonds, and other wealth, which he had acquired

in that oppressed country, received from Bonaparte a friendly hint to be more cautious in such exhibitions. But his acknowledged rapacity was never thought of as a reason disqualifying him for being presently afterwards sent to the government of Illyria.

We are informed in another of the emperor's communications, that his Council of State was of admirable use to him in the severe inquisition which he was desirous of making into the public accounts. The proceedings of this Star Chamber, and the fear of being transmitted to the cognition of the grand judge, usually brought the culprits to composition; and when they had disgorged one, two, or three millions,* the government was enriched, or, according to Bonaparte's ideas, the laws were satisfied. The truth seems to be, that Bonaparte, though he contemned wealth in his own person, was aware that avarice, which, after all, is but a secondary and sordid species of ambition, is the most powerful motive to mean and vulgar minds; and he willingly advanced gold to those who chose to prey upon it, so long as their efforts facilitated his possessing and retaining the unlimited authority to which he had reached. In a country where distress and disaster of every kind, public and private, had enabled many to raise large fortunes by brokerage and agiotage, a monied interest of a peculiar character was soon formed, whose hopes were of course rested on the wonderful ruler, by whose gigantic ambition new schemes of speculation were opened in constant succession, and whose unrivaled talents seemed to have found the art of crowning the most difficult undertakings with success.

It might be thought that the manufacturing interest must have perished in France, from the same reasons which so strongly and unfavourably afflicted the commerce of that country. In ceasing to import, there must indeed have been a corresponding diminution of the demand for goods to be exported, whether these were the growth of the soil, or the productions of French labour. Accordingly, this result had in a great degree taken place, and there was a decrease to a large amount in those goods which the French were accustomed to export in exchange for the various commodities supplied to them by British trade. But though the real and legitimate stimulus to manufactures had thus ceased, Napoleon had substituted an artificial one, which had, to a certain extent, supplied the place of the natural trade. We must remark, that Napoleon, practically and personally frugal, was totally a stranger to the science of political economy. He never received or acted upon the idea, that a liberal system of commerce operates most widely in diffusing the productions which are usually the subjects of exchange, and in affording to every country the greatest share of the bounties of nature, or the produce of industry at the easiest rates. On the contrary, he had proceeded to act against the commerce of England, as, in a military capacity, he would have done in regard to the water which supplied a besieged city. He strove to cut it off, and altogether to destroy it, and to supply the absence

of its productions by such substitutes as France could furnish. Hence, the factitious encouragement given to the French manufactures, not by the natural demand of the country, but by the bounties and prohibitions by which they were guarded. Hence, the desperate efforts made to produce a species of sugar from various substances, especially from the beet-root. To this unnatural and unthrifty experiment, Bonaparte used to attach so much consequence, that a piece of the new composition, which, with much time and trouble, had been made to approximate the quality of ordinary loaf-sugar, was preserved in a glass-case over the Imperial mantel-piece; and a pound or two of beet-sugar, highly refined, was sent to foreign courts to illustrate the means by which Napoleon consoled his subjects for the evils incumbent on the continental system. No way of flattering or gratifying the emperor was so certain, as to appear eager in supporting these views; and it is said, that one of his generals, when tottering in the Imperial good graces, regained the favour of his master, by planting the whole of a considerable estate with beet-root. In these, and on similar occasions, Napoleon, in his eager desire to produce the commodity desiderated, became regardless of those considerations which a manufacturer first ascertains when about to commence his operations, namely, the expense at which the article can be produced, the price at which it can be disposed of, and its fitness for the market which it is intended to supply. The various encouragements given to the cotton manufacturers, and others, in France, by which it was designed to supply the want of British goods, proceeded upon a system equally illiberal and impolitic. Still, however, the expensive bounties, and forced sales, which the influence of government afforded, enabled these manufacturers to proceed, and furnished employment to a certain number of men, who were naturally grateful for the protection which they received from the emperor. In the same manner, although no artificial jet d'eau, upon the grandest scale of expense, can so much refresh the face of nature, as the gentle and general influence of a natural shower, the former will nevertheless have the effect of feeding and nourishing such vegetable productions as are within the reach of its limited influence. It was thus, that the efforts of Napoleon, at encouraging arts and manufactures, though proceeding on mistaken principles, produced, in the first instance, results apparently beneficial.

We have already had occasion to observe the immense public works which were undertaken at the expense of Bonaparte's government. Temples, bridges, and aqueducts, are, indeed, the coin with which arbitrary princes, in all ages, have endeavoured to compensate for the liberty of which the people are deprived. Such monuments are popular with the citizens, because the enjoyment of them is common to all, and the monarch is partial to a style of expenditure promising more plausibly than any other, to extend the memory of his present greatness far into the bosom of futurity. Bonaparte was not, and could not be, insensible to either of these motives. His mind was too much enlarged to seek enjoyment in any of the

* *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. II, p. 331.

ordinary objects of exclusive gratification; and undoubtedly, he who had done so much to distinguish himself during his life above ordinary mortals, must have naturally desired that his public works should preserve his fame to future ages. Accordingly, he undertook and executed some of the most splendid labours of modern times. The road over the Simplon, and the basins at Antwerp, may be always appealed to as gigantic specimens of his public spirit.

On the other hand, as we have before hinted, Napoleon sometimes aimed at producing immediate effect, by proposals and plans hastily adopted, as hastily decreed, and given in full form to the government journal; but which were either abandoned immediately after having been commenced, or perhaps never advanced farther than the plan announced in the *Moniteur*. Bonaparte's habits of activity, his powers of deciding with a single glance upon most points of either military or civil engineering, were liberally drawn upon to strike his subjects with wonder and admiration. During the few peaceful intervals of his reign, his impatience of inaction found amusement in traversing, with great rapidity, and often on the shortest notice, the various departments in France. Traveling with incredible celerity, though usually accompanied by the Empress Joséphine, he had no sooner visited any town of consequence, than he threw himself on horseback, and, followed only by his aide-de-camp and his Mameluke Ronstan, who with difficulty kept him in view, he took a flying survey of the place, its capacities of improvement, or the inconveniences which attached to it. With this local knowledge, thus rapidly acquired, he gave audience to the municipal authorities, and overwhelmed them very often with liberal and long details concerning the place round which he had galloped for the first time, but in which they had spent their days. Amazement at the extent and facility of the emperor's powers of observation was thus universally excited, and his hints were recorded in the *Moniteur*, for the admiration of France. Some public work, solicited by the municipality, or suggested by the enlightened benevolence of the emperor himself, was then projected, but which, in many, if not most cases, remained unexecuted; the imperial funds not being in all circumstances adequate to the splendour of Napoleon's undertakings, or, which was the more frequent case, some new absorbing war, or project of ambition, occasioning every other object of expenditure to be postponed.

Even if some of Bonaparte's most magnificent works of public splendour had been completed, there is room to doubt whether they would have been attended with real advantage to his power, bearing the least proportion to the influence which their grandeur necessarily produces upon the imagination. We look with admiration, and even with astonishment, on the splendid dock-yards of the Scheldt; but had they been accomplished, what availed the building of first-rates, which France could hardly find sailors to man; which, being manned, dared not venture out of the river; or, hazarding themselves upon the ocean, were sure to become the prizes of the first British men-of-war with whom they chanced to encounter? Almost all

this profuse expense went to the mere purposes of vain-glory; for more mischief would have been done to British commerce, which Bonaparte knew well was the assailable point, by six privateers from Dunkirk, than by all the ships of the line which he could build at the new and most expensive dock-yard of Antwerp, with Brest and Toulon to boot.

In such cases as these, Napoleon did, in a most efficient manner, that which he ridiculed the Directory for being unable to do—he wrought on the imagination of the French nation, which indeed had been already so dazzled by the extraordinary things he had accomplished, that, had he promised them still greater prodigies than were implied in the magnificent works which he directed to be founded, they might still have been justified in expecting the performance of his predictions. And it must be admitted, looking around the city of Paris, and traveling through the provinces of France, that Bonaparte has, in the works of peaceful grandeur, left a stamp of magnificence, not unworthy of the soaring and at the same time profound spirit, which accomplished so many wonders in warfare.

The personal and family life of Napoleon was skilfully adapted to his pre-eminent station. If he had foibles connected with pleasure and passion, they were so carefully veiled as to remain unknown to the world—at least, they were not manifested by any of those weaknesses which might serve to lower the emperor to the stamp of common men. His conduct towards the Empress Joséphine was regular and exemplary. From their accession to grandeur till the fatal divorce, as Napoleon once termed it, they shared the privacy of the same apartment, and for many years partook the same bed. Joséphine is said, indeed, to have given her husband, upon whom she had many claims, some annoyance by her jealousy, to which he patiently submitted, and escaped the reproach thrown on so many heroes and men of genius, that, proof to everything else, they are not so against the allurements of female seduction. What amours he had were of a passing character. No woman, excepting Joséphine and her successor, who exercised their lawful and rightful influence, was ever known to possess any power over him.

The dignity of his throne was splendidly and magnificently maintained, but the expense was still limited by that love of order which arose out of Bonaparte's powers of arithmetical calculation habitually and constantly employed, and the trusting to which, contributed, it may be, to that external regularity and decorum which he always supported. In speaking of his own peculiar taste, Bonaparte said that his favourite work was a book of logarithms, and his choicest amusement was working out the problems. The individual to whom the emperor made this singular avowal mentioned it with surprise to an officer near his person, who assured him, that not only did Napoleon amuse himself with arithmetical ciphers, and the theory of computation, but that he frequently brought it to bear on his domestic expenses, and diverted himself with comparing the price at which particular articles were charged to him, with the rate which they ought to have cost at the fair market price, but which, for reasons unne-

cessary to state, was in general greatly exceeded. Las Cases mentions his detecting such an overcharge in the gold fringe which adorned one of his state apartments. A still more curious anecdote respects a watch which the most eminent artist in Paris had orders to finish with his utmost skill, in a style which might become a gift from the Emperor of France to his brother the King of Spain. Before the watch was out of the artist's hands, Napoleon received news of the battle of Vittoria. "All is now over with Joseph," were almost his first words after receiving the intelligence. "Send to countermand the order for the watch." *

Properly considered, this anecdote indicates no indifference as to his brother's fate, nor anxiety about saving a petty sum; it was the rigid calculation of a professed accountant, whose habits of accuracy induced him to bring every loss to a distinct balance, however trivial the off-set may be. But although the emperor's economy descended to minute trifles, we are not to suppose that among such was its natural sphere. On the contrary, in the first year of the consulate, he discovered and rectified an error in the statement of the revenue, to the amount of no less than two millions of francs, to the prejudice of the state. In another instance, with the skill which only a natural taste for calculation brought to excellence by constant practice could have attained, he discovered an enormous overcharge of more than sixty thousand francs in the pay-accounts of the garrison of Paris. Two such discoveries, by the head magistrate, must have gone far to secure regularity in the departments in which they were made, in future.

Attending to this remarkable peculiarity throws much light on the character of Bonaparte. It was by dint of his rapid and powerful combinations that he succeeded as a general; and the same laws of calculation can be traced through much of his public and private life.

The palace charges, and ordinary expenses of the emperor, were completely and accurately regulated by his imperial majesty's own calculation. He boasted to have so simplified the expenditure of the ancient kings of France, that his hunting-establishment, though maintained in the utmost splendour, cost a considerable sum less than that of the Bourbons. But it must be recollected, first, that Napoleon was free from the obligation which subjected the Bourbons to the extravagant expenses which attended the high appointments of their household; secondly, that under the imperial government, the whole establishment of falconry was abolished; a sport which is, in the opinion of many, more strikingly picturesque and interesting than any other variety of the chase; and which, as it infers a royal expense, belongs properly to sovereign princes.

The imperial court was distinguished not only by a severe etiquette, but the grantees, by whom its principal duties were discharged, were given to understand, that the utmost magnificence of dress and equipage was required from them upon public

occasions. It was, indeed, a subject of complaint amongst the servants of the crown, that though Bonaparte was in many respects attentive to their interests, gave them opportunities of acquiring wealth, invested them with large dotations and endowments, and frequently assisted them with an influence not easily withstood in the accomplishment of advantageous marriages; yet still the great expenditure at which they were required to support their appearance at the imperial court, prevented their realizing any fortune which could provide effectually for their family. This expense Bonaparte loved to represent, as a tax which he made his courtiers pay to support the manufactures of France; but it was extended so far as to show plainly, that, determined as he was to establish his nobility on such a scale as to grace his court, it was far from being his purpose to permit them to assume any real power, or to form an existing and influential barrier between the crown and the people. The same inference is to be drawn from the law of France concerning succession in landed property, which is in ordinary cases equally divided amongst the children of the deceased; a circumstance which must effectually prevent the rise of great hereditary influence. And although, for the support of dignities granted by the crown, and in some other cases, an entail of a portion of the favoured person's estate, called a *majorat*, is permitted to follow the title, yet the proportion is so small as to give no considerable weight to those upon whom it devolves.

The composition of Bonaparte's court was singular. Amid his military dukes and marshals were mingled many descendants of the old noblesse, who had been struck out of the lists of emigration. On these Bonaparte spread the cruel reproach, "I offered them rank in my army—they declined the service;—I opened my ante-chambers to them—they rushed in and filled them." In this the emperor did not do justice to the ancient noblesse of France. A great many resumed their natural situation in the military ranks of their country, and a still greater number declined, in any capacity, to bend the knee to him, whom they could only consider as a successful usurper.

The ceremonial of the Tuileries was upon the most splendid scale, the public festivals were held with the utmost magnificence, and the etiquette was of the most strict and indefeasible character. To all this Bonaparte himself attached consequence, as ceremonies characterizing the spirit and dignity of his government; and he had drilled even his own mind into a veneration for all those outward forms connected with royalty, as accurately as if they had been during his whole life the special subject of his attention. There is a curious example given by Monsieur Las Cases. Bonaparte, in good-humoured trifling, had given his follower the titles of your highness, your lordship, and so forth, amidst which it occurred to him, in a fit of abstraction, to use the phrase, "Your Majesty." The instant that the word, sacred to his own ears, had escaped him, the humour of frolic was ended, and he resumed a serious tone, with the air of one who feels that he has let his pleasantry trespass upon an unbecoming and almost hallowed subject.

* The watch, half completed, remained in the hands of the artist, and is now the property of the Duke of Wellington.

There were many of Bonaparte's friends and followers, bred, like himself, under the influence of the Revolution, who doubted the policy of his entering into such a strain of imitation of the ancient courts of Europe, and of his appearing anxious to emulate them in the only points in which he must necessarily fail, antiquity and long observance giving to ancient usages an effect upon the imagination, which could not possibly attach to the same ceremonial introduced into a court of yesterday. These would willingly have seen the dignity of their master's court rested upon its real and pre-eminent importance, and would have desired, that though republican principles were abandoned, something of the severe and manly simplicity of republican manners should have continued to characterize a throne whose site rested upon the Revolution. The courtiers who held such opinions were at liberty to draw consolation from the personal appearance and habits of Napoleon. Amid the gleam of embroidery, of orders, decorations, and all that the etiquette of a court demands to render ceremonial at once accurate and splendid, the person of the emperor was to be distinguished by his extreme simplicity of dress and deportment. A plain uniform, with a hat having no other ornament than a small three-coloured cockade, was the dress of him who bestowed all these gorgeous decorations, and in honour of whom these costly robes of ceremonial had been exhibited. Perhaps Napoleon might be of opinion, that a person under the common size, and in his latter days somewhat corpulent, was unfit for the display of rich dresses; or it is more likely he desired to intimate, that although he exacted from others the strict observance of etiquette, he held that the Imperial dignity placed him above any reciprocal obligation towards them.

Perhaps, also, in limiting his personal expenses, and avoiding that of a splendid royal wardrobe, Bonaparte might indulge that love of calculation and order, which we have noticed as a leading point of his character. But his utmost efforts could not carry a similar spirit of economy among the female part of his Imperial family; and it may be a consolation to persons of less consequence to know, that in this respect the emperor of half the world was nearly as powerless as they may feel themselves to be. Joséphine, with all her amiable qualities, was profuse, after the general custom of Creoles, and Pauline de Borghese was no less so. The efforts of Napoleon to limit their expenses sometimes gave rise to singular scenes. Upon one occasion, the emperor found in company of Joséphine a certain milliner of high reputation and equal expense, with whom he had discharged his wife to have any dealings. Incensed at this breach of his orders, he directed the *marchande de modes* to be conducted to Bicêtre; but the number of carriages which brought the wives of his principal courtiers to consult her in captivity, convinced him that the popularity of the milliner was too powerful even for his imperial authority; so he wisely dropped a contention which must have seemed ludicrous to the public, and the artist was set at liberty, to charm and pillage the gay world of Paris at her own pleasure.

On another occasion, the irregularity of Joséphine

in the article of expense led to an incident which reminds us of an anecdote in the history of some oriental sultan. A creditor of the empress, become desperate from delay, stopped the Imperial *calèche*, in which the emperor was leaving St. Cloud, with Joséphine by his side, and presented his account, with a request of payment. Bonaparte did as Saladin would have done in similar circumstances—he forgave the man's boldness, in consideration of the justice of his claim, and caused the debt to be immediately settled. In fact, while blaming the expense and irregularity which occasioned such demands, his sense of justice, and his family affection, equally inclined him to satisfy the creditor.

The same love of order, as a ruling principle of his government, must have rendered Bonaparte a severe censor of all public breaches of the decencies of society. Public morals are in themselves the accomplishment and fulfilment of all laws; they alone constitute a national code. Accordingly, the manners of the imperial court were under such regulation as to escape public scandal, if they were not beyond secret suspicion.* In the same manner, gambling, the natural and favourite vice of a court, was not practised in that of Bonaparte, who discountenanced high play by every means in his power. But he suffered it to be licensed to an immense and frightful extent, by the minister of his police; nor can we give him the least credit when he affirms, that the gambling-houses, which paid such immense rents to Fouché, existed without his knowledge. Napoleon's own assertion cannot make us believe that he was ignorant of the principal source of revenue which supported his police. He compounded, on this as on other occasions, with a good-will, in consideration of the personal advantage which he derived from it.

In the public amusements of a more general kind, Bonaparte took a deep interest. He often attended the theatre, though commonly in private, and without éclat. His own taste, as well as political circumstances, led him to encourage the amusements of the stage; and the celebrated Talma, whose decided talents placed him at the head of the French performers, received, as well in personal notice from the emperor, as through the more substantial medium of a pension, an assurance, that the kindness which he had shown in early youth to the little Corsican student had not been forgotten. The strictest care was taken that nothing should be admitted on the stage which could awaken feelings or recollections unfavourable to the imperial government. When the acute wit of the Parisian audience seized on some expression or incident which had any analogy to public affairs, the greatest pains were taken, not only to prevent the circumstance from recurring, but even to hinder it from getting into general circulation. This secrecy respecting what occurred in public, could not be attained in a free country, but was easily accomplished in one where the public papers, the general organs of intelligence, were under the strict and unremitted vigilance of the government.

* We again repeat, that we totally disbelieve the gross infamies imputed to Napoleon within his own family, although sanctioned by the evidence of the *Memoirs of Fouché*. Neither Bonaparte's propensities nor his faults were those of a voluptuary.

There were periods, when Bonaparte, in order to gain the approbation and sympathy of those who claim the exclusive title of lovers of liberty, was not unwilling to be thought the friend of liberal opinions, and was heard to express himself in favour of the liberty of the press, and other checks upon the executive authority. To reconcile his opinions (or rather what he threw out as his opinions) with a practice diametrically opposite, was no easy matter, yet he sometimes attempted it. On observing one or two persons, who had been his silent and surprised auditors on such an occasion, unable to suppress some appearance of incredulity, he immediately entered upon his defence. "I am," he said, "at bottom, and naturally, for a fixed and limited government. You seem not to believe me, perhaps because you conceive my opinions and practice are at variance. But you do not consider the necessity arising out of persons and circumstances. Were I to relax the reins for an instant, you would see a general confusion. Neither you nor I, probably, would spend another night in the Tuileries."

Such declarations have often been found in the mouths of those, who have seized upon an unlawful degree of authority over their species. Cromwell was forced to dissolve the parliament, though he besought the Lord rather to slay him. State necessity is the usual plea of tyrants, by which they seek to impose on themselves and others; and, by resorting to such an apology, they pay that tribute to truth in their language, to which their practice is in the most decided opposition. But if there are any to whom such an excuse may appear valid, what can be, or must be, their sentiments of the French revolution, which, instead of leading to national liberty, equality, and general happiness, brought the country into such a condition, that a victorious soldier was obliged, contrary to the conviction of his own conscience, to assume the despotic power, and subject the whole empire to the same arbitrary rules which directed the followers of his camp?

The press, at no time, and in no civilized country, was ever so completely enchaind and fettered as at this period it was in France. The public journals were prohibited from inserting any article of public news which had not first appeared in the *Moniteur*, the organ of government; and this, on all momentous occasions, was personally examined by Bonaparte himself. Nor were the inferior papers permitted to publish a word, whether in the way of explanation, criticism, or otherwise, which did not accurately correspond with the tone observed in the leading journal. They might, with the best graces of their eloquence, enhance the praise, or deepen the censure, which characterized the leading paragraph; but seizure of their paper, confiscation, imprisonment, and sometimes exile, were the unflinching reward of any attempt to correct what was erroneous in point of fact, or sophistical in point of reasoning. The *Moniteur*, therefore, was the sole guide of public opinion; and by his constant attention to its contents, it is plain that Napoleon relied as much on its influence to direct the general mind of the people of France, as he did upon the power of his arms, military reputation, and extensive resources, to overawe the other nations of Europe.

CHAPTER LVII.

System of education introduced into France by Napoleon.—National University—its nature and objects.—Lyceums.—Proposed establishment at Meudon.

THE reputation of Bonaparte as a soldier was the means which raised him to the Imperial dignity; and, unfortunately for himself, his ideas were so constantly associated with war and victory, that peaceful regulations of every kind were postponed, as of inferior importance; and thus war, which in the eye of reason ought always, even when most necessary and justifiable, to be regarded as an extraordinary state into which a nation is plunged by compulsion, was certainly regarded by Napoleon as almost the natural and ordinary condition of humanity. He had been bred on the battle-field, from which his glory first arose. "The earthquake voice of victory," according to the expression of Britain's noble and lost bard, "was to him the breath of life." And although his powerful mind was capable of applying itself to all the various relations of human affairs, it was with war and desolation that he was most familiar, and the tendency of his government accordingly bore an aspect decidedly military.

The instruction of the youth of France had been the subject of several projects during the Republic; which was the more necessary, as the Revolution had entirely destroyed all the colleges and seminaries of public instruction, most of which were more or less connected with the church, and had left the nation almost destitute of any public means of education. These schemes were of course marked with the wild sophistry of the period. In many cases they failed in execution from want of public encouragement; in others, from want of funds. Still, however, though no fixed scheme of education had been adopted, and though the increasing vice and ignorance of the rising generation was sufficiently shocking, there existed in France two or three classes of schools for different purposes; as indeed it is not to be supposed that so great and civilized a nation could, under any circumstances, tolerate a total want of the means of educating their youth.

The schemes to which we allude had agreed in arranging, that each commune (answering, perhaps, to our parish) should provide a school and teacher, for the purpose of communicating the primary and most indispensable principles of education. This plan had in a great measure failed, owing to the poverty of the communes on whom the expense was thrown. In some cases, however, the communes had found funds for this necessary purpose; and, in others, the expense had been divided betwixt the public body and the pupils who received the benefit of the establishment. So that these primary schools existed in many instances, though certainly in a precarious and languishing state.

The secondary schools were such as qualified persons, or those who held themselves out as such, had established upon speculation, or by the aid of private contributions, for teaching the learned and modern languages, geography, and mathematics.

There was besides evinced on the part of the ca-

tholic clergy, so soon as the Concordat had restored them to some rank and influence, a desire to resume the task of public education, which, before the Revolution, had been chiefly vested in their hands. Their seminaries had been supported by the public with considerable liberality, and being under the control of the bishop, and destined chiefly to bring up young persons intended for the church, they had obtained the name of Ecclesiastical Schools.

Matters were upon this footing when Bonaparte brought forward his grand project of a National University, composed of a grand master, a chancellor, a treasurer, ten counsellors for life, twenty counsellors in ordinary, and thirty inspectors general; the whole forming a sort of imperial council, whose supremacy was to be absolute on matters respecting education. All teachers, and all seminaries of education, were subjected to the supreme authority of the National University, nor could any school be opened without a brevet or diploma from the grand master, upon which a considerable tax was imposed. It was indeed the policy of the government to diminish as far as possible the number of Secondary and of Ecclesiastical Schools, in order that the public education might be conducted at the public seminaries, called Lyceums, or Academies.

In these Lyceums the discipline was partly military, partly monastic. The masters, censors, and teachers, in the Lyceums and Colleges, were bound to celibacy; the professors might marry, but in that case were not permitted to reside within the precincts. The youth were entirely separated from their families, and allowed to correspond with no one save their parents, and then only through the medium, and under the inspection, of the censors. The whole system was subjected to the strict and frequent investigation of the University. The grand master might dismiss any person he pleased, and such a sentence of dismissal disqualified the party receiving it from holding any civil employment.

In the general case, it is the object of a place of learning to remove from the eyes of youth that pomp and parade of war, by which at an early age they are so easily withdrawn from severe attention to their studies. The Lyceums of Bonaparte were conducted on a contrary principle; everything was done by beat of drum; all the interior arrangements of the boys were upon a military footing. At a period when the soldier's profession held out the most splendid prospects of successful ambition, it was no wonder that young men soon learned to look forward to it as the only line worthy of a man of spirit to pursue. The devotion of the young students to the emperor, carefully infused into them by their teachers, was farther excited by the recollection, that he was their benefactor for all the means of instruction afforded them; and thus they learned from every circumstance around them, that the first object of their lives was devotion to his service, and that the service required of them was of a military character.

There were in each Lyceum one hundred and fifty exhibitions, or scholarships, of which twenty were of value sufficient to cover the student's full expenses, while the rest, of smaller amount, were called half or three quarter bursaries, in which the

parents or relations of the lad supplied a portion of the charge. From these Lyceums, two hundred and fifty of the most selected youth were yearly draughted into the more professional and special military schools maintained by the emperor; and to be included in this chosen number was the prime object of every student. Thus, everything induced the young men brought up at these Lyceums, to look upon a military life as the most natural and enviable course they had to pursue; and thus Bonaparte accomplished that alteration on the existing generation, which he intimated, when he said, "The clergy regard this world as a mere diligence which is to convey us to the next—it must be my business to fill the public carriage with good recruits for my army."

Of the whole range of national education, that which was conducted at the Lyceums, or central schools, was alone supported by the state; and the courses there taught were generally limited to Latin and mathematics, the usual accomplishments of a military academy. Undoubtedly Bienne was in Napoleon's recollection; nor might he perhaps think a better, or a more enlarged course of education necessary for the subjects of France, than that which had advanced their sovereign to the supreme government. But there was a deeper reason in the limitation. Those who, under another system of education, might have advanced themselves to that degree of knowledge which becomes influential upon the mind of the public, or the fortunes of a state, by other means than those of violence, were disqualified for the task by that which they received in the Lyceums; and the gentle, studious, and peaceful youth, was formed, like all the rest of the generation, to the trade of war, to which he was probably soon to be called by the conscription. If the father chose to place his son at one of the secondary schools, where a larger sphere of instruction was opened, it was still at the risk of seeing the youth withdrawn from thence and transferred to the nearest Lyceum, if the Directors of the Academy should judge it necessary for the encouragement of the schools which appertained more properly to government.

Yet, Napoleon appears to have been blind to the errors of this system, or rather to have been delighted with them, as tending directly to aid his despotic views. "My university," he was accustomed to say to the very last, "was a master-piece of combination, and would have produced the most material effect on the public mind." And he was wont on such occasions to throw the blame of its failure on Monsieur de Fontanes, the grand master, who, he said, afterwards took merit with the Bourbons for having encumbered its operation in some of its most material particulars.

Bonaparte, it must be added, at a later period, resolved to complete his system of national education, by a species of Corinthian capital. He proposed the establishment of an institution at Meudon, for the education of his son, the King of Rome, where he was to be trained to the arts becoming a ruler, in the society of other young princes of the Imperial family, or the descendants of the allies of Napoleon. This would have been reversing the plan of tuition imposed on Cyrus, and on Henry IV.,

who were bred up among the common children* of the peasants, that their future grandeur might not too much or too early obscure the real views of human nature and character. But it is unnecessary to speculate on a system which never was doomed to be brought to experiment; only, we may presume it was intended to teach the young Napoleon more respect to the right of property which his princely companions held in their toys and playthings, than his father evinced towards the crowns and sceptres of his brothers and allies.

CHAPTER LVIII.

Military details.—Plan of the conscription.—Its nature—and effects.—Enforced with unsparing rigour.—Its influence upon the general character of the French soldiery.—New mode of conducting hostilities introduced by the Revolution.—Constitution of the French armies.—Forced marches.—La maraude.—Its nature—and effects—on the enemy's country, and on the French soldiers themselves.—Policy of Napoleon, in his personal conduct to his officers and soldiers.—Altered character of the French soldiery during, and after, the Revolution.—Explained.

WE have shown that the course of education practised in France was so directed, as to turn the thoughts and hopes of the youth to a military life, and prepare them to obey the call of the conscription. This means of recruiting the military force, the most formidable ever established in a civilized nation, was originally presented to the Council of Five Hundred in 1798. It comprehended a series of lists, containing the names of the whole youth of the kingdom, from the age of twenty to twenty-five, and empowering government to call them out successively, in such numbers as the exigencies of the state should require. The classes were five in number. The first contained those who were aged twenty years complete, before the commencement of the year relative to which the conscription was demanded, and the same rule applied to the other four classes of men, who had attained the twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth years successively, before the same period. In practice, however, the second class of conscripts were not called out until the first were actually in service, nor was it usual to demand more than the first class in any one year. But as the first class amounted to 60 or 80,000, so forcible and general a levy presented immense facilities to the government, and was proportionally burdensome to the people.

This law, undoubtedly, has its general principle in the duty which every one owes to his country. Nothing can be more true, than that all men capable of bearing arms are liable to be employed in the defence of the state; and nothing can be more politic, than that the obligation which is incumbent upon all, should be, in the first instance, imposed upon the youth, who are best qualified for military service by the freshness of their age, and whose absence from the ordinary business of the country will occasion the least inconvenience. But it is obvious, that such a measure can only be vindicated in defensive war, and that the conduct of Bonaparte,

who applied the system to the conduct of distant offensive wars, no otherwise necessary than for the satisfaction of his own ambition, stands liable to the heavy charge of having drained the very life-blood of the people intrusted to his charge, not for the defence of their own country, but to extend the ravages of war to distant and unoffending regions.

The French conscription was yet more severely felt by the extreme rigour of its conditions. No distinction was made betwixt the married man whose absence might be the ruin of his family, and the single member of a numerous lineage, who could be easily spared. The son of the widow, the child of the decrepid and helpless, had no right to claim an exemption. Three sons might be carried off in three successive years from the same desolated parents; there was no allowance made for having already supplied a recruit. Those unable to serve were mulcted in a charge proportioned to the quota of taxes which they or their parents contributed to the state, and which might vary from fifty to twelve hundred francs. Substitutes might indeed be offered, but then it was both difficult and expensive to procure them, as the law required that such substitutes should not only have the usual personal qualifications for a military life, but should be domesticated within the same district as their principal, or come within the conscription of the year. Suitable persons were sure to know their own value, and had learned so well to profit by it, that they were not to be bribed to serve without excessive bounties. The substitutes also had the practice of deserting upon the road, and thus cheating the principal, who remained answerable for them till they joined their colours. On the whole, the difficulty of obtaining exemption by substitution was so great, that very many young men, well educated, and of respectable families, were torn from all their more propitious prospects, to bear the life, discharge the duties, and die the death of common soldiers in a marching regiment.

There was no part of Napoleon's government enforced with such extreme rigour as the levy of the conscriptions. The mayor, upon whom the duty devolved of seeing the number called for selected by lot from the class to whom they belonged, was compelled, under the most severe penalties, to avoid showing the slightest indulgence,—the brand, the pillory, or the galleys, awaited the magistrate himself, if he was found to have favoured any individual on whom the law of conscription had claims. The same laws held out the utmost extent of their terrors against refractory conscripts, and the public functionaries were everywhere in search of them. When arrested, they were treated like convicts of the most infamous description. Clothed in a dress of infamy, loaded with chains, and dragging weights which were attached to them, they were condemned like galley slaves to work upon the public fortifications. Their relations did not escape, but were often rendered liable for fines and penalties.

But perhaps the most horrible part of the fate of the conscript was, that it was determined for life. Two or three, even four or five years spent in military service, might have formed a more endurable, though certainly a severe tax upon human life, with its natural prospects and purposes. But the con-

scription effectually and for ever changed the character of its victims. The youth, when he left his father's hearth, was aware that he was bidding it adieu, in all mortal apprehension, for ever; and the parents who had parted with him, young, virtuous, and ingenuous, and with a tendency, perhaps, to acquire the advantages of education, could only expect to see him again (should so unlikely an event ever take place) with the habits, thoughts, manners, and morals, of a private soldier.

But whatever distress was inflicted on the country by this mode of compulsory levy, it was a weapon particularly qualified to serve Bonaparte's purposes. He succeeded to the power which it gave the government, amongst other spoils of the Revolution, and he used it to the greatest possible extent.

The conscription, of course, comprehended recruits of every kind, good, bad, and indifferent; but chosen as they were from the mass of the people, without distinction, they were, upon the whole, much superior to that description of persons among whom volunteers for the army are usually levied in other countries, which comprehends chiefly the desperate, the reckless, the profligate, and those whose unsettled or vicious habits render them unfit for peaceful life. The number of young men of some education who were compelled to serve in the ranks, gave a tone and feeling to the French army of a very superior character, and explains why a good deal of intellect and power of observation was often found amongst the private sentinels. The habits of the nation also being strongly turned towards war, the French formed, upon the whole, the most orderly, most obedient, most easily commanded and best regulated troops, that ever took the field in any age or country. In the long and protracted struggle of battle, their fiery courage might sometimes be exhausted before that of the determined British; but in all that respects the science, practice, and usages of war, the French are generally allowed to have excelled their more stubborn, but less ingenious rivals. They excelled especially in the art of shifting for themselves; and it was one in which the wars of Napoleon required them to be peculiarly adroit.

The French Revolution first introduced into Europe a mode of conducting hostilities, which transferred almost the whole burthen of the war to the country which had the ill-fortune to be the seat of its operations, and rendered it a resource rather than a drain to the successful belligerent. This we shall presently explain.

At the commencement of a campaign, nothing could be so complete as the arrangement of a French army. It was formed into large bodies called *corps d'armées*, each commanded by a king, viceroy, marshal, or general officer of high pretensions, founded on former services. Each *corps d'armée* formed a complete army within itself, and had its allotted proportion of cavalry, infantry, artillery, and troops of every description. The *corps d'armée* consisted of from six to ten divisions, each commanded by a general of division. The divisions, again, were subdivided into brigades, of which each, comprehending two or three regiments (consisting of two or more battalions), was commanded by a

general of brigade. A *corps d'armée* might vary in number from fifty to eighty thousand men, and upwards; and the general of such a body exercised the full military authority over it, without the control of any one except the emperor himself. There were very few instances of the emperor's putting the officers who were capable of this high charge under command of each other; indeed so very few, as might almost imply some doubt on his part, of his commands to this effect being obeyed, had they been issued. This system of dividing his collected forces into separate and nearly independent armies, the generals of which were each intrusted with and responsible for his execution of some separate portion of an immense combined plan, gave great celerity and efficacy to the French movements; and superintended as it was by the master spirit which planned the campaign, often contributed to the most brilliant results. But whenever it became necessary to combine two *corps d'armée* in one operation, it required the personal presence of Napoleon himself.

Thus organized, the French army was poured into some foreign country by forced marches, without any previous arrangement of stores or magazines for their maintenance, and with the purpose of maintaining them solely at the expense of the inhabitants. Bonaparte was exercised in this system; and the combination of great masses, by means of such forced marches, was one great principle of his tactics. This species of war was carried on at the least possible expense of money to his treasury; but it was necessarily at the greatest possible expenditure of human life, and the incalculable increase of human misery. Napoleon's usual object was to surprise the enemy by the rapidity of his marches, defeat him in some great battle, and then seize upon his capital, levy contributions, make a peace with such advantages as he could obtain, and finally return to Paris.

In these dazzling campaigns, the army usually began their march with provisions, that is, bread or biscuit, for a certain number of days, on the soldiers' backs. Cattle also were for a time driven along with them, and slaughtered as wanted. These articles were usually provided from some large town or populous district, in which the troops might have been cautioned. The horses of the cavalry were likewise loaded with forage, for the consumption of two or three days. Thus provided, the army set forward on its expedition by forced marches. In a very short time the soldiers became impatient of their burdens, and either wasted them by prodigal consumption, or actually threw them away. It was then that the officers, who soon entertained just apprehensions of the troops suffering scarcity before another regular issue of provisions, gave authority to secure supplies by what was called *la maraude*, in other words, by plunder. To insure that these forced supplies should be collected and distributed systematically, a certain number of soldiers from each company were dispatched to obtain provisions at the villages and farm-houses in the neighbourhood of the march, or of the ground upon which the army was encamped. These soldiers were authorized to compel the inhabitants to deliver their provisions without receipt or payment; and such being their

regular duty, it may be well supposed that they did not confine themselves to provisions, but exacted money and articles of value, and committed many other similar abuses.

It must be owned, that the intellectual character of the French, and the good-nature which is the real ground of their national character, rendered their conduct more endurable under the evils of this system than could have been expected, provided always that provisions were plenty, and the country populous. A sort of order was then observed, even in the disorder of the *maraude*, and pains were taken to divide regularly the provisions thus irregularly obtained. The general temper of the soldiery, when unprovoked by resistance, made them not wholly barbarous; and their original good discipline, the education which many had received, with the habits of docility which all had acquired, prevented them from breaking up into bands of absolute banditti, and destroying themselves by their own irregularities. No troops except the French could have subsisted in the same manner; for no other army is sufficiently under the command of its officers.

But the most hideous features of this system were shown when the army marched through a thinly-peopled country, or when the national character, and perhaps local facilities, encouraged the natives and peasants to offer resistance. Then the soldiers became animated alike by the scarcity of provisions, and irritated at the danger which they sometimes incurred in collecting them. As their hardships increased, their temper became relentless and reckless, and, besides indulging in every other species of violence, they increased their own distresses by destroying what they could not use. Famine and sickness were not long of visiting an army, which traversed by forced marches a country exhausted of provisions. These stern attendants followed the French columns as they struggled on. Without hospitals, and without magazines, every straggler who could not regain his ranks fell a victim to hunger, to weather, to weariness, to the vengeance of an incensed peasantry. In this manner, the French army suffered woes, which, till these tremendous wars, had never been the lot of troops in hostilities carried on between civilized nations. Still Bonaparte's object was gained; he attained, amid these losses and sacrifices, and at the expense of them, the point which he had desired; displayed his masses to the terrified eyes of a surprised enemy; reaped the reward of his dispatch in a general victory, and furnished new subjects of triumph to the *Moniteur*. So much did he rely upon the celerity of movement, that if an officer asked time to execute any of his commands, it was frequently his remarkable answer,—"Ask me for anything except time." That celerity depended on the uncompromising system of forced marches, without established magazines, and we have described how wasteful it must have been to human life. But when the battle was over, the dead were at rest, and could not complain; the living were victors, and soon forgot their sufferings; and the loss of the recruits who had been wasted in the campaign, was supplied by another draught upon the youth of France, in the usual forms of the conscription.

Bonaparte observed, with respect to his army, an adroit species of policy. His marshals, his generals, his officers of high rank, were liberally honoured and rewarded by him; but he never treated them with personal familiarity. The forms of etiquette were, upon all occasions, strictly maintained. Perhaps he was of opinion that the original equality in which they had stood with regard to each other, would have been too strongly recalled by a more familiar mode of intercourse. But to the common soldier, who could not misconstrue or intrude upon his familiarity, Bonaparte observed a different line of conduct. He permitted himself to be addressed by them on all suitable occasions, and paid strict attention to their petitions, complaints, and even their remonstrances. What they complained of, was, in all instances, inquired into and reformed, if the complaints were just. After a battle, he was accustomed to consult the regiments which had distinguished themselves, concerning the merits of those who had deserved the Legion of Honour, or other military distinction. In these moments of conscious importance, the sufferings of the whole campaign were forgotten; and Napoleon seemed, to the soldiery who surrounded him, not as the ambitious man who had dragged them from their homes, to waste their valour in foreign fields, and had purchased victory at the expense of subjecting them to every privation, but as the father of the war, to whom his soldiers were as children, and to whom the honour of the meanest private was as dear as his own.

Every attention was paid, to do justice to the claims of the soldier, and provide for his preferment as it was merited. But with all this encouragement, it was the remark of Bonaparte himself, that the army no longer produced, under the empire, such distinguished soldiers as Picbegré, Kleber, Moreau, Masséna, Desaix, Hoche, and he himself above all, who, starting from the ranks of obscurity, like runners to a race, had astonished the world by their progress. These men of the highest genius had been produced, as Bonaparte thought, in and by the fervour of the Revolution; and he appears to have been of opinion, that, since things had returned more and more into the ordinary and restricted bounds of civil society, men of the same high class were no longer created. There is, however, some fallacy in this statement. Times of revolution do not create great men, but revolutions usually take place in periods of society when great principles have been under discussion, and the views of the young and of the old have been turned, by the complexion of the times, towards matters of grand and serious consideration, which elevate the character and raise the ambition. When the collision of mutual violence, the explosion of the revolution itself actually breaks out, it neither does nor can create talent of any kind. But it brings forth (and in general destroys), in the course of its progress, all the talent which the predisposition to discussion of public affairs had already encouraged and fostered; and when that talent has perished, it cannot be replaced from a race educated amidst the furies of civil war. The abilities of the Long Parliament ceased to be seen under the Commonwealth, and

the same is true of the French Convention, and the empire which succeeded it. Revolution is like a conflagration, which throws temporary light upon the ornaments and architecture of the house to which it attaches, but always ends by destroying them.

It is said also, probably with less authority, that Napoleon, even when surrounded by those Imperial Guards, whose discipline had been so sedulously carried to the highest pitch, sometimes regretted the want of the old revolutionary soldiers, whose war-cry, *Vive la République!* identified each individual with the cause which he maintained. Napoleon, however, had no cause to regret any circumstance which referred to his military power. It was already far too great, and had destroyed the proper scale of government in France, by giving the military a decided superiority over all men of civil professions, while he himself, with the habits and reasoning of a despotic general, had assumed an almost unlimited authority over the fairest part of Europe. Over foreign countries, the military renown of France streamed like a comet, inspiring universal dread and distrust; and, whilst it rendered indispensable similar preparations for resistance, it seemed as if peace had departed from the earth for ever, and that its destinies were hereafter to be disposed of according to the laws of brutal force alone.

CHAPTER LIX.

Effects of the peace of Tilsit.—Napoleon's views of a state of peace.—Contrasted with those of England.—The Continental System—Its nature—and effects.—Berlin and Milan Decrees.—British Orders in Council.—Spain—Retrospect of the relations of that country with France since the Revolution.—Godoy—His influence—Character—and political views.—Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias, applies to Napoleon for aid.—Affairs of Portugal.—Treaty of Fontainebleau.—Departure of the Prince Regent for Brazil.—Entrance of Junot into Lisbon—His unbounded rapacity.—Disturbances at Madrid.—Ferdinand detected in a plot against his father, and imprisoned.—King Charles applies to Napoleon.—Wily policy of Bonaparte.—Orders the French army to enter Spain.

THE peace of Tilsit had been of that character, which, while it settled the points of dispute between two rival monarchies, who had found themselves hardly matched in the conflict to which it put a period, left both at liberty to use towards the nations more immediately under the influence of either, such a degree of discretion as their power enabled them to exercise. Such was Napoleon's idea of pacification, which amounted to this:—"I will work my own pleasure with the countries over which my power gives me not indeed the right, but the authority and power; and you, my ally, shall, in recompense, do what suits you in the territories of other states adjoining to you, but over which I have no such immediate influence."

This was the explanation which he put upon the treaty of Amiens, and this was the species of peace which long afterwards he regretted had not been concluded with England. His regrets on that point

were expressed at a very late period, in language which is perfectly intelligible. Speaking of France and England, he said, "We have done each other infinite harm—we might have rendered each other infinite service by mutual good understanding. If the school of Fox had succeeded, we would have understood each other—there would only have been in Europe one army and one fleet—we would have governed the world—we would have fixed repose and prosperity everywhere, either by force or by persuasion. Yes—I repeat how much good we might have done—how much evil we have actually done to each other."

Now the fundamental principle of such a pacification, which Bonaparte seems to the very last to have considered as the mutual basis of common interest, was such as could not, ought not, nay, dared not, have been adopted by any ministry which England could have chosen, so long as she possessed a free parliament. Her principle of pacification must have been one that ascertained the independence of other powers, not which permitted her own aggressions, and gave way to those of France. Her wealth, strength, and happiness, do, and must always, consist in the national independence of the states upon the Continent. She could not, either with conscience or safety, make peace with a usurping conqueror, on the footing that she herself was to become a usurper in her turn. She has no desire or interest to blot out other nations from the map of Europe, in order that no names may remain save those of Britain and France; nor is she interested in depriving other states of their fleets, or of their armies. Her statesmen must disclaim the idea of governing the world, or a moiety of the world, and of making other nations either happy or unhappy by force of arms. The conduct of England in 1814 and 1815, evinced this honest and honourable policy; since, yielding much to others, she could not be accused of being herself influenced by any views to extend her own dominion, in the general confusion and blending which arose out of the downfall of the external power of France. That, however, is a subject for another place.

In the meanwhile, France, who, with Russia, had arranged a treaty of pacification on a very different basis, was now busied in gathering in the advantages which she expected to derive from it. In doing so, it seems to have been Bonaparte's principal object so to consolidate and enforce what he called his Continental System, as ultimately to root out and destroy the remaining precarious communications, which England, by her external commerce, continued to maintain with the nations of the Continent.

To attain this grand object, the treaty of Tilsit and its consequences had given him great facilities. France was his own—Holland was under the dominion, nominally, of his brother Louis, but in a great measure at his devotion. His brother Jérôme was established in the kingdom of Westphalia. It followed, therefore, in the course of his brother's policy, that he was to form an alliance worthy of his new rank. It has been already noticed that he had abandoned, by his brother's command, Elizabeth Paterson, daughter of a respectable gentleman of Baltimore, whom he had married in 1803. He was

now married at the Tuileries to Frederica Catherine, daughter of the King of Wirtemberg.

Prussia, and all the once free ports of the Hanseatic League, were closed against English commerce, so far as absolute military power could effect that purpose. Russia was not so tractable in that important matter as the terms of the treaty of Tilsit, and Napoleon's secret engagements with the czar, had led him to hope. But Alexander was too powerful to be absolutely dictated to in the enforcement of this anti-commercial system; and, indeed, the peculiar state of the Russian nation might have rendered it perilous to the czar to enforce the non-intercourse to the extent which Napoleon would have wished. The large, bulky, and heavy commodities of Russia,—hemp and iron, and timber and wax, and pitch and naval stores—that produce upon which the Boyards of the empire chiefly depended for their revenue, would not bear the expense of transportation by land; and England, in full and exclusive command of the sea, was her only, and at the same time her willing customer. Under various elusory devices, therefore, England continued to purchase Russian commodities, and pay for them in her own manufactures, in spite of the decrees of the French Emperor, and in defiance of the ukases of the czar himself; and to this Bonaparte was compelled to seem blind, as what his Russian ally could not, or would not, put an end to.

The strange struggle ever witnessed in the civilized world began now to be maintained, betwixt Britain and those countries who felt the importation of British goods as a subject not only of convenience, but of vital importance, on the one hand, and France on the other; whose ruler was determined that on no account should Britain either maintain intercourse with the Continent, or derive the inherent advantages of a free trade. The decrees of Berlin were reinforced by others of the French Emperor, yet more peremptory and more vexatious. By these, and particularly by one promulgated at Milan, 17th December, 1807, Napoleon declared Britain in a state of blockade—all nations whatever were prohibited not only to trade with her, but to deal in any articles of British manufactures. Agents were named in every seaport and trading town on the part of Bonaparte. There was an ordinance that no ship should be admitted into any of the ports of the Continent without certificates, as they were called, of origin; the purpose of which was to show that no part of their cargo was of British produce. These regulations were met by others on the part of Britain, called the Orders in Council. They permitted all neutrals to trade with countries at peace with Great Britain, providing they touched at a British port and paid the British duties. Neutrals were thus placed in a most undesirable predicament betwixt the two great contending powers. If they neglected the British Orders in Council, they were captured by the cruisers of England, with which the sea was covered. If they paid duties at British ports, they were confiscated, if the fact could be discovered, on arrival at any port under French influence. This led to every species of deception by which the real character of the mercantile transaction could be disguised. False

papers, false entries, false registers, were everywhere produced; and such were the profits attending the trade, that the most trusty and trusted agents of Bonaparte, men of the highest rank in his empire, were found willing to wink at this contraband commerce, and obtained great sums for doing so. All along the sea-coast of Europe, this struggle was keenly maintained betwixt the most powerful individual the world ever saw, and the wants and wishes of the society which he controlled—wants and wishes not the less eagerly entertained, that they were directed towards luxuries and superfluities.

But it was chiefly the Spanish peninsula, in which the dominion of its ancient and natural princes still nominally survived, which gave an extended vent to the objects of British commerce. Bonaparte, indeed, had a large share of its profits, since Portugal, in particular, paid him great sums to connive at her trade with England. But at last the weakness of Portugal, and the total disunion of the royal family in Spain, suggested to Napoleon the thoughts of appropriating to his own family, or rather to himself, that noble portion of the continent of Europe. Hence arose the Spanish contest, of which he afterwards said in bitterness, "That wretched war was my ruin—It divided my forces—multiplied the necessity of my efforts, and injured my character for morality." But could he expect better results from a usurpation, executed under circumstances of treachery perfectly unexampled in the history of Europe? Before entering, however, upon this new and most important era of Napoleon's history, it is necessary hastily to resume some account of the previous relations between France and the Peninsula since the Revolution.

Manuel de Godoy, a favourite of Charles IV. and the paramour of his profligate queen, was at this time the uncontrolled minister of Spain. He bore the title of Prince of the Peace, or of Peace, as it was termed for brevity's sake, on account of his having completed the pacification of Basle, which closed the revolutionary war betwixt Spain and France. By the subsequent treaty of Saint Ildephonso, he had established an alliance, offensive and defensive, betwixt the two countries, in consequence of which Spain had taken from time to time, without hesitation, every step which Bonaparte's interested policy recommended. But notwithstanding this subservience to the pleasure of the French ruler, Godoy seems in secret to have nourished hopes of getting free of the French yoke; and at the very period when the Prussian war broke out, without any necessity which could be discovered, he suddenly called the Spanish forces to arms, addressing to them a proclamation of a boastful, and, at the same time, a mysterious character, indicating that the country was in danger, and that some great exertion was expected from the Spanish armies in her behalf. Bonaparte received this proclamation on the field of battle at Jena, and is said to have sworn vengeance against Spain. The news of that great victory soon altered Godoy's military attitude, and the minister could find no better excuse for it, than to pretend that he had armed against an apprehended invasion of the Moors. Napoleon permitted the circumstance to remain unexplained. It

had made him aware of Godoy's private sentiments in respect to himself and to France, if he had before doubted them; and, though passed over without farther notice, this hasty armament of 1806 was assuredly not dismissed from his thoughts.

In the state of abasement under which they felt their government and royal family to have fallen, the hopes and affections of the Spaniards were naturally turned on the heir-apparent, whose accession to the crown they looked forward to as a signal for better things, and who was well understood to be at open variance with the all-powerful Godoy. The Prince of the Asturias, however, does not seem to have possessed any portion of that old heroic pride, and love of independence, which ought to have marked the future King of Spain. He was not revolted at the sway which Bonaparte held in Europe and in Spain, and, far from desiring to get rid of the French influence, he endeavoured to secure Bonaparte's favour for his own partial views, by an offer to connect his own interests in an indissoluble manner with those of Napoleon and his dynasty. Assisted by some of the grantees, who were most especially tired of Godoy and his administration, the prince wrote Bonaparte a secret letter, expressing the highest esteem for his person; intimating the condition to which his father, whose too great goodness of disposition had been misguided by wicked counsellors, had reduced the flourishing kingdom of Spain; requesting the counsels and support of the Emperor Napoleon, to detect the schemes of those perfidious men; and entreating, that, as a pledge of the paternal protection which he solicited, the emperor would grant him the honour of allying him with one of his relations.

In this manner the heir-apparent of Spain threw himself into the arms, or, more properly, at the feet of Napoleon; but he did not meet the reception he had hoped for. Bonaparte was at this time engaged in negotiation with Charles IV., and with that very Godoy whom it was the object of the prince to remove or ruin; and as they could second his views with all the remaining forces of Spain, while Prince Ferdinand was in possession of no actual power or authority, the former were for the time preferable allies. The prince's offer, as what might be useful on some future occasion, was for the present neither accepted nor refused. Napoleon was altogether silent. The fate of the royal family was thus in the hands of the stranger. Their fate was probably already determined. But, before expelling the Bourbons from Spain, Napoleon judged it most politic to use their forces in subduing Portugal.

The flower of the Spanish army, consisting of sixteen thousand men, under the Marquis de la Romana, had been marched into the north of Europe, under the character of auxiliaries of France. Another detachment had been sent to Tuscany, commanded by O'Farrel. So far the kingdom was weakened by the absence of her own best troops; the conquest of Portugal was to be made a pretext for introducing the French army to dictate to the whole Peninsula.

Portugal was under a singularly weak government. Her army was ruined; the soul and spirit of her nobility was lost; her sole hope for continuing in

existence, under the name of an independent kingdom, rested in her power of purchasing the clemency of France, and some belief that Spain would not permit her own territories to be violated for the sake of annihilating an unoffending neighbour and ally.

Shortly after the treaty of Tilsit, the Prince Regent of Portugal was required, by France and Spain jointly, to shut his ports against the English, to confiscate the property of Britain, and to arrest the persons of her subjects wherever they could be found within his dominions. The prince reluctantly acceded to the first part of this proposal; the last he peremptorily refused, as calling upon him at once to violate the faith of treaties and the rights of hospitality, and the British merchants received intimation, that it would be wisdom to close their commercial concerns, and retire from a country which had no longer the means of protecting them.

In the meantime, a singular treaty was signed at Fontainebleau, for the partition of the ancient kingdom of Portugal. By this agreement, a regular plan was laid for invading Portugal with French and Spanish armies, accomplishing the conquest of the country; and dividing it into three parts. The northern provinces were to form a small principality for the King of Etruria (who was to cede his Italian dominions to Napoleon); another portion was to be given in sovereignty to Godoy, with the title of King of the Algarves; and a third was to remain in sequestration till the end of the war. By the treaty of Fontainebleau, Napoleon obtained two important advantages; the first, that Portugal should be conquered; the second, that a great part of the Spanish troops should be employed on the expedition, and their native country thus deprived of their assistance. It is impossible to believe that he ever intended Godoy, or the King of Etruria, should gain anything by the stipulations in their behalf.

Junot, one of the most grasping, extravagant, and profligate of the French generals, a man whom Bonaparte himself has stigmatized as a monster of rapacity, was appointed to march upon Lisbon, and intrusted with the charge of reconciling to the yoke of the invaders a nation who had neither provoked war nor attempted resistance.

Two additional armies, consisting partly of French and partly of Spaniards, supported the attack of Junot. A French army, amounting to 40,000 men, was formed at Bayonne, in terms of the treaty of Fontainebleau, destined, it was pretended, to act as an army of reserve, in case the English should land troops for the defence of Portugal, but which, it had been stipulated, was on no account to enter Spain, unless such a crisis should demand their presence. It will presently appear what was the true purpose of this army of reserve, and under what circumstances it was really intended to enter the Spanish territory.

Meantime Junot advanced upon Lisbon with such extraordinary forced marches, as very much dislocated and exhausted his army. But this was of the less consequence, because, aware that he could not make an effectual resistance, the Prince Regent had determined that he would not, by an effectual show of defence, give the invaders a pretext to treat

Portugal like a conquered country. He resolved at this late hour to comply even with the last and harshest of the terms dictated by France and Spain, by putting the restraint of a register on British subjects and British property; but he had purposely delayed compliance, till little was left that could be affected by the measure. The British Factory, so long domiciliated at Lisbon, had left the Tagus on the 18th of October, amid the universal regret of the inhabitants. The British resident minister, Lord Strangford, although feeling compassion for the force under which the Prince Regent acted, was, nevertheless, under the necessity of considering these unfriendly steps as a declaration against England. He took down the British arms, departed from Lisbon accordingly, and went on board Sir Sydney Smith's squadron, then lying off the Tagua. The Marquis of Marialva was then sent as an ambassador extraordinary, to state to the courts of France and Spain, that the Prince Regent had complied with the whole of their demands, and to request that the march of their forces upon Lisbon should be countermanded.

Junot and his army had by this time crossed the frontiers of Portugal, entering, he said, as the friends, allies, and protectors of the Portuguese, come to save Lisbon from the fate of Copenhagen, and relieve the inhabitants from the yoke of the maritime tyrants of Europe. He promised the utmost good discipline on the part of his troops, while, at the same time, the constant plunder and exactions of the French were embittered by wanton scorn and acts of sacrilege, which, to a religious people, seemed peculiarly horrible. Nothing, however, retarded the celerity of his march; for he was well aware that it was his master's most anxious wish to seize the persons of the Portuguese royal family, and especially that of the Prince Regent.

But the prince, although his general disposition was gentle and compromising, had, on this occasion, impressions not unworthy of the heir of Braganza. He had determined that he would not kiss the dust at the feet of the invader, or be made captive to enhance his triumph. The kingdom of Portugal had spacious realms beyond the Atlantic, in which its royal family might seek refuge. The British ambassador offered every facility which her squadron could afford, and, as is now known, granted the guarantee of Great Britain, that she would acknowledge no government which the invaders might establish in Portugal, to the prejudice of the house of Braganza. The Prince Regent, with the whole royal family, embarked on board the Portuguese vessels of the line, hastily rigged out as they were, and indifferently prepared for sea; and thus afforded modern Europe, for the first time, an example of that species of emigration, frequent in ancient days, when kings and princes, expelled from their native seats by the strong arm of violence, went to seek new establishments in distant countries. The royal family embarked amid the tears, cries, and blessings of the people, from the very spot whence Vasco de Gama loosened his sails, to discover for Portugal new realms in the East. The weather was as gloomy

as were the actors and spectators of this affecting scene; and the firmness of the Prince Regent was applauded by the nation which he was leaving, aware that his longer presence might have exposed himself to insult, but could have had no effect in ameliorating their own fate.

Junot, within a day's march of Lisbon, was almost frantic with rage when he heard this news. He well knew how much the escape of the prince, and the resolution he had formed, would diminish the lustre of his own success in the eyes of his master. Once possessed of the Prince Regent's person, Bonaparte had hoped to get him to cede possession of the Brazils; and transmarine acquisitions had for Napoleon all the merit of novelty. The empire of the house of Braganza in the new world was now effectually beyond his reach; and his general, thus far unsuccessful, might have some reason to dread the excess of his master's disappointment.

Upon the first of December, exhausted with their forced marches, and sufficiently miserable in equipment and appearance, the French van-guard approached the city, and their general might see the retreating sails of the vessels which deprived him of so fair a portion of his prize. Junot, however, was soon led to resume confidence in his own merits. He had been connected with Bonaparte ever since the commencement of his fortunes, which he had faithfully followed. Such qualifications, and his having married a lady named Commene, who affirmed herself to be descended from the blood of the Greek emperors, was sufficient, he thought, to entitle him to expect the vacant throne of Lisbon from the hand of his master. In the meantime, he acted as if already in possession of supreme power. He took possession of the house belonging to the richest merchant in the city, and although he received twelve hundred cruzadoes a month for his table, he compelled his landlord to be at the whole expense of his establishment, which was placed on the most extravagant scale of splendour. His inferior officers took the hint, nor were the soldiers slow in following the example. The extortions and rapacity practised in Lisbon seemed to leave all former excesses of the French army far behind. This led to quarrels betwixt the French and the natives; blood was shed; public executions took place, and the invaders, proceeding to reduce and disband the remnant of the Portuguese army, showed their positive intention to retain the kingdom under their own exclusive authority.

This purpose was at last intimated by an official document or proclamation, issued by Junot, under Bonaparte's orders. It declared, that, by leaving his kingdom, the Prince of Brazil had in fact abdicated the sovereignty, and that Portugal, having become a part of the dominions of Napoleon, should, for the present, be governed by the French general-in-chief, in name of the emperor. The French flag was accordingly displayed, the arms of Portugal everywhere removed. The property of the Prince Regent, and of all who had followed him, was sequestered, with a reserve in favour of those who should return before the 15th day of February, the proclamation being published upon the first day of that month. The next demand upon the unhappy

country, was for a contribution of forty millions of cruzadoes, or four millions and a half sterling; which, laid upon a population of something less than three millions, came to about thirty shillings a-head, while the share of the immense numbers who could pay nothing, fell upon the upper and middling ranks, who had still some property remaining. There was not specie enough in the country to answer the demand; but plate, valuables, British goods, and colonial produce, were received instead of money. Some of the French officers turned jobbers in these last articles, sending them off to Paris, where they were sold to advantage. Some became money-brokers, and bought up paper-money at a discount. So little does the profession of arms retain of its disinterested and gallant character, when its professors become habituated and accustomed depredators.

The proclamation of 2d February, vesting the government of Portugal in General Junot, as the representative of the French empire, seemed entirely to abrogate the treaty of Fontainebleau, and in fact really did so, except as to such articles in favour of Napoleon, as he himself chose should remain in force. As for the imaginary proedom of Algarves, with which Godoy was to have been invested, no more was ever said or thought about it; nor was he in any condition to assert his claim to it, however formal the stipulation.

While the French were taking possession of Portugal, one of those scandalous scenes took place in the royal family at Madrid, which are often found to precede the fall of a shaken throne.

We have already mentioned the discontent of the Prince of Asturias with his father, or rather his father's minister. We have mentioned that he had desired to ally himself with the family of Bonaparte, in order to secure his protection, but that the Emperor of France had given no direct encouragement to his suit. Still, a considerable party, headed by the Duke del Infantado, and the Canon Escocquiz, who had been the prince's tutor, relying upon the general popularity of Ferdinand, seem to have undertaken some cabal, having for its object probably the deposition of the old king and the removal of Godoy. The plot was discovered; the person of the prince was secured, and Charles made a clamorous appeal to the justice of Napoleon, and to the opinion of the world. He stated that the purpose of the conspirators had been aimed at his life, and that of his faithful minister; and produced, in support of this unnatural charge, two letters from Ferdinand, addressed to his parents, in which he acknowledges (in general terms) having failed in duty to his father and sovereign, and says, that he has denounced his advisers, professes repentance, and craves pardon. The reality of this affair is not easily penetrated. That there had been a conspiracy, is more than probable; the intended parricide was probably an aggravation, of which so weak a man as Charles IV. might be easily convinced by the arts of his wife and her paramour.

So standing matters in that distracted house, both father and son appealed to Bonaparte, as the august friend and ally of Spain, and the natural umpire of the disputes in its royal family. But Napoleon nourished views which could not be served by giving

either party an effectual victory over the other. He caused his ambassador, Beaumont, to intercede in favour of the Prince of Asturias. Charles IV. and his minister were alarmed and troubled at finding his powerful ally take interest, even to this extent, in behalf of his disobedient son. They permitted themselves to allude to the private letter from the Prince of Asturias to Napoleon, and to express a hope that the Great Emperor would not permit a rebellious son to shelter himself by an alliance with his Imperial family. The touching this chord was what Bonaparte desired. It gave him a pretext to assume a haughty, distant, and offended aspect towards the reigning king, who had dared to suspect him of bad faith, and had mentioned with less than due consideration the name of a lady of the Imperial house.

Godoy was terrified at the interpretation put upon the remonstrances made by himself and his master, by the awful arbiter of their destiny. Izquierdo, the Spanish ambassador, was directed to renew his applications to the emperor, for the especial purpose of assuring him that a match with his family would be in the highest degree acceptable to the King of Spain. Charles wrote with his own hand to the same purpose. But it was Napoleon's policy to appear haughty, distant, indifferent, and offended; and to teach the contending father and son, who both looked to him as their judge, the painful feelings of mutual suspense. In the meantime, a new levy of the conscription put into his hands a fresh army; and forty thousand men were stationed at Bayonne, to add weight to his mediation in the affairs of Spain.

About this period, he did not hesitate to avow to the ablest of his counsellors, Talleyrand and Fouché, the resolution he had formed, that the Spanish race of the house of Bourbon should cease to reign. His plan was opposed by these sagacious statesmen, and the opposition on the part of Talleyrand is represented to have been obstinate. At a later period, Napoleon found it more advantageous to load Talleyrand with the charge of being his adviser in the war with Spain, as well as in the tragedy of the Duke d'Enghien. In Fouché's Memoirs, there is an interesting account of his conversation with the emperor on that occasion, of which we see room fully to credit the authenticity. It places before us, in a striking point of view, arguments for and against this extraordinary and decisive measure. "Let Portugal take her fate," said Fouché, "she is, in fact, little else than an English colony. But that King of Spain has given you no reason to complain of him; he has been the humblest of your prefects. Besides, take heed you are not deceived in the disposition of the Spaniards. You have a party amongst them now, because they look on you as a great and powerful potentate, a prince, and an ally. But you ought to be aware that the Spanish people possess no part of the German phlegm. They are attached to their laws, their government, their ancient customs. It would be an error to judge of the national character by that of the higher classes, which are there, as elsewhere, corrupted, and indifferent to their country. Once more, take heed you do not convert, by such

an act of aggression, a submissive and useful tributary kingdom, into a second Vendée."

Bonaparte answered these prophetic remarks, by observations on the contemptible character of the Spanish government, the imbecility of the king, and the worthless character of the minister; the common people, who might be influenced to oppose him by the monks, would be dispersed, he said, by one volley of cannon. "The stake I play for is immense—I will continue in my own dynasty the family system of the Bourbons, and unite Spain for ever to the destinies of France. Remember that the sun never sets on the immense empire of Charles V."

Fouché urged another doubt; whether, if the flames of opposition should grow violent in Spain, Russia might not be encouraged to resume her connexion with England, and thus place the empire of Napoleon betwixt two fires? This suspicion Bonaparte ridiculed as that of a minister of police, whose habits taught him to doubt the very existence of sincerity. The Emperor of Russia, he said, was completely won over, and sincerely attached to him. Thus, warned in vain of the wrath and evil to come, Napoleon persisted in his purpose.

But, ere yet he pounced upon the tempting prey, in which form Spain presented herself to his eyes, Napoleon made a hurried expedition to Italy. This journey had several motives. One was, to interrupt his communications with the royal family of Spain, in order to avoid being pressed to explain the precise nature of his pretensions, until he was prepared to support them by open force. Another was, to secure the utmost personal advantage which could be extracted from the treaty of Fontainebleau, before he threw that document aside like waste paper; it being his purpose that it should remain such, in so far as its stipulations were in behalf of any others than himself. Under pretext of this treaty, he expelled from Tuscany, or Etruria, as it was now called, the widowed queen of that territory. She now, for the first time, learned, that by an agreement to which she was no party, she was to be dispossessed of her own original dominions, as well as of those which Napoleon himself had guaranteed to her, and was informed that she was to receive a compensation in Portugal. This increased her affliction. "She did not desire," she said, "to share the spoils of any one, much more of a sister and a friend." Upon arriving in Spain, and having recourse to her parent, the King of Spain, for redress and explanation, she had the additional information, that the treaty of Fontainebleau was to be recognized as valid, in so far as it deprived her of her territories, but was not to be of any effect in as far as it provided her with indemnification. At another time, or in another history, this would have been dwelt upon as an aggravated system of violence and tyranny over the unprotected. But the far more important affairs of Spain threw those of Etruria into the shade.

After so much preparation behind the scenes, Bonaparte now proposed to open the first grand act of the impending drama. He wrote from Italy to the King of Spain, that he consented to the proposal which he had made for the marriage betwixt the

Prince of Asturias and one of his kinswomen; and having thus maintained to the last the appearances of friendship, he gave orders to the French army lying at Bayonne to enter Spain on different points, and to possess themselves of the strong fortresses by which the frontier of that kingdom is defended.

CHAPTER LX.

Pampeluna, Barcelona, Montjov, and St Sebastian's, are fraudulently seized by the French.—King Charles proposes to sail for South America—Insurrection at Aranyuez in consequence.—Charles resigns the crown in favour of Ferdinand.—Murat enters Madrid.—Charles disavows his resignation.—General Savary arrives at Madrid.—Napoleon's letter to Murat, touching the invasion of Spain.—Ferdinand is instigated to set out to meet Napoleon—Halts at Vittoria, and learns too late Napoleon's designs against him—Joins Bonaparte at Bayonne.—Napoleon opens his designs to Escoiquiz and Cevallos, both of whom he finds intractable.—He sends for Charles, his queen, and Godoy, to Bayonne.—Shocking scene with Ferdinand, who is induced to abdicate the crown in favour of his father, who resigns it next day to Napoleon.—This transfer is reluctantly confirmed by Ferdinand, who, with his brothers, is sent to splendid imprisonment at Valencey.—Joseph Bonaparte is appointed to the throne of Spain, and joins Napoleon at Bayonne.—Assembly of Notables convoked.

NOT a word was spoken, or a motion made, to oppose the entrance of this large French army into the free territories of a friendly power. Neither the king, Godoy, nor any other, dared to complain of the gross breach of the treaty of Fontainebleau, which, in stipulating the formation of the army of reserve at Bayonne, positively provided that it should not cross the frontiers, unless with consent of the Spanish government. Received into the cities as friends and allies, it was the first object of the invaders to possess themselves, by a mixture of force and fraud, of the fortresses and citadels which were the keys of Spain on the French frontier. The details are curious.

At Pampeluna, a body of French troops, who apparently were amusing themselves with casting snowballs at each other on the esplanade of the citadel, continued their sport till they had an opportunity of throwing themselves upon the drawbridge, possessing the gate, and admitting a body of their comrades, who had been kept in readiness; and the capture was thus effected.

Duhesme, who commanded the French troops detached upon Barcelona, had obtained permission from the Spanish governor to mount guards of French along with those maintained by the native soldiers. He then gave out that his troops were about to march; and, as if previous to their moving, had them drawn up in front of the citadel of the place. A French general rode up under pretence of reviewing these men, then passed forward to the gate of the citadel, as if to speak to the French portion of the guard. A body of Italian light troops rushed in close after the French officer and his suite; and the citadel of Barcelona was in the hands of the French. Montjov, the citadel, as it may be termed, of Barcelona, shared the same fate.

St Sebastian's was overpowered by a body of French, who had been admitted as patients into the hospital.

Thus the first fruits of the French invasion were the unresisted possession of these four fortresses, each of which might have detained armies for years under its walls.

Nothing could exceed the consternation of the Spanish nation when they saw their frontier invaded, and four of the most impregnable forts in the world thus easily lost and won. There was indignation as well as sorrow in every countenance; and even at this late hour, had Charles and his son attempted an appeal to the spirit of the people, it would have been vigorously answered. But Godoy, who was the object of national hatred, and was aware that he would instantly become the victim of any general patriotic movement, took care to recommend only such measures of safety as he himself might have a personal share in. He had at once comprehended Napoleon's intentions of seizing upon Spain; and could discern no better course for the royal family, than that they should follow the example to which their own invasion of Portugal had given rise, and transport themselves, like the house of Braganza, to their South American provinces. But what in the Prince of Brazil, surrounded by such superior forces, was a justifiable, nay, a unanimous effort to avoid personal captivity, would have been in the King of Spain the pusillanimous desertion of a post, which he had yet many means of defending.

Nevertheless, upon Godoy's suggestion, the voyage for America was determined on, and troops were hastily collected at Madrid for the sake of securing the retreat of the royal family to Cadiz, where they were to embark. The terror and confusion of the king's mind was fully increased by a letter from Napoleon, expressing deep resentment at the coldness which Charles, as he alleged, had exhibited on the subject of the proposed match with his house. The intimidated king returned for answer, that he desired nothing so ardently as the instant conclusion of the marriage, but at the same time redoubled his preparations for departure. This effect was probably exactly what Napoleon intended to produce. If the king went off to America, his name might be used to curb the party of the Prince of Asturias; and the chance of influencing the countries where the precious metals are produced, would be much increased, should they fall under the dominion of the weak Charles and the profligate Godoy.

Meantime, the resolution of the king to depart from the royal residence of Aranjuez to Cadiz, with the purpose of going from thence to New Spain, began to get abroad among the people of all ranks. The Council of Castile remonstrated against the intentions of the sovereign. The Prince of Asturias and his brother joined in a strong protest against the measure. The populace, partaking the sentiments of the heir-apparent and council, treated the departure of the king as arising out of some scheme of the detested Godoy, and threatened to prevent it by force. The unfortunate and perplexed monarch changed his opinions, or his language at least, with every new counsellor and every new alarm.

On the 17th of March, the walls of the palace were covered with a royal proclamation, professing his majesty's intentions to remain with and share the fate of his subjects. Great crowds assembled joyfully beneath the balcony, on which the royal family appeared and received the thanks of their people, for their determination to abide amongst them. But, in the course of that same evening, the movements among the guards, and the accumulation of carriages and baggage, seemed plainly to indicate immediate intentions to set forth. While the minds of the spectators were agitated by appearances so contradictory of the royal proclamation, an accidental quarrel took place betwixt one of the king's body-guard and a bystander, when the former fired a pistol. The literal flash of the weapon could not more effectually have ignited a powder-magazine, than its discharge gave animation at once to the general feelings of the crowd. The few household troops who remained steady could not check the enraged multitude; a regiment was brought up, commanded by Godoy's brother, but the men made a prisoner of their commanding-officer, and joined the multitude. A great scene of riot ensued, the cry was universal to destroy Godoy, and some, it is said, demanded the abdication or deposition of the king. Godoy's house was plundered in the course of the night, and outrages committed on all who were judged his friends and counsellors.

In the morning the tumult was appeased by the news that the king had dismissed his minister. But the crowd continued strictly to search for him, and at length discovered him. He was beaten, wounded, and it was with some difficulty that Ferdinand saved him from instant death, on a promise that he should be reserved for punishment by the course of justice. The people were delighted with their success thus far, when, to complete their satisfaction, the old, weak, and unpopular king, on the 20th March, resigned his crown to Ferdinand, the favourite of his subjects, professing an unconstrained wish to retire from the seat of government, and spend his life in peace and quiet in some remote province. This resolution was unquestionably hurried forward by the insurrection at Aranjuez; nor does the attitude of a son, who grasps at his father's falling diadem, appear good or graceful. Yet it is probable that Charles, in making this abdication, executed a resolution on which he had long meditated, and from which he had chiefly been withheld by the intercession of the queen and Godoy, who saw in the continuation of the old man's reign the only means to prolong their own power. The abdication was formally intimated to Napoleon, by a letter from the king himself.

While the members of the royal family were distracted by these dissensions, the army of France was fast approaching Madrid, under the command of Joachim Murat, the brother-in-law of Bonaparte. He was at Aranda de Duero upon the day of the insurrection at Aranjuez, and his approach to Madrid required decisive measures on the part of the government. Ferdinand had formed an administration of those statesmen whom the public voice pointed out as the best patriots, and, what was thought synonymous, the keenest opponents of Godoy. There

was no time, had there been sufficient spirit in the councils of the new prince, to request this military intruder to stay upon his road; he was a guest who would have known but too well how to make force supply the want of welcome. But this alarming visitor was, they next learned, to be followed hard upon the heel by one still more formidable. Napoleon, who had hurried back to Paris from Italy, was now setting out for Bayonne, with the purpose of proceeding to Madrid, and witnessing in person the settlement of the Spanish peninsula.

To render the approach of the Emperor of France yet more appalling to the young king and his infant government, Beauharnais, the French ambassador, made no recognition of Ferdinand's authority, but observed a mysterious and ominous silence, when all the other representatives of foreign powers at Madrid, made their addresses of congratulation to the new sovereign. Murat next appeared, in all the pomp of war; brought ten thousand men within the walls of Madrid, where they were received with ancient hospitality, and quartered more than thrice that number in the vicinity. This commander also wore a doubtful and clouded brow, and while he expressed friendship for Ferdinand, and good-will to his cause, declined any definite acknowledgment of his title as king. He was lodged in the palace of Godoy, supported in the most splendid style, and his every wish watched that it might be attended to. But nothing more could be extracted from him than a reference to Napoleon's determination, which he advised Ferdinand to wait for and be guided by. In the idle hope (suggested by French councils) that a compliment might soothe either the sultan or the satrap, the sword of Francis I., long preserved in memory of his captivity after the battle of Pavia, was presented to Murat with great ceremony, in a rich casket, to be by his honoured hands transmitted to those of the Emperor of France. The hope to mitigate Bonaparte's severe resolves by such an act of adulation, was like that of him who should hope to cool red-hot iron by a drop of liquid perfume.

But though Murat and Beauharnais were very chary of saying anything which could commit their principal, they were liberal of their private advice to Ferdinand as his professed friends, and joined in recommending that he should send his second brother, the Infant Don Carlos, to greet Napoleon upon his entrance into Spain, as at once a mark of respect, and as a means of propitiating his favour. Ferdinand consented to this, as what he dared not well decline. But when it was proposed that he himself should leave his capital, and go to meet Bonaparte in the north of Spain, already completely occupied by French troops, he demurred, and by the advice of Cevallos, one of the wisest of his counselors, declined the measure proposed, until, at least, he should receive express information of Napoleon's having crossed the frontier. To meet the French Emperor in Spain might be courtesy, but to advance into France would be meanness, as well as imprudence.

Meantime, Murat, under pretence of hearing all parties in the family quarrel, opened, unknown to Ferdinand, a correspondence with his father and

mother. The queen, equally attached to her paramour, and filled with unnatural hatred to her son, as Godoy's enemy, breathed nothing but vengeance against Ferdinand and his advisers; and the king at once avowed that his resignation was not the act of his voluntary will, but extorted by compulsion, in consequence of the insurrection of Aranjuez, and its consequences. Thus, the agents of Bonaparte obtained and transmitted to him documents, which, if Ferdinand should prove intractable, might afford ground for setting his right aside, and transacting with his father as still the legitimate possessor of the throne of Spain.

A new actor soon appeared on this busy stage. This was Savary, who was often intrusted with Bonaparte's most delicate negotiations. He came, it was stated, to inquire particularly into the character of the insurrection at Aranjuez, and of the old king's abdication. He affected to believe that the explanations which Ferdinand afforded on these subjects would be as satisfactory to his sovereign as to himself; and having thus opened the young king's heart, by perfectly approving of his cause and conduct, he assumed the language of a friendly adviser, and urged and entreated, by every species of argument, that Ferdinand should meet Bonaparte on the road to Madrid; and the young sovereign, beset with difficulties, saw no resource but in compliance. The capital was surrounded by an army of forty thousand foreigners. The communications of Murat with France were kept open by thirty thousand more; while, exclusive of the Spanish troops, whom the French had withdrawn to distant realms in the character of auxiliaries, the rest of the native forces dispersed over the whole realm, and in many cases observed and mastered by the French, did not perhaps exceed thirty thousand men. If Ferdinand remained in Madrid, therefore, he was as much under the mastery of the French as he would have been when advancing northward on the journey to meet Bonaparte; while, to leave his capital, and raise his standard against France in a distant province, seemed an idea which desperation only could have prompted.

Murat, whose views of personal ambition were interested in the complete accomplishment of the subjugation of Spain, seems to have seen no objection remaining when military resistance was placed out of the question. But the penetration of Napoleon went far deeper; and, judging from a letter written to Murat on the 29th March, it seems to have induced him to pause, while he surveyed all the probable chances which might attend the prosecution of his plan. The resignation of Charles IV. had, he observed, greatly complicated the affairs of Spain; and thrown him into much perplexity. "Do not," he continued, "conceive that you are attacking a disarmed nation, and have only to make a demonstration of your troops to subject Spain. The revolution of the 20th March, when Charles resigned the throne, serves to show there is energy among the Spanish people. You have to do with a *new* people, who will display all the enthusiasm proper to men whose political feelings have not been worn out by frequent exercise. The grandees and clergy are masters of Spain. If they once entertain fear

for their privileges and political existence, they may raise levies against us *en masse*, which will render the war eternal. I have at present partisans; but if I show myself in the character of a conqueror, I cannot retain one of them. The Prince of the Peace is detested, because they accuse him of having betrayed Spain to France. The Prince of the Asturias has none of the qualities requisite for a monarch, but that will not prevent their making him out a hero, providing he stands forth in opposition to us. I will have no violence offered to the persons of that family—it is needless to render ourselves unnecessarily odious."

Napoleon, in this remarkable document, touches again on the hazard of a popular war in Spain, and on the dangers arising from the interference of the English; and then proceeds to consider what course his own politics demand. "Shall I go to Madrid, and there exercise the power of a grand protector of the realm of Spain, by deciding between the father and son?—Were I to replace Charles and his minister, they are so unpopular that they could not sustain themselves three months. On the other hand, Ferdinand is the enemy of France; and to set him on the throne would be to gratify those parties in the state who have long desired the destruction of her authority. A matrimonial alliance would be but a feeble tie of union betwixt us.

"I do not approve of your highness having so hastily possessed yourself of the capital. You ought to have kept the army at ten leagues distant from Madrid. You could not be sure whether the people and the magistracy would have recognized the young king. Your arrival has powerfully served him, by giving the alarm to the Spaniards. I have commanded Savary to open a communication with the new king, and he will inform you of what passes. In the meantime, I prescribe to you the following line of conduct:—

"You will take care not to engage me to hold any interview with Ferdinand *within Spain*, unless you judge the situation of things such, that I have no alternative save acknowledging him as king. You will use all manner of civility towards the old king, the queen, and Godoy, and will require that the same honours be rendered to them as heretofore. You will so manage, that the Spaniards may not suspect the course I intend to pursue. This will not be difficult, for I have not fixed upon it myself." He then recommends, that such insinuations be made to all classes, as may best induce them to expect advantages from a more close union with France; exhorts Murat to trust his interests exclusively to his care; hints that Portugal will remain at his disposal; and enjoins the strictest discipline on the part of the French soldiery. Lastly, he enjoins Murat to avoid all explanation with the Spanish generals, and all interference with their order of march. "There must not," he says in one place, "be a single match burnt;" and in another, he uses the almost prophetic expression,—"If war once break out, all is lost."

This letter has a high degree of interest, as it tends to show, that not one of the circumstances which attended the Spanish insurrection escaped the prescient eye of Napoleon, although the head-

long course of his ambition drove him upon the very perils which his political wisdom had foreseen and delineated. The immense object of adding Spain to his empire seemed worthy of being pursued, even at the risk of stirring to arms her hardy population, and exciting a national war, which he himself foretold might prove perpetual.

Meantime, to assist the intrigues of Murat, there was carried on a sort of under plot, the object of which was to disguise Napoleon's real intentions, and induce the counsellors of Ferdinand to conclude, that he did not mean to use his power over Spain, save for the attainment of some limited advantages, far short of engrossing the supreme authority, and destroying the independence of the kingdom. With this view, some illusory terms held out had been communicated by Duroc to the Spanish ambassador, Izquierdo, and of which Ferdinand's council had received information. These seemed to intimate, that Napoleon's exactions from Spain might be gratified by the cession of Navarre, and some part of her frontier on the north, in exchange for the whole of Portugal, which, according to Izquierdo's information, Napoleon was not unwilling to cede to Spain. Such an exchange, however objectionable on the ground of policy and morality, would have been regarded as a comparatively easy ransom, considering the disastrous state of Spain, and the character of him who had coiled around the defenceless kingdom the folds of his power.

Under all the influences of hope and fear, conscious helplessness, and supreme dread of Napoleon, Ferdinand took his determination, and announced to his Council of State his purpose of going as far as Burgos, to meet his faithful friend and mighty ally the emperor. His absence, he said, would amount to a few days, and he created his uncle, Don Antonio, President, during that time, of the High Council of Government. An effort was made by Ferdinand, previous to his departure, to open a more friendly communication with his father; but the answer only bore that the king was retiring to rest, and could not be troubled.

On the 11th April, in an evil day, and an hour of woe, to use the language of the Spanish romancers, Ferdinand set out on his journey, accompanied by Savary, who eagerly solicited that honour, assuring him that they would meet Bonaparte at Burgos. But at Burgos there were no tidings of the French Emperor, and it was only when he had proceeded as far as Vittoria, that Ferdinand learned Napoleon had but then reached Bordeaux, and was on his way to Bayonne. He halted, therefore, at Vittoria, where Savary left him, and went on to France, to render an account to his master to what extent his mission had succeeded.

Afraid to advance or to retire, yet feeling ridiculous in the situation where he was, Ferdinand's unpleasant moments spent at Vittoria, were not much cheered by private intelligence brought him by Don Mariano Urquijo. This was a Spanish nobleman of considerable talent, who had penetrated the scheme of Napoleon, and came to inform the young king and his counsellors, that the intention of Napoleon was to possess himself of the royal person, depose the dynasty of the Bourbons, and name a

member of his own family to reign in their stead.

Another Spaniard, Don Joseph Hervas, the brother-in-law of General Duroc, and the intimate friend of Savary, had acquired such strong suspicions of the plot, that his information corroborated that of Urquijo. The astounded sovereign, and his perplexed advisers, could but allege the unlikelihood, that a hero like Napoleon could meditate such treachery. "Men of extraordinary talents," replied Urquijo, "commit great crimes to attain great objects, and are not the less entitled heroes." He offered to go to Bayonne as Ferdinand's ambassador; and advised him even yet to make his escape, and retire to some part of his dominions, where, free at least, if not powerful, he might treat with Napoleon on more equal terms.

Ferdinand thought it too late to follow this wise counsel; and, instead of attempting an escape, he wrote a letter to Napoleon, appealing to all that he had done to show himself the devoted friend and ally of France, and endeavouring to propitiate his favour. An answer was instantly returned, containing much that was alarming and ominous. In this the emperor treated Ferdinand as Prince of Asturias, not King of Spain—censured his earliest measure of writing to himself without his father's knowledge, and, with what seemed a jealous apprehension for the rights of sovereigns, blamed him for availing himself of the arm of the people to shake his father's throne. He intimated, that he had taken the Prince of the Peace under his own protection; hinted that the prince ought not to rip up the follies of his mother—nay, did not forbear the highly offensive insinuation, that, by exposing her faults, Ferdinand might occasion his own legitimacy to be called in question. Still he assured the prince of his continued friendship, declared himself anxious to have some personal communication with him on the subject of the revolution of Aranjuez, and intimated, that if the resignation of Charles should appear to have been voluntary, he would no longer scruple to acknowledge King Ferdinand.

Cevallos, before-mentioned as one of Ferdinand's wisest counsellors, would fain have prevailed on him to turn back from Vittoria on receiving a letter of such doubtful tenor. Even the people of the town opposed themselves to the prosecution of his rash journey, and went so far as to cut the traces of his mules. Ferdinand however proceeded, entered France, and reached Bayonne; placing himself thus in that state of absolute dependence upon the pleasure of the French autocrat, which, as Napoleon had foretold to Murat, could not have had an existence at any spot within the Spanish territory. Ferdinand was now a hostage at least, perhaps a prisoner.

Bonaparte received the anxious prince with flattering distinction, invited him to dinner, and treated him with the usual deference exchanged between sovereigns when they meet. But that very evening he sent Savary, by whose encouragement Ferdinand had been deluded to undertake this journey, to acquaint him that the Bourbon dynasty was to cease to reign in Spain, and that the prince must prepare to relinquish to Napoleon all right over the territories of his ancestors.

Bonaparte explained himself at length to the Canon Escoiquiz, as the person most likely to reconcile Ferdinand to the lot, which he was determined should be inevitable. The Bourbons, he said, were the mortal enemies of him and of his house; his policy could not permit them to reign in Spain. They were incapable of wise government; and he was determined that Spain should be wisely governed in future, her grievances redressed, and the alliance betwixt her and France placed on an unalterable footing. "King Charles," he said, "is ready to co-operate in such a revolution, by transferring to me his own rights. Let Ferdinand follow his father's wise example, and he shall have the crown of Etruria, and my niece in marriage. Otherwise, I will treat with King Charles exclusively, and all Ferdinand can expect is permission to return to Spain, when hostilities must ensue between us." Escoiquiz justified the insurrection at Aranjuez, and pleaded hard the cause of his former pupil. By protecting Ferdinand, he said, Napoleon might merit and gain the esteem and the affection of Spain; but by an attempt to subject the nation to a foreign yoke, he would lose their affections for ever. Bonaparte set these arguments at defiance. The nobles and higher classes would, he said, submit for security of their property; a few severe chastisements would keep the populace in order. But he declared he was determined on the execution of his plan, should it involve the lives of two hundred thousand men. "The new dynasty," replied Escoiquiz, "will in that case be placed on a volcano—an army of two hundred thousand men will be indispensable to command a country of discontented slaves." The canon was interrupted by Bonaparte, who observed that they could not agree upon their principles, and said he would on the morrow make known his irrevocable determination.

To do Napoleon justice, he at no time through this extraordinary discussion made the least attempt even to colour his selfish policy. "I am desirous," he said, "that the Bourbons should cease to reign, and that my own family should succeed them on the throne of Spain." He declared, that this was best both for Spain and France—above all, that he had the power as well as the will to accomplish his purpose. There was never a more unpalliated case of violent and arbitrary spoliation. He argued also with Escoiquiz with the most perfect good humour, and pulled him familiarly by the ear as he disputed with him. "So then, canon," he said, "you will not enter into my views?"—"On the contrary," said Escoiquiz, "I wish I could induce your majesty to, adopt mine, though it were at the expense of my ears," which Napoleon was at the moment hauling somewhat rudely.

With Cevallos the emperor entered into a more violent discussion, for Bonaparte was as choleric by temperament, as he was upon reflection and by policy calm and moderate. Upon hearing Cevallos, in a discussion with his minister Champagny, insist in a high tone upon the character of the Spaniards, and the feelings they were likely to entertain on the manner in which Ferdinand had been received, he gave loose to his native violence of disposition, accused Cevallos of being a traitor, because, having

served the old king, he was now a counsellor of his son, and at length concluded with the characteristic declaration,—“I have a system of policy of my own—You ought to adopt more liberal ideas—to be less susceptible on the point of honour, and to beware how you sacrifice the interest of Spain to a fantastic loyalty for the Bourbons.”

Cevallos being found as intractable as Escoiquiz, the conduct of the negotiation, if it could be called so, on the part of Ferdinand, was intrusted to Don Pedro de Labrador. Labrador, however, insisted on knowing, as an indispensable preliminary, whether King Ferdinand were at liberty; and if so, why he was not restored to his own country? Champagne replied, that such return could scarce be permitted, till the emperor and he came to an understanding. Labrador, in his turn, presented a note, expressing on what terms Ferdinand had put himself in the power of Bonaparte, and declaring his master's intention of immediate departure. As a practical answer to this intimation, the guards on the king and his brother were doubled, and began to exercise some restraint over their persons. One of the Infants was even forcibly stopped by a gendarme. The man was punished; but the resentment and despair, shown by the Spaniards of the king's retinue, might have convinced Napoleon, how intimately they connected the honour of their country with the respect due to their royal family.

Bonaparte found, by all these experiments, that Ferdinand and his counsellors were likely to be less tractable than he had expected; and that it would be necessary, however unpopular King Charles, and still more his wife and minister, were in Spain, to bring them once more forward on this singular stage. He therefore sent to Murat to cause the old king, with the queen and Godoy, to be transported to Bayonne without delay. The arrival of Charles excited much interest in the French assembled at Bayonne, who flocked to see him, and to trace in his person and manners the descendant of Louis XIV. In external qualities, indeed, there was nothing wanting. He possessed the regal port and dignified manners of his ancestors; and, though speaking French with difficulty, the expatriated monarch, on meeting with Napoleon, showed the easy manners and noble mien of one long accustomed to command all around him. But in spirit and intellect there was a woful deficiency. Napoleon found Charles, his wife, and minister, the willing tools of his policy; for Godoy accounted Ferdinand his personal enemy; the mother hated him as wicked women have been known to hate their children when they are conscious of having forfeited their esteem; and the king, whose own feelings resented the insurrection of Aranjuez, was readily exasperated to an uncontrollable fit of rage against his son.

Upon his first arrival at Bayonne, Charles loudly protested that his abdication of the 20th March was the operation of force alone; and demanded that his son should repossess him in the crown, of which he had violently deprived him.

The reply of Ferdinand alleged that the resignation of his father had been unquestionably voluntary at the time, and he quoted the old king's repeated declarations to that effect. But he declared, that if

they were both permitted to return to Madrid, and summon the Cortes, or body of national representatives, he was ready to execute, in their presence, a renunciation of the rights vested in him by his father's abdication.

In his answer, Charles declared that he had sought the camp of his powerful ally, not as a king in regal splendour, but as an unhappy old man, whose royal office had been taken from him, and even his life endangered by the criminal ambition of his own son. He treated the convocation of the cortes with contempt. “Everything,” he said, “ought to be done by sovereigns for the people; but the people ought not to be suffered to carve for themselves.” Finally, he assured his son that the Emperor of France could alone be the saviour of Spain, and that Napoleon was determined that Ferdinand should never enjoy the crown of that kingdom. In different parts of this paternal admonition, Charles accused his son of the crime which existing circumstances rendered most dangerous—of being indisposed towards the interests of France.

Ferdinand replied to this manifesto in firm and respectful terms, and appealed, too justly, to the situation he at present stood in, as a proof how unbounded had been his confidence in France. He concluded, that since the conditions he had annexed to his offer of resigning back the crown to his father had given displeasure, he was content to abdicate unconditionally; only stipulating that they should both be permitted to return to their own country, and leave a place where no deed which either could perform would be received by the world as flowing from free-will.

The day after this letter was written, the unfortunate Ferdinand was summoned to the presence of his parents, where he also found Napoleon himself. The conclave received him sitting; and while the king overwhelmed him with the most outrageous reproaches, the queen (the statement appears scarce credible) in the height of her fury, lost sight of shame and womanhood so far as to tell Ferdinand, in her husband's presence, that he was the son of another man. Bonaparte expressed himself greatly shocked at this scene, in which he compared the queen's language and deportment to that of a fury on the Grecian stage. The prince's situation, he owned, moved him to pity; but the emotion was not strong enough to produce any interposition in his favour. Confused with a scene so dreadful, and at the same time so disgusting, Ferdinand at length executed the renunciation which had been demanded in such intemperate terms. This occurred on the 6th of May, 1808. But the master of the drama had not waited till this time to commence his operations.

Two days before Ferdinand's abdication, that is, upon the 4th, his father, Charles, acting in the character of king, which he had laid aside at Aranjuez, had named Joachim Murat lieutenant-general of his kingdom, and president of the governments. A proclamation was at the same time published, in which the Spaniards were particularly and anxiously cautioned against listening to treacherous men, agents of England, who might stir them up against France, and assuring them that Spain had no well-

founded hope of safety, excepting in the friendship of the Great Emperor.

On the same day, and without waiting for such additional right as he might have derived from his son's renunciation, Charles resigned all claims on Spain, with its kingdoms and territories, in favour of his friend and faithful ally, the Emperor of the French. To preserve some appearance of attention to external forms, it was stipulated that the cession only took place under the express conditions that the integrity and independence of the kingdom should be preserved, and that the catholic religion should be the only one practised in Spain. Finally, all decrees of confiscation or of penal consequences, which had been issued since the revolution of Aranjuez, were declared null and void. Charles having thus secured, as it was termed, the prosperity, integrity, and independence of his kingdom, by these articles, stipulates, by seven which follow, for the suitable maintenance of himself and his queen, his minister the Prince of the Peace, and of others their followers. Rank, income, appanages, were heaped on them, accordingly, with no niggard hand; for the prodigality of the king's gift called for some adequate requital.

Still the resignation of Ferdinand in Napoleon's favour was necessary to give him some more colourable right, than could be derived from the alienation, by the father, of a crown which he had previously abdicated. Much urgency was used with Ferdinand on the occasion, and for some time firmly resisted. But he found himself completely in Napoleon's power; and the tragedy of the Duke d'Enghien might have taught him, that the emperor stood on little ceremony with those who were interruptions in his path. His counsellors also assured him, that no resignation which he could execute in his present state of captivity could be binding upon himself or upon the Spanish nation. Yielding, then, to the circumstances in which he was placed, Ferdinand also entered into a treaty of resignation; but he no longer obtained the kingdom of Etruria, or the marriage with Bonaparte's niece, or any of the other advantages held out in the beginning of the negotiation. These were forfeited by his temporary hesitation to oblige the emperor. A safe and pleasant place of residence, which was not to be absolutely a prison, and an honourable pension, were all that was allowed to Ferdinand, in exchange for his natural birthright, the mighty kingdom of Spain. The Infants, his brothers, who adhered to the same accession which stripped Ferdinand of his heritage, were in like manner recompensed by similar provisions for their holding in future the kind of life which that resignation condemned them to. The palace of Navarre and its dependencies had been assigned to Ferdinand as his residence; but he and his brothers, the Infants, were afterwards conducted to that of Valencey, a superb mansion belonging to the celebrated Talleyrand, who was punished, it was said, by this allocation, for having differed in opinion from his master, on the mode on which he should conduct himself towards Spain. The royal captives observed such rules of conduct as were recommended to them, without dreaming apparently either of escape or of resistance to the will of the victor; nor did their

deportment, during the tremendous conflict which was continued in the name of Ferdinand for three years and upwards, ever give Napoleon any excuse for close restraint, or food for ulterior suspicions.

The Spanish royal family thus consigned to an unresisted fate, it only followed to supply the vacant throne by a new dynasty, as Napoleon called it; but, in fact, by some individual closely connected with himself, and absolutely dependent upon him;—much in the manner in which the inferior partners of a commercial establishment are connected with, and subject to, the management of the head of the house. For this purpose, he had cast his eyes on Lucien, who was, after Napoleon, the ablest of the Bonaparte family, and whose presence of mind had so critically assisted his brother at the expulsion of the Council of Five Hundred from Saint-Cloud, in a moment when, in the eyes of the by-standers, that of Napoleon seemed rather to waver.

It has been mentioned before, that Lucien had offended Napoleon by forming a marriage of personal attachment; and it is supposed, that on his part, he saw with displeasure the whole institutions and liberties of his native country sacrificed to the grandeur of one man, though that man was his brother. He had been heard to say of Napoleon, "that every word and action of his were dictated by his political system," and "that the character of his politics rested entirely on egotism." Even the proffer of the kingdom of Spain, therefore, did not tempt Lucien from the enjoyments of a private station, where he employed a large income in collecting pictures and objects of art, and amused his own leisure with literary composition. Receiving this repulse from Lucien, Bonaparte resolved to transfer his eldest brother Joseph from the throne of Naples, where, as an Italian, acquainted with the language and manners of the country, he enjoyed some degree of popularity, and bestow on him a kingdom far more difficult to master and to govern. Joachim Murat, Grand Duke, as he was called, of Berg, at present in command of the army which occupied Madrid, was destined to succeed Joseph in the throne which he was about to vacate. It was said, that the subordinate parties were alike disappointed with the parts assigned them in this masque of sovereigns. Murat thought his military talents deserved the throne of Spain, and the less ambitious Joseph, preferring quiet to extent of territory, would have willingly remained contented with the less important royalty of Naples. But Napoleon did not permit the will of others to interfere with what he had previously determined, and Joseph was summoned to meet him at Bayonne, and prepared, by instructions communicated to him on the road, to perform without remonstrance his part in the pageant. The purposes of Napoleon were now fully announced to the world. An Assembly of Notables from all parts of Spain were convoked, to recognize the new monarch, and adjust the constitution under which Spain should be in future administered.

The place of meeting was at Bayonne; the date of convocation was the 15th of June; and the object announced for consideration of the Notables was the regeneration of Spain, to be effected under the auspices of Napoleon.

But events had already occurred in that kingdom, tending to show that the prize, of which Bonaparte disposed so freely, was not, and might perhaps never be, within his possession. He had indeed obtained, by a course of the most audacious treachery, all those advantages which, after the more honourable success obtained in great battles, had prostrated powerful nations at his feet. He had secured the capital with an army of forty thousand men. The frontier fortresses were in his possession, and enabled him to maintain his communications with Madrid; the troops of the Spanish monarchy were either following his own banner in remote climates, or broken up and scattered in small bodies through Spain itself. These advantages he had obtained over Austria after Austerlitz, and over Prussia after Jena; and in both cases these monarchies were placed at the victor's discretion. But in neither case had he, as now at Bayonne, the persons of the royal family at his own disposal, or had he reduced them to the necessity of becoming his mouth-piece, or organ, in announcing to the people the will of the conqueror. So that, in this very important particular, the advantages which he possessed over Spain were greater than those which Napoleon had obtained over any other country. But then Spain contained within herself principles of opposition, which were nowhere else found to exist in the same extent.

CHAPTER LXI.

State of morals and manners in Spain.—The nobility—the middle classes—the lower ranks.—The indignation of the people strongly excited against the French.—Insurrection at Madrid on the 2d May, in which many of the French troops fell.—Murat proclaims an amnesty, notwithstanding which, upwards of 200 Spanish prisoners are put to death.—King Charles appoints Murat Lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and Ferdinand's renunciation of the throne is announced.—Murat unfolds the plan of government to the Council of Castile, and addresses of submission are sent to Bonaparte from various quarters.—Notables appointed to meet at Bayonne on 15th June.—The flame of resistance becomes universal throughout Spain.

THE government of Spain, a worn-out despotism, lodged in the hands of a family of the lowest degree of intellect, was one of the worst in Europe; and the state of the nobility, speaking in general (for there were noble exceptions), seemed scarce less degraded. The incestuous practice of marrying within the near degrees of propinquity had long existed, with its usual consequences, the dwarfing of the body, and degeneracy of the understanding. The education of the nobility was committed to the priests, who took care to give them no lights beyond catholic bigotry. The custom of the country introduced them to premature indulgences, and they ceased to be children, without arriving either at the strength or the intellect of youth.

The middling classes, inhabitants of towns, and those who followed the learned professions, had not been so generally subjected to the same withering influence of superstition and luxury. In many instances, they had acquired good educations, and

were superior to the bigotry which the ecclesiastics endeavoured to inspire them with; but, mistaking the reverse of wrong for the right, many of these classes had been hurried into absolute scepticism, having renounced altogether the ideas of religion, which better instruction would have taught them to separate from superstition, and having adopted in their extravagance many of the doctrines which were so popular in France at the commencement of the Revolution.

The lower classes of Spain, and especially those who resided in the country, possessed nearly the same character which their ancestors exhibited under the reign of Charles V. They were little interested by the imperfections of the government, for the system, though execrable, did not immediately affect their comforts. They lay too low for personal oppression, and as the expenses of the state were supplied from the produce of the American provinces, the Spanish peasants were strangers, in a great measure, to the actions of the tax-gatherer. Born in a delicious climate, where the soil, on the slightest labour, returned far more than was necessary for the support of the labourer, extreme poverty was as rare as hard toil. The sobriety and moderation of the Spaniard continued to be one of his striking characteristics; he preferred his personal ease to increasing the sphere of his enjoyments, and would rather enjoy his leisure upon dry bread and onions, than toil more severely to gain better fare. His indolence was, however, often exchanged for the most active excitation, and though slow in the labours of the field, the Spaniard was inexhaustible in his powers of traveling through his plains and sierras, and at the end of a toilsome day's journey, seemed more often desirous of driving away his fatigue by the dance, than of recruiting himself by repose. There were many classes of peasantry,—shepherds, muleteers, traders between distant provinces,—who led a wandering life by profession, and, from the insecure state of the roads, were in the habit of carrying arms. But even the general habits of the cultivators of the soil led them to part with the advantages of civilized society upon more easy terms than the peasantry of a less primitive country. The few and simple rights of the Spaniard were under the protection of the alcalde, or judge of his village, in whose nomination he had usually a vote, and whose judgment was usually satisfactory. If, however, an individual experienced oppression, he took his cloak, sword, and musket, and after or without avenging the real or supposed injury, plunged into the deserts in which the Peninsula abounds, joined one of the numerous bands of contraband traders and outlaws by which they were haunted, and did all this without experiencing any violent change, either of sentiment or manner of life.

As the habits of the Spaniard rendered him a ready soldier, his disposition and feelings made him a willing one. He retained, with other traits of his ancestry, much of that Castilian pride, which mixed both with the virtues and defects of his nation. The hours of his indolence were often bestowed on studying the glories of his fathers. He was well acquainted with their struggles against the Moors, their splendid conquests in the New World, their long

was with France; and when the modern Castilian contrasted his own times with those which had passed away, he felt assurances in his bosom, that, if Spain had descended from the high pre-eminence she formerly enjoyed in Europe, it was not the fault of the Spanish people. The present crisis gave an additional stimulus to their natural courage and their patriotism, because the yoke with which they were threatened was that of France, a people to whom their own national character stands in such opposition, as to excite mutual hatred and contempt. Nothing, indeed, can be so opposite as the stately, grave, romantic Spaniard, with his dislike of labour and his rigid rectitude of thinking, to the lively, bustling, sarcastic Frenchman, indefatigable in prosecution of whatever he undertakes, and calculating frequently his means of accomplishing his purpose, with much more ingenuity than integrity. The bigotry of the Spaniards was no less strikingly contrasted with the scoffing, and, at the same time, proselytizing scepticism, which had been long a distinction of modern France.

To conclude, the Spaniards, easily awakened to anger by national aggression, and peculiarly sensible to such on the part of a rival nation, were yet more irresistibly excited to resistance and to revenge, by the insidious and fraudulent manner in which they had seen their country stript of her defenders, deprived of her frontier fortresses, her capital seized, and her royal family kidnapped, by an ally who had not alleged even a shadow of pretext for such enormous violence.

Such being the character of the Spaniards, and such the provocation they had received, it was impossible that much time should elapse ere their indignation became manifest. The citizens of Madrid had looked on with gloomy suspicion at the course of public events which followed Ferdinand's imprudent journey to Bayonne. By degrees almost all the rest of the royal family were withdrawn thither, and Godoy, upon whose head, as a great public criminal, the people ardently desired to see vengeance inflicted, was also transferred to the same place. The interest excited in the fate of the poor relics of the royal family remaining at Madrid, which consisted only of the Queen of Etruria and her children, the Infant Don Antonio, brother of the old king, and Don Francisco, youngest brother of Ferdinand, grew deeper and deeper among the populace.

On the last day of April, Murat produced an order to Don Antonio, who still held a nominal power of regency, demanding that the Queen of Etruria and her children should be sent to Bayonne. This occasioned some discussion, and the news getting abroad, the public seemed generally determined that they would not permit the last remains of their royal family to travel that road, on which, as on that which led to the lion's den in the fable, they could discern the trace of no returning footsteps. The tidings from thence had become gradually more and more unfavourable to the partisans of Ferdinand, and the courier, who used to arrive every night from Bayonne, was anxiously expected on the evening of April the 30th, as likely to bring decisive news of Napoleon's intentions towards his royal visitor. No courier arrived, and the populace retired for the

evening, in the highest degree gloomy and discontented. On the next day (first of May) the Gate of the Sun, and the vicinity of the Post-office were crowded with men, whose looks menaced violence, and whose capas, or long cloaks, were said to conceal arms. The French garrison got under arms, but this day also passed off without bloodshed.

On the 2d of May, the streets presented the same gloomy and menacing appearance. The crowds which filled them were agitated by reports that the whole remaining members of the royal family were to be removed, and they saw the Queen of Etruria and her children put into their carriages, together with Don Francisco, the youngest brother of Ferdinand, a youth of fourteen, who appeared to feel his fate, for he wept bitterly. The general fury broke out at this spectacle, and at once and on all sides, the populace of Madrid assailed the French troops with the most bitter animosity. The number of French who fell was very considerable, the weapons of the assailants being chiefly their long knives, which the Spaniards use with such fatal dexterity.

Murat poured troops into the city to suppress the consequences of an explosion, which had been long expected. The streets were cleared with volleys of grape-shot and with charges of cavalry, but it required near three or four hours' hard fighting to convince the citizens of Madrid, that they were engaged in an attempt entirely hopeless. About the middle of the day, some members of the Spanish government, joining themselves to the more humane part of the French generals, and particularly General Harispe, interfered to separate the combatants, when there at length ensued a cessation of these strange hostilities, maintained so long and with such fury by men almost totally unarmed, against the flower of the French army.

A general amnesty was proclaimed, in defiance of which Murat caused seize upon and execute several large bands of Spaniards, made prisoners in the scuffle. They were shot in parties of forty or fifty at a time; and as the inhabitants were compelled to illuminate their houses during that dreadful night, the dead and dying might be seen lying on the pavement as clearly as at noon-day. These military executions were renewed on the two or three following days, probably with more attention to the selection of victims, for the insurgents were now condemned by French military courts. The number of citizens thus murdered is said to have amounted to two or three hundred at least. On the 5th May, Murat published a proclamation, relaxing in his severity.

This crisis had been extremely violent, much more so, perhaps, than the French had ever experienced in a similar situation; but it had been encountered with such celerity, and put down with such rigour, that Murat may well have thought that the severity was sufficient to prevent the recurrence of similar scenes. The citizens of Madrid did not again, indeed, undertake the task of fruitless opposition; but, like a bull stupified by the first blow of the axe, suffered their conquerors to follow forth their fatal purpose, without resistance, but also without submission.

News came now with sufficient speed, and their

tenor was such as to impress obedience on those ranks, who had rank and title to lose. Don Antonio set off for Bayonne; and on the 7th of May arrived and was promulgated at Madrid, a declaration by the old King Charles, nominating Murat lieutenant-general of the kingdom. The abdication of the son, less expected and more mortifying, was next made public, and a proclamation in his name and those of the Infants, Don Carlos and Don Antonio, recommended the laying aside all spirit of resistance, and an implicit obedience to the irresistible power of France.

The destined plan of government was then unfolded by Murat to the Council of Castile, who first, by an adulatory address, and then by a deputation of their body dispatched personally to Bayonne, hailed the expected resuscitation of the Spanish monarchy as a certain and infallible consequence of the throne being possessed by a relation of the great Napoleon. Other bodies of consequence were prevailed upon to send similar addresses; and one in the name of the city of Madrid, its streets still slippery with the blood of its citizens, was dispatched to express the congratulations of the capital. The summons of Murat, as lieutenant-general of King Charles, and afterwards one from Bonaparte, as possessed of the sovereign power by the cession of that feeble monarch, convoked the proposed meeting of the Notables at Bayonne on 15th June; and the members so summoned began to depart from such places as were under the immediate influence of the French armies, in order to give their attendance upon the proposed convocation.

The news of the insurrection of Madrid, on the 2d May, had in the meantime communicated itself with the speed of electricity to the most remote provinces of the kingdom; and everywhere, like an alarm-signal, had inspired the most impassioned spirit of opposition to the invaders. The kingdom, from all its provinces, cried out with one voice for war and vengeance; and the movement was so universal and simultaneous, that the general will seemed in a great measure to overcome or despise every disadvantage, which could arise from the suddenness of the event, and the unprepared state of the country.

The occupation of Madrid might have been of more importance to check and derange the movements of the Spanish nation at large, if that capital had borne exactly the same relation to the kingdom which other metropolises of Europe usually occupy to theirs, and which Paris, in particular, bears towards France. But Spain consists of several separate provinces, formerly distinct sovereignties, which having been united under the same sovereignty by the various modes of inheritance, treaty, or conquest, still retain their separate laws; and though agreeing in the general features of the national character, have shades of distinction which distinguish them from each other. Biscay, Galicia, Catalonia, Andalusia, Valencia, and other lesser dominions of Spain, each had their capitals, their internal government, and the means of providing themselves for resistance, though Madrid was lost. The patriotic spirit broke out in all parts of Spain at once, excepting where the French actually possessed large garrisons, and even there the spirit of the people was sufficiently manifest. The call for

resistance usually began among the lower class of the inhabitants. But in such instances as their natural leaders and superiors declared themselves frankly for the same cause, the insurgents arranged themselves quietly in the ranks of subordination natural to them, and the measures which the time rendered necessary were adopted with vigour and unanimity. In other instances, when the persons in possession of the authority opposed themselves to the wishes of the people, or gave them reason, by tergiversation and affectation of delay, to believe they were not sincere in the cause of the country, the fury of the people broke out, and they indulged their vindictive temper by the most bloody excesses. At Valencia in particular, before the insurrection could be organized, a wretched priest, called Calvo, had headed the rabble in the massacre of upwards of two hundred French residing within the city, who were guiltless of any offence, except their being of that country. The governor of Cadiz, Solano, falling under popular suspicion, was, in like manner, put to death; and similar bloody scenes signalized the breaking out of the insurrection in different parts of the Peninsula.

Yet, among these bursts of popular fury, there were mixed great signs of calmness and national sagacity. The arrangements made for organizing their defence, were wisely adopted. The supreme power of each district was vested in a Junta, or Select Committee, who were chosen by the people, and in general the selection was judiciously made. These bodies were necessarily independent in their respective governments, but a friendly communication was actively maintained among them, and by common consent a deference was paid to the Junta of Seville, the largest and richest town in Spain, after Madrid, and whose temporary governors chanced, generally speaking, to be men of integrity and talents.

These provisional Juntas proceeded to act with much vigour. The rich were called upon for patriotic contributions. The clergy were requested to send the church plate to the mint. The poor were enjoined to enter the ranks of the defenders of the country, or to labour on the fortifications which the defences rendered necessary. All these calls were willingly obeyed. The Spanish soldiery, wherever situated, turned invariably to the side of the country, and the insurrection had not broken out many days, when the whole nation assumed a formidable aspect of general and permanent resistance. Let us, in the meantime, advert to the conduct of Napoleon.

That crisis, of which Bonaparte had expressed so much apprehension in his prophetic letter to Murat—the commencement of that war, which was to be so long in arriving at a close—had taken place in the streets of Madrid on the second of May; and the slaughter of the inhabitants, with the subsequent executions by the orders of Murat, had given the signal for the popular fermentation throughout Spain, which soon attained the extent we have just described.

The news arrived at Bayonne on the 4th May, the very day on which the weak old king surrendered his regal rights to Napoleon; and the knowledge that blood had been spilled became an additional reason for urging Ferdinand to authenticate that

cession. To force forward the transaction without a moment's delay; to acquire a right such as he could instantly make use of as a pretext to employ his superior force and disciplined army, became now a matter of the last importance; and Cevallos avers, that, in order to overcome Ferdinand's repugnance, Napoleon used language of the most violent kind, commanding his captive to chuse between death and acquiescence in his pleasure. The French Emperor succeeded in this point, as we have already shown, and he now proceeded to the execution of his ultimate purpose, without condescending to notice that the people of Spain were a party concerned in this change of rulers, and that they were in arms in all her provinces for the purpose of opposing it.

To the French public, the insurrection of Madrid was described as a mere popular explosion, although, perhaps for the purpose of striking terror, the numbers of the Spanish who fell were exaggerated from a few hundreds to "some thousands of the worst disposed wretches of the capital," whose destruction was stated to be matter of joy and congratulation to all good citizens. On the yet more formidable insurrections through Spain in general, the *Moniteur* observed an absolute silence. It appeared as if the French troops had been everywhere received by the Spanish people as liberators; and as if the proud nation, which possessed so many ages of fame, was waiting her doom from the pleasure of the French Emperor, with the same passive spirit exhibited by the humbled republics of Venice or Genoa.

Bonaparte proceeded on the same plan of disguise, and seemed himself not to notice those signs of general resistance which he took care to conceal from the public. We have already mentioned the proceedings of the Assembly of Notables, whom he affected to consider as the representatives of the Spanish nation, though summoned by a foreign prince, meeting within a foreign land, and possessing no powers of delegation enabling them, under any legal form, to dispose of the rights of the meanest hamlet in Spain. Joseph, who arrived at Bayonne on the fifth of June, was recognized by these obsequious personages; received their homage; agreed to guarantee their new constitution, and promised happiness to Spain, while he only alluded to the existence of discontents in that kingdom, by expressing his intention to remain ignorant of the particulars of such ephemeral disturbances.

At length Napoleon, who had convoked this compliant body, thought proper to give them audience before their return to their own country. It is said he was tired of a farce to which few were disposed to give any weight or consequence. At least he was so much embarrassed by a consciousness of the wide distinction between the real condition in which he was placed, and that which he was desirous of being thought to hold, that he lost, on this occasion, his usual presence of mind; was embarrassed in his manner; repeated from time to time phrases which had neither meaning nor propriety; and took a brief adieu of his astonished audience, who were surprised to see how much the consciousness of the evil part he was acting had confused his usual audacity of assertion, and checked the fluency of his general style of elocution.

The brothers then parted, and Joseph prepared to accomplish the destinies shaped out for him by his brother, while Napoleon returned to the capital of his augmented empire. The former did not travel fast or far, although the *Moniteurs* announced nothing save the general joy testified by the Spaniards at his reception, and the serenades performed by the natives on their guitars from night till morning under the windows of their new sovereign. The sounds by which he was in reality surrounded were of a sterner and more warlike character. The tidings of insurrection, imperfectly heard and reluctantly listened to, on the northern side of the Pyrenees, were renewed with astounding and overpowering reiteration, as the intrusive king approached the scene of his proposed usurpation. He was in the condition of the huntsman, who, expecting that the tiger is at his mercy, and secured in the toils, has the unpleasant surprise of finding him free, and irritated to frenzy. It was judged proper, as Joseph possessed no talents of a military order, that he should remain at Vittoria until the measures adopted by his brother's generals might secure him a free and safe road to the capital. It is singular, that the frontier town which thus saw his early hesitation at entering upon his undertaking, was also witness to its final and disgraceful conclusion, by the final defeat which he received there in 1813.

No doubts or forebodings attended the return of Napoleon to Paris. The eyes of the French were too much dazzled by the splendid acquisition to the Great Empire, which was supposed to have been secured by the measures taken at Bayonne, to permit them to examine the basis of violence and injustice on which it was to be founded. The union of France and Spain, under kindred monarchs, had been long accounted the masterpiece of Louis XIV.'s policy; and the French now saw it, to outward appearance, on the point of accomplishment, at the simple wish of the wonderful man who had erected France into the Mistress of the World, and whose vigour in forming plans for her yet augmenting grandeur was only equalled by the celerity with which they were carried into execution.

Bonaparte had indeed availed himself to the utmost of that art of seducing and acting upon the imagination of the French people, in which he accused the Directory of being deficient. He had strung the popular feeling in such a manner, that it was sure to respond to almost every note which he chose to strike upon it. The love of national glory, in itself a praiseworthy attribute, becomes a vice when it rests on success accomplished by means inconsistent with honour and integrity. These unfavourable parts of the picture he kept in shade, while, as an artful picture-dealer, he threw the full lights on those which announced the augmented grandeur and happiness of France. The nation, always willing listeners to their own praises, were contented to see with the eyes of their ruler; and at no period in his life did Bonaparte appear to be in such a genuine degree the pride and admiration of France as when returning from Bayonne, after having, in his attempt to seize upon the crown of Spain, perpetrated a very great crime, and at the same time committed an egregious folly.

The appearance of brilliant success, however, had its usual effect upon the multitude. In his return through Pau, Toulouse, Montauban, and the other towns in that district, the emperor was received with the honours due to a demi-god. Their antique and gloomy streets were arched over with laurels, and strewed with flowers; the external walls of their houses were covered with tapestry, rich hangings, and splendid paintings; the population crowded to meet the emperor, and the mayors, or prefects, could scarce find language enough to exaggerate what was the actual prevailing tone of admiration towards Napoleon's person. Bordeaux alone exhibited a melancholy and silent appearance. But Nantes and La Vendée, so distinguished as faithful to the Bourbon cause, seemed to join in the general feeling of the period; and the population of these countries rushed to congratulate him, who had with a strong hand plucked from the throne the last reigning branch of that illustrious house. The gods, says a heathen poet, frequently punish the folly of mortals by granting their own ill-chosen wishes. In the present case, they who rejoiced in the seeming acquisition of Spain to the French empire, could not foresee that it was to cost the lives of a million of Frenchmen; and he who received their congratulations was totally unaware, that he had been digging under his own feet the mine by which he was finally to be destroyed.

CHAPTER LXII.

Plans of defence of the Spanish Juntas—defeated by the ardour of the insurrectionary armies.—Cruelty of the French troops, and inveteracy of the Spaniards.—Successes of the invaders—Defeat of Rio Secco—Exultation of Napoleon.—Joseph enters Madrid.—His reception.—Duke of Parma compelled to retreat to Barcelona, and Money from before Valencia.—Defeat of Dupont by Castanos at Baylen—His army surrenders prisoners of war.—Effects of this victory and capitulation.—Unreasonable expectations of the British public.—Joseph leaves Madrid, and retires to Vittoria.—Defence of Zaragoza.

SURROUNDED by insurrection, as we have stated them to be, the French generals who had entered Spain entertained no fear but that the experience of their superiority in military skill and discipline would soon teach the Spaniards the folly of their unavailing resistance. The invading armies were no longer commanded by Murat, who had returned to France, to proceed from thence to take possession of the throne of Naples, vacant by the promotion of Joseph, as in earlier life he might have attained a higher step of military rank, in consequence of regimental succession. Savary, who had, as we have seen, a principal share in directing Ferdinand's mind towards the fatal journey to Bayonne, remained in command at Madrid, and endeavoured, by a general system of vigorous effort in various directions, to put an end to the insurrection, which had now become general wherever the French did not possess such preponderating armed force, as rendered opposition impossible. We can but hint at the character which the war assumed even at the

onset, and touch generally upon its more important incidents.

The Spanish Juntas had wisely recommended to their countrymen to avoid general engagements,—to avail themselves of the difficulties of various kinds which their country presents to an army of invaders,—to operate upon the flanks, the rear, and the communications of the French,—and to engage the enemy in a war of posts, in which courage and natural instinct bring the native sharp-shooter more upon a level with the trained and practised soldier, than the professors of military tactics are at all times willing to admit. But although this plan was excellently laid down, and in part adhered to, in which case it seldom failed to prove successful, yet on many occasions it became impossible for the Spanish leaders to avoid more general actions, in which defeat and loss were usually inevitable. The character of the insurrectionary armies, or rather of the masses of armed citizens so called, led to many fatal errors of this kind. They were confident in their own numbers and courage, in proportion to their ignorance of the superiority which discipline, the possession of cavalry and artillery, and the power of executing combined and united movements, must always bestow upon regular forces. They were also impatient of the miseries necessarily brought upon the country by a protracted and systematic war of mere defence, and not less unwilling to bear the continued privations to which they themselves were exposed. On some occasions, opposition on the part of their officers to their demand of being led against the enemy, to put an end, as they hoped, to the war, by one brave blow, was construed into cowardice or treachery; and falling under the suspicion of either, was a virtual sentence of death to the suspected person. Sometimes, also, these insurrectionary bodies were forced to a general action, which they would willingly have avoided, either by want of provisions, with which they were indifferently supplied at all times, or by the superior manoeuvres of a skilful enemy. In most of the actions which took place from these various causes, the French discipline effectually prevailed over the undisciplined courage of the insurgents, and the patriots were defeated with severe loss.

On these occasions, the cruelty of the conquerors too frequently sullied their victory, and materially injured the cause in which it was gained. Affecting to consider the Spaniards, who appeared in arms to oppose a foreign yoke and an intrusive king, as rebels taken in the fact, the prisoners who fell into the hands of the French were subjected to military execution; and the villages where they had met with opposition were delivered up to the licentious fury of the soldier, who spared neither sex nor age. The French perhaps remembered, that some such instances of sanguinary severity, in the commencement of the Italian campaigns, had compelled the insurgents of Lombardy to lay down their arms, and secured the advantages which Napoleon had gained by the defeat of the Austrian forces. But in Spain the result was extremely different. Every atrocity of this kind was a new injury to be avenged, and was resented as such by

a nation at no time remarkable for forgiveness of wrongs. The sick, the wounded, the numerous stragglers of the French army, were, when they fell into the hands of the Spaniards, which frequently happened, treated with the utmost barbarity; and this retaliation hardening the heart, and inflaming the passions of either party, as they suffered by it in turn, the war assumed a savage, bloody, and atrocious character, which seemed to have for its object not the subjection, but the extermination of the vanquished.

The character of the country, very unfavourable to the French mode of supporting their troops at the expense of the districts through which they marched, added to the inveteracy of the struggle. Some parts of Spain are no doubt extremely fertile, but there are also immense tracts of barren plains, or unproductive mountains, which afford but a scanty support to the inhabitants themselves, and are totally inadequate to supply the additional wants of an invading army. In such districts the marauders, to be successful in their task of collecting provisions, had to sweep a large tract of country on each side of the line of march,—an operation the more difficult and dangerous, that though the principal high-roads through Spain are remarkably good, yet the lateral communications connecting them with the countries which they traverse are of the worst possible description, and equally susceptible of being defended by posts, protected by ambuscades, or altogether broken up, and rendered impervious to an invader. Hence it was long since said by Henry IV., that if a general invaded Spain with a small army, he must be defeated—if with a large one, he must be starved; and the gigantic undertaking of Bonaparte appeared by no means unlikely to fail, either from the one or the other reason.

At the first movement of the French columns into the provinces which were in insurrection, victory seemed everywhere to follow the invaders. Lefebvre Desnoettes defeated the Spaniards in Arragon on the 9th of June; General Bessières beat the insurgents in many partial actions in the same month, kept Navarre and Biscay in subjection, and overawed the insurgents in Old Castile. These, however, were but petty advantages, compared to that which he obtained, in a pitched battle, over two united armies of the Spaniards, consisting of the forces of Castile and Leon, joined to those of Galicia.

The first of these armies was commanded by Coesta, described, by Southey, as a brave old man, energetic, hasty, and headstrong, in whose resolute, untractable, and decided temper, the elements of the Spanish character were strongly marked. His army was full of zeal, but in other respects in such a state of insubordination, that they had recently murdered one of the general officers against whom they harboured some rashly adopted suspicions of treachery. The Galician army was in the same disorderly condition; and they also had publicly torn to pieces their general, Filangieri, upon no further apparent cause of suspicion than that he had turned his thoughts rather to defensive than offensive operations. Blake, a good soldier, who enjoyed the

confidence of the army, but whose military talents were not of the first order, succeeded Filangieri in his dangerous command, and having led his Galician levies to form a junction with Coesta, they now proceeded together towards Burgos. The two generals differed materially in opinion. Coesta, though he had previously suffered a defeat from the French near Cabezon, was for hazarding the event of a battle, moved probably by the difficulty of keeping together and maintaining their disorderly forces; while Blake, dreading the superiority of the French discipline, deprecated the risk of a general action. Bessières left them no choice on the subject. He came upon them, when posted near Medina del Rio Secco, where, on the 14th July, the combined armies of Galicia and Castile received the most calamitous defeat which the Spaniards had yet sustained. The patriots fought most bravely, and it was said more than twenty thousand slain were buried on the field of battle.

Napoleon received the news of this victory with exultation. "It is," he said, "the battle of Villa Viciosa. Bessières has put the crown on Joseph's head. The Spaniards," he added, "have now perhaps fifteen thousand men left, with some old blockhead at their head;—the resistance of the Peninsula is ended." In fact the victory of Medina del Rio Secco made the way open for Joseph to advance from Vittoria to Madrid, where he arrived without molestation. He entered the capital in state, but without receiving any popular greetings, save what the municipal authorities found themselves compelled to offer. The money which was scattered amongst the populace was picked up by the French alone, and by the French alone were the theatres filled which had been thrown open to the public in honour of their new prince.

In the meantime, however, the advantages obtained by Bessières in Castile seemed fast in the course of being outbalanced by the losses which the French sustained in the other provinces. Duhesme with those troops which had so treacherously possessed themselves of Barcelona and Figueras, seems, at the outset, to have entertained little doubt of being able, not only to maintain himself in Catalonia, but even to send troops to assist in the subjugation of Valencia and Arragon. But the Catalonians are, and have always been, a warlike people, addicted to the use of the gun, and naturally disposed, like the Tyrolese, to act as sharpshooters. Undismayed by several partial losses, they made good the strong mountain-pass of Bruch and other defiles, and, after various actions, compelled the French general to retreat towards Barcelona, with a loss both of men and character.

An expedition undertaken by Marshal Moncey against Valencia was marked with deeper disaster. He obtained successes, indeed, over the insurgents as he advanced towards the city; but when he ventured an attack on the place itself, in hopes of carrying it by a sudden effort, he was opposed by all the energy of a general popular defence. The citizens rushed to man the walls,—the monks, with a sword in one hand and a crucifix in the other, encouraged them to fight, in the name of God and their king,—the very women mingled in the combat,

bringing ammunition and refreshments to the combatants. Every attempt to penetrate into the city was found unavailing; and Moncey, disappointed of meeting with the reinforcements which Duhesme was to have dispatched him from Barcelona, was obliged to abandon his enterprise, and to retreat, not without being severely harassed, towards the main French army, which occupied Old and New Castile.

It was not common in Napoleon's wars for his troops and generals to be thus disconcerted, foiled, and obliged to abandon a purpose which they had adopted. But a worse and more decisive fate was to attend the division of Dupont, than the disappointments and losses which Duhesme had experienced in Catalonia, and Moncey before Valencia.

So early as Murat's first occupation of Madrid, he had dispatched Dupont, an officer of high reputation, towards Cadiz, of which he named him governor. This attempt to secure that important city, and protect the French fleet which lay in its harbours, seems to have been judged by Napoleon premature, probably because he was desirous to leave the passage open for Charles IV. to have made his escape from Cadiz to South America, in case he should so determine. Dupont's march, therefore, was countermanded, and he remained stationary at Toledo, until the disposition of the Andalusians, and of the inhabitants of Cadiz, showing itself utterly inimical to the French, he once more received orders to advance at all risk, and secure that important seaport, with the French squadron which was lying there. The French general moved forward accordingly, traversed the chain of wild mountains called Sierra Morena, which the tale of Cervantes has rendered classical, forced the passage of the river Guadalquivir at the bridge of Arcolea, advanced to, and subdued the ancient town of Cordova.

Dupont had thus reached the frontiers of Andalusia; but the fate of Cadiz was already decided. That rich commercial city had embraced the patriotic cause, and the French squadron was in the hands of the Spaniards; Seville was in complete insurrection, and its Junta, the most active in the kingdom of Spain, were organizing large forces, and adding them daily to a regular body of ten thousand men, under General Castanos, which had occupied the camp of St Roque, near Gibraltar.

If Dupont had ventured onward in the state in which matters were, he would have rushed on too unequal odds. On the other hand, his situation at Cordova, and in the neighbourhood, was precarious. He was divided from the main French army by the Sierra Morena, the passes of which were infested, and might almost be said to be occupied, by the insurgent mountaineers; and he was exposed to be attacked by the Andalusian army, so soon as their general might think them adequate to the task. Dupont solicited reinforcements, therefore, as well from Portugal as from the French army in the Castiles; such reinforcements being absolutely necessary, not merely to his advancing into Andalusia, but to his keeping his ground, or even effecting a safe retreat. Junot, who commanded in Portugal, occupied at once by the insurrection of the natives of that country, and by the threatened descent of the English,

was, as we shall hereafter see, in no situation to spare Dupont the succours he desired. But two brigades, under Generals Vedel and Gobert, joined Dupont from Castile, after experiencing some loss of rather an ominous character, for it could neither be returned nor avenged, from the armed peasantry of the Sierra.

These reinforcements augmented Dupont's division to twenty thousand men, a force which was thought adequate to strike a decisive blow in Andalusia, providing Castanos could be brought to hazard a general action. Dupont accordingly put himself in motion, occupied Baylen and La Carolina in Andalusia, and took by storm the old Moorish town of Jaen. The sagacious old Spanish general had in the meantime been bringing his new levies into order, and the French, after they had possessed themselves of Jaen, were surprised to find themselves attacked there with great vigour and by superior forces, which compelled them, after a terrible resistance, to evacuate the place and retire to Baylen. From thence, Dupont wrote dispatches to Savary at Madrid, stating the difficulties of his situation. His men, he said, had no supplies of bread, save from the corn which they reaped, grinded, and baked with their own hands—the peasants, who were wont to perform the country labour, had left their harvest-work to take up arms—the insurgents were becoming daily more audacious—they were assuming the offensive, and strong reinforcements were necessary to enable him either to maintain his ground, or do anything considerable to annoy the enemy. These dispatches fell into the hands of Castanos, who acted upon the information they afforded.

On the 16th July, two large divisions of the Spaniards attacked the French on different points, and, dislodging them from Baylen, drove them back on Menjibar; while Castanos, at the head of a large force, overawed Dupont, and prevented his moving to the assistance of his generals of brigade, one of whom, Gobert, was killed in the action. On the night of the 18th, another battle commenced, by an attempt on the part of the French to recover Baylen. The troops on both sides fought desperately, but the Spaniards, conscious that succours were at no great distance, made good their defence of the village. The action continued the greater part of the day, when, after an honourable attempt to redeem the victory, by a desperate charge at the head of all his forces, Dupont found himself defeated on all points, and so inclosed by the superior force of the Spaniards, as rendered his retreat impossible. He had no resource except capitulation. He was compelled to surrender himself, and the troops under his immediate command, prisoners of war. But, for the division of Vedel, which had not been engaged, and was less hard pressed than the other, it was stipulated, that they should be sent back to France in Spanish vessels. This part of the convention of Baylen was afterwards broken by the Spaniards, and the whole of the French army were detained close prisoners. They were led to this act of bad faith, partly by an opinion that the French generals had been too cunning for Castanos in the conditions they obtained,—partly from the false idea, that the perfidy with which they had acted towards Spain

dispensed with the obligations of keeping terms with them,—and partly at the instigation of Morla, the successor of the unhappy Solano, who scrupled not to recommend to his countrymen that sacrifice of honour to interest, which he himself afterwards practised, in abandoning the cause of his country for that of the intrusive king.

The battle and subsequent capitulation of Baylen was in itself a very great disaster, the most important which had befallen the French arms since the star of Bonaparte arose,—the *furca Caudina*, as he himself called it, of his military history. More than three thousand Frenchmen had been lost in the action,—seventeen thousand had surrendered themselves,—Andalusia, the richest part of Spain, was freed from the French armies,—and the wealthy cities of Seville and Cadiz had leisure to employ a numerous force of trained population, and their treasures, in support of the national cause. Accordingly the tidings which Napoleon received while at Bordeaux, filled him with an agitation similar to that of the Roman Emperor, when he demanded from Varus his lost legions. But the grief and anxiety of Bonaparte was better founded than that of Augustus. The latter lost only soldiers, whose loss might be supplied; but the battle of Baylen dissolved that idea of invincibility attached to Napoleon and his fortunes, which, like a talisman, had so often palsied the councils and disabled the exertions of his enemies, who felt, in opposing him, as if they were predestined victims, struggling against the dark current of destiny itself. The whole mystery, too, and obscurity, in which Bonaparte had involved the affairs of Spain, concealing the nature of the interest which he held in that kingdom, and his gigantic plan of annexing it to his empire, were at once dispelled. The tidings of Dupont's surrender operated like a whirlwind on the folds of a torpid mist, and showed to all Europe, what Napoleon most desired to conceal,—that he was engaged in a national conflict of a kind so doubtful, that it had commenced by a very great loss on the side of France; and that he was thus engaged purely by his own unprincipled ambition. That his armies could be defeated, and brought to the necessity of surrendering, was now evident to Spain and to Europe. The former gathered courage to persist in an undertaking so hopelessly begun, while nations, now under the French domination, caught hope for themselves while they watched the struggle; and the spell being broken which had rendered them submissive to their fate, they cherished the prospect of speedily emulating the contest, which they at present only witnessed.

Yet were these inspiring consequences of the victory of Castanos attended with some counterbalancing inconveniences, both as the event affected the Spaniards themselves, and the other nations of Europe. It fostered in the ranks of Spain their national vice, an excess of presumption and confidence in their own valour; useful, perhaps, so far as it gives animation in the moment of battle, but most hazardous when it occasions inattention to the previous precautions which are always necessary to secure victory, and which were so often neglected in the Spanish armies. In short, while the success at Baylen induced the Spaniards to reject the advice of experi-

ence and skill, when to follow it might have seemed to entertain a doubt of the fortunes of Spain, it encouraged also the most unreasonable expectations in the other countries of Europe, and especially in Great Britain, where men's wishes in a favourite cause are so easily converted into hopes. Without observing the various concurrences of circumstances which had contributed to the victory of Baylen, they considered it as a scene which might easily be repeated elsewhere, whenever the Spaniards should display the same energy; and thus, because the patriots had achieved one great and difficult task, they expected from them on all occasions, not miracles only, but sometimes even impossibilities. When these unreasonable expectations were found groundless, the politicians who had entertained them were so much chagrined and disappointed, that, hurrying into the opposite extreme, they became doubtful either of the zeal of the Spanish nation in the cause for which they were fighting, or their power of maintaining an effectual resistance. And thus, to use the scriptural phrase, the love of many waxed cold, and men of a desponding spirit were inclined to wish the aid of Britain withdrawn from a contest which they regarded as hopeless, and that those supplies should be discontinued, on which its maintenance in a great measure depended.

The event of Baylen was not known at Madrid till eight or ten days after it had taken place; but when it arrived, Joseph Bonaparte, the intrusive king, plainly saw that the capital was no longer a safe residence for him, and prepared for his retreat. He generously gave leave to the individuals composing his administration, either to follow his fortunes, or to take the national side, if they preferred it; and, leaving Madrid, again retired to Vittoria, where, secured by a French garrison, and at no great distance from the frontier, he might in safety abide the events of the war.

Another memorable achievement of the Spanish conflict, which served perhaps better than even the victory of Baylen to evince the character of the resistance offered to the French, was the immortal defence of Zaragossa, the capital of Arragon. This ancient city was defenceless, excepting for the old Gothic, or Roman, or Moorish wall, of ten feet high, by which it is surrounded, and which is in most places a mere curtain, without flankers or returning angles of any kind. Its garrison consisted chiefly of the citizens of the place; and its governor, a young nobleman, called Don Joseph Palafox, who was chosen captain-general because he happened to be in the vicinity, had hitherto been only distinguished by the share he had taken in the frivolous gaieties of the court. The city thus possessing no important advantages of defence, and the French general in Arragon, Lefebvre Desnouettes, having defeated such of the insurgents as had shown themselves in the field, he conceived he had only to advance in security of occupying the capital of the province. But there never was on earth a defence in which the patriotic courage of the defenders sustained so long, and baffled so effectually, the assaults of an enemy provided with all those military advantages, of which they themselves were totally destitute.

On the 15th of June, the French attempted to carry the place by a *coup-de-main*, in which they failed with great loss. On the 27th, reinforced and supplied with a train of mortars, they made a more regular effort, and succeeded in getting possession of a suburb called the Terrero. They then began to invest the place more closely, showered bombs on its devoted edifices, and amid the conflagration, occasioned by these missiles of destruction, attempted to force the gates of the city at different points. All the Zaragossians rushed to man their defences—condition, age, even sex, made no difference; the monks fought abreast with the laity, and several women showed more than masculine courage.

Lefebvre was incensed by a defence of a place which, according to all common rules, was untenable. He forgot the rules of war in his turn, and exposed his troops to immense loss by repeatedly attempting to carry the place at the bayonet's point. Meanwhile ammunition ran scarce—but the citizens contrived to manufacture gunpowder in considerable quantities. Famine came—its pressure was submitted to. Sickness thinned the ranks of the defenders—those who survived willingly performed the duty of the absent. It was in vain that the large convent of Santa Engracia, falling into the hands of the besiegers, enabled them to push their posts into the town itself. The French general announced this success in a celebrated summons:—"Santa Engracia—Capitulation." "Zaragossa—war to the knife's blade," was the equally laconic answer. The threat was made good—the citizens fought from street to street, from house to house, from chamber to chamber—the contending parties often occupied different apartments of the same house—the passages which connected them were choked with dead. After this horrid contest had continued for several weeks, the gallant defence of Zaragossa excited at once the courage and sympathy of those who shared the sentiments of its heroic garrison and citizens, and a considerable reinforcement was thrown into the place in the beginning of August. After this the citizens began to gain ground in all their skirmishes with the invaders; the news of Dupont's surrender became publicly known, and Lefebvre, on the 13th of August, judged it most prudent to evacuate the quarter of the city which he possessed. He blew up the church of Santa Engracia, and set fire to several of the houses which he had gained, and finally retreated from the city which had so valiantly resisted his arms.

The spirit of indomitable courage which the Spaniards manifested on this occasion has perhaps no equal in history, excepting the defence of Numantium by their ancestors. It served, even more than the victory of Baylen, to extend hope and confidence in the patriotic cause; and the country which had produced such men as Palafox and his followers was, with much show of probability, declared unconquerable.

It is now necessary to trace the effects which this important revolution produced, as well in England, as in the Portuguese part of the Peninsula.

CHAPTER LXIII.

Zeal of Britain with regard to the Spanish struggle—It is resolved to send an expedition to Portugal.—Retrospect of what had passed in that country.—Portuguese Assembly of Notables summoned to Bayonne—Their singular audience of Bonaparte.—Effects of the Spanish success on Portugal.—Sir Arthur Wellesley—His character as a general.—Dispatched at the head of the expedition to Portugal.—Attacks and defeats the French at Roleia.—The insurrection becomes wide and general.—Battle and victory of Vimeira.—Sir Harry Burrard Neale assumes the command, and frustrates the results proposed by Sir Arthur Wellesley from the battle.—Sir Harry Burrard is superseded by Sir Hew Dalrymple; so that the British army has three generals within twenty-four hours.—Convention of Cintra—Its unpopularity in England—A Court of Inquiry is held.

THERE is nothing more praiseworthy in the British, or rather in the English character,—for it is they who in this respect give tone to the general feelings of the other two British nations,—than the noble candour with which, laying aside all petty and factitious considerations, they have at all times united in the same spring-tide of sentiment, when the object in question was in itself heart-stirring and generous. At no time was this union of sentiment more universally felt and expressed, than when the news became general through Britain that the Spanish nation, the victim of an unparalleled process of treachery, had resolved to break through the toils by which they were inclosed, and vindicate their national independence at the hazard of their lives. "The war," says the elegant historian,* to whose labours we are so much indebted in this part of our subject, "assumed a higher and holier character, and men looked to the issue with faith as well as hope." Both these were the brighter that they seemed to have arisen out of the midnight of scepticism, concerning the existence of public spirit in Spain.

It became the universal wish of Britain, to afford the Spaniards every possible assistance in their honourable struggle. Sheridan declared, that the period had arrived for striking a decisive blow for the liberation of Europe; and another distinguished member of opposition, having expressed himself with more reserve on the subject, found it necessary to explain, that in doing so he disclaimed the thoughts of abandoning the heroic Spaniards to their fate. But it was with particular interest that all lovers of their country listened to the manly declaration of Mr Canning, in which, disclaiming the false and petty policy which made an especial object of what were called peculiarly British interests, he pledged himself, and the administration to which he belonged, for pursuing such measures as might insure Spanish success, because it was that which, considering the cause in which he was embarked, comprehended the essential interest not of England only, but of the world. The resolution to support Spain through the struggle, founded as it was on this broad and generous basis, met the universal approbation of the country.

It remained only to inquire in what shape the

* Southey's *History of the Peninsular War*, vol. I, p. 346.

succours of Britain should be invested, in order to render them most advantageous to the cause of Spanish independence. Most Spaniards seemed to concur with the deputies, who had been hastily dispatched to England by the Junta of the Asturias, in declining the assistance of an auxiliary army; "of men," they said, "Spain had more than enough." Arms, ammunition, and clothing, were sent, therefore, with a liberal and unsparing profusion; and military officers of skill and experience were dispatched, to assist where their services could be useful to the insurgents. The war with Spain was declared at an end, and the Spanish prisoners, freed from confinement, clothed, and regaled at the expense of the English, were returned to their country in a sort of triumph.

The conduct of the Spaniards in declining the aid of British troops, partly perhaps arose out of that overweening confidence which has been elsewhere noted as their great national foible, and might be partly justified by the difficulty of combining the operations of a body of native insurgents with regular forces, consisting of foreigners, professing a different religion, and speaking another language. These objections, however, did not apply with the same force to Portugal, where the subjected state of the country did not permit their national pride, though not inferior to that of the Spaniards, to assume so high a tone; and where, from long alliance, the English, in despite of their being foreigners and heretics, were ever regarded with favour. It was, therefore, resolved to send an expedition, consisting of a considerable body of troops, to assist in the emancipation of Portugal, an operation for which the progress of the Spanish insurrection rendered the time favourable.

We left Portugal under the provisional command of General Junot, described by Napoleon himself as one whose vanity was only equalled by his rapacity, and who conducted himself like a tyrant over the unresisting natives, from whom he levied the most intolerable exactions.

There is no access to know in what manner Napoleon intended to dispose of this ancient kingdom. The partition treaty executed at Fontainebleau, which had been made the pretext of occupying Portugal, had never been in reality designed to regulate its destinies, and was neglected on all sides, as much as if it never had existed. Bonaparte subsequently seems to have entertained some idea of new-modeling the kingdom, which caused him to summon together at Bayonne a Diet, or Assembly of Portuguese Notables, in order to give an ostensible authority to the change which he was about to introduce.

They met him there, according to the summons; and, although their proceedings had no material consequences, yet, as narrated by the Abbé de Pradt, who was present on the occasion, they form too curious an illustration of Bonaparte's mind and manner to be omitted in this place. Having heard with indifference an address pronounced by the Count de Lima, an ancient Portuguese noble, who was president of the deputation, Napoleon opened the business in this light and desultory way:—"I hardly know what to make of you, gentlemen—it must

depend on the events in Spain. And then, are you of consequence sufficient to constitute a separate people?—have you enough of size to do so? Your prince has let himself be carried off to the Brazils by the English—he has committed a great piece of folly, and he will not be long in repenting of it. A prince," he added, turning gaily to the Abbé de Pradt, "is like a bishop—he ought to reside within his charge."—Then again speaking to the Count de Lima, he asked what was the population of Portugal, answering, at the same time, his own question, "Two millions, is it?"

"More than three, sire," replied the count.

"Ah—I did not know that—And Lisbon—Are there one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants?"

"More than double that number, sire."

"Ah—I was not aware of that."

Proceeding through several questions regarding matters in which his information did not seem more accurate, he at length approached the prime subject of the conference. "What do you wish to be, you Portuguese?" he said. "Do you desire to become Spaniards?" This question, even from Napoleon, roused the whole pride of the Portuguese; for it is well known with what ill-will and jealousy they regard the sister-country of the Peninsula, against whom they have so long preserved their independence. The Count de Lima drew up his person to its full height, laid his hand on his sword, and answered the insulting demand by a loud No, which resounded through the whole apartment. Bonaparte was not offended, but rather amused by this trait of national character. He broke up the meeting without entering farther on the business for which it was summoned together, and afterwards told those about his person, that the Count de Lima had treated him with a superb No. He even showed some personal favour to that high-spirited nobleman, but proceeded no farther in his correspondence with the Portuguese deputies. The whole scene is curious, as serving to show how familiar the transference of allegiance, and alienation of sovereignty, was become to his mind, since, in the case of a kingdom like Portugal, of some importance, were even its ancient renown alone regarded, he could advance to the consideration of its future state with such imperfect knowledge of its circumstances, and so much levity both of manner and of purpose. Kingdoms had become the cards, which he shuffled and dealt at his pleasure, with all the indifference of a practised gamester. The occasion he had for the services of the Portuguese Assembly of Notables passed away, and the deputies of whom it had consisted were sent to Bordeaux, where they resided in neglect and poverty until the general peace permitted them to return to Portugal.

Some hints in Bonaparte's letter to Murât, formerly quoted, might induce one to believe that the crown of the house of Braganza was meant to be transferred to his brows; but he obtained that of Naples, and the fate of Portugal continued undetermined, when the consequences of the Spanish revolution seemed about to put it beyond the influence of Napoleon.

A movement so general as the revolution effected in Spain through all her provinces, could not fail to

have a sympathetic effect on the sister kingdom of Portugal, on whom the French yoke pressed so much more severely; not merely wounding the pride, and destroying the independence of the country, but leading to the plunder of its resources, and the maltreatment of the inhabitants. The spirit which animated the Spaniards soon showed itself among the Portuguese. Oporto, the second city in the kingdom, after a first attempt at insurrection, which the French, by aid of the timid local authorities, found themselves able to suppress, made a second effort with better success, expelled the French from the city and the adjacent country, and placed themselves under the command of a provisional junta, at the head of whom was the Bishop of Oporto. The kindling fire flew right and left in every direction; and at length, wherever the French did not possess a strong and predominating armed force, the country was in insurrection against them. This did not pass without much bloodshed. The French, under command of Loison, marched from the frontier fortress of Almeida, to suppress the insurrection at Oporto; but General Silveira, a Portuguese nobleman, who had put himself at the head of the armed population, managed so to harass the enemy's march, that he was compelled to abandon his intention, and return to Almeida, though his force amounted to four thousand men. At Beja, Leiria, Evora, and other places, the discipline of the French overcame the opposition of the citizens and peasantry; and, in order to strike terror, the bloody hand of military execution was extended against the unfortunate towns and districts. But the inhumanity of the victors only served to increase the numbers and the ferocity of their enemies. Men who had seen their houses burned, their vineyards torn up, their females violated, had no farther use of life save for revenge; and when either numbers, position, or other advantages, gave the Portuguese an opportunity, it was exercised with premeditated and relentless cruelty.

Had Junot been able to employ his full force against the insurgents, it is likely that in so narrow a country this miserable war might have been ended by the despotic efforts of irresistible military force. But the French general had apprehensions from another quarter, which obliged him to concentrate a considerable part of his army, that might otherwise have been disposable for the total subjugation of Portugal. Britain, long excluded from the Continent, had assumed, with regard to it, the attitude of the Grecian hero, who, with his lance pointed towards his enemy, surveys his armour of proof from head to foot, in hopes of discovering some rent or flaw, through which to deal a wound. Junot justly argued, that the condition of the Peninsula, more especially of Portugal, was such as to invite a descent on the part of the English. In fact, an expedition of ten thousand men had already sailed from Cork, and, what was of more importance than if the force had been trebled, it was placed under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, a younger son of the Earl of Mornington, one of those gifted individuals, upon whom the fate of the world seems to turn like a gate upon its hinges, or as a vessel is managed by its rudder.

In India, Sir Arthur Wellesley had seen and conducted war upon a large and extended scale, of which no general officer in the European army of England had much comprehension, at least much experience. He was well acquainted with the best mode of supplying armies while in the field. His thoughts had been familiarly exercised in the task of combining grand general movements over extended regions, and his natural genius, deducing the principles of war from the service which he had seen in the East, qualified him to apply them to other countries, and to an enemy of a different description. Formidable in his preparations for battle, and successful in the action itself, he was even more distinguished by the alertness and sagacity which never rested satisfied with a useless victory, but improved to the uttermost the advantages which he had attained, by his own masterly dispositions, and the valour of his troops. His mind was never entirely engrossed by the passing event, how absorbing soever its importance; the past and the future were alike before him; and the deductions derived from a consideration of the whole were combined, in all their bearings, with a truth and simplicity, which seemed the work of intuition, rather than the exercise of judgment. In fact, the mind of this singular and distinguished man seemed inaccessible to those false and delusive views which mislead ordinary thinkers, his strength of judgment rejected them, as some soils will not produce noxious weeds; and it might be said of him, that on subjects to which he gave his attention, the opinions which he formed approached, perhaps, as near the perfection of human reason as the fallibility of our nature will permit.

To this prescience of intellect, in itself so rare a quality, was added a decision, which, when his resolution was once formed, enabled Sir Arthur Wellesley to look to the event with a firmness, inaccessible to all the doubts and vacillations to which minds of the highest resolution have been found accessible in arduous circumstances, but which are sure to impair the energy, and exhaust the spirits of others. A frame fitted to endure every species of fatigue and privation, and capable of supplying the want of regular repose by hasty and brief slumbers, snatched as occasion permitted, together with a power of vision uncommonly acute, may be mentioned as tending to complete the qualities of Sir Arthur Wellesley for the extraordinary part to which Providence had destined him. It may be added, that in precision of thought, sagacity of judgment, promptness of decision, and firmness of resolution, there was a considerable resemblance betwixt Napoleon and the English general, destined to be his great rival; and that the characters of both serve to show that the greatest actions are performed, and the greatest objects attained, not by men who are gifted with any rare and singular peculiarities of talent, but by those in whom the properties of judgment, firmness, power of calculation, and rapidity in execution, which ordinary men possess in an ordinary degree, are carried to the highest and most uncommon degree of perfection.

Sir Arthur Wellesley's qualities were well known in India, where, in the brilliant campaign of Assaye,

he defeated the whole force of the Mahrattas, and ended triumphantly a long and doubtful war. The following expressions, on his leaving India, occur in the familiar letter of an excellent judge of human character, and who, it is to be hoped, lives to take a natural and just pride in the event of his own prophecy:—"You seem," he wrote to his European correspondent, "to be at a loss for generals in England. There is one now returning from India, who, if you can overcome the objections of precedence and length of service, and place him at once at the head of the British army, is capable of saving England at least, if not Europe, from the dangers which seem thickening around you."—Most fortunately for England, and for Europe, the objections which might have obstructed the rise of another officer in like circumstances, did not operate against Sir Arthur Wellesley in the same degree. His brother, the Marquis Wellesley, distinguished by the talents which had governed and extended our empire in India, had already much interest in our domestic councils, in which, some months afterwards, he held an eminent place.

He was selected at this important crisis to go as ambassador plenipotentiary to Spain, as one on whose wisdom and experience the utmost reliance could be reposed. The Marquis was of course well acquainted with Sir Arthur's talents; and, conscious that in urging his brother's pretensions to high employment in his profession, he was preparing for the arms of Great Britain every chance of the most distinguished success, he requested his assistance as the hand to execute the counsels, which were, in a great measure, to emanate from himself as the head.

The army and the public had become acquainted with Sir Arthur's merits during the brief campaign of Copenhagen,—his name already inspired hope and confidence into the country,—and when the brother of the Marquis Wellesley received the command of the expedition destined for the Peninsula, none bated that the selection had been made from undue partiality; and subsequent events soon taught the nation, not only that the confidence, so far as reposed in Sir Arthur Wellesley, was perfectly just, but that it ought, in wisdom, to have been much more absolute.

Under these auspices the expedition set sail for the Peninsula, and, touching at Corunna, received such news as determined Sir Arthur Wellesley to select Portugal as the scene of his operations, being the point upon which success seemed most likely to influence the general cause. He opened a communication with Oporto, and soon learned the important news of the defeat of Dupont, and the flight of the intrusive king from Madrid. These tidings were of particular importance, because the consequences were likely to find full occupation in Spain for the victorious army of Bessières, which, if left disengaged, might have entered Portugal, and co-operated with Junot. At the same time, a body of British troops, which had been destined to support Castanos, was left disposable by the surrender of Baylen, and, having embarked for Portugal, now joined Sir Arthur Wellesley. Lastly, came the important intelligence, that Sir Arthur's army was to be rein-

forced immediately with fifteen thousand men, and that Sir Hew Dalrymple was to command in chief. This officer was governor of Gibraltar, and, during the Spanish insurrection, had acted both with wisdom and energy in assisting, advising, and encouraging the patriots; but it is doing him no injury to say, that he does not appear to have had the uncommon combination of talents, both military and political, which, in the present crisis, the situation of commander-in-chief in Portugal peremptorily demanded.

Assured of these succours, Sir Arthur Wellesley disembarked his army in Mondego Bay, and advanced towards Leiria by the sea-coast, for the sake of communicating with the fleet, from which they received their provisions. The French generals Laborde and Thomières, were detached from Lisbon to check the progress of the invaders, and Loison, moving from the Alentejo, was in readiness to form a junction with his countrymen. In the meantime, a tumultuary Portuguese army of insurgents, commanded by General Freire, an unreasonable and capricious man (who afterwards lost his life under strong suspicions of treachery to the patriot cause), first incommoded the British general by extravagant pretensions, and finally altogether declined to co-operate with him. A general of an ordinary character might not unreasonably have been so far disgusted with the conduct of those whom he had come to assist, as to feel diminished zeal in a cause which seemed to be indifferent to its natural defenders. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, distinguished as much by his knowledge of mankind as his military talents, knew how to make allowance for the caprice of an individual called suddenly to a command, for which perhaps his former life had not fitted him, and for the ebb and flow of national spirit in the ranks of an insurgent population. He knew that victory over the French was necessary to obtain the confidence of the Portuguese; and, with an alertness and activity which had prevented the junction of Loison with Laborde, he pushed on to attack (17th August) the latter French general, where he waited the approach of his colleague in a strong position near the town of Roleia. Attacking at once in front and upon the flank, he drove them from their ground, and his victory formed the first permanent and available success obtained by the British army in the eventful Peninsular struggle. Laborde retreated upon Torres Vedras, on which Loison had also directed his course.

The Portuguese insurrection became wide, and general on flank and rear, and Junot saw little chance of extinguishing the conflagration, unless he should be able to defeat the English general in a pitched battle. For this purpose he withdrew all the French garrisons except from Lisbon itself, Elvas, Almeida, and Peniche; and, collecting his whole forces at Vimeira, near Torres Vedras, determined there to abide the shock of war.

In the meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley had been joined by a part of the promised succours; who, disembarking with difficulty on the dangerous coast, formed a junction with the main body as they marched towards the enemy. It was not an equally fortunate circumstance, that Sir Harry Burrard

Neale, an officer of superior rank, also appeared on the coast, and communicated with Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter explained his plan of engaging the French army, and throwing it back on Lisbon, where an insurrection would instantly have taken place in their rear, and thus Portugal might have been delivered by a single blow. But Sir Harry Burrard, though a brave officer, does not appear to have had that confidence in the British soldiery which they so well deserve at the hands of their leaders. He recommended a defensive system until the arrival of the succours from England; neither seeing how much, in war, depends upon a sudden and powerful effort, nor considering that the French of all men can best employ, to their own advantage, whatever leisure may be allowed them by the timidity or indecision of their enemy.

At this time, however, the difficulties of Junot's situation had determined him on the hazard of a general action; and the armies being already very near each other, the only change occasioned in the course of events by the interposition of the lately arrived British general, was, that Sir Arthur Wellesley, instead of being the assailant, as he had proposed, was, on the memorable 21st August, himself attacked by Junot near the town of Vimeira. The British army amounted to about 16,000 men, but of these not above one half were engaged; the French consisted of about 14,000, all of whom were brought into action. The French attacked in two divisions; that on the left, commanded by Laborde, about five thousand men, and that on the right, under Loison, considerably stronger. The centre, or reserve, was commanded by Kellermann, occupied the space between the attacking divisions, and served to connect them with each other. The battle was interesting to military men, as forming a remarkable example of that peculiar mode of tactics by which the French troops had so often broken through and disconcerted the finest troops of the Continent, and also of the manner in which their impetuous valour might be foiled and rendered unavailing, by a steady, active, and resolute enemy.

The favourite mode of attack by the French was, we have often noticed, by formation into massive columns, the centre and rear of which give the head no opportunity to pause, but thrust the leading files headlong forward on the thin line of enemies opposed to them, which are necessarily broken through, as unequal to sustain the weight of the charging body. In this manner, and in full confidence of success, General Laborde in person, heading a column of better than two thousand men, rushed on the British advanced guard, consisting of the 50th regiment, with some field-pieces, and a single company of sharpshooters. The regiment, about 400 men in number, drawn up in line on the brow of a hill, presented an obstacle so little formidable to the heavy column which came against them, that it seemed the very noise of their approach should have driven them from the ground. But Colonel Walker, suddenly altering the formation of his regiment, so as to place its line obliquely on the flank of the advancing column, instead of remaining parallel to it, opened a terrible, well-sustained, and irresistible fire, where every ball passing through

the dense array of the enemy, made more than one victim, and where the close discharge of grape-shot was still more fatal. This heavy and destructive fire was immediately seconded by a charge with the bayonet, by which the column, unable to form or to deploy, received on their defenceless flank, and among their shattered ranks, the attack of the handful of men whom they had expected at once to sweep from their course. The effect was instantaneous and irresistible; and the French, who had hitherto behaved with the utmost steadiness, broke their ranks and ran, leaving near three-fourths of their number in killed, wounded, and prisoners.* The same sort of close combat was general over the field. The brigade of General Fergusson, on the right, was attacked by General Loison with an impetuosity and vigour not inferior to that of Laborde. A mutual charge of bayonets took place; and here, as at Maida, the French advanced, indeed, bravely to the shock, but lost heart at the moment of the fatal encounter. To what else can we ascribe the undeniable fact, that their whole front rank, amounting to three hundred grenadiers, lay stretched on the ground almost in a single instant?

The French were now in full retreat on all sides. They had abandoned their artillery,—they were flying in confusion,—the battle was won,—the victor had only to stretch forth his hand to grasp the full fruits of conquest. Sir Arthur Wellesley had determined to move one part of his army on Torres Vedras, so as to get between the French and the nearest road to Lisbon, while with another division he followed the chase of the beaten army, to whom thus no retreat on Lisbon would remain, but by a circuitous route through a country in a state of insurrection. Unhappily, Sir Arthur Wellesley's period of command was for the present ended. Sir Harry Burrard had landed during the action, and had with due liberality declined taking any command until the battle seemed to be over; when it unhappily occurred to him, in opposition to the remonstrances of Sir Arthur Wellesley, General Fergusson, and other general officers, to interpose his authority for the purpose of prohibiting farther pursuit. He accounted such a measure incautions where the enemy was superior in cavalry, and perhaps entertained too sensitive a feeling of the superiority of French tactics. Thus Vimeira, in its direct consequences, seemed to be only another example of a victory gained by the English without any corresponding results; one of those numerous instances, in which the soldiers gain the battle from confidence in their own hearts and arms, and the general fails to improve it, perhaps from an equally just diffidence of his own skill and talents.

Meanwhile Sir Hew Dalrymple, arriving from Gibraltar in a frigate, superseded Sir Harry Burrard, as Sir Harry had superseded Sir Arthur; and thus, within twenty-four hours, the English army had successively three commanders-in-chief. The time of prosecuting the victory was passed away before

* After the capitulation of Cintra, General Loison desired to be introduced to Colonel Walker, and congratulated that officer on the steadiness and talent with which he had rendered the defence in line so decidedly superior to Napoleon's favourite measure, the attack in column.

Sir Hew Dalrymple came ashore,—for the French had been able to gain the position of Torres Vedras, from which it had been Sir Arthur Wellesley's chief object to exclude them. That general then knew well, as he afterwards showed to the world, what advantage might be taken of that position for the defence of Lisbon.

But Junot had suffered too severely in the battle of Vimeira, and had too many difficulties to contend with, to admit of his meditating an obstinate defence. The victorious British army was in his front,—the insurgents, encouraged by the event of the battle, were on his flanks,—the English fleet might operate in his rear,—and the populous town of Lisbon itself was not to be kept down without a great military force. Then if the successes in Andalusia were to be followed by similar events, the Spanish armies might invade Portugal, and co-operate with the English. Moved by these circumstances, the French general was induced to propose that evacuation of Portugal, its cities, and fortresses, which was afterwards concluded by the treaty of Cintra. The French, by the articles of that convention, were to be transported to their own country, with their arms, artillery, and property,—under which last article they carried off much of the plunder of which they had stripped the Portuguese. A Russian fleet in the Tagus, commanded by Admiral Siniavin, was delivered up to the English, in deposit, as it was termed; so unwilling were we to use towards Russia the language or practice of war, although the countries were in a state of avowed hostilities. In a military point of view, all the British generals concurred in approving of the convention. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who saw better, it may be supposed, than the others, how long the war might be protracted, after the favourable moment of victory had been permitted to pass without being improved, considered the liberation of Portugal, with its sea-coast, its ports, and its fortresses, besides the eastern line of frontier, which offered an easy communication with Spain, as an advantage of the highest importance, and cheaply purchased by the articles granted to Junot.

But the light in which the people of England saw the Convention of Cintra was extremely different. It is their nature to nurse extravagant hopes, and they are proportionally incensed when such are disappointed. The public were never more generally united in the reprobation of any measure; and although much of their resentment was founded in ignorance and prejudice, yet there were circumstances in the transaction which justified in some measure the general indignation. The succession of the three generals was compared to the playing of trump-cards at a game of whist, and, whether it was designed or fortuitous, had an air of indecision that was almost ludicrous. Then it was obvious, that the younger and inferior officer of the three had been prevented from following up the victory he had gained, and that this interference had rendered necessary the convention, which England seemed determined to consider as injurious to Portugal, and dishonourable to herself. A Court of Inquiry put the proceedings in a more just point of view for the two superior officers, whose error appeared in no degree to have exceeded

a mistake in judgment, the fruit of too much caution. But the fierce and loudly expressed resentment on the part of the public produced very important consequences; and though there occurred exceptions, it became comparatively difficult or dangerous, from that period, to propose any one as commander of an expedition whose talents had not pretensions to merit the confidence of the people.

CHAPTER LXIV.

Duplicity of Bonaparte on his return to Paris.—Official statements in the Moniteur—poor and humiliating.—Two reports issued by Champagny, minister of the foreign department—Difference betwixt them;—the second demanding another conscription of 80,000 men—Agreed to by the Senate.—Review of the French relations with the different powers of Europe.—Universal spirit of resistance throughout Germany—Russia.—Napoleon and Alexander meet at Erfurt on 27th September, and separate in apparent friendship on 14th October—Actual feelings of the autocrats—Their joint letter to the King of Great Britain, proposing a general peace on the principle of uti possidetis—Why rejected.—Proceedings in Spain.—Catalonia.—Return of La Romana to Spain. Armies of Blake, Castanos, and Palafox.—Expedition of General Moore—His desponding views of the Spanish cause—His plans.—Defeat of Blake—and Castanos.—Treachery of Morla.—Sir John Moore retreats to Corunna—Disasters on the march.—Battle of Corunna, and death of Sir John Moore.

DURING no part of his history did Bonaparte appear before the public in a meaner and more contemptible light, than immediately after the commencement of the Spanish revolution. In the deeper disasters of his life, the courage with which he struggled against misfortune, gave to his failing efforts the dignity of sinking greatness; but, on the present occasion, he appeared before France and before Europe, in the humiliating condition of one who had been tempted by selfish greed to commit a great crime, from which he had derived the full harvest of ignominy, without an iota of the expected profit. On the contrary, blinded by the unconscionable desire of acquisition, he had shown himself as short-sighted concerning results, as he was indifferent respecting means. In this, as in other memorable instances, iniquity had brought with it all the consequences of folly.

For some time after his triumphal return to Paris, Bonaparte preserved a total silence on the affairs of the Peninsula, excepting general assurances that all was well; and that the few partial commotions which had been excited by the agents of England, had been everywhere suppressed by the wisdom of the Grand Council, and the ready concurrence of the good citizens, who saw no safety for Spain save in the renewal of the family compact of the Bourbons, in the more fortunate dynasty of Napoleon. To accredit this state of things, many pieces of news were circulated in the provinces which lay nearest to Spain, tending to depress the spirit and hopes of the insurgents. Thus, Monsieur de Champagny was made to write to the prefect of the department of La Gironde, that George III. of England was dead; that George IV., on succeeding, had made

an instant and total change of ministry; and that a general pacification might be instantly expected. The same article, with similar legends, was inserted officially in the Madrid Gazette.

But a system of fiction and imposition resembles an untempered sword-blade, which is not only subject to break at the utmost need of him who wields it, but apt to wound him with the fragments as they spring asunder. The truth began to become too glaring to be concealed. It could not be disguised that the kingdom of Portugal had been restored to independence—that Junot and his army had been driven from Lisbon—that Dupont had surrendered in the south of Spain—that King Joseph had been expelled from Madrid—and that in almost all the harbours of the Peninsula, which, in the month of March, had been as it were hermetically sealed against the British shipping and commerce, the English were now received as friends and allies. Nor was it possible to conceal, that these blots on the French arms had all taken place in consequence of the unprincipled ambition, which, not satisfied with disposing of the produce and power of Spain, by using the name of her native princes, had prompted Napoleon to exasperate the feelings of the people by openly usurping the supreme power, and had thus converted a submissive and complaisant ally into a furious and inexorable enemy. It was no easy matter, even for the talents and audacity of Napoleon, to venture before the French nation with an official account of these errors and their consequences, however palliated and modified. Accordingly, we must needs say, that not the confession of a felon, when, compelled to avow his general guilt, he seeks to disguise some of its more atrocious circumstances, and apologize for others, sounds to us more poor and humiliating, than the uncandid, inconsistent, and unmanly exposition which Napoleon was at length compelled to mumble forth in his official document, when the truth could no longer be concealed, and was likely indeed to be circulated even with exaggerations.

Suddenly, on the 4th of September, there appeared in the *Moniteur*, which previously had been chiefly occupied by scientific details, lyrical poetry, or theatrical criticism, a minute and garbled account of the insurrection in Spain. The sanguinary conduct of the insurgents was dwelt upon; the successes obtained by the French armies were magnified; the losses which they had sustained were extenuated or glossed over. Dupont was represented as having behaved like a fool or a traitor. The sufferings of Zaragosa, during the siege, were dwelt upon with emphasis; but on its result the official account remained silent. The most was made of the victory of Medina del Rio Secco, and the retreat of King Joseph from Madrid was ascribed to his health's disagreeing with the air of that capital. There were two reports on the subject of Spanish affairs, both from Champagny, minister of the foreign department, and both addressed to the emperor. The first was designed to justify the attempt of Napoleon on Spain. It was dated at Bayonne, as far back as the 14th of April, a period when Bonaparte was very little inclined to enter into any reasoning on his right, since, believing he had the power to accom-

plish his purpose, he did not doubt that the advantage and honour which France would derive from the subjugation of Spain, would sufficiently plead his cause with the Great Nation. But when his first efforts had failed, and further exertions were found inevitably necessary, it became of consequence to render the enterprise popular, by showing that the measures which led to it were founded on policy at least, if not upon moral justice.

To say the truth, the document is contented with arguing the first point. Something is hinted of the Spanish administration having been supposed to nourish hostile purposes towards France, and Godoy's manifesto at the time of the Prussian war is alluded to; but the principle mainly rested upon, and avowed by Monsieur Champagny, is, in plain language, a gross and indecent sophism. "That which policy renders necessary," says the statesman, "justice must of course authorize;" thus openly placing interest in diametrical opposition to that which is honourable or honest; or, in other words, making the excess of the temptation a justification for the immorality of the action. This is the same principle which sends the robber on the high road, and upon which almost every species of villainy is committed, excepting those rare enormities which are practised without any visible motive on the part of the perpetrators. To apply his reasoning to the case, Champagny sets forth the various advantages which France must derive from the more intimate union with Spain—the facilities which such a union afforded for enforcing the continental system against Great Britain—the necessity that Spain should be governed by a prince, on whose faithful attachment France could repose unlimited confidence—and the propriety of recommending the work which had been the leading object of the policy of Louis the Fourteenth. Having thus shown that the seizing upon the crown and liberties of Spain would be highly advantageous to France, the reporter holds his task accomplished, and resumes his proposition in these remarkable words:—"Policy demands a grand measure from your majesty—Justice authorizes it—the troubles of Spain render it indispensably necessary."

The second report of Monsieur de Champagny held a different and more ominous tone. It was dated Paris, 1st September, and darkly indicated that the gold and machinations of the English had fomented popular intrigues in Spain, which had frustrated the attempt of his Imperial Majesty to render that country happy. The reporter then, in the tone with which a priest addresses the object of his worship, reverentially expostulates with Napoleon, for permitting anarchy to spread over great part of Spain, and for leaving Britain at liberty to say, that her flag, driven from the shores of the Baltic and of the Levant, floats triumphantly, nevertheless, on the coasts of the kingdom which is the nearest neighbour to France. Having thus indirectly communicated the general fact, that Spain was in insurrection, and that the English fleet rode triumphant on her coasts, the reporter resumes a noble confidence in the power and authority which he was invoking. "No, never, sire, shall it be thus. Two millions of brave men are ready, if necessary.

to cross the Pyrenees, and chase the English from the Peninsula; if the French would combat for the liberty of the seas, they must begin by rescuing Spain from the influence of England."

Much more there is to the same purpose, serving to inform the French people by implication, if not in direct terms, that the emperor's plans upon Spain had been disconcerted; that he had found unanimous resistance where he had expected unconditional submission; and that the utmost sacrifices would be necessary on the part of France, to enable her ruler to perfect the measures which he had so rashly undertaken. But besides the pressure of Spanish affairs, those of Austria were also hinted at, as requiring France to increase her armies, and stand upon her guard, as that power had been of late sedulously employed in increasing her military strength. The ultimate conclusion founded on these reasonings was the necessity of anticipating another conscription of eighty thousand men.

The senate, to whom these reports were sent down, together with a message from the emperor, failed not to authorize this new draught on the French population, or, it may be said, on her very flesh and life-blood. Like the judge in the drama, without regret or expostulation, they enforced the demand of the unrelenting creditor. "The court allowed it, and the law did give it." "The will of France," said these subservient senators, "is the same with the will of her emperor. The war with Spain is politic, just, and necessary."

Thus armed with all the powers which his mighty empire could give, Napoleon girded himself personally to the task of putting down by force the Spanish insurrection, and driving from the Peninsula the British auxiliaries. But while preparations were making on an immense scale for an enterprise of which experience had now taught him the difficulty, it was necessary for him, in the first place, to ascertain how his relations with the few powers in Europe who had some claim to independence, had been affected by the miscarriage of his Spanish scheme.

Since the treaty of Presburg, by which she lost such a proportion of her power, Austria had lain like a prostrated combatant, whom want, not of will, but of strength, prevents from resuming the contest. In 1806, her friendship became of consequence to Napoleon, then engaged in his contest with Prussia and Russia. The cession of Brannau, and some territories about the mouth of the Cattaro, were granted to Austria by France, as in gaerdon of her neutrality. But in 1807 and 1808, the government of that country, more vexed and humiliated by the territory and influence which she had lost, than thankful for the importance she had been permitted to retain, began to show the utmost activity in the war department. Abuses were reformed; more perfect discipline was introduced; old soldiers were called to muster; new levies were made on a large scale; armies of reserve were formed, through the Austrian dominions, of the *Landwehr* and National Guards, and they were subjected to service by conscription, like the militia of England. The Austrian armies of the line were increased to great magnitude. The Hungarian Diet had voted twelve thousand recruits for 1807, and eighty thousand for 1808; while eighty thousand

organized soldiers, of whom thirty thousand were cavalry, constituted the formidable reserve of this warlike nation. Everything seemed to announce war, although the answers of the court to the remonstrances of France were of the most pacific tendency.

Yet it was not alone the hostile preparations of Austria which seemed to trouble the aspect of Germany. Napoleon had defeated her efforts and defied her armies, when her force was still more imposing. But there was gradually awakening and extending through Germany, and especially its northern provinces, a strain of opinion incompatible with the domination of France, or of any other foreign power within the ancient empire.

The disappearance of various petty states, which had been abolished in the convulsion of the French usurpation, together with the general system of oppression under which the whole country suffered, though in different degrees, had broken down the divisions which separated the nations of Germany from each other, and, like relations who renew an interrupted intimacy under the pressure of a common calamity, the mass of the people forgot that they were Hanoverians, Hessians, Saxons, or Prussians, to remember that they were all Germans, and had one common cause in which to struggle, one general injury to revenge. Less fiery than the Spaniards, but not less accessible to deep and impassioned feeling, the youth of Germany, especially such as were engaged in the liberal studies, cherished in secret, and with cantion, a deep hatred to the French invaders, and a stern resolution to avail themselves of the first opportunity to achieve the national liberty.

The thousand presses of Germany could not be altogether silenced, though the police of Napoleon was unceasingly active in suppressing political publications, wherever they could exercise influence. But the kind of feeling which now prevailed among the German youth did not require the support of exhortations or reasoning, directly and in express terms adapted to the subject. While a book existed, from the Holy Scriptures down to the most idle romance; while a line of poetry could be recited from the works of Schiller or Goethe, down to the most ordinary stall ballad,—innendos, at once secret and stimulating, might be drawn from them, to serve as watch-words, or as war-cries. The prevailing opinions, as they spread wider and wider, began to give rise to mysterious associations, the object of which was the liberation of Germany. That most generally known was called the Band, or Alliance for Virtue and Justice. The young academicians entered with great zeal into these fraternities, the rather that they had been previously prepared for them by the Borchenschaften, or associations of students, and that the idea of secret councils, tribunals, or machinations, is familiar to the reader of German history, and deeply interesting to a people whose temper is easily impressed by the mysterious and the terrible. The professors of the universities, in most cases, gave way to or guided these patriotic impressions, and in teaching their students the sciences or liberal arts, failed not to impress on them the duty of devoting themselves to the libera-

tion of Germany, or, as it was now called, Teutonia.

The French, whose genius is in direct opposition to that of the Germans, saw all this with contempt and ridicule. They laughed at the mummery of boys affecting a new sort of national free-masonry, and they gave the principle of patriotic devotion to the independence of Germany the name of Ideology; by which nick-name the French ruler used to distinguish every species of theory, which, resting in no respect upon the practical basis of self-interest, could, he thought, prevail with none save hot-brained boys and crazed enthusiasts.

Napoleon, however, saw and estimated the increasing influence of these popular opinions, more justly than might have been inferred from his language. He knew that a government might be crushed, an army defeated, an inimical administration changed, by violence; but that the rooted principle of resistance to oppression diffuses itself the wider, the more martyrs are made on its behalf. The Heir of the Revolution spoke on such subjects the language of the most legitimate of monarchs, and exclaimed against the system of the Tugendbund, as containing principles capable of disorganizing the whole system of social society.

The menacing appearance of Austria, and the extension of anti-Gallican principles and feelings through Germany, made it more especially necessary for Bonaparte to secure his hold upon the Emperor of Russia. Trusting little in so important a case to his ministers, Napoleon desired personally to assure himself by a direct communication with the Emperor Alexander, which was willingly acceded to. We have elsewhere* assigned some reasons, why such direct conference, or correspondence betwixt sovereigns, tends to degrade their character, without adding any additional security to the faith of their treaties. It is unbecoming their rank to take upon themselves the task of advancing, receding, renouncing, resuming, insisting, and evading, which must occur more or less in all political negotiations. At the same time, they are flattering to princes, as if inferring that they are able to act personally, and free of ministerial control; and in so far have their charms.

Bonaparte and Alexander met at Erfurt on 27th September, with the same appearance of cordiality with which they had parted—their friendship seemed uninjured by a shadow of suspicion. The most splendid festivities celebrated their meeting, and the theatres of Paris sent their choicest performers to enliven the evenings.

Amid all these gaieties politics were not neglected, and Bonaparte found his great ally as tractable as at Tilsit. Alexander not only ratified the transactions of Spain, but also the subsequent act, by which Napoleon appropriated to himself the kingdom of Etruria, which, according to the first draught of the Spanish scheme exhibited at Tilsit, was to have been assigned to the disinherited Ferdinand. The czar stipulated, however, on his own part, that Bonaparte should not in any shape interfere to prevent Russia from aggrandizing herself at the expense

of Turkey. He promised, also, to take an ally's share with Bonaparte, if the quarrel with Austria should come to arms. To this indeed he was bound by treaties; nor was there any way of ridding himself from their obligation. The conferences of Erfurt ended on the 14th of October, and, as they had begun, amid the most splendid festivities. Among these was an entertainment given to the emperor on the battle-ground of Jena, where Prussia, the hapless ally of Alexander, received such a dreadful blow.

It is probable, however, notwithstanding all the show of cordiality betwixt the emperors, that Alexander did not require the recollections which this battle-field was sure to inspire, to infuse into his mind some tacit jealousy of his powerful ally. He even already saw the possibility of a quarrel emerging between them, and was deeply desirous that Austria should not waste her national strength, by rushing into a contest, in which he would be under the reluctant necessity of acting against her. Neither did Napoleon return from Erfurt with the same undoubting confidence in his imperial ally. The subject of a match between the Emperor of France and one of the Russian Archduchesses had been resumed, and had been evaded, on account, as it was alleged, of the difference in their religions. The objections of the empress mother, as well as of the reigning empress, were said to be the real reasons,—objections founded on the character of Napoleon, and the nature of his right to the greatness which he enjoyed. Such a proposal could not be brought forward, and rejected, or evaded, with how much delicacy soever, without injury to the personal feelings of Napoleon; and as he must have been conscious, that more than the alleged reason of religion entered into the cause of declining his proposal, he must have felt in proportion offended, if not affronted. Still, however, if their cordiality was in any degree diminished, the ties of mutual interest, which bound together these two great autocrats, were as yet sufficient to assure Napoleon of the present assistance of Russia. To confirm this union still farther, and to make their present friendship manifest to the world, the two emperors joined in a letter to the King of Great Britain, proposing a general peace; and it was intimated that they would admit the basis of *uti possidetis*, which would leave all the contracting powers in possession of what they had gained during the war. The proposal, as must have been foreseen, went off, on Britain demanding that the Spanish government and the King of Sweden should be admitted as parties to the treaty.

But the letter of the emperors had served its turn, when it showed that the ties between France and Russia were of the most intimate nature; and, confident in this, Napoleon felt himself at liberty to employ the gigantic force which he had already put in preparation, to the subjugation of Spain, and to chasing away the "hideous leopards,"* as he was pleased

* It was one of the minute and childish particulars in which Bonaparte showed a spleen against the British nation, that he would not bear the heraldic achievement, which the English flag had displayed for five hundred years, to be termed Lions, but always called them Leopards. The spirit which this ebullition of spite manifested, could only

* See pp. 287, 354, etc.

to term the English banners, from the Peninsula.

In the meantime, the Spaniards had not been unfaithful to the cause they had undertaken. They had vested the supreme management of the affairs of their distracted kingdom in a Central or Supreme Junta, which, composed of delegates from all the provincial Juntas, fixed their residence at the recovered capital of Madrid, and endeavoured, to the best of their power, to provide for resistance against the invaders. But their efforts, though neither in themselves unwise nor mistimed, were seriously impeded by two great causes, arising both from the same source.

The division of Spain, as already observed, into several disunited and almost unconnected provinces and kingdoms, though it had contributed much to the original success of the insurrection, while each province, regardless of the fate of others, or of the capital itself, provided the means of individual resistance, rendered them, when the war assumed a more general character, unsuited to obey the dictates which emanated from the Supreme Junta. General Cuesta, whose devoted and sincere patriotism was frustrated by the haughtiness, self-importance, and insubordination of his character, was the first to set an unhappy example of disobedience to what had been chosen as the residence of the supreme authority. He imprisoned two members of the Supreme Junta, because he thought the choice which had been made of them was derogatory to his own authority, as Captain-general of Castile and Leon, and thus set a perilous example of disunion among the patriots, for which his real energy and love of his country were scarce afterwards sufficient to atone.

But besides this and other instances of personal disregard to the injunctions of the Junta, there was another deep and widely-operating error which flowed from the same source. Each province, according to the high sense which the inhabitants entertained of their individual importance, deemed itself adequate to the protection of its own peculiar territory, and did not, or would not, see the necessity of contributing an adequate proportion of the provincial force to the defence of the nation in general. Those who had shown themselves manfully eager, and often successful, in the defence of their own houses and altars, were more deaf than prudence warranted to the summons which called them to the frontier, to act in defence of the kingdom as a whole. They had accustomed themselves, unhappily, too much to undervalue the immense power by which they were about to be invaded, and did not sufficiently see, that to secure the more distant districts, it was necessary that the war should be maintained by the united force of the realm. What added to this miscalculation, was a point in the national character, of which William III. of England, when commanding an allied army to which Spain furnished a contingent, had a century before bitterly complained. "The Spanish generals were so proud of the reputation of their

troops and their country," said that experienced warrior, "that they would never allow that they were in want of men, ammunition, guns, or the other necessities of war, until the moment of emergency came, when they were too apt to be found unprovided in all with which they had represented themselves as being well supplied."

The same unhappy spirit of over-confidence and miscalculation now greatly injured the patriotic cause. Levies and supplies, which it had been determined to raise, were too often considered as completed, when the vote which granted them had been passed, and it was deemed unworthy and unpatriotic to doubt the existence of what the national or provincial council had represented as indispensable. In this manner the Spaniards misled both themselves and their allies the British, upon the actual state of their resources; and it followed of course, that British officers, deceived by their representations in such instances, were disposed to doubt of the reality of their zeal, and to hesitate trusting their future representations.

Notwithstanding these unhappy errors, the Spanish force, assembled for the defence of the kingdom, was perhaps not inadequate to the task, had they been commanded by a general whose superior energies could have gained him undisputed authority, and who could have conducted the campaign with due attention to the species of warfare which the time and the character of the invading army demanded. But, unhappily, no Robert Bruce, no Washington, arose in Spain at this period; and the national defence was committed to men whose military knowledge was of a bounded character, though their courage and zeal admitted of no dispute. Yet favourable incidents occurred to balance these great inconveniences, and for a time the want of unity amongst themselves, and of military talent in the generals, seemed to a certain extent compensated by the courage of the Spanish leaders, and the energy of their followers.

The warlike population of Catalonia are, like the Tyrolese, natural marksmen, who take the field in irregular bodies, called *Somatenes*, or *Miquelets*. The inhabitants of this country arose in arms almost universally; and, supported by a small body of four thousand men from Andalusia, contrived, without magazines, military chest, or any of the usual materials necessary to military manœuvres, to raise the siege of Gerona, which had been formed by General Duhesme, and to gain so many advantages over the enemy, that, probably, an auxiliary force of English, under such a general as the Earl of Peterborough, adventurous at once and skilful, might, like that gallant leader, have wrested Barcelona, with Montjoy, from the hands of the French, and left the invaders no footing in that important district. The troops might have been supplied from Sicily, where a great British force was stationed, and there was no want of good and experienced officers, competent to the ordinary duties of a general. But that genius, which, freeing itself from the pedantry of professional education, can judge exactly how far insurrectionary allies are to be trusted; that inventive talent, which finds resources where the ordinary aids and appliances are scarce, or altogether wanting, is

be compared to that exhibited by the poor citizen, when he revenged himself, as he thought, upon the cognizance of the Earl of Oxford, by calling the nobleman's Swan a Goose.

a gift of very rare occurrence; and, unfortunately, there are no means of distinguishing the officers by whom it is possessed, unless chance puts them into a situation to display their qualifications.

Another circumstance favourable for the Spanish cause, was the return of General La Romana to Spain, to co-operate in the defence of his country. This nobleman, one of the best soldiers whom Spain had at the time, and a man, besides, of patriotic virtue, and excellent talents, commanded that auxiliary body of ten thousand Spanish troops which Bonaparte had prevailed on Godoy to unite with the French army in the north of Europe, in order to secure their absence when he should put his schemes of invasion into execution against their country. These forces, or a large proportion of them, were secluded in the isle of Funen, in the Baltic, with a view to conceal from them all that it did not suit Bonaparte should be known of the events which were agitating Spain. Nevertheless, a dexterous and daring agent, a catholic priest of Scotch extraction, named Robertson, going ashore in disguise, succeeded in opening a communication between the Spanish general and the British admiral Keates, in consequence of which, and by using bold and skilful combinations, La Romana was able to extricate the greater part of his troops from the precarious situation in which they were placed, and finally to embark them for Spain. It was the intention of this judicious officer to have made this little force of nine or ten thousand men the foundation of a regular army, by forming every regiment into a triple battalion. This he was unable to accomplish, but still his body of veterans inspired the Spaniards with hope and trust.

Three armies had been formed in Spain, designed to co-operate with each other; the sum of their numbers was calculated at 130,000 men, but they certainly did not exceed 100,000 at the very utmost. Their commissariat was in a wretched state, and even before the war commenced, the hardships of scarcity were felt in their camps. Three generals, each with independent authority (an evil of the country and time), commanded the Spanish armies. Blake, on the western frontier, extended his line from Burgos to Bilbao, disputing the possession of, and finally maintaining himself in, that capital of Biscay. The head-quarters of the central army, under Castanos, were as far back as Soria; while the eastern army, under Palafox, extended between Zaragoza and Sanguesa. So that the wings of the army were advanced towards the frontier; and the centre being drawn back, the whole position had the form of a crescent, with the concave side opposed to the enemy. Strongly posted within the position of Northern Spain, which they retained, the French armies, about sixty thousand men strong, lay protected by the fortresses which they occupied, and awaited the approach of Napoleon, with such a predominating force as should enable them to resume the offensive. The co-operation of a British auxiliary force became now an object of the first consequence; and the conduct of Britain had given every reason to expect that she would make in the Spanish cause exertions to which she had been yet a stranger.

When the two Emperors of France and Russia met at Erfurt, it had been resolved, as we have said, to offer peace to Great Britain, either in some hope that it might have been made upon terms consistent with Bonaparte's pretensions to universal dominion, and Alexander's views upon Turkey, or in order to assume to themselves the credit of a disposition to pacific measures. A letter was accordingly dispatched to the King of England, signed by both emperors, expressive of their wish for a general peace. The official note in which the British administration replied to this overture, declared that the King of England was willing to treat for peace in conjunction with his allies, the King of Sweden, and those now possessing the supreme power in Spain, and exercising it in the name of Ferdinand VII. The admission of any claim in favour of either of these powers, would have interfered with the plans both of France and Russia. The latter had for her object the possession of Finland, and the former judged that peace with England was chiefly desirable for gaining time to overcome all resistance in Spain; but must become useless if the independence of that country was to be stipulated in the treaty. The negotiation, therefore, broke off on these terms, while Britain, by her share in it, showed a manful resolution to identify her cause with that of the Spanish patriots.

The actions of England bore a part with her professions. It was determined, as we have already seen, to reinforce the Portuguese army with an additional force of ten thousand men, and the whole was placed under the command of General Moore, a darling name in the British army, and the only one (excepting the victor of Vimeira, had his rank in the service permitted the choice), to whom the public would have looked with confidence for the discharge of a trust so unusually weighty. But although the requisite degree of vigour was shown by the English government, yet they were not yet sufficiently accustomed to the necessity of acting with rapidity in executing their resolutions.

The arrival of General Moore's army had been expected so early as the 21st August, by those having best access to know the purposes of government; yet Sir John Moore and his army were not in motion, to take part in the Spanish cause, till the beginning of October; and every day which was thus lost in unreadiness and indecision was of the most precious import to the cause of Spain. This procrastination could not be imputed to the general, nor even to the administration. It was the consequence of want of alertness in the different departments, which had been little accustomed to hurry and exertion, and also of the hesitation apt to influence those who venture for the first time on a great and decisive measure. Even when the expedition arrived, there was uncertainty and delay.

Sir John Moore also, in all other respects one of the most eminent military characters, had embraced an unfavourable idea of the event of the Spanish struggle. He saw the faults and imperfections of their system, and they were of a kind which appeared most peculiarly perilous. Independent generals,—an unpaid and ill-fed soldiery,—a Supreme Junta which could not obtain obedience,—were fea-

tures which argued a speedy and disastrous conclusion to the contest, when opposed to the disciplined army of France, with which General Moore was so well acquainted, and to whose merits he could give the testimony of experience.

His fears, therefore, predominating over his hopes, yet his wishes alike, and his duty, prompting him to do something for the support of the Spanish cause, he was anxious so to direct his efforts, that he might retreat, in case of need, without suffering any considerable loss. For this purpose it would have been his desire to have carried round the British army to Cadix, to assist in the defence of Andalusia, where the sea, in case of disaster, would always be open for their retreat. But the English ministers had formed a bolder and more decisive plan of the campaign,—a plan which might have been decisive of the fate even of Bonaparte himself, at least of his Spanish projects of ambition, if either the Spaniards had acted with the skill which distinguished the victors of Baylen, or the enthusiasm which animated the defenders of Zaragoza, or if the British troops had been able to enter into communication with their armies before they were broken and overwhelmed by the Emperor of the French. This plan directed, that the British forces should proceed at once to the north of Spain, where the principal scene of action was necessarily laid, and thus co-operate with Blake, and the other Spanish armies, which were destined to cover the capital, and withstand the first effort of the invaders. It was left to the judgment of the commander, either to advance into Spain by land from the frontiers of Portugal, or to transport his troops by sea to Corunna, with the purpose of marching through the province of Galicia, and entering in that manner upon the scene of action.

To accomplish the purpose of government, Sir John Moore deemed it most convenient to divide his forces. He sent ten thousand men, under Sir David Baird, by sea to Corunna, and determined to march himself at the head of the rest of the army, about sixteen thousand, to the north of Spain, from the frontiers of Portugal. The general science of war, upon the most extended scale, seems to have been so little understood or practised by the English generals at this time, that, instead of the country being carefully reconnoitred by officers of skill, the march of the army was arranged by such hasty and inaccurate information as could be collected from the peasants. By their report, General Moore was induced to divide his army into five divisions, which were directed to move upon Salamanca, where, or at Valladolid, they were to form a junction with the forces of Sir David Baird, expected from Corunna. The advance commenced about the 7th of November; but, unhappily, ere these auxiliaries appeared on the field, the armies of the Spaniards, whom they were destined to support, were defeated, dispersed, and almost annihilated.

There was no hesitation, no mark of indecision, no loss of precious time, on the part of Napoleon. He traversed the earth as a comet does the sky, working changes wherever he came. The convention at Erfurt broke up on the 14th October; on the 25th of the same month he opened, in person, the session of the Legislative Body; and on the second following

day, he set off for the frontiers of Spain. Here he had prepared, in ample extent, all the means of conquest; for, though trusting, or affecting to trust, a great deal to the influence of his fortune and his star, it was his wise and uniform policy to leave nothing to chance, but always to provide means adequate to the purpose which he meditated.

Nearly a hundred thousand men had been gradually pouring into the position which the French occupied upon the Ebro. The head-quarters at Vittoria, honoured with the residence of the intrusive king, was soon more illustrious by the arrival of Bonaparte himself, a week before the British army had commenced its march from Portugal or Corunna.

To destroy the army of Blake, which lay opposed to the right flank of the French, before the Spanish general could be supported by Sir John Moore's forces, became for Bonaparte a matter of instant and peremptory importance. After some previous fighting, a French division, under Marshal Victor, brought the Spanish general to action at the position of Espinosa. The battle continued for three hours in the evening, and was renewed the next day, when the French turned the Spanish position, and Blake, totally defeated, withdrew from the field, with the purpose of making a stand at Reynosa, where he had his supplies and magazines.

Meantime the activity of Bonaparte had struck another fatal blow on a different part of the Spanish defensive line. An army designed to cover Burgos, and support the right flank of Blake's army, had been formed under the command of the Count de Belvidere, a young nobleman of courage, but without experience. He had under his command some remnants of the old Spanish army of the line, with the Walloons and Spanish guards, and a battalion of students, volunteers from Salamanca and Leon. Here also the French were successful. The youths, whom patriotism had brought to the field, could not be frightened from it by danger. They fell in their ranks, and their deaths spread mourning through many a respectable family in Spain.

Burgos was taken, in consequence of Count Belvidere's defeat; and it was by the same calamity rendered easy for the Duke of Dalmatia to co-operate with the French generals, who were operating against the unfortunate Blake, with a view to drive him from his place of refuge at Reynosa. Surrounded on every side, the Spanish general saw no safety for the remnant of his forces, excepting in a retreat to Saint Andero, accomplished under such circumstances of haste and confusion, that his army might be considered as totally disorganized and dispersed. The disasters of Blake were the more to be lamented, that they involved the destruction of that fine body of soldiers whom La Romana had led from the Baltic, and who, injudiciously brought into action by single battalions, perished ingloriously among the cliffs at Espinosa.

The whole left wing of the Spanish army of defence, which so lately stretched from Bilbao to Burgos, and in support of which the British forces were advancing, was now totally annihilated, and the central army, under Castanos, whose left flank was now completely uncovered, was exposed to im-

minent danger. The veteran would fain have reserved his forces for a more fortunate time, by falling back and avoiding a battle. But he had been joined by Palafox, who had under his independent authority the army of Arragon; and the Supreme Junta, acting in that particular according to the custom of the French Convention, had dispatched a commissioner to his camp, to see that that general performed his duty. This official person, with Palafox and other generals, joined in overpowering Castanos's reasoning, and, by the imputations of cowardice and treachery, compelled him to venture an action.

The battle took place at Tudela, on the 22d November, with all the results which Castanos had dreaded. A great number of Spaniards were killed; guns and baggage were taken; and, for the first time, a considerable number of prisoners fell into the hands of the French. Castanos, with the routed troops of his proportion of the army, escaped to Calatayud, while Palafox retreated again on the heroic city of Zaragoza, which was destined to suffer further distresses, and acquire additional renown. The road of the invader was now open to Madrid, unless in so far as it might be defended by some forces stationed at the pass of Somosierra, a mountainous defile about ten miles from the city, or as his entrance into the capital might be opposed by the desperate resolution of the citizens themselves. A part of the population placed their hopes on the defence afforded by this defile, not aware how easily, in modern warfare, such passes are either stormed or turned. But most of the citizens assumed the fierce and lowering appearance, which, in the Spaniard, announces an approaching burst of furious violence. Many thousands of peasants arrived from the neighbouring country, to assist, they said, in the defence of the capital; and, animated by the success of the Zaragozians, menaced war to the knife's point. There were about eight thousand troops of the line in Madrid; resistance was undoubtedly possible, and the people seemed determined upon it. A summons from the Supreme Junta called the inhabitants to arms, and the commencement of the preparations for defence was begun with unanimous vigour. For this purpose the pavement of the streets was taken up and converted into barricades; the houses were secured, and loopholed for musketry; and the whole body of the population toiled at erecting batteries, not only in the day-time but by torch-light.

Had Palafox commanded in Madrid, the experiment of resistance would, at all risks, have been attempted. But the governor was Don Thomas Morla, the same who succeeded Solano at Cadiz. His subsequent conduct seems to show, that, despairing of the cause of his country, he already meditated an intended change to the side of the usurper; so that the citizens of Madrid, at the moment when they had recourse to his skill and authority, received neither encouragement nor instructions, nor means of defence. We shall presently see in what manner the generous intentions of the people were cheated and baffled.

Amidst the accumulation of disasters which overwhelmed the Spanish cause, Sir John Moore arrived at Salamanca, and Sir David Baird at Astorga, where the latter general halted. The situation of

General Moore was extremely embarrassing, and gave him cause for the deepest anxiety. He knew the strength and character of the French armies, and was unwilling to repose too much confidence in the Spaniards, whose wisdom, he contended, was not a wisdom of action or exertion. On the other hand, he well knew the enthusiasm of the English for the Spanish cause, and the high expectations which were founded on his own talents, and on the gallantry of one of the finest armies which ever left Britain; and he felt that something was to be attempted worthy of the character of both. The general voice of the officers and soldiers was also clamorous for being employed. But the defeat of Castanos at Tudela seems to have extinguished the last hope in Sir John Moore's mind, and he at one time determined upon commencing his retreat to Portugal.

Before finally adopting this measure, he thought proper, however, to consult Mr Frere, the British minister, whether he thought any good would result from the daring measure of marching on Madrid, instead of retreating to Portugal. The correspondents differed, as might have been expected, from their difference of temperament and habits. Mr Frere, a scholar and a poet, well known in the world of letters, being attached with enthusiasm to the cause of Spain, was a willing believer in the miracles that might be wrought by the higher and nobler qualities, which found a chord in unison in his own bosom. He advised, as a Spartan would have done, that General Moore should throw all upon the cast, and advance to the succour of Madrid. The general, upon whom the responsibility devolved, viewed the measure in a different light, and his military habits did not permit him to place much confidence in a defence to be maintained by irregular forces against the disciplined armies of France. Yet, urged by his own feelings, and the importunity of the Spanish government, he resolved to try, by an effort against the north-western part of the French army, to answer the double purpose of preventing them from pressing on La Romana, who, with indefatigable zeal, was collecting the scattered remains of the Galician army, which had been destroyed under Cuesta, and also of hindering the French from advancing southward to complete the subjugation of the Peninsula.

But while General Moore determined to hazard this bold measure, he saw painfully the danger of drawing upon himself, by adopting it, a predominant force of the enemy, before whom his retreat might be difficult and perilous. Yet he finally ordered Sir David Baird, whose retreat to Corunna was already commenced, again to occupy Astorga, and expressed his intention of hazarding an advance, at whatever risk. But he added these ominous words; "I mean to proceed bridle in hand, for if the bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it."

The fate of Madrid was soon decided; but, as is generally believed, not without great treachery on the part of those who had been most apparently zealous for its defence. The passes of Guadarama and Somosierra had fallen into the possession of the French. The latter, on which the people of Madrid had fixed their eyes as on a second Thermopylæ or

Roncesvalles, was cleared of its defenders by a charge of Polish lancers! These melancholy tidings, as they were in correspondence with General Moore's expectations, did not prevent his intended movement on the French lines of communication. By this means he might co-operate with General La Romana and his army, and if pressed by superior numbers of the French, the retreat lay through Galicia to Corunna, where the transports were attending for the reception of the troops.

General Moore left Salamanca on the 12th December, and proceeded towards Mayorga, where, on the 20th, he formed a junction with Sir David Baird. Advancing upon Sahagun, the troops received encouragement from a gallant action maintained by the 15th hussars, five hundred of whom took, cut down, and dispersed, nearly double their own number of French cavalry. All now imagined they were to attack Soult, who had concentrated his forces behind the river Carrion to receive the assault. The British army was in the highest possible spirits, when news were suddenly received that Soult had been considerably reinforced; that Bonaparte was marching from Madrid, at the head of ten thousand of his guards; and that the French armies, who had been marching to the south of Spain, had halted and assumed a direction to the north-west, as if to enclose and destroy the British army. This was exactly the danger which Moore had never ceased to apprehend, even when executing the movement that led to it. A retreat into, if not through Galicia, was the only mode of avoiding the perils by which the British were surrounded. The plan of defending this strong and mountainous province, or at least of effecting a retreat through it with order and deliberation, had been in view for several weeks; Sir David Baird's division of the army passed through it in their advance to Astorga; yet so imperfect at that time was the British general staff, that no accurate knowledge seemed to have been possessed of the roads through the country, of the many strong military positions which it presents, or of the particular military advantages which it affords for defensive war. Another deficiency, incidental to our service at that period, was the great deficiency of the commissariat department, which had been pointed out so forcibly by Sir Arthur Wellesley, but which had not yet been remedied.*

Sufficient exertions in this department might have brought forward supplies from Corunna, and col-

lected those which Galicia itself afforded; and the troops, retiring gradually from position to position, and maintained from their own resources, would have escaped the loss and dishonour of a retreat which resembled a flight in every particular, excepting the terror which accompanies it.

Besides these great deficiencies, a disadvantage of the most distressing kind occurred, from the natural and constitutional aversion of the British army to retrograde movements. Full of hope and confidence when he advances, the English soldier wants the pliability, lightness, and elasticity of character, which enables the Frenchman to distinguish himself during a retreat, by his intelligence, discipline, and dexterity. Chafed, sullen, and discontented, the soldiers next became mutinous and insubordinate; and, incensed against the Spaniards, by whose want of zeal they thought they had been betrayed, they committed the most unjustifiable excesses on the unresisting inhabitants. Despite the repeated orders of the commander-in-chief, endeavouring to restrain the passions, and soothe the irritation of the soldiers, these disgraceful outrages were continued. It is matter of some consolation, that, losing their character for discipline, they retained that for courage. The French, who had pressed on the British rear, near to Benavente, and thrown across the river a large body of the Imperial cavalry, were driven back and defeated on the 29th December; and, leaving General Lefebvre Desnouettes a prisoner, in future were contented with observing, without pressing upon the English retreat.

At Astorga, 30th December, the commander-in-chief found about 5000 Spaniards under La Romana, the relics of the Galician army. These troops wanted clothing, accoutrements, arms, ammunition, and pay—they wanted, in short, everything excepting that courage and devotion to the cause of their country, which would have had a better fate, had fortune favoured desert.

The Spanish general still proposed to make a stand at this rallying point; but whatever might be La Romana's own skill, and the bravery of his followers, his forces were not of a quality such as to induce Sir John Moore to halt his retreat, which he now directed avowedly upon Corunna.

The scarcity of provisions required forced marches, and combined, with want of general knowledge of the country in a military sense, to hurry forward the soldiers, who too readily took advantage of these irregular movements to straggle and plunder, inflicting on the friendly natives, and receiving from them in return, the mutual evils which are given and received by invaders in an enemy's country. The weather dark and rainy—the roads blockaded by half-melted snow—the fords become almost impassable—augmented the difficulties of a retreat, resembling that by which a defeated army is forced into a country totally unknown to them, and through which the fugitives must find their way as they can. The baggage of the army, and its ammunition, were abandoned and destroyed. The sick, the wounded, were left to the mercy of the pursuers; and the numbers who in that hour of despair gave way to the national vice of intoxication, added largely to

* Sir Arthur Wellesley, while exculpating from blame the individuals composing the commissariat of the Portuguese expedition, added these words:—"The fact is, that I wished to draw the attention of the government to this important branch of the public service, which is but little understood in this country. The evils of which I complained are probably owing to the nature of our political situation, which prevents us from undertaking great military operations, in which the subsistence of armies becomes a subject of serious consideration and difficulty; and these evils consisted in the inexperience of almost every individual, of the mode of procuring, conveying, and distributing supplies." He requested that this explanation might stand in the minutes.—*Southey's History of the Peninsular War*, vol. I, p. 540.

the ineffective and the helpless. The very treasure-chests of the army were thrown away and abandoned. There was never so complete an example of a disastrous retreat.

One saving circumstance, already mentioned, tended to qualify the bad behaviour of the troops; namely, that when a report arose that a battle was to be expected, the courage, nay, the discipline of the soldiers, seemed to revive. This was especially the case on the 6th January, when the French ventured an attack upon our rear-guard near Lugo. So soon as a prospect of action was presented, stragglers hastened to join their ranks—the disobedient became at once subordinate, as if on the parade; and it was made manifest that the call to battle, far from having the natural effect of intimidating to utter dispersion troops already so much disordered, was to the English army the means of restoring discipline, steadiness, and confidence.

The French having declined the proffered engagement, Sir John Moore continued his retreat under the same disadvantageous circumstances, until he arrived at Corunna, the original object of his destination. He was preparing to embark his forces in the transports, which lay prepared for their reception, when his pursuer, Soult, now pressing boldly forward, made it evident that this could not be accomplished unless either by a convention with him, or by the event of a battle, which might disqualify him from opposing the embarkation. Sir John Moore, with the dignity becoming his character, chose the latter alternative; and occupied a position of no great strength in front of the town, to protect the embarkation. The attack was made by the French on the 16th January, in heavy columns, and with their usual vivacity; but it was sustained and repelled on all hands. The gallant general was mortally wounded in the action, just as he called on the 42d Highland regiment to "remember Egypt," and reminded the same brave mountaineers, that though ammunition was scarce, "they had their bayonets."

Thus died on the field of victory, which atoned for previous misfortunes, one of the bravest and best officers of the British army. His body was wrapped in his military cloak, instead of the usual vestments of the tomb; it was deposited in a grave hastily dug on the ramparts of the citadel of Corunna; and the army completing its embarkation upon the subsequent day, their late general was "left alone with his glory."

Thus ended, in the acquisition of barren laurels, plentifully blended with cypress, the campaign, which had been undertaken by so beautiful and efficient an army, under so approved a commander. The delay in sending it to the scene of action was one great cause of its failure, and for that the gallant general, or his memory, cannot be held responsible. Such a force at Salamanca, while the French were unequal in numbers to the Spanish armies, might have had the most important consequences. At a later period, when the patriotic armies were everywhere defeated, we confess that General Moore, with the ideas which he entertained of the Spaniards, does not seem to us to have been called upon to place the fate of the British army,—auxiliaries, it must be observed, not principals in the

war,—on the same desperate cast by which the natives were compelled to abide. The disasters of the retreat appear to rest on want of knowledge of the ground they were to traverse, and on the deficiency of the commissariat, which, though the army must be entirely dependent on it, was not at that time sufficiently under the control of the commander-in-chief. We owe it to his memory to say, that, at the close of his own valuable life, he amply redeemed in his last act the character of the army which he commanded.

CHAPTER LXV.

General Belliard occupies Madrid on 4th December, 1808.

—Napoleon returns to France.—Singular conversation at Valladolid, betwixt him and the Abbé de Pradt.—Cause of his hurried return.—View of the circumstances leading to a rupture with Austria.—Feelings of Russia upon this occasion.—Secret intrigues of Talleyrand to preserve peace.—Immense exertions made by Austria.—Distribution of her armies.—Counter efforts of Bonaparte.—The Austrian army enters Bavaria, 9th April, 1809.—Napoleon hastens to meet them.—Austrians defeated at Austerlitz on the 20th—and at Eckmühl on the 22d, with great loss.—They are driven out of Ratisbon on the 23d.—The Archduke Charles retreats into Bohemia.—Napoleon pushes forward to Vienna, which, after a brief defence, is occupied by the French on the 12th of May.—Retrospect of the events of the war in Poland, Italy, the North of Germany, and the Tyrol.—Enterprises of Schill—of the Duke of Brunswick Orléans.—Movements in the Tyrol—Character and manners of the Tyrolese.—Retreat of the Archduke John into Hungary.

HAVING thus completed the episode of Sir John Moore's expedition, we resume the progress of Napoleon, to whom the successive victories of Espinosa, Burgos, and Tudela, had offered a triumphant path to Madrid. On the 1st of December, his head-quarters being at the village of Saint Augustino, he was within sight of that capital, and almost within hearing of the bells, whose hollow and continued toll announced general insurrection, and the most desperate resistance. Nor was the zeal of the people of Madrid inadequate to the occasion, had it been properly directed and encouraged. They seized on the French officer who brought a summons of surrender, and were with difficulty prevented from tearing him to pieces. On the 3d, the French attacked Buen Retiro, a palace which had been fortified as a kind of citadel. A thousand Spaniards died in the defence of this strong-hold. On the 4th, Morla opened a capitulation with Napoleon. He and Yriarte, another noble Spaniard, of whom better things had been hoped, came to testify their repentance for the rash part they had undertaken, and to express their sense that the city could in no wise be defended; but, at the same time to state, that the populace and volunteers were resolute in its defence, and that some delay would be necessary, to let their zeal cool, and their fears come to work in their turn.

Bonaparte admitted these deputies to his own presence, and with the audacity which sometimes characterized his language, he read them a lecture on their bad faith, in not observing the treaty of

Baylen—on their bad faith, in suffering Frenchmen to be assassinated—on their bad faith, in seizing upon the French squadron at Cadiz. This rebuke was gravely urged by the individual, who had kidnapped the royal family of Spain while they courted his protection as his devoted vassals,—who had seized the fortresses into which his troops had been received as friends and allies,—who had floated the streets of Madrid with the blood of its population,—and, finally, who had taken it upon him to assume the supreme authority, and dispose of the crown of Spain, under no better pretext than that he had the will and the power to do so. Had a Spaniard been at liberty to reply to the Lord of Legions, and reckon with him injury for injury, falsehood for falsehood, drop of blood for drop of blood, what an awful balance must have been struck against him!

In the meantime, those citizens of Madrid who had determined on resistance, began to see that they were deserted by such as should have headed them in the task, and their zeal became cooled under the feelings of dismay and distrust. A military convention was finally concluded, in virtue of which General Belliard took possession of the city on the 4th of December. The terms were so favourable, as to show that Bonaparte, while pretending to despise the sort of resistance which the population might have effected, was well pleased, nevertheless, not to drive them to extremity. He then published a proclamation, setting forth his desire to be the regenerator of the Spanish empire. But in case his mild and healing mediation should be again refused, he declared he would treat them as a conquered people, and place his brother on another throne. "I will, in that case, set the crown of Spain on my own head, and I shall know how to make it respected; for God," concluded this extraordinary document, "has given me the power and the will to surmount all difficulties."

There were now two operations which nearly concerned Bonaparte. The first was the dispersion of the remaining troops of Castanos, which had escaped the fatal battle of Tudela, and such other armed bodies as continued to occupy the south of Spain. In this the French had for some time an easy task; for the Spanish soldiers, surprised and incensed at their own disasters, were, in many instances, the assassins of their generals, and the generals had lost all confidence in their mutinous followers. But before pursuing his successes in the south, it was Bonaparte's first resolution to detach a part of the French army upon Portugal, by the way of Talavera, and by occupying Lisbon, intercept the retreat of Sir John Moore and his English army. The advance of the English general to Salamanca interfered with this last design. It seemed to Napoleon, that he did not yet possess forces sufficient at the same time to confront and turn back Sir John Moore, and, on the other hand, to enter Portugal and possess himself of Lisbon. The latter part of the plan was postponed. Placing himself at the head of his guards, Napoleon, as we have seen, directed his march towards Valladolid, and witnessed the retreat of Sir John Moore. He had the pleasure of beholding with his own eyes the people whom he hated most, and certainly did not fear the least, in

full retreat, and was observed scarcely ever to have seemed so gay and joyous as during the pursuit, which the French officers termed the race of Benavente. But he had also the less pleasing spectacle of the skirmish, in which the general commanding the cavalry of his Imperial Guard was defeated, and his favourite General Lefebvre, made prisoner. He halted with his guards at Astorga, left Ney with 18,000 men, to keep the country in subjection, and assigned to Soult the glorious task of pursuing the English, and completing their destruction. We have already seen how far he proved able to accomplish his commission.

Meanwhile, the emperor himself returned to Valladolid, and from thence set off for France with the most precipitate haste. His last act was to declare his brother Joseph generalissimo over the French armies; yet, notwithstanding this mark of trust and confidence, there is reason to believe that Bonaparte repented already his liberality, in assigning to another, though his own brother, an appanage so splendid, and which was likely to cost so much blood and treasure. Something to this purpose broke out in his proclamation to the people of Madrid; and he was more explicit when speaking confidentially to the Abbé de Pradt, whom, in returning from Benavente, the emperor met at Valladolid.

They were alone; it was a stormy night; and Bonaparte, opening the window from time to time, to ascertain the possibility of traveling, only turned from it to overwhelm Monsieur de Pradt with questions on the state of the capital which he had just left. The abbé did not disguise their disaffection; and when Napoleon endeavoured to show the injustice of their complaints, by insisting on the blessings he had conferred on Spain, by the diminution of tithes, abolishing feudal servitudes, and correcting other abuses of the old government, De Pradt answered by saying, that the Spaniards did not thank Napoleon for relief from evils to which they were insensible; and that the country was in the situation of the wife of Sganarelle in the farce, who quarreled with a stranger for interfering with her husband when he was beating her. Bonaparte laughed, and continued in these remarkable words:—"I did not know what Spain was. It is a finer country than I was aware, and I have made Joseph a more valuable present than I dreamed of. But you will see, that by and by the Spaniards will commit some folly, which will place their country once more at my disposal. I will then take care to keep it to myself, and divide it into five great viceroys."

While the favourite of fortune nourished these plans of engrossing and expanding ambition, the eagerness of his mind seems to have communicated itself to his bodily frame; for, when the weather permitted him to mount on horseback, he is said at once, and without halting save to change horses, to have performed the journey from Valladolid to Burgos, being thirty-five Spanish leagues, or about seventy English miles and upwards, in the space of five hours and a half.

The incredible rapidity with which Napoleon pressed his return to France, without again visiting Madrid, or pausing to bear the fate of the English army, surprised those around him. Some conjectured

that a conspiracy had been discovered against his authority at Paris; others, that a band of Spaniards had devoted themselves to assassinate him; a third class assigned different causes; but it was soon found that the dispatch which he used had its cause in the approaching rupture with Austria.

This breach of friendship appears certainly to have been sought by Austria, without any of those plausible reasons of complaint, on which nations generally are desirous to bottom their quarrels. She did not allege that, with respect to herself or her dominions, France had, by any recent aggression, given her cause of offence. The Abbé de Pradt remarks upon the occasion, with his usual shrewdness, that if Napoleon was no religious observer of the faith of treaties, it could not be maintained that other states acted much more scrupulously in reference to him. Bonaparte himself has alleged, what, in one sense of the word, was true, that many of his wars were, in respect to the immediate causes of quarrel, merely defensive on his side. But this was a natural consequence of the style and structure of his government, which, aiming directly at universal empire, caused him to be looked upon by all nations as a common enemy, the legitimate object of attack whenever he could be attacked with advantage, because he himself neglected no opportunity to advance his pretensions against the independence of Europe.

The singular situation of Great Britain, unassailable by his arms, enabled her to avow this doctrine, and to refuse making peace with Napoleon, on terms how favourable soever for England, unless she were at the same time recognized as having authority to guarantee the security of such states as she had a chance of protecting, if she remained at war. Thus, she refused peace when offered under the condition that France should have Sicily; and at the period of which we treat, she had again recently declined the terms of pacification proposed by the overture from Erfurt, which inferred the abandonment of the Spanish cause.

This principle of constant war with Bonaparte, or rather with the progress of his ambition, guided and influenced every state in Europe, which had yet any claim for their independence. Their military disasters, indeed, often prevented their being able to keep the flag of defiance flying; but the seasons which they were compelled to make at the moment of defeat, only exasperated their feelings of resentment, and made them watch more eagerly for the period, when their own increasing strength, or the weakness of the common enemy, might enable them to resume the struggle. Napoleon's idea of a peace was, as we have elsewhere seen, that the party with whom he treated should derive no more from the articles agreed upon, than the special provisions expressed in his favour. So long, for instance, as he himself observed all points of the treaty of Presburg, the last which he had dictated to Austria, that power, according to his view of the transaction, had no farther right either of remonstrance or intervention, and was bound to view with indifference whatever changes the French Emperor might please to work on the general state of Europe. This was no doubt a convenient inter-

pretation for one, who, aiming at universal monarchy, desired that there should be as little interference as possible with the various steps by which he was to achieve that great plan; but it is entirely contradictory of the interpretation put upon treaties by the jurists; and were the jurists of a contrary opinion, it is in diametrical opposition to the feelings of human nature, by which the policy of states, and the conduct of individuals, are alike dictated. Bonaparte being, as his conduct showed him, engaged in a constant train of innovation upon the liberties of Europe, it followed, that the states whom he had not been able entirely to deprive of independence should, without farther, or more particularly national cause of war, be perpetually on the watch for opportunities to destroy or diminish his terrible authority. In this point of view, the question for Austria to consider was, not the justice of the war, but its expediency; not her right of resisting the common enemy of the freedom of Europe, but, practically, whether she had the means of effectual opposition. The event served to show that Austria had over-estimated her own resources.

It is true, that an opportunity now presented itself, which seemed in the highest degree tempting. Bonaparte was absent in Spain, engaged in a distant conquest, in which, besides the general unpopularity of his cause, obstacles had arisen which were strangers to any previous part of his history, and resistance had been offered of a nature so serious, as to shake the opinion hitherto entertained of his invincibility. On the other hand, Austria had instituted in her states organic laws, by which she secured herself the power of being able to call out to arms her immense and military population; and her chief error seems to have been, in not postponing the fatal struggle until these new levies had acquired a better disciplined and more consolidated form. Of this the Emperor of Russia was fully sensible, and, as we have already noticed, he saw with great apprehension Austria's purpose of opposing herself singly to the arms of France; since, however close the intimacy which, for the present, subsisted betwixt Alexander and Napoleon, it was impossible for the former to be indifferent to the vast risk which Europe must incur, should France finally annihilate the independence of Austria. A series of intrigues, of a very singular nature, was accordingly undertaken at Paris, in the hope of preserving peace. Talleyrand, who, perhaps on Napoleon's own account as well as that of France, was unwilling that another great continental war should arise, was active in endeavouring to discover means by which peace might be preserved. In the evening, it was his custom to meet the Counts Metterrich and Romanzow at the assemblies of the Prince of Tour and Taxis, and there, totally unknown to Bonaparte, to agitate the means of preventing war;—so certain it is, that even the ablest and most absolute of sovereigns was liable, like an ordinary prince, to be deceived by the statesmen around him. But the ingenuity of these distinguished politicians could find no means of reconciling the interests of Austria,—seeing, as she thought, an opportunity of forcing from Napoleon in his hour of weakness, what she had been compelled to surrender to him in his hour

of strength,—and those of Bonaparte, who knew that so soon as he should make a single sacrifice to compulsion, he would be held as having degraded that high military reputation which was the foundation of his power. It may reasonably be supposed, that, with the undecided war of Spain on his hands, he would willingly have adjourned the contest; but with him, the sound of the trumpet was a summons to be complied with, in the most complicated state of general embarrassment.

The exertions made by Austria on this important occasion were gigantic, and her forces were superior to those which she had been able to summon out at any former period of her history. Including the army of reserve, they were computed as high as five hundred and fifty thousand men, which the Archduke Charles once more commanded in the character of generalissimo. It is said that this gallant prince did not heartily approve of the war, at least of the period chosen to commence it, but readily sacrificed his own opinion to the desire of contributing his utmost abilities to the service of his brother and of his country.

Six corps d'armée, each about thirty thousand strong, were destined, under the archduke's immediate command, to maintain the main weight of the war in Germany; a seventh, under the Archduke Ferdinand, was stationed in Galicia, and judged sufficient to oppose themselves to what forces Russia, in compliance with her engagements to Napoleon, might find herself obliged to detach in that direction; and two divisions, under the Archduke John, were destined to awaken hostilities in the north of Italy, into which they were to penetrate by the passes of Carinthia and Carniola.

Bonaparte had not sufficient numbers to oppose these formidable masses; but he had recourse to his old policy, and trusted to make up for deficiency of general numerical force, by such rapidity of movement as should insure a local superiority on the spot in which the contest might take place. He summoned out the auxiliary forces of the Confederation of the Rhine, and of the King of Saxony. He remanded many troops who were on their march for Spain, and by doing so virtually adjourned, and, as it proved, for ever, the subjugation of that country. He had already in Germany the corps of Davoust, and of General Oudinot. The garrisons which France had established in Prussia, and in the northern parts of Germany, were drained for the purpose of reinforcing his ranks; but the total amount of his assembled forces was still greatly inferior to those of the Archduke Charles.

On the 9th of April, 1809, the Archduke crossed the Inn; and thus a second time Austria commenced her combat with France, by the invasion of Germany. Some confidence was placed in the general discontent which prevailed among the Germans, and especially those of the Confederation of the Rhine, and their hatred of a system which made them on every occasion the instruments of French policy. The Archduke averred in his manifesto, that the cause of his brother was that of general independence, not individual aggrandisement; and he addressed himself particularly to those his brothers of Germany, who were now com-

pelled by circumstances to serve in the opposite ranks. Whatever effects might have been produced by such an address, supposing it to have had time to operate, the result was disconcerted by the promptitude, which with Bonaparte was almost always the harbinger of success.

While the Austrian army moved slow, and with frequent halts, encumbered as they were with their baggage and supplies, Napoleon had no sooner learned by the telegraph the actual invasion of Bavaria, than he left Paris on the instant, and hurried to Frankfort, without guards, without equipage, almost without a companion, save the faithful Joséphine, who accompanied him as far as Strasburg, and there remained for some time watching the progress of the campaign, the event of which was destined to have such a melancholy influence on her own happiness.

The Archduke Charles's plan was to act upon the offensive. His talents were undoubted, his army greatly superior in numbers to the French, and favourably disposed, whether for attack or defence; yet, by a series of combinations, the most beautiful and striking, perhaps, which occur in the life of one so famed for his power of forming such, Bonaparte was enabled, in the short space of five days, totally to defeat the formidable masses which were opposed to him.

Napoleon found his own force unfavourably disposed, on a long line, extending between the towns of Augsburg and Ratisbon, and presenting, through the incapacity it is said of Berthier, an alarming vacancy in the centre, by operating on which the enemy might have separated the French army into two parts, and exposed each to a flank attack. Sensible of the full, and perhaps fatal consequences, which might attend this error, Napoleon determined on the daring attempt to concentrate his army by a lateral march, to be accomplished by the two wings simultaneously. With this view he posted himself in the centre, where the danger was principally apprehended, commanding Masséna to advance by a flank movement from Augsburg to Pfaffenhofen, and Davoust to approach the centre by a similar manoeuvre from Ratisbon to Neustadt. These marches must necessarily be forced, that of Davoust being eight, that of Masséna betwixt twelve and thirteen leagues. The order for this daring operation was sent to Masséna on the night of the 17th, and concluded with an earnest recommendation of speed and intelligence. When the time for executing these movements had been allowed, Bonaparte, at the head of the centre of his forces, made a sudden and desperate assault upon two Austrian divisions, commanded by the Archduke Louis and General Hiller. So judiciously was this timed, that the appearance of Davoust on the one flank kept in check those other Austrian corps d'armée, by whom the divisions attacked ought to have been supported; while the yet more formidable operations of Masséna, in the rear of the Archduke Louis, achieved the defeat of the enemy. This victory, gained at Abensberg upon the 20th April, broke the line of the Austrians, and exposed them to farther misfortunes. The emperor attacked the fugitives the next day at Landsbut, where the Austrians lost

thirty pieces of cannon, nine thousand prisoners, and much ammunition and baggage.

On the 22d April, after this fortunate commencement of the campaign, Bonaparte directed his whole force, scientifically arranged into different divisions, and moving by different routes, on the principal army of the Archduke Charles, which, during these misfortunes, he had concentrated at Eckmühl. The battle is said to have been one of the most splendid which the art of war could display. A hundred thousand men and upwards were dispossessed of all their positions by the combined attack of their scientific enemy, the divisions appearing on the field, each in its due place and order, as regularly as the movements of the various pieces in a game of chess. All the Austrian wounded, great part of their artillery, fifteen stand of colours, and twenty thousand prisoners, remained in the power of the French. The retreat was attended with corresponding loss; and Austria, again baffled in her hopes of re-acquiring her influence in Germany, was once more reduced to combat for her existence amongst nations.

On the subsequent day, the Austrians made some attempt to protect the retreat of their army, by defending Ratisbon. A partial breach in the ancient walls was hastily effected, but for some time the French who advanced to the storm, were destroyed by the musketry of the defenders. There was at length difficulty in finding volunteers to renew the attack, when the impetuous Lannes, by whom they were commanded, seized a ladder, and rushed forward to fix it himself against the walls. "I will show you," he exclaimed, "that your general is still a grenadier." The example prevailed, the wall was surmounted, and the combat was continued or renewed in the streets of the town, which was speedily on fire. A body of French, rushing to charge a body of Austrians, which still occupied one end of a burning street, were interrupted by some waggons belonging to the enemy's train. "They are tumbrils of powder," cried the Austrian commanding, to the French; "if the flames reach them, both sides perish." The combat ceased, and the two parties joined in averting a calamity which must have been fatal to both, and, finally, saved the ammunition from the flames. At length the Austrians were driven out of Ratisbon, leaving much cannon, baggage, and prisoners, in the hands of the enemy.

In the middle of this last *mêlée*, Bonaparte, who was speaking with his adjutant, Duroc, observing the affair at some distance, was struck on the foot by a spent musket-ball, which occasioned a severe contusion. "That must have been a Tyrolese," said the emperor, coolly, "who has aimed at me from such a distance. These fellows fire with wonderful precision." Those around remonstrated with him for exposing his person; to which he answered, "What can I do? I must needs see how matters go on." The soldiers crowded about him in alarm at the report of his wound; but he would hardly allow it to be dressed, so eager was he to get on horseback and put an end to the solicitude of his army, by showing himself publicly among the troops.

Thus within five days,—the space, and almost the very days of the month, which Bonaparte had assigned for settling the affairs of Germany,—the ori-

ginal aspect of the war was entirely changed; and Austria, who had engaged in it with the proud hope of reviving her original influence in Europe, was now to continue the struggle for the doubtful chance of securing her existence. At no period in his momentous career, did the genius of Napoleon appear more completely to prostrate all opposition; at no time did the talents of a single individual exercise such an influence on the fate of the universe. The forces which he had in the field had been not only unequal to those of the enemy, but they were, in a military point of view, ill-placed and imperfectly combined. Napoleon arrived alone, found himself under all these disadvantages, and, we repeat, by his almost unassisted genius, came, in the course of five days, in complete triumph out of a struggle which bore a character so unpromising. It was no wonder that others, nay, that he himself, should have annexed to his person the degree of superstitious influence claimed for the chosen instruments of destiny, whose path must not be crossed, and whose arms cannot be arrested.

While the relics of the Archduke Charles's army were on full retreat to Bohemia, Napoleon employed the 23d and 24th of April, to review his troops, and distributed with a liberal hand honours and rewards. It was in this sphere that he was seen to greatest advantage; for, although too much of a soldier among sovereigns, no one could claim with better right to be a sovereign among soldiers. It was on this occasion, that, striking a soldier familiarly on the cheek, as he said "I create you a knight," he asked the honoured party his name.

"You ought to know it well," answered the soldier; "since I am the man, who, in the deserts of Syria, when you were in extremity, relieved you from my flask."

Napoleon instantly recollected the individual and the circumstance. "I make you," he said, "a knight, with an annuity of twelve hundred francs—what will you do with so much money?"

"Drink with my comrades to the health of him that is so necessary to us."

The generals had their share in the imperial bounty, particularly Davoust, to whose brilliant execution of the manœuvres commanded by Napoleon, the victory was directly to be attributed. He was created Prince of Eckmühl. It was a part of Napoleon's policy, by connecting the names of fields of victory with the titles of those who contributed to acquire it, to ally the recollections of their merits with his own grateful acknowledgment of them. Thus the title of every ennobled marshal was a fresh incentive to such officers as were ambitious of distinction.

After the fatal battle of Eckmühl, the Archduke Charles effected, as we have seen, his retreat into the mountainous country of Bohemia, full of defiles, and highly capable of defence, where he could remodel his broken army, receive reinforcements of every kind, and make a protracted defence, should Napoleon press upon him in that direction. But the victories of these memorable five days had placed the French Emperor in full possession of the right bank of the Danube, and of the high-road to the city of Vienna, which is situated on the same

side of the river. True to his principle of striking directly at the heart of his antagonist, Napoleon determined to march on the metropolis of Austria, instead of pursuing the archduke into the mountains of Bohemia. By the latter course, the war might have been long protracted, a contingency which it was always Napoleon's policy to avoid; and, alarmed for the preponderance which France was about to acquire, Russia herself, now acting tardily and unwillingly as the ally of Napoleon, might have assumed a right of mediating, which she had strength enough to enforce if it should be declined.

On the other hand, the Austrian General Hiller, defeated at Landshut, and cut off from communication with the archduke, had been able to unite himself with a considerable reserve, and assumed the mien of defending the high-road to the capital. Bonaparte had thus an enemy of some consequence in front, while the army of Charles might operate from Bohemia upon the communications in his rear; and a universal national insurrection of the Tyrolese threatened not only entirely to expel the French and Bavarians from their mountains, but even to alarm Bavaria herself. Insurrections were also beginning to take place all through Germany, of a character which showed, that, had the tide of war turned against France, almost all the north of Germany would have been in arms against her. These dangers, which would have staggered a man of less determination, only confirmed Napoleon in his purpose of compelling Austria to make peace, by descending the Danube, and effecting a second occupation of her capital.

All was shortly in motion for the intended enterprise. General Hiller, too weak to attempt the defence of the Inn, retreated to Ebersberg, a village with a castle upon the river Traun, which was in most places unfordable, and had elevated rocky banks, scarped by the hand of Nature. One bridge communicating with the town was the only mode of approaching the position, which, viewed in front, seemed almost impregnable. It was occupied by Hiller with more than thirty thousand men, and a formidable train of artillery. He trusted to be able to maintain himself in this strong line of defence, until he should renew his communications with the Archduke Charles, and obtain that prince's co-operation in the task of covering Vienna, by defending the course of the Danube.

Upon the 3d of May the position of Ebersberg was attacked by Masséna, and stormed after a most desperate resistance, which probably cost the victors as many men as the vanquished. The hardness of this attack has been censured by some military critics, who pretend, that if Masséna had confined his front attack to a feint, the Austrian general would have been as effectually dislodged, and at a much cheaper rate, by a corresponding movement upon his flank, to be executed by General Lannes, who passed the river Traun at Wels for that purpose. But Masséna, either from the dictates of his own impetuous disposition, or because he had understood the emperor's commands as positively enjoining an attack, or that he feared Lannes might be too late in arriving, when every moment was precious, because every moment might re-establish the com-

munication between the Archduke and Hiller,—attempted and succeeded in the desperate resolution of disposing the Austrian general by main force.

General Hiller retreated to St. Pölten, then crossed the Danube by the bridge at Mautern, which he destroyed after his passage, and, marching to form his junction with the Archduke Charles, left the right side of the Danube, and consequently the high-road to Vienna, open to the French. Napoleon moved forward with a steady yet rapid pace, calculating upon gaining the advance necessary to arrive at the Austrian capital before the archduke, yet at the same time marching without precipitation, and taking the necessary measures for protecting his communications.

The city of Vienna, properly so called, is surrounded by the ancient fortifications which withstood the siege of the Turks in 1683. The suburbs, which are of great extent, are surrounded by some slighter defences, but which could only be made good by a large army. Had the archduke, with his forces, been able to throw himself into Vienna before Bonaparte's arrival under its walls, no doubt a formidable defence might have been made. The inclination of the citizens was highly patriotic. They fired from the ramparts on the advance of the French, and rejected the summons of surrender. The Archduke Maximilian was governor of the place, at the head of ten battalions of troops of the line, and as many of landwehr, or militia.

A shower of bombs first made the inhabitants sensible of the horrors to which they must necessarily be exposed by defensive war. The palace of the Emperor of Austria was in the direct front of this terrible fire. The emperor himself, and the greater part of his family, had retired to the city of Buda in Hungary; but one was left behind, confined by indisposition, and this was Maria Louisa, the young archduchess, who shortly afterwards became Empress of France. On intimation to this purpose being made to Bonaparte, the palace was respected, and the storm of these terrible missiles directed to other quarters. The intention of defending the capital was speedily given up. The Archduke Maximilian, with the troops of the line, evacuated the city; and, on the 12th, General O'Reilly, commanding some battalions of landwehr, signed the capitulation with the French.

Napoleon did not himself enter Vienna; he fixed his head-quarters at Schönbrunn, a palace of the emperor's in the vicinity of the capital.

In the meanwhile, the Archduke Charles, unable to prevent the fall of Vienna, was advancing to avenge it. In the march which he made through Bohemia, he had greatly increased his army; and the events in the north of Germany and the Tyrol had been so dangerous to French influence, that it required all the terrors of the battle of Eckmühl to keep the unwilling vassals of the conqueror in a state of subjection. Before, therefore, we trace the course of remarkable events which were about to take place on the Danube, the reader is requested to take a brief view of the war on the Polish frontier, in Italy, in the north of Germany, and in the Tyrol; for no smaller portion of the civilized world was

actually the scene of hostilities during this momentous period.

In Poland, the Archduke Ferdinand threw himself into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, as the part of Poland which formerly belonged to Prussia; obtained possession of Warsaw itself, and pressed northward with such vivacity, that, while Prince Poniatowski was hardly able to assemble a small defensive army between the Narew and the Vistula, the archduke approached Thorn, and was in a situation to summon Prussia to arms. The call would doubtless have been readily obeyed, had the Archduke Charles obtained any shadow of success in the commencement of the campaign. But the French had possession of all the most important Prussian fortresses, which rendered it imprudent, indeed almost impossible, for that power to offer any effectual means of resistance, until the arms of Austria should assume that decided preponderance, which they were not on this occasion doomed to attain.

The feeling of indignation against the foreign yoke had, however, penetrated deeply into the bosom of the Prussians. The doctrines of the Tugend-bund had been generally received among the higher and middling classes—the lower listened to the counsels only of their own patriotism and courage. The freedom of Europe—the independence of Germany—the delivery of Prussia from a foreign bondage—the obtaining security for what was most dear and valuable to mankind, determined Schill, a Prussian major of hussars, to attempt, even without the commands of his king, the liberation of his country.

During the former unhappy war, Schill, like Blücher, conducted himself with the most patriotic devotion, and had, when courage and conduct were rare, been distinguished by both in his service as a partisan officer. On the present occasion, his attempt may be likened to a rocket shot up into the firmament, which, by its descent upon a magazine, may give rise to the most appalling results; or which, bursting in empty space, is only remembered by its brief and brilliant career. Chance allotted to Schill the latter and more unfavourable conclusion; but his name must be enrolled in the list of those heroes who have ventured their lives to redress the wrongs of their country, and the remembrance of whose courage often forms the strongest impulse to others to reassume the heroic undertaking, for which they themselves have struggled in vain.

The movement which this daring soldier had projected, was connected with a plan of general insurrection, but was detected by a premature discovery. Colonel Doernberg, an officer of the Westphalian guard, was engaged in the conspiracy, and had undertaken to secure the person of Jérôme Bonaparte. His scheme was discovered; and among his papers were found some which implicated Schill in these insurrectionary measures. Jérôme, of course, made his complaint to the King of Prussia, who was in no capacity to refuse to deliver up the accused officer. Obligated thus to precipitate his plan of insurrection, Schill put himself at the head of his regiment, which was animated by his own spirit, and marched out of Berlin to proclaim the independence of his country. He showed the utmost

speed and dexterity in his military manoeuvres, and soon assembled a small army of 5000 or 6000 men, sufficient to take possession of various towns, and of the little fortress of Demitz.

Katt, another insurgent, placed himself at the head of an insurrection in Cassel; and a yet more formidable leader, distinguished alike by his birth, his bravery, and his misfortunes, appeared in the field. This was the Duke of Brunswick Oels, son of him who was mortally wounded at Jena. The young prince had ever since before his eyes the remembrance of his father, to whom Bonaparte's enmity would not permit even the leisure of an hour to die in his own palace. The breaking out of the war betwixt France and Austria seemed to promise him the road to revenge. The duke contracted with Austria to levy a body of men, and he was furnished by England with the means to equip and maintain them. His name, his misfortunes, his character, and his purpose, tended soon to fill his ranks; the external appearance of which indicated deep sorrow, and a determined purpose of vengeance. His uniform was black, in memory of his father's death; the lace of the cavalry was disposed like the ribs of a skeleton; the helmets and caps bore a death's head on their front.

The brave young soldier was too late in appearing in the field. If he could have united his forces with those of Schill, Doernberg, Katt, and the other insurgents, he might have effected a general rising in the north; but the event of Eckmühl, and the taking of Vienna, had already checked the awakening spirit of Germany, and subsequent misfortunes tended to subdue, at least for the time, the tendency to universal resistance which would otherwise certainly have been manifested. It was about the middle of May when the Duke of Brunswick advanced from Bohemia into Lusatia, and by that time the corps of Schill and others were existing only as separate bands of partisans, surrounded or pursued by the adherents of France, to whom the successes of Bonaparte had given fresh courage.

General Thielmann opposed himself to the duke, at the head of some Saxon troops, and was strong enough to prevent his forcing his way into the middle of Germany, where his presence might have occasioned great events. Still, however, though the plans of the insurgents had been thus far disappointed or checked, their forces remained on foot, and formidable, and the general disposition of the nation in their favour rendered them more so.

While the insurrectional spirit which animated the Germans smouldered in some places like subterranean fire, and partially showed itself by eruptions in others, the mountains of the Tyrol were in one general blaze through their deepest recesses. Those wild regions, which had been one of the oldest inheritances of Austria, had been torn from her by the treaty of Presburg, and conferred on the new kingdom of Bavaria. The inclination of the inhabitants had not been consulted in this change. The Austrians had always governed them with a singular mildness and respect for their customs; and had thus gained the affection of their Tyrolese subjects, who could not therefore understand how an allegiance resembling that of children to a parent, should

have been transferred without their consent to a stranger sovereign, with whom they had no tie of mutual feeling. The nation was the more sensible of these natural sentiments, because the condition of the people is one of the most primitive in Europe. The extremes of rank and wealth are unknown in those pastoral districts; they have almost no distinction among their inhabitants; neither nobles nor serfs, neither office-bearers nor dependents; in one sense, neither rich nor poor. As great a degree of equality as is perhaps consistent with the existence of society, is to be found in the Tyrol. In temper they are a gay, animated people, fond of exertion and excitation, lovers of the wine-flask and the dance, extempore poets, and frequently good musicians. With these are united the more hardy qualities of the mountaineer, accustomed to the life of a shepherd and huntsman, and, amidst the Alpine precipices, often placed in danger of life, while exercising one or other of the occupations. As workmen, the Tyrolese are accounted the finest in Europe; and the readiness with which they obeyed the repeated summons of Austria, during former wars, showed that their rustic employments had in no respect diminished their ancient love of military enterprise. Their magistrates in peace, and leaders in war, were no otherwise distinguished from the rest of the nation than by their sagacity and general intelligence; and as these qualities were ordinarily found among innkeepers, who, in a country like the Tyrol, have the most general opportunities of obtaining information, many of that class were leaders in the memorable war of 1809. These men sometimes could not even read or write, yet, in general, exhibited so much common sense and presence of mind, such a ready knowledge of the capacity of the troops they commanded, and of the advantages of the country in which they served, that they became formidable to the best generals and the most disciplined soldiers.*

In the beginning of April these ready warriors commenced their insurrection, and in four days, excepting in the small fortress of Kufstein, which continued to hold out, there was not a Frenchman or Bavarian in the Tyrol, save those who were prisoners. The history of that heroic war belongs to another page of history. It is enough here to say, that, scarcely supported by the Austrians, who had too much to do at home, the Tyrolese made against every odds the most magnanimous and obstinate defence. It was in vain that a French army, led by Lefebvre, marched into the country, and occupied Innspruck, the capital. The French were a second time compelled by these valiant mountaineers to retreat with immense loss; and if Austria could have maintained her own share of the contest, her faithful provinces of Tyrol and the Vorarlberg must on their side have come off victors.

* The Austrians censured the want of tactics of the Tyrolese. Some poetical sharp-shooter defended his countrymen by an epigram, of which the following is a translation:—

It is but chance, our learn'd tacticians say,
Which without science gains the battle day;
Yet would I rather win the field by chance,
Than study tactics, and be beat by France.

But the disasters of the Archduke Charles, as they neutralized the insurrections in Germany, and rendered of no comparative avail the victories of the Tyrolese, so they also checked the train of success which had attended the movements of the Archduke John in Italy, at the commencement of the war. We have already said, that the safety and honour of Austria being, as it was thought, sufficiently provided for by the strength of the main army, this young prince had been dispatched into Italy, as the Archduke Ferdinand into Poland, to resuscitate the interest of their house in their ancient dominions. Eugène, the son-in-law of Bonaparte, and his viceroy in Italy, was defeated at Sacile upon the 15th of April, by the Archduke John, and compelled to retire to Caldiero on the Adige. But ere the Austrian prince could improve his advantages, he received the news of the defeat at Eckmühl, and the peril in which Vienna was placed. He was, therefore, under the necessity of retreating, to gain, if possible, the kingdom of Hungary, where the presence of his army might be of the most essential consequence. He was in his turn pursued by Prince Eugène, to whom the Austrian retreat gave the means of uniting himself with the French force in Dalmatia, from which he had been separated, and thus enabled him to assume the offensive with forces much augmented.

Thus the mighty contest was continued with various events, from the shores of the Baltic to those of the Adriatic, and from the eastern provinces of Germany to those of Hungary. But the eyes of all men, averted from the more remote and subordinate scenes of the struggle, were now turned towards the expected combat betwixt Bonaparte and the Archduke Charles, which it was easily predicted must soon take place under the walls of Vienna, and decide, it was then apprehended for ever, the future fate, perhaps the very existence, of the empire of Austria.

CHAPTER LXVI.

Positions of the French and Austrian armies after the battle of Eckmühl.—Napoleon crosses the Danube on 20th May.—Great conflict at Asperne on the 21st and 22d, when victory was claimed by both parties.—Both armies are strongly reinforced.—Battle of Wagram fought on the 6th July, in which the Austrians are completely defeated, with the loss of 20,000 prisoners.—Armistice concluded at Znaim.—Close of the career of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick Oels.—Defence of the Tyrol—Its final unfortunate result.—Growing resistance becomes manifest throughout Germany—Its effects on Bonaparte.—He publishes a singular manifesto in the Moniteur—This manifesto examined.

We left Napoleon concentrating his army near Vienna, and disposing it so as to preserve his communications with France, though distant and precarious. He occupied the city of Vienna and the right bank of the Danube. The Archduke Charles now approached the left bank of the same river, which, swollen by the spring rains, and the melting of snow on the mountains, divided the two hostile armies as if by an impassable barrier. In the year

1805, when Napoleon first obtained possession of Vienna, the bridges over the Danube were preserved, which had enabled him to press his march upon Koutousoff and the Russians. This time he had not been so fortunate. No bridge had been left unbroken on the Danube, whether above or below Vienna, by which he might push his forces across the river, and end the war by again defeating the Austrian Archduke. At the same time, the hours lost in indecision were all unfavourable to the French Emperor. Charles expected to be joined by his brothers, and, being in his own country, could subsist with ease; while Napoleon, in that of an enemy, could expect no recruits, and might have difficulty in obtaining supplies. Besides, so long as an Austrian army was in the field, the hopes of Germany remained unextinguished. The policy, therefore, of Bonaparte determined him to pursue the most vigorous measures, by constructing a bridge over the Danube, and crossing it at the head of his army, with the purpose of giving battle to the Archduke on the left bank.

The place originally selected for this bold enterprise was at Nussdorf, about half a league above Vienna, where the principal stream passes in a full but narrow channel under the right bank, which is there so high as to command the opposite verge of the river, and affords, therefore, the means of protecting the passage. But about five hundred men having been pushed across, with the view of re-establishing the old bridge which had existed at Nussdorf in 1805, were attacked and cut off by the Austrians, and this point of passage was in consequence abandoned.

Napoleon then turned his thoughts to establishing his intended bridge at a village called Ebersdorf, on the right bank, opposite to which the channel of the Danube is divided into five branches, finding their course amongst islands, one of which, called the Island of Lobau, is extremely large. Two of these branches are very broad. The islands are irregular in their shape, and have an alluvial character. They exhibit a broken and diversified surface, partly covered with woods, partly marshy, and at times overflowed with water. Here Napoleon at length determined to establish his bridge, and he collected for that purpose as many boats and small craft as he could muster, and such other materials as he could obtain. The diligence of the engineer officer, Aubry, was distinguished on this occasion.

The French were obliged to use fishers' boats, and caissons filled with bullets instead of anchors, and to make many other substitutions for the accomplishment of their objects. They laboured without interruption; for the Austrians, though they made various demonstrations upon Krems and Linz, as if they themselves meant to cross the Danube above Vienna, yet did nothing to disturb Napoleon's preparation for a passage at Ebersdorf, although troops might have been easily thrown into the Island of Lobau, to dispute the occupation, or to interrupt the workmen. It is impossible to suppose the Archduke Charles ignorant of the character of the ground in the neighbourhood of his brother's capital; we must therefore conjecture, that the Austrian general had determined to let Bonaparte accomplish his

purpose of passing the river, in order to have the advantage of attacking him when only a part of his army had crossed, and of compelling him to fight with the Danube in his rear, which, in case of disaster, could only be re-passed by a succession of frail and ill-constructed bridges, exposed to a thousand accidents. It is doing the archduke no discredit to suppose he acted on such a resolution, for we shall presently see he actually gained the advantages we have pointed out, and which, could they have been prosecuted to the uttermost, would have involved the ruin of Bonaparte and his army.

The materials having been brought together from every quarter, Napoleon, on the 19th May, visited the Isle of Lobau, and directed that the completion of the bridge should be pressed with all possible dispatch. So well were his orders obeyed, that, on the next day, the troops were able to commence their passage, although the bridge was still far from being complete. They were received by skirmishers on the left bank; but as these fell back without any obstinacy of resistance, it became still more obvious that the archduke did not mean to dispute the passage, more especially as he had not availed himself of the important means of doing so which the locality presented.

At the point where the extremity of the last bridge of the chain (for there were five in number, corresponding to the five streams), touched the left bank of the Danube, the French troops, as they passed over, entered upon a little plain, extending between the two villages of Asperne and Essling. Asperne lies farthest to the left, a thousand toises distant from the bridge; Essling is at the other extremity of the plain, about one thousand five hundred toises from the same point. The villages being built of mason-work, with gardens, terraces, and court-yards, formed each a little fortified place, of which the churchyard of Asperne, and a large granary at Essling, might be termed the citadels. A high-road, bordered by a deep ditch, extended between these two strong posts, which it connected as a curtain connects two bastions. This position, if occupied, might indeed be turned on either flank, but the character of the ground would render the operation difficult.

Still farther to the right, lay another village, called Entzersdorf. It is a thousand toises from Asperne to Essling, and somewhat less from Essling to Entzersdorf. Before these villages arose an almost imperceptible ascent, which extended to two hamlets called Raschdorf and Breitenlee, and on the left lay the wooded heights of Bisamberg, bounding the landscape in that direction. Having passed over near thirty thousand infantry, with about six thousand horse, Napoleon directed a redoubt to be constructed to cover the extremity of the bridge on the left side. Meantime, his troops occupied the two villages of Asperne and Essling, and the line which connected them.

The reports brought in during the night were contradictory, nor could the signs visible on the horizon induce the generals to agree concerning the numbers and probable plans of the Austrians. On the distant heights of Bisamberg many lights were seen, which induced Lannes and others to conceive

the enemy to be there concentrated. But much nearer the French, and in their front, the horizon also exhibited a pale streak of about a league in length, the reflected light of numerous watchfires, which the situation of the ground prevented being themselves seen.

From these indications, while Lannes was of opinion they had before them only a strong rearguard, Masséna, with more judgment, maintained they were in presence of the whole Austrian army. Napoleon was on horseback by break of day on the 21st, to decide by his own observation; but all the ground in front was so thickly masked and covered by the Austrian light cavalry, as to render it vain to attempt to reconnoitre. On a sudden, this living veil of skirmishers was withdrawn, and the Austrians were seen advancing with their whole force, divided into five columns of attack, headed by their best generals, their numbers more than double those of the French, and possessing two hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. The combat commenced by a furious attack on the village of Asperne, which seemed only taken that it might be retaken, only retaken that it might be again lost. The carnage was dreadful; the obstinacy of the Austrians in attacking could not, however, overcome that of the French in their defence. Essling was also assailed by the Austrians, though not with the same pertinacity; yet many brave men fell in its attack and defence.

The battle began about four afternoon; and, when the evening approached, nothing decisive had been done. The archduke brought his reserves, and poured them in successive bodies upon the disputed village of Asperne. Every garden, terrace, and farm-yard, was a scene of the most obstinate struggle. Waggons, carts, barrows, ploughs, were employed to construct barricades. As the different parties succeeded on different points, those who were victorious in front were often attacked in the rear by such of the other party as had prevailed in the next street. At the close of the day, Masséna remained partially master of the place, on fire as it was with bombs, and choked with the slain. The Austrians, however, had gained possession of the church and churchyard, and claimed the superiority on the left accordingly.

Essling was the object, during the last part of this bloody day, of three general attacks; against all which the French made decisive head. At one time, Lannes, who defended the post, was so hard pressed, that he must have given way, had not Napoleon relieved him and obtained him breathing time, by a well-timed though audacious charge of cavalry. Night separated the combatants.

The French could not in any sense be said to have been beaten; but it was an unusual thing for them, fighting under Napoleon's eye, to be less than completely victorious. The Austrians could as little be called victors; but even the circumstance of possessing themselves of the most important part of Asperne, showed that the advantage had been with, rather than against them; and both armies were affected with the results of the day, rather as they appeared when compared with those of their late encounters, than as considered in their own proper

character. The feeling of the Austrians was exultation; that of the French not certainly discouragement, but unpleasant surprise.

On the 22d, the work of carnage recommenced. Both armies had received reinforcements during the night—Napoleon from the left bank, the archduke from reserves in his rear. The French had at first the advantage—they recovered the church of Asperne, and made a number of Austrians prisoners in the village. But the attacks on it were presently renewed with the same fury as on the preceding day. Napoleon here formed a resolution worthy of his military fame. He observed that the enemy, while pressing on the village of Asperne, which was the left-hand point of support of the French position, kept back, or, in military language, refused, the right and centre of his line, which he was therefore led to suppose were weakened for the purpose of supporting the assault upon Asperne. He determined, for this reason, to advance the whole French right and centre, to assail the Austrian position on this enfeebled point. This movement was executed in échelon advancing from the French right. Heavy masses of infantry, with a numerous artillery, now advanced with fury. The Austrian line was forced back, and in some danger of being broken. Regiments and brigades began to be separated from each other, and there was a danger that the whole centre might be cut off from the right wing. The Archduke Charles hastened to the spot, and in this critical moment discharged at once the duty of a general and of a common soldier. He brought up reserves, replaced the gaps which had been made in his line by the fury of the French, and, seizing a standard, himself led the grenadiers to the charge.

At this interesting point, the national accounts of the action differ considerably. The French dispatches assert, that, notwithstanding the personal gallantry of their general, the Austrians were upon the point of a total defeat. Those of the archduke, on the contrary, affirm that the resistance of the Austrians was completely successful, and that the French were driven back on all points. All agree, that just at this crisis of the combat, the bridge which Bonaparte had established over the Danube was swept away by the flood.

This opportune incident is said, by the Austrian accounts, to have been occasioned by fire-ships sent down the river. The French have denied the existence of the fire-ships, and, always unwilling to allow much effect to the result of their adversaries' exertions, ascribe the destruction of the floating bridge to the trunks of trees and vessels borne down by a sudden swell of the Danube. General Pellet, indeed, admits, with some reluctance, that timber frames of one or more windmills, filled with burning combustibles, descended the river. But whether the Austrians had executed the very natural plan of launching such fire-works and drift-wood on the stream, or whether, as the ancient heathen might have said, the aged and haughty river shook from his shoulders by his own exertions the yoke which the strangers had imposed on him, the bridge was certainly broken, and Bonaparte's army was extremely endangered.

He saw himself compelled to retire, if he meant

to secure, or rather to restore, his communication with the right bank of the Danube. The French movement in retreat was the signal for the Austrians' advance. They recovered Asperne; and had not the French fought with most extraordinary conduct and valour, they must have sustained the greatest loss. General Lannes, whose behaviour had been the subject of admiration during the whole day, was mortally wounded by a ball, which shattered both his legs. Masséna sustained himself in this crisis with much readiness and presence of mind; and the preservation of the army was chiefly attributed to him. It is said, but perhaps falsely, that Napoleon himself showed on this occasion less alertness and readiness than was his custom.

At length, the retreat of the French was protected by the cannon of Essling, which was again and again furiously assailed by the Austrians. Had they succeeded on this second point, the French army could hardly have escaped, for it was Essling alone which protected their retreat. Fortunately for Bonaparte, that end of the bridge which connected the great Isle of Lobau with the left bank on which they were fighting still remained uninjured, and was protected by fortifications. By this means he was enabled to draw back his shattered army during night into the great island, evacuating the whole position which he had held on the right bank. The loss of both armies was dreadful, and computed to exceed twenty thousand men on each side, killed and wounded. General St-Hilaire, one of the best French generals, was killed in the field, and Lannes, mortally wounded, was brought back into the island. He was much lamented by Bonaparte, who considered him as his own work. "I found him," he said, "a mere swordsman, I brought him up to the highest point of talent. I found him a dwarf, I raised him up into a giant." The death of this general, called the Roland of the army, had something in it inexpressibly shocking. With both his legs shot to pieces, he refused to die, and insisted that the surgeons should be banded who were unable to cure a marshal and Duke de Montebello. While he thus clung to life, he called on the emperor, with the instinctive hope that Napoleon at least could defer the dreaded hour, and repeated his name to the last, with the wild interest with which an Indian prays to the object of his superstition. Bonaparte showed much and creditable emotion at beholding his faithful follower in such a condition.

The news of this terrible action flew far and wide, and was represented by the Austrians as a glorious and complete victory. It might have well proved so, if both the villages of Asperne and Essling could have been carried. As it was, it cannot properly be termed more than a repulse, by which the French Emperor's attempt to advance had been defeated, and he himself driven back into an island, and cut off by an inundation from the opposite bank, on which his supplies were stationed; and so far, certainly, placed in a very precarious condition.

The hopes and wishes of all Europe were opposed to the domination of Bonaparte; and Hope, it is well known, can build fair fabrics on slighter foundations than this severe check afforded. It had been repeatedly prophesied, that Napoleon's fortune would

some time or other fail in one of those hardy measures, and that by penetrating into the depth of his enemy's country, in order to strike a blow at his capital, he might engage himself beyond his means of recovery, and thus become the victim of his own rashness. But the time was not yet arrived which fate had assigned for the fulfilment of this prophecy. More activity on the part of the Austrian prince, and a less vigorous development of resources and energy on that of Napoleon, might have produced a different result; but, unhappily, the former proved less capable of improving his advantage, than the latter of remedying his disasters.

On the morning of the 23d, the day after the bloody battle of Asperne, Bonaparte, with his wounded, and the remnant of his forces, was cooped up in the marshy island of Lobau, and another nearer to the left bank, called Entzersdorf, from the village of that name. This last island, which served as an outwork to the larger, is separated from the left bank, which was occupied by the Austrians, only by a small channel of twenty toises in breadth. The destruction of the bridges had altogether divided Bonaparte from the right bank, and from his rear, under Davoust, which still remained there. The nature of the ground, on the left side of the Danube, opposite to the isle of Entzersdorf, admitted cannon being placed to command the passage, and it is said that General Hiller ardently pressed the plan of passing the stream by open force at that point, and attacking successively the islands of Entzersdorf and Lobau, and offered to answer with his head for its success. The extreme loss sustained by the Austrian army on the two preceding days appears to have been the cause that his proposal was rejected. It has been also judged possible for Prince Charles to have passed the Danube, either at Presburg or higher up, and thus placed himself on the right bank, for the purpose of attacking and destroying the reserves which Bonaparte had left at Ebersdorf under Davoust, and from which he was separated by the inundation. Yet neither did the archduke adopt this plan, but, resuming the defensive, from which he had only departed for a few hours, and concluding that Napoleon would, on his part, adopt the same plan which he had formerly pursued, the Austrian engineers were chiefly engaged in fortifying the ground between Asperne and Essling, while the army quietly awaited till it should suit Napoleon to renew his attempt to cross the Danube.

With unexampled activity, Bonaparte had assembled materials, and accomplished the re-establishment of his communications with the right bank, by the morning of the second day after the battle. Thus was all chance destroyed of the Austrians making any farther profit of the interruption of his communications. With equal speed, incessant labour converted the Isle of Lobau into an immense camp, protected by battering cannon, and secured either from surprise or storm from the Austrian side of the river; so that Hiller's plan became equally impracticable. The smaller islands were fortified in the like manner; and, on the 1st of July, Bonaparte pitched his head-quarters in the Isle of Lobau, the name of which was changed to Napoleon Island, as in an immense citadel, from which he had pro-

vided the means of sallying at pleasure upon the enemy. Boats, small craft, and means to construct, on a better plan than formerly, three floating bridges, were prepared and put in order in an incredibly short space of time. The former bridge, repaired so strongly as to have little to fear from the fury of the Danube, again connected the islands occupied by the French with the left-hand bank of that river; and so imperfect were the Austrian means of observation, though the campaign was fought within their own country, whose fate depended upon its issue, that they appear to have been ignorant of the possibility of Napoleon's using any other means of passage than this identical original bridge, which debouched betwixt Asperne and Essling; and they lost their time in erecting fortifications under that false impression. Yet certainly a very little inquiry might have discovered that the French Emperor was constructing three bridges, instead of trusting to one.

For several weeks, each army was receiving reinforcements. The Austrian and Hungarian nobles exerted themselves to bring to the field their vassals and tenantry; while Bonaparte, through every part of Germany which was subject to his direct or indirect influence, levied additional forces, for enabling him to destroy the last hope of their country's independence.

More powerful and numerous auxiliary armies also approached the scene of action from the north-eastern frontier of Italy, from which the Archduke John, as we have already mentioned, was retiring, in order, by throwing his army into Hungary, to have an opportunity of co-operating with his brother, the Archduke Charles. He came, but not unpursued or unmolested. Prince Eugene Beauharnais, at the head of the army which was intended to sustain the Archduke John's attack in Italy, joined to such forces as the French had in Dalmatia, followed the march of the Austrians, brought them to action repeatedly, gained advantages over them, and finally arrived on the frontiers of Hungary as soon as they did. Here the town of Raab ought to have made some protracted defence, in order to enable the Archduke John to co-operate with his younger brother Regnier, another of this warlike family, who was organizing the Hungarian insurrection. But the same fatality which influenced everything else in this campaign, occasioned the fall of Raab in eight days after the Austrian prince had been worsted in a fight under its walls. The Italian army of Eugene now formed its junction with the French; and the Archduke John, crossing the Danube at Presburg, advanced eastward, for the purpose of joining the Archduke Charles. But it was not the purpose of Napoleon to permit this union of forces.

On the 5th of July, at ten o'clock at night, the French began to cross from the islands in the Danube to the left-hand bank. Gun-boats, prepared for the purpose, silenced some of the Austrian batteries; others were avoided, by passing the river out of reach of their fire, which the French were enabled to do by the new and additional bridges they had secretly prepared.

At day-light on the next morning, the archduke had the unpleasant surprise to find the whole French

army on the left bank of the Danube, after having turned all the fortifications which he had formed for the purpose of opposing their passage, and which were thus rendered totally useless. The villages of Essling and Entzersdorf had been carried, and the French line of battle was formed upon the extremity of the archduke's left wing, menacing him, of course, both in flank and rear. The Archduke Charles endeavoured to remedy the consequences of this surprise by out-flanking the French right, while the French made a push to break the centre of the Austrian line, the key of which position was the village of Wagram. Wagram was taken and retaken, and only one house remained, which was occupied by the Archduke Charles, when night closed the battle, which had been bloody and indecisive. Courier after courier were dispatched to the Archduke John, to hasten his advance.

On the next day, being the 6th July, was fought the dreadful battle of Wagram, in which, it is said, that the Archduke Charles committed the great military error of extending his lines, and weakening his centre. His enemy was too alert not to turn such an error to profit. Lauriston, with a hundred pieces of cannon, and Macdonald, at the head of a chosen division, charged the Austrians in the centre, and broke through it. Napoleon himself showed all his courage and talents, and was ever in the hottest of the action, though the appearance of his retinue drew on him showers of grape, by which he was repeatedly endangered.

At length the Austrian army seems to have fallen into disorder; the left wing, in particular, conducted itself ill; cries of alarm were heard, and the example of precipitate flight was set by those who should have been the last to follow it, when given by others. The French took twenty thousand prisoners; and so complete was the discomfiture, that, though the Archduke John came up with a part of his army before the affair was quite over, so little chance was there of redeeming the day, that he was glad to retire from the field unnoticed by the enemy.

All hope of farther resistance was now abandoned by the Austrian princes and government; and they concluded an armistice with Bonaparte at Znaim, by which they agreed to evacuate the Tyrol, and put the citadels of Brunn and Gratz into the hands of Napoleon, as pledges for their sincerity in desiring a peace.

With this armistice sunk all the hopes of the gallant Tyrolese, and of the German insurgents, who had sought by force of arms to recover the independence of their country. But the appearance of these patriots on the stage, though productive of no immediate result of importance, is worthy of particular notice, as indicative of a recovery of national spirit, and of an awakening from that cold and passive slavery of mind, which makes men as patient under a change of masters, as the doll animal who follows with indifference any person who has the end of his halter in his hand. We, therefore, referring to what we have said of the revival of public feeling in Germany, have briefly to notice the termination of the expeditions of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick, together with the insurrection of the Tyrolese.

The career of the gallant Schill had long since closed. After traversing many parts of Germany, he had failed in augmenting his little force of about five thousand men, against whom Jérôme Bonaparte had assembled a large army from all points. In his marches and skirmishes, Schill displayed great readiness, courage, and talent; but so great were the odds against him, that men looked on, wondered, and praised his courage, without daring to espouse his cause. Closely pursued, and often nearly surrounded, by bodies of Dutch, of Westphalians, and of Danes, Schill at length saw himself obliged to throw himself into some defensive position, where he might wait the assistance of Great Britain, either to prosecute his adventure, or to effect his escape from the Continent. The town of Stralsund presented facilities for this purpose; and, suddenly appearing before it on the 25th of May, he took possession of the place; repaired, as well as he could, its ruined fortifications, and there resolved to make a stand.

But the French saw the necessity of treading out this spark, which might so easily have excited a conflagration. A large force of Dutch and Danish troops advanced to Stralsund on the 31st May, and in their turn forced their way into the place. Schill, with his brave companions, drew up in the market-place, and made a most desperate defence, which might even have been a successful one, had not Schill himself fallen, relieved by death from the yoke of the oppressor. The King of Prussia had from the beginning disavowed Schill's enterprise; and when the capture of Vienna rendered the Austrian cause more hopeless, he issued a proclamation against him and his followers, as outlaws. Availing themselves of this disavowal and denunciation, the victorious French and their vassals proceeded to inflict on the officers of Schill the doom due to unauthorized robbers and pirates—a doom which, since the days of Wallace and Llewellyn, has been frequently inflicted by oppressors on those by whom their tyranny has been resisted.

Schill's career was nearly ended ere that of the Duke of Brunswick began. Had it been possible for them to have formed a junction, the result of either enterprise might have been more fortunate. The young duke, while he entered into alliance with Austria, and engaged to put himself at the head of a small flying army, declined to take rank in the imperial service, or appear in the capacity of one of their generals. He assumed the more dignified character of a son, bent to revenge his father's death; of a Prince of the Empire, determined to recover by the sword the inheritance of which he had been forcibly deprived by the invasion of strangers. Neither his talents nor his actions were unequal to the part which he assumed. He defeated the Saxons repeatedly, and showed much gallantry and activity. But, either from the character of the Austrian general, Am Ende, who should have co-operated with the duke, or from some secret jealousy of an ally who aspired to personal independence, the assistance which the duke should have received from the Austrians was always given tardily, and sometimes altogether withheld at the moment of utmost need.

Nevertheless, the Duke of Brunswick occupied,

temporarily, Dresden, Leipsic, Lindenau—compelled the intrusive King of Westphalia to retreat, and at the date of the armistice of Znaim, was master of a considerable part of Franconia. There, of course, terminated the princely adventurer's career of success, as he was, in consequence of the terms of that convention, entirely abandoned by the Austrian armies. Being then at Schleitz, a town in Upper Saxony, the Duke of Brunswick, instead of listening to the timid counsellors who advised him to capitulate with some one of the generals commanding the numerous enemies that surrounded him, resolved to cut his way through them, or die in the attempt, rather than tamely lay down the arms he had assumed for the purpose of avenging his father's death and the oppression of his country.

Deserted by many of his officers, the brave prince persevered in his purpose, dispersed some bodies of cavalry that lay in his way, and marched upon Halberstadt, which he found in possession of some Westphalian infantry, who had halted there for the purpose of forming a junction with the French general Renbel. Determined to attack this body before they could accomplish their purpose, the duke stormed the gates of the place, routed the Westphalians, and made prisoners upwards of sixteen hundred men; while the citizens welcomed him with shouts of "Long live the Duke of Brunswick!—Success to the Sable Yagers!"

From Halberstadt he proceeded to Wolfenbützel, and thence to Brunswick, the capital of his father's states, and of his own patrimony. The hopeless state in which they saw their young duke arrive did not prevent the citizens from offering their respect and their services, though certain that in doing so they were incurring the heavy hatred of those, who would be again in possession of the government within a very short period.

The duke left his hereditary dominions the next day, amid the regrets of the inhabitants, openly testified by gestures, good wishes, and tears; and, forcing his way to the shores of the Baltic, through many dangers, had at length the good fortune to embark his Black Legion for Britain, undishonoured by submission to the despot who had destroyed his father's house. His life, rescued probably from the scaffold, was reserved to be laid down in paving the way for that great victory, in which the arms of Germany and of Brunswick were fully avenged.

The defence of the Tyrol, which fills a passage in history as heroic as that which records the exploits of William Tell, was also virtually decided by the armistice of Znaim. Not that this gallant people abandoned their cause, because the Austrians, in whose behalf they had taken arms, had withdrawn their forces, and yielded them up to their fate. In the month of July, an army of forty thousand French and Bavarians attacked the Tyrol from the German side; while from Italy, General Rusca, with eighteen thousand men, entered from Klagenfurt, on the southern side of the Tyrolean Alps. Undismayed by this double and formidable invasion, they assailed the invaders as they penetrated into their fastnesses, defeated, and destroyed them. The fate of a division of 10,000 men, belonging to the French and Bavarian army, which eu-

tered the Upper Innthal, or Valley of the Inn, will explain in part the means by which these victories were obtained.

The invading troops advanced in a long column up a road bordered on the one side by the river Inn, there a deep and rapid torrent, where cliffs of immense height overhang both road and river. The van-guard was permitted to advance unopposed as far as Prutz, the object of their expedition. The rest of the army were therefore induced to trust themselves still deeper in this tremendous pass, where the precipices, becoming more and more narrow as they advanced, seemed about to close above their heads. No sound but of the screaming of the eagles disturbed from their cries, and the roar of the river, reached the ears of the soldier, and on the precipices, partly enveloped in a lazy mist, no human forms showed themselves. At length the voice of a man was heard calling across the ravine, "Shall we begin?"—"No," was returned in an authoritative tone of voice, by one who, like the first speaker, seemed the inhabitant of some upper region. The Bavarian detachment halted, and sent to the general for orders; when presently was heard the terrible signal, "In the name of the Holy Trinity, cut all loose!" Huge rocks, and trunks of trees, long prepared and laid in heaps for the purpose, began now to descend rapidly in every direction, while the deadly fire of the Tyrolese, who never throw away a shot, opened from every bush, crag, or corner of rock, which could afford the shooter cover. As this dreadful attack was made on the whole line at once, two-thirds of the enemy were instantly destroyed; while the Tyrolese, rushing from their shelter, with swords, spears, axes, scythes, clubs, and all other rustic instruments which could be converted into weapons, beat down and routed the shattered remainder. As the van-guard, which had reached Prutz, was obliged to surrender, very few of the ten thousand invaders are computed to have extricated themselves from the fatal pass.

But not all the courage of the Tyrolese, not all the strength of their country, could possibly enable them to defend themselves, when the peace with Austria had permitted Bonaparte to engage his whole immense means for the acquisition of these mountains. Austria too—Austria herself, in whose cause they had incurred all the dangers of war, instead of securing their indemnity by some stipulations in the treaty, sent them a cold exhortation to lay down their arms. Resistance, therefore, was abandoned as fruitless; Hoffer, chief commander of the Tyrolese, resigned his command, and the Bavarians regained the possession of a country which they could never have won back by their own efforts. Hoffer, and about thirty chiefs of these valiant defenders of their country, were put to death, in poor revenge for the loss their bravery had occasioned. But their fame, as their immortal spirit, was beyond the power of the judge alike and executioner; and the place where their blood was shed becomes sacred to the thoughts of freedom, as the precincts of a temple to those of religion.

Bonaparte was particularly aware of the danger around him from that display of national spirit, which,

commencing in Spain, exhibited itself in the undertakings of Schill and the Duke of Brunswick, and blazed forth in the defence of the Tyrol. He well knew the character of these insurrections to be awful indications, that in future wars he would not only have the enmity of the governments to encounter, but the hatred of the people; not merely the efforts of the mercenary soldier, whose power may be great, yet can always be calculated, but the resistance of the population at large, which cannot be made subject to any exact means of computation, and which, amid disorder, and even flight, often finds a road to safety and to revenge.

It was Napoleon's policy, of course, to place in an odious and false point of view every call which the sovereigns of Europe made on the people of that Continent, exciting them to rise in their own defence, and stop the French plan of extended and universal dominion. Every summons of this kind he affected to regard with horror, as including jacobinical and anti-social principles, and tending to bring back all the worst horrors of the French Revolution. There is a very curious paper in the *Moniteur*, upon the promises of liberty, and exhortations to national union and national vengeance, which were circulated at this period in Germany. These were compared with the cries of liberty and equality, with which the French republicans, in the early days of the Revolution, sapped the defences and seduced the feelings of the nations whom they afterwards attacked, having made their democratic doctrines the principal means to pave the way for the success of their arms. The *Moniteur*, therefore, treats such attempts to bring the people forward in the national defence, as similar to the use of poisoned weapons, or other resources inconsistent with the laws of civilized war. General Pellet, also, the natural admirer of the sovereign whose victories he had shared, has the same sacred horror at invoking the assistance of a nation at large to defend its independence. He inveighs vehemently against the inexpedience and the impolicy, nay, the ingratitude, of lawful princes employing revolutionary movements against Napoleon, by whom the French Revolution, with all the evils which its duration boded to existing monarchies, had been finally ended. He asks, what would have been the state of the world, had Napoleon in his turn inflamed the popular feelings, and excited the common people, by democratical reasoning, against the existing governments? a sort of reprisals which he is stated to have held in conscientious horror. And the cause of civilization and good order is invoked, as endangered by a summons to a population to arm themselves against foreign invasion.

These observations, which are echoes of expressions used by Napoleon himself, belong closely to our subject, and require some examination.

In the first place, we totally deny that an invitation to the Spanish, the Tyrolese, or the Germans, or any other people, whom a victorious enemy has placed under a foreign yoke, has anything whatever in common with the democratic doctrines which instigated the lower classes, during the French Revolution, to plunder the rich, banish the distinguished, and murder the loyal and virtuous.

Next, we must point out the extreme inconsis-

ency betwixt the praise assigned to Napoleon as the destroyer of revolutionary practices, the friend and supporter of tottering thrones, and that which is at the same time claimed for him by himself and his advocates, as the actual Messias of the principles of the said Revolution, whose name was to be distinguished by posterity, as being connected with it. Where could be the sense, or propriety, or consistency, of such a rant as the following, in the mouth of one, who, provoked by the example of the allies to appeal to revolutionary principles, yet considered them as too criminal and too dangerous to be actually resorted to in retaliation:—"The great principles of our Revolution, these great and beautiful truths, must abide for ever; so much have we interwoven them with glory, with monuments, with prodigies. Issued from the bosom of the French tribune; decorated with the laurels of victory; greeted with the acclamations of the people, etc., etc., etc. they must ever govern. They will be the faith, the religion, the morality, of all nations in the universe. And that memorable era, whatever can be said to the contrary, will ally itself with me; for it was I who held aloft the torch, and consecrated the principles of that epoch, and whom persecution now renders its victim." Surely these pretensions, which are the expressions of Napoleon himself, are not to be reconciled with his alleged regard to the preservation of the ancient governments of Europe, and the forbearance for which he claims credit, in having refused to employ against those tottering thrones the great lever of the Revolution.

But the truth is, that no such forbearance existed; for Bonaparte, like more scrupulous conquerors, failed not to make an advantage to himself of whatever civil dissensions existed in the nations with whom he was at war, and was uniformly ready to support or excite insurrections in his enemy's country. His communications with the disaffected in Ireland, and in Poland, are sufficiently public; his intrigues in Spain had their basis in exciting the people against their feudal lords and royal family; and, to go no farther than this very war, during which it was pretended he had abstained from all revolutionary practices against the Austrians, he published the following address to the people of Hungary:—"Hungarians, the moment is come to revive your independence. I offer you peace, the integrity of your territory, the inviolability of your constitutions, whether of such as are in actual existence, or of those which the spirit of the time may require. I ask nothing from you; I only desire to see your nation free and independent. Your union with Austria has made your misfortune; your blood has flowed for her in distant regions; and your dearest interests have always been sacrificed to those of the Austrian hereditary estates. You form the finest part of the empire of Austria, yet you are treated as a province. You have national manners, a national language, you boast an ancient and illustrious origin. Reassume then your existence as a nation. Have a king of your own choice, who will reside amongst you, and reign for you alone.... Unite yourselves in a national Diet in the fields of Racos, after the manner of your ancestors, and make me acquainted with your determination."

After reading this exhortation, it will surely not be believed, that he by whom it was made felt any scruple at exciting to insurrection the subjects of an established government. If the precise language of republican France be not made use of, it must be considered, first, that no one would have believed him, had he, the destroyer of the French republic, professed, in distinct terms, his purpose to erect commonwealths elsewhere; secondly, that the republican language might have excited recollections in his own army, and among his own forces, which it would have been highly imprudent to have recalled to their mind.

The praise so gratuitously assumed for his having refused to appeal to the government against the governors is, therefore, in the first place, founded on an inaccurate statement of the facts; and next, so far as it is real, Napoleon's forbearance has no claim to be imputed to a respect for the rights of government, or a regard for the established order of society, any more than the noble spirit of patriotism and desire of national independence, which distinguished Schill, Hoffer, and their followers, ought to be confounded with the anti-social doctrines of those stern demagogues, whose object was rapine, and their sufficing argument the guillotine.

CHAPTER LXVII.

Conduct of Russia and England during the war with Austria.—Meditated expedition of British troops to the Continent.—Considerations respecting it.—Sent to Walcheren—Its calamitous details and result.—Proceedings of Napoleon with regard to the pope—injudicious and inconsistent—Explained and accounted for.—General Miollis enters Rome.—Napoleon publishes a decree, uniting the States of the Church to the French empire—Lis excommunicated.—Pius VII. is banished from Rome, and sent to Grenoble—afterwards brought back to Savona.—Reflections upon this procedure.—Bonaparte is attacked by an assassin—Views and object of the criminal.—Definitive treaty of peace signed at Schœnbrunn—Its provisions.—Napoleon returns to France on the 14th November, 1809.

THE particular conditions of the peace with Austria were not adjusted until the 14th October, 1809, although the armistice was signed nearly three months before. We avail ourselves of the interval to notice other remarkable events, which happened during this eventful summer; and first, we must briefly revert to the conduct of Russia and England during the war.

Notwithstanding the personal friendship betwixt the Emperors Alexander and Napoleon—notwithstanding their engagements entered into at Tilsit, and so lately revived at Erfurt, it seems to have been impossible to engage Russia heartily as an ally of Napoleon, in a war which had the destruction or absolute humiliation of Austria. The court of St Petersburg had, it is true, lost no time in securing the advantages which had been stipulated for Russia in the conferences alluded to. Finland had been conquered, torn from Sweden, to which the province had so long belonged, and united with Russia, to whom it furnished a most important frontier and barrier. Russia was also, with connivance of France,

making war on the Porte, in order to enlarge her dominions by the addition of Moldavia and Wallachia. But though the court of St Petersburg had gained one of these advantages, and was in a way of obtaining the other, the Russian ministers saw with anxiety the impending fate of Austria, the rather that they themselves were bound by treaty to lend their aid for her destruction. We have seen that Russia had interposed to prevent the war. She was now unwillingly compelled to take part in it; yet when Prince Galitzin marched into Galicia at the head of 30,000 Russians, the manifesto which he published could be hardly termed that of a hostile nation. The emperor, it is stated, had done all in his power to prevent things from coming to this extremity; but now, the war having actually broken out, he was bound by the faith of treaties to send the stipulated number of auxiliaries. The motions of this body of Russians were slow, and their conduct in the Austrian dominions rather that of allies than enemies. Some of the Russian officers of rank avowed their politics to be in direct opposition to those of the emperor, and declared that three-fourths of the generals commanding territorial divisions in Russia were of their opinion. These expressions, with the unusual slowness and leaity just alluded to, were for the present passed over without remark, but were recorded and remembered as matter of high offence, when Napoleon thought that the time was come to exact from Russia a severe account for everything in which she had disappointed his expectations.

The exertions of England, at the same period, were of a nature and upon a scale to surprise the world. It seemed as if her flag literally overshadowed the whole seas on the coasts of Italy, Spain, the Ionian Islands, the Baltic Sea. Wherever there was the least show of resistance to the yoke of Bonaparte, the assistance of the English was appealed to, and was readily afforded. In Spain, particularly, the British troops, led by a general whose name began soon to be weighed against those of the best French commanders, displayed their usual gallantry under auspices which no longer permitted it to evaporate in actions of mere eclat.

Yet the British administration, while they had thus embraced a broader and more adventurous, but at the same time a far wiser system of conducting the war, showed, in one most important instance, that they, or a part of them, were not entirely free from the ancient prejudices, which had so long rendered vain the efforts of Britain in favour of the liberties of the world. The general principle was indeed adopted, that the expeditions of Britain should be directed where they could do the cause of Europe the most benefit, and the interests of Napoleon the greatest harm; but still there remained a lurking wish that they could be so directed, as, at the same time, to acquire some peculiar and separate advantage to England, and to secure the accomplishment of what was called a British object. Some of the English ministers might thus be said to resemble the ancient converts from judaism, who, in embracing the christian faith, still held themselves bound by the ritual and fettered by the prejudices of the Jewish people, separated as they were from the rest of mankind.

It is no wonder that the voice of what is in reality selfishness is listened to in national councils with more respect than it deserves, since in that case it wears the mask and speaks the language of a species of patriotism, against which it can only be urged that it is too exclusive in its zeal. Its effects, however, are not the less to be regretted, as disabling strong minds, and misleading wise men; of which the history of Britain affords but too many instances.

Besides the forces already in the Peninsula, Britain had the means of disposing of, and the will to send to the Continent, forty thousand men, with a fleet of thirty-five ships of the line, and twenty frigates, to assist on any point where their services could have been useful. Such an armament on the coast of Spain might have brought to a speedy decision the long and bloody contest in that country, saved much British blood, which the protracted war wasted, and struck a blow, the effects of which, as that of Trafalgar, Bonaparte might have felt on the banks of the Danube. Such an armament, if sent to the north of Germany ere the destruction of Schill and the defeat of the Duke of Brunswick's enterprise, might have been the means of placing all the northern provinces in active opposition to France, by an effort for which the state of the public mind was already prepared. A successful action would even have given spirits to Prussia, and induced that depressed kingdom to resume the struggle for her independence. In a word, Britain might have had the honour of kindling the same flame, which, being excited by Russia in 1813, was the means of destroying the French influence in Germany, and breaking up the Confederation of the Rhine.

Unhappily, neither of these important objects seemed to the planners of this enterprise to be connected in a manner sufficiently direct, with objects exclusively interesting to Britain. It was therefore agreed, that the expedition should be sent against the strong fortresses, swampy isles, and dangerous coasts of the Netherlands, in order to seek for dock-yards to be destroyed, and ships to be carried off. Antwerp was particularly aimed at. But, although Napoleon attached great importance to the immense naval yards and docks which he had formed in the Scheldt, yet, weighed with the danger and difficulty of an attack upon them, the object of destroying them seems to have been very inadequate. Admitting that Bonaparte might succeed in building ships in the Scheldt, or elsewhere, there was no possibility, in the existing state of the world, that he could have been able to get sailors to man them; unless, at least, modern seamen could have been bred on dry land, like the crews of the Roman galleys during the war with Carthage. If even the ships could have been manned, it would have been long ere Napoleon, with his utmost exertions, could have brought out of the Scheldt such a fleet as would not have been defeated by half their own numbers of British ships. The dangers arising to Britain from the naval establishments in the Scheldt were remote, nor was the advantage of destroying them, should such destruction be found possible, commensurate with the expense and hazard of the enterprise which was directed against them. Be-

sides, before Antwerp could be attacked, the islands of Beveland and Walcheren were to be taken possession of, and a long amphibious course of hostilities was to be maintained, to enable the expedition to reach the point where alone great results were expected.

The commander-in-chief was the Earl of Chatham, who, inheriting the family talents of his father, the great minister, was remarkable for a spirit of inactivity and procrastination, the consequences of which had been felt in all the public offices which he held, and which, therefore, were likely to be peculiarly fatal in an expedition requiring the utmost celerity and promptitude of action. It is remarkable, that though these points in Lord Chatham's character were generally known, the public voice at the time, in deference to the talents which distinguished his house, did not censure the nomination.

Upon the 30th of July, the English disembarked on the islands of South Beveland and Walcheren; on the 1st of August they attacked Flushing, the principal place in the neighbourhood, by land and sea. On the 15th of August, the place surrendered, and its garrison, four or five thousand men strong, was sent prisoners of war to England. But here the success of the British ended. The French, who had at first been very much alarmed, had time to recover from their consternation. Fouché, then at the head of the police, and it may be said, of the government (for he exercised for the time the power of minister of the interior), showed the utmost readiness in getting under arms about 40,000 national guards, to replace the regular soldiers, of which the Low Countries had been drained. In awakening the military ardour of the citizens of France, in which he succeeded to an unusual degree, Fouché made use of these expressions:—"Let Europe see, that if the genius of Napoleon gives glory to France, still his presence is not necessary to enable her to repel her enemies from her soil." This phrase expressed more independence than was agreeable to Napoleon, and was set down as intimating a self-sufficiency, which counterbalanced the services of the minister.

Neither did Fouché's selection of a military chief to command the new levies prove more acceptable. Bernadotte, whom we have noticed as a general of republican fame, had been, at the time of Bonaparte's elevation, opposed to his interests, and attached to those of the Directory. Any species of rivalry, or pretence of dispute betwixt them, was long since ended; yet still Bernadotte was scarce accounted an attached friend of the emperor, though he was in some sort connected with the house of Napoleon, having married a sister-in-law of Joseph, the intrusive King of Spain. In the campaign of Vienna, which we have detailed, Bernadotte (created Prince of Ponte-Corvo), commanded a division of Saxons, and had incurred Bonaparte's censure more than once, and particularly at the battle of Wagram, for the slowness of his movements. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo came, therefore, to Paris in a sort of disgrace, where Fouché, in conjunction with Clarke, the minister at war, invited him to take on himself the defence of Antwerp. Bernadotte hesitated to

accept the charge; but having at length done so, he availed himself of the time afforded by the English to put the place in a complete state of defence, and assembled within, and under its walls, above thirty thousand men. The country was inundated by opening the sluices; strong batteries were erected on both sides of the Scheldt, and the ascending that river became almost impossible.

The British naval and military officers also disagreed among themselves, as often happens where difficulties multiply, and there appears no presiding spirit to combat and control them. The final objects of the expedition were therefore abandoned; the navy returned to the English ports, and the British forces were concentrated,—for what reason, or with what expectation, it is difficult to see,—in that fatal conquest, the isle of Walcheren. Among the marshes, stagnant canals, and unwholesome trenches of this island, there broods continually, a fever of a kind deeply pestilential and malignant, and which, like most maladies of the same description, is more destructive to strangers than to the natives, whose constitutions become by habit proof against its ravages. This dreadful disease broke out among our troops with the force of a pestilence, and besides the numerous victims who died on the spot, shattered, in many cases for ever, the constitutions of the survivors. The joy with which Napoleon saw the army of his enemy thus consigned to an obscure and disgraceful death, broke out even in his bulletins, as if the pestilence under which they fell had been caused by his own policy, and was not the consequence of the climate, and of the ill-advised delay which prevented our soldiers being withdrawn from it. "We are rejoiced," he said, in a letter to the minister at war, "to see that the English have packed themselves in the morasses of Zealand. Let them be only kept in check, and the bad air and fevers peculiar to the country will soon destroy their army." At length, after the loss of more lives than would have been wasted in three general battles, the fortifications of Flushing were blown up, and the British forces returned to their own country.

The evil consequences of this expedition did not end even here. The mode in which it had been directed and conducted introduced dissensions into the British cabinet, which occasioned the temporary secession of one of the most able and most eloquent of its members, Mr George Canning, who was thus withdrawn from public affairs when his talents could be least spared by the country. On the other hand the appointment of Marquis Wellesley to the situation of secretary at war gave, in the estimation of the public, a strong pledge that the efficient measures suggested by the talents of that noble statesman would be supported and carried through by his brother Sir Arthur, to whom alone, as a general, the army and the people began to look with hope and confidence.

While England was thus exerting herself, Bonaparte, from the Castle of Schönbrunn, under the walls of Vienna, was deciding the fate of the Continent on every point where British influence had no means of thwarting him. One of the revolutions which cost him little effort to accomplish, yet which

struck Europe with surprise, by the numerous recollections which it excited, was his seizure of the city of Rome, and the territories of the church, and depriving the pope of his character of a temporal prince.

It must be allowed, by the greatest admirers of Napoleon, that his policy, depending less upon principle than upon existing circumstances, was too apt to be suddenly changed, as opportunity or emergency seemed to give occasion. There could, for example, be scarce a measure of his reign adopted on more deep and profound consideration than that of the Concordat, by which he re-established the national religion of France, and once more united that country to the Catholic Church. In reward for this great service, Pope Pius VII., as we have seen, had the unusual complaisance to cross the Alps, and visit Paris, for the sake of adding religious solemnity, and the blessing of St Peter's successor, to the ceremony of Napoleon's coronation. It might have been thought that a friendship thus cemented, and which, altogether essential to the safety of the pope, was far from indifferent to the interests of Bonaparte, ought to have subsisted undisturbed at least for some years. But the emperor and pontiff stood in a suspicious attitude with respect to each other. Pius VII. felt that he had made, in his character of chief of the church, very great concessions to Napoleon, and such as he could hardly reconcile to the tenderness of his own conscience. He therefore expected gratitude in proportion to the scruples which he had surmounted, while Bonaparte was far from rating the services of his holiness so high, or sympathizing with his conscientious scruples.

Besides, the pope, in surrendering the rights of the church in so many instances, must have felt that he was acting under motives of constraint, and in the character of a prisoner; for he had sacrificed more than had been yielded by any prelate who had held the See of Rome, since the days of Constantine. He may therefore have considered himself not only as doubly bound to secure what remained of the authority of his predecessors, but even at liberty, should opportunity offer, to reclaim some part of that which he had unwillingly yielded up. Thus circumstanced in respect to each other, Pius VII. felt that he had done more in complaisance to Bonaparte than he could justify to his conscience; while Napoleon, who considered the reunion of France to Rome, in its spiritual relations, as entirely his own work, thought it of such consequence as to deserve greater concessions than his holiness had yet granted.

The pope, on his first return to Italy, showed favourable prepossessions for Napoleon, whom he commemorated in his address to the College of Cardinals, as that mighty Emperor of France, whose name extended to the most remote regions of the earth; whom Heaven had used as the means of reviving religion in France, when it was at the lowest ebb; and whose courtesies toward his own person, and compliance with his requests, merited his highest regard and requital. Yet Napoleon complained, that, subsequent to this period, Pius VII. began by degrees to receive counsel from the enemies of France, and that he listened to advisers, who encouraged him to hold the rights of the church

higher than the desire to gratify the emperor. Thus a suppressed and unavowed, but perpetual struggle took place, and was carried on betwixt the emperor and the pope; the former desirous to extend and consolidate his recent authority, the latter to defend what remained of the ancient privileges of the church.

It is probable, however, that, had there been only spiritual matters in discussion between them, Napoleon would have avoided an open rupture with the holy father, to which he was conscious much scandal would attach. But in the present situation of Italy, the temporal states of the pope furnished a strong temptation for his ambition. These extend, as is well known, betwixt the kingdom of Naples, then governed by Joachim Murat, and the northern Italian provinces, all of which, by the late appropriation of Tuscany, were now amalgamated into one state, and had become, under the name of the Kingdom of Italy, a part of the dominions of Bonaparte. Thus the patrimony of the church was the only portion of the Italian peninsula which was not either directly, or indirectly, under the empire of France; and, as it divided the Neapolitan dominions from those of Napoleon, it afforded facilities for descents of British troops, either from Sicily or Sardinia, and what Bonaparte was not less anxious to prevent, great opportunities for the importation of English commodities. The war with Austria in 1809, and the large army which the Archduke John then led into Italy, and with which, but for the defeat at Eckmühl, he might have accomplished great changes, rendered the independence of the Roman States the subject of still greater dislike and suspicion to Bonaparte.

His ambassador, therefore, had instructions to press on the pope the necessity of shutting his ports against British commerce, and adhering to the continental system; together with the further decisive measure, of acceding to the confederacy formed between the kingdom of Italy and that of Naples, or, in other words, becoming a party to the war against Austria and England. Pius VII. reluctantly submitted to shut his ports, but he positively refused to become a party to the war. He was, he said, the father of all christian nations; he could not, consistently with that character, become the enemy of any.

Upon receiving this refusal, Bonaparte would no longer keep terms with him; and, in order, as he said, to protect himself against the inconveniences which he apprehended from the pertinacity of the holy father, he caused the towns of Ancona and Civita Vecchia to be occupied by French troops, which were necessarily admitted when there were no means of resistance.

This act of aggression, to which the pope might have seen it prudent to submit without remonstrance, as to what he could not avoid, would probably have sufficiently answered all the immediate purposes of Bonaparte; nor would he, it may be supposed, have incurred the further scandal of a direct and irreconcilable breach with Pius VII., but for recollections, that Rome had been the seat of empire over the christian world, and that the universal sovereignty to which he aspired would

hardly be thought to exist in the full extent of majesty which he desired to attach to it, unless the ancient capital of the world made a part of his dominions. Napoleon was himself an Italian, and showed his sense of his origin by the particular care which he always took of that nation, where, whatever benefits his administration conferred on the people, reached them both more profusely and more directly than in any other part of his empire. That swelling spirit entertained the proud, and, could it have been accomplished consistently with justice, the noble idea, of uniting the beautiful peninsula of Italy into one kingdom, of which Rome should once more be the capital. He also nourished the hope of clearing out the Eternal City from the ruins in which she was buried, of preserving her ancient monuments, and of restoring what was possible of her ancient splendour. Such ideas as these, dearer to Napoleon, because involving a sort of fame which no conquest elsewhere could be attended with, must have had charms for a mind which constant success had palled to the ordinary enjoyment of victory; and no doubt the recollection that the existence of the pope as a temporal prince was totally inconsistent with this fair dream of the restoration of Rome and Italy, determined his resolution to put an end to his power.

On the 2d February, 1809, General Miollis, with a body of French troops, took possession of Rome itself, disarmed and disbanded the pope's guard of gentlemen, and sent his other soldiers to the north of Italy, promising them as a boon that they should be no longer under the command of a priest. The French cardinals, or those born in countries occupied by, or subjected to the French, were ordered to retire to the various lands of their birth, in order to prevent the holy father from finding support in the councils of the conclave. The proposal of his joining the Italian league, offensive and defensive, was then again pressed on the pope as the only means of reconciliation. He was also urged to cede some portion of the estates of the church, as the price of securing the rest. On both points, Pius VII. was resolute; he would neither enter into an alliance which he conceived injurious to his conscience, nor consent to spoil the see of any part of its territories. This excellent man knew, that though the temporal strength of the popedom appeared to be gone, everything depended on the courage to be manifested by the pope personally.

At length, on the 17th May, Napoleon published a decree, in which, assuming the character of successor of Charlemagne, he set forth, 1st, That his august predecessor had granted Rome and certain other territories in fief to the bishops of that city, but without parting with the sovereignty thereof. 2d, That the union of the religious and civil authority had proved the source of constant discord, of which many of the pontiffs had availed themselves to extend their secular dominion, under pretext of maintaining their religious authority. 3d, That the temporal pretensions of the pope were irreconcilable with the tranquillity and well-being of the nations whom Napoleon governed; and that all proposals which he had made on the subject had been rejected. Therefore it was declared by the decree, that

the estates of the church were reunited to the French empire. A few articles followed for the preservation of the classical monuments, for assigning to the pope a free income of two millions of francs, and for declaring that the property and palace belonging to the see were free of all burdens or right of inspection. Lastly, the decree provided for the interior government of Rome by a Consultum, or committee of administrators, to whom was delegated the power of bringing the city under the Italian constitution. A proclamation of the Consultum issued upon the 10th June, in consequence of the Imperial rescript, declared that the temporal dominion of Rome had passed to Napoleon, but she would still continue to be the residence of the visible Head of the Catholic Church.

It had doubtless been thought possible to persuade the pope to acquiesce in the annihilation of his secular power, as the Spanish Bourbons were compelled to ratify the usurpation of the Spanish crown, their inheritance. But Pius VII. had a mind of a firmer tenor. In the very night when the proclamation of the new functionaries finally divested him of his temporal principality, the head of the church assumed his spiritual weapons, and in the name of God, from whom he claimed authority, by missives drawn up by himself, and sealed with the seal of the Fisherman, declared Napoleon, Emperor of the French, with his adherents, favourers, and counsellors, to have incurred the solemn doom of excommunication, which he proceeded to launch against them accordingly. To the honour of Pius VII. it must be added, that, different from the bulls which his predecessors used to send forth on similar occasions, the present sentence of excommunication was pronounced exclusively as a spiritual punishment, and contained a clause prohibiting all and any one from so construing its import, as to hold it authority for any attack on the person either of Napoleon or any of his adherents.

The emperor was highly incensed at the pertinacity and courage of the pontiff in adopting so bold a measure, and determined on punishing him. In the night betwixt the 5th and 6th of July, the Quirinal Palace, in which his holiness resided, was forcibly entered by soldiers, and General Rodet, presenting himself before the holy father, demanded that he should instantly execute a renunciation of the temporal estates belonging to the See of Rome.

"I ought not—I will not—I cannot make such a cession," said Pius VII. "I have sworn to God to preserve inviolate the possessions of the Holy Church—I will not violate my oath."

The general then informed his holiness he must prepare to quit Rome.

"This, then, is the gratitude of your emperor," exclaimed the aged pontiff, "for my great condescension towards the Gallican Church, and towards himself? Perhaps in that particular my conduct has been blame-worthy in the eyes of God, and he is now desirous to punish me. I humbly stoop to his divine pleasure."

At three o'clock in the morning, the pope was placed in a carriage, which one cardinal alone was permitted to share with him, and thus forcibly carried from his capital. As they arrived at the gate

del Popolo, the general observed it was yet time for his holiness to acquiesce in the transference of his secular estates. The pontiff returned a strong negative, and the carriage proceeded.

At Florence, Pius was separated from Cardinal Pacca, the only person of his court who had been hitherto permitted to attend him; and the attendance of General Rodet was replaced by that of an officer of gendarmes. After a toilsome journey, partly performed in a litter, and sometimes by torchlight, the aged pontiff was embarked for Alexandria, and transferred from thence to Mondovi, and then across the Alps to Grenoble.

But the strange sight of the Head of the Catholic Church traveling under a guard of gendarmes, with the secrecy and the vigilance used in transporting a state criminal, began to interest the people in the south of France. Crowds assembled to beseech the holy father's benediction, perhaps with more sincerity than when, as the guest of Bonaparte, he was received there with all the splendour the Imperial orders could command.

At the end of ten days, Grenoble no longer seemed a fitting place for his holiness's residence, probably because he excited too much interest, and he was again transported to the Italian side of the Alps, and quartered at Savona. Here, it is said, he was treated with considerable harshness, and for a time at least confined to his apartment. The prefect of Savoy, Monsieur de Chabrol, presented his holiness with a letter from Napoleon, upbraiding him in strong terms for his wilful obstinacy, and threatening to convoke at Paris a council of bishops, with a view to his deposition. "I will lay his threats," said Pius VII., with the firmness which sustained him through his sufferings, "at the foot of the crucifix, and I leave with God the care of avenging my cause, since it has become his own."

The feelings of the catholics were doubtless enhanced on this extraordinary occasion, by their belief in the sacred, and, it may be said, divine character, indissolubly united with the head of the church. But the world, papist and protestant, were alike sensible to the outrageous indecency with which an old man, a priest and a sovereign, so lately the friend and guest of Bonaparte, was treated, for no other reason that could be alleged, than to compel him to despoil himself of the territories of the church, which he had sworn to transmit inviolate to his successors. Upon reflection, Napoleon seems to have become ashamed of the transaction, which he endeavoured to shift from his own shoulders, while in the same breath he apologized for it, as the act of the politician, not the individual.*

* See *Mémorial de St. Hélène*, vol. II, pp. 47. He avowed that he himself would have refused, as a man and an officer, to mount guard on the pope, "whose transportation into France," he added "was done without my authority." Observing the surprise of Las Cases, he added, "that what he said was very true, together with other things which he would learn by and by. Besides," he proceeded, "you are to distinguish the deeds of a sovereign, who acts collectively, as different from those of an individual, who is restrained by no consideration that prevents him from following his own sentiments. Policy often permits, nay orders, a prince to do that which would be unpardonable in an

Regarded politically, never was any measure devised to which the interest of France and the emperor was more diametrically opposed. Napoleon nominally gained the city of Rome, which, without this step, it was in his power to occupy at any time; but he lost the support, and incurred the mortal hatred of the catholic clergy, and of all whom they could influence. He unraveled his own web, and destroyed by this unjust and rash usurpation, all the merit which he had obtained by the re-establishment of the Gallican Church. Before this period he had said of the French clergy, and certainly had some right to use the language, "I have re-established them, I maintain them—they will surely continue attached to me." But in innovating upon their religious creed, in despoiling the church, and maltreating its visible head, he had cut the sinews of the league which he had formed betwixt the church and his own government. It is easy to see the mistaken grounds on which he reckoned. Himself an egotist, Napoleon supposed that when he had ascertained and secured to any man, or body of men, their own direct advantage in the system which he desired should be adopted, the parties interested were debarr'd from objecting to any innovations which he might afterwards introduce into that system, providing their own interest was not affected. The priests and sincere catholics of France, on the other hand, thought, and in conscience could not think otherwise, that the Concordat engaged the emperor to the preservation of the Catholic Church, as, on the other hand, it engaged them to fealty towards Napoleon. When, therefore, by his unprovoked aggression against the head of the church, he had incurred the spiritual censure of excommunication, they held, by consequence, that all their engagements to him were dissolved by his own act.

The natural feelings of mankind acted also against the emperor. The pope, residing at Rome in the possession of temporal power and worldly splendour, was a far less interesting object to a devout imagination, than an old man hurried a prisoner from his capital, transported from place to place like a criminal, and at length detained in an obscure Italian town, under the control of the French police and their instruments.

The consequences of this false step were almost as injurious as those, which resulted from the un-

individual.* Of this denial and this apology we shall only say that the first seems very apocryphal, and the second would justify any crime which Machiavel or Achiropoli could invent or recommend. Murat is the person whom the favourers of Napoleon are desirous to load with the violence committed on the pope. But if Murat had dared to take so much upon himself, would it not have been as King of Naples? and by what warrant could he have transferred the pontiff from place to place in the north of Italy, and even in France itself, the emperor's dominions, and not his own? Besides, if Napoleon was, as has been stated, surprised, shocked, and incensed at the captivity of the pope, why did he not instantly restore him to his liberty, with suitable apologies, and indemnification? His not doing so plainly shows, that if Murat and Rodet had not express orders for what they did, they at least knew well it would be agreeable to the emperor when done, and his acquiescence in their violence is a sufficient proof that they argued justly.

principled invasion of Spain. To place that kingdom under his more immediate control, Napoleon converted a whole nation of docile allies into irreconcilable enemies; and, for the vanity of adding to the empire of France the ancient capital of the world, he created a revolt in the opinion of the catholics, which was in the long-run of the utmost prejudice to his authority. The bulls of the pope, in spite of the attention of the police, and of the numerous arrests and severe punishments inflicted on those who dispersed them, obtained a general circulation; and, by affording a religious motive, enhanced and extended the disaffection to Napoleon, which, unavowed and obscure, began generally to arise against his person and government even in France, from the repeated draughts upon the conscription, the annihilation of commerce, and the other distressing consequences arising out of the measures of a government, which seemed only to exist in war.

While Bonaparte, at Schoenbrunn, was thus disposing of Rome and its territories, and weighing in his bosom the alternative of dismembering Austria, or converting her into a friend, his life was exposed to one of those chances, to which despotic princes are peculiarly liable. It had often been predicted, that the dagger of some political or religious enthusiast, who might be willing to deposit his own life in gage for the success of his undertaking, was likely to put a period to Napoleon's extended plans of ambition. Fortunately, men like Felton or Sand are rarely met with, for the powerful instinct of self-preservation is, in the common case, possessed of influence even over positive lunatics, as well as men of that melancholy and atrabilious temperament, whose dark determination partakes of insanity. Individuals, however, occur from time to time, who are willing to sacrifice their own existence, to accomplish the death of a private or public enemy.

The life of Bonaparte at Schoenbrunn was retired and obscure. He scarcely ever visited the city of Vienna; and spent his time as if in the Tuileries, amid his generals, and a part of his ministers, who were obliged to attend him during his military expeditions. His most frequent appearance in public was when reviewing his troops. On one of these occasions, while a body of the French Guard was passing in review, a young man, well dressed, and of the middle rank, rushed suddenly forward, and attempted to plunge a long sharp knife, or poniard, in Napoleon's bosom. Berthier threw himself betwixt his master and the assassin, and Rapp made the latter prisoner. On his examination, the youth evinced the coolness of a fanatic. He was a native of Erfurt, son of a Lutheran clergyman, well educated, and of a decent condition in life. He avowed his purpose to have killed Napoleon, as called to the task by God, for the liberation of his country. No intrigue or correspondence with any party appeared to have prompted his unjustifiable purpose, nor did his behaviour or pulse testify any sign of insanity or mental alienation. He told Bonaparte, that he had so much respect for his talents, that if he could have obtained an audience of him, he would have commenced the conference by an exhortation to him to make peace; but if he could not succeed, he was determined to take his life.

"What evil have I done you?" asked Napoleon.

"To me personally, none; but you are the oppressor of my country, the oppressor of the world, and to have put you to death would have been the most glorious act a man of honour could do."

Stabbs, for that was his name, was justly condemned to die; for no cause can justify assassination. His death was marked by the same fanatical firmness which had accompanied his crime; and the adventure remained a warning, though a fruitless one, to Bonaparte, that any man who is indifferent to his own life may endanger that of the most absolute sovereign upon earth, even when at the head of his military force.

The negotiations for peace with Austria continued, notwithstanding the feeble state of the latter power, to be unusually protracted. The reason, at that time secret, became soon after publicly known.

Bonaparte's first intentions had been to dismember the empire, which he had found so obstinate and irreconcilable in its enmity, and, separating from the dominions of Austria either the kingdom of Hungary, or that of Bohemia, or both, to reduce the house of Hapsburg to the rank of a second-rate power in Europe. Napoleon himself affirmed, when in St Helena, that he was encouraged by one of the royal family (the Archduke Charles is indicated) to persist in his purpose, as the only means of avoiding future wars with Austria; and that the same prince was willing to have worn one of the crowns, thus to be torn from the brows of his brother Francis. We can only say, that the avowals of Napoleon when in exile, like his bulletins when in power, seem so generally dictated by that which he wished to be believed, rather than by a frank adherence to truth, that we cannot hold his unsupported and inexplicit testimony as sufficient to impose the least stain on the noble, devoted, and patriotic character of the arch duke, whose sword and talents had so often served his brother's cause, and whose life exhibits no indication of that meanness, which would be implied in a wish to share the spoils of his country, or accept at the hands of the conqueror a tributary kingdom, reft from the dominions of his king and brother. Bonaparte himself paid the courage and devotion of the Austrian prince a flattering compliment, when, in sending to him a decoration of the Legion of Honour, he chose that which was worn by the common soldier, as better suited to the determination and frankness of his character, than one of those richly ornamented, which were assigned to men of rank, who had perhaps never known, or only seen at some distance, the toils and dangers of battle.

The crisis, however, approached, which was to determine the fate of Austria. Bonaparte's favourite minister, Champagny, Duke of Cadore, had been for some time at Presburg, arranging with Metternich the extent of cession of territory by which Austria was to pay for her unfortunate assumption of hostilities. The definitive treaty of peace, when at length published, was found to contain the following articles:—1. Austria ceded, in favour of the Princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and a part of Upper Austria. 2. To France directly, she ceded her only seaport of Trieste, the districts of Carniola, Friuli, the

Circle of Villach, and some part of Croatia and Dalmatia. These dominions tended to strengthen and enlarge the French province of Illyria, and to exclude Austria from the Adriatic, and the possibility of communication with Great Britain. A small lordship, called Razons, lying within the territories of the Grison League, was also relinquished. 3. To the King of Saxony, in that character, Austria ceded some small part of Bohemia, and, in the capacity of Duke of Warsaw, she gave up to him the city of Cracow, and the whole of Western Galicia. 4. Russia had a share, though a moderate one, in the spoils of Austria. She was to receive, in reward of her aid, though tardily and unwillingly tendered, a portion of Eastern Galicia, containing a population of four hundred thousand souls. But from this cession the town of Brody, a commercial place of consequence, was specially excepted; and it has been said that this exception made an unfavourable impression on the Emperor Alexander, which was not overbalanced by the satisfaction he received from the portion of spoil transferred to him.

In his correspondence with the Russian court, Napoleon expressed himself as having, from deference to Alexander's wishes, given Austria a more favourable peace than she had any reason to expect. Indeed, Europe in general was surprised at the moderation of the terms; for though Austria, by her cessions on different points, yielded up a surface of forty-five thousand square miles, and a population of between three and four millions, yet the extremity in which she was placed seemed to render this a cheap ransom, as she still retained 180,000 square miles, and upwards, of territory, which, with a population of twenty-one millions, rendered her, after France and Russia, even yet the most formidable power on the Continent. But her good angel had not slept. The house of Rodolph of Hapsburg had arisen, from small beginnings, to its immense power and magnitude, chiefly by matrimonial alliances,* and it was determined that, by another intermarriage of that Imperial house, with the most successful conqueror whom the world had ever seen, she should escape with comparative ease from the greatest extremity in which she had ever been placed. There is no doubt, also, that, by secret articles of treaty, Napoleon, according to his maxim of making the conquered party sustain the expense of the war, exacted for that purpose heavy contributions from the Austrian government.

He left Schoenbrunn on the 16th October, two days after the definitive treaty of peace, which takes its name from that palace, had been signed there; and it is remarkable that no military caution was relaxed in the evacuation of the Austrian dominions by the French troops. They retreated by échelon, so as to be always in a position of mutual support, as if they had still been manœuvring in an enemy's country.

On the 14th November, Napoleon received at Paris the gratulations of the Senate, who too fondly complimented him on having acquired, by his triumphs, the palm of peace. That emblem, they said, should be placed high above his other laurels,

* The verses are well known,

Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube, etc.

upon a monument which should be dedicated by the gratitude of the French people, "To the Greatest of Heroes, who never achieved victory but for the happiness of the world."

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Change which took place in Napoleon's domestic life, after the Peace of Vienna—Causes which led to it—His anxiety for an heir—A son of his brother Louis is fixed upon, but dies in childhood.—Character and influence of Josephine—Strong mutual attachment betwixt her and Napoleon.—Fouché opens to Josephine the plan of a divorce—her extreme distress—On 5th December, Napoleon announces her fate to Josephine—On 15th they are formally separated before the Imperial Council—Josephine retaining the rank of empress for life.—Espousals of Bonaparte and Maria Louisa of Austria take place at Vienna, 11th March, 1810.—Comparison, and contrast, betwixt Josephine and her successor.—The results of this union different from what was expected—Foreseen by the Emperor Alexander.

THERE is perhaps no part of the varied life of the wonderful person of whom we treat, more deeply interesting, than the change which took place in his domestic establishment, shortly after the peace of Vienna. The main causes of that change are strongly rooted in human nature, but there were others which arose out of Napoleon's peculiar situation. The desire of posterity—of being represented long after our own earthly career is over, by those who derive their life and condition in society from us, is deeply rooted in our species. In all ages and countries, children are accounted a blessing, barrenness a misfortune at least, if not a curse. This desire of maintaining a posthumous connexion with the world, through the medium of our descendants, is increased, when there is property or rank to be inherited; and, however vain the thought, there are few to which men cling with such sincere fondness, as the prospect of bequeathing to their children's children the fortunes they have inherited from their fathers, or acquired by their own industry. There is kindness as well as some vanity in the feeling; for the attachment which we bear to the children whom we see and love, naturally flows downward to their lineage whom we may never see. The love of distant posterity is in some degree the metaphysics of natural affection.

It was impossible that the founder of so vast an empire as that of Napoleon could be insensible to a feeling which is so deeply grafted in our nature, as to influence the most petty proprietor of a house and a few acres—it is of a character to be felt in proportion to the extent of the inheritance; and so viewed, there never existed in the world before, and, it is devoutly to be hoped, will never be again permitted by Providence to arise, a power so extensive, so formidable as Napoleon's. Immense as it was, it had been, moreover, the work of his own talents; and, therefore, he must have anticipated, with the greater pain, that the system perfected by so much labour and blood, should fall to pieces on the death of him by whom it had been erected, or that the reins of empire should be grasped after that event "by some unlined hand,"

No son of his succeeding.

The drop of gall, which the poet describes so naturally as embittering the cup of the usurper of Scotland, infused, there is no doubt, its full bitterness into that of Napoleon.

The sterility of the Empress Joséphine was now rendered, by the course of nature, an irremediable evil, over which she mourned in hopeless distress; and conscious on what precarious circumstances the continuance of their union seemed now to depend, she gave way occasionally to fits of jealousy, less excited, according to Napoleon, by personal attachment, than by suspicion that her influence over her husband's mind might be diminished, in case of his having offspring by some paramour.

She turned her thoughts to seek a remedy, and exerted her influence over her husband, to induce him to declare some one his successor, according to the unlimited powers vested in him by the Imperial constitution. In the selection, she naturally endeavoured to direct his choice towards his step-son, Eugène Beauharnais, her own son by her first marriage; but this did not meet Bonaparte's approbation. A child, the son of his brother Louis, by Hortense Beauharnais, appeared, during its brief existence, more likely to become the destined heir of this immense inheritance. Napoleon seemed attached to the boy; and when he manifested any spark of childish spirit, rejoiced in the sound of the drum, or showed pleasure in looking upon arms and the image of war, he is said to have exclaimed,—"There is a child fit to succeed, perhaps to surpass me."

The fixing his choice on an heir so intimately connected with herself, would have secured the influence of Joséphine, as much as it could receive assurance from anything save bearing her husband issue herself; but she was not long permitted to enjoy this prospect. The son of Louis and Hortense died of a disorder incident to childhood; and thus was broken, while yet a twig, the shoot, that, growing to maturity, might have been reckoned on as the stay of an empire. Napoleon showed the deepest grief, but Joséphine sorrowed as one who had no hope.

Yet, setting aside her having the misfortune to bear him no issue, the claims of Joséphine on her husband's affections were as numerous as could be possessed by a wife. She had shared his more lowly fortunes, and, by her management and address during his absence in Egypt, had paved the way for the splendid success which he had attained on his return. She had also done much to render his government popular, by softening the sudden and fierce bursts of passion to which his temperament induced him to give way. No one could understand, like Joséphine, the peculiarities of her husband's temper;—no one dared, like her, to encounter his displeasure, rather than not advise him for his better interest;—no one could possess such opportunities of watching the fit season for intercession, and no one, it is allowed on all hands, made a more prudent, or a more beneficent use of the opportunities she enjoyed. The character of Bonaparte, vehement by temper, a soldier by education, and invested by Fortune with the most despotic power, required peculiarly the moderating influence of such a mind, which could interfere

without intrusion, and remonstrate without offence.

To maintain this influence over her husband, Joséphine made not only unreluctantly, but eagerly, the greatest personal sacrifices. In all the rapid journeys which he performed, she was his companion. No obstacle of road or weather was permitted to interfere with her departure. However sudden the call, the empress was ever ready; however untimely the hour, her carriage was in instant attendance. The influence which she maintained by the sacrifice of her personal comforts was used for the advancement of her husband's best interests,—the relief of those who were in distress, and the averting the consequences of hasty resolutions, formed in a moment of violence or irritation.

Besides her considerable talents, and her real beneficence of disposition, Joséphine was possessed of other ties over the mind of her husband. The mutual passion which had subsisted between them for many years, if its warmth had subsided, seems to have left behind affectionate remembrances and mutual esteem. The grace and dignity with which Joséphine played her part in the imperial pageant was calculated to gratify the pride of Napoleon, which might have been shocked at seeing the character of empress discharged with less ease and adroitness; for her temper and manners enabled her, as one early accustomed to the society of persons of political influence, to conduct herself with singular dexterity in the intrigues of the splendid and busy court, where she filled so important a character. Lastly, it is certain that Bonaparte, who, like many of those that affect to despise superstition, had a reserve of it in his own bosom, believed that his fortunes were indissolubly connected with those of Joséphine; and loving her as she deserved to be beloved, he held his union with her the more intimate, that there was attached to it, he thought, a spell affecting his own destinies, which had ever seemed most predominant when they had received the recent influence of Joséphine's presence.

Notwithstanding all these mutual ties, it was evident to the politicians of the Tuileries, that whatever attachment and veneration for the empress Napoleon might profess and feel, it was likely in the long-run to give way to the eager desire of a lineal succession, to which he might bequeath his splendid inheritance. As age advanced, every year weakened, though in an imperceptible degree, the influence of the empress, and must have rendered more eager the desire of her husband to form a new alliance, while he was yet at a period of life enabling him to hope he might live to train to maturity the expected heir.

Fouché, the minister of police, the boldest political intriguer of his time, discovered speedily to what point the emperor must ultimately arrive, and seems to have meditated the insuring his own power and continuance in favour, by taking the initiative in a measure, in which, perhaps, Napoleon might be ashamed to break the ice in person. Sounding artfully his master's disposition, Fouché was able to discover that the emperor was struggling betwixt the supposed political advantages to be derived from a new matrimonial union on the one hand, and, on the other, love for his present consort, habits of

society which particularly attached him to Joséphine, and the species of superstition which we have already noticed. Having been able to conjecture the state of the emperor's inclinations, the crafty counsellor determined to make Joséphine herself the medium of suggesting to Bonaparte the measure of her own divorce, and his second marriage, as a sacrifice necessary to consolidate the empire, and complete the happiness of the emperor.

One morning at Fontainebleau, as the empress was returning from mass, Fouché detained her in the embrasure of a window in the gallery, while, with an audacity almost incomprehensible, he explained, with all the alleviating qualifications his ingenuity could suggest, the necessity of a sacrifice, which he represented as equally sublime and inevitable. The tears gathered in Joséphine's eyes—her colour came and went—her lips swelled—and the least which the counsellor had to fear, was his advice having brought on a severe nervous affection. She commanded her emotions, however, sufficiently to ask Fouché, with a faltering voice, whether he had any commission to hold such language to her. He replied in the negative, and said that he had only ventured on such an insinuation from his having predicted with certainty what must necessarily come to pass; and, from his desire to turn her attention to what so nearly concerned her glory and happiness.

In consequence of this interview, an impassioned and interesting scene is said to have taken place betwixt Bonaparte and his consort, in which he naturally and truly disavowed the communication of Fouché, and attempted by every means in his power to dispel her apprehensions. But he refused to dismiss Fouché, when she demanded it as the punishment due to that minister's audacity, in tampering with her feelings; and this refusal alone might have convinced Joséphine, that though ancient habitual affection might for a time maintain its influence in the nuptial chamber, it must at length give way before the suggestions of political interest, which were sure to predominate in the cabinet. In fact, when the idea had once been started, the chief objection was removed, and Bonaparte, being spared the pain of directly communicating the unkind and ungrateful proposal to Joséphine, had now only to afford her time to familiarize herself with the idea of a divorce, as that which political combinations rendered inevitable.

The communication of Fouché was made before Napoleon undertook his operations in Spain; and by the time of the meeting at Erfurt, the divorce seems to have been a matter determined, since the subject of a match betwixt Bonaparte and one of the arch-duchesses, the possibility of which had been anticipated as far back as the treaty of Tilsit, was resumed, seriously treated of, and if not received with cordiality by the Imperial family of Russia, was equally far from being finally rejected. The reigning empress and the empress mother, were, however, opposed to it. The ostensible motive was as we have elsewhere said, the difference of religion; but these high-minded princesses rejected the alliance chiefly on account of the personal character of the suitor. And although it

must have been managed with the greatest secrecy imaginable, it seems probable that the idea of substituting an archduchess of Austria for her whose hand was refused him, was started in the course of the treaty of Schoenbrunn, and had its effects in providing lenient terms for the weaker party. Napoleon himself says, that he renounced his purpose of dismembering Austria when his marriage was fixed upon. But the conditions of peace were signed on the 14th of October, and therefore the motive which influenced Napoleon in granting them must have had existence previous to that period.

Yet the contrary is boldly asserted. The idea of the match is said to have been suggested by the Austrian government at a later period, upon understanding that difficulties had occurred in Napoleon's negotiation for a matrimonial alliance in the family of Alexander. Fouché ascribes the whole to the address of his own agent, the Count de Narbonne, a Frenchman of the old school, witty, pliant, gay, well-mannered and insinuating, who was ambassador at Vienna in the month of January, 1810.

But whether the successor of Joséphine were or were not already determined upon, the measures for separating this amiable and interesting woman from him whose fortunes she had assisted to raise, and to whose person she was so much attached, were in full and public operation soon after her husband's return from the campaign of Wagram. Upon the 3d of December, Bonaparte attended the solemn service of *Te Deum* for his victories. He was clad with unusual magnificence, wearing the Spanish costume, and displaying in his hat an enormous plume of feathers. The Kings of Saxony and Württemberg, who attended as his satellites on this occasion, were placed beside him in full uniform, and remained uncovered during the ceremony.

From the cathedral, Napoleon passed to the opening of the Legislative Body, and boasted, in the oration he addressed to them, of the victories which he had achieved, and the trophies which he had acquired; nay, he vaunted of his having reunited Tuscany to the empire,—as if the spoiling the inoffensive and unresisting widow and orphan could ever be a legitimate subject of triumph. From the existing affairs of Spain, no direct reason for gratulation could be derived; but when Napoleon could no longer claim praise from things as they presently stood, he was profuse in his promises of a rapid change to the better, and spoke as a prophet when he ceased to be the reporter of agreeable facts.

"When I," he said, "show myself on the other side of the Pyrenees, the terrified Leopard shall plunge into the ocean, to avoid shame, defeat, and destruction. The triumph of my arms shall be that of the Genius of Good over the Genius of Evil, of moderation, order, and morals, over civil war, anarchy, and the malevolent passions." With such fair colouring will ambition and injustice attempt to screen their purposes. A poetical reply from Monsieur de Fontanes assured the emperor, that whatever was connected with him must arise to grandeur, whatever was subjected to any other influence was threatened with a speedy fall. "It was therefore necessary," he continued, "to submit to your ascendancy, whose

councils are at once recommended by heroism and by policy." To this speech Bonaparte made a rejoinder, in which, resuming the well-worn themes of his own praises, he alluded to the obstacles which he had surmounted, and concluded; "I and my family will always know how to sacrifice our most tender affections to the interests and welfare of the Great Nation." These concluding words, the meaning of which was already guessed by all who belonged to the court, were soon no riddle to the public in general.

Two days afterwards, Napoleon made Joséphine acquainted with the cruel certainty, that the separation was ultimately determined upon. But not the many months which had passed since the subject was first touched upon by Fouché—not the conviction which she must have long since received from various quarters, that the measure was unalterably resolved upon, could strengthen her to hear the tongue of her beloved husband announce what was in fact, though not in name, a sentence of repudiation. She fell into a long and profound swoon. Napoleon was much affected, but his resolution was taken, and could not be altered. The preparations for the separation went on without delay.

On the 15th December, just ten days after the official communication of her fate had been given to the empress, Napoleon and Joséphine appeared in presence of the arch-chancellor, the family of Napoleon, the principal officers of state,—in a word, the full Imperial Council. In this assembly, Napoleon stated the deep national interest which required that he should have successors of his own body, the heirs of his love for his people, to occupy the throne on which Providence had placed him. He informed them, that he had for several years renounced the hope of having children by his well-beloved empress Joséphine; and that therefore he had resolved to subject the feelings of his heart to the good of the state, and desire the dissolution of their marriage. He was, he said, but forty years old, and might well hope to live to train up such children as Providence might send him, in his own sentiments and arts of government. Again he dwelt on the truth and tenderness of his beloved spouse, his partner during fifteen years of happy union. Crowned as she had been by his own hand, he desired she should retain the rank of empress during her life.

Joséphine arose, and with a faltering voice, and eyes suffused with tears, expressed in few words sentiments similar to those of her husband. The imperial pair then demanded from the arch-chancellor a written instrument in evidence of their mutual desire of separation; and it was granted accordingly, in all due form, with the authority of the council.

The Senate were next assembled; and on the 16th December, pronounced a consultum, or decree, authorizing the separation of the emperor and empress, and assuring to Joséphine a dowry of two millions of francs, and the rank of empress during her life. Addresses were voted to both the imperial parties, in which all possible changes were rung on the duty of subjecting our dearest affections to the public good; and the conduct of Bonaparte, in exchanging his old consort for a young one, was pro-

claimed a sacrifice, for which the eternal love of the French people could alone console his heart.

The union of Napoleon and Joséphine being thus abrogated by the supreme civil power, it only remained to procure the intervention of the spiritual authorities. The arch-chancellor, duly authorized by the imperial pair, presented a request for this purpose to the Diocesan of the Officiality, or ecclesiastical court of Paris, who did not hesitate to declare the marriage dissolved, assigning, however, no reason for such their doom. They announced it, indeed, as conforming to the decrees of councils, and the usages of the Gallican Church—a proposition which would have cost the learned and reverend officials much trouble, if they had been required to make it good either by argument or authority.

When this sentence had finally dissolved their union, the emperor retired to St-Cloud, where he lived in seclusion for some days. Joséphine, on her part, took up her residence in the beautiful villa of Malmaison, near St-Germain. Here she principally dwelt for the remaining years of her life, which were just prolonged to see the first fall of her husband; an event which might have been averted had he been content to listen more frequently to her lessons of moderation. Her life was chiefly spent in cultivating the fine arts, of which she collected some beautiful specimens, and in pursuing the science of botany; but especially in the almost daily practice of acts of benevolence and charity, of which the English *détenués*, of whom there were several at St-Germain, frequently shared the benefit. Napoleon visited her very frequently, and always treated her with the respect to which she was entitled. He added also to her dowry a third million of francs, that she might feel no inconvenience from the habits of expense to which it was her foible to be addicted.

This important state measure was no sooner completed, than the Great Council was summoned, on the 1st February, to assist the emperor in the selection of a new spouse. They were given to understand, that a match with a Grand Duchess of Russia had been proposed, but was likely to be embarrassed by disputes concerning religion. A daughter of the King of Saxony was also mentioned, but it was easily indicated to the council that their choice ought to fall upon a princess of the house of Austria. At the conclusion of the meeting, Eugène, the son of the repudiated Joséphine, was commissioned by the council to propose to the Austrian ambassador a match between Napoleon and the Archduchess Maria Louisa. Prince Schwartzenberg had his instructions on the subject; so that the match was proposed, discussed, and decided in the council, and afterwards adjusted between plenipotentiaries on either side, in the space of twenty-four hours. The espousals of Napoleon and Maria Louisa were celebrated at Vienna, 11th March, 1810. The person of Bonaparte was represented by his favourite Berthier, while the Archduke Charles assisted at the ceremony in the name of the Emperor Francis. A few days afterwards, the youthful bride, accompanied by the Queen of Naples, proceeded towards France.

With good taste, Napoleon dispensed with the

ceremonies used in the reception of Marie Antoinette, whose marriage with Louis XVI., though never named or alluded to, was in other respects the model of the present solemnity. Near Soissons, a single horseman, no way distinguished by dress, rode past the carriage in which the young empress was seated, and had the boldness to return, as if to reconnoitre more closely. The carriage stopped, the door was opened, and Napoleon, breaking through all the tediousness of ceremony, introduced himself to his bride, and came with her to Soissons. The marriage ceremony was performed at Paris by Bonaparte's uncle, the Cardinal Fesch. The most splendid rejoicings, illuminations, concerts, festivals, took place upon this important occasion. But a great calamity occurred, which threw a shade over these demonstrations of joy. Prince Schwartzberg had given a distinguished ball on the occasion, when unhappily the dancing-room, which was temporary, and erected in the garden, caught fire. No efforts could stop the progress of the flames, in which several persons perished, and particularly the sister of Prince Schwartzberg himself. This tragic circumstance struck a damp on the public mind, and was considered as a bad omen, especially when it was remembered that the marriage of Louis XVI. with a former princess of Austria had been signalized by a similar disaster.

As a domestic occurrence, nothing could more contribute to Bonaparte's happiness than his union with Maria Louisa. He was wont to compare her with Joséphine, by giving the latter all the advantages of art and grace; the former the charms of simple modesty and innocence. His former empress used every art to support or enhance her personal charms; but with so much prudence and mystery, that the secret cares of her toilet could never be traced—her successor trusted, for the power of pleasing, to youth and nature. Joséphine mismanaged her revenue, and incurred debt without scruple. Maria Louisa lived within her income, or if she desired any indulgence beyond it, which was rarely the case, she asked it as a favour of Napoleon. Joséphine, accustomed to political intrigue, loved to manage, to influence, and to guide her husband; Maria Louisa desired only to please and to obey him. Both were excellent women, of great sweetness of temper, and fondly attached to Napoleon. In the difference between these distinguished persons, we can easily discriminate the leading features of the Parisian, and of the simple German beauty; but it is certainly singular that the artificial character should have belonged to the daughter of the West Indian planter; that marked by nature and simplicity, to a princess of the proudest court in Europe.

Bonaparte, whose domestic conduct was generally praiseworthy, behaved with the utmost kindness to his princely bride. He observed, however, the strictest etiquette, and required it from the empress. If it happened, for example, as was often the case, that he was prevented from attending at the hour when dinner was placed on the table, he was displeased if, in the interim of his absence, which was often prolonged, she either took a book, or had recourse to any female occupa-

tion,—if, in short, he did not find her in the attitude of waiting for the signal to take her place at table. Perhaps a sense of his inferior birth made Napoleon more tenacious of this species of form, as what he could not afford to relinquish. On the other hand, Maria Louisa is said to have expressed her surprise at her husband's dispensing with the use of arms and attendance of guards, and at his moving about with the freedom of an individual; although this could be no great novelty to a member of the imperial family of Austria, most of whom, and especially the Emperor Francis, are in the habit of mixing familiarly with the people of Vienna, at public places, and in the public walks.

As it influenced his political fate, Bonaparte has registered his complaint, that the Austrian match was a precipice covered with flowers, which he was rashly induced to approach by the hopes of domestic happiness. But if this proved so, it was the fault of Napoleon himself; his subjects and his allies augured very differently of its consequences, and to himself alone it was owing that these anguries were disappointed. It was to have been expected, that a connexion formed with the most ancient Imperial family in Christendom, might have induced Bonaparte to adopt some of those sentiments of moderation which regard rather the stability than the increase of power. It constituted a point at which he might pause. It might have been thought that, satiated with success, and wearied with enterprise, he would have busied himself more in consolidating the power which he desired to transmit to his expected posterity, than in aiming at rendering his grandeur more invidious and more precarious, by further schemes of ambition. Even the charms which this union added to his domestic life, might, it was hoped, bring on a taste for repose, which, could it have influenced that fiery imagination and frame of iron, might have been of such essential advantage to Europe.

Napoleon knew what was expected, and endeavoured to vindicate himself beforehand for the disappointment which he foresaw was about to ensue.

"The good citizens rejoice sincerely at my marriage, monsieur?" he said to Decrès, his minister.

"Very much, sire."

"I understand they think the Lion will go to slumber, ha?"

"To speak the truth, sire, they entertain some hopes of that nature."

Napoleon paused an instant, and then replied, "They are mistaken; yet it is not the fault of the Lion; slumber would be as agreeable to him as to others. But see you not that while I have the air of being constantly the attacking party, I am, in fact, acting only on the defensive?"

This sophism, by which Napoleon endeavoured to persuade all men, that his constant wars arose, not from choice, but out of the necessity of his situation, will be best discussed hereafter.

In the meantime, we may only notice, that the Emperor Alexander judged most accurately of the consequences of the Austrian match, when he said, on receiving the news, "Then the next task will be, to drive me back to my forests;" so certain he was

that Napoleon would make his intimate alliance with the Emperor Francis, the means of an attack upon Russia; and so acute was he in seeing the germs of future and more desperate wars, in a union from which more short-sighted politicians were looking for the blessings of peace.

CHAPTER LXIX.

Almost all the foreign French settlements fall into the hands of the British.—French squadron destroyed at the Isle of Aix, by Lord Cochrane—and in the bay of Rosas, by Lord Collingwood.—Return to the proceedings in Spain.—Soul takes Oporto.—Attacked and defeated by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and compelled to a disastrous retreat.—Ferrol and Corunna retaken by the patriots.—Battle of Talavera, gained by Sir Arthur Wellesley—who, nevertheless, in consequence of the obstinacy and bigotry of Cuesta, is compelled to retreat upon Portugal.—Created Lord Wellington.—The French armies take many towns and strong places.—Supreme Junta retreat to Cadiz.—Unsubdued spirit of the Spanish people.—The Guerilla system.—Mutual cruelties of the Guerillas and the French troops.—Growing disappointment of Bonaparte.—His immense exertions.—A large army raised, under the name of the army of Portugal, commanded by Masséna.—Lord Wellington compelled to remain inactive, from his inferiority of force.—Battle of Busaco, in which the French are defeated with great loss.—Lord Wellington's famous retreat on Torres Vedras.

NOTWITHSTANDING the credit which Napoleon had acquired, by dictating to the house of Austria the triumphant treaty of Schoenbrunn, and also by allying himself with that ancient Imperial house, which had, on different occasions, shown towards him the signs of persevering enmity, this period of his history did not pass without his experiencing several reverses of fortune. The few foreign settlements, which hitherto remained united to France, were now successively taken by the British. Cayenne, Martinique, Senegal, and Saint Domingo, were conquered and occupied in the West Indies; while Lord Collingwood, with troops furnished from Sicily, occupied the islands of Cephalonia, Zante, Ithaca, and Cerigo.

A French squadron of men of war being blockaded in the roadstead of the Isle of Aix, the determined valour of Lord Cochrane was employed for their destruction. Fire-ships were sent against the French vessels, and though the execution was less complete than had been expected, owing to some misunderstanding between Lord Cochrane and Admiral Gambier, who commanded in chief, yet the greater part of the French ships were burnt, or driven ashore and destroyed. Lord Collingwood also destroyed an important French convoy, with the armed vessels who protected it, in the bay of Rosas. Everything announced that England retained the full command of what has been termed her native element; while the transactions in Spain showed, that, under a general who understood at once how to gain victories, and profit by them when obtained, the land forces of Britain were no less formidable than her navy. This subject draws our attention to the affairs of the Peninsula, where it might be truly said "the land was burning."

The evacuation of Corunna by the army of the

late Sir John Moore, and their return to England, which their disastrous condition rendered indispensable, left Soul in seeming possession of Galicia, Ferrol and Cornana having both surrendered to him. But the strength of the Spanish cause did not lie in walls and ramparts, but in the indomitable courage of the gallant patriots. The Galicians continued to distinguish themselves by a war of posts, in which the invaders could claim small advantages; and when Soul determined to enter Portugal, he was obliged to leave Ney, with considerable forces, to secure his communication with Spain.

Soul's expedition began prosperously, though it was doomed to terminate very differently. He defeated General La Romana, and compelled him to retreat to Sanabria. The frontier town of Chaves was taken by Soul, after some resistance, and he forced his way towards Oporto. But no sooner had the main body of Soul's army left Chaves, than, in spite of the efforts of the garrison, the place was relieved by an insurrectionary army of Portuguese, under General Silveira. The invader, neglecting these operations in his rear, continued to advance upon Oporto, carried that fine city by storm, after a desultory defence of three days, and suffered his troops to commit the greatest cruelties, both on the soldiers and unarmed citizens.

But when Marshal Soul had succeeded thus far, his situation became embarrassing. The Galicians, recovering their full energy, had retaken Vigo and other places; and Silveira, advancing from Chaves to the bridge of Amarante, interposed betwixt the French general and Galicia, and placed himself in communication with the Spaniards.

While Soul was thus cooped up in Oporto, the English ministry, undaunted by the failure of their late expedition, resolved to continue the defence of the Portuguese, and to enter into still closer alliance with the Supreme Junta of Spain. Consulting their own opinion and the public voice, all consideration of rank and long service was laid aside, in order to confer the command of the troops which were to be sent to the Continent on Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose conduct in the battle of Vimiera, and the subsequent explanations which he afforded at the Court of Inquiry, had taught all Britain to believe, that if Portugal could be defended at all, it must be by the victor of that day. He was scarce landed at Lisbon, ere he fully justified the good opinion of his countrymen. He crossed the Douro at different points, with a celerity for which the French were unprepared, and, after a brilliant action under the walls of Oporto, compelled Soul to evacuate that city, and commence a retreat, so disastrous as to resemble that of Sir John Moore. In this retrograde movement, the French left behind them cannon, equipments, baggage—all that can strengthen an army, and enable it to act as such; and, after all these sacrifices, their leader could hardly make his escape into Galicia, with scarce three-fourths of his army remaining, where he found great difficulty in remodeling his forces. Ney, whom he had left as governor of that province, was hard pressed by the patriots, who defeated the French in several battles, and eventually retook the towns of Ferrol and Corunna.

Sir Arthur Wellesley was prevented from completing Soult's defeat by pursuing him into Galicia, because, after the Spaniards had sustained the severe defeat of Tudela, the French had penetrated into Andalusia in great strength, where they were only opposed by an ill-equipped and dispirited army of 40,000 men, under the rash and ill-starred General Cuesta. It was evident, that Marshal Victor, who commanded in Andalusia, had it in his power to have detached a considerable part of his force on Lisbon, supposing that city had been uncovered by Sir Arthur Wellesley's carrying his forces in pursuit of Soult. This was to be prevented, if possible. The English general formed the magnificent plan, for which Napoleon's departure to the Austrian campaign afforded a favourable opportunity, of marching into Andalusia, uniting the British forces with those of Cuesta, and acting against the invaders with such vigour, as might at once check their progress in the South, and endanger their occupation of Madrid. Unhappily, an ill-timed jealousy seems to have taken possession of Cuesta, which manifested itself in every possible shape, in which frowardness, and a petty obstinacy of spirit, could be exhibited. To no one of the combined plans, submitted to him by the English general, would he give assent or effectual concurrence; and when a favourable opportunity arrived of attacking Victor, before he was united with the forces which Joseph Bonaparte and Sebastiani were bringing from Madrid to his support, Cuesta alleged he would not give battle on a Sunday.

The golden opportunity was thus lost; and when the allies were obliged to receive battle instead of giving it, on the 28th July, 1809, it was without the advantages which the former occasion held out. Yet the famous battle of Talavera de la Reyna, in which the French were completely defeated, was, under these unfavourable circumstances, achieved by Sir Arthur Wellesley. The event of this action, in which the British forces had been able to defend themselves against double their own number, with but little assistance from the Spanish army, became, owing to the continued wilfulness of Cuesta, very different from what such a victory ought to have produced. The French troops, assembling from every point, left Sir Arthur no other mode of assuring the safety of his army, than by a retreat on Portugal; and for want of means of transport, which the Spanish general ought to have furnished, more than fifteen hundred of the wounded were left to the mercy of the French. They were treated as became a courteous enemy, yet the incident afforded a fine pretext to contest the victory, which the French had resigned by flying from the field.

The assertions of the bulletins in the *Moniteur*, could not deceive men on the true state of affairs. The Spanish Junta were sensible of the services rendered by the English general, and, somewhat of the latest, removed Cuesta from the command, to manifest their disapprobation of his unaccountable conduct. At home, Sir Arthur Wellesley was promoted to the peerage, by the title of Lord Wellington, who was destined to ascend, with the universal applause of the nation, as high as our constitution will permit. But Bonaparte paid the

greatest compliment to the victor of Talavera, by the sullen resentment with which he was filled by the news. He had received the tidings by his private intelligence, before the officer arrived with the regular dispatches. He was extremely ill received by the emperor; and, as if the messengers had been responsible for the tidings they brought, a second officer, with a duplicate of the same intelligence, was treated still more harshly, and for a time put under arrest. This explosion of passion could not be occasioned by the consequences of the action, for the experienced eye of Napoleon must have discriminated the circumstances by which the effects of victory were in a great measure lost to the allied armies; but he saw in the battle of Talavera, an assurance given to both English and Spanish soldiers, that, duly resisted, the French would fly from them. He foresaw, also, that the British government would be tempted to maintain the contest on the Continent, and that the Spaniards would be encouraged to persevere in resistance. He foresaw, in short, that war of six desperate and bloody campaigns, which did not terminate till the battle of Toulouse, in 1814.

But it needed no anticipation to fill Napoleon's mind with anxiety on the subject of Spain. It is true, fortune seemed everywhere to smile on his arms. Zaragoza, once more besieged, maintained its former name, but without the former brilliant result. After a defence as distinguished as in the first siege, the brave garrison and citizens, deprived of means of defence, and desperate of all hope of relief, had been compelled to surrender some months before.

Gerona, Tarragona, Tortosa, though still vigorously defended, were so powerfully invested, that it seemed as if Catalonia, the most warlike of the Spanish departments, was effectually subdued; and, accordingly, these fortresses also were afterwards obliged to capitulate.

Andalusia, the richest province which sustained the patriot cause, certainly was conquered, in consequence of a total defeat encountered by the Spanish grand army, under Areizaga, at Ocaña, November, 1809, after the English troops had retreated to the Portuguese frontier. Joseph Bonaparte, whose road was cleared by this last success, entered Cordova in triumph upon the 17th of January, 1810, and proud Seville itself upon the 1st of February following. Yet the chief prize of victory had not yet been gained. The Supreme Junta had effected their retreat to Cadiz, which city, situated in an island, and cut off from the mainland, on one side by a canal, and on the other three by the ocean, was capable of the most strenuous defence.

Cadiz contained a garrison of twenty thousand men, English, Spanish, and Portuguese, under the command of General Graham, a distinguished officer, whose merits, like those of Bonaparte, had been first distinguished at the siege of Toulon.* Marshal Soult, as first in command in Spain, disposed himself to form the siege of this city, the capture of which would have been almost the death-knell to the cause of the patriots.

* See p. 171.

But although these important successes read well in the *Moniteur*, yet such was the indomitable character of the Spaniards, which Napoleon had contrived fully to awaken, that misfortunes, which would have crushed all hope in any other people, seemed to them only an incentive to further and more desperate resistance. When they talked of the state of their country, they expressed no dismay at their present adverse circumstances. It had cost their ancestors, they said, two centuries to rid themselves of the Moors; they had no doubt that in a shorter time they should free themselves of the yoke of France; but they must reckon on time and opportunity, as well as valour. The events of the war in many respects gave credit to their hopes. The Spaniards, often found weak where they thought themselves strongest, proved sometimes most powerful, where, to all human appearance, they seemed weakest. While they lost Andalusia, believed to be so defensible, the mountainous province of Galicia, through which the French had so lately marched triumphantly in pursuit of the British, taking in their progress the important maritime towns of Corunna and Ferrol, was wrenched from the conquerors by the exertions of La Romana, assisted by the warlike natives of the country, and at the head of an undisciplined and ill-equipped army.

In Catalonia, too, the French had hardly time to accomplish the conquest of towns and fortresses to which we have alluded, when they found themselves checked, baffled, and sometimes defeated, by the Catalans, under Lacy, O'Donnell, and d'Eroles, who maintained the patriotic cause at the head of those energetic marksmen, the Somatenes, or Miquelets. Nay, while the French were extending their seeming conquests to the Mediterranean Sea, and thundering at the gates of Cadiz, so little were they in peaceful possession of Navarre, and the other provinces adjoining to France, that not an officer with dispatches could pass from Burgos to Bayonne without a powerful escort, and bands of Spaniards even showed themselves on the French frontier, and passed it for the purpose of skirmishing and raising contributions. Such being the case on the frontiers nearest to France, it may be well supposed, that the midland provinces were not more subordinate. In fact, through the whole Peninsula, the French held no influence whatsoever that was not inspired by the force of the bayonet and sabre; and where these could not operate, the country was in universal insurrection.

The basis of this extensive and persevering resistance was laid in the general system of Guerilla, or partisan warfare, to which the genius of the Spanish people, and the character of their country, are peculiarly fitted, and which offered a resistance to the invaders more formidable by far than that of regular armies, because less tangible, and less susceptible of being crushed in general actions. It was with the defenders of Spain, as with the guardian of the enchanted castle in the Italian romance. An armed warrior first encountered the champion who attempted the adventure, and when he had fallen under the sword of the assailant, the post which he had occupied appeared manned by a body of pigmies small in size, but so numerous and so enterprising, as to

annoy the knight-errant far more than the gigantic force of his first adversary. The qualities of a partisan, or irregular soldier, are inherent in the national character of the Spaniard. Calm, temperate, capable of much fatigue, and veiling under a cold demeanour an ardent and fiery character, they are qualified to wait for opportunities of advantage, and are not easily discouraged by difficulty or defeat. Good marksmen in general, and handling the lance, sword, and dagger with address, they are formidable in an ambush, and not less so in a close *mêlée*, where men fight hand to hand, more as nature dictates than according to the rules of war. The obstinacy of the Castilian character, also, had its advantages in this peculiar state of warfare. Neither promises nor threats made any impression on them, and the severities executed in fulfilment of menaces only inflamed the spirit of hostility by that of private revenge, to which the Spaniard is far more accessible than either to the voice of caution or persuasion.

Neither were the officers less qualified for the task than the men. The command of a guerilla was of a character not to be desired by any who did not find himself equal to, and in some measure called upon to accept, the dangerous pre-eminence. There were few Spanish officers possessed of the scientific knowledge of war, and of course few adequate to lead armies into the field; but the properties necessary for a guerilla leader are imprinted in the human mind, and ready for exercise whenever they are required. These leaders were, as it chanced, some of them men of high birth and military education; some had been smugglers or peasants, or had practised other professions, as was discovered from their *noms-de-guerre*, as the Curate, the Doctor, the Shepherd, and so forth. Many of their names will be long associated with recollection of their gallant actions; and those of others, as of Mina and the Empecinado, will, at the same time, remind us of the gross ingratitude with which their heroic efforts have been rewarded.

These daring men possessed the most perfect knowledge of the passes, strengths, woods, mountains, and wildernesses, of the provinces in which they warred; and the exact intelligence which they obtained from the peasantry made them intimately acquainted with the motions of the enemy. Was too weak a French detachment moved, it ran the risk of being cut off: was the garrison too feeble at the place which it left, the fort was taken. The slightest as well as the most important objects met the attention of the guerillas; a courier could not move without a large escort, nor could the intrusive king take the amusement of hunting, however near to his capital, unless, like Earl Percy in the ballad, attended by a guard of fifteen hundred men. The Juramentados, those Spaniards, that is, who had sworn allegiance to King Joseph, were of course closely watched by the guerillas, and if they rendered themselves inconveniently or obnoxiously active in the cause they had espoused, were often kidnapped and punished as traitors; examples which rendered submission to, or active co-operation with the French, at least as imprudent as boldly opposing the invaders.

The numbers of the guerillas varied at different times, as the chiefs rose or declined in reputation,

and as they possessed the means of maintaining their followers. Some led small flying armies of two thousand and upwards. Others, or the same chiefs under a reverse of fortune, had only ten or twenty followers. The French often attempted to surprise and destroy the parties by which they suffered most, and for that purpose detached moveable columns from different points, to assemble on the rendezvous of the guerrilla. But, notwithstanding all their activity and dexterity on such expeditions, they rarely succeeded in catching their enemy at unawares; or, if it so happened, the individuals composing the band broke up, and dispersed by ways only known to themselves; and when the French officers accounted them totally annihilated, they were again assembled on another point, exercising a partisan war on the rear, and upon the communications of those who lately expected to have them at their mercy. Thus invisible when they were sought for, the guerrillas seemed everywhere present when damage could be done to the invaders. To chase them was to pursue the wind, and to circumvent them was to detain water with a sieve.

Soult had recourse to severity to intimidate these desultory but most annoying enemies, by publishing a proclamation, threatening to treat the members of the guerrillas, not as regular soldiers, but as banditti taken in the fact, and thus execute such of them as chanced to be made prisoners. The chiefs, in reply to this proclamation, published a royal decree, as they termed it, declaring that each Spaniard was, by the necessity of the times, a soldier, and that he was entitled to all military privileges when taken with arms in his hands. They therefore announced, that having ample means of retaliation in their power, they would not scruple to make use of them, by executing two Frenchmen for every one of their followers who should suffer in consequence of Soult's unjust and inhuman proclamation. These threats were fulfilled on both sides. It is said, a horrid example of cruelty was given by a French general, who in a manner crucified, by nailing to trees, eight prisoners, whom he had taken from the guerrillas of the Empecinado. The daring Spaniard's passions were wound up too high to listen either to pity or fear; he retaliated the cruelty by nailing the same number of Frenchmen to the same trees, and leaving them to fill the forest of Guadarama with their groans. But these excesses became rare on either side, for the mutual interest of both parties soon led them to recur to the ordinary rules of war.

We have given a slight sketch of the peculiar character of this singular warfare, which constitutes a curious and interesting chapter in the history of mankind, and serves to show how difficult it is to subject, by the most formidable military means, a people who are determined not to submit to the yoke. The probability of the case had not escaped the acute eye of Bonaparte himself, who, though prescient of the consequences, had not been able to resist the temptation of seizing upon this splendid sovereignty, and who was still determined, as he is said to have expressed himself, to reign at least over Spain, if he could not reign over the Spanish people. But even this stern wish, adopted in vengeance rather than in soberness of mind, could not,

if gratified, have removed the perplexity which was annexed to the affairs of the Peninsula.

Bonaparte, in the spirit of calculation which was one of his great attributes, had reckoned that Spain, when in his hands, would retain the same channels of wealth which she had possessed from her South American provinces. Had he been able to carry into execution his whole plan—had the old king really embarked for Peru or Mexico, it might have happened that Napoleon's influence over Charles, his queen, and her favourite Godoy, could have been used to realize these expectations. But in consequence of the rupture which had taken place, the Spanish colonies, at first taking part with the patriots of the mother country, made large remittances to Cadiz for the support of the war against the French; and when afterwards, adopting another view of the subject, the opportunity appeared to them favourable for effecting their own independence, the golden tide which annually carried tribute to Old Spain was entirely dried up.

This Bonaparte had not reckoned upon, and he had now to regret an improvident avidity, similar to that of *Æsop's* boy, who killed the bird which laid eggs of gold. The disappointment was as great as unexpected. Napoleon had, from his private treasure, and the means he possessed in France, discharged the whole expense of the two large armies, by whom the territory of Spain was first occupied; and it was natural for him to suppose, that in this, as in so many other cases, the French troops should, after this first expedition, be paid and maintained at the expense of the provinces in which they were quartered. This was the rather to be expected, when Andalusia, Grenada, Valencia, fertile and rich provinces, were added to the districts overrun by the invading army. But so general was the disinclination to the French, so universal the disappearance of specie, so unintermitting the disturbances excited by the guerrillas, that both King Joseph, his court, and the French army, were obliged to have constant recourse to Napoleon for the means of supporting themselves; and such large remittances were made for these purposes, that in all the countries occupied by the French, the Spanish coin gradually disappeared from the circulation, and was replaced by that of France. The being obliged, therefore, to send supplies to the kingdom from which he had expected to receive them, was a subject of great mortification to Napoleon, which was not, however, the only one connected with the government he had established there.

In accepting the crown of Spain at the hands of Napoleon, Joseph, who was a man of sense and penetration, must have been sufficiently aware that it was an emblem of borrowed and dependent sovereignty, gleaming but with such reflected light as his brother's imperial diadem might shed upon it. He could not but know, that in making him King of Spain, Napoleon retained over him all his rights as a subject of France, to whose emperor, in his regal as well as personal capacity, he still, though a nominal monarch, was accounted to owe all vassalage. For this he must have been fully prepared. But Joseph, who had a share of the family pride, expected to possess with all others, save Bonaparte,

the external appearance at least of sovereignty, and was much dissatisfied with the proceedings of the marshals and generals sent by his brother to his assistance. Each of these, accustomed to command his own separate corps d'armée, with no subordination save that to the emperor only, proceeded to act on his own authority, and his own responsibility, levied contributions at pleasure, and regarded the authority of King Joseph as that of a useless and ineffective civilian, who followed the march along with the impediments and baggage of the camp, and to whom little honour was reckoned due, and no obedience. In a word, so complicated became the state of the war and of the government, so embarrassing the rival pretensions set up by the several French generals, against Joseph and against each other, that when Joseph came to Paris to assist at the marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa, he made an express demand that all the French troops in Spain should be placed under his own command, or rather that of his major-general; and in case this was declined, he proposed to abdicate the crown, or, what was equivalent, that the French auxiliaries should be withdrawn from Spain. Bonaparte had on a former occasion named his brother generalissimo of the troops within his pretended dominions; he now agreed that the French generals serving in Spain should be subjected, without exception, to the control of Marshal Jourdan, as major-general of King Joseph. But as these commanders were removed from Bonaparte's immediate eye, and were obliged to render an account of their proceedings both to the intrusive king and to Napoleon, it was not difficult for them to contrive to play off the one against the other, and in fact to conduct themselves as if independent of both.

These very embarrassing circumstances were increased by the presence of the English army, which, having twice driven the French from Portugal, showed no intention of returning to their ships, but lay on the frontiers of the latter kingdom, ready to encourage and assist the continued resistance of Spain. It was not the fault of the commander-in-chief that their duties were for the present in a great measure limited to those of an army of observation. If the troops which assisted in the ill-advised Walcheren expedition had been united to those under the command of Lord Wellington, they would, at a loss infinitely less, and yet greatly more honourably incurred, have driven the French beyond the Ebro, or more probably, have compelled them to evacuate Spain. But our cabinet, though adopting new and more bold, as well as more just ideas of the force of the country, could not be expected perhaps all at once, and amid the clamour of an opposition who saw nothing but reckless desperation in whatever measures were calculated to resist France, to hazard so much of the national force upon one single adventure, although bearing in their own eyes a promising aspect. Statesmen, and even those of no mean character, are apt to forget, that where a large supply of men and money is necessary to insure the object aimed at, it is miserable policy to attempt to economize either; and that such ill-timed thrift must render the difficulties attending the expedition either altogether insurmountable, or greatly add to the

loss which must be encountered to overcome them.

In the meantime, Bonaparte, with respect to the Peninsula, convulsed as it was by civil war in every province,—half-subdued and half-emancipated,—causing him an immense expense, as well as endless contradiction and mortification,—stood much in the condition, to use a popular simile, of one, who, having hold of a wolf, feels it equally difficult to overpower the furious animal, and dangerous to let him go. His power over the general mind, however, rested a great deal on the opinion commonly received, that he was destined to succeed in whatever enterprise he undertook. He himself entertained some such ideas concerning the force of his own destiny; and, as it was no part either of his temper or his policy to abandon what he had once undertaken, he determined to make a gigantic effort to drive the Leopards and their Sepoy general, as the French papers called the British and Lord Wellington, out of Portugal; to possess himself of Lisbon; and to shut that avenue against foreign forces again attempting to enter the Peninsula.

In obedience to the emperor's commands, an army, to be termed that of Portugal, was assembled, on a scale which the Peninsula had scarcely yet seen.

It was called by the French themselves one hundred and ten thousand men, but certainly rather exceeded than fell short of the number of eighty thousand. This large force was put under the command of Masséna, Prince of Essling, the greatest name in the French army, after that of Napoleon, and so favoured by fortune, that his master was wont to call him the Spoilt Child of Victory.

Lord Wellington's British troops did not exceed twenty-five thousand in number, and there were among them so many invalids, that his motions were necessarily entirely limited to the defensive. He had, however, a subsidiary force under his command, consisting of thirty thousand Portuguese, in whom other generals might have rested little confidence; but they were receiving British pay and British allowances, were disciplined in the British manner, and commanded by British officers; and Lord Wellington, who had seen the unwarlike Hindu behave himself in similar circumstances like a companion not unworthy of the English soldier, had little doubt of being able to awaken the dormant and suppressed, but natural ardour of the natives of Portugal. This force had been in a great measure trained under the auspices of Marshal Beresford, an officer who has eternal claims on the gratitude of his country, for the generous manner in which he devoted himself to a labour, which had at first little that was flattering or promising; and for the very great perfection to which, by dint of skill, good temper, and knowledge of human nature, he was able to bring his task to completion at such an important crisis.

It was, however, of the utmost importance to avoid trusting too much to the Portuguese troops, which were so recently levied and trained, until they had acquired something of the practice, as well as the theory, of the military profession.

Thus, between the weak state of the British, and the imperfect discipline of the Portuguese, Lord Wellington was reduced to temporary inactivity,

and had the mortification to see the frontier places of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida taken almost in the presence of his army. The fears of the British nation were as usual excited in an unreasonable degree by these two sinister events; but they had both come within the calculations of Lord Wellington, whose advance to the frontier was without the intention of incurring any risk for the preservation of those places, but merely, by inducing the garrisons to hold out, to protract as long as possible a defence, the duration of which must be equally advantageous to the allies, and wasteful to the French.

The position on which he meant to maintain the defence of Portugal had been long since fixed upon, and the fortifications had been as long in progress. It was that of Torres Vedras, where, as appears from his own evidence before the Cintra Court of Inquiry, he had expected Junot to make a defence, after the battle of Vimeira. All Lord Wellington's previous movements were adjusted carefully, for the purpose of drawing the enemy from his supplies and communications to that point, beyond which he proposed the invader should pass no farther.

Admirably as Lord Wellington's premises were connected with the conclusion he aimed at, chance, or rather the presumption of the French general, favoured him with an unexpected opportunity of adding glory to a retreat, which was dictated by prudence. Masséna, if he did justice to British courage, thought himself entitled to set the military skill of their general at utter defiance. He saw, indeed, their retrograde movements, from the banks of the Coa towards Lisbon, conducted with all the deliberate and guarded caution of a game at chess; but still these movements were retrograde, nor could he resist the temptation, by a bold and sudden attack, to attempt to precipitate the retreat of the British, and drive them, if not into the sea, at least into their ships, to which he doubted not they were ultimately bound.

This led to the battle of Busaco, which was fought on the 27th of September, 1810.

Upon that memorable day the British army was assembled on the Sierra, or ridge of the hills called Busaco. Masséna, by turning the extremity of the ridge, might have compelled the English general to recommence his retreat; but he meditated a direct attack on the position. It was made by five strong divisions of the French. Two attacked on the right, one of which, forcing its way to the top of the ridge, was bayoneted and driven headlong down; the other, suffering great loss from the fire, gave way before reaching the top. Three divisions attacked on the left, with nearly the same fate. Defeated upon such unfavourable ground, the enemy lost, it was computed, at least two thousand men slain, besides very many wounded. The moral effect of the battle of Busaco was immense. It assured both the English themselves, and the people of Portugal, that the retreat of Lord Wellington's army was not the effect of fear, but of a deliberate choice. It evinced, also, what degree of trust might be securely reposed in the Portuguese levies. "They had shown themselves worthy of contending," said Lord Wellington,

in his official dispatch, "in the same ranks with British troops;" and they felt their own confidence rise as their merits became acknowledged.

The French army, declining any farther attack on the Sierra, proceeded to turn its extremity, and move upon Lisbon by the way of Coimbra. Here Masséna established a strong rear-guard with his hospitals and wounded; but the inspiration occasioned by the victory of Busaco had not yet subsided among the Portuguese. Colonel Trant, a British officer, who commanded a body of Portuguese militia, rushed gallantly into Coimbra, and carried the place by a sudden attack. About five thousand men, many of course wounded, with all the French hospital stores, fell into the hands of the Portuguese; and Masséna, who could not recover the place, suffered all the loss of stores and provisions which that city afforded as a dépôt, and which the fertile district in the neighbourhood might have enabled him to collect.

Great was the surprise of both armies, when the retreat of the British, and advance of the French, suddenly terminated. The former entered a regular position, which, by the utmost exertion of skill and labour, had been rendered almost impregnable, being most formidably protected by field-works and heavy guns. They found that the Tagus and port of Lisbon afforded them assurance of subsistence, even in plenty, and that their inferiority in numbers was completely made up to them by the strength of their position.

The French, on the contrary, who had fondly expected to enter Lisbon as conquerors, found themselves in a country wasted by the hands of its cultivators; without hospitals or magazines in their rear; in front a foe, of whom they had lately felt the strength; and around, a hostile population, for the greater part in arms. If, in such a situation, Masséna could be said to besiege Lisbon, he was, nevertheless, in the utmost danger of suffering those extremities of famine which usually fall to the lot of the beleaguered party. He seemed, by some strange transmutation, to have changed lots with the natives of Lisbon, and to suffer all the evils which he expected to inflict.

The war now paused on both sides. Lord Wellington had reached the point of his defence. Masséna seemed at a loss where to commence his attack. The deer was turned to bay, but the dogs sprang not. The eyes of all Europe rested upon the Tagus, on whose banks were to be decided the pretensions to superiority asserted by two great generals in the name of two mighty nations. But that event was suspended for several months, during which it is fitting that we should resume the narrative of other matters.

CHAPTER LXX.

Change in Napoleon's principles of government.—Causes leading to this.—Becomes suspicious of Talleyrand and Fouché.—Remonstrates with the latter, who satisfies him for the time.—Fouché endeavours, without the knowledge of Napoleon, to ascertain the views of England with respect to peace.—His plan is defeated by a singular collision with a similar one of Napoleon, brought

forward without the knowledge of his minister — and Fouché is sent away as Governor-general of Rome.—His moral and political character.—His dismissal regretted. — Murmurings of the people against the Austrian alliance, and its supposed effects.—Continental system.—Its object.—Ignorance of Napoleon of the actual political feelings of Great Britain.—License system.—Its nature and effects. — Louis Bonaparte.—Endeavours in vain to defend Holland from the effects of the continental system.—He abdicates the throne, and retires to Grotz in Styria.—Holland is annexed to the French empire.—This step renders Napoleon extremely unpopular.

SINCE Bonaparte obtained, in 1804, the absolute rule of the French Republic, a change had been gradually taking place in his principles of government, and in the character of the statesmen whom he employed as his ministers and advisers. For the first two years, and more, he had governed on the principle of a limited monarch, who avails himself of the best talents he can find among his subjects, and shows a deference to those who are distinguished, either for the political part which they have performed, or the share they possess in the good opinion of the public. Among his advisers at this period, we find many of the leading men of the Revolution; persons who, though they had been induced from various motives to see the rise of Napoleon with equanimity, and even to aid him, then their equal, in his attempt to climb to supreme power, yet still remembered in what relation he and they had originally stood to each other. In counseling an emperor, these statesmen did it with the more freedom that they remembered a period when they were on a level with him, nay, perhaps, when they stood a good deal higher.

This period of his reign, during which Napoleon suffered the wild and powerful flights of his own ambition to be in some degree restrained and directed by the judgment of others, formed the most laudable and useful certainly, if not the most brilliant part of his career. But gradually as his power became augmented and consolidated, the emperor began to prefer that class of complaisant ministers, who would rather reflect his own opinions, prefaced with additional recommendations and arguments, than less courteously attempt to criticise and refute them.

The history of Napoleon justifies, or at least excuses him, for falling into this natural error. He felt, and justly, that he was the sole projector of his gigantic plans, and also, in a great measure, the agent who carried them through; and he was led to believe, that, because he did so much, he might as well do the whole. The schemes which he had himself originally formed were executed by his own military genius; and thus it seemed as if the advice of counsellors, so indispensable to other princes, might be unnecessary to a sovereign who had shown himself all-sufficient alike in the cabinet and in the field. Yet this, though a plausible, was a delusive argument, even though it appeared to be borne out by the actual fact. It may be true, that in Bonaparte's councils, few measures of consequence were suggested by his ministers, and that he himself generally took the lead in affairs of importance. But still it was of great consequence that such plans,

having been proposed, should be critically weighed, and canvassed by men of too much experience to be deceived by appearances, and too much courage to be prevented from speaking their mind. The advice of such men as Talleyrand and Fouché operated as a restraint upon schemes hastily operated or opinionatively maintained; and their influence, though unseen and unheard, save in the Imperial cabinet, might yet be compared to the keel of a vessel, which, though invisible, serves to steady her among the waves, and regulate the force by which she is propelled by her swelling canvas; or to the pendulum of a time-piece, which checks and controls the main-spring of the machinery. Yet though Bonaparte must have been sensible of these advantages, he was still more accessible to the feelings of jealousy, which made him suspect, that these statesmen were disposed rather to establish separate interests for themselves in the government and nation, than to hold themselves completely dependent on the Imperial authority.

The character of both Talleyrand and Fouché, indeed, authorized some such suspicion. They had been distinguished in the French Revolution before Napoleon's name had been heard of, were intimately acquainted with all the springs which had moved it, and retained, as Bonaparte might suspect, the inclination, and even the power, to interfere at some possible state crisis more effectually than accorded with his views of policy. He had gorged them indeed with wealth; but if he consulted his own bosom, he might learn that wealth is but an indifferent compensation for the loss of political power. In a word, he suspected that the great services which Talleyrand rendered him with regard to foreign relations, and Fouché as minister of police, were calculated to raise them into necessary and indispensable agents, who might thus become, to a certain degree, independent of his authority. He doubted, moreover, that they still kept up relations with a political society called Philadelphes, consisting of old republicans and others, of different political creeds, but who were united in their views of obtaining some degree of freedom, either by availing themselves of such slender means of restraint as the constitution, so carefully purged of every means of opposing the imperial will, might yet afford, or by waiting for some disaster befalling Napoleon which might render their voice potent.

The suspicions with which Bonaparte regarded his ministers did not rest on vague conjecture. While he was in Spain, he received information, appearing to indicate that a party was forming itself in the Legislative Assembly, the bond connecting which was opposition to the imperial will. That body voted, it must be remembered, by ballot; and great was the surprise and alarm of the assembly, when black balls, disapproving a measure suggested to their consideration by government, were counted to the number of a hundred and twenty-five, being a full third of the members present.

An official note, dated from Valladolid, 4th December, instantly recalled the presumptuous dissentients to a sense that the power of rejecting the laws laid before them in the emperor's name, which they had attempted thus boldly to exercise, was

only entrusted to them for show, but was meant to contain no really effectual power of control. The words of Napoleon, the friend, as has been pretended, of liberal institutions, are well worthy of remark. "Our evils," he said, "have arisen in part from an exaggeration of ideas, which has tempted the Legislative Body to consider itself as representing the nation; an idea which is chimerical and even criminal, since implying a claim of representation which is vested in the emperor alone. The Legislative Body ought to be called the Legislative Council—it does not possess the right of making laws, since it has not the right of propounding them. In the constitutional hierarchy, the emperor, and the ministers his organs, are the first representatives of the nation. If any other pretensions, pretending to be constitutional, should pervert the principles of our monarchical constitution, everything is undone."

This is all very intelligible, and shows that in principle, if not in practice, the monarchical constitution of France rested upon the same basis of despotism which supports the monarchical constitution of Constantinople, where the Ulemas, or men of law, have an ostensible title to resist the Grand Seignor's edicts, and are only exposed to the penalty of being pounded to death in a mortar, should they presume to exercise it. Yet, a member of the French Legislative Body might have been pardoned for being inquisitive on two subjects: 1st, he might wish to know, if that body, chosen by the people, though indeed not directly, did not represent their electors, whom was it that they did represent? 2dly, what was their real authority in the state, since they were not to enjoy the power of rejecting the overtures which the constitution contended should be laid before them, before they were passed into laws?

Bonaparte entertained strong suspicion that this recalcitrating humour, so suddenly testified by so complaisant an assembly, must have had the countenance of Talleyrand and of Fouché. So soon as he returned to Paris, therefore, he sounded the latter minister on the revolt in the Legislative Body, and desired his opinion on the sort of measures by which he had repressed it. Fouché had been too long a spy upon the private thoughts of others, to be capable of the weakness of betraying his own. He expatiated, in a tone of panegyric, on the decisive tone of the official note, affirmed that this was the only way to govern a kingdom, and added, that if any constitutional body arrogated the right of national representation, the sovereign had no choice but instantly to dissolve it. "If Louis XVI. had acted thus," said the minister, "he might have been alive, and King of France at this day." Astonished at the zeal and promptitude of this reply, Bonaparte looked for an instant with wonder at his minister, who thus avouched sentiments so different from those which had governed the earlier part of his political life. "And yet, Duke of Otranto," said the emperor to the ex-jacobin, "methinks you were yourself one of those whose voices sent Louis XVI. to the scaffold?"

"I was," answered the supple statesman, without confusion or hesitation: "and it was the first service which I had the honour to render to your majesty."

This courtly answer saved the minister for the moment; but Napoleon did not the less continue to see in Fouché an object of suspicion and apprehension, whose power, owing to his having been so long at the head of the police, was immense; whose duplicity was unfathomable, and who evinced many indications of desiring to secure some separate individual authority, either by being too necessary to be dismissed, or too formidable to be offended.

Fouché himself has, indeed, admitted that he endeavoured to regulate the duties of his office, so as to secure as much power to himself as possible, and was desirous, out of a desire of popularity, as well as from respect for the virtue which he did not himself possess, to execute those duties with the least possible harm to individuals. His mode of transacting business with the emperor was thus characteristically described by himself. A person of rank, one of the *détenus*, desirous of escaping from the durance in which he was confined, had been fortunate enough to engage the interest of Fouché in his behalf. He had received more than one intimation from this statesman that his passport would certainly be granted, but still it never received the imperial signature; and Fouché, who began to fear that his own sincerity might be called in question, commenced one morning, in the presence of our informer, and of one of the distinguished generals of the empire, the following oblique explanation of the cause of his failure.

"You no doubt think yourself a brave man?" said he, addressing the general.

"Bah!" replied the other, entering into the same vein of raillery,—"Brave! brave as a hundred lions."

"But I," continued the statesman, "am much braver than you. Look you, I desire some favour, the liberation of a friend or the like; I watch the happy moment of access, select the moment of persuasion, am insinuating,—eloquent,—at length, by argument or importunity, I am successful. Next day, the paper which should ratify the boon which I had requested, is rejected when offered, torn perhaps, or flung beneath a heap of petitions and supplications. Now, herein is displayed my courage, which consists in daring again and again to recommence the unacceptable suit, and what is perhaps the last verge of audacity, to claim it as a promise, which, being once pledged, can only be redeemed by specific performance."

In this confession we read the account of a minister, still possessing influence, but declining in favour, and already become the object of his sovereign's jealousy; to whose personal request a favour cannot be decently refused, although a promise, reluctantly conceded to importunity, is willingly forgotten, or at length tardily and disobligingly granted.

Standing on these terms with a master at once watchful and jealous, we cannot but be surprised at the audacity of Fouché, who feared not to affect a sort of independence, by anticipating the desires of Napoleon in the public service, and even in the imperial family. A striking instance of the last occurred in his intrigue with Joséphine on the subject of the divorce; and perhaps it was his escape out of that former involvement, without loss of power

or credit, which urged him to a second interference of a more public and national character, by which he endeavoured to sound the possibility of accomplishing a peace with England.

We may discover more than one motive for Fouché's proceeding in this most important business without either the knowledge or consent of Napoleon. He was aware that his master might have rendered it, in his way of treating, impossible, even at starting, to discover on what terms Great Britain would conclude peace, by stating as preliminaries certain concessions which it was probable would not be granted, but from which, once stated, Napoleon could not himself recede. If, therefore, Fouché could find some secret mode of ascertaining upon what terms a treaty with England might really be obtained, he was doing a service to France, to Britain, to Napoleon himself, and to the world. It is not the Duke of Otranto, however, in particular, whom we would expect to incur disgrace, and even personal hazard, on mere public grounds. But, besides the pleasure which those who have long engaged in political intrigues find in carrying them on, until the habit becomes as inveterate as that of the gambler, we can see that Fouché might reasonably propose to himself an important accession of influence by the success of such a negotiation. If he could once acquire a knowledge of the price at which Napoleon might obtain that peace for which the world sighed in vain, he would become possessed of an influence over public opinion, both at home and abroad, which could not but render him a person of extreme importance; and if he was able to become the agent in turning such knowledge to advantage, and negotiating such an important treaty, he might fix himself even on Napoleon, as one of those ministers frequently met with in history, whom their sovereign may have disliked, but could not find means to dismiss.

Acting upon such motives, or on others which we can less easily penetrate, Fouché anxiously looked around, to consider what concessions France might afford to make, to soothe the jealousy of England; trusting it would be possible to come to some understanding with the British ministry, weakened by the loss of Mr Canning, and disheartened by the defeats sustained by the Spanish patriots, and the sinister event of the Walcheren expedition. The terms which he would have been willing to have granted, comprehended an assurance of the independence of the two kingdoms of Holland and Spain (as if such a guarantee could have availed anything, while these kingdoms had for sovereigns the brothers of Napoleon, men reigning as his prefects, and, we shall presently see, subject to removal at his pleasure), together with the acknowledgment of the Sicilian monarchy in the present king, and that of Portugal in the house of Braganza. Monsieur Ouvrard, a gentleman who had been permitted to go to London on commercial business, was employed by Fouché to open this delicate and furtive negotiation with the Marquis of Wellesley. But the negotiation was disconcerted by a singular circumstance.

The idea of endeavouring to know on what terms peace could be obtained, had occurred to Napoleon

as well as to Fouché; and the sovereign, on his part, unsuccessful as he had been on two occasions in his attempt to open a personal correspondence with the King of England, had followed the steps of his minister, in making Monsieur Labouchère, a commercial person, agent of a great Dutch mercantile establishment, the medium of communication with the British government. The consequence was, that Ouvrard, and the agent of the emperor, neither of whom knew of the other's mission, entered about the same time into correspondence with the Marquis Wellesley, who, returned from his Spanish mission, was now secretary at war. The British statesman, surprised at this double application, became naturally suspicious of some intended deception, and broke off all correspondence both with Ouvrard and his competitor for the office of negotiator.

Napoleon must naturally have been so highly incensed with Fouché for tampering without his consent in a matter of such vital consequence, that one is almost surprised to find him limiting the effects of his resentment to disgracing the minister. He sent for Fouché, and having extorted from him an avowal of his secret negotiation, he remarked, "So, then, you make peace or war without my leave?" The consequence was, that the Duke of Otranto was deprived of his office of minister of police, in which he was succeeded by Savary; and he was shortly after sent into a species of honourable exile, in the character of Governor-general of Rome. It cost Bonaparte no little trouble to redeem from the clutches of his late minister the confidential notes which he had himself written to him upon affairs of police. For a long time Fouché pretended that he had consigned these important documents to the flames; and it was not until he had before his eyes the alternative of submission or a dungeon, that he at length delivered up the Imperial warrants, containing, no doubt, much that would have been precious to history. Dismissed at present from the stage, we shall again meet with this bold statesman at other periods of our history, when, as is observed of some kinds of sea-fowl, his appearance seldom failed to announce danger and tempest.

The character of Fouché, in point of principle or morality, could scarcely be accounted even tolerable; but he had high talents, and in many points the soundness of his judgment led him to pursue and recommend moderate and beneficent measures, out of policy, if not from a higher motive. On other accounts, also, many of the French had some partiality to him; especially those who cast their eyes backward upon their national history, and regretted the total loss of that freedom, so eagerly longed for, so briefly possessed, and which they could never be properly said to have enjoyed; and to the recovery of which, in part at least, Fouché was understood to be favourable as far as he could or dared. The remnant of the sterner republicans might despise him as a time-server, yet they respected him, at the same time, as a relic of the Revolution, and on different occasions experienced his protection. To the royalists also he had been courteous, and so decidedly so, as encouraged one of the boldest agents of the Bourbons to penetrate to his presence, and

endeavour to bring him over to the cause of the exiled family. Fouché dismissed him, indeed, with a peremptory refusal to listen to his proposal; but he did not deliver him to the police, and he allowed him twenty-four hours to leave the kingdom. These various feelings occasioned to many alarm and regret at the dismissal of the Duke of Otranto.

The disgrace of this able minister seemed the more portentous, that shortly before it occurred, the terrible charge of which he was about to be deprived had received an alarming extension of jurisdiction. The number of state prisons was extended from one, being the old tower of Vincennes, to no less than six, situated in different parts of France.* These Bastilles, chiefly old Gothic castles, were destined to be the abode of captives, whom the government described as persons who could not be convicted of any crime perpetrated, but whom, as entertaining dangerous thoughts and principles, it was not safe to permit to remain at large. The *lettre de cachet*, by authority of which these victims of political suspicion were to be secluded from liberty, was to consist in a decree of the Privy Council, which might have been as well termed the pleasure of the emperor. This measure was adopted on the 3d of March, 1810, upon a report made to the Council of State in the name of Fouché, and agreed to by them; but it was well understood, that, in this and similar instances, the individual at the head of any department was obliged to father the obloquy of such measures as Napoleon desired to introduce into it. The minister of police was therefore held guiltless of recommending an extension of the government's encroachments upon public liberty; which, in fact, were the exclusive device of Napoleon and his Privy Council.

It was another unfortunate circumstance for Napoleon, that the observers of the times ascribed the dismissal of the old republican counsellors, and the more rigorous measures adopted against political malcontents, to the influence of the Austrian alliance. With many persons in France, Bonaparte, as the Heir of the Revolution, might, like Danton, Robespierre, and others, have exercised the most despotic authority, providing he claimed his right to do so by and through the Revolution. But they could not endure to see the Emperor Napoleon, while exercising the same authority with a thousand times more lenity, attempt to improve his right to the submission of his subjects by an alliance with one of the ancient houses of Europe, against whom the principles of the Revolution had declared eternal war. Every class of politicians has its fanatics, and in that of the ancient jacobins were many who would rather have perished by the short, sharp terrors of the republican guillotine, than survived to linger in a dungeon during the pleasure of a son-in-law of the Emperor of Germany. Such ideas, inconsistent as they were in themselves, and utterly irreconcilable with the quiet, gentle, and irreproachable character of Maria Louisa, who could never be justly accused of even attempting to influence her husband upon any political subject, cir-

culated, nevertheless, and were even accredited in political society. There was indeed this argument in their favour, that no other motive could be assigned for Bonaparte's sparing Austria when she was lying at his mercy, and chusing a partner out of her royal family, than the desire of allying himself with the house of Hapsburg, and of gaining such access as could be attained by such an alliance to a share in the rights and privileges of the most ancient hereditary dynasty of Europe. But in approaching to that fraternal alliance with legitimate royalty, Napoleon proportionally abandoned those revolutionary principles and associates, by whose means he had first climbed to power; and by this change, rather of the basis of his authority than of the authority itself, he offended many of the republicans, without effectually gaining the aristocrats, to whom his new connexion might have seemed a recommendation. Indeed, when his right to sovereignty was considered without reference to his possession, and his power to maintain it, Napoleon was in some measure censured like the bat in the fable. The democrats urged against him his matrimonial alliance with a house of the ancient regime; while the aristocrats held him disqualified, on account of the origin of his power under the revolutionary system.

But although such objections existed among the zealots of both political factions, the great body of the French people would have cared little to what principle Napoleon had ascribed his title to the Imperial crown, providing he had but been contented to allow the subject and himself the advantage of a short repose from wars and conquests. This tranquillity, however, was becoming every day less probable, for new incidents seemed to dictate new acquisitions to the empire; and, unhappily for his own and other countries, the opportunity of aggrandisement was with Bonaparte all that it wanted to recommend it, and the pressure of the occasion was always a complete justification of any measure which the time rendered expedient.

That which now chiefly occupied him, since the overtures for peace with England had been rendered abortive by the collision of his own confidential emissary with that of Fouché, was the destruction of the strength, and the sapping of the resources of that country, by dint of enforcing and extending what he called the European Continental System; which consisted of the abolition of all commerce, and the reducing each nation, as in the days of primitive barbarism, to remain satisfied with its own productions, however inadequate to the real or artificial wants to which its progress in society had gradually given rise.

Like most foreigners, Napoleon understood little or nothing of the constitutional opinions, or influential principles, belonging to England. He was well acquainted with human character, as modified by the governments and customs of France and Italy; but this experience no more qualified him to judge of the English character, than the most perfect acquaintance with the rise and fall of the Mediterranean, amounting to five or six inches in height, would prepare a navigator to buffet with the powerful tides which burst and foam on the shores of the British islands. The information which he received

* Saumur, Ham, Landsknecht, Pierre-Châtel, and Fénétrille.

from that hostile country, Bonaparte construed according to his wishes; and when it was supplied by private intelligencers, they were of course desirous of enhancing the value of what they told, by exaggerating its importance. It was, indeed, no difficult task to impose on a statesman, ignorant enough of the present state of North Britain to believe, that he could, even at this time of day, have disturbed the security of the reigning family, by landing in Scotland some candidate, having pretensions to the crown through the house of Stuart. With the same inaccuracy, he concluded every warm speech in Parliament a summons to revolt—every temporary riot or testimony of popular displeasure, from whatever cause, a commencement of open rebellion. He could not be convinced, that from the peculiarity of the English constitution, and the temper of her people, such disturbances and such violent debates must frequently exist; and although, like eruptions on the human body, they are both unpleasant and unseemly, they are yet the price at which sound internal health is preserved.

Actuated by such erroneous views as we have stated, Napoleon conceived that in 1810 he saw in England the important results of his continental system, or interdiction of British commerce with the Continent.

The associations of the Luddites, as they were called, were at this time giving great disturbance in the manufacturing districts of England. These, it is well known, were framed to prevent the introduction of looms wrought by machinery, or power-looms, to the superseding the ordinary looms wrought by hand. The cause would have equally existed, and the discontent also, if the continental system had never been heard of; for such discontent must and will exist in every trade where a number of men are suddenly thrown out of employment by the introduction of abbreviated means of labour. Yet Napoleon never doubted that these heart-burnings, and the violence of the parliamentary debates, arose entirely from the new mode he had found of striking at Great Britain by the destruction of her commerce. He, therefore, as we shall presently see, examined all Europe, with the intention of shutting every creek and fishing-port, through which cargoes of muslins or cotton goods could by possibility penetrate; and the absolute authority which he could exercise over the whole Continent, with the exception of Russia, and of the "still-veiled" Peninsula, entitles us to compare him to the beedful governor of a jail, who traverses his gloomy dominions at stated hours, striking with his hammer every bar to ascertain that it rings sound, and proving every lock, to see that no secret means of communication exist with the free port of humanity. Thus commerce, the silken tie which binds nations to each other, whose influence is so salutary to all states, so essential to the very existence of many, was in danger of being totally abrogated, unless in as far as it was carried on by a system of licenses.

The adoption of this system, which went in a great measure to counteract the effects of that very continental system which he made it such an especial point to press and enforce upon all neutral powers, was a singular sacrifice made by Napoleon,

partly to necessity, partly to the desire of accumulating treasure.

The license system was a relaxation of the continental blockade, of which England had set the example by giving protections to such neutral vessels as, clearing out from a British port, had a certain proportion of their cargo made up of British goods or colonial produce. This was what, in mercantile language, is termed a real transaction—the British merchandise was purchased by such as designed to make a profit, by selling it again upon any part of the Continent to which they might be able to introduce it. Bonaparte, in like manner, granted Imperial licenses, purchased for large sums of money, by which trading vessels were permitted to import a certain quantity of colonial produce, on condition of exporting an equal proportion of French manufactures. This system differed from that of England, in this important respect, that the demand for articles of the French manufactures was entirely simulated. The goods were not wanted in Britain, could not be re-sold there without payment of heavy duties, and were often thrown into the sea in preference to discharging the English duties upon them. Editions of books, a commodity thus exported, and thus disposed of, were wittily said to be *ad usum Delphini*. The prime cost at which these French goods had been purchased, in compliance with Bonaparte's regulations, was of course laid upon the colonial goods, which were the only actual subject of trade. Thus, if the French manufacturers derived any profit from the transaction, it was raised, not by their goods being exported and sold in foreign countries, in the usual course of trade, but by the prime cost being imposed as a tax upon the colonial produce imported; and the price was paid, of course, not by the foreign market, which the goods seldom reached, but by the French consumers of sugar, rum, and coffee.

The real temptation for continuing this attempt to force a trade was, as we have seen, the impossibility of dispensing with colonial produce entirely, and the large revenue accruing to the French government from these licenses, who, in this manner, exercising a complete monopoly in a trade which they interdicted to all others, made immense additions to the treasure which almost choked the vaults of the pavilion Marsan, in the Tuileries.

The language held by the minister of Napoleon, to the powers thus affected, amounted therefore to the following proposition:—"You shall shut your ports against British commodities; for, without your doing so, it will be impossible for the Emperor Napoleon to humble the Mistress of the Seas. But while you are thus deprived of all commerce, whether passive or active, Napoleon reserves to himself, by the system of license, the privilege of purchasing and dealing in the commodities of Britain and her colonies, which, reaching your country by any other mode than through his permission, will be subject to confiscation, nay, to destruction."

At a later period, Bonaparte greatly regretted that he had suffered the emolument derived from the license-trade, to seduce him into relaxing his continental system. He seems to lament having relinquished his supposed advantage, as a vindictive

freebooter might regret his having been reduced to let go his hold on his enemy's throat, by the tempting opportunity of plunging his hand into the pocket of a bystander. The injustice which thus imposed on neutrals the necessity of abstaining from a lucrative commerce, which France, the belligerent power, reserved to herself the privilege of carrying on in such degree as she might find convenient, was of so crying a description, that, at any other time than during the irresistible ascendancy of Napoleon, the very mention of it would have revolted all Europe. And even as times stood, the non-compliance with terms so harsh and unjust, cost the fall of two European thrones, ere it became the means of undermining that of Napoleon himself.

The first of the royal sufferers was the brother of Napoleon, Louis Bonaparte, who had been created King of Holland. By every account which we have been able to collect, Louis was an amiable, well-intentioned, and upright man, of a romantic disposition, and a melancholic complexion, which he had increased by studying the sentimental philosophy of Rousseau. But he was, in his brother's language, an ideologist; that is, one who is disposed to do that which is right according to principle, rather than that which circumstances render expedient. He was embarrassed by some family disputes, and lived on indifferent terms with his wife, who was a greater favourite with Napoleon than was Louis himself. Since he had been under the necessity of accepting the crown of Holland, he had endeavoured to afford that country all the protection which could be derived from his near relationship to Napoleon; and if he could not save his subjects entirely from the evils of a conquered and dependent state, he endeavoured to diminish these as much as his means permitted. The Dutch, a calm and deliberate people, gave Louis full credit for his efforts, and, in general, regarded him as their friend and protector. But at the period we treat of, the evils which approached their state were far beyond Louis's power to avert or even to modify. Other countries may have more or less of a commercial character, but Holland exists by commerce entirely. It was the influence of commerce which gained her amphibious territory from the waves, and, were that influence withdrawn, her fair towns must again become fishing-villages; her rich pastures must return to their original state of salt-water marshes, shallows, and sand-banks. The French exactions already paid, to the amount of one hundred millions of francs, had purchased, as the natives of Holland fondly imagined, some right to exert the small means of commerce which remained to them, and which, under King Louis's sanction, were almost entirely engaged in traffic with England, now declared contraband.

Napoleon used threats and commands to induce Louis to bring his subjects to a more rigorous observance of the continental system, while Louis employed expostulation and entreaty in behalf of the nation over whom he had been called to rule. Each brother grew more obstinate in his opinion, and at length, as the emperor began to see that neither fear nor favour could induce Louis to become the agent of oppression in Holland, his removal from that

country was distinctly pointed at as the consequence of his obstinacy. It was intimated, in a report by Champagny, the Duke de Cadore, that the situation of Louis on the throne of Holland was rendered critical, by his feelings being divided betwixt the inprescriptible duties which he owed to France, and to his family, and the interest which it was natural he should take in the welfare of Dutch commerce. To terminate this strife in his brother's mind, the report informed the public that Napoleon meant to recal the prince of his blood whom he had placed on the Dutch throne, since the first duty of a French prince, having a place in the succession to that monarchy, was to France exclusively; and it was intimated, that Holland, divested of her king, and her nominal independence, would be reduced to the condition of a province of France, occupied by French troops, and French officers of the revenue; and thus deprived of the means of thwarting the continental system, so necessary for the subjugation of Britain, by the obstinate continuance of commercial intercourse with a nation under the ban of the empire.

This report is peculiarly interesting, as explanatory of Bonaparte's views respecting the rights and regal authority of the sovereigns whom he created and displaced at pleasure, as the interest of France, or rather as his own, required, or seemed to require. Either, however, Napoleon became, for the moment, ashamed to acknowledge this fact so broadly; or he thought that such a contradiction of his repeated declarations might have a bad effect upon the Westphalian subjects of Jérôme, and upon the Spaniards, whom he desired to become those of Joseph; or, perhaps, the remonstrances of Louis produced some temporary effect upon his mind; for he stopped short in his full purpose, and on the 16th March concluded a treaty with Louis, the terms of which were calculated, it was said, to arrange disputed points betwixt the sovereigns, and render the independence of Holland consistent with the necessary conformity to the continental system.

By this treaty, Zealand, Dutch Brabant, and the whole course of the Rhine, as well the right as the left bank, were transferred from Holland to France. French officers of the customs were to be placed in all the Dutch harbours; eighteen thousand troops were to be maintained by the kingdom of Holland, of whom six thousand were to be French; a fleet was to be fitted out by the same kingdom for the service of France; English manufactures were to be prohibited by the Dutch government; and other restrictions were subscribed to by Louis, in hopes his brother's stern resolution might be so far softened as to leave the remaining portions of the territories of Holland in a state of nominal independence. But he was soon made sensible that this was no part of Napoleon's intentions. Instead of six thousand French troops, twenty thousand were assembled at Utrecht, with the purpose of being poured into Holland. Instead of this foreign soldiery being stationed on the coasts, where alone their presence could be requisite to prevent the contraband trade, which was the sole pretext of introducing them at all, Louis was informed, that they were to take mi-

litary possession of the whole country; and that the head-quarters of this army, which was totally independent of his authority, were to be established at Amsterdam, his capital.

Seeing himself thus deprived by his brother of all power in the kingdom which was still called his, Louis generously refused to play the pageant part of a monarch, who could neither exert his rights nor protect his subjects.

On the 1st of July he executed a deed of abdication in favour of his son, then a minor, expressing an affectionate hope, that though he himself had been so unhappy as to offend his brother the emperor, he would not, nevertheless, visit with his displeasure his innocent and unoffending family. In a letter from Haarlem, dated the 1st July, Louis enlarged on the causes of his abdication, in a manner honourable to his head and his heart, and with a moderation, when he spoke of his brother, which gave weight to his just complaints. "He could not," he said, "consent to retain the mere title of king, separated from all real authority in his kingdom, his capital, or even his palace. He should be in such a case the witness of all that passed, without the power of influencing the current of events for the good of his people, yet remaining responsible for evils which he could neither remedy nor prevent. He had long foreseen the extremity to which he was now reduced, but could not avoid it without sacrificing his most sacred duties, without ceasing to bear at heart the happiness of his people, and to connect his own fate with that of the country. This," he said, "was impossible. Perhaps," he continued, "I am the only obstacle to the reconciliation of Holland with France. Should that prove the case, I may find some consolation in dragging out the remainder of a wandering and languishing life, at a distance from my family, my country, and the good people of Holland, so lately my subjects."

Having finished his vindication, and adjusted means for making it public, which he could only do by transmitting it to England, the Ex-King of Holland entertained a chosen party of friends at his palace at Haarlem until near midnight, and then, throwing himself into a plain carriage which was in attendance, left behind him the kingly name and the kingly revenue, rather than hold them without the power of discharging the corresponding duties of a sovereign. Louis retired to Gratz, in Styria, where he lived in a private manner, upon a moderate pension, amusing his leisure with literature. His more ambitious consort, with a much more ample revenue, settled herself at Paris, where her wit and talents, independent of her connexion with Napoleon, attracted around her the world of fashion, of which she was a distinguished ornament.

Bonaparte, as was to have been expected, paid no regard to the claim of Louis's son, in whose favour his father had abdicated. He created that young person Grand Duke of Berg, and, although he was yet a child, he took an opportunity to make him a speech, which we have elsewhere adverted to, in which, after inculcating the conduct of his brother, the tenor of which he stated could be accounted for by *malady* alone, he explained in few words the duties incurred by his satellite sovereigns. "Never

forget, that whatever position you may be required to occupy, in order to conform to my line of politics, and the interest of my empire, your first duty must always regard ME, your second must have reference to France. All your other duties, even those towards the countries which I commit to your charge, are secondary to these primary obligations."

Thus was the leading principle clearly announced, upon which the nominal independence of kingdoms allied to France was in future to be understood as resting. The monarchs, to whom crowns were assigned, were but to be regarded as the lieutenants of the kingdoms in which they ruled; and whatever part the interest of their dominions might call upon them to act, they were still subject, in the first instance, to the summons and control of their liege lord the emperor, and compelled to prefer what his pleasure should term the weal of France, to every other call of duty whatsoever.

The fate of Holland was not long undecided. Indeed it had probably been determined on as far back as Champagny's first report, in which it had been intimated, that Holland, with all its provinces, was to become an integral part of France. This was contrary to the pledge given by Napoleon to the Senate, that the Rhine should be considered as the natural boundary of France; nor was it less inconsistent with his pretended determination, that the independence of Holland should be respected and maintained. But both these engagements yielded to the force of the reasoning used by his mouth-piece Champagny, in recommending the union of Holland with the French empire, and with France itself. They are worth quoting, were it only to show how little men of sense are ashamed to produce the weakest and most inconsistent arguments, when they speak as having both the power and the settled purpose to do wrong.

"Holland," said the minister, whose very effrontery renders his arguments interesting, "is in a manner an emanation from the territory of France, and is necessary to the full complement of the empire. To possess the entire Rhine (which had been proposed as the natural boundary of France), your majesty must extend the frontier to the Zuyder-Zee. Thus the course of all the rivers which arise in France, or which bathe her frontier, will belong to her as far as the sea. To leave in the hands of strangers the mouths of our rivers, would be, sire, to confine your power to an ill bounded monarchy, instead of extending its dominions to the natural limits befitting an imperial throne."

On such precious reasoning (much on a par with the claim which Napoleon set up to Great Britain as the natural appendage of France, along with the Isle of Oleron), Holland was, 9th July, 1810, declared an integral part of the French empire.

But the usurpation was not unavenged. It cost Bonaparte a greater declension in public opinion than had arisen even from his unprincipled attempts on Spain. It is true, none of the bloody and extensively miserable consequences had occurred in Holland, which had been occasioned by the transactions at Bayonne. But the seizure of Holland brought Bonaparte's worst fault, his ambition, before the public, in a more broad and decided point of view.

There were people who could endure his robbing strangers, who were yet shocked that he, so fond of his kindred, and in general so liberal to them, should not have hesitated to dethrone his own brother, merely for entertaining sentiments becoming the rank to which he had been raised by himself; to disinherit his nephew; to go nigh taxing so near a relation with mental imbecility; and all on so slight a provocation;—for the only real point of difference, that, viz. respecting the English commerce, had been yielded by Louis in the treaty which Napoleon had signed, but only, it seemed, for the purpose of breaking it. It was observed, too, that in the manly but respectful opposition, made by Louis to his brother's wishes, there appeared nothing to provoke the displeasure of Napoleon, though one of the most irritable of men on subjects with which his ambition was implicated. It seemed a species of gratuitous violence, acted as if to show that no circumstance of relationship, family feeling, or compassion (to make no mention of justice or moderation), could interfere with or check the progress of Napoleon's ambition; and whilst the more sanguine prophesied, that he who ran so rashly might one day run himself to a close, all agreed that his empire, composed of such heterogeneous parts, could not, in all probability, survive the mortal date of the founder, supposing it to last so long. In the meantime it was evident that the condition of no state, however solemnly guaranteed by Bonaparte himself, could be considered as secure or free from change while it was subject to his influence. To conclude the whole, the Dutch were informed by the emperor with bitter composure, that "he had hoped to unite them to France as allies, by giving them a prince of his own blood as a ruler; that his hopes, however, had been deceived; and that he had shown more forbearance than consisted with his character, or than his rights required;"—thus intimating some farther and unexpressed severity, which he might have felt himself justified in adding to the virtual exile of his brother; and the confiscation of his late dominions; and insinuating, that the Dutch had escaped cheaply with the loss of their separate national existence.

CHAPTER LXXI.

Gustavus IV. of Sweden is dethroned and succeeded by his uncle.—The Crown Prince killed by a fall from his horse.—Candidates proposed for the succession.—The Swedes, thinking to conciliate Napoleon, meditate fixing on Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo.—Reasons for supposing that the choice was not altogether agreeable to Bonaparte—who reluctantly acquiesces in the choice.—Parting interview between Bernadotte and Napoleon.—Subsequent attempts of the latter to bind Sweden to the policy of France.—The Crown Prince unwillingly accedes to the continental system.—Napoleon makes a tour through Flanders and Holland—returns to Paris, and takes measures for extending the continental system.—Seizure of the Valais.—Coast along the German Ocean annexed to France.—Protest by the czar against the appropriation of Oldenburg.—Russia allows the importation, at certain seaports, of various articles of British commerce.—Negotiations for exchange of prisoners between France and England and for a general

peace, broken off by Bonaparte's unreasonable demands.

In the destruction of the kingdom of Holland, a new sceptre, and that of Napoleon's own forming, was broken, as he wrenched it out of the hands of his brother. In the case of Sweden, and in hopes of insuring the patronage of the French Emperor, or averting his enmity, a diadem was placed on the brows of one who, like Napoleon himself, had commenced his career as a soldier of fortune.

We have repeatedly observed, that the high spirit and intrepid enterprise of Gustavus IV., unsupported as they were either by distinguished military abilities, or by effectual power, seemed as if heaped the parts of Gustavus Adolphus or Charles XII., without considering the declined condition of the country he governed, or the inferiority of his own talents. Sweden had suffered great losses by the daring manner in which this prince maintained the ancient principles of aristocracy against the overwhelming power of France.

Pomerania, being the only dominion belonging to Sweden on the south side of the Baltic, had been taken possession of by France in the war of 1806-7; and Russia, who had been a party to that war, and who had encouraged Gustavus to maintain it, had, since changing her politics at the treaty of Tilsit, herself declared war against Sweden, for the sole and undisguised purpose of possessing herself of Finland, which she had succeeded in appropriating. Sweden had therefore lost, under this ill-fated monarch, above one-third of her territories, and the inhabitants became anxious to secure, even were it by desperate measures, the independence of that which remained. There were fears lest Russia should aspire to the conquest of the rest of the ancient kingdom—fears that France might reward the adhesion and the sufferings of Denmark, by uniting the crown of Sweden with that of Denmark and Norway, and aiding the subjugation of the country with an auxiliary army. While these calamities impended over their ancient state, the Swedes felt confident that Gustavus was too rash to avert the storm by submission, too weak, and perhaps too unlucky, to resist its violence. This conviction led to a conspiracy, perhaps one of the most universal known in history.

The unfortunate king was seized upon and made prisoner in March, 1809, without any other resistance than his own unassisted sword could maintain; and so little were the conspirators afraid of his being able to find a party in the state desirous of replacing him in the government, that they were content he should have his liberty and a suitable pension, on his agreeing to consider himself as an exile from Sweden; in which sentence of banishment, with little pretence to justice, his wife, sister of the Empress of Russia, and his children, comprehending the heir of his crown, were also included.

The Duke of Sudermania, uncle of the dethroned prince, was called to the throne, and the succession of the kingdom was destined to Christian of Augustenberg, a prince of the house of Holstein. Peace was made by the new king with Russia, at the expense of ceding Finland and the Isle of Aland to

that power. Soon afterwards a treaty was signed at Paris, by which Charles XIII. promised to adhere to the continental system, and to shut his ports against all British commerce, with certain indulgences on the articles of salt and colonial produce. In requital, Napoleon restored to Sweden her continental province of Pomerania, with the Isle of Rugen, reserving, however, such dotations or pensions as he had assigned to his soldiers, or followers, upon those territories. But though the politics of Sweden were thus entirely changed, its revolution was destined to proceed.

The king being aged, the eyes of the people were much fixed on the successor, or Crown Prince, who took upon himself the chief labour of the government, and appears to have given satisfaction to the nation. But his government was of short duration. On the 28th of May, 1810, while reviewing some troops, he suddenly fell from his horse, and expired on the spot, leaving Sweden again without any head excepting the old king. This event agitated the whole nation, and various candidates were proposed for the succession of the kingdom.

Among these was the King of Denmark, who, after the sacrifices he had made for Bonaparte, had some right to expect his support. The son of the late unfortunate monarch, rightful heir of the crown, and named like him Gustavus, was also proposed as a candidate. The Duke of Oldenburg, brother-in-law of the Emperor of Russia, had partisans. To each of these candidates there lay practical objections. To have followed the line of lawful succession, and called Gustavus to the throne (which could not be forfeited by his father's infirmity, so far as he was concerned), would have been to place a child at the head of the state, and must have inferred, amid this most arduous crisis, all the doubts and difficulties of choosing a regent. Such choice might, too, be the means, at a future time, of reviving his father's claim to the crown. The countries of Denmark and Sweden had been too long rivals, for the Swedes to subject themselves to the yoke of the King of Denmark; and to chuse the Duke of Oldenburg would have been, in effect, to submit themselves to Russia, of whose last behaviour towards her Sweden had considerable reason to complain.

In this embarrassment they were thought to start a happy idea, who proposed to conciliate Napoleon by bestowing the ancient crown of the Goths upon one of his own marshals, and a high noble of his empire, namely John Julian Baptiste Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo. This distinguished officer was married to a sister of Joseph Bonaparte's wife (daughter of a wealthy and respectable individual, named Clary), through whom he had the advantage of an alliance with the imperial family of Napoleon, and he had acquired a high reputation in the north of Europe, both when governor of Hanover, and administrator of Swedish Pomerania. On the latter occasion, Bernadotte was said to have shown himself in a particular manner the friend and protector of the Swedish nation; and it was even insinuated that he would not be averse to exchange the errors of popery for the reformed tenets of Luther. The Swedish nation fell very generally into the line of policy which prompted this choice. Humiliating as

it might at another period have been to a people proud of their ancient renown, to chuse for their master a foreign soldier, differing from them in birth and religious faith, such an election yet promised to place at the head of the nation a person admirably qualified to comprehend and encounter the difficulties of the time; and it was a choice, sure, as they thought, to be agreeable to him upon whose nod the world seemed to depend.

Yet, there is the best reason to doubt, whether, in preferring Bernadotte to their vacant throne, the Swedes did a thing which was gratifying to Napoleon. The name of the Crown Prince of Sweden elect had been known in the wars of the Revolution, before that of Bonaparte had been heard of. Bernadotte had been the older, therefore, though certainly not the better soldier. On the 18th Brumaire, he was so far from joining Bonaparte in his enterprise against the Council of Five Hundred, notwithstanding all advances made to him, that he was on the spot at St-Cloud armed and prepared, had circumstances permitted, to place himself at the head of any part of the military, who might be brought to declare for the Directory. And although, like every one else, Bernadotte submitted to the consular system, and held the government of Holland under Bonaparte, yet then, as well as under the empire, he was always understood to belong to a class of officers, whom Napoleon employed indeed, and rewarded, but without loving them, or perhaps relying on them more than he was compelled to do, although their character was in most instances a warrant for their fidelity.

These officers formed a comparatively small class, yet comprehending some of the most distinguished names in the French army, who, in seeing the visionary Republic glide from their grasp, had been, nevertheless, unable to forget the promises held out to them by the earlier dawn of the Revolution. Reconciled by necessity to a state of servitude which they could not avoid, this party considered themselves as the soldiers of France, not of Napoleon, and followed the banner of their country rather than the fortunes of the emperor. Without being personally Napoleon's enemies, they were not the friends of his despotic power; and it was to be expected, should any opportunity occur, that men so thinking would make a stand, for the purpose of introducing some modifications into the arbitrary system which the emperor had established.

Napoleon, always deeply politic, unless when carried off by sudden bursts of temperament, took, as already mentioned, great care in his distribution of duties and honours, at once to conceal from the public the existence of a difference in opinion among his general officers, and also to arm the interests of those patriots themselves against their own speculative opinions, by rendering the present state of things too beneficial to them for their being easily induced to attempt any change. Still it may nevertheless be conceived, that it was not out of this class of lukewarm adherents he would have voluntarily selected a candidate for a kingdom, which, being removed at some distance from the influence of France, he would more willingly have seen conferred on some one, whose devotion to the will of

his emperor was not likely to be disturbed by any intrusion of conscientious patriotism.

But, besides the suspicion entertained by Napoleon of Bernadotte's political opinions, subjects of positive discord had recently arisen between them. Bernadotte had been blamed by the emperor for permitting the escape of La Romana and the Spaniards, as already mentioned. At a later period, he was commander of the Saxon troops in the campaign of Wagram; and, notwithstanding a set of very scientific manoeuvres, by which he detained General Bellegarde on the frontiers of Bohemia, when his presence might have been essentially useful to the Archduke Charles, he was censured by Napoleon as tardy in his movements.

The landing of the English at Walcheren induced Fouché, as has been already said, with the concurrence of Clarke, then minister at war, to intrust Bernadotte with the charge of the defence of Flanders and Holland. But neither in this service had he the good fortune to please the emperor. Fouché, at whose instance he had accepted the situation, was already tottering in office; and the ill-selected expression, "that however necessary Napoleon was to the glory of France, yet his presence was not indispensable to repel invasion," was interpreted into a magnifying of themselves at the expense of the emperor. Napoleon made his displeasure manifest by depriving Bernadotte of the command in Belgium, and sending him back to the north of Germany; and it is said that the general, on his part, was so little inclined to make a secret of his resentment, that he was remarked as a fiery Gascon, who, if he should ever have an opportunity, would be likely to do mischief.

But while such were the bad terms betwixt the emperor and his general, the Swedes, unsuspecting of the true state of the case, imagined, that in chusing Bernadotte for successor to their throne, they were paying to Bonaparte the most acceptable tribute. And, notwithstanding that Napoleon was actually at variance with Bernadotte, and although, in a political view, he would much rather have given his aid to the pretensions of the King of Denmark, he was under the necessity of reflecting, that Sweden retained a certain degree of independence; that the sea separated her shores from his armies; and that, however willing to conciliate him, the Swedes were not in a condition absolutely to be compelled to receive laws at his hand. It was necessary to acquiesce in their choice, since he could not dictate to them; and by doing so he might at the same time exhibit another splendid example of the height to which his service conducted his generals, of his own desire to assist their promotion, and of that which might be much more doubtful than the two first propositions,—of his willingness to pay deference to the claims of a people in electing their chief magistrate. When, therefore, Bernadotte, protesting that he would be exclusively guided by Napoleon's wishes in pursuing or relinquishing this important object, besought him for his countenance with the States of Sweden, who were to elect the Crown Prince, Bonaparte answered, that he would not interfere in the election by any solicitations or arguments, but that he gave the Prince of Ponte-

Corvo his permission to be a candidate, and should be well pleased if he proved a successful one. Such is Napoleon's account of the transaction. We have, however, been favoured with some manuscript observations, in which a very different colour is given to Napoleon's proceedings, and which prove distinctly, that while Napoleon treated the Crown Prince Elect of Sweden with fair language, he endeavoured by underhand intrigues to prevent the accomplishment of his hopes.*

The Swedes, however, remained fixed in their choice, notwithstanding the insinuations of Désaugiers, the French envoy, whom Napoleon afterwards affected to disown and recal, for supporting, in the diet of Orebro, the interest of the King of Denmark, instead of that of Bernadotte.

Napoleon's cold assent, or rather an assurance that he would not dissent, being thus wrung reluctantly from him, Bernadotte, owing to his excellent character among the Swedes, and their opinion of his interest with Napoleon, was chosen Crown Prince of Sweden by the States of that kingdom, 21st August, 1810. Napoleon, as he himself acknowledges, was enabled to resist, though with difficulty, a strong temptation to retract his consent, and defeat the intended election. Perhaps this unfriendly disposition might be in some degree overcome by the expectation, that by their present choice the Emperor of France would secure the accession of Sweden to the anti-commercial system; whereas, by attempting a game which he was not equally sure of winning, he might, indeed, have disappointed a man whom he loved not, but by doing so must run the risk of throwing the States of Sweden, who were not likely to be equally unanimous in behalf of any other French candidate, into the arms of England, his avowed foe; or of Russia, who, since the treaty of Schönbrunn, and Napoleon's union with the house of Austria, could only be termed a doubtful and cloudy friend.

But he endeavoured to obtain from Bernadotte some guarantee of his dependence upon France and its emperor. He took the opportunity of making the attempt when Bernadotte applied to him for letters of emancipation from his allegiance to France, which could not decently be withheld from the Prince Royal of another country. "The expediting of the letters patent," said Napoleon, "has been retarded by a proposal made by the council, that Bernadotte should previously bind himself never to bear arms against Napoleon." Bernadotte exclaimed against a proposal which must have left him in the rank of a French general. The emperor was ashamed to persist in a demand so unreasonable, and dismissed him with the almost prophetic words,—“Go—our destinies must be accomplished.” He promised the Prince Royal two millions of francs as an indemnity for the principality of Ponte-Corvo, and other possessions which had been assigned to him in Holland, and which he restored on ceasing to be a subject of France. It is singular enough that Napoleon, while at St Helena, permitted himself to assert that he had made a present of this money (of which only

* See Appendix, No. 6.—“Reflections on the conduct of Napoleon towards the Prince Royal of Sweden.”

one million was ever paid), to enable Bernadotte to take possession of his new dignity with becoming splendour.

To bring the affairs of Sweden to a close for the present, we may here add, that, though that nation were desirous to escape the renewal of the desperate and hopeless struggle with France, they were most unwilling, nevertheless, to lose the advantages of their commerce with England. The conduct of the national business soon devolved entirely upon the Crown Prince, the age and infirmities of the king not permitting him to conduct them any longer. It became Bernadotte's, or, as he was now named, Charles John's difficult and delicate task, to endeavour at once to propitiate France, and to find excuses which might dispose Bonaparte to grant some relaxation on the subject of the continental system. But as it was impossible for the Prince of Sweden to disguise his motive for evading a cordial co-operation in Napoleon's favourite measure, so the latter, about three months after the accession of his former companion in arms to supreme power, grew impatient enough to overwhelm the Swedish minister, Baron Lagerbjelke, with a tirade similar to his celebrated attack on Lord Whitworth. He discoursed with the utmost volubility for an hour and a quarter, leaving the astonished ambassador scarce an opening to thrust in a word by way of observation, defence, or answer. "Do they believe in Sweden that I am to be so easily duped? Do they think I will be satisfied with this half state of things? Give me no sentiments! it is from facts we form our opinions. You signed the peace with me in the beginning of the year, and engaged yourself then to break off all communication with Britain; yet you retained an English agent till late in the summer, and kept the communication open by way of Gottenburg. Your small islands are so many smuggling magazines; your vessels meet the English and exchange freights. I have not slept an hour to-night on account of your affairs; yet you ought to suffer me to take repose, I have need of it. You have vessels in every port in England. You talk of the necessity of buying salt, forsooth. Is it for salt you go into the Thames?—You talk of suffering, by superseding the trade. Do you not believe that I suffer? That Germany, Bordeaux, Holland, and France suffer? But it must all be ended. You must fire on the English, and you must confiscate their merchandise, or you must have war with France. Open war, or constant friendship—this is my last word, my ultimate determination. Could they think in Sweden that I would modify my system, because I love and esteem the Prince Royal? Did I not love and esteem the King of Holland? He is my brother, yet I have broken with him: I have silenced the voice of nature to give ear to that of the general interest." These, and many violent expressions to the same purpose, Bonaparte poured out in an elevation of voice that might be heard in the adjoining apartments.

The emperor's remonstrances, transmitted by the ambassador, were seconded at the court of Stockholm by the arguments of Denmark and Russia; and the Crown Prince was at last obliged to give the national adherence of Sweden to the continental

system, and to declare war against England. The British government were fully sensible of the constraint under which Sweden acted, and, so far from acting hostilely towards that kingdom, did not seem to make any perceptible change in the relations which had before subsisted between the countries.

In the meantime, Bernadotte and Napoleon, for a time, veiled under the usual forms of courtesy their mutual dislike and resentment. But the Crown Prince could not forgive the emperor for an attempt to lord it over him like a superior over a vassal, and compelling him, notwithstanding his entreaties, to distress his subjects, and to render his government unpopular, by sacrificing a lucrative trade. Napoleon, on the other hand, was incensed that Bernadotte, whose greatness he considered as existing only by his own permission, should affect to differ in opinion from him, or hesitate betwixt obliging France and injuring Sweden.

On other occasional differences betwixt the sovereigns, it appeared that there was no eager desire on the part of the Crown Prince of Sweden to oblige the Emperor of France. Repeated demands for sailors and soldiers to be engaged in the French service, were made by Napoleon. These Bernadotte always contrived to evade, by referring to the laws of Sweden, as a limited monarchy, which did not permit him, like the absolute Majesty of Denmark, to dispose of her sailors at pleasure; and by enlarging on the nature of the Swedes, who, bold and willing soldiers at home, were too much attached to their own climate and manners, to endure those of any other country. In these, and such like excuses, no one could read, more readily than Napoleon, a fixed resolution on the part of his old companion in arms, not to yield to the influence of France in any point in which he could avoid it. And though an outward show of friendship was maintained between the countries, and even between the sovereigns, yet it was of that insincere kind which was sure to be broken off on the slightest collision of their mutual interests. It remained, however, undisturbed till the eventful year of 1812. —We return to the affairs of France.

The emperor undertook a tour through the provinces of Flanders and Holland, with his young empress, with the view of enforcing his views and purposes in church and state. In the course of this journey, one or two remarkable circumstances took place. The first was his furious reproaches to the clergy of Brabant, who, more rigorous papists than in some other catholic countries, had circulated among their congregations the bull of excommunication fulminated by the pope against Napoleon. The provocation was certainly considerable, but the mode of resenting it was indelicately violent. He was especially angry that they appeared without their canonical dresses. "You call yourselves priests," he said; "where are your vestments? Are you attorneys, notaries, or peasants? You begin by forgetting the respect due to me; whereas, the principle of the christian church, as these gentlemen (turning to the protestant deputies) can teach you, is, as they have just professed, to render unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's. But you—you will not pray for your sovereign, because a Romish

priest excommunicated me. But who gave him such a right? Perhaps it is your wish to bring back tortures and scaffolds, but I will take care to baffle you. I bear the temporal sword, and know how to use it. I am a monarch of God's creation, and you reptiles of the earth dare not oppose me. I render an account of my government to none save God and Jesus Christ. Do you think I am one formed to kiss the pope's slipper? Had you the power, you would shave my head, clap a cowl on me, and plunge me in a cloister. But if you preach not the Gospel as the Apostles did, I will banish you from the empire, and disperse you like so many Jews.—And, Monsieur le Préfet, see that these men swear to the Concordat; and take care that the orthodox Gospel be taught in the ecclesiastical seminaries, that they may send out men of sense, and not idiots like these." Thus closed this edifying admonition.

The Dutch were under the necessity of assuming the appearance of great rejoicing; yet even the danger of indulging their blunt humour could not altogether restrain these downright merchants. When the emperor made a stir about establishing a Chamber of Commerce at Amsterdam, one of the burgo-masters gravely observed, there was no need of a chamber, since a closet would hold all the commerce left them. In like manner, when Napoleon was vaunting that he would soon have a fleet of two hundred sail; "and when you have got them," said a plain-spoken citizen, "the English will have double the number."

But, more formidable than blunt truths and indifferent jests, there appeared, while Bonaparte was in Holland, one of those stern invocations exciting the people against foreign tyranny, which have often occasioned the downfall of unjust power, and always rendered those who possess it unhappy and insecure. "People of Holland," said this singular paper (which may be compared to the tract called *Killing no Murder*, which drove sleep from Cromwell's pillow), "why do you fear your oppressor?—he is one, you are many. Appeal to his very soldiers; their desertions in Spain show how they hate him; and even his generals would abandon him, could they secure their own rank and grandeur independent of his. But above all, arise to the task of your own redemption; rise in the fulness of national strength. A general revolt of the Continent will ensue; the oppressor will fall, and your triumph will be a warning to tyrants, and an example to the world."

This address produced no perceptible effect at the time, but, with other papers of the kind, it made a profound impression on the public mind.

On his return to Paris, Napoleon set himself still further to impose the extension of the continental system, which he was induced to attempt by the appropriation of Holland, and the revolution in Sweden. Holding his plan as much more decisive than it could have been even if his power and his spleen had been adequate to effect his purpose, he cast his eyes in every direction, to close every aperture, however small, through which British commerce, the victim he hoped entirely to smother, might draw ever so slight a gasp of breath.

It was a feature of Bonaparte's ambition—as in-

deed it is of inordinate ambition in general—that whatever additions were made to his empire extended his wish of acquisition. Holland, whose traders were princes, and she herself the Queen of Commerce, had been already devoured, with her ample sea-coast and far-famed harbours. But other cities, less wealthy and famed, yet still venerable from their ancient importance, must become a part of France, ere Bonaparte thought his blockade against British commerce complete and impervious.

The seizure of the poor regions called the Valais, which had hitherto been suffered to exist as a free republic, gave France the absolute command of the road over the Simplon; the property, and perhaps the command of which passage, it being the great means of communication betwixt France and Italy, Napoleon did not incline should remain with a petty republic. It was a sufficient reason, at this unhappy period, for depriving any country of its independence, that France was to be benefited by the change. It was not in this case a bloodless one. The poor mountaineers drew to arms, and it required some fighting before they were compelled to submission, and their barren mountains were annexed to France.

But it was of much greater importance, in Napoleon's eye, to prevent the commerce which he had expelled from Holland from shifting its residence to the trading towns of the north of Germany, composing what was called the Hanseatic League. A new appropriation of territory, therefore, united to France the whole sea-coasts along the German Ocean, comprehending the mouths of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine; the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe. And it was the emperor's proposal to unite these maritime territories to France by a canal, which was to join the Baltic Ocean to the Seine. A considerable proportion of the kingdom of Westphalia, and of the Grand Duchy of Berg, both principalities of Napoleon's own creation, fell under this appropriation, and formed another example, had not that of Holland been sufficient, to show how little respect Napoleon was disposed to pay even to those rights which emanated from himself, when they interfered with fresher plans and wider prospects of ambition.

Had Prussia retained her ancient influence as protector of the North, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck, would not have been thus unceremoniously melted down and confounded with the French empire. But while these venerable and well-known free cities sunk without protection or resistance under a despotism which threatened to become universal, a petty state of far less consequence, scarce known as having an independent existence by any who was not intimate with the divisions of the north of Germany, found a patron, and a powerful one. This was Oldenburg, a dukedom, the present prince of which was related to the Emperor of Russia, as both were descended of the house of Holstein-Gottorp, and was, moreover, Alexander's brother-in-law. This state of Oldenburg had been stigmatically excepted from the changes made in the north of Germany, after the treaty of Tilsit, which made the present confiscation of its territory an act of more marked slight towards the court of Russia. A formal expostulation being transmitted to Napoleon, he proposed

to repair the injury of the Duke of Oldenburg, by assigning to him the town and territory of Erfurt, with the lordship of Blankenheim. But the duke felt himself too strongly supported to be under the necessity of surrendering his dominions, and receiving others in exchange. The offer of indemnity was haughtily rejected; France persevered in her purpose of usurping Oldenburg; and the Emperor Alexander, in a protest, gravely but temperately worded, a copy of which was delivered to every member of the diplomatic body, intimated that he did not acquiesce in the injury done to a prince of his family, although he continued to adhere to that great line of political interest which had occasioned the alliance between France and Russia.

The real truth was, that Napoleon, secure of the friendship of Austria by the late alliance, had not, it would seem, regarded Russia as any longer worthy of the same observance which he had originally found it politic to pay to the Emperor Alexander. The czar himself felt this; and the very large proportion of his subjects composing the party of Old Russians, as they termed themselves, who were favourable to the English alliance, and detested the connexion with France, improved the opportunity by pointing out the evils which all classes in the country endured, from the czar's having, in compliance to the plans of Napoleon, decreed the abolition of English commerce. They showed that this compliance with the views of France had been attended with great detriment to his own subjects, who could neither sell their commodities, and the produce of their estates, for which Britain always offered a market, nor acquire the colonial produce and British manufactured goods, which the consumption of Russia almost peremptorily demanded.

An ukase was issued on the 31st of December, 1810, which was drawn up with considerable art; for while in words it seemed to affirm the exclusion of British manufactures from the empire in general, it permitted importations to be made at Archangel, St. Petersburg, Riga, Revel, and five or six other seaports, where various articles of merchandize, and, in particular, colonial produce, unless proved to belong to Britain, might be freely imported. So that, while appearing to quote and respect the continental system, Napoleon could not but be sensible that Russia virtually renounced it. But as Alexander had not ventured to avail himself of the seizure of Oldenburg as a reason for breaking off his alliance with France, so Napoleon, on his part, though the changed tone of Russian policy could not escape him, paused, nevertheless, in coming to a final rupture with an enemy so powerful, upon the subject of the ukase of December, 1810.

Meantime the French Emperor became probably sensible that peace with England was the surest ground upon which he could secure his throne. In the month of April, 1810, some attempt at obtaining terms of pacification had been made during the mission of Mr Mackenzie, who was sent to Morlaix as agent on the part of the British government. It had been not the least cruel peculiarity of this invertebrate war, that no cartel for exchange of prisoners

had been effected on either side, and of course that those unhappy persons whom chance had thrown into the power of the enemy, had no visible alternative but to linger out their lives in a distant and hostile country, or at least remain captives till the conclusion of hostilities, to which no one could presume to assign a date. The original impediment to such an exchange, which has in all civilized countries been considered as a debt indispensably due to soften the rigours of war, and lessen the sufferings of its victims, was a demand of Napoleon, that the persons possessing no military character, whom he had made prisoners contrary to the law of nations at the commencement of hostilities, should be exchanged against French sailors and soldiers. The British ministers for a long time resisted so unusual an application, to which policy, indeed, forbade them to accede. At length, however, the sufferings of individuals, and of their families, induced the British government to allow the French Emperor the advantage of his oppressive act in detaining these unfortunate persons, and agree that they should be included in the proposed cartel. But when the commissioners met at Morlaix, Mr Mackenzie found himself as far from approaching an agreement as ever. The number of French prisoners in Britain was more by many thousands than that of the British in France; and Bonaparte, who seldom made a bargain in which he did not secure the advantage to himself, insisted that the surplus of French prisoners should be exchanged for Germans, Spaniards, Portuguese, or others who should be captive in France.

This was readily agreed to, so far as regarded foreign troops in British pay, but it was equally unreasonable and contrary to usage to require that we should restore to France her native subjects, whose services she might use to augment her military force, while we received in exchange foreigners, unconnected with us by service or allegiance, and who, perhaps, when set at liberty, might be as apt to join the French ranks, as those of the nation in whose name they had obtained freedom.

After much wrangling and dispute, Mr Mackenzie, to show the sincere desire which the British government entertained of releasing the prisoners on both sides, made a proposal that the exchange should commence by liberating as many French prisoners as could be balanced by British captives in the French prisons; that after this, captives of every nation should be exchanged indifferently on both sides; and whatever number of prisoners might remain on either side, after the general balance had been struck, should also be set at liberty, upon an engagement not to serve till regularly exchanged. To this proposal—a more liberal one could hardly be made—the French only answered by starting new demands, and making new objections. Among these, perhaps, it will scarcely be believed, that Moustier, the French commissioner, had the modesty to propose that Lord Wellington and his army, lying in the lines at Torres Vedras, should be reckoned as French prisoners in the proposed cartel! Mr Mackenzie answered with becoming spirit, that he would neither be the medium through which his government should be insulted by such a proposal,

nor would he proceed in the negotiation until this impertinence were atoned for.

It is needless to proceed farther in the elusory detail of a treaty, which Napoleon had previously determined should be brought to no useful issue. He had calculated which country could best support the absence of their prisoners, or rather to whom their services were of most consequence. He felt that he himself, by the conscription, as well as by the auxiliary troops which he could summon at pleasure from his neighbours or dependents, could always command a sufficiency of men even for his gigantic undertakings; while to Britain, whose soldiers could only be obtained by a high bounty, the deliverance of her prisoners was proportionally more valuable. Whatever was his view in establishing the negotiation, which was probably only to satisfy the French army, by evincing a seeming interest in the unfortunate portion of their brethren in arms who were immured in English prisons, they gave way to the consideration, that while things remained as they were, Britain suffered more in proportion than France.

Some proposals for a general peace had been made during the conferences at Morlaix; and the British government had stated three different principles, any of which they expressed themselves willing to admit as a basis. These were, first, the state of possession before the war; or, secondly, the present state of possession; or, thirdly, a plan of reciprocal compensations. But none of these principles suited the French government to act upon; so that the treaty for a general peace, and that for restoring, taking into calculation the prisoners on both sides, upwards of a hundred thousand human beings to liberty, their country, and their home, proved both of them altogether nugatory.

The note of defiance was therefore resumed, so soon as it had been ascertained that Britain would reject any terms of peace which were not founded on equal and liberal principles. An oration of Count Sémonville demonstrated that it was all owing to the persevering ambition of England that Bonaparte had been obliged to possess himself of the sea-coast of Europe—that all his encroachments on the land were the necessary consequences of her empire of the seas. He then demanded, in prophetic fury, to know what in future would be the bounds of possibility. "It is the part of England," he said "to reply. Let her turn her eyes on the past, and learn to judge from thence the events of the future. France and Napoleon will never change."

CHAPTER LXXII.

View of Napoleon's gigantic power at the present period. — The Empress Maria Louisa delivered of a son.—Criticism on the title given him, of King of Rome.—Speculations in regard to the advantages or disadvantages arising from this event.—Retrospect.—Ex-Queen of Etruria.—Her severe and unjustifiable treatment by Napoleon.—Lucien Bonaparte is invited to England, where he writes epic poetry.—Attempt to deliver Ferdinand, defeated.—His pusillanimity.—Operations in Portugal.—Retreat of Masséna.—View of his conduct as a man and as a general.—Skill displayed on both

sides.—Battles of Fuentes d'Onoro fought by Lord Wellington—on the south frontier of Portugal, by Lord Beresford—of Barossa, by General Graham.—In all of which the English are victorious.—Enterprise of Arago-Mollinas.—Spaniards defeated under Blake.—Valencia captured by the French, and he and his army made prisoners of war.—Disunion among the French generals.—Joseph writes to Napoleon, wishing to abdicate the throne of Spain.

THE natural consequences of an overgrown empire were already sapping that of Napoleon; for extent of territory does not constitute power, any more than corpulence in the human frame constitutes strength or health; and Napoleon's real authority was in truth greater some years before, than now when his dominion was so much enlarged. The war in Spain, maintained at such an expense of blood and treasure, was a wasting and consuming sore. The kingdom of Holland had afforded him supplies more readily, and had more the means of doing so, when under the dominion of his brother Louis, than the Dutch now either showed or possessed, when ranked as a constituent part of the French empire. The same might be said of the states and free towns in the north of Germany, where, in many instances, strong bands of smugglers, dressed, and armed as guerilla parties, maintained a desultory war with the officers of the French customs; and, moved equally by national hatred and the love of gain, won by desperate risks, made in some districts a kind of petty civil war. Yet though such canker-worms gnawed the root of the tree, the branches and foliage, to all outward appearance, extended a broader shade than ever. It was especially when a formal annunciation, both in France and Austria, called the good subjects of both realms to rejoice in the prospect that Maria Louisa would soon give an heir to Napoleon, that men who opened the map of Europe saw with fear and wonder the tremendous inheritance to which the expected infant was likely to succeed.

The actual dominions of France, governed by Napoleon in his own proper right as Emperor of the French, had gradually attained the following extravagant dimensions. They extended, from north-east to south-west, from Travemunde, on the Baltic Ocean, to the foot of the Pyrenees; and from north-west to south-east, from the port of Brest to Terracina, on the confines of the Neapolitan territories. A population of forty-two millions of people, fitted in various ways to secure the prosperity of a state, and inhabiting, for wealth, richness of soil, and felicity of climate, by far the finest portion of the civilized earth, formed the immediate liege subjects of this magnificent empire.

Yet to stop here were greatly to undervalue the extent of Napoleon's power. We have to add to his personal empire, Carniola and the Illyrian provinces, and also the fine kingdom of Italy. Then, in his character of Mediator of the Helvetic Republic, the emperor exercised an almost absolute authority in Switzerland, which furnished him, though unwillingly, with several fine regiments of auxiliaries. The German Confederation of the Rhine, though numbering kings among their league, were at the slightest hint bound to supply him each with his

prescribed quota of forces, with a readiness and an affectation of zeal very different from the slack and reluctant manner in which they formerly supplied their paltry contingents to the Emperor of Germany.

Murat, with his kingdom of Naples, was at his brother-in-law's disposal; and if, as Bonaparte's hopes whispered, the Peninsula should ultimately prove unable to resist the war he waged, then Spain and Portugal would be added to his immense empire, being now in the state of sturdy and contumacious rebels, whose resistance seemed in the speedy prospect of being finally subdued. Thus an empire of 800,000 square miles, and containing a population of 85 millions, in territory one fifth part, and in the number of inhabitants one half of united Europe, was either in quiet subjection to Napoleon's sceptre, or on the point, as was supposed, of becoming so.

Of those who shared amongst them the residue of Europe, and still maintained some claim to independence, Britain might make the proud boast, that she was diametrically in opposition to this ruler of the world; that, in the long-continued strife, she had dealt him injuries as deep as she had ever received, and had disdained, under any circumstances, to treat with him on less terms than those of equality. Not to that fair land be the praise, though she supported many burdens and endured great losses; but to Providence, who favoured her efforts and strengthened her resolutions; who gave her power to uphold her own good cause, which, in truth, was that of European independence, and courage to trust in the justice of Heaven, when the odds mustered against her seemed, in earthly calculation, so dreadful as to deprive the wise of the head to counsel; the brave of the heart to resist!

Denmark, so powerful was the voice which France had in her councils, might almost be accounted humbled to one of the federative principalities.

Sweden had but a moderate and second-rate degree of power. She felt, as other German nations, the withering blight of the continental or anti-social system; but, circumstanced as she was, with the possession of Swedish Pomerania dependent on French pleasure, she had no other remedy than to wait her opportunity.

Still more was this the case with Prussia, through all her provinces the mortal enemy of the French name, but whom the large garrisons which France had planted in her dominions, and the numerous forces which she maintained there, compelled for the time to be as submissive as a handmaiden. That the court were, as noiselessly as possible, endeavouring to revive their military establishment; that they were dismissing the villains who had sold and betrayed their country, and replacing them by age which had been tried, or youth which had witnessed the agony of their country, and been trained up in thinking that to avenge her was their dearest duty, was true. True it was, also, that the people in Prussia, and many other parts of Germany, waited, as for the day dawning, for the hope of winning back their freedom; but outward appearances indicated nothing of these smothered hopes, wishes, and preparations; and the general eye saw in Prussia only a nation resigned to her bondage, without, apparently, any hope of redemption.

Austria, besides the terrible losses which the last war had brought upon her, was now fettered to Napoleon by a link which gave the proud house of Hapsburg an apology for the submission, or at least the observance, which she paid to the son-in-law of her emperor.

Turkey, though she should have had her turn, had the tide of fortune continued to keep the course in which it had so long flowed, was not yet in the way of being comprehended in Napoleon's plan of politics.

Russia was waging with the Porte an impolitic war of acquisition, to realize some of the selfish plans of aggrandizement which Napoleon had assented to, or perhaps suggested, at Tilsit and Erfurt. But he now witnessed them without wishing them success, and listened to the complaints of Austria, who unwillingly saw the ambitious views of Russia in these provinces. Of all the continental states, therefore, assuming even the semblance of independence, Russia seemed alone to possess it in reality; and from late acts of estrangement, such as the protest on the subject of the Duchy of Oldenburg, and the reception of British ships and merchandize into her ports, it certainly appeared that a different spirit was in the councils of this great empire than had ruled them during the meetings at Tilsit and Erfurt. Yet there were but few who thought that Russia, in opposition to the whole continent of Europe, would dare confront Napoleon; and still fewer, even of the most sanguine politicians, had any deep-grounded hope that her opposition would be effectual. Out of such a Cimmerian midnight, to all human views, was the day-spring of European liberty destined to arise.

America, happy in the Atlantic which severed her from Europe, now an almost universal scene of war or slavery, looked on in conscious security, and, by reviving at this crisis disputed claims upon Britain, seemed to listen more to the recollection of recent enmity, than of mutual language, manners, and descent.

Within a year after her marriage with Napoleon, the young empress was announced to have been taken with the pains of labour. The case was a difficult and distressing one; and the professional person employed lost courage, and was afraid to do what was necessary. Napoleon appeared in the apartment, and commanded him to proceed as if the patient were the wife of an ordinary burgess. She was at length successfully and safely delivered of a fine boy, which Bonaparte, with feelings, doubtless, as highly strung as after a battle gained, carried into the next apartment, and exhibited in triumph to the great officers and courtiers, by whom he was unanimously hailed King of Rome, the dignity which had been destined to the heir of the French Republic.

The title did not, indeed, pass uncriticised. Some said, that taking the regal designation from a city where the very name of king had been accounted unlucky, had an ominous presage. Catholics objected to it, as it necessarily carried with it the recollection of the sacrilegious violence which had stripped the pope of his temporal possessions. And lastly, it was asked what chance there ever was of

the execution of that part of the Italian constitution, which, after Napoleon's death, guaranteed the succession in the kingdom of Italy to some one different from the Emperor of France, when the title of King of Rome was assumed as that of the heir of the French empire?*

Such ominous remarks, however, only circulated among the disaffected, or passed with anti-imperial jests, satires, and calembourgs, through such saloons of the Faubourg St Germain, as were still tenanted by the ancient and faithful adherents of the house of Bourbon. The city of Paris made as general a show of rejoicing as they ever testified when an heir was born to one of their most beloved sovereigns; deputations with addresses came from public bodies of every description; and, that flattery might sound the very base string of humility, the fashionable colour of dress for the season bore a name alluding to the young King of Rome, which delicacy, if not pride, ought to have rejected. But, perhaps, the strangest circumstance of the whole was, that the old dethroned King of Spain, and his consort, undertook a journey, for the purpose of carrying their personal congratulations on the birth of an heir, to one who had deposed, and was detaining in prison their own lineage, and had laid Spain, their native dominions, in blood, from the Pyrenees to the Pillars of Hercules.

Napoleon, and his more devoted admirers, rejoiced in this happy incident, as that which was most likely, in their eyes, to sustain the empire of France, when fate should remove him by whom it was founded. The protection of the house of Austria, and the charm flung around the child by the high fame of the father, could not, it was thought, but insure a peaceful accession to the throne, and an undisturbed security in possessing it. His life, too, was insured in future against such fanatics as that of Schoenbrunn; for what purpose would it serve to cut off the emperor, when the empire was to survive, and descend in all its strength upon his son and heir?

Others there were, who pretended that the advantages arising from the birth of the King of Rome were balanced by corresponding inconveniences. These asserted, that several of the French great generals had followed the fortunes of Napoleon, in hopes that, upon his death in battle, or upon his natural decease, they, or some of them, might, like the successors of Alexander the Great, share amongst them the ample succession of kingdoms and principalities which were likely to become the property of the strongest and bravest, in the lottery which might be expected to take place on the death of the great favourite of Fortune. These great soldiers, it was

surmised, being cut short of this fair prospect, would no longer have the same motives for serving the living Napoleon, whose inheritance at his death was now to descend, like the patrimony of a peasant or burgess, in the regular and lawful line of inheritance. But the politicians who argued thus did not sufficiently regard the pitch of superiority which Napoleon had attained over those around him; his habit of absolute command, theirs of implicit obedience; and the small likelihood there was of any one who served under him venturing to incur his displeasure, and the risk of losing the rank and fortune which most had actually obtained, by showing any marks of coldness or dissatisfaction, on account of the disappointment of distant and visionary hopes.

There were others who augured different consequences, from the effect of the same event on the feelings of Bonaparte's enemies, both open and unavowed. It had been a general belief, and certainly was founded on probability, that the immense but ill-constructed empire which Napoleon had erected would fall to pieces, so soon as it was not kept steady and compact by the fear and admiration of his personal talents. Hence the damp cast by persons affecting a wise caution, upon the general desire to shake off the yoke of France. They enlarged upon the invincible talent, upon the inevitable destinies of Napoleon personally; but they consoled the more impatient patriots, by counseling them to await his death, before making a daring attempt to vindicate their freedom. Such counsels were favourably listened to, because men are, in spite of themselves, always willing to listen to prudent arguments, when they tend to postpone desperate risks. But this species of argument was ended, when the inheritance of despotism seemed ready to be transmitted from father to son in direct descent. There was no termination seen to the melancholy prospect, nor was it easy for the most lukewarm of patriots to assign any longer a reason for putting off till Napoleon's death the resistance which to-day demanded. Under these various lights was the birth of the King of Rome considered; and it may after all remain a matter of doubt, whether the blessing of a son and heir, acceptable as it must necessarily have been to his domestic feelings, was politically of that advantage to him which the Emperor of France unquestionably expected.

And now, before we begin to trace the growing differences betwixt France and Russia, which speedily led to such important consequences, we may briefly notice some circumstances connected with Spain and with Spanish affairs, though the two incidents which we are to mention first, are rather of a detached and insulated nature.

The first of these refers to the Ex-Queen of Etruria, a daughter, it will be remembered, of Charles, King of Spain, and a sister of Ferdinand. Upon this princess and her son Bonaparte had settled the kingdom of Etruria, or Tuscany. Preparatory to the Bayonne intrigue, he had forcibly deprived her of this dignity, in order to offer it as an indemnification to Ferdinand for the cession, which he proposed to that unhappy prince, of the inheritance of Spain. Having contrived to obtain that cession without any compensation, Bonaparte reserved Etruria to him-

* Jest, as well as serious observations, were made on this occasion. "Have you any commands for France?" said a Frenchman at Naples to an English friend: "I shall be there in two days." "In France?" answered his friend, "I thought you were setting off for Rome." "True; but Rome, by a decree of the emperor, is now indissolubly united to France." "I have no news to burden you with," said his friend; "but can I do anything for you in England? I shall be there in half an hour." "In England?" said the Frenchman, "and in half an hour!" "Yes," said his friend, "within that time I shall be at sea, and the sea has been indissolubly united to the British empire."

self, and retained the late queen as a hostage. For some time she was permitted to reside with her parents at Compiègne; but afterwards, under pretext of conducting her to Parma, she was escorted to Nice, and there subjected to the severe vigilance of the police. The princess appears to have been quicker in her feelings than the greater part of her family, which does not, indeed, argue any violent degree of sensibility. Terrified, however, and alarmed at the situation in which she found herself, she endeavoured to effect an escape into England. Two gentlemen of her retinue were sent to Holland, for the purpose of arranging her flight, but her project was discovered. On the 16th April, 1811, officers of police and gendarmes broke into the residence of the queen at Nice, seized her person and papers, and, after detaining her in custody for two months, and threatening to try her by a military tribunal, they at length intimated to her a sentence, condemning her, with her daughter (her son had been left very much indisposed at Compiègne), to be detained close prisoners in a monastery at Rome, to which she was compelled to repair within twenty-four hours after the notice of her doom. Her two agents, who had been previously made prisoners, were sent to Paris. They were condemned to death by a military commission, and were brought out for that purpose to the plain of Grenelle. One was shot on the spot, and pardon was extended to his companion when he was about to suffer the same punishment. The mental agony of the poor man had, however, affected the sources of life, and he died within a few days after the reprieve. The severity of this conduct towards a princess,—a queen indeed,—who had placed her person in Napoleon's hands, under the expectation that her liberty at least should not be abridged, was equally a breach of justice, humanity, and gentlemanlike courtesy.

It is curious, that about the same time when Napoleon treated with so much cruelty a foreign and independent princess, merely because she expressed a desire to exchange her residence from France to England, his own brother Lucien was received with hospitality in that island, so heartily detested, so frequently devoted to the fate of a second Carthage. Napoleon, who was always resolute in considering the princes of his own blood as the first slaves in the state, had become of late very urgent with Lucien to dismiss his wife, and unite himself with some of the royal families on the Continent, or at least to agree to bestow the hand of his daughter upon young Ferdinand of Spain, who had risen in favour by his behaviour on an occasion immediately to be mentioned. But Lucien, determined at this time not to connect himself or his family with the career of his relative's ambition, resolved to settle in America, and place the Atlantic betwixt himself and the importunities of his Imperial brother. He applied to the British minister at Sardinia for a pass, who was under the necessity of referring him to his government. On this second application he was invited to England, where he was permitted to live in freedom upon his parole, one officer only having a superintendence of his movements and correspondence. These were in every respect blameless; and the ex-statesman, who had played so

distinguished a part in the great revolutionary game, was found able to amuse himself with the composition of an epic poem on the subject of Charlemagne;—somewhat more harmlessly than did his brother Napoleon, in endeavouring again to rebuild and consolidate the vast empire of the son of Pepin.

Another intrigue of a singular character, and which terminated in an unexpected manner, originated in an attempt of the English ministry to achieve the liberty of Ferdinand, the lawful king of Spain. A royal and a popular party had begun to show themselves in that distracted country, and to divert the attention of the patriots from uniting their efforts to accomplish the object of most engrossing importance, the recovery, namely, of their country, from the intruding monarch and the French armies. The English government were naturally persuaded that Ferdinand, to whose name his subjects were so strongly attached, would be desirous and capable of placing himself, were he at liberty, at their head, putting an end to their disputes by his authority, and giving their efforts an impulse, which could be communicated by no one but the King of Spain, to the Spanish nation. It is no doubt true, that had the government of England known the real character of this prince, a wish for his deliverance from France, or his presence in Spain, would have been the last which they would have formed. This misapprehension, however, was natural, and was acted upon.

A Piedmontese, of Irish extraction, called the Baron Kolli (or Kelly), the selected agent of the British government, was furnished with some diamonds and valuable articles, under pretext of disposing of which he was to obtain admission to the prince as a prisoner at Valency, where his chief amusement, it is believed, was embroidering a gown and petticoat, to be presented to the Virgin Mary. Kolli was then to have informed the prince of his errand, effected Ferdinand's escape by means of confederates among the royalist party, and conveyed him to the coast, where a small squadron awaited the event of the enterprise, designed to carry the King of Spain to Gibraltar, or whither else he chose. In March, 1810, Kolli was put ashore in Quiberon Bay, whence he went to Paris to prepare for his enterprise. He was discovered, however, by the police, and arrested at the moment when he was setting out for Valency. Some attempts were made to induce him to proceed with the scheme, of which his papers enabled the police to comprehend the general plan, keeping communication at the same time with the French minister. As he disdained to undertake this treacherous character, Kolli was committed close prisoner to the castle of Vincennes, while a person,—the same who betrayed his principal, and whose exterior in some degree answered the description of the British emissary,—was sent to represent him at the castle of Valency.

But Ferdinand, either suspicious of the snare which was laid for him, or poor-spirited enough to prefer a safe bondage to a brave risk incurred for liberty, would not listen to the supposed agent of Britain, and indeed denounced the pretended Kolli to Barthélemy, the governor of the castle. The false Kolli, therefore, returned to Paris. while the real

one remained in the castle of Vincennes till the capture of Paris by the allies. Ferdinand took credit, in a letter to Bonaparte, for having resisted the temptation held out to him by the British government, who had, as he pathetically observed, abused his name, and occasioned, by doing so, the shedding of much blood in Spain. He again manifested his ardent wish to become the adopted son of the emperor; his hope that the author and abettors of the scheme to deliver him might be brought to condign punishment; and concluded with a hint, that he was extremely desirous to leave Valençey, a residence which had nothing about it but what was unpleasant, and was not in any respect fitted for him. The hint of Ferdinand about a union with Bonaparte's family probably led to the fresh importunity on the emperor's part, which induced Lucien to leave Italy. Ferdinand did not obtain the change of residence he desired, nor does he seem to have profited in any way by his candour towards his keeper, excepting that he evaded the strict confinement, or yet worse fate, to which he might have been condemned, had he imprudently confided in the false Baron Kolli.

In Portugal, the great struggle betwixt Masséna and Wellington, upon which, as we formerly observed, the eyes of the world were fixed, had been finally decided in favour of the English general. This advantage was attained by no assistance of the elements,—by none of those casual occurrences which are called chances of war,—by no dubious, or even venturous risks,—by the decision of no single battle lost or won; but solely by the superiority of one great general over another, at the awful game in which neither had yet met a rival.

For more than four months, Masséna, with as fine an army as had ever left France, lay looking at the impregnable lines with which the British forces, so greatly inferior in numerical strength, were covering Lisbon, the object of his expedition. To assail in such a position troops, whose valour he had felt at Busaco, would have been throwing away the lives of his soldiers; and to retreat, was to abandon the enterprise which his master had entrusted to him, with a confidence in his skill and his good fortune, which must, in that case, have been thereafter sorely abated. Masséna tried every effort which military skill could supply, to draw his foe out of his place of advantage. He threatened to carry the war across the Tagus—he threatened to extend his army towards Oporto; but each demonstration he made had been calculated upon and anticipated by his antagonist, and was foiled almost without an effort. At length, exhausted by the want of supplies, and the interruption of his communications, after lying one month at Alenquer, Masséna retreated to Santarém, as preferable winter quarters; but, in the beginning of March, he found that these were equally untenable, and became fully sensible, that if he desired to save the remnant of a sickly and diminished army, it must necessarily be by a speedy retreat.

This celebrated movement, decisive of the fate of the campaign, commenced about the 4th of March. There are two different points in which Masséna's conduct may be regarded, and they differ as light

and darkness. If it be considered in the capacity of that of a human being, the indignant reader, were we to detail the horrors which he permitted his soldiers to perpetrate, would almost deny his title to the name. It is a vulgar superstition, that when the Enemy of mankind is invoked, and appears, he destroys in his retreat the building which has witnessed the apparition. It seemed as if the French, in leaving Portugal, were determined that ruins alone should remain to show they had once been there. Military license was let loose in its most odious and frightful shape, and the crimes which were committed embraced all that is horrible to humanity. But if a curtain is dropped on these horrors, and Masséna is regarded merely as a military leader, his retreat, perhaps, did him as much honour as any of the great achievements which formerly had made his name famous. If he had been rightly called Fortune's favourite, he now showed that his reputation did not depend on her smile, but could be maintained by his own talents, while she shone on other banners. In retreating through the north of Portugal, a rugged and mountainous country, he was followed by Lord Wellington, who allowed him not a moment's respite. The movements of the troops to those who understood, and had the calmness to consider them, were as regular consequences of each other, as occur in the game of chess.

The French were repeatedly seen drawn up on ground where it seemed impossible to dislodge them; and as often the bayonets of a British column, which had marched by some distant route, were observed twinkling in the direction of their flank, intimating that their line was about to be turned. But this was only the signal for Masséna to recommence his retreat, which he did before the English troops could come up; nor did he fail again to halt where opportunity offered, until again dislodged by his sagacious and persevering pursuer. At length, the French were fairly driven out of the Portuguese territory, excepting the garrison in the frontier town of Almeida, of which Lord Wellington formed first the blockade, and afterwards the siege.

So soon as he escaped from the limits of Portugal, Masséna hastened to draw together such reinforcements as he could obtain in Castile, collected once more a large force, and, within about a fortnight after he had effected his retreat, resumed the offensive, with the view of relieving Almeida, which was the sole trophy remaining to show his triumphant advance in the preceding season. Lord Wellington did not refuse the battle, which took place on the 5th of May, near Fuentes d'Onoro. The conflict was well disputed, but the French general sustained a defeat, notwithstanding his superiority of numbers, and particularly of cavalry. He then retreated from the Portuguese frontier, having previously sent orders for the evacuation of Almeida by the garrison, which the French commandant executed with much dexterity.

On the more southern frontier of Portugal, Lord Beresford fought also a dreadful and sanguinary battle. The action was in some measure indecisive, but Soult, who commanded the French, failed in obtaining such a success as enabled him to accom-

plish his object, which was the raising of the siege of Badajoz. In Portugal, therefore, and along its frontiers, the British had been uniformly successful, and their countrymen at home began once more to open their ears to the suggestions of hope and courage.

Cádiz, also, the remaining bulwark of the patriots, had been witness to a splendid action. General Graham, with a body of British troops, had sallied out from the garrison in March, 1811, and obtained a victory upon the heights of Barossa, which, had he been properly seconded by the Spanish general Lapena, would have been productive of a serious influence upon the events of the siege; and which, even though it remained imperfect, gave heart and confidence to the besieged, and struck a perpetual damp into the besiegers, who found themselves bearded in their own position. There had been much fighting through Spain with various results. But, if we dare venture to use such an emblem, the bush, though burning, was not consumed, and Spain continued that sort of general resistance which seemed to begin after all usual means of regular opposition had failed, as Nature often musters her strength to combat a disease which the medical assistants have pronounced mortal.

Catalonia, though her strong-holds were lost, continued, under the command of De Lacy and d'Eroles, to gain occasional advantages over the enemy; and Spain saw Figueras, one of her strongest fortresses, recovered by the bold stratagem of Rovira, a doctor of divinity, and commander of a guerilla party. Being instantly besieged by the French, and ill supplied with provisions, the place was indeed speedily regained; but the possibility of its being taken was, to the peculiarly tenacious spirit of the Spaniards, more encouraging than its recapture was matter of dismay.

But chiefly the auxiliary British, with the Portuguese, who, trained by the care of Lord Beresford, were fit to sustain their part in line by the side of their allies, showed that they were conducted in a different spirit from that which made their leaders in former expeditions stand with one foot on sea and one on land, never venturing from the sight of the ocean, as if they led amphibious creatures, who required the use of both elements to secure their existence; and the scheme of whose campaign was to rout and repel, as they best could, the attacks of the enemy, but seldom to venture upon anticipating or disconcerting his plans. To protect Galicia, for example, when invaded by the French, Lord Wellington, though with a much inferior army than he was well aware could be brought against him, formed the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo; thus compelling the enemy to desist from their proposed attempt on that province, and to concentrate their forces for the relief of that important place. Such a concentration could not, in the condition of the French armies, be effected without much disadvantage. It afforded breathing space for all the guerillas, and an opportunity which they never neglected, of acting with their usual courage and sagacity against small parties and convoys of the French, as well as that of seizing upon any posts which the enemy might have been obliged to leave imperfectly defended. And

when the French had collected their whole force to overwhelm the British general and his forces, Marmont had the mortification to see the former withdraw from the presence of a superior enemy, with as much calmness and security as if marching through a peaceful country.

Nothing remained for the French general, save to detail in the pages of the *Moniteur*, what must have been the fate of the English but for their hasty and precipitate flight, when the well-concerted and boldly-executed enterprise of Arroyo-Molinos, convinced him to his cost that a retreat was no rout. In this village upwards of 1400 French were taken prisoners, at a moment when they least expected to be attacked. This little action showed a spirit of hazard, a disposition to assume the offensive, which the French did not expect from the British forces; and they were, for the first time, foiled in their own military qualities of vigilance, enterprise, and activity. In Britain, also, the nation perceived that their army showed the same courage and the same superiority, which had been considered as the exclusive property of their gallant sailors. The French were defeated under the rock of Gibraltar by the Spanish general Ballasteros, and their general, Godinot, blew out his own brains, rather than face the account, to which Soult, his commander-in-chief, was about to summon him. Tarifa, in the same quarter, was defended successfully by a garrison of mingled Spaniards and British, and the French were computed to have lost before it about two thousand five hundred men.

On the other hand, the French discipline continued to render them superior over the patriots, wherever the latter could be brought to face them in anything resembling a pitched battle. Thus Blake, after a gallant action, was totally defeated near Murviedro, and that town itself fell into possession of the enemy. A more severe consequence of the battle of Ocana, as that disastrous action was termed, was the capture of Valencia, where Blake, and the remainder of his army, were made prisoners of war.

But amid those vicissitudes of good or bad fortune, Spain continued to Bonaparte the same harassing and exhausting undertaking, which it had been almost from the commencement. Sickness and want made more ravages amongst the French troops than the sword of the enemy, though that did not lie idle. Many of the districts are unhealthy to strangers; but of these, as well as others, it was necessary for the invaders to retain possession. There, while numerous deaths happened among the troops, the guerillas watched the remnant, until sickness and fatigue had reduced the garrisons to a number insufficient for defence, and then pounced upon them like birds of prey on a fallen animal, upon which they have been long in attendance.

Besides, disunion continued to reign among the French generals. Joseph, although in point of power the very shadow of what a king ought to be, had spirit enough to resent the condition in which he was placed amid the haughty military chiefs, who acknowledged no superior beside the emperor, and listened to no commands save those emanating from Paris. He wrote to his brother a letter, accompany-

ing a formal abdication of the throne of Spain, unless he was to be placed in more complete authority than even the orders of Napoleon himself had hitherto enabled him to attain. But the prospect of a northern war approaching nearer and nearer, Napoleon was induced to postpone his brother's request, although so pressingly urged, and Spain was in some measure left to its fate during the still more urgent events of the Russian campaign.

CHAPTER LXXIII.

Retrospect of the causes leading to the rupture with Russia—Originate in the treaty of Tilsit.—Russia's alleged reasons of complaint.—Arguments of Napoleon's counsellors against war with Russia.—Fouché is against the war—Presents a memorial to Napoleon upon the subject—His answer.—Napoleon's views in favour of the war, as urged to his various advisers.

WE are now approaching the verge of that fated year, when Fortune, hitherto unwearied in her partiality towards Napoleon, turned first upon himself, personally, a clouded and stormy aspect. Losses he had sustained both by land and sea, but he could still remark, as when he first heard of the defeat at Trafalgar,—"I was not there—I could not be everywhere at once." But he was soon to experience misfortunes, to the narrative of which he could not apply this proud commentary. The reader must be first put in remembrance of the causes of the incipient quarrel betwixt the empire of France and that of Russia.

Notwithstanding the subsequent personal intimacy which took place betwixt the two sovereigns, and which for five years prevented the springing up of any enmity betwixt Alexander and Napoleon, the seeds of that quarrel were, nevertheless, to be found in the treaty of pacification of Tilsit itself. Russia, lying remote from aggression in every other part of her immense territory, is open to injury on that important western frontier by which she is united with Europe, and in those possessions by virtue of which she claims to be a member of the European republic. The partition of Poland, unjust as it was in every point of view, was a measure of far greater importance to Russia than either to Austria or Prussia; for, while that state possessed its former semi-barbarous and stormy independence, it lay interposed in a great measure betwixt Russia and the rest of Europe; or, in other words, betwixt her and the civilized world. Any revolution which might restore Poland to the independence, for which the inhabitants had not ceased to sigh, would have effectually thrust the czar back upon his forests, destroyed his interest and influence in European affairs, and reduced him comparatively to the rank of an Asiatic sovereign. This liberation of their country, and the reunion of its dismembered provinces under a national constitution, was what the Poles expected from Bonaparte. For this they crowded to his standard after the battle of Jena; and although he was too cautious to promise any thing explicitly concerning the restoration of Poland to its rank among nations, yet most of his measures indicated a future purpose of accomplishing that

work. Thus, when those Polish provinces which had fallen to the portion of Prussia, were formed into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, as an independent principality, and the sovereignty was conferred, not without a secret meaning, on the King of Saxony, a descendant of the ancient monarchs of Poland, what could this be supposed to indicate, save the commencement of an independent state, to which might be added, as opportunity occurred, the remaining districts of Poland which had been seized upon by Austria and Russia? "To what purpose," asked those statesmen, who belonged to the old Russian or anti-Gallican party in the empire, "are those stipulations for a free military road and passage of troops from Saxony, to Warsaw and its territory, through Silesia, if it is not that France may preserve the means of throwing an overpowering force into the duchy, so soon as it shall be her pleasure to undo the work of the sage Catherine, by depriving Russia of those rich Polish provinces, which her policy had added to the empire? Wherefore," asked the same persons, "should there have been a special article in the same treaty of Tilsit, that France should retain Dantzic until a maritime peace, unless it was to serve as a place of arms in the event of a new war with Russia, the probability of which Napoleon, therefore, must certainly have calculated upon, even at the very moment when he cultivated such close personal intimacy with the Emperor Alexander?"

These suspicions were considerably increased by the articles of peace concluded with Austria at Schœnbrunn. By that treaty all Western Galicia, together with the city of Cracow, and other territories, were disjoined from Austria, and added to the dukedom of Warsaw, marking, it was supposed, still farther the intention of Napoleon, at one time or another, to restore in its integrity the ancient kingdom of Poland, of which Russia alone now held the full share allotted to her by the partition treaties.

Other causes led to the same conclusion. The old Russians, a numerous and strong party in the empire, which comprehended the greater part of the large landholders, felt, as they had done under the Emperor Paul, much distress, national and personal, from the interruption of the British trade by Bonaparte's continental system. Their timber, their pitch, their potash, their hemp, and other bulky and weighty commodities, the chief produce of their estates, for which the British had been ready customers, remained on their hands, while they were deprived of the colonial produce and manufactures of Britain, which they were wont to receive in exchange for those articles, with mutual profit and convenience to both parties. It was in vain that, to reconcile them to this state of interdiction, they saw in the speeches and decrees of Bonaparte, tirades about the freedom of the seas, and the maritime tyranny of England. It seemed an ill-omened species of liberation, which began by the destruction of their commerce and impoverishment of their estates; and the Russian Boyards could no more comprehend the declamation of Bonaparte against the English, than the millers of the Ebro could be made to understand the de-

nunciation of Don Quixote against their customers. These magnates only saw that the ruler of France wished them to submit to great commercial distress and inconvenience, in order to accelerate his plan of ruining Great Britain, after which achievement he might find it a more easy undertaking to destroy their own natural importance as a European power, by re-establishing Poland, and resuming the fertile provinces on the western boundary; thus leading the Russian cabinet, if the French interest should remain paramount there, by a very disadvantageous road to a still more disastrous conclusion.

There was, besides, spread through the Russian nation generally, a sense that France was treating their emperor rather on the footing of an inferior. It is a thing entirely unknown in diplomacy, that one government should pretend a right to dictate to another, who is upon terms of equality, the conditions on which she should conduct her commerce; and the assuming such a right, seconded by threatening language in case of non-compliance, has been always held a legitimate cause of war. Indeed, the opinion that the French league disgraced the Russian nation, plunged their country into embarrassments, and was likely to occasion still farther misfortunes to them, became so general, that the emperor must have paid some attention to the wishes of his people, even if his own friendship with Bonaparte had not been cooled by late occurrences.

The alliance with Austria was of a character calculated to alarm Alexander. Russia and Austria, though they had a common interest to withstand the overpowering strength of Bonaparte, had been in ordinary times always rivals, and sometimes enemies. It was the interference of Austria, which, upon several occasions, checked the progress of the Russians in Turkey, and it was Austria also which formed a barrier against the increase of their power in the south of Europe. The family connexion, therefore, formed by Bonaparte with the house of Hapsburg, made him still more formidable to Russia, as likely to embrace the quarrels and forward the pretensions of that power against the czar, even if France herself should have none to discuss with him.

But there was no need to have recourse to remote causes of suspicion. Russia had, and must always have had, direct and immediate cause of jealousy, while France or her emperor claimed the permanent right of thinking and deciding for her, as well as other nations, in the relations of commerce and others, in which every independent state is most desirous of exercising the right of deliberating for herself. This was the true state of the case. To remain the ally of Bonaparte, Alexander must have become his vassal; to attempt to be independent of him, was to make him his enemy; and it can be no wonder that a sovereign so proud and powerful as the czar, chose rather to stand the hazard of battle, than diminish the lustre, or compromise the independence, of his ancient crown.

The time, too, for resistance, seemed as favourable as Russia could ever expect. The war of Spain, though chequered in its fortune, was in no respect near a sudden end. It occupied two hundred and fifty thousand of the best and oldest French troops;

demanding also an immense expenditure, and diminished, of course, the power of the French Emperor to carry on the war on the frontiers of Russia. A conclusion of these wasting hostilities would have rendered him far more formidable with respect to the quality, as well as the number, of his disposable forces, and it seemed the interest of Russia not to wait till that period should arrive.

The same arguments which recommended to Russia to chuse the immediate moment for resisting the extravagant pretensions of France, ought, in point of prudence, to have induced Napoleon to desist from urging such pretensions, and to avoid the voluntarily engaging in two wars at the same time, both of a character decidedly national, and to only one of which he could give the influence of his own talents and his own presence. His best and wisest generals, whom he consulted, or, to speak more properly, to whom he opened his purpose, used various arguments to induce him to alter, or at least defer, his resolution. He himself hesitated for more than a year, and was repeatedly upon the point of settling with Russia the grounds of disagreement betwixt them upon amicable terms.

The reasons of complaint, on the part of the czar, were four in number.

I. The alarm given to Russia by the extension of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw by the treaty of Schönbrunn, as if it were destined to be the central part of an independent state, or kingdom, in Poland, to which those provinces of that dismembered country, which had become part of Russia, were at some convenient time to be united. On this point the czar demanded an explicit engagement, on the part of the French Emperor, that the kingdom of Poland should not be again established. Napoleon declined this form of guarantee, as it seemed to engage him to warrant Russia against an event which might happen without his co-operation; but he offered to pledge himself that he would not favour any enterprise which should, directly or indirectly, lead to the re-establishment of Poland as an independent state. This modified acquiescence in what was required by Russia fell considerably short of what the czar wished; for the stipulation, as at first worded, would have amounted to an engagement on the part of France to join in opposing any step towards Polish independence; whereas, according to the modification which it received at Paris, it only implied that France should remain neuter if such an attempt should take place.

II. The wrong done by including the Duchy of Oldenburg, though guaranteed by the treaty of Tilist to its prince, the czar's near relative and ally, in the territory annexed to France, admitted of being compensated by an indemnification. But Russia desired that this indemnification should be either the city of Dantzic, or some equally important territory, on the frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which might offer an additional guarantee against the apprehended enlargement of that state. France would not listen to this, though she did not object to compensation elsewhere.

III. The third point in question, was the degree to which the Russian commerce with England was to be restricted. Napoleon proposed to grant some

relaxation on the occasions where the produce of Russia was exported in exchange for that of England, to be effected by the way of mutual licenses.

IV. It was proposed to revise the Russian tariff of 1810, so as, without injuring the interests of Russia, it might relax the heavy duties imposed on the objects of French commerce.

From this statement, which comprehends the last basis on which Napoleon expressed himself willing to treat, it is quite evident, that had there not been a deeper feeling of jealousy and animosity betwixt the two emperors, than those expressed in the subjects of actual debate betwixt them, these might have been accommodated in an amicable way. But as it was impossible for Napoleon to endure being called to account, like a sovereign of the second rate, or at least in the tone of an equal, by the Emperor of Russia; so the latter, more and more alarmed by the motions of the French armies, which were advancing into Pomerania, could not persuade himself, that, in agreeing to admit the present grounds of complaint, Napoleon meant more than to postpone the fatal struggle for superiority, until he should find a convenient time to commence it with a more absolute prospect of success.

In the meantime, and ere the negotiations were finally broken off, Bonaparte's counsellors urged him, with as much argument as they dared, to desist from running the hazard of an enterprise so remote, so hazardous, and so little called for. They contended, that no French interest, and no national point of honour, were involved in the disagreement which had arisen. The principles upon which the points of dispute might be settled, being in a manner agreed upon, they argued that their master should stop in his military preparations. To march an army into Prussia, and to call forth the Prussians as auxiliaries, would, they contended, be using measures towards Russia, which could not but bring on the war which they anxiously deprecated. To submit to menaces supported by demonstrations of open force, would be destructive of the influence of Russia, both at home and abroad. She could not be expected to give way without a struggle.

These advisers allowed, that a case might be conceived for justifying an exertion to destroy the power of Russia, a case arising out of the transactions between France and the other states of Europe, and out of the apprehension that these states, aggrieved and irritated by the conduct of France, might be tempted to seek a leader, patron, and protector, in the Emperor Alexander. But this extremity, they alleged, could not exist so long as France had the means of avoiding a perilous war, by a mitigation of her policy towards her vassals and auxiliaries; for if the states whose revolt (so to call it) was apprehended, could be reconciled to France by a more lenient course of measures to be adopted towards them, they would lose all temptation to fly to Russia as a protector. In such case the power of Russia would no longer give jealousy to France, or compel her to rush to a dubious conflict, for the purpose of diminishing an influence which could not then become dangerous to the southern empire, by depriving France of her clientage.

It might have been added, though it could not be

so broadly spoken out, that in this point of view nothing would have been more easy for France, than to modify or soften her line of policy in favour of the inferior states, in whose favour the Russian interference was expected or apprehended. That policy had uniformly been a system of insult and menace. The influence which France had gained in Europe grew less out of treaty than fear, founded on the recollection of former wars. All the states of Germany felt the melancholy consequences of the existence of despotic power vested in men, who, like Napoleon himself, and the military governors whom he employed, were new to the exercise and enjoyment of their authority; and, on the other hand, the French Emperor and his satellites felt, towards the people of the conquered, or subjected states, the constant apprehension which a conscious sense of injustice produces in the minds of oppressors, namely, that the oppressed only watch for a safe opportunity to turn against them. There was therefore no French interest, or even point of honour, which called on Napoleon to make war on Alexander; and the temptation seems to have amounted solely to the desire on Napoleon's part to fight a great battle,—to gain a great victory,—to occupy, with his victorious army, another great capital,—and, in fine, to subject to his arms the power of Russia, which, of all the states on the Continent, remained the only one that could be properly termed independent of France.

It was in this light that the question of peace and war was viewed by the French politicians of the day; and it is curious to observe, in the reports we have of their arguments, the total absence of principle which they display in the examination of it. They dwell on the difficulty of Napoleon's undertaking, upon its dangers, upon its expense, upon the slender prospect of any remuneration by the usual modes of confiscation, plunder, or levy of contributions. They enlarge, too, upon the little probability there was, that success in the intended war would bring to a conclusion the disastrous contest in Spain; and all these various arguments are insinuated or urged with more or less vehemence, according to the character, the station, or the degree of intimacy with Napoleon, of the counsellor who ventured to use the topics. But among his advisers, none that we read or hear of, had the open and manly courage to ask, Where was the justice of this attack upon Russia? What had she done to merit it? The emperors were friends by the treaty of Tilsit, confirmed by personal intimacy and the closest intercourse at Erfurt. How had they ceased to be such? What had happened since that period to place Russia, then the friend and confessed equal of France, in the situation of a subordinate and tributary state? On what pretence did Napoleon confiscate to his own use the Duchy of Oldenburg, acknowledged as the property of Alexander's brother-in-law, by an express article in the treaty of Tilsit? By what just right could he condemn the Russian nation to all the distresses of his anti-commercial system, while he allowed them to be a free and independent state?—Above all, while he considered them as a sovereign and a people entitled to be treated with the usual respect due between powers

that are connected by friendly treaties, with what pretence of justice, or even decency, could he proceed to enforce claims so unfounded in themselves, by introducing his own forces on their frontier, and arming their neighbours against them for the same purpose? Of these pleas, in moral justice, there was not a word urged; nor was silence wonderful on this fruitful topic, since to insist upon it would have been to strike at the fundamental principle of Bonaparte's policy, which was, never to neglect a present advantage for the sake of observing a general principle. "Let us hear of no general principles," said Bonaparte's favourite minister of the period. "Ours is a government not regulated by theory, but by emerging circumstances."

We ought not to omit to mention, that Fouché, among others, took up a testimony against the Russian war. He had been permitted to return to his château of Ferrières, near Paris, under the apology that the air of Italy did not agree with his constitution. But Napoleon distrusted him, and the police were commissioned to watch with the utmost accuracy the proceedings of their late master. Fouché was well aware of this; and, desirous that his remonstrance with the emperor should have all the force of an unexpected argument, he shut himself up in the strictest seclusion while engaged in composing a production, which perhaps he hoped might be a means of recalling him to recollection, if not to favour.

In an able and eloquent memorial, Fouché reminded Bonaparte, that he was already the absolute master of the finest empire the world had ever seen; and that all the lessons of history went to demonstrate the impossibility of attaining universal monarchy. The French empire had arrived, according to the reasoning of this able statesman, at that point when its ruler should rather think of securing and consolidating his present acquisitions, than of achieving farther conquests, since, whatever his empire might acquire in extent, it was sure to lose in solidity. Fouché stated the extent of the country which Napoleon was about to invade, the poverty of the soil, the rigour of the climate, and the distance which each fresh victory must remove him from his resources, annoyed as his communications were sure to be by nations of Cossacks and Tartars. He implored the emperor to remember the fate of Charles XII. of Sweden. "If that warlike monarch," he said, "had not, like Napoleon, half Europe in arms at his back, neither had his opponent, the Czar Peter, four hundred thousand soldiers, and fifty thousand Cossacks. The invader, it was stated, would have against him the dislike of the higher ranks, the fanaticism of the peasantry, the exertions of soldiers accustomed to the severity of the climate. There were besides to be dreaded, in case of the slightest reverse, the intrigues of the English, the fickleness of his continental allies, and even the awakening of discontent and conspiracy in France itself, should an idea generally arise, that he was sacrificing the welfare of the state to the insatiable desire of fresh enterprises and distant conquests."

Fouché presented himself at the Tuileries, and requested an audience of the emperor, hoping,

doubtless, that the unexpected circumstance of his appearing there, and the reasoning in his memorial, would excite Napoleon's attention. To his great surprise, Napoleon, with an air of easy indifference, began the audience. "I am no stranger, Monsieur le Duc, to your errand here. You have a memorial to present me—give it me—I will read it, though I know already its contents. The war with Russia is not more agreeable to you than that of Spain."

"Your Imperial Majesty will pardon my having ventured to offer some observations on this important crisis?" said the statesman, astonished to find himself anticipated, when he believed he had laboured in the most absolute secrecy.

"It is no crisis," resumed Napoleon; "merely a war of a character entirely political. Spain will fall when I have annihilated the English influence at St Petersburg. I have eight hundred thousand men; and to one who has such an army, Europe is but an old prostitute, who must obey his pleasure. Was it not yourself who told me that the word *impossible* was not good French? I regulate my conduct more on the opinion of my army than the sentiments of you *grandses*, who are become too rich; and while you pretend anxiety for me, only are apprehensive of the general confusion which would follow my death. Don't disquiet yourself, but consider the Russian war as a wise measure, demanded by the true interests of France, and the general security. Am I to blame, because the great degree of power I have already attained forces me to assume the dictatorship of the world? My destiny is not yet accomplished—my present situation is but a sketch of a picture which I must finish. There must be one universal European code, one court of appeal. The same money, the same weights and measures, the same laws, must have currency through Europe. I must make one nation out of all the European states, and Paris must be the capital of the world. At present you no longer serve me well, because you think my affairs are in danger; but before a year is over you will assist me with the same zeal and ardour as at the periods of Marengo and Austerlitz. You will see more than all this—it is I who assure you of it. Adieu, Monsieur le Duc. Do not play the disgraced courtier, or the captious critic of public affairs; and be so good as to put a little confidence in your emperor."

He then turned his back on Fouché, and left him to reflect by what means he, who so well knew all the machinations of the police, could himself have become exposed to their universal vigilance; * with some cause, perhaps, to rejoice, that his secret employment, though unpleasant to Bonaparte, was not

* Fouché afterwards remembered, that an individual in his neighbourhood, mayor of a municipality, and whom he himself had employed in matters of police, had one morning intruded rather hastily on him in his study, under pretext of pleading the cause of a distressed tenant; and concluded, that while he was searching for the papers concerning his visitor's ostensible business, Mr Mayor had an opportunity to glance at the sheets on his *scrutoire*, where the repetition of V. M. I. and R. M. (intimating your Imperial and Royal Majesty), betrayed that he was drawing up a memorial to Napoleon, and a word or two of the context explained its purport.

of a character to attract punishment as well as animadversion.

As Napoleon discountenanced and bore down the remonstrances of the subtle Fouché, so he represented to his various advisers the war upon which he was unalterably determined, in the light most proper to bring them over to his own opinion. To the army in general, the mere name of war was in itself a sufficient recommendation. It comprehended preferment, employment, plunder, distinction, and pensions. To the generals, it afforded marshals' batons,—to the marshals, crowns and sceptres;—to the civilians, he urged, as to Fouché, that it was a war of policy,—of necessity,—the last act in the drama, but indispensably requisite to conclude the whole;—to his most intimate friends he expressed his conviction that his fortune could not stand still; that it was founded on public opinion; and that if he did not continue to advance he must necessarily retrograde. To his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, he used a still more extraordinary argument. This prelate, a devout catholic, had begun to have compunction about his nephew's behaviour towards the pope; and these sentiments mingled like an ominous feeling with the alarms excited by the risks of his tremendous undertaking. With more than usual freedom he conjured his kinsman to abstain from tempting Providence. He entreated him not to defy heaven and earth, the wrath of man, and the fury of the elements, at the same time; and expressed his apprehension that he must at length sink under the weight of the enmity which he incurred daily.* The only answer which Bonaparte vouchsafed, was to lead the cardinal to the window, and, opening the casement, and pointing upwards, to ask him, "If he saw yonder star?"

"No, sire," answered the astonished cardinal.

"But I see it," answered Bonaparte; and turned from his relation as if he had fully confuted his arguments.

This speech might admit of two meanings;—either that Napoleon wished in this manner to express that his own powers of penetration were superior to those of the cardinal, or it might have reference to a certain superstitious confidence in his predestined good fortune, which we have already observed he was known to entertain. But as it was not Napoleon's fashion, whatever reliance he might place on such auguries, to neglect any means of insuring success within his power, we are next to inquire what political measures he had taken to carry on the proposed Russian war to advantage.

CHAPTER LXXIV.

Allies on whose assistance Bonaparte might count.—Causes which alienated from him the Prince Royal of Sweden—who signs a Treaty with Russia.—Delicate situation of the King of Prussia, whose alliance the Em-

* It is not unworthy of notice, that the emperor's mother (Madame Mère, as she was termed) always expressed a presentiment, that the fortunes of her family, splendid as they were, would be altered before her death; and when ridiculed by her children for her frugal disposition, she used to allege she was saving money for them in their distress; and in fact she lived to apply her boards to that purpose.

peror Alexander on that account declines.—A treaty with France dictated to Prussia.—Relations between Austria and France—in order to preserve them, Bonaparte is obliged to come under an engagement not to revolutionize Poland.—His error of policy in neglecting to cultivate the alliance of the Porte.—Amount of Bonaparte's army.—Levies of the Ban, the Second Ban, and Arrière-Ban, for the protection of France in the emperor's absence.—Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo, by Lord Wellington.—Bonaparte makes overtures of peace to Lord Castlereagh.—The correspondence broken off.—Ultimatum of Russia rejected, and made the direct cause of hostilities by Napoleon—who sets out from Paris, 9th May, 1812—and meets the sovereigns his allies at Dresden, where a variety of royal festivities are held.—A last attempt of Napoleon to negotiate with Alexander proves unsuccessful.

THE several powers, who might in their different degrees of strength aid or impede the last and most daring of Bonaparte's undertakings, were,—Denmark, Saxony, Sweden, and Prussia, in the north of Europe; in the south Austria, and the Turkish empire.

Denmark and Saxony were both devoted to the cause of France; but the former power, who had made over to Napoleon her seamen, had no land troops to spare for his assistance. The few that she had on foot were scarce sufficient to protect her against any enterprise of Sweden or England.

Saxony was also the firm friend of Napoleon, who had enlarged her dominions, and changed her ruler's electoral bonnet into a royal crown. It is true, if Poland was to be regenerated, as seemed to be the natural consequence of a war with Russia, the King of Saxony must have reckoned upon losing his ducal interest in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. But from this he derived little present advantage, and as he was secure of indemnification, the apprehension of that loss did not prevent him from following the banner of Napoleon, with the same good will as ever.

Very different was the condition of Sweden. That kingdom, since the reign of Francis I., had been the ancient and natural ally of France against Russia; in acting against which last power her local advantages afforded great facility. Sweden was also governed at the moment by a Frenchman. But the Prince Royal had received more injuries and affronts, than favours, at the hands of the Emperor Napoleon, and the violent policy which the latter was in the habit of using towards those of his allies and neighbours, who did not submit unresistingly to all his demands, had alienated from France the hearts of the Swedes, and from his own person the friendship of his old companion in arms. We have mentioned the mode of argument, or rather declamation, which he had used to compel the Swedes into a total exclusion of English manufactures, contrary to a reservation made in a recent treaty, by which the Swedes had retained the right of importing colonial goods and salt, while consenting to exclude British commodities generally. With the same urgency and menace, he had compelled the Crown Prince to declare war against Britain.

But although Napoleon succeeded in both points, he could not oblige Britain to treat Sweden as a beligerent power. On the contrary, England seemed

not in the slightest degree to alter the relations of amity to a state which she considered as having adopted the attitude of an enemy towards her, merely from compulsion too powerful to be resisted. This moderation on the part of Great Britain, did not prevent Sweden from feeling all the evils of the anti social system of Bonaparte. Her commerce was reduced to a mere coasting-trade, and her vessels skulked from port to port, exposed to the depredations of Danish and French privateers, who seized upon and confiscated upwards of fifty Swedish ships, under pretence of enforcing the non-intercourse system. The Prince Royal applied for redress at the court of Paris; but although vague promises were given, yet neither were the acts of piracy discontinued, nor any amends made for those daily committed. The Baron Alquier, who was the French envoy at Stockholm, used, according to Bernadotte's expression, the language of a Roman proconsul, without remembering that he did not speak to slaves.

When asked, for example, to state categorically what Napoleon expected from Sweden, and what he proposed to grant her in return, Alquier answered, that "the emperor expected from Sweden compliance in every point conformable to his system; after which it would be time enough to inquire into what his Imperial Majesty might be disposed to do in favour of Sweden."

On another occasion, the French envoy had the assurance to decline farther intercourse with the Crown Prince on the subject of his mission, and to desire that some other person might be appointed to communicate with him. There can be no doubt, that, in this singular course of diplomacy, Baron Alquier obeyed his master's instructions, who was determined to treat the Prince Royal of Sweden, emancipated as he was from his allegiance to France by letters patent from the Imperial Chancery, as if he had still been his subject, and serving in his armies. Napoleon went so far as to say, before his courtiers, that he had a mind to make Bernadotte finish his lessons in the Swedish language in the Castle of Vincennes. It is even said, that the emperor thought seriously of putting this threat into execution, and that a plot was actually formed to seize the person of the Prince Royal, putting him on board a vessel, and bringing him prisoner to France. But he escaped this danger by the information of an officer named Salazar, formerly an aide-de-camp of Marmont, who conveyed to the prince timely information of the outrage which was intended.*

With so many causes of mutual animosity between France and Sweden, all arising out of the impolitic vehemence by which Bonaparte endeavoured to drive, rather than lead, the Prince Royal into the measures he desired, it can hardly be supposed that the last would neglect any opportunity to assert his independence, and his resolution not to submit to a superiority so degrading in itself, and so ungraciously and even unmercifully exercised.

Such was the state of matters betwixt the two countries, when, from the approaching war with Russia, the assistance of Sweden became essential

to France. But what bait could Napoleon hold out to bring back an alienated friend? He might, indeed, offer to assist Bernadotte in regaining the province of Finland, which, by the connivance of Napoleon, had been conquered by Russia. But the Crown Prince concluded, that, to enter into a war with the view of recovering Finland, would occasion expenses which the country could not afford, and which the acquisition of Finland could not compensate, even supposing it sure to be accomplished. Besides, the repossession of Finland would engage Sweden in perpetual disputes with Russia, whereas the two nations, separated by the Gulf of Bothnia, had at present no cause of difference. On the other hand, by siding with Russia in the great contest which was impending, Sweden might expect the assistance of that empire, as well as of Britain, to achieve from Denmark, the ally of France, the conquest of her kingdom of Norway, which, in its geographical situation, lay so conveniently for Sweden, and afforded her the whole range of sea-coast along the western shores of Scandinavia. It is said that the Prince Royal offered to Napoleon to enter into a league, offensive and defensive, with France, providing Norway as well as Finland were added to his dominions; but the emperor rejected the terms with disdain. The whole alleged negotiation, however, has been disputed and denied.

So soon as Bonaparte found there was no hope of conciliating the Prince Royal, which indeed he scarce seems seriously to have attempted, he proceeded, without waiting for the ceremony of declaring war, to strike against Sweden the most severe, or rather the only blow, in his power. In January, 1812, General Davoust marched into Swedish Pomerania, the only possession of Sweden south of the Baltic Sea, seized upon the country and its capital, and proceeded to menace the military occupation of Prussia, so far as that country was not already in the hands of France.

Receiving no satisfaction for this aggression, Sweden, 24th March, 1812, signed a treaty with Russia, declaring war against France; and proposing a diversion, with a joint force of twenty-five or thirty thousand Swedes, together with fifteen or twenty thousand Russians, upon some point of Germany. And the Emperor of Russia became bound, either by negotiation or military co-operation, to unite the kingdom of Norway to that of Sweden, and to hold the Russian army, which was at present in Finland, as disposable for that purpose. Thus was the force of Sweden, rendered yet more considerable by the high military character of its present chief, thrown into the scale against France, to whom, but for the passionate and impolitic character of Napoleon's proceedings towards her, she might, in all probability, have remained the same useful and faithful ally which she had been since the alliance of Francis I. with Gustavus Vasa.

No reason can be discovered for insulting Sweden at the precise moment when her co-operation would have been so useful, excepting the animosity of Napoleon against a prince whom he regarded as an ancient rival before the 18th Brumaire, and now as a contumacious and rebellious vassal. A due regard to the honour and interest of France, would have

* See Appendix, No. 6.—"Reflections on the conduct of Napoleon towards the Prince Royal of Sweden."

induced him to lay aside such personal considerations. But this does not appear to have been in Bonaparte's nature, who, if he remembered benefits, had also a tenacious recollection of enmities, said to be peculiar to the natives of Corsica. When this feeling obtained the ascendancy, he was too apt to sacrifice his policy to his spleen.

The situation of the King of Prussia, at the breaking out of the dispute between the empires of France and Russia, was truly embarrassing. His position lying betwixt the contending parties, rendered neutrality almost impossible; and if he took up arms, it was a matter of distracting doubt on which side he ought to employ them. Oppressed by French exactions and French garrisons; instigated, besides, by the secret influence of the Tagend-bund, the people of Prussia were almost unanimous in their eager wish to seize the sword against France, nor was the king less desirous to redeem the independence, and revenge the sufferings of his kingdom. The recollections of an amiable and beloved queen, who had died in the prime of life, heart-broken with the distresses of her country, with her hands locked in those of her husband, called also for revenge on France, which had insulted her when living, and slandered her when dead.*

Accordingly it is now well understood, that the first impulse of the King of Prussia's mind was to throw himself into the arms of Russia, and offer, should it cost him his life and crown, to take share in the war as his faithful ally. But the Emperor Alexander was sensible that, in accepting this offered devotion, he would come under an obligation to protect Prussia in case of those reverses, which might be almost reckoned on as likely to occur in the early part of the campaign. The strongest fortresses in Prussia were in the hands of the French, the army of the king did not amount to more than forty thousand men, and there was no time to arm or organize the national forces. In order to form a junction with these forty thousand men, or as many of them as could be collected, it would be necessary that Alexander should precipitate the war, and march a strong army into Silesia, upon which the Prussians might rally. But such an army, when it had attained its object, must have had in front the whole forces of France, Saxony, and the Confederacy of the Rhine, while the hostile troops of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with probably a body of Austrian auxiliaries, would have been in their rear. This premature movement in advance, would have resembled the conduct of Austria in the unhappy campaigns of 1805 and 1809; in both of which she precipitated her armies into

Bavaria, in hopes of acquiring allies, but only exposed them to the decisive defeats of Ulm and Eckmühl. It would also have been like the equally ill-omened advance of the Prussian army in 1806, when, hurrying forward to compel Saxony to join him, the Duke of Brunswick gave occasion to the unhappy battle of Jena.

Experience and reflection, therefore, had led the Russian Emperor and cabinet to be of opinion, that they ought to avoid encountering the French in the early part of the campaign; and in consequence, that, far from advancing to meet them, they should rather suffer the invaders to involve themselves in the immense wastes and forests of the territories of Russia itself, where supplies and provisions were not to be found by the invader, and where every peasant would prove an armed enemy. The support which could be derived from an auxiliary army of Prussians, amounting only to 40,000 men, of whom perhaps the half could not be drawn together, was not, it appeared, an adequate motive for altering the plan of the campaign, which had been founded on the most mature consideration. The Emperor Alexander, therefore, declined accepting of the King of Prussia's alliance, as only tending to bring upon that prince misfortunes, which Russia had not even the chance of averting, without entirely altering those plans of the campaign which had been deliberately adopted. Foreseeing at the same time that this refusal on his part must have made it necessary for Frederick, whose situation rendered neutrality impossible, to take part with France, the Emperor Alexander generously left him at liberty to take the measures, and form the connexions, which his circumstances rendered inevitable, assuring him, nevertheless, that if Russia gained the ascendant, Prussia should derive the same advantage from the victory, whatever part she might be compelled to adopt during the struggle.

While the King of Prussia saw his alliance declined by Russia, as rather burdensome than beneficial, he did not find France at all eager to receive him on her part as a brother of the war. He offered his alliance to Bonaparte repeatedly, and especially in the months of March, May, and August, 1811; but receiving no satisfaction, he began to be apprehensive that his destruction was intended. There was some reason for this fear, for Napoleon seems to have entertained a personal dislike towards Frederick, and is said to have exclaimed, when he was looking over a map of the Prussian territories, "Is it possible I can have been simple enough to leave that man in possession of so large a kingdom?" There is great reason, besides, to suppose, that Napoleon may have either become acquainted with the secret negotiations betwixt Prussia and Russia, or may have been induced to assume from probability the fact that such had existed. He hesitated, certainly, whether or not he would permit Prussia to remain an independent power.

At length, however, on the 24th February, 1812, a treaty was dictated to Frederick, under condition of subscribing which, the name and title of King of Prussia were to be yet left him; failing his compliance, Davoust, who had occupied Swedish Pomerania, was to march into Prussia, and treat it as a

* In the *Moniteur*, a scandalous intrigue was repeatedly alluded to as existing between this princess and the Emperor Alexander, and both to Monsieur Las Cases and to others, Bonaparte affirmed the same personally; telling, at the same time, as a good jest, that he himself had kept the King of Prussia out of the way, to provide the lovers a stolen meeting. These averments are so inconsistent with the character universally assigned to this high-spirited and unhappy princess, that we have no hesitation to assign them directly to calumny; a weapon which Napoleon never disdained to wield, whether in private or national controversy.

hostile country. In thus sparing for the time a monarch, of whom he had every reason to be jealous, Napoleon seems to have considered it more advisable to use Frederick's assistance than to throw him into the arms of Russia. The conditions of this lenity were severe; Prussia was to place at the disposal of France about twenty thousand men, with sixty pieces of artillery, the disposable part of the poor remnant of the standing army of the Great Frederick. She was also to supply the French army with everything necessary for their sustenance as they passed through her dominions; but the expense of these supplies was to be imputed as part of the contributions imposed on Prussia by France, and not yet paid. Various other measures were taken to render it easy for the French, in case of necessity, to seize such fortresses belonging to Prussia as were not already in their hands, and to keep the Prussian people as much as possible disarmed, a rising amongst them being considered inevitable, if the French arms should sustain any reverse. Thus, while Russia fortified herself with the assistance of France's old ally, Sweden, France advanced against Russia, supported by the remaining army of Frederick of Prussia, who was at heart Alexander's best well-wisher.

Napoleon had, of course, a weighty voice in the councils of his father-in-law of Austria. But the Austrian cabinet were far from regarding his plans of ambitious aggrandizement with a partial eye. The acute Metternich had been able to discover and report to his master, on his return to Vienna in the spring of 1811, that the marriage which had just been celebrated, would not have the effect of inducing Napoleon to sheathe his sword, or of giving to Europe permanent tranquillity. And now, although on the approach of the hostilities into which they were to be involved by their formidable ally, Austria agreed to supply an auxiliary army of 30,000 men, under Prince Schwartzenberg, it seems probable that she remembered, at the same time, the moderate and lenient mode of carrying on the war practised by Russia, when the ally of Napoleon during the campaign of Wagram, and gave her general secret instructions to be no further active in the campaign than the decent supporting of the part of an auxiliary peremptorily required.

In one most material particular, the necessity of consulting the interests of Austria interfered with Napoleon's readiest and most formidable means of annoying Russia. We have repeatedly alluded to the re-establishment of Poland as an independent kingdom, as a measure which would have rent from Russia some of the finest provinces which connect her with Europe, and would have gone a certain length in thrusting her back into the character of an Asiatic sovereignty, unconnected with the politics of the civilized world. Such reconstruction of Poland was however impossible, so long as Austria continued to hold Polish Galicia; and that state, in her treaty of alliance with France against Russia, made it an express condition, that no attempt should be made for the restoration of Polish independence by Napoleon, without the consent of Austria, or without making compensation to her for being, in the event supposed, deprived of her share of Poland.

This compensation, it was stipulated, was to consist in the retrocession, on the part of France, of the Illyrian provinces, yielded up by his Imperial Majesty of Austria at the treaty of Schoenbrunn.

By submitting to this embargo on his proceedings in Poland, Napoleon lost all opportunity of revolutionizing that military country, from which he drew therefore little advantage, unless from the Duchy of Warsaw. Nothing but the tenacity with which Bonaparte retained every territory that fell into his power, would have prevented him from at once simplifying this complicated engagement, by assigning to Austria those Illyrian provinces, which were entirely useless to France, but on which her ally set great value, and stipulating in return,—what Austria would then have willingly granted,—the power of disposing, according to his own pleasure, as well of Polish Galicia, as of such parts of the Polish provinces as should be conquered from Russia; or in case, as De Pradt insinuates, the court of Austria were averse to the exchange, it was in the power of Napoleon to have certainly removed their objections, by throwing Venice itself into the scale. But we have good reason to believe that Illyria would have been a sufficient inducement to the transaction.

We cannot suppose Bonaparte blind to the importance of putting, as he expressed it, all Poland on horseback; but whether it was, that in reality he did not desire to establish an independent state upon any terms, or whether he thought it hard to give up the Illyrian provinces, ceded to France in property, in order to reconstruct a kingdom, which, nominally at least, was to be independent; or whether, in fine, he had an idea that, by vague promises and hopes, he could obtain from the Poles all the assistance he desired,—it is certain that he embarrassed himself with this condition in favour of Austria, in a manner which tended to render complex and difficult all that he afterwards attempted in Polish affairs; and lost the zealous co-operation and assistance of the Lithuanians, at a time when it would have been invaluable to him.

Turkey remains to be noticed as the sole remaining power whom Bonaparte ought in prudence to have propitiated, previous to attacking Russia, of which empire she is the natural enemy, as she was also held the natural and ancient ally of France. Were it not that the talents of Napoleon were much better fitted to crush enemies than to gain or maintain friends, it would be difficult to account for his losing influence over the Porte at this important period. The Turkish government had been rendered hostile to France by the memorable invasion of Egypt; but Sultan Selim, an admirer of Napoleon's valour and genius, had become the friend of the Emperor of France. Selim was cut off by a conspiracy, and his successor was more partial to the English interests. In the treaty of Tilsit the partition of Turkey was actually agreed upon, though the term was adjourned;* as, at the negotiations of

* The fact is now pretty generally admitted to have been as stated in the text. But in the public treaty, it appeared that France negotiated an armistice, called that of Slobodzen, by which it was stipulated that the two disputed provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were to be restored to the Turks. But the armistice, as had previously been set-

Erfurt, Napoleon agreed to abandon the Turkish dominions as far as the Danube, to become the property of Russia, if it should be in her power to conquer them.

The Court of St Petersburg were ill-advised enough to make the attempt, although they ought to have foreseen, even then, that the increasing power of France should have withheld them from engaging in any scheme of conquest at that period. Indeed their undertaking this war with the Ottoman Empire, a proceeding so impolitic in case of a rupture with France, may be quoted to show the Emperor Alexander's confidence that no such event was likely to take place, and consequently to prove his own determination to observe good faith towards Napoleon.

The Turks made a far better defence than had been anticipated; and though the events of war were at first unfavourable to them, yet at length the grand vizier obtained a victory before Routschouk, or at least gave the Russian general such a serious check as obliged him to raise the siege of that place. But the gleam of victory on the Turkish banners was of brief duration. They were attacked by the Russians in their entrenched camp, and defeated in a battle so sanguinary, that the vanquished army was almost annihilated. The Turks, however, continued to maintain the war, forgotten and neglected as they were by the Emperor of France, whose interest it chiefly was, considering his views against Russia, to have sustained them in their unequal struggle against that formidable power. In the meanwhile, hostilities languished, and negotiations were commenced; for the Russians were of course desirous so soon as a war against France became a probable event, to close that with Turkey, which must keep engaged a very considerable army, at a time when all their forces were necessary to oppose the expected attack of Napoleon.

At this period, and so late as the 21st March, 1812, it seemed to occur all at once to Bonaparte's recollection, that it would be highly politic to maintain, or rather to renew, his league with a nation, of whom it was at the time most important to secure the confidence. His ambassador was directed to urge the Grand Seignor in person to move towards the Danube, at the head of one hundred thousand men; in consideration of which, the French Emperor proposed not only to obtain possession for them of the two disputed provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, but also to procure the restoration to the Porte of the Crimea.

This war-breathing message arrived too late; the Porte having adopted a pacific line of policy. The splendid promises of France succeeded too abruptly to so many years of neglect, to obtain credit for sincerity. The envoys of England, with a dexterity which it has not been always their fortune to display, obtained a complete victory in diplomacy over those

of France, and were able to impress on the Sublime Porte the belief, that though Russia was their natural enemy among European nations, yet a peace of some permanence might be secured with her, under the guarantee of England and Sweden; whereas, if Napoleon should altogether destroy Russia, the conquest of the Turkish Empire, of which he had already meditated the division, would be a measure no state could have influence to prevent, as, in subduing Russia, he would overcome the last terrestrial barrier to his absolute power. It gives no slight idea of the general terror and suspicion impressed by the very name of Napoleon, that a barbarous people like the Turks, who generally only comprehend so much of politics as lies straight before them, should have been able to understand that there was wisdom in giving peace on reasonable terms to an old and inveterate enemy, rather than, by assisting in his destruction, to contribute to the elevation of a power still more formidable, more ambitious, and less easily opposed. The peace of Bucharest was accordingly negotiated between Russia and Turkey, of which we shall hereafter have occasion to speak.

Thus was France, on the approaching struggle, deprived of her two ancient allies, Sweden and Turkey. Prussia she brought to the field like a slave at her chariot-wheels; Denmark and Saxony in the character of allies, who were favoured so long as they were sufficiently subservient; and Austria, as a more equal confederate, but who had contrived to stipulate, that, in requital of an aid coldly and unwillingly granted, the French Emperor should tie himself down by engagements respecting Poland, which interfered with his using his influence over that country in the manner which would best have served his purposes. The result must lead to one of two conclusions. Either that Napoleon, confident in the immense preparations of his military force, disdained to enter into negotiations to obtain that assistance which he could not directly command, or else that his talents in politics were inferior to those which he displayed in military affairs.

It is true, that if the numbers, and we may add the quality, of the army which France brought into the field on this momentous occasion, were alone to be considered, Napoleon might be excused for holding cheap the assistance which he might have derived from Sweden or the Porte. He had anticipated the conscription of 1811, and he now called out that of 1812; so that it became plain, that so long as Napoleon lived and warred, the conscription of the first class would be,—not a conditional regulation, to be acted or not acted upon according to occasion,—but a regular and never-to-be-remitted tax of eighty thousand men, annually levied, without distinction, on the youth of France. To the amount of these conscriptions for two years, were to be added the contingents of household kings, vassal princes, subjected republics,—of two-thirds of Europe, in short, which were placed under Bonaparte's command. No such army had taken the field since the reign of Xerxes, supposing the exaggerated accounts of the Persian invasion to be admitted as historical. The head almost turns dizzy as we read the amount of their numbers.

tied between Napoleon and Alexander, broke up without any such restoration; and a congress, which was held at Jassy for the arrangement of the quarrel between the Porte and Court of St Petersburg having been also dissolved without coming to an agreement, the war between the Turks and Russians recommenced upon the Danube.

The gross amount of the whole forces of the empire of France, and its dependencies and allies, is thus given by Boutourlin :—

Total amount of the French army.....	800,000 men.
The army of Italy, under the Viceroy Eugène.....	60,000
— of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw,	
with other Poles.....	60,000
— of Bavaria.....	40,000
— of Saxony.....	30,000
— of Westphalia.....	30,000
— of Wirtemberg.....	15,000
— of Baden.....	9,000
— of the Princes of the Confederacy	
of the Rhine.....	23,000
The corps of Prussian Auxiliaries.....	30,000
— of Austrian Auxiliaries.....	30,000
The army of Naples.....	30,000
	1,127,000 men.

But to approximate the actual force, we must deduce from this total of 1,127,000, about 387,000 men, for those in the hospital, absent upon furlough, and for incomplete regiments. Still there remains the appalling balance of eight hundred thousand men, ready to maintain the war; so that Bonaparte was enabled to detach an army to Russia greatly superior to what the Emperor Alexander could, without immense exertions, get under arms, and this without withdrawing any part of his forces from Spain.

Still, however, in calculating all the chances attending the eventful game on which so much was to be staked, and to encounter such attempts upon France as England might by his absence be tempted to make, Napoleon judged it prudent to have recourse to additional means of national defence, which might extend the duty of military service still more widely among his subjects than was effected even by the conscription. As the measure was never but in one particular brought into general activity, it may be treated of the more slightly. The system consisted in a levy of national guards, divided into three general classes; the Ban, the Second Ban, and *Arrière-Ban*; for Bonaparte loved to retain the phrases of the old feudal institutions. The First Ban was to contain all men, from twenty to twenty-six years, who had not been called to serve in the army. The Second Ban included all capable of bearing arms, from the age of twenty-six to that of forty. The *Arrière-Ban* comprehended all able-bodied men from forty to sixty. The levies from these classes were not to be sent beyond the frontiers of France, and were to be called out in succession, as the danger pressed. They were divided into cohorts of eleven hundred and twenty men each. But it was the essential part of this project that it placed one hundred cohorts of the First Ban (that is, upwards of one hundred thousand men, between twenty and twenty-six years), at the immediate disposal of the minister of war. In short, it was a new form of conscription, with the advantage, to the recruits, of limited service.

The celebrated philosopher Count Lacépède, who, from his researches into natural history, as well as from the ready eloquence with which he could express the acquiescence of the Senate in

whatever scheme was proposed by the emperor, had acquired the title of King of Reptiles, had upon this occasion his usual task of justifying the imperial measures. In this allotment of another mighty draught of the youth of France to the purposes of military service, at a time when only the unbounded ambition of Napoleon rendered such a measure necessary, he could discover nothing save a new and affecting proof of the emperor's paternal regard for his subjects. The youths, he said, would be relieved by one-sixth part of a cohort at a time; and, being at an age when ardour of mind is united to strength of body, they would find in the exercise of arms rather salutary sport and agreeable recreation, than painful labour or severe duty. Then the express prohibition to quit the frontiers would be, their parents might rest assured, an absolute check on the fiery and impetuous character of the French soldier, and prevent the young men from listening to their headlong courage, and rushing forward into distant fields of combat, which no doubt there might be otherwise reason to apprehend. All this sounded very well, but the time was not long ere the Senate removed their writ *ne exeat regno*, in the case of these hundred cohorts; and, whether hurried on by their own impetuous valour, or forced forward by command of their leaders, they were all engaged in foreign service, and marched off to distant and bloody fields, from which few of them had the good fortune to return.

While the question of peace or war was yet trembling in the scales, news arrived from Spain that Lord Wellington had opened the campaign by an enterprise equally successfully conceived and daringly executed. Ciudad Rodrigo, which the French had greatly strengthened, was one of the keys of the frontier between Spain and Portugal. Lord Wellington had blockaded it, as we have seen, in the preceding year, but more with the purpose of compelling General Marmont to concentrate his forces for its relief, than with any hope of taking the place. But in the end of January, 1812, the French heard with surprise and alarm that the English army, suddenly put in motion, had opened trenches before Ciudad Rodrigo, and were battering in breach.

Marmont once more put his whole forces in motion, to prevent the fall of a place which was of the greatest consequence to both parties; and he had every reason to hope for success, since Ciudad Rodrigo, before its fortifications had been improved by the French, had held out against Masséna for more than a month, though his army consisted of 100,000 men. But in the present instance, within ten days from the opening of the siege, the place was carried by storm, almost under the very eyes of the experienced general who was advancing to its relief, and who had no alternative but to retire again to cantonments, and ponder upon the skill and activity which seemed of a sudden to have inspired the British forces.

Lord Wellington was none of those generals who think that an advantage, or a victory gained, is sufficient work for one campaign. The French were hardly reconciled to the loss of Ciudad Rodrigo, so extraordinary did it appear to them, when Badajoz

was invested, a much stronger place, which had stood a siege of thirty-six days against the French in the year 1811, although the defences were then much weaker, and the place commanded by an officer of no talent, and dubious fidelity. It was now, with incomprehensible celerity, battered, breached, stormed, and taken, within twelve days after the opening of the trenches. Two French marshals had in vain interfered to prevent this catastrophe. Mar-mont made an unsuccessful attempt upon Ciudad Rodrigo, and assumed the air of pushing into Portugal; but no sooner did he learn the fall of the place, than he commenced his retreat from Castel-Branco. Soult, who had advanced rapidly to relieve Badajos, was in the act, it is said, of informing a circle of his officers that it was the commands of the emperor—commands never under any circumstances to be disobeyed—that Badajos should be relieved, when an officer, who had been sent forward to reconnoitre, interrupted the shouts of *Vive l'empereur!* with the equally dispiriting and incredible information, that the English colours were flying on the walls.

These two brilliant achievements were not only of great importance by their influence on the events of the campaign, but still more so as they indicated that our military operations had assumed an entirely new character, and that the British soldiers, as now conducted, had not only the advantage of their own strength of body and natural courage, not only the benefit of the resources copiously supplied by the wealthy nation to whom they belonged, but also, as began to be generally allowed, an undoubted superiority in military art and science. The objects of the campaign were admirably chosen, for the exertion to be made was calculated with a degree of accuracy which dazzled and bewildered the enemy; and though the loss incurred in their attainment was very considerable, yet it was not in proportion to the much greater advantages attained by success.

Badajos fell on the 9th of April; and on the 18th of that month, an overture of pacific tendency was made by the French government to that of Britain. It is not unlikely that Bonaparte, on beholding his best commanders completely out-generaled before Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos, might foresee in this inauspicious commencement the long train of defeat and disaster which befel the French in that campaign of 1812, the events of which could not have failed to give liberty to Spain, had Spain, or rather had her government, been united among themselves, and cordial in supporting their allies.

It might be Lord Wellington's successes, or the lingering anxiety to avoid a war involving so many contingencies as that of Russia; or it might be a desire to impress the French public that he was always disposed towards peace, that induced Napoleon to direct the Duke of Bassano to write a letter to Lord Castlereagh, proposing that the integrity and independence of Spain should be guaranteed under the *present reigning dynasty*; that Portugal should remain under the rule of the princes of Braganza; Sicily under that of Ferdinand; and Naples under Murat; each nation, in this manner, retaining possession of that which the other had not been able to wrench from them by force of war. Lord Castle-

reagh immediately replied, that if the reign of King Joseph was meant by the phrase "the dynasty actually reigning," he must answer explicitly, that England's engagements to Ferdinand VII. and the Cortes presently governing Spain, rendered her acknowledging him impossible.

The correspondence went no farther. The nature of the overture served to show the tenacity of Bonaparte's character, who, in treating for peace, would yield nothing save that which the fate of war had actually placed beyond his reach; and expected the British to yield up to him the very kingdom of Spain, whose fate depended upon the bloody arbitrement of the sword. It also manifested the insincerity with which he could use words to mislead those who treated with him. He had in many instances, some of which we have quoted, laid it down as a sacred principle, that princes of his blood called to reign over foreign states, should remain still the subjects of France and vassals of its emperor, whose interest they were bound to prefer on all occasions to that of the countries they were called to govern. Upon these grounds he had compelled the abdication of King Louis of Holland; and how was it possible for him to expect to receive credit, when he proposed to render Spain independent under Joseph, whose authority was unable to control even the French marshals who acted in his name?

This feeble effort towards a general peace having altogether miscarried, it became subject of consideration, whether the approaching breach betwixt the two great empires could yet be prevented. The most active preparations for war were taking place on both sides. Those of Russia were defensive; but she mustered great armies on the Niemen, as if in expectation of an assault; while France was rapidly pouring troops into Prussia, and into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and assuming those positions most favourable for invading the Russian frontier. Yet amid preparations for war, made on such an immense scale as Europe had never before witnessed, there seemed to be a lingering wish on the part of both sovereigns, even at this late hour, to avoid the conflict. This indeed might have been easily done, had there been on the part of Napoleon a hearty desire to make peace, instead of what could only be termed a degree of hesitation to commence hostilities. In fact, the original causes of quarrel were already settled, or, what is the same thing, principles had been fixed, on which their arrangement might be easily adjusted. Yet still the preparations for invading Russia became more and more evident—the purpose was distinctly expressed in the treaty between France and Prussia; and the war did not appear the less certain that the causes of it seemed to be in a great measure abandoned. The anxiety of Alexander was therefore diverted from the source of the dispute, to its important consequences; and he became most naturally more solicitous about having the French troops withdrawn from the frontiers of Poland, than about the cause that originally brought them there.

Accordingly, Prince Kourakin, the Russian plenipotentiary, had orders to communicate to the Duke of Bassano his master's ultimatum. The grounds of arrangement proposed by the czar were, the evacu-

ation of Prussia and Pomerania by the French troops; a diminution of the garrison of Dantzic; and an amicable arrangement of the dispute between Napoleon and Alexander. On these conditions, which, in fact, were no more than necessary to assure Russia of France's peaceable intentions, the czar agreed to place his commerce upon a system of licenses as conducted in France; to introduce the clauses necessary to protect the French trade; and, farther, to use his influence with the Duke of Oldenburg, to obtain his consent to accept some reasonable indemnification for the territory, which had been so summarily annexed to France.

In looking back at this document, it appears to possess as much the character of moderation, and even of deference, as could be expected from the chief of a great empire. His demand that France, unless it were her determined purpose to make war, should withdraw the armies which threatened the Russian frontier, seems no more than common sense or prudence would commend. Yet this condition was made by Napoleon, however unreasonably, the direct cause of hostilities.

The person, in a private brawl, who should say to an angry and violent opponent, "Sheathe your sword, or at least lower its point, and I will accommodate you, on your own terms, the original cause of quarrel," would surely not be considered as having given him any affront, or other cause for instant violence. Yet Bonaparte, in nearly the same situation, resented, as an unattonable offence, the demand that he should withdraw his armies from a position, where they could have no other purpose save to overawe Russia. The demand, he said, was insolent; he was not accustomed to be addressed in that style, nor to regulate his movements by the commands of a foreign sovereign. The Russian ambassador received his passports; and the unreasonable caprice of Napoleon, which considered an overture towards an amicable treaty as a gross offence, because it summoned him to desist from his menacing attitude, led to the death of millions, and the irretrievable downfall of the most extraordinary empire which the world had ever seen. On the 9th May, 1812, Bonaparte left Paris; the Russian ambassador had his passports for departure two days later.

Upon his former military expeditions, it had been usual for Napoleon to join his army suddenly, and with a slender attendance; but on the present occasion he assumed a style of splendour and dignity becoming one, who might, if any earthly sovereign ever could, have assumed the title of King of Kings. Dresden was appointed as a mutual rendezvous for all the kings, dominations, princes, dukes, and dependent royalties of every description, who were subordinate to Napoleon, or hoped for good or evil at his hands. The Emperor of Austria, with his empress, met his mighty son-in-law upon this occasion, and the city was crowded with prince of the most ancient birth, as well as with others who claimed still higher rank; as belonging to the family of Napoleon. The King of Prussia also was present, neither a willing nor a welcome guest, unless so far as his attendance was necessary to swell the victor's triumph. Melancholy in heart and in

looks, he wandered through the gay and splendid scenes, a mourner rather than a reveler. But fate had amended in store, for a prince whose course, in times of unparalleled distress, had been marked by courage and patriotism.

Amidst all these dignitaries, no one interested the public so much as he, for whom, and by whom, the assembly was collected; the wonderful being who could have governed the world, but could not rule his own restless mind. When visible, Napoleon was the principal figure of the group; when absent, every eye was on the door, expecting his entrance. He was chiefly employed in business in his cabinet, while the other crowned personages (to whom, indeed, he left but little to do) were wandering abroad in quest of amusement. The feasts and banquets, as well as the assemblies of the royal personages and their suites, after the theatrical representations, were almost all at Napoleon's expense, and were conducted in a style of splendour, which made those attempted by any of the other potentates seem mean and paltry.

The youthful empress had her share of these days of grandeur. "The reign of Maria Louisa," said her husband, when in Elba, "has been very short, but she had much to make her enjoy it. She had the world at her feet." Her superior magnificence in dress and ornaments, gave her a great preeminence over her mother-in-law, the Empress of Austria, betwixt whom and Maria Louisa there seems to have existed something of that petty feud, which is apt to divide such relations in private life. To make the Austrian Empress some amends, Bonaparte informs us, that she often visited her daughter-in-law's toilet, and seldom went back without receiving some marks of her munificence. Perhaps we may say of this information, as Napoleon says of something else, that an emperor should not have known these circumstances, or at least should not have told them. The truth is, Bonaparte did not love the Empress of Austria; and though he represents that high personage as showing him much attention, the dislike was mutual. The daughter of the Duke of Modena had not forgot her father's sufferings by the campaigns of Italy.

In a short time, however, the active spirit of Napoleon led him to tire of a scene, where his vanity might for a time be gratified, but which soon palled on his imagination as empty and frivolous. He sent for De Pradt, the Bishop of Malines, whose talents he desired to employ as ambassador at Warsaw, and in a singular style of diplomacy, thus gave him his commission. "I am about to make a trial of you. You may believe I did not send for you here to say mass (which ceremony the bishop had performed that morning). You must keep a great establishment; have an eye to the women, their influence is essential in that country. You know Poland; you have read Rulhière. For me, I go to beat the Russians; time is flying; we must have all over by the end of September; perhaps we are even already too late. I am tired to death here; I have been here eight days playing the courtier to the Empress of Austria." He then threw out indistinct hints of compelling Austria to quit her hold on Galicia, and accept an indemnification in Illyria, or otherwise

remain without any. As to Prussia, he avowed his intention, when the war was over, to ruin her completely, and to strip her of Silesia. "I am on my way to Moscow," he added. "Two battles there will do the business; I will burn Toul; the Emperor Alexander will come on his knees, and then is Russia disarmed. All is ready, and only waits my presence. Moscow is the heart of their empire; besides, I make war at the expense of the blood of the Poles. I will leave fifty thousand of my Frenchmen in Poland. I will convert Dantzic into another Gibraltar. I will give fifty millions a-year in subsidies to the Poles. I can afford the expense. Without Russia be included, the continental system would be mere folly. Spain costs me very dear; without her I should be master of the world; but when I am so, my son will have nothing to do but to keep his place, and it does not require to be very clever to do that. Go, take your instructions from Maret."

The complete confidence of success implied in these disjointed, yet striking expressions, was general through all who approached Napoleon's person, whether French or foreigners. The young military men looked on the expedition against Russia as on a hunting party which was to last for two months. The army rushed to the fatal country, all alive with the hopes of plunder, pensions, and promotion. All the soldiers who were not included railed against their own bad luck, or the partiality of Napoleon, for detaining them from so triumphant an enterprise.

Meantime, Bonaparte made a last attempt at negotiation, or rather to discover what was the state of the Emperor Alexander's mind, who, while he was himself surrounded by sovereigns, as the sun by planets, remained lonely in his own orbit, collecting around him means of defence, which, immense as they were, seemed scarcely adequate to the awful crisis in which he stood. General Lauriston had been dispatched to Wilna, to communicate definitively with Alexander. Count de Narbonne, already noticed as the most adroit courtier of the Tuileries, was sent to invite the czar to meet Napoleon at Dresden, in hopes that, in a personal treaty, the two sovereigns might resume their habits of intimacy, and settle between themselves what they had been unable to arrange through their ambassadors. But Lauriston could obtain no audience of the emperor, and the report of Narbonne was decidedly warlike. He found the Russians neither depressed nor elated, but arrived at the general conclusion, that war was become inevitable, and therefore determined to submit to its evils, rather than avoid them by a dishonourable peace.

CHAPTER LXXV.

Napoleon's plan of the campaign against Russia—Understood and provided against by Barclay de Tolly, the Russian generalissimo.—Statement of the grand French army.—Of the grand Russian army.—Disaster on the river Wilna.—Difficulties of the campaign, on the part of the French, stated and explained.—Their defective commissariat and hospital department.—Great consequent losses.—Cause of Bonaparte's determination to advance.

—His forced marches occasion actual delay.—Napoleon remains for some days at Wilna.—Abbé de Pradt—His intrigues to excite the Poles.—Neutralized by Napoleon's engagements with Austria.—An attempt to excite insurrection in Lithuania also fails.

In ancient history, we often read of the inhabitants of the northern regions, impelled by want, and by the desire of exchanging their frozen deserts for the bounties of a more genial climate, breaking forth from their own bleak regions, and, with all the terrors of an avalanche, bursting down upon those of the south. But it was reserved for our generation to behold the invasion reversed, and to see immense hosts of French, Germans, and Italians, leaving their own fruitful, rich, and delightful regions, to carry at once conquest and desolation through the dreary pine forests, swamps, and barren wildernesses of Scythia. The philosopher, Hume, dedicated an essay to consider, whether futurity might expect a new inundation of barbarian conquerors; a fresh "living cloud of war," from the northern hives; but neither to him nor any one else had it occurred to anticipate the opposite danger, of combined hundreds of thousands from the most fair and fertile regions of Europe, moving at the command of a single man, for the purpose of bereaving the wildest country of Europe of its national independence. "Russia," said Bonaparte, in one of his Delphic proclamations, "is dragged on by her fate; her destiny must be accomplished. Let us march; let us cross the Niemen; let us carry war into her territories. The second war of Poland will be as glorious to the French arms as the first; but the peace we shall conclude shall carry with it its guarantee, and terminate that haughty influence which Russia has exercised for more than fifty years on the affairs of Europe." Napoleon's final object was here spoken out; it was to thrust Russia back upon her Asiatic dominions, and deprive her of her influence in European politics.

The address of the Russian Emperor to his troops was in a different, more manly, rational, and intelligible strain, devoid of those blustering attempts at prophetic eloquence, which are in bad taste when uttered, and, if they may acquire some credit among the vulgar when followed by a successful campaign, become the most bitter of satires, if fortune does not smile on the vaticination. Alexander enforced on his subjects the various efforts which he had made for the preservation of peace, but which had proved fruitless. "It now only remains," he said, "after invoking the Almighty Being who is the witness and defender of the true cause, to oppose our forces to those of the enemy. It is unnecessary to recal to generals, officers, and soldiers, what is expected from their loyalty and courage; the blood of the ancient Slavonians circulates in their veins. Soldiers, you fight for your religion, your liberty, and your native land. Your emperor is amongst you, and God is the enemy of the aggressor."

The sovereigns who addressed their troops, each in his own peculiar mode of exhortation, had their different plans for the campaign. Bonaparte's was formed on his usual system of warfare. It was his primary object to accumulate a great force on the centre of the Russian line, to break it asunder, and

cut off effectually as many divisions, as activity could surprise and overmaster in such a struggle. To secure the possession of large towns, if possible, one of the two capitals, Petersburg or Moscow; and to grant that which he doubted not would by that time be humbly craved, the terms of a peace which should strip Russia of her European influence, and establish a Polish nation in her bosom, composed of provinces rent from her own dominions,—would have crowned the undertaking.

The tactics of Napoleon had, by long practice, been pretty well understood, by those studious of military affairs. Barclay de Tolly, whom Alexander had made his generalissimo, a German by birth, a Scotchman by extraction, had laid down and recommended to the czar, with whom he was in great favour, a plan of foiling Bonaparte upon his own system. He proposed that the Russians should first show only so much opposition on the frontier of their country, as should lay the invaders under the necessity of marching with precaution and leisure; that they should omit no means of annoying their communications, and disturbing the base on which they rested, but should carefully avoid everything approaching to a general action.* On this principle it was proposed to fall back before the invaders, refusing to engage in any other action than skirmishes, and those upon advantage, until the French lines of communication, extended to an immeasurable length, should become liable to be cut off even by the insurgent peasantry. In the meanwhile, as the French became straitened in provisions, and deprived of recruits and supplies, the Russians were to be reinforcing their army, and at the same time refreshing it. Thus, it was the object of this plan of the campaign not to fight the French forces, until the bad roads, want of provisions, toilsome marches, diseases, and loss in skirmishes, should have deprived the invading army of all its original advantages of numbers, spirit, and discipline. This procrastinating system of tactics suited Russia the better, that her preparations for defensive war were very far from being completed, and that it was important to gain time to receive arms and other supplies from England, as well as, by making peace with the Turks, to obtain the disposal of the large army now engaged upon the Danube.

At the same time it was easy to foresee, that so long a retreat, together with the desolation occasioned to the Russian territory by the presence of an invading army, might wear out the patience of the Russian soldiery. Some advantageous position was therefore to be selected, and skilfully fortified beforehand, in which a stand might be made, like that of Lord Wellington in the lines at Torres Vedras. For this purpose a very large fortified camp was prepared at Drissa, on the river Dwina, or Dwina, which, apposing the object of the French to have been St Petersburg, would have

* The base of military operations is, in stratégie, understood to mean that space of country which every army marching through a hostile territory must keep open and free in the rear, otherwise his main body must necessarily be deprived of its communications, and probably cut off. The base, therefore, contains the supplies and dépôts of the army.

been well calculated to cover that capital. On the other hand, were the French to move on Moscow, which proved their final determination, the entrenchments at Drissa were of no importance.

We must speak of the immense hosts combined under Bonaparte, as if they were all constituent parts of one army, although the theatre of war which they occupied was not less than a hundred and twenty French leagues in extent of front.

Macdonald commanded the left wing of the whole French army, which consisted of above 30,000 men: his orders were to penetrate into Courland, and threaten the right flank of the Russians; and, if it were found advisable, to besiege Riga, or at least to threaten that important seaport. The extreme right of Napoleon's army was placed towards Pinsk, in Volhynia, and consisted almost entirely of the Austrian auxiliaries, under Prince Schwartzberg. They were opposed to the Russian army under General Tormazoff, which had been destined to protect Volhynia. This was a false step of Napoleon, adopted, doubtless, to allay the irritable jealousy of his ally Austria, on the subject of freeing and restoring the kingdom of Poland. The natives of Volhynia, it must be remembered, are Poles, subjected to the yoke of Russia. Had French troops, or those of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, been sent amongst them, the Volhynians would probably have risen in arms to vindicate their liberty. But they had little temptation to do so when they only saw the Austrians, by whose arms Galicia was yet detained in subjection, and whose emperor was as liable as Alexander himself to suffer from the resuscitation of Polish independence.

Between the left wing, commanded by Macdonald, and the right under Schwartzberg, lay the grand French army, divided into three masses. Bonaparte himself moved with his guards, of which Bessières commanded the cavalry, the Marshals Lefévre and Mortier the infantry. The emperor had also under his immediate command the corps d'armée, commanded by Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney; which, with the divisions of cavalry, under Grouchy, Montbrun, and Nansouty, amounting, it was computed, to no fewer than two hundred and fifty thousand men, were ready to rush forward and overpower the opposite army of Russians, called the army of the West. King Jérôme of Westphalia, with the divisions of Junot, Poniatowski, and Régnier, and the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, forming a mass of about 80,000 men, were destined in the same manner to move forward on the Russian second, or supporting army. Lastly, a central army, under Eugène, the Viceroy of Italy, had it in charge to press between the first and second Russian army, increase their separation, render their junction impossible, and act against either, or both, as opportunity should arise. Such was the disposition of the invading force. Murat, King of Naples, well known by his old name of *le beau sabreur*, commanded the whole cavalry of this immense army.

On the other hand, the grand Russian army, commanded by the emperor in person, and more immediately by Barclay de Tolly, advanced its headquarters as far as Wilna; not that it was their purpose to defend Lithuania, or its capital, but to

oblige the French to manoeuvre, and so show their intentions. It amounted to one hundred and twenty thousand men. On the north, towards Courland, this grand army communicated with a division of ten thousand men, under Count Essen; and on the south held communication, but on a line rather too much prolonged, with the second army, under the gallant Prince Bagration, one of the best and bravest of the Russian generals. Platoff, the celebrated Hettman, or Captain-general of the Cossacks, attended this second army, with twelve thousand of his children of the desert. Independent of these, Bagration's army might amount to eighty thousand men. On the extreme left, and watching the Austrians, from whom perhaps no very vigorous measures were apprehended, was Tormazoff, with what was termed the army of Volhynia, amounting to twenty thousand men. Two armies of reserve were in the course of being formed at Novogorod and Smolensk. They might amount to about 20,000 men each.

Thus, on the whole, the Russians entered upon the campaign with a sum total of two hundred and sixty thousand men, opposed to four hundred and seventy thousand, or with an odds of almost one half against them. But during the course of the war, Russia raised reinforcements of militia and volunteers to greatly more than the balance which was against her at the commencement.

The grand Imperial army marched upon the river Niemen in its three overwhelming masses; the King of Westphalia upon Grodno, the Viceroy of Italy on Pilyon, and the emperor himself on a point called Nagaraïski, three leagues beyond Kowno. When the head of Napoleon's columns reached the river which rolled silently along under cover of immense forests on the Russian side, he advanced in person to reconnoitre the banks, when his horse stumbled and threw him. "A bad omen," said a voice, but whether that of the emperor or one of his suite, could not be distinguished; "a Roman would return." On the Russian bank appeared only a single Cossack, who challenged the first party of French that crossed the river, and demanded their purpose in the territories of Russia. "To beat you, and to take Wilna," was the reply. The patrol withdrew, nor was another soldier seen.

A dreadful thunder-storm was the welcome which they received in this wild land; and shortly after the emperor received intelligence that the Russians were falling back on every side, and manifested an evident intention to evacuate Lithuania without a battle. The emperor urged forward his columns with even more than his usual promptitude, eager to strike one of those formidable blows by which he was wont to annihilate his enemy at the very commencement of the campaign. This gave rise to an event more ominous than the fall of his horse, or the tempest which received him on the banks of the Niemen. The river Wilia being swollen with rain, and the bridges destroyed, the emperor, impatient of the obstacle, commanded a body of Polish cavalry to cross by swimming. They did not hesitate to dash into the river. But ere they reached the middle of the stream, the irresistible torrent broke their ranks, and they were swept down and lost al-

most to a man, before the eyes of Napoleon, to whom some of them in the last struggle turned their faces, exclaiming, *Vive l'empereur!* The spectators were struck with horror. But much greater would that feeling have been, could they have known that the fate of this handful of brave men was but an anticipation of that which impended over the hundreds of thousands, who, high in health and hope, were about to rush upon natural and artificial obstacles, no less formidable and no less insurmountable than the torrent which had swept away their unfortunate advanced guard.

While his immense masses were traversing Lithuania, Napoleon fixed his head-quarters at Wilna, the ancient capital of that province, where he began to experience the first pressure of those difficulties which attended his gigantic undertaking. We must pause to detail them; for they tend to show the great mistake of those who have followed Napoleon himself in supposing, that the Russian expedition was a hopeful and well-conceived plan, which would certainly have proved successful, if not unexpectedly disconcerted by the burning of Moscow, and the severity of the weather, by which the French armies were compelled to retreat into Poland.

We have elsewhere mentioned, that, according to Napoleon's usual style of tactics, the French troops set out upon their campaign with bread and biscuit for a few days, and when that was expended (which, betwixt waste and consumption, usually happened before the calculated period), they lived on such supplies as they could collect in the country, by the means of marauding or pillage, which they had converted into a regular system. But Napoleon had far too much experience and prudence to trust, amid the wastes of Russia, to a system of supplies, which had sufficed for maintenance of the army in the rich fields of Austria. He knew well that he was plunging with half a million of men into inhospitable deserts, where Charles XII. could not find subsistence for twenty thousand Swedes. He was aware, besides, of the impolicy there would be in harassing the Lithuanians by marauding excursions. To conciliate them was a great branch of his plan, for Lithuania, in respect to Russia, was a conquered province, into which Napoleon hoped to inspire the same desire of independence which animated Poland, and thus to find friends and allies among the very subjects of his enemy. The utmost exertion of his splendid talents, putting into activity the utmost extent of his unlimited power, had been, therefore, turned towards collecting immense magazines of provisions, and for securing the means of transporting them along with the army. His strong and impassioned genius was, for months before the expedition, directed to this important object, which he pressed upon his generals with the utmost solicitude. "For masses like those we are about to move, if precautions be not taken, the grain of no country can suffice," he said, in one part of his correspondence.—In another, "All the provision-waggons must be loaded with flour, rice, bread, vegetables, and brandy, besides what is necessary for the hospital service. The result of my movements will assemble four hundred thousand men on a single point. There will be nothing to expect from

the country, and it will be necessary to have everything within ourselves."

These undeniable views were followed up by preparations, which, abstractedly considered, must be regarded as gigantic. The cars and waggons, which were almost innumerable, destined for the carriage of provisions, were divided into battalions and squadrons. Each battalion of cars was capable of transporting six thousand quintals of flour; each squadron of heavy waggons nearly four thousand eight hundred quintals; besides the immense number dedicated to the service of the engineers and the hospitals, or engaged in transporting besieging materiel and pontoons.

This sketch must convince the reader, that Napoleon had in his eye, from the outset, the prospect of deficiency in supplying his army with provisions, and that he had bent his mind to the task of overcoming it by timely preparation. But all his precautions proved totally inadequate. It was found a vain attempt, to introduce military discipline amidst the carters and waggon-drivers; and when wretched roads were encumbered with fallen horses and broken carriages, when the soldiers and wain-drivers began to plunder the contents of the cars and waggons which they were appointed to protect and to manage, the confusion became totally inextricable. Very far from reaching Lithuania, where their presence was so essential, few of the heavy waggons ever attained the banks of the Vistula, and almost none proceeded to the Niemen. Weeks and months after the army had passed, some of the light cars and herds of cattle did arrive, but comparatively few in number, and in most miserable plight. The soldiers were, therefore, at the very commencement of the campaign, compelled to have recourse to their usual mode of supplying themselves, by laying contributions on the country; which, while they continued in Poland, the immense fertility of the soil enabled it to supply. But matters became greatly worse after entering Lithuania, which the Russians had previously endeavoured to strip of all that could benefit the French.

Thus, in the very first march from the Niemen and the Wilia, through a country which was regarded as friendly, and before they had seen an enemy, the immense army of Napoleon were incurring great loss themselves, and doing infinite damage to the country on which they lived at free cost, in spite of all the measures which Bonaparte had devised, and all the efforts he had made to maintain them from their own stores.

This uncertain mode of subsistence was common to the whole army, though its consequences were especially disastrous in particular corps. Ségur *

* Here and elsewhere we quote, as a work of complete authority, Count Philip de Ségur's account of this memorable expedition. The author is, we have always understood, a man of honour, and his work evinces him to be a man of talent. We have had the opinion of several officers of high character, who had themselves served in the campaign, that although unquestionably there may be some errors among the details, and although in some places the author may have given way to the temptation of working up a description, or producing effect by a dialogue, yet his narrative on the whole is candid, fair, and liberal. The

informs us, that the armies under Eugène and Davoust were regular in their work of collecting contributions, and distributing them among the soldiers; so that their system of marauding was less burdensome to the country, and more advantageous to themselves. On the other hand, the Westphalian, and other German auxiliaries, under King Jérôme, having learned the lesson of pillaging from the French, and wanting, according to Ségur, the elegant manner of their teachers, practised the arts they had acquired with a coarse rapacity, which made the French ashamed of their pupils and imitators. Thus the Lithuanians, terrified, alienated, and disgusted, with the injuries they sustained, were far from listening to the promises of Napoleon, or making common cause with him against Russia, who had governed them kindly, and with considerable respect to their own habits and customs.

But this was not the only evil. The direct loss sustained by the French army was very great. In the course of the very first marches from the Niemen and the Wilia, not less than ten thousand horses, and numbers of men, were left dead on the road. Of the young conscripts especially, many died of hunger and fatigue; and there were instances of some who committed suicide, rather than practise the cruel course of pillage by which only they could subsist; and of others, who took the same desperate step, from remorse at having participated in such cruelties. Thousands turned stragglers, and subsisted by robbery. The Duke of Treviso, who followed the march of the grand army, informed Na-

unfriendly criticism of General Gourgaud impeaches Count Ségur's opportunities of knowing the facts he relates, because his duty did not call him into the line of battle, where he might have seen the military events with his own eyes. We conceive, with deference, that, as a historian, Count Ségur's situation was more favourable for collecting intelligence than if he had been actually engaged. We speak from high authority in saying, that a bottle is in one respect like a ball,—every one recollects the next morning the partner with whom he danced, and what passed between them, but none save a bystander can give a general account of the whole party. Now, Count Ségur eminently resembled the bystander in his opportunities of collecting exact information concerning the whole events of the campaign. His duty was to take up and distribute the lodgings at the general head-quarters. It was, therefore, seldom that an officer could go to or return from head-quarters without holding communication with Count Ségur; and, having his plan of a narrative in view, he could not be the man of ability he appears, if he did not obtain from those who arrived at or left head-quarters, such information as they had to communicate. As he had no pressing military duty to perform, he had nothing to prevent his arranging and recording the information he collected; and when General Gourgaud urges the impossibility of the historian's being present at some of the most secret councils, he forgets that many such secrets percolate from the cabinet into the better-informed circles around it, even before the seal of secrecy is removed, but especially when, as in the present case, a total change of circumstances renders secrecy no longer necessary. We have only to add, that though the idolatry of Count Ségur towards the emperor is not sufficient to satisfy his critic, he must in other eyes be considered as an admirer of the late emperor: and that those who knew the French army will find no reason to suspect him of being a false brother.

pooleon, that, from the Niemen to the Wilia, he had seen nothing but ruined habitations abandoned, carriages overturned, broke open and pillaged, corpses of men and horses,—all the horrible appearances, in short, which present themselves in the route of a defeated army.

Those who desired to flatter Bonaparte, ascribed this loss to the storm of rain, which fell at the time they were entering Lithuania. But summer rain, whatever its violence, does not destroy the horses of an army by hundreds and thousands. That which does destroy them, and renders those that survive almost unfit for service during the campaign, and incapable of bearing the hardships of winter, is hard work, forced marches, want of corn or dry fodder, and the supporting them on the green crop which is growing in the fields. It was now the season when, of all others, a commander, who values the serviceable condition of his army, will avoid such enterprises as require from his cavalry hard work and forced marches. In like manner, storms of summer rain do not destroy the foot soldiers exposed to them, more than other men; but forced marches on bad roads, and through a country unprovided with shelter, and without provisions, must ruin infantry, since every man, who, from fatigue, or from having straggled too far in quest of food, chances to be left behind, is left exposed without shelter to the effects of the climate, and if he cannot follow and rejoin his corps, has no resource but to lie down and die.

The provisions of the hospital department had been as precarious as those of the commissariat. Only six thousand patients could be accommodated in the hospitals at Wilna, which is too small a proportion for an army of 400,000 men, even if lying in quarters in a healthy and peaceful country, where one invalid in fifty is a most restricted allowance, but totally inadequate to the numbers which actually required assistance, as well from the maladies introduced by fatigue and bad diet, as by the casualties of war. Although no battle, and scarce a skirmish had been fought, twenty-five thousand patients encumbered the hospitals of Wilna; and the villages were filled with soldiers who were dying for want of medical assistance. The King of Westphalia must be exempted from this general censure; his army was well provided with hospitals, and lost much fewer men than the others. This imperfection of the hospital department was an original defect in the conception of the expedition, and continued to influence it most unfavourably from beginning to end.

Napoleon sometimes repined under these losses and calamities, sometimes tried to remedy them by threats against marauders, and sometimes endeavoured to harden himself against thought of the distress of his army, as an evil which must be endured, until victory should put an end to it. But repining and anger availed nothing; denunciations against marauders could not reasonably be executed upon men who had no other means of subsistence; and it was impossible to obtain a victory over an enemy who would not risk a battle.

The reader may here put the natural question, Why Bonaparte, when he found the stores, which he considered as essential to the maintenance of his army, had not reached the Vistula, should have

passed on, instead of suspending his enterprise until he was provided with those means, which he had all along judged essential to its success? He might in this manner have lost time, but he would have saved his men and horses, and avoided distressing a country which he desired to conciliate. The truth is, that Napoleon had suffered his sound and cooler judgment to be led astray, by strong and ardent desire to finish the war by one brilliant battle and victory. The hope of surprising the Emperor Alexander at Wilna, of defeating his grand army, or at least cutting off some of its principal corps, resembled too much many of his former exploits, not to have captivation for him. For this purpose, and with this expectation, forced marches were to be undertaken, from the Vistula even to the Dwina and Dnieper; the carts, carriages, cattle, all the supplies brought from France, Italy, and Germany, were left behind, the difficulties of the enterprise forgotten, and nothing thought of but the expectation of finding the enemy at unawares, and totally destroying him at one blow. The fatal consequence of the forced marches we have stated; but what may appear most strange is, that Napoleon, who had recourse to this expeditious and reckless advance, solely to surprise his enemy by an unexpected attack, rather lost than gained that advantage of time, to procure which he had made such sacrifices. This will appear from the following detail:—

The army which had been quartered on the Vistula broke up from thence about the 1st of June, and advanced in different columns, and by forced marches, upon the Niemen, which it reached upon different points, but chiefly near Kowno, upon the 23d, and commenced the passage on the 24th of the same month. From the Vistula to the Niemen is about 250 wersts, equal to two hundred and thirty-five, or two hundred and forty English miles; from Kowno, on the banks of the Niemen, to Vitepsk, on the Dwina, is nearly the same distance. The whole space might be marched by an army, moving with its baggage, in the course of forty marches, at the rate of twelve miles a-day; yet the traversing this distance took, as we shall presently see, four days more, notwithstanding the acceleration of forced marches, than would have been occupied by an army moving at an ordinary and easy rate, and carrying its own supplies along with its columns. The cause why this overhaste should have been attended with actual delay, was partly owing to the great mass of troops which were to be supplied by the principle of the marauding system, partly to the condition of the country, which was doomed to afford them; and partly, it may be, to the political circumstances which detained Napoleon eighteen precious days at Wilna. The first reason is too obvious to need illustration, as a flying army of twenty thousand men bears comparatively light on the resources of a country, and may be pushed through it in haste; but those immense columns, whose demands were so unbounded, could neither move rapidly, nor have their wants hastily supplied. But, besides, in a country like Lithuania, the march could not be regular, and it was often necessary to suspend the advance; thus losing in some places the time which great exertion had

gained in others. Wildernesses and pathless forests were necessarily to be traversed in the utmost haste, as they afforded nothing for the marauders, on whose success the army depended for support. To make amends for this, it was necessary to halt the troops for one day, or even more, in the richest districts, or in the neighbourhood of large towns, to give leisure and opportunity to recruit their supplies at the expense of the country. Thus the time gained by the forced marches was lost in inevitable delays; and the advance, though attended with such tragic consequences to the soldier, did not secure the advantage which the general proposed to attain.

Upon arriving at Wilna, Napoleon had the mortification to find, that although the Emperor Alexander had not left the place until two days after he had himself crossed the Niemen, yet the Russian retreat had been made with the utmost regularity; all magazines and provisions, which could yield any advantage to the invaders, having been previously destroyed to a very large amount. While Bonaparte's generals had orders to press forward on their traces, the French Emperor himself remained at Wilna, to conduct some political measures, which seemed of the last importance to the events of the campaign.

The Abbé de Pradt had executed with ability the task entrusted to him, of exciting the Poles of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with the hope of a general restoration of Polish freedom. This brave but unhappy country, destined, it would seem, to spend its blood in every cause but its own, had, in that portion of it which formerly belonged to Prussia, and now formed the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, gained but little by its nominal independence. This state had only a population of about five millions of inhabitants, yet maintained for the service of France, rather than for its own, an armed force of eighty-five thousand men. Eighteen regiments of these were embodied with the emperor's army, and paid by France; but the formation and expense of the rest far exceeded the revenues of the duchy. The last amounted only to forty millions of francs, while the expenses more than doubled that sum. The Grand Duchy had also suffered its full share of distress from the continental system of Napoleon. The revenue of Poland depends on the sale of the grain which her fertile soil produces; and that grain, in the years previous to the present, had lain rotting in the warehouses. The misery of the poor was extreme; the opulence of the rich classes had disappeared, and they could not relieve them. The year 1811 had been a year of scarcity here as well as elsewhere; and, as in former years the Poles had grain which they could not send to market, so at present they had neither corn, nor means to purchase it. To all these disadvantages must be added, the plunder and misery sustained by the duchy during the march of Bonaparte's numerous forces from the Vistula to the Niemen.

Yet so highly toned is the national patriotism of the Poles, that it kindled at the name of independence, notwithstanding the various accumulated circumstances which tended to damp the flame. When therefore a diet of the Duchy of Warsaw was convened, where the nobles assembled according to

ancient form, all were anxious to meet Napoleon's wishes; but an unfortunate hint which the emperor had thrown out concerning the length of the discourse with which the Diet was to be opened, induced the worthy Count Mathechewitz, whose duty it was to draw up the peroration, to extend it to fifty pages of very close writing.

As all the assembly exclaimed against the prolixity of this mortal harangue, the French ambassador, the Abbé de Pradt, was required to substitute something more suitable for the occasion. Accordingly he framed a discourse more brief, more in the taste of his own country, and, we doubt not, more spirited and able than that of Count Mathechewitz. It was hailed by the warm and enthusiastic applause of the Diet. Notwithstanding which, when sent to Napoleon, then at Wilna, he disapproved of it, as too obviously written in the French style of composition, and intimated in plain terms, that language like that of an ancient Pole, speaking his national sentiments in the oriental tropes of his national language, would better have suited the occasion.

The intimation of this dissatisfaction tore the veil from the Abbé de Pradt's eyes, as he himself assures us. He foresaw that the infatuated want of judgment which the emperor displayed, in disliking his discourse, was that of a doomed and falling man; he dated from that epoch the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and was so much moved with the spirit of prophecy, that he could not withhold his predictions even before the young persons connected with his embassy.

But a more fatal sign of Napoleon's prospects than could be inferred by any except the author, from his disapprobation of the Abbé de Pradt's discourse, occurred in his answer to the address of the Diet of the Grand Duchy.

The Diet of Warsaw, anticipating, as they supposed, Napoleon's wishes, had declared the whole kingdom, in all its parts, free and independent, as if the partition treaties had never existed; and no just-thinking person will doubt their right to do so. They entered into a general confederation, declared the kingdom of Poland restored, summoned all Poles to quit the service of Russia, and, finally, sent deputations to the Grand Duke and the King of Saxony, and another to Napoleon, announcing their desire to accelerate the political regeneration of Poland, and their hope to be recognized by the entire Polish nation as the centre of a general union. The expressions addressed to Napoleon were in a tone of idolatry. They applied for the countenance of the "Hero who dictated his history to the age, in whom resided the force of Providence," language which is usually reserved to the Deity alone. "Let the Great Napoleon," they said, "only pronounce his fiat that the kingdom of Poland should exist, and it will exist accordingly. The natives of Poland will unite themselves at once and unanimously to the service of him to whom ages are as a moment, and space no more than a point." In another case, this exaggerated eloquence would have induced some suspicion of sincerity on the part of those who used it; but the Poles, like the Gascons, to whom they have been compared, are fond of superlatives, and of an exalted and enthusiastic tone of language,

which, however, they have in all ages been observed to support by their actions in the field.

The answer of Bonaparte to this high-toned address was unexpectedly cold, doubtful, and indecisive. It was at this moment, probably, he felt the pressure of his previous engagements with Austria, which prevented his at once acquiescing in the wishes of the Polish mission. "He loved the Polish nation," he said, "and in the situation of the Diet at Warsaw, would act as they did, but he had many interests to reconcile, and many duties to fulfil. Had he reigned when Poland was subjected to those unjust partitions which had deprived her of independence, he would have armed in her behalf, and as matters stood, when he conquered Warsaw and its surrounding territories, he instantly restored them to a state of freedom. . . . He applauded what they had done—authorized their future efforts, and would do all he could to second their resolution. If their efforts were unanimous, they might compel their oppressors to recognize their rights, but these hopes must rest on the exertions of the population." These uncertain and cool assurances of his general interest in the Polish cause were followed by the express declaration, "That he had guaranteed to the Emperor of Austria the integrity of his dominions, and he could not sanction any manoeuvre, or the least movement, tending to disturb the peaceable possession of what remained to *him* of the Polish provinces. As for the provinces of Poland attached to Russia, he was content with assuring them, that provided they were animated by the spirit evinced in the Grand Duchy, Providence would crown their good cause with success."

This answer, so different from that which the Poles had expected, struck the mission with doubt and dismay. Instead of countenancing the re-union of Poland, Napoleon had given an assurance, that, in the case of Galicia, he neither could nor would interfere to detach that province from Austria; and in that of the Polish provinces attached to Russia, he exhorted the natives to be unanimous, in which case, instead of assuring them of his powerful assistance, he was content with recommending them to the care of that Providence, in whose place the terms of their bombastic address had appeared to instal Napoleon himself. The Poles accordingly began from that period to distrust the intentions of Napoleon towards the re-establishment of their independence, the more so, as they observed that neither Polish nor French troops were employed in Volhynia or elsewhere, whose presence might have given countenance to their efforts, but Austrians only, who, for example's sake, were as unwilling to encourage the Russian provinces of Poland to declare for the cause of independence, as they would have been to preach the same doctrines in those which belonged to Austria.

Napoleon afterwards often and bitterly regretted the sacrifice which he made on this occasion to the wishes of Austria; and he had the more occasion for this regret, as the error seemed to be gratuitous. It is true, that to have pressed Austria on the subject of emancipating Polish Galicia, might have had the effect of throwing her into the arms of Russia; but this might probably have been avoided by the ces-

sion of the Illyrian provinces as an indemnity. And, if this exchange could not be rendered acceptable to Austria, by throwing in Trieste, or even Venice, Napoleon ought then to have admitted the impossibility of reinstating the independence of Poland, to have operated as a reason for entirely declining the fatal war with Russia.

The French ruler miscarried also in an effort to excite an insurrection in Lithuania, although he named a provisional government in the province, and declared the country was free of the Russian yoke. But the Lithuanians, a colder people than the Poles, were not in general much dissatisfied with the government of Russia, while the conduct of the French armies in their territories alienated their minds from Napoleon. They observed also the evasive answer which he returned to the Poles, and concluded, that if the French Emperor should have occasion to make peace with Alexander, he would not hesitate to do so at the expense of those whom he was now encouraging to rise in insurrection. Thus the moral effect which Napoleon expected to produce on the Russian frontier was entirely checked and counteracted; inasmuch, that of a guard of honour, which the Lithuanians had proposed to serve for the emperor's person, only three troopers ever made their appearance on parade. Nor did the country at large take any steps, either generally or individually, to intimate a national interest in the events of the war, seeming to refer themselves entirely to the course of events.

CHAPTER LXXVI.

Proceedings of the army under Prince Bagration—Napoleon's manoeuvres against him.—King Jérôme of Westphalia is disgraced for alleged inactivity.—Bagration is defeated by Davoust, but succeeds in gaining the interior of Russia, and re-establishing his communication with the grand army—which retreats to Drissa.—Barclay de Tolly and Bagration meet at Smolensk on the 20th July.—The French generals become anxious that Napoleon should close the campaign at Vitepsk for the season.—He persists in proceeding.—Manoeuvres of both armies in regard to Smolensk.—It is evacuated by Barclay de Tolly, after setting fire to the place.—Reduced condition of the French, and growing strength of the Russian armies.—Peace offered between Russia, and England, Sweden, and Turkey.—Napoleon resolves to advance upon Moscow.

NAPOLEON continued to occupy his head-quarters at Wilna, from 28th June to 16th July, the space of eighteen days. It was not usual with him to make such long halts; but Wilna was his last point of communication with Europe, and he had probably much to arrange ere he could plunge into the forests and deserts of Russia, whence all external intercourse must be partial and precarious. He named Maret, Duke of Bassano, Governor of Lithuania, and placed under the management of that minister the whole charge of correspondence with Paris and with the armies; thus rendering him the centre of administrative, political, and even military communication between the emperor and his dominions.

It must not be supposed, however, that these eighteen days passed without military movements

of high importance. The reader must remember that the grand army of Russia was divided into two unequal portions. That commanded under the emperor by Barclay de Tolly had occupied Wilna and the vicinity, until the French entered Lithuania, when, by a preconcerted and well-executed retreat, they fell back on their strong fortified camp at Drissa. The smaller army, under Prince Bagration, was much farther advanced to the south-westward, and continued to occupy a part of Poland. The prince's head-quarters were at Wolkowisk; Platoff, with seven thousand Cossacks, lay at Grodno, and both he and Bagration maintained communication with the main army through its left wing, which, under Dorokhoff, extended as far as Lida. The army of Bagration had been posted thus far to the south-west, in order that when Napoleon crossed the Niemen, this army might be placed in his rear as he advanced to Wilna. To execute this plan became impossible, so much greater was the invading army than the Russians had anticipated. On the contrary, the French were able to protect the flank of their advance against Wilna by an army of 30,000 men, under the King of Westphalia, placed betwixt them and this secondary Russian army. And far from having it in his power to annoy the enemy, Bagration was placed so much in advance as greatly to hazard being separated from the main body, and entirely cut off. The Russian prince accordingly had directions from Barclay de Tolly to get his army out of their perilous situation; and again, on the 13th of July, he had orders from Alexander to move on the camp of Drissa.

When Napoleon arrived at Wilna, the danger of Bagration became imminent; for the entrenched camp at Drissa was the rendezvous of all the Russian corps, and Napoleon being 150 wersts, or seven days' march, nearer to Drissa than Bagration, neither Napoleon nor any other general had ever so fair an opportunity for carrying into execution the French emperor's favourite manœuvre, of dividing into two the line of his enemy, which was unquestionably too much extended.

It was the 30th of June ere Napoleon was certain of the advantage which he possessed, and he hastened to improve it. He had dispatched the greater part of his cavalry under Murat, to press on the retreat of the grand Russian army; the second corps under Oudinot, and the third under Ney, with three divisions of the first corps, were pushed towards the Dwina on the same service, and constituted a force too strong for the army of Barclay de Tolly to oppose. On the right of the army, the King of Westphalia had directions to press upon Bagration in front, and throw him upon the army of Davoust, which was to advance on his flank and towards his rear. It was concluded that Bagration, cut off from the grand army, and attacked at once by Jérôme and Davoust, must necessarily surrender or be destroyed.

Having thus detached very superior forces against the only two Russian armies which were opposed to him, Bonaparte himself, with the Guards, the army of Italy, the Bavarian army, and three divisions of Davoust's corps d'armée, was at liberty to have marched forward upon Vitepsk, occupying the in-

terval between the corps of Murat, who pressed upon Alexander and Barclay de Tolly, and of Davoust, who was pursuing Bagration. By thus pressing on where there was no hostile force opposed to him, Napoleon might have penetrated between the two Russian armies, to each of whom a superior force was opposed, might have forced himself between them and occupied Vitepsk, and threatened both St Petersburg and Moscow; or, if he decided for the latter capital, might have advanced as far as Smolensk. That Bonaparte formed this plan of the campaign on the 10th of July at Wilna, we are assured by Ségur; but it was then too late for putting it in execution—yet another week was lost at Wilna. All seem to have been sensible of an unusual slowness in Napoleon's motions on this important occasion; and Ségur attributes it to a premature decay of constitution, of which, however, we see no traces in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814. But the terrible disorder of an army, the sick and stragglers of which absolutely filled Lithuania, and that army one of such immense size, required considerable time to remodel and new-organize it; and this of itself, a misfortune inherent in the enterprise, is sufficient to account for the halt at Wilna.

Meantime Bagration, in a precarious situation, defended himself with the greatest skill and gallantry. Being cut off from the direct road to Drissa, it was his object to retreat eastward to his rear, instead of moving northward by his right flank, and thus to make his way towards the Dwina, either through Ostrowno and Minsk, or by the town of Borizoff. When he gained the Dwina, Bagration trusted to form a junction with the grand army, from which he was now so fearfully separated. The actual strength of his army was, however, increased not only by the Hettman Platoff with his Cossacks, who, being advanced south-westward as far as Grodno, made in fact a part of Bagration's command, and assisted him materially in his retreat; but also by the division of General Dorokhoff, which, forming the extreme left of the grand Russian army, was cut off in the retreat upon Drissa by the advance of the French, and therefore had been placed also in communication with Bagration. So that, numerically, the prince might have under his command from forty to fifty thousand men.

The ground which Bagration had to traverse was the high plain of Lithuania, where arise the sources of the rivers which take different directions to the Black and Baltic Seas. The soil is unusually marshy, and traversed by long causeways, which the Russians made use of in defending themselves against the attacks of Jérôme's advanced guard. But while Bagration struggled against the attempt on his front, Davoust, having occupied all the posts on the Russian's right flank, and succeeded in preventing him taking the shortest road to Drissa, began next to cut him off from his more circuitous route to the east, occupying the town of Minsk, and the defiles by which Bagration must issue from Lithuania towards Vitepsk and the Dwina. The occupation of Minsk greatly embarrassed the retreat of Bagration; inasmuch, that the French were of opinion that it was only the want of skill and enterprise on the part of King Jérôme of Westphalia,

who did not, it was said, press the Russians with sufficient vigour, that prevented the Russian prince being thrust back on Davoust, and totally destroyed. At any rate, Jérôme, whether guilty or not of the alleged slowness of movement, was, according to the fashion in which the chief of the Napoleon dynasty treated the independent princes whom he called to sovereignty, sent back in disgrace to his Westphalian dominions, unaccompanied even by a soldier of his guards, for all of whom Napoleon had sufficient employment.

Several skirmishes were fought between the corps of Bagration, and those opposed to it, of which the event was dubious. Platoff and his Cossacks had more than one distinguished success over the Polish cavalry, who, with all their fiery courage, had not yet the intimate acquaintance with partisan war, which seems to be a natural attribute of the modern Scythians. In the meanwhile, Bagration, continuing his attempts at extricating his army, made another circuitous march towards the south, and, avoiding his pursuers, he effected the passage of the Beresina at Bobruisk. The Dnieper (anciently the Borysthenes) was the next obstacle to be overcome, and with a view to regain the ground he had lost, Bagration ascended that stream as far as Mohiloff. Here he found himself again anticipated by Davoust, who was equally, though less unpleasantly surprised, by finding himself in front of Bagration, who prepared to clear his way by the sword. The combat was at first advantageous to the Russians, but they were at length repulsed roughly, and lost the battle; without, however, suffering much, except in the failure of their purpose. Disappointed in this attempt, Bagration, with unabated activity, once more altered his line of retreat, descended the Dnieper so far as to reach Nevoi-Bikoff, finally crossed at that point, and thus gained the interior of Russia, and an opportunity of again placing himself in communication with the grand Russian army, from which he had been so nearly cut off.

It was certainly a new event in the history of Napoleon's wars, that two large armies of French should be baffled and outmanœuvred by a foreign general. And yet this was clearly the case; for, admitting that the Russians committed originally the great error of extending their line too far from Drissa, the intended point of union, and although, in consequence, the army of Bagration run great risk of being cut off, yet the manœuvres by which he effectually eluded the enemy showed superior military talent on the part of the general, as well as excellent discipline on that of the soldiers, and were sufficient for the extrication of both.

We return to the grand army, commanded by the emperor, or rather by Barclay de Tolly, which, though pressed by Murat, at the head of the greater part of the French cavalry, as well as by Oudinot and Ney, all burning for combat, made a regular and successful retreat to the entrenched camp at Drissa, where the Russian army had been appointed to concentrate itself. The French troops, on their part, approached the left bank of the Dwina, and that river now separated the hostile armies, and there took place only partial actions between detached corps with various success. But the Rus-

sian general Wittgenstein, whose name began to be distinguished both for enterprise and conduct, observing that Sébastiani's van-guard of French cavalry had quartered themselves with little precaution in the town of Drissa, he passed the river unexpectedly on the night of the 2d July, beat up Sébastiani's quarters, and was completely successful in the skirmish which ensued. Enterprises of this sort show a firm and energetic character, and Napoleon began already to be aware of the nature of the task he had before him, and of the necessity of employing his own talents in the campaign.

In the meantime, Barclay de Tolly was led to change his plan, from learning the danger to which Prince Bagration was exposed. The camp at Drissa became too distant a point of junction, and there was every risk that the whole body of the French army, which was now getting itself into motion, would force a passage across the Dwina at Vitepsk, a good deal higher up than Drissa, and thus at once turn Barclay de Tolly's left flank, and entirely separate him from Bagration and his corps d'armée. Alarmed at this prospect, Barclay de Tolly evacuated the camp, and began to ascend the right side of the Dwina, by Polotsk, towards Vitepsk. This line of movement converged with that of Bagration's retreat, and served essentially to favour the desired junction of the two Russian armies. Wittgenstein was left near Drissa to observe the enemy, and cover the road to St Petersburg. The army first arrived at Polotsk, when the Emperor Alexander left the troops, and hastened to Moscow, to recommend and enforce energetic measures, and solicit the heavy sacrifices which the emergency demanded. Barclay de Tolly continued his march upon Vitepsk, hoping to get into communication with Bagration, to whom he had sent orders, directing him to descend the Dnieper as far as Orscha (or Orcha), which is about fifty-six wersts from Vitepsk.

At this period, Napoleon was directing his whole reserved forces upon the same point of Vitepsk, with a purpose as anxious to prevent the junction of the two Russian armies, as that of Barclay de Tolly to accomplish that important movement. Had Napoleon's march commenced earlier, there can be no doubt that he must have attained the disputed position sooner by marching from Wilna, than Barclay de Tolly could have reached it by ascending the Dwina from Drissa. Hastening from Wilna upon the 4th, he might easily have reached Vitepsk on the 20th, and would then have found himself, with a chosen army of 120,000 men, without an enemy on his front, posted between the two hostile armies, each of which was pressed by a force superior to their own, and having their flanks and communications at his mercy. Instead of this advantageous condition, the emperor found himself in front of the grand army of Russia, in a situation where they could not easily be brought to action, although severe and bloody skirmishes took place between the cavalry on both sides.

On his part, Barclay de Tolly was far from easy. He heard nothing of Bagration, whom he expected to approach from Orscha; and, rather than abandon him to his fate by a retreat, he formed, on the 14th

July, the almost desperate resolution of risking a general action with very superior forces, commanded by Napoleon. But just as he had made his dispositions for battle, the Russian general received news from one of the prince's aides-de-camp, which made him joyfully alter his determination. The repulse at Mohloff had, as before noticed, obliged Bagration to change his line of retreat, which was now directed upon Smolensk. Barclay de Tolly, renouncing instantly his purpose of battle, commenced a retreat upon the same point, and arriving at Smolensk on the 20th, was joined by Bagration within two days after. The result of these manoeuvres had been on the whole disappointing to the Emperor of the French. The two armies of Russians had united without material loss, and placed themselves upon their own lines of communication. No battle had been fought and won; and although Napoleon obtained possession of the fortified camp at Drissa, and afterwards of Vitepsk, it was only as positions which it no longer served the enemy's purpose to retain.

The marshals and generals who surrounded Napoleon began to wish and hope that he would close at Vitepsk the campaign of the season, and, quartering his troops on the Dwina, await supplies, and the influence of the invasion upon the mind of the Russian nation, till next spring. But this suggestion Bonaparte treated with contempt, asking those who favoured such a sentiment, whether they thought he had come so far only to conquer a parcel of wretched huts. If ever, therefore, he had seriously thought of settling his winter quarters at Vitepsk, which *Ségur* affirms, and *Gourgaud* positively denies, it had been but a passing purpose. Indeed, his pride must have revolted at the very idea of fortifying himself with entrenchments and redoubts in the middle of summer, and confessing his weakness to Europe, by stopping short in the midst of a campaign, in which he had lost one-third of the active part of his great army, without even having fought a general action, far less won a decisive victory.

Meanwhile the Russians, finding their two wings united, to the number of 120,000, were not inclined to remain inactive. The French army at Vitepsk lay considerably more dispersed than their own, and their plan was, by moving suddenly upon Napoleon, to surprise him ere his army could be concentrated. With this view, General Barclay de Tolly directed the march of a great part of the grand army upon Rudneia, a place about half-way between Vitepsk and Smolensk, being nearly the centre of the French line of position. Their march commenced on the 26th July; but, on the next day, Barclay de Tolly received information from the outposts, which induced him to conclude that Napoleon was strengthening his left flank for the purpose of turning the Russian right wing, and assailing the town of Smolensk in their rear. To prevent this misfortune, Barclay de Tolly suspended his march in front, and began by a flank movement to extend his right wing, for the purpose of covering Smolensk. This error, for such it was, led to his advanced guard, who had not been informed of the change of plan, being placed in some danger at Inkowo, a place about two wersts from Rudneia. Platoff, however, had the advan-

tage in the cavalry skirmish which took place. The Russian general, in consequence of the extension of his flank, discovered that there was no French force on the left, and consequently, that he was in no danger on that point; and he resumed his original plan of pressing the French at Rudneia. But while Barclay de Tolly lost four days in these fruitless marches and countermarches, he at length learned, that the most speedy retreat towards Smolensk would be necessary to save him from that disaster which he had truly apprehended, though he mistook the quarter from which the danger was to come.

While Barclay de Tolly was in hopes of surprising Napoleon, the emperor had laid a scheme of a singularly audacious character, for inflicting the surprise with which he had been himself threatened. Without allowing his purpose to be suspended by the skirmishing on his front, he resolved entirely to change his line of operations from Vitepsk upon the Dwina, to concentrate his army on the Dnieper, making Orscha the central point of his operations, and thus, turning the left of the Russians instead of their right, as Barclay de Tolly had apprehended, he hoped to gain the rear of their forces, occupy Smolensk, and act upon their lines of communication with Moscow. With this purpose Napoleon withdrew his forces from Vitepsk, and the line of the Dwina, with equal skill and rapidity, and, by throwing four bridges over the Dnieper, effected a passage for Ney, the viceroy, and Davoust. The King of Naples accompanied them, at the head of two large corps of cavalry. Poniatowski, with Janot, advanced by different routes to support the movement. Ney and Murat, who commanded the van-guard, drove everything before them until they approached Krasnoi, upon 14th August, where a remarkable action took place. This manoeuvre, which transferred the emperor's line of operations from the Dwina to the Dnieper, has been much admired by French and Russian tacticians, but it has not escaped military criticism.*

General Newerowskoi had been stationed at Krasnoi with above six thousand men, a part of the garrison of Smolensk, which had been sent out for the purpose of making a strong recognizance. But finding himself attacked by a body of infantry stronger than his own, and no less than eighteen thousand cavalry besides, the Russian general commenced his retreat upon the road to Smolensk. The ground through which the road lay was open, flat, and favourable for the action of cavalry. Murat, who led the pursuit, and, while he affected the dress and appearance of a cavalier of romance, had the fiery courage necessary to support the character, sent some of his light squadrons to menace the front of the Russian corps, while with his heavy horse he annoyed their flanks or thundered upon their rear. To add to the difficulties of the Russians, their columns consisted of raw troops, who had never been under fire, and who might have been expected to shrink from the furious onset of the cavalry. They behaved bravely, however, and availed themselves of a double row of trees, which borders the high-road to Smolensk on

* See Appendix, No. 7.—Extract from manuscript observations on Napoleon's Russian campaign, by an English officer of rank.*

each side, to make their musketry effectual, and to screen themselves from the repeated charges. Protecting themselves as they retreated by a heavy fire, Newerowski made good a lion-like retreat into Smolensk, having lost four hundred men, chiefly by the artillery, and five guns, but receiving from friend and foe the testimony due to a movement so bravely and ably conducted.

Upon the 14th of August, the same day with this skirmish, Napoleon arrived at Rasassina, upon the Dnieper, and continued during the 15th to press forward towards Smolensk, in the rear of Ney and Murat. Prince Bagration, in the meantime, threw General Raefskoi into Smolensk, with a strong division, to reinforce Newerowski, and advanced himself to the Dnieper, along the left bank of which he pressed with all possible speed towards the endangered town. Barclay de Tolly was now made aware, as we have already stated, that while he was engaged in false manoeuvres to the right, his left had been in fact turned, and that Smolensk was in the utmost danger. Thus the two Russian generals pressed forward from different points to the relief of the city, whilst Napoleon used every effort to carry the place before their arrival.

Smolensk, a town of consequence in the empire, and, like Moscow, honoured by the appellation of the Sacred, and of the Key of Russia, contains about 12,600 inhabitants. It is situated on the heights of the left bank of the Dnieper, and was then surrounded by fortifications of the ancient Gothic character. An old wall, in some places dilapidated, was defended by about thirty towers, which seemed to flank the battlements; and there was an ill-contrived work, called the Royal Bastion, which served as a species of citadel. The walls, however, being eighteen feet thick, and twenty-five high, and there being a ditch of some depth, the town, though not defensible if regularly approached, might be held out against a *coup-de-main*. The greatest inconvenience arose from the suburbs of the place, which, approaching near to the wall of the town, preserved the assailants from the fire of the besieged, as they approached it. Raefskoi prepared to defend Smolensk at the head of about sixteen thousand men. He was reinforced on the 16th of August by a division of grenadiers under Prince Charles of Mecklenberg, who were detached for that purpose by Bagration.

Ney arrived first under the walls of the city, and instantly rushed forward to attack the citadel. He failed entirely, being himself wounded, and two-thirds of the storming party cut off. A second attempt was made to as little purpose, and at length he was forced to confine his efforts to a cannonade, which was returned from the place with equal spirit. Later in the day, the troops of Napoleon appeared advancing from the eastward on one side of the Dnieper, while almost at the same moment there were seen upon the opposite bank clouds of dust enveloping long columns of men, moving from different points with uncommon celerity. This was the grand army of Russia under Barclay de Tolly, and the troops of Bagration, who, breathless with haste and anxiety, were pressing forward to the relief of Smolensk.

"At length," said Napoleon, as he gazed on the advance from the opposite side, "at length I have them!" He had no doubt it was the purpose of the Russians to pass through the city, and, deploying from its gates, to offer him under the walls that general action for which he longed, and on which so much depended. He took all the necessary measures for preparing his line of battle.

But the cautious Barclay de Tolly was determined, that not even for the protection of the sacred city would he endanger the safety of his army, so indispensably necessary to the defence of the empire. He dismissed to Ellnia his more impatient coadjutor, Prince Bagration, who would willingly have fought a battle, incensed as he was at beholding the cities of Russia sacked, and her fields laid waste, without the satisfaction either of resistance or revenge. Barclay de Tolly in the meanwhile occupied Smolensk, but only for the purpose of covering the flight of the inhabitants, and emptying the magazines.

Bonaparte's last look that evening was on the still empty fields betwixt his army and Smolensk. There was no sign of any advance from its gates, and Murat prophesied that the Russians had no purpose of fighting. Davoust entertained a different opinion; and Napoleon, continuing to believe what he most wished, expected with the peep of day to see the whole Russian army drawn up betwixt his own front and the walls of Smolensk. Morning came, however, and the space in which he expected to see the enemy was vacant as before. On the other hand, the high-road on the opposite side of the Dnieper was filled with troops and artillery, which showed that the grand army of the Russians was in full retreat. Disappointed and incensed, Napoleon appointed instant measures to be taken to storm the place, resolving as speedily as possible to possess himself of the town, that he might have the use of its bridge in crossing to the other side of the Dnieper, in order to pursue the fugitive Russians. There are moments when men of ordinary capacity may advise the wisest. Murat remarked to Bonaparte, that as the Russians had retired, Smolensk, left to its fate, would fall without the loss that must be sustained in an attack by storm, and he more than hinted the imprudence of penetrating farther into Russia at this late season of the year. The answer of Napoleon must have been almost insulting; for Murat, having exclaimed that a march to Moscow would be the destruction of the army, spurred his horse like a desperate man to the banks of the river, where the Russian guns from the opposite side were cannonading a French battery, placed himself under a tremendous fire, as if he had been courting death, and was with difficulty forced from the dangerous spot.

Meantime the attack commenced on Smolensk, but the place was defended with the same vigour as on the day before. The field-guns were found unable to penetrate the walls; and the French lost four or five thousand men in returning repeatedly to the attack. But this successful defence did not alter Barclay de Tolly's resolution of evacuating the place. It might no doubt have been defended for several days more, but the Russian general feared that a

protracted resistance on this advanced point might give Napoleon time to secure the road to Moscow, and drive the Russian armies back upon the barren and exhausted provinces of the north-west, besides getting betwixt them and the ancient capital of Russia. In the middle of the night, then, while the French were throwing some shells into the place, they saw fires beginning to kindle, far faster and more generally than their bombardment could have occasioned. They were the work of the Russian troops, who, having completed their task of carrying off or destroying the magazines, and having covered the flight of the inhabitants, had now set the dreadful example of destroying their own town, rather than that its houses or walls should afford assistance to the enemy.

When the Frenchmen entered Smolensk, which they did the next morning, 18th August, most of the town, which consisted chiefly of wooden houses, was yet blazing—elsewhere they found nothing but blood and ashes. The French troops were struck with horror at the inveterate animosity of the Russians, and the desperation of the resistance which they met with; and all began to wish a period to a war, where there was nothing to be gained from the retreating enemy, except a long vista of advance through an inhospitable wilderness of swamps, pine-forests, and deserts; without provisions, and without shelter; without hospitals for the sick, and dressings for the wounded; and without even a shed where the weary might repose, or the wounded might die.

Bonaparte himself hesitated, and is reported to have then spoken of concluding the campaign at Smolensk, which would, he said, be an admirable head of cantonnements. "Here," he said, "the troops might rest and receive reinforcements. Enough was done for the campaign. Poland was conquered, which seemed a sufficient result for one year. The next year they would have peace, or they would seek it at Moscow." But in the interior of his councils, he held a different language, and endeavoured to cover, with the language of prudence, the pride and perversity of character, which forbade him to stop short in an enterprise which had yet produced him no harvest of renown. He stated to his generals the exhausted state of the country, in which his soldiers were living from hand to mouth; and the risk and difficulty of drawing his supplies from Dantzic or Poland, through Russian roads, and in the winter season. He alleged the disorganized state of the army, which might move on, though it was incapable of stopping. "Motion," he said, "might keep it together; a halt or a retreat would be at once to dissolve it. It was an army of attack, not of defence; an army of operation, not of position. The result was, they must advance on Moscow, possess themselves of the capital, and there dictate a peace."

The language which Ségur has placed in the mouth of the emperor by no means exaggerates the dreadful condition of the French army. When Napoleon entered the country, only six weeks before, the corps which formed his operating army amounted to two hundred and ninety-seven thousand men; and by the 5th August, when preparing to break up from Vitepsk, that number was diminished to one hundred and eighty-five thousand, not two-thirds

of their original number, and a great additional loss had been sustained in the movements and encounters on the Dnieper. The wounded of the army were in the most miserable state, and it was in vain that the surgeons tore up their own linen for dressings; they were obliged to use parchment, and the down that grows on the birch-trees: it is no wonder that few recovered.

Thus it may be concluded, that this rash enterprise carried with it, from the beginning, the seeds of destruction, which, even without the conflagration of Moscow, or the Russian climate, though the latter must have been at all events included, made the expedition resemble that of Cambyzes into Egypt; of Crassus, and after him Julian, into Parthia; and so many others of the same character, where the extent of preparation only rendered the subsequent fate of the invaders more signally calamitous.

While the French army was thus suffering a gradual or rather hasty decay, that of the Russians was now receiving rapid reinforcements. The Emperor Alexander, on leaving the army for Moscow, had convoked the nobles and the merchants of that capital in their several assemblies, had pledged to them his purpose never to make peace while a Frenchman remained in Russia, and had received the most enthusiastic assurances from both ranks of the state, of their being devoted to his cause with life and property. A large sum was voted by the merchants as a general tax; besides which, they opened a voluntary subscription, which produced great supplies. The nobility offered a levy of ten men in the hundred through all their estates; many were at the sole expense of fitting out and arming their recruits, and some of these wealthy boyards furnished companies, nay battalions, entirely at their own expense. The word peace was not mentioned, or only thought of as that which could not be concluded with an invader, without an indelible disgrace to Russia.

Other external circumstances occurred, which greatly added to the effect of these patriotic exertions.

A peace with England, and the restoration of commerce, was the instant consequence of war with France. Russia had all the support which British diplomacy could afford her, in operating a reconciliation with Sweden, and a peace with Turkey. The former being accomplished, under the mediation of England, and the Crown Prince being assured in possession of Norway, the Russian army under General Steigenteil, or Steingel, which was, while Bernadotte's amicable disposition might be doubted, necessarily detained in Finland, was now set at liberty, for the more pressing service of defending the empire.

A peace, even still more important, was made with the Turks at Bucharest, on the 16th May. The Porte yielded up to Russia, Bessarabia, and that part of Moldavia situated on the left of the river Pruth, and Russia renounced all claim to the rest of the two provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. But the great advantage which accrued to Russia by this treaty, was its setting at liberty a veteran army of forty-five thousand men, and ren-

dering them a disposable force in the rear of the French troops.

If the able statesman, who at that period conducted the foreign affairs of Great Britain,* had never rendered to his own country and to the world, any other service than the influence which he successfully exercised in these important diplomatic affairs, he must have gone down to posterity as the minister, who had foreseen and provided, in the most critical moment, the mode of strengthening Russia to combat with her formidable invaders, and which, after all her exertions, was the means of turning the balance in her favour.

It was at Vitepsk that Napoleon learned that the Turks had made peace; and as it had only instigated him to precipitate his measures against Smolensk, so now the same reason urged him to continue his march on Moscow. Hitherto his wings had had the advantage of the enemy. Macdonald, in blockading Riga, kept all Courland at his disposal, and alarmed St Petersburg. More to the south, St-Cyr had some hard fighting with Wittgenstein, and after a severe battle at Polotsk, had reduced that enterprising officer to the defensive.

Equally favourable intelligence had reached from Volhynia, the extreme right of the terrible line of invasion. The Russian General Tormazoff had made, when least expected, his appearance in the Grand Duchy, driven before him Régnier, who was covering that part of Poland, destroyed a Saxon brigade, and alarmed Warsaw. But Régnier united himself with the Austrian general Schwartzberg, advanced on Tormazoff, and engaging him near a place called Gorodeczna, defeated him with loss, and compelled him to retreat. It was obvious, however, that the advantage of these two victories at Polotsk and Gorodeczna would be entirely lost, if General Steingel, with the Finland army, should join Wittgenstein, while Tormazoff fell back on the Moldavian army of Russia, commanded by Admiral Tchitchagoff.

For Napoleon to await in cantonments at Smolensk, in a wasted country, the consequences of these junctions, which were likely to include the destruction of his two wings, would have been a desperate resolution. It seemed waiting for the fate which he had been wont to command. To move forward was a bold measure. But the French army, in its state of disorganization, somewhat resembled an intoxicated person, who possesses the power to run, though he is unable to support himself if he stand still. If Napoleon could yet strike a gallant blow at the Russian grand army; if he could yet obtain possession of Moscow the Holy, he reckoned on sending dismay into the heart of Alexander, and dictating to the czar, as he had done to many other princes, the conditions of peace from within the walls of his own palace. Bonaparte, therefore, resolved to advance upon Moscow. And perhaps, circumstanced as he was, he had no safer course, unless he had abandoned his whole undertaking, and fallen back upon Poland; which would have been an acknowledgment of defeat that we can hardly conceive his stooping to, while he was yet at the head of an army.

* Lord Castlereagh.

CHAPTER LXXVII.

Napoleon detaches Murat and other generals in pursuit of the Russians.—Bloody, but indecisive action, at Valontina.—Barclay de Tolly's defensive system relinquished, and Koutousoff appointed to the chief command of the Russian army.—Napoleon advances from Smolensk.—Battle of Borodino fought, on 5th September.—Victory remains with the French, but without affording them any essential service.—Prince Bagration among the slain.—Koutousoff retreats upon Mojaïsk, and thence upon Moscow.—Napoleon continues his advance on the 12th.—Count Rostopchin, governor of Moscow—His character.—The Russians abandon Moscow, which is evacuated by the inhabitants, after the removal of the archives and public treasures, and the emptying of the magazines.—On the 14th September, the grand Russian army marches through Moscow—Last public court of justice held there by Rostopchin, after which he follows the march of the army.

WITHOUT communicating his purpose of advancing in person from Smolensk, and completing, without any interval of delay, his great undertaking, Napoleon failed not to detach Murat, Ney, Junot, and Davoust, in pursuit of the Russians, as they retired from Smolensk. Either, however, his own mind was not made up, or he did not wish his purpose of going onward to be known. He represented this demonstration as arising merely out of the desire of pressing the Russian retreat, though in fact it was preliminary to his own advance.

Barclay de Tolly having performed the stern duty of burning Smolensk, had retired for two or three miles along the road to St Petersburg, which route he chose in order to avoid a cannonade from the left side of the Dnieper. Having proceeded a little way in this direction, he turned southward to regain the road to Moscow, which he would have taken at first, but for its exposing him to loss from the enemy's artillery, where it bordered on the river. The French could not for some time determine on which route they were to pursue the Russians. At length, finding the track, they overtook the rear-guard at a place called Valontina, encumbered as it was with guns and baggage. Here a desperate action took place, the Russians reinforcing their rear-guard as fast as the French brought new bodies to attack them. Both parties fought most obstinately, and the distinguished French general Gudin was mortally wounded. The French blamed Junot, who, having been dispatched across the Dnieper, showed no alertness in advancing to charge the enemy. There was seen, indeed, in this affair of Valontina, or Lombino, that the marshals and the great officers who had been accustomed each to command a separate corps d'armée, disinclined to receive either orders, or even advice or hints, from a brother of the same rank. Wherever there were two or three of these dignitaries on the field, it was necessary Bonaparte should be within reach, to issue the necessary orders; for no voice save that of the emperor was implicitly obeyed by all.

In the meantime, the bloody action of Valontina had an unsatisfactory result. The Russians, whose rear-guard had been attacked, had moved off without losing either guns, prisoners, or baggage. They

had lost equal numbers with the French, but the time was fast approaching when they must possess a numerical superiority, and when, of course, an equal loss would tell in favour of the party which was nearest to its resources.

The plan of Barclay de Tolly had hitherto been scrupulously adhered to. All general actions had been cautiously avoided; and while no means were left unemployed to weaken the enemy in partial actions, and to draw him on from swamp to swamp, from conflagration to conflagration, from one wild and waste scene to another of equal sterility and disconsolation, the end had been in a great measure attained, of undermining the force and breaking the moral courage of the invading army, who wandered forward like men in a dream, feeling on all hands a sense of oppressive and stifling opposition, yet unable to encounter anything substantial which the slumberer can struggle with and overcome. Barclay de Tolly, if he had made some faults by extending his line too much at the commencement of the campaign, and afterwards by his false movements upon Radnein, had more than atoned for these errors by the dexterity with which he had manoeuvred before Smolensk, and the advantages which he had gained over the enemy on various other occasions. But they were now approaching Moscow the Grand, the Sanctified, and the military councils of Russia were about to change their character.

The spirit of the Russians, especially of the new levies, was more and more exasperated at the retreat, which seemed to have no end; and at the style of defence, which seemed only to consist in inflicting on the country, by the hands of Cossacks or Tartars, the very desolation which was perhaps the worst evil they could experience from the French. The natural zeal of the new levies, their confidence, and their desire to be led to fight in the cause for which they were enlisted, eagerly declared against further retreat; and they demanded a halt, and a battle under a Russian general, more interested, as they supposed such must be, in the defence of the country, than a German stranger. The emperor almost alone continued to adhere to the opinion of Barclay de Tolly. But he could not bid defiance to the united voice of his people and his military council. The political causes which demanded a great battle in defence of Moscow, were strong and numerous, and overcame the military reasons which certainly recommended that a risk so tremendous should not be incurred.

In compliance, therefore, with the necessity of the case, the emperor sacrificed his own opinion. General Koutousoff, an officer high in military esteem among the Russians, was sent for from the corps which had been employed on the Danube against the Turks, to take the chief command of the grand army; and it was to Barclay de Tolly's great honour, that, thus superseded, he continued to serve with the utmost zeal and good faith in a subordinate situation.

The French were not long of learning that their enemy's system of war was to be changed, and that the new Russian general was to give them battle, the object which they had so long panted for. Bonaparte, who had halted six days at Smolensk, moved from thence on the 24th August, and now pressed

forward to join the advanced guard of his army at Gjatiz. In this place his followers found a Frenchman who had dwelt long in Russia. They learned from this man the promotion of Koutousoff to the chief command of the army opposed to them, and that he was placed there for the express purpose of giving battle to the French army. The news were confirmed by the manner of a Russian officer, who arrived under some pretext with a flag of truce, but probably to spy the state of the invader's army. There was defiance in the look of this man; and when he was asked by a French general what they would find between Wiazma and Moscow, he answered sternly, "Pultawa." There was, therefore, no doubt, that battle was approaching.

But the confusion of Bonaparte's troops was still such, that he was obliged to halt two days at Gjatiz, in order to collect and repose his army. He arrived at the destined field of battle, an elevated plain, called Borodino, which the Russians had secured with lines and batteries.

The French army were opposed to them on the 5th September, having consumed seventeen days in marching two hundred and eighty versets. Their first operation was a successful attack upon a redoubt in the Russian front, but which—a great error in war—was situated too distant from it to be effectually supported. The French gained it and kept it. The armies lay in presence of each other all the next day, preparing for the approaching contest. Upon a position naturally strong, the Russians had raised very formidable field-works. Their right flank rested on a wood, which was covered by some detached entrenchments. A brook, occupying in its course a deep ravine, covered the front of the right wing, and the centre of the position as far as the river of Borodino; from that village the left extended down to another village, called Semoneskoie, which is more open, yet protected by ravines and thickets in front. This, as the most accessible point, was anxiously secured by redoubts and batteries; and in the centre of the position, upon a gentle elevation, arose a sort of double battery, like a citadel, for the protection of the whole line.

In this strong position was stationed the Russian army, equal now in numbers to the French, as each army might be about 120,000 men. They were commanded by a veteran, slow, cautious, tenacious of his purpose, wily, too, as Napoleon afterwards found to his cost, but perhaps not otherwise eminent as a military leader. The army he led were of one nation and language, all conscious that this battle had been granted to their own ardent wishes, and determined to make good the eagerness with which they had called for it.

The French army, again, consisted of various nations; but they were the *élite*, and seasoned soldiers who had survived the distresses of a most calamitous march; they were the veterans of the victors of Europe; they were headed by Napoleon in person, and under his immediate command by those marshals, whose names in arms were only inferior to his own. Besides a consciousness of their superiority in action, of which, from the manner in which they had covered themselves in entrenchments, the enemy seemed aware, the French had before them the prospect of

utter destruction, if they should sustain a defeat in a country so difficult that they could hardly advance even as a successful army, and certainly could never hope to retreat as a routed one. Bonaparte's address to his troops had less of the tinsel of oratory than he generally used on such occasions. "Soldiers," he said, "here is the battle you have longed for; it is necessary, for it brings us plenty, good winter-quarters, and a safe return to France. Behave yourselves so that posterity may say of each of you, 'He was in that great battle under the walls of Moscow.'"

In the Russian camp was a scene of a different kind, calculated to awaken feelings to which France had long ceased to appeal. The Greek clergy showed themselves to the troops, arrayed in their rich vestments, and displaying for general worship the images of their holiest saints. They told their countrymen of the wrongs which had been offered by the invaders to earth as well as Heaven, and exhorted them to merit a place in paradise by their behaviour in that day's battle. The Russians answered with shouts.

Two deeply-interesting circumstances occurred to Napoleon the day before the battle. An officer brought him a portrait of his boy, the King of Rome, which he displayed on the outside of the tent, not only to satisfy the officers, but the soldiers, who crowded to look upon the son of their emperor. The other was the arrival of an officer from Spain with dispatches, giving Napoleon news of the loss of the battle of Salamanca. He bore the evil tidings with temper and firmness, and soon turned his thoughts alike from domestic enjoyments and foreign defeats, to forming the necessary plans for the action before him.

Davoust proposed a plan for turning the left of the enemy's entrenched line, by following the old road from Smolensk to Moscow, and placing 35,000 men in the flank and rear of that part of the Russian position. This operation was partly to be accomplished by a night march, partly on the morning, while the rest of the army was engaging the enemy's attention in front. The ground to which this road would have conducted Davoust and his troops, forms the highest land in the neighbourhood, as appears from the rivulets taking their source there. Upon this commanding position the attacking corps might have been formed in the rear of the Russian line. Such a movement on that point must have cut off the Russians from their point of retreat on Mojaïsk and Moscow, and Davoust might have come down on their line, driving everything before him, advancing from redoubt to redoubt, and dispersing reserve after reserve, till the Russians should no longer have the semblance of an army. Perhaps Napoleon considered this plan as too hazardous, as it implied a great weakening of his front line, which, in that case, might have been attacked and broken before the corps d'armée under Davoust had attained the desired position.

The emperor therefore determined that Poniatowski, with not more than five thousand men, should make a demonstration, that should commence upon their left, in the direction proposed by Davoust, and that then a general attack should

commence on the Russian right and centre. Foreseeing an obstinate resistance, he had ordered as much artillery as possible to be brought into line, and the guns on each side are said to have amounted to a thousand. The battle began about seven o'clock, by Ney's attacking the bastioned redoubt on the Russian centre, with the greatest violence, while Prince Eugène made equal efforts to dislodge the enemy from the village of Semoneskoie, and the adjoining fortifications. No action was ever more keenly debated, nor at such a wasteful expenditure of human life. The fury of the French onset at length carried the redoubts, but the Russians rallied under the very line of their enemy's fire, and advanced again to the combat, to recover their entrenchments. Regiments of peasants, who till that day had never seen war, and who still had no other uniform than their grey jackets, formed with the steadiness of veterans, crossed their brows, and having uttered their national exclamation,—"*Gospodee pomiloui nas!*—God have mercy upon us!"—rushed into the thickest of the battle, where the survivors, without feeling fear or astonishment, closed their ranks over their comrades as they fell, while, supported at once by enthusiasm for their cause, and by a religious sense of predestination, life and death seemed alike indifferent to them.

The fate of the day seemed more than once so critical, that Napoleon was strongly urged, on more than one occasion, to bring up the Young Guard, whom he had in reserve, as the last means of deciding the contest. He was censured by some of those around him for not having done so; and it has been imputed to illness, as he had passed a bad night, and seemed unusually languid during the whole of the day. But the secret of his refusal seems to be contained in his reply to Berthier when he urged him on the subject. "And if there is another battle to-morrow, where is my army?" The fact is, that this body of ten thousand household troops were his last reserve. They had been spared as far as possible in the march, and had, of course, retained their discipline in a proportional degree; and had they sustained any considerable loss, which, from the obstinate resistance and repeated efforts of the Russians, was to be apprehended, Bonaparte, whom even victory must leave in a perilous condition, would in that case have lost the only corps upon whom, in the general disorganization of his army, he could thoroughly depend. The compromising the last reserve is an expedient reluctantly resorted to by prudent generals; and perhaps, if Napoleon had been as circumspect on that subject at Waterloo as at Borodino, his retreat from that bloody field might have been less calamitous than it proved.

The Russians, whose desperate efforts to recover their line of redoubts had exposed them to so much loss, were at length commanded to retreat; and although the victory was certainly with the French, yet their enemies might be said rather to desist from fighting, than to have suffered a defeat. Indeed, it was the French who, after the battle, drew off to their original ground, and left the Russians in possession of the bloody field of battle, where they buried their dead, and carried off their wounded, at their leisure. Their cavalry even alarmed the

French camp on the very night of their victory.

Both parties sustained a dreadful loss in this sanguinary battle. Among that of the Russians, the death of the gallant Prince Bagration, whose admirable retreat from Poland we have had occasion to commemorate, was generally lamented. General Touczkoff also died of his wounds; and many other Russian generals were wounded. Their loss amounted to the awful sum total of fifteen thousand men killed, and more than thirty thousand wounded. The French were supposed to have at least ten thousand men killed, and double the number wounded. Of these last few recovered, for the great convent of Kolotskoi, which served them as an hospital, was very ill provided with anything for their relief; and the medical attendants could not procure a party to scour the neighbouring villages, to obtain lint and other necessities,—for it seems even the necessities of an hospital could, in this ill-fated army, only be collected by marauding. Eight French generals were slain, of whom Monbrun and Caulaincourt, brother of the grand equerry, were men of distinguished reputation. About thirty other generals were wounded. Neither party could make any boast of military trophies, for the Russians made a thousand prisoners, and the French scarce twice the number; and Koutousoff carried away ten pieces of cannon belonging to the French, leaving in their hands thirteen guns of his own. So slight, except in the numbers of slain, had been the consequences of the battle, that it might have seemed to have been fought, as in the games of chivalry, merely to ascertain which party had the superior strength and courage.

According to the Russian accounts, Koutousoff entertained thoughts of giving battle again the next day; but the reports from various corps having made him acquainted with the very large loss they had sustained, he deemed the army too much exhausted to incur such a risk. He retreated the next day upon Mojaïsk, without leaving behind him a single fragment to indicate that he had the day before sustained such an immense loss. Upon the 9th September, the French arrived at Mojaïsk, and came again in sight of the Russian rear-guard, and made dispositions to attack them. But on the 11th, they found that the Russian army had again disappeared, by a retreat so well conducted, and so effectually masked and concealed, as to leave Napoleon altogether uncertain whether they had taken the road to Moscow, or to Kalouga. Owing to this uncertainty, Napoleon was obliged to remain at Mojaïsk till the 12th, when he received positive intelligence that the Russian army had retreated upon their capital.

It is impossible to avoid observing, how often the Russian army, though large, and consisting of new levies, had, in the course of this campaign, escaped from the front of the French, and left Napoleon at a loss to conjecture whither they had gone. Besides the present occasion, the same circumstance took place at Vitepsk, and again before the walls of Moscow. No doubt the Russians were in their own country, and possessed clouds of Cossacks, by means of whom they might cover the retreat of their main body; yet with all these advantages we are

led to admire the natural spirit of obedience, and instinct of discipline, by which they were brought to execute that movement with such steadiness, that not a single straggler remained to betray their secret.

On the 12th September, Bonaparte resumed his march, the army having no better guide than the direction of the high-road, and the men no better food than horse-flesh and bruised wheat. Upon the previous day, Murat and Mortier, who led the vanguard, found the Russians strongly posted near Krymskoie, where the inconsiderate valour of the King of Naples brought on an action, in which the French lost two thousand men. Still Bonaparte pursued the traces of the Russians, because he could not suppose it possible that they would resign their capital without a second struggle. He was the more anxious to meet it, as two divisions of the Italian army, under Laborde and Pino, had joined him from Smolensk, which again carried his numbers, sore thinned after the battle of Borodino, to upwards of one hundred thousand men.

A council of war, of the Russian generals, had been called, to deliberate on the awful question, whether they should expose the only army which they had in the centre of Russia, to the consequences of a too probable defeat, or whether they should abandon without a struggle, and as a prey to the spoiler, the holy Moscow—the Jerusalem of Russia—the city beloved of God and dear to man, with the name and existence of which so many historical, patriotic, national, and individual feelings were now involved. Reason spoke one language, pride and affection held another.

To hazard a second battle, was in a great measure to place the fate of their grand army upon the issue; and this was too perilous an adventure even for the protection of the capital. The consideration seems to have prevailed, that Napoleon being now in the centre of Russia, with an army daily diminishing, and the hard season coming on, every hour during which a decisive action could be delayed was a loss to France, and an advantage to Russia. This was rather the case, that Wittgenstein, on the northern frontier, being reinforced by Steingel with the army of Finland; and, on the south, that of Moldavia being united to Tormazoff,—Lithuania, and Poland, which formed the base of Napoleon's operations, were in hazard of being occupied by the Russians from both flanks, an event which must endanger his supplies, magazines, reserves, and communications of every kind, and put in peril at once his person and his army. Besides, the Russian generals reflected, that by evacuating Moscow, a measure which the inhabitants could more easily accomplish than those of any other city in the civilized world, they would diminish the prize to the victor, and leave him nothing to triumph over save the senseless buildings. It was, therefore, determined, that the preservation of the army was more essential to Russia than the defence of Moscow, and it was agreed that the ancient capital of the czars should be abandoned to its fate.

Count Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow, was a man of worth and talent, of wit also, as we have been informed, joined to a certain eccentricity. He

had, since the commencement of the war, kept up the spirits of the citizens with favourable reports and loyal declarations, qualified to infuse security into the public mind. After the fate of Smolensk, however, and especially after the recommencement of Bonaparte's march eastward, many of the wealthy inhabitants of Moscow removed or concealed their most valuable effects, and left the city themselves. Rostopchin continued, however, his assurances, and took various means to convince the people that there was no danger. Among other contrivances, he engaged a great number of females in the task of constructing a very large balloon, from which he was to shower down fire, as the people believed, upon the French army. Under this pretext, he is stated to have collected a large quantity of fire-works and combustibles, actually destined for a very different purpose.

As time passed on, however, the inhabitants became more and more alarmed, and forming a dreadful idea of the French, and of the horrors which would attend their entrance into the city, not only the nobility, gentry, and those of the learned professions, but tradesmen, mechanics, and the lower orders in general, left Moscow by thousands, while the governor, though keeping up the language of defiance, did all he could to superintend and encourage the emigration. The archives and the public treasures were removed; the magazines, particularly those of provisions, were emptied, as far as time permitted; and the roads, especially to the south, were crowded with files of carriages, and long columns of men, women, and children on foot, singing the hymns of their church, and often turning their eyes back to the magnificent city, which was so soon destined to be a pile of ruins.

The Grand Army of Moscow arrived in the position of Fili, near the capital; not, it was now acknowledged, to defend the sacred city, but to traverse its devoted streets, associating with their march the garrison, and such of the citizens as were fit to bear arms, and so leave the capital to its fate. On the 14th of September, the troops marched with downcast looks, furled banners, and silent drums, through the streets of the metropolis, and went out at the Kolonna gate. Their long columns of retreat were followed by the greater part of the remaining population. Meanwhile Rostopchin, ere departing, held a public court of justice. Two men were brought before him, one a Russian, an enthusiast, who had learned in Germany, and been foolish enough to express at Moscow, some of the old French republican doctrines. The other was a Frenchman, whom the near approach of his countrymen had emboldened to hold some indiscreet political language. The father of the Russian delinquent was present. He was expected to interfere. He did so; but it was to demand his son's death.

"I grant you," said the governor, "some moments to take leave and to bless him."

"Shall I bless a rebel?" said this Scythian Brutus. "Be my curse upon him that has betrayed his country!"

The criminal was hewed down on the spot.

"Stranger," said Rostopchin to the Frenchman, "thou hast been imprudent; yet it is but natural

thou shouldst desire the coming of thy countrymen. Be free, then, and go to meet them. Tell them there was one traitor in Russia, and thou hast seen him punished."

The governor then caused the jails to be opened, and the criminals to be set at liberty; and, abandoning the desolate city to these banditti, and a few of the lowest rabble, he mounted his horse, and, putting himself at the head of his retainers, followed the march of the army.

CHAPTER LXXVIII.

On 14th September, Napoleon reaches Moscow, which he finds deserted by the inhabitants.—The city is discovered to be on fire about midnight.—Napoleon takes up his quarters in the Kremlin.—The fire is stopped next day, but arises again at night.—Believed to be wilful, and several Russians apprehended and shot.—On the third night, the Kremlin is discovered to be on fire.—Bonaparte leaves it, and takes his abode at Petrowsky.—The fire rages till the 19th, when four-fifths of the city are burnt down.—On the 20th, Bonaparte returns to the Kremlin.—Discussion as to the origin of this great conflagration.—Disorganization and indiscipline of the French army.—Difficulty as to the route on leaving Moscow.—Lauriston sent with a letter to the Emperor Alexander.—Retrospect of the march of the Russian army, after leaving Moscow.—Lauriston has an interview with Koutousoff on 5th October.—The result.—Armistice made by Murat.—Preparations for retreat.—The Emperor Alexander refuses to treat.

On the 14th September, 1812, while the rear-guard of the Russians were in the act of evacuating Moscow, Napoleon reached the hill called the Mount of Salvation, because it is there where the natives kneel and cross themselves at first sight of the Holy City.

Moscow seemed lordly and striking as ever, with the steeples of its three hundred churches, and its copper domes glittering in the sun; its palaces of eastern architecture mingled with trees, and surrounded with gardens; and its Kremlin, a huge triangular mass of towers something between a palace and a castle, which rose like a citadel out of the general mass of groves and buildings. But not a chimney sent up smoke, not a man appeared on the battlements, or at the gates. Napoleon gazed every moment, expecting to see a train of bearded boyards arriving to fling themselves at his feet, and place their wealth at his disposal. His first exclamation was, "Behold at last that celebrated city!"—His next, "It was full time." His army, less regardful of the past or the future, fixed their eyes on the goal of their wishes, and a shout of "Moscow!—Moscow!"—passed from rank to rank.

Meantime no one interrupted his meditations, until a message came from Murat. He had pushed in among the Cossacks, who covered the rear of the Russians, and readily admitted to a parley the chivalrous champion, whom they at once recognized, having so often seen him blazing in the van of the French cavalry. The message which he sent to Bonaparte intimated, that Miloradovitch threatened to burn the town, if his rear was not allowed time to march through it. This was a tone of defiance.

Napoleon, however, granted the armistice, for which no inhabitants were left to be grateful.

After waiting two hours, he received from some French inhabitants, who had hidden themselves during the evacuation, the strange intelligence that Moscow was deserted by its population. The tidings that a population of two hundred and fifty thousand persons had left their native city was incredible, and Napoleon still commanded the boyards, the public functionaries, to be brought before him; nor could he be convinced of what had actually happened, till they led to his presence some of that refuse of humanity, the only live creatures they could find in the city, but they were wretches of the lowest rank. When he was at last convinced that the desertion of the capital was universal, he smiled bitterly, and said, "The Russians will soon learn better the value of their capital."

The signal was now given for the troops to advance; and the columns, still in a state of wonder at the solitude and silence which received them everywhere, penetrated through that assemblage of huts, mingled with palaces, where it seemed that *Pecury*, which has scarce means to obtain the ordinary necessities of life, had for her next door neighbour all the wealth and profuse expenditure of the East. At once the silence was broken by a volley of musketry, which some miserable fanatics poured from the battlements of the Kremlin on the first French troops that approached the palace of the czars. These wretches were most of them intoxicated; yet the determined obstinacy with which they threw away their lives, was another feature of that rugged patriotism of which the French had seen, and were yet to see, so many instances.

When he entered the gates of Moscow, Bonaparte, as if unwilling to encounter the sight of the empty streets, stopt immediately on entering the first suburb. His troops were quartered in the desolate city. During the first few hours after their arrival, an obscure rumour, which could not be traced, but one of those which are sometimes found to get abroad before the approach of some awful certainty, announced that the city would be endangered by fire in the course of the night. The report seemed to arise from those evident circumstances which rendered the event probable, but no one took any notice of it, until at midnight, when the soldiers were startled from their quarters by the report that the town was in flames. The memorable conflagration began amongst the coachmakers' warehouses and workshops in the Bazaar, or general market, which was the most rich district of the city. It was imputed to accident, and the progress of the flames was subdued by the exertions of the French soldiers. Napoleon, who had been roused by the tumult, hurried to the spot, and when the alarm seemed at an end, he retired, not to his former quarters in the suburbs, but to the Kremlin, the hereditary palace of the only sovereign whom he had ever treated as an equal, and over whom his successful arms had now attained such an apparently immense superiority. Yet he did not suffer himself to be dazzled by the advantage he had obtained, but availed himself of the light of the blazing Bazaar, to write to the emperor proposals of peace with his

own hand. They were dispatched by a Russian officer of rank, who had been disabled by indisposition from following the army. But no answer was ever returned.

Next day the flames had disappeared, and the French officers luxuriously employed themselves in selecting out of the deserted palaces of Moscow, that which best pleased the fancy of each for his residence. At night the flames again arose in the north and west quarters of the city. As far the greater part of the houses were built of wood, the conflagration spread with the most dreadful rapidity. This was at first imputed to the blazing brands and sparkles which were carried by the wind; but at length it was observed, that, as often as the wind changed, and it changed three times in that terrible night, new flames broke always forth in that direction, where the existing gale was calculated to direct them on the Kremlin. These horrors were increased by the chance of explosion. There was, though as yet unknown to the French, a magazine of powder in the Kremlin; besides that a park of artillery, with its ammunition, was drawn up under the emperor's window. Morning came, and with it a dreadful scene. During the whole night, the metropolis had glared with an untimely and unnatural light. It was now covered with a thick and suffocating atmosphere of almost palpable smoke. The flames defied the efforts of the French soldiery, and it is said that the fountains of the city had been rendered inaccessible, the water-pipes cut, and the fire-engines destroyed or carried off.

Then came the reports of fire-balls having been found burning in deserted houses; of men and women, that, like demons, had been seen openly spreading the flames, and who were said to be furnished with combustibles for rendering their dreadful work more secure. Several wretches against whom such acts had been charged were seized upon, and, probably without much inquiry, were shot on the spot. While it was almost impossible to keep the roof of the Kremlin clear of the burning brands which showered down the wind, Napoleon watched from the windows the course of the fire which devoured his fair conquest, and the exclamation burst from him, "These are indeed Scythians!"

The equinoctial gales rose higher and higher upon the third night, and extended the flames, with which there was no longer any human power of contending. At the dead hour of midnight, the Kremlin itself was found to be on fire. A soldier of the Russian police, charged with being the incendiary, was turned over to the summary vengeance of the Imperial Guard. Bonaparte was then, at length, persuaded, by the entreaties of all around him, to relinquish his quarters in the Kremlin, to which, as the visible mark of his conquest, he had seemed to cling with the tenacity of a lion holding a fragment of his prey. He encountered both difficulty and danger in retiring from the palace, and before he could gain the city-gate, he had to traverse with his suite streets arched with fire, and in which the very air they breathed was suffocating. At length, he gained the open country, and took up his abode in a palace of the czar's called *Petrowsky*, about a French league from the city. As he looked back on the fire, which, under the influence

of the autumnal wind, swelled and surged around the Kremlin, like an infernal ocean around a sable Pandemonium, he could not suppress the ominous expression, "This bodes us great misfortune."

The fire continued to triumph unopposed, and consumed in a few days what it had cost centuries to raise. "Palaces and temples," says a Russian author, "monuments of art, and miracles of luxury, the remains of ages which had past away, and those which had been the creation of yesterday; the tombs of ancestors, and the nursery-cradles of the present generation, were indiscriminately destroyed. Nothing was left of Moscow save the remembrance of the city, and the deep resolution to avenge its fall." *

The fire raged till the 19th with unabated violence, and then began to slacken for want of fuel. It is said, four fifths of this great city were laid in ruins.

On the 20th, Bonaparte returned to the Kremlin; and, as if in defiance of the terrible scene which he had witnessed, took measures as if he were disposed to make Moscow his residence for some time. He even caused a theatre to be fitted up, and plays to be acted by performers sent from Paris, to show perhaps that it was not in the most terrible of elements to overawe his spirit, or interrupt his usual habits of life. In the same style of indifference or affectation, a set of very precise regulations respecting the Théâtre Français was drawn up by the emperor amid the ruins of Moscow. He was not superior to the affectation of chasing distant places and foreign capitals for the date of domestic and trifling ordinances. It gave the emperor an air of ubiquity, to issue rules for a Parisian theatre from the Kremlin. It had already been prophesied that he would sacrifice his army to have the pleasure of dating a decree from Moscow.

The conflagration of Moscow was so complete in its devastation; so important in its consequences; so critical in the moment of its commencement, that almost all the eye-witnesses have imputed it to a sublime, yet almost horrible exertion of patriotic decision on the part of the Russians, their government, and, in particular, of the governor, Rostopchin. Nor has the positive denial of Count Rostopchin himself diminished the general conviction, that the fire was directed by him. All the French officers continue to this day to ascribe the conflagration to persons whom he had employed.

On the other hand, there are many, and those good judges of the probabilities in such an event, who have shown strong reasons for believing, that Moscow shared but the fate of a deserted city, which is almost always burnt as well as pillaged. We shall only observe, that should the scale of evidence incline to the side of accident, History will lose one of the grandest, as well as most terrible incidents which she has on record. Considered as a voluntary Russian act, the burning of their capital is an incident of gigantic character, which we consider with awe and terror; our faculties so confused by the immensity of the object, considered in its different bearings,

that we hardly know whether to term it vice or virtue, patriotism or vengeance.

Whether the conflagration of Moscow was, or was not, the work of Russian will, and Russian hands, the effects which it was to produce on the campaign were likely to be of the most important character. Bonaparte's object in pressing on to the capital at every risk, was to grasp a pledge, for the redemption of which he had no doubt Alexander would be glad to make peace on his own terms. But the prize of his victory, however fair to the sight, had, like that fabled fruit said to grow on the banks of the Dead Sea, proved in the end but soot and ashes. Moscow, indeed, he had seized, but it had perished in his grasp; and far from being able to work upon Alexander's fears for its safety, it was reasonable to think that its total destruction had produced the most vehement resentment on the part of the Russian monarch, since Napoleon received not even the civility of an answer to his conciliatory letter. And thus the acquisition so much desired as the means of procuring peace, had become, by this catastrophe, the cause of the most irreconcilable enmity.

Neither was it a trifling consideration, that Napoleon had lost by this dreadful fire a great part of the supplies, which he expected the capture of the metropolis would have contributed for the support of his famished army. Had there existed in Moscow the usual population of a capital, he would have found the usual modes of furnishing its markets in full activity. These, doubtless, are not of the common kind, for provisions are sent to this capital, not, as is usual, from fertile districts around the city, but from distant regions, whence they are brought by water-carriage in the summer, and by sledges, which travel on the ice and frozen snow, in the winter time. To Moscow, with its usual inhabitants, these supplies must have been remitted as usual, lest the numerous population of 250,000 and upwards, should be famished, as well as the enemy's army. But Moscow deserted,—Moscow burnt, and reduced to mountains of cinders and ashes,—had no occasion for such supplies; nor was it to be supposed that the provinces from which they were usually remitted, would send them to a heap of ruins, where there remained none to be fed, save the soldiers of the invading army. This conviction came with heavy anticipation on the Emperor of France and his principal officers.

Meanwhile, the ruins of Moscow, and the remnant which was left standing, afforded the common soldiers an abundance of booty during their short day of rest; and, as is their nature, they enjoyed the present moment without thinking of futurity. The army was dispersed over the city, plundering at pleasure whatever they could find; sometimes discovering quantities of melted gold and silver, sometimes rich merchandize and precious articles, of which they knew not the value; sometimes articles of luxury, which contrasted strangely with their general want of comforts, and even necessities. It was not uncommon to see the most tattered, shoeless wretches, sitting among bales of rich merchandize, or displaying costly shawls, precious furs, and vestments rich with barbaric pearl and gold. In another

* Karamzin, a Russian historian of eminence, whose works were expressly excepted from the censorship, by the late Emperor Alexander.

place, there were to be seen soldiers possessed of tea, sugar, coffee, and similar luxuries, while the same individuals could scarce procure carrion to eat, or muddy water to drink. Of sugar, in particular, they had such quantities, that they mixed it with their horse-flesh soup. The whole was a contrast of the wildest and most lavish excess, with the last degree of necessity, disgusting to witness, and most ominous in its presage. They esteemed themselves happiest of all, who could procure intoxicating liquors, and escape by some hours of insensibility from the scene of confusion around them.

Napoleon and his officers toiled hard to restore some degree of organization to the army. The plundering, which could not be discontinued, was latterly set about more regularly; and detachments were sent to pillage the ruins of Moscow, as in turn of duty. The rest of the troops were withdrawn from the city, or confined to their quarters in the buildings which remained entire. Everything was done to protect the few peasants, who brought provisions to the camp for sale. Nevertheless, few appeared, and at length not one was to be seen. The utmost exertion, therefore, could not, it was obvious, render Moscow a place of rest for many days; and the difficulty of chusing the route by which to leave it, became now an embarrassing consideration.

There were three modes of proceeding on evacuating Moscow, all of which had in their turn Napoleon's anxious consideration. First, he might march on St Petersburg, and deal with the modern, as he had with the ancient capital of Russia. This counsel best suited the daring genius of Bonaparte, ever bent upon the game by which all is to be lost, or all won. He even spoke of that measure as a thing resolved; but Berthier and Bessières prevailed in convincing him, that the lateness of the season, the state of the roads, the want of provisions, and the condition of the army, rendered such an attempt totally desperate. The second proposed measure, was to move southwards upon the fertile province of Kalouga, and thence to proceed westward towards Smolensk, which was their first dépôt. In this route Napoleon must have fought a general action with Koutousoff, who, as we shall presently see, had taken a position to the south of Moscow. This, indeed, would have been, in many respects, a motive with Napoleon to take the route to Kalouga; but a second battle of Borodino, as obstinately fought, and as doubtful in its termination, would have been a bad commencement for a retreat, the flanks of which would certainly be annoyed, even if the Moldavian army did not intercept the front. The third plan was, to return by the route on which he had advanced, and on which, by a few places hastily fortified, he still preserved a precarious communication with Smolensk, Vitepsk, and so on to Wilna. This line, however, lay through the countries which had been totally destroyed and wasted by the advance of the army, and where all the villages and hamlets had been burned and abandoned, either by the French or the Russians themselves. To take this direction was to confront famine.

Napoleon's hesitation on this important point was increased by the eagerness with which he still adhered to his own plan for the conclusion of the war,

by a triumphant peace with Alexander, concluded on the ruins of his capital. His mind, which ever clung with tenacity to the opinionous he had once formed, revolved the repeated instances in which his voice had in such circumstances commanded peace, and dictated the articles. The idea which he had formed of Alexander's disposition during the interviews of Tilsit and Erfurt, had made him regard the czar as docile, and disposed to submit to the rebuke of his own predominant genius. But he mistook the character of the sovereign, and of the nation he commanded. The one, although he had hitherto encountered nothing but defeat and disaster, was determined not to submit, while his immense resources furnished the means of resistance. The other, in all probability, would not have permitted the sovereign to act otherwise, for the popular indignation was now at spring-tide; and from the palace of the czar to the hut of the slave, there was nothing breathed save resistance and revenge.

It was in vain, therefore, that Napoleon expected that Alexander would open some communication on the subject of, or would answer, the letter which he had sent, during the first night he possessed Moscow, by a Russian officer. He grew impatient at length, and resolved himself to make farther advances. But not even to his confidential advisers would he own that he sought peace on his own score; he affected to be anxious only on account of Alexander. "He is my friend," he said; "a prince of excellent qualities; and should he yield to his inclinations, and propose peace, the barbarians in their rage will dethrone and put him to death, and fill the throne with some one less tractable. We will send Caulaincourt to break the way for negotiation, and prevent the odium which Alexander might incur, by being the first to propose a treaty." The emperor abode by this resolution, excepting in so far as he was persuaded with some difficulty to dispatch General Count Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, upon this embassy; lest Caulaincourt's superior rank of master of the horse might indicate that his master sought a treaty, less for Alexander's security than his own, and that of his army. Lauriston, who was well acquainted with the Russian character, urged several doubts against the policy of the mission intrusted to him, as betraying their necessity to the enemy; and recommended that the army should, without losing a day, commence its retreat by Kalouga, and the more southern route. Bonaparte, however, retained his determination, and Lauriston was dismissed with a letter to the Emperor Alexander, and the parting instruction,—"I must have peace, and will sacrifice to obtain it, all except my honour."

Before we give the result of Lauriston's mission, it is proper to trace the movements of the Russian grand army, since their melancholy march through the city of Moscow. They left the city by the route of Kolomna, and marched for two days in that direction; and having thus imposed on the enemy a belief, that they were bent in securing a retreat to the south-east, leaving at once the eastern and northern provinces undefended, Koutousoff executed one of the most dexterous movements of the Russian army during the campaign. The observa-

tion of the St Petersburg road was intrusted to Winzengerode, with a small flying army. Kontousoff himself turning to the southward, performed a circular march, of which Moscow was the centre, so as to transfer the grand army to the route towards Kalouga. They marched in stern dejection; for the wind, great as the distance was, showered among their ranks the ashes of their burning capital, and in the darkness, the flames were seen to rage like a huge ocean of fire. The movement was a bold one also, for, although performed at a respectful distance from the French army, yet the march was for three days a flank march, and consequently of a very delicate character. The Russians manoeuvred, however, with such precision, that they performed their movement in perfect safety; and while the French troops who had been sent in their pursuit, were amusing themselves with pursuing two regiments of horse, which had been left on the Kolonna road, they were astonished to find that the grand Russian army had assumed a position on the south-eastern side of Moscow, from which they could operate upon and harass, nay, intercept at pleasure, Napoleon's line of communication with Smolensk and with Poland, and at the same time cover the town of Kalouga, where great magazines had been assembled, and that of Toulou, famed for the fabrication of arms and artillery.

The ardent King of Naples, with the advanced guard of his brother-in-law's army at length moved against their enemies on the Kalouga road; but little took place save skirmishes, by which the Russians protected their rear, until they took up a stationary posture in the strong position of Taroutino. They were here admirably placed for the purpose of covering the important town of Kalouga. There are three routes which lead from Moscow to that city; and Taroutino being situated in the middle road, an army placed there can with little trouble, by moving to the right or the left, occupy either of the other two. The front of the Russian position was covered by the river Nera. The camp was amply supplied with provisions from the wealthy and plentiful districts in the rear; and as the spirit of the country more and more developed itself, recruits and new-raised regiments arrived faster than the exertions of the veteran soldier could train them to arms, although the Russian, from his docility and habits of obedience, receives military discipline with unusual readiness. The Ukraine and Don sent twenty regiments of Cossacks, most of them men who, having already served their stipulated time, were excused from military duty, but who universally assumed the lance and sabre at a crisis of such emergency.

Murat at the same time pressed forward to establish himself in front of the Russian camp, for the purpose of watching their motions. In his progress, he passed what had been a splendid domain, belonging to Count Rostopchin, the governor of Moscow. It was in ashes; and a letter from the proprietor informed the French he had destroyed it, lest it should give an invader comfort or shelter.* The same

* "Frenchmen," such was the tenor of this remarkable intimation, "for eight years it has been my pleasure to embellish this my family residence. The inhabitants,

spirit possessed the peasantry. They set fire to their hamlets, wherever they could be of use to the invaders; proclaimed the punishment of death to all of their own order, who, from avarice or fear, should be tempted to supply the enemy with provisions; and they inflicted it without mercy on such as incurred the penalty. It is an admitted fact, that when the French, in order to induce their refractory prisoners to labour in their service, branded some of them on the hand with the letter N, as a sign that they were the serfs of Napoleon, one peasant laid his branded hand on a log of wood, and struck it off with the axe which he held in the other, in order to free himself from the supposed thralldom. The French who looked on shuddered, and cursed the hour which brought them into collision with enemies of such a rugged and inexorable disposition. The patriotism of the peasants in general had been turned to still better account by the partisan or guerrilla warfare, for which Spain had given an example.

Lieutenant-colonel Dennis Davidoff, who became well known to the French by the name of *le Capitaine Noir*, had suggested this species of war to Prince Bagration, a little before the battle of Borodino; and had obtained distinguished success at the head of a small party of Cossacks and hussars, by his operations on the route betwixt Gjat and Wiazma, in cutting off supplies, and defeating small detached parties of the enemy. He was speedily put at the head of a much larger force; and other free corps of the same kind were raised, with brave and active spirits at their head. They scoured the country, infested the French lines of communication, drove in their outposts, and distressed them on every point.

The peasants also took arms, and formed themselves into bodies of partisans, rendered formidable by their perfect knowledge of the woods, by-paths, and passes. They have a natural contempt for foreigners, for whom they have no other name than "the deaf and dumb," to denote their ignorance of the Russian language. The events of the campaign, especially the conflagration of Moscow, had converted their scorn into deadly hatred; and whatever soldier of Napoleon fell into their hands was put to death without scruple or pity.

Meantime the cavalry of Murat, which afforded the best means of chastising and repressing these bands, gradually declined under hard work and want of subsistence; and, although little used to droop or distress himself about the future, the King of Naples wrote repeatedly from his advanced post, to press Napoleon no longer to delay a retreat which was become absolutely necessary. It was while matters were in this state that General Lauriston arrived at the Russian outposts, and after a good deal of difficulty, real or affected, was at length admitted to an interview with Kontousoff, at midnight on the 5th October. His reception was such as to make him consider himself a welcome envoy.

Lauriston opened his business with a proposal for

1,700 in number, will leave it as you approach; and it will be reduced to ashes, that not one of you may pollute it by your presence. I have left you two palaces in Moscow, with their furniture, worth half a million of rubles. Here you will only find ashes.*

exchange of prisoners, which was of course declined on the part of Koutousoff, aware, that while soldiers were plenty among the Russians, the ranks of Napoleon must become every day thinner. Lauriston next introduced the subject of the independent bands, and proposed that an end should be put to this species of unusual war, in which so many cruelties were committed. Koutousoff replied, that this kind of partisan war did not depend on his orders, but arose from the native spirit of the country, which led the Russians to regard the French invasion as an incursion of Tartars. General Lauriston then entered on the real business of his mission, by asking whether "this war, which had assumed such an unheard-of character, was to last for ever;" declaring, at the same time, his master the Emperor of France's sincere desire, to terminate hostilities between two great and generous nations.

The astucious old Russian saw Bonaparte's evident necessity in his affected wish for peace, and immediately adopted the course most likely to gain time, which must at once increase the difficulties of the French, and his own power of availing himself of them. He affected a sincere desire to promote a pacification, but declared he was absolutely prohibited either to receive any proposal to that effect himself, or to transmit such to the emperor. He therefore declined to grant General Lauriston the desired passport to the presence of Alexander, but he offered to send General Wolkonsky, an aide-de-camp of the czar, to learn his imperial pleasure.

The express charge which Lauriston had received from his master, that peace was to be obtained on any terms not inferring dishonour, did not permit him to object to this arrangement. He was even encouraged to hope it might prove effectual, so much satisfaction was expressed by General Koutousoff and the officers of his military family, all of whom seemed to deplore the continuance of the war, and went so far as to say, that this announcement of a treaty would be received at St Petersburg with public rejoicings. These accounts being transmitted to Napoleon, lulled him into a false security. He returned to his original opinion, which had been shaken, but not subverted; and announced to his generals, with much satisfaction, that they had but to wait a fortnight for a triumphant pacification. He boasted his own superior knowledge of the Russian character, and declared, that on the arrival of his overture for peace, St Petersburg would be full of bonfires.

Napoleon, however, was not so confident of peace as to approve a singular sort of armistice which Murat had entered into with the Russians. It was to be broken off, on an intimation of three hours' space, by either party to the other; and, while in existence, it only subsisted along the fronts of the two armies, leaving the Russians at liberty to carry on their partisan war on the flanks as much as ever. The French could not obtain a load of furze, or a cart of provisions, without fighting for it, and often to disadvantage. A large party of the dragoons of the Imperial Guard were surprised and piked by the Cossacks. Two considerable convoys were surprised and cut off on the road to Mojaïsk, the only communication which the French army had with its magazines and reinforcements. The French

were surprised, and lost a detachment in the town of Vereia, on Murat's left flank. Thus the war continued everywhere, except on the front of the armies, where it had the greatest chance to be favourable to the French.

This bad policy is not to be imputed to Napoleon, who had refused to authorize the armistice, but to the vanity of Murat, under whose authority it was still observed. It gave him an opportunity of amusing himself, by caracoling on the neutral ground betwixt the camps, displaying his handsome form, gallant horsemanship, and splendid dresses, to the soldiers on both sides; receiving the respectful salutes of the Russian patrols, and the applause of the Cossacks. These last used to crowd around him, partly in real admiration of his chivalrous appearance and character, which was of a kind to captivate these primitive warriors, and partly, doubtless, from their natural shrewdness, which saw the utility of maintaining his delusion. They called him their Hettiman; and he was so intoxicated with their applause, as to have been said to nourish the wild idea of becoming in earnest King of the Cossacks.

Such delusions could not for ever lull Murat's vigilance to sleep. The war was all around him, and his forces were sinking under a succession of petty hostilities; while the continual rolling of drums, and the frequent platoon firing, heard from behind the Russian encampment, intimated how busily they were engaged in drilling numerous bodies of fresh recruits. The Russian officers at the outposts began to hold ominous language, and ask the French if they had made a composition with the Northern Winter, Russia's most fearful ally. "Stay another fortnight," they said, "and your nails will drop off, and your fingers fall from your hands, like boughs from a blighted tree." The numbers of the Cossacks increased so much, as to resemble one of the ancient Scythian emigrations; and wild and fantastic figures, on unbroken horses, whose manes swept the ground, seemed to announce that the inmost recesses of the desert had sent forth their inhabitants. Their grey-bearded chiefs sometimes held expostulations with the French officers, in a tone very different from that which soothed the ears of Murat. "Had you not," they said, "in France, food enough, water enough, air enough, to subsist you while you lived,—earth enough to cover you when you died; and why come you to enrich our soil with your remains, which by right belong to the land where you were born?" Such evil bodements affected the van of the army, from whence Murat transmitted them to the emperor.

Immured in the recesses of the Kremlin, Napoleon persisted in awaiting the answer to the letter dispatched by Lauriston. It had been sent to St Petersburg on the 6th, and an answer could not be expected before the 26th. To have moved before that period, might be thought prudent in a military point of view; but, politically considered, it would greatly injure his reputation for sagacity, and destroy the impression of his infallibility. Thus sensible, and almost admitting that he was wrong, he determined, nevertheless, to persevere in the course he had chosen, in hopes that Fortune, which never

before failed him, might yet stand his friend in extremity.

A bold scheme is said to have been suggested by Daru, to turn Moscow into an entrenched camp, and occupy it as winter quarters. They might kill the remainder of the horses, he said, and salt them down; foraging must do the rest. Napoleon approved of what he termed a Lion's counsel. But the fear of what might happen in France, from which this plan would have secluded them for six months, induced him finally to reject it. It might be added, that the obtaining supplies by marauding was likely to become more and more difficult, as winter and the scarcity increased, especially now that the country around Moscow was completely ruined. Besides, if Napoleon fixed himself at Moscow for the winter, not only his line of communications, but Lithuania, and the Grand Duchy, which formed the base of his operations, ran every risk of being invaded. On the south-west, the dubious faith of Austria was all he had to trust to, for the purpose of resisting the united armies of Tchitchagoff and Tormazoff, which might be augmented to 100,000 men, and make themselves masters of Warsaw and Wilna. On the northern extremity of his general line of operations, Macdonald and St-Cyr might prove unable to resist Wittgenstein and Steingel; and he had in his rear Prussia, the population of which Napoleon justly considered as ready to take arms against him at the first favourable opportunity. The scheme, therefore, for occupying winter quarters at Moscow was rejected as fraught with dangers.

Even when appearances of a fall of snow reminded the emperor of the climate which he was braving, his preparations for retreat were slowly and reluctantly made; and some of them were dictated by his vanity, rather than his judgment. All the pictures, images, and ornaments of the churches, which were left unburnt, were collected, and loaded upon wains, to follow the line of march, already too much encumbered with baggage. A gigantic cross, which stood on the tower of Ivan the Great, the tallest steeple of Moscow, was dismounted with much labour, that it might add to the trophies, which were already sufficiently cumbersome. On the same principle, Napoleon was angry when it was proposed to leave some of his immense train of artillery, which was greatly too numerous for the reduced size of his army. "He would leave no trophy for the Russians to triumph over." That all the artillery and baggage might be transported, he surprised his officers by an order to buy twenty thousand horses, where, perhaps, there were not an hundred to be sold, and when those which they had already were daily dying for want of forage. The latter article, he ordered, should be provided for two months, in dépôts on his route. This mandate might make known his wants; but as it certainly could contribute little to supply them, it must only have been issued for the purpose of keeping up appearances. Perhaps the desire to have some excuse to himself and others for indulging in his lingering wish to remain a day or two longer, to await the answer from St Petersburg, might be a secret cause of issuing orders, which must occasion some inquiry ere it could be

reported in what extent they could be obeyed.

If this were the case, it was the rash indulgence of a groundless hope. The Emperor Alexander refused to hear of any negotiation for peace, and took no other notice of that which had been transmitted to him by Wolkonsky, than to pass a censure on the Russian officers concerned, and Prince Koutousoff himself, for having had the least intercourse with the French generals. He reminded the generalissimo how positive his instructions had been on this subject, and that he had enjoined him on no account to enter into negotiations or correspondence with the invaders; and he revived and enforced his injunctions to that effect.

The sagacious general was not, it is to be supposed, greatly affected by a rebuke which was only given for form's sake. He made his soldiers acquainted with the emperor's unalterable resolution to give no terms to the invaders; and spreading through the camp, at the same time, the news of the victory at Salamanca, and the evacuation of Madrid, pointed out to them, that Frenchmen, like others, were liable to defeat; and called on his soldiers to emulate the courage of the British, and patriotism of the Spaniards. While the minds of the soldiery were thus excited and encouraged, Koutousoff took measures for anticipating Napoleon, by putting an end to the armistice, and assuming an offensive posture.

CHAPTER LXXIX.

Murat's armistice broken off.—He is attacked and defeated.

—Napoleon leaves Moscow on 19th October.—Bloody skirmish at Mala-Yarowslavetz.—Napoleon in great danger while reconnoitring.—He retreats to Verela, where he meets Mortier and the Young Guard.—Winzengerode made prisoner, and insulted by Bonaparte.—The Kremlin is blown up by the French.—Napoleon continues his retreat towards Poland.—Its horrors.—Conflict near Wiazma, on 3d November, where the French lose 4,000 men.—Cross the river Wiazma during the night.—Proceedings of the Viceroy of Italy.—He reaches Smolensk, in great distress, on the 13th.—Bonaparte arrives at Smolensk, with the headmost division of the grand army.—Sketch of the calamitous retreat of Ney's division.—The whole French army now collected at Smolensk.—Retrospect of proceedings on the extreme flanks of Napoleon's line of advance.—Cautious conduct of Prince Schwartzberg.—Winzengerode freed on his road to Paris, by a body of Cossacks.—Tchitchagoff occupies Minsk on 14th November, and Lamberg, one of his generals, captures Borissoff, after severe fighting.—Perilous situation of Napoleon.

It was easy to make Murat himself the active person in breaking off the armistice, a step which the Russian general preferred, lest a formal intimation of rupture on his own side might lead the King of Naples to suspect his further purpose. Accordingly, a Cossack having fired his carabine when Murat was examining the advanced guards, irritated, as it was designed to do, that fiery soldier, and induced him to announce to the Russian generals that the armistice was ended. The Russians were the first to commence hostilities.

The camp, or position, which Murat occupied, Wordonow, was covered on the right, and on the

centre, by a rivolet or brook, running in a deep ravine; but the stream taking another direction, left a good part of the left wing uncovered, which was at the same time exposed to surprise from a wood covering a little plain where his left rested. The sum of Murat's force, which consisted of the cavalry, and Poniatowski's division, was computed to be upwards of thirty thousand. It is singular that since the King of Naples expected an attack, as was intimated by his letter to his brother-in-law, he did not take the precaution of placing videttes and advanced guards in the woody plain. But the French, from their long train of success, were accustomed to despise their enemies, and to consider a surprise as a species of affront which they were never to be exposed to.

The Russians had laid a plan, which, had it been dexterously executed, must have destroyed the whole French advanced guard. An attack upon the left of Murat's position, by two Russian columns, under Count Orloff-Dennizoff, was completely successful; but two other columns, by whom he should have been supported, did not arrive in time upon the point of action; the Poles, under Poniatowski, made a glorious defence upon the right, and the van-guard was saved from utter destruction. But there was a complete defeat; the King of Naples lost his cannon, his position, and his baggage, had two thousand men killed, and lost fifteen hundred prisoners. The French cavalry, except a few of those belonging to the guard, might be said to be utterly destroyed. Everything which the Russians saw in the enemies' camp convinced them of the distress to which the French were reduced. Flayed cats and horse-flesh were the dainties found in the King of Naples' kitchen.

It was the 18th of October when first the noise of the cannon, and soon after, the arrival of an officer, brought intelligence of this mishap to Bonaparte. His energy of character, which had appeared to slumber during the days he had spent in a species of irresolution at Moscow, seemed at once restored. He poured forth, without hesitation, a torrent of orders suited for the occasion, directing the march of the troops to support Murat at Worodonow. Notwithstanding the miscellaneous variety of directions, each was distinct in itself, yet critically connected with the others, so as to form, on the whole, a perfect and well connected plan of movements. Part of the army marched that night; the rest had their route for the next morning. A garrison, under Marshal Mortier, was left as a rear-guard in the Kremlin; from which it may be inferred that Napoleon did not as yet intend a final retreat.

On the 19th October, before day-break, the emperor in person left Moscow, after an abode of thirty-four days. "Let us march," he said, "on Kalouga, and woe to those who shall oppose us." In this brief sentence he announced the whole plan of his retreat, which was to defeat the army of Koutousoff, or compel him to retire, and then himself to return to the frontiers of Poland, by the unwanted route of Kalouga, Medyn, Inkowo, Ellnia and Smolensk.

The French army, which now filed from the gates of Moscow, and which continued to move on in a living mass for many hours, comprehended

about one hundred and twenty thousand men, indifferently well appointed, and marching in good order. They were followed by no less than five hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, a train beyond proportion to their numbers, and two thousand artillery waggons. So far the march had a martial and imposing aspect. But in the rear of these came a confused crowd of many thousands, consisting of followers of the camp, stragglers who had rejoined it, and prisoners, many of them employed in carrying, or driving forward in wheelbarrows, the spoil of the conquerors.

Among these were French families formerly inhabitants of Moscow, and composing what was called the French colony there, who could no longer reckon upon it as a safe place of abode, and who took the opportunity of retiring with their countrymen. There was, besides, a mixture and confusion of all imaginable kind of carriages, charged with the baggage of the army, and with the spoils of Moscow, as well those trophies which Napoleon had seized upon to amuse the Parisians, as what had been seized by individuals. This miscellaneous crowd resembled, according to Ségur, a horde of Tartars returning from a successful invasion.

There were, as has been said, three routes from Moscow to Kalouga. The central, or old road, was that upon which the Russians lay encamped at their grand position of Taroutino, and in front of it was that of Worodonow, or Inkowo, where they had so lately defeated Murat. Napoleon advanced a day's march on this route, in order to induce Koutousoff to believe that he proposed to attack his army in front; but this was only a feint, for, on the next day, he turned off by cross-roads into the eastern, or new road to Kalouga, with the view of advancing by that route until he should be past the Russian camp at Taroutino, on the right flank, and then of again crossing from the new road to the old one, and thus getting possession of Borowsk and Mala-Yarowslavetz, towns on the same road to the southward of Taroutino. Thus the Russian position would be turned and avoided, while the main body of the French Emperor would be interposed between Koutousoff and Kalouga, and the fertile southern provinces laid open to supply his army.

On the 23d, the emperor with his main body attained Borowsk, and learned that the division of Delzons, which formed his van-guard, had occupied Mala-Yarowslavetz without opposition. Thus far all seemed to have succeeded according to Napoleon's wish.

But Koutousoff, so soon as he was aware of the danger in which he stood of being cut off from Kalouga, retaliated upon Napoleon his own manoeuvre, and detached Generals Doktoroff and Raefskoi to the southward with a strong division, to outmarch the French, and occupy the position of Mala-Yarowslavetz, or to regain it if it was taken. He himself, breaking up his camp at Taroutino, followed with his whole army by the road of Lectazowo, and marched so rapidly as to outstrip the French army, and reach the southward of Mala-Yarowslavetz, and consequently again interpose himself between Napoleon and Kalouga.

Mala-Yarowslavetz offers a strong position. The

town is built on a rapid declivity, broken with cliffs, the bottom of which is washed by the river Louja. On the northern side of the Louja, and connected with the town by a bridge, is a small plain with some huts, where Delzons' army bivouacked, having stationed two battalions to defend the town, and to watch the motions of the enemy. About four in the morning, when all were asleep, save the few sentinels who kept a careless watch, the Russians rushed into the place with dreadful outcries, drove the two battalions out of the town, and pushed them down the declivity and across the Louja to their main body. The noise of the artillery drew the attention of Eugène the viceroy, who being only about three leagues from the scene of action, arrived there about the dawn. The soldiers of Delzons' division were then discovered struggling to regain the southern bank, on which the town was situated. Encouraged by the approach of Eugène, Delzons pushed forward across the bridge, repelled the Russians, gained the middle of the village, and was shot dead. His brother, who endeavoured to drag the general's body from the spot, incurred the same fate. General Guilleminot succeeded to the command, and threw a strong party of French into the church, which served as a citadel during the continuance of the action. The Russians rushed in once more, and drove Guilleminot back to the bridge. He was, however, succoured by Prince Eugène, who, after various less serious attempts, directed a whole division on the town.

Mala-Yarowslavetz was then recovered by the French; but, on reconnoitring a little farther, the whole of Koutousoff's army appeared on the plain beyond it, upwards of 100,000 men in number, and already possessed of a good position, which they were improving by entrenchments. Reinforcements from the Russian ranks immediately attacked the French, who were driven back on the town, which, being composed of wooden huts, was now in flames, and the French were again dispossessed of Mala-Yarowslavetz. The miserable ruins of this place were five times won and lost. At length, as the main body of the grand army came up under Napoleon himself, he found the French still in possession of the disputed village and its steep bank. But beyond them lay the numerous Russian army stationed and entrenched, supported by a very large train of artillery, and seeming to render a battle absolutely indispensable to dislodge them from the position they had taken, and the fortifications with which they had secured themselves.

A council of war was held in the head-quarters of the emperor, the hut of a poor weaver, divided by a screen, which served as the only partition. Here he received and meditated upon the reports of his generals, together with their opinions, and learned, to his distress, that Bessières, and other good officers, reported that the position occupied by Koutousoff was unassailable. He resolved to judge with his own eyes on the next day, and in the meantime turned a negligent ear to the reports which informed him that the Cossacks were stealing through the woods, and insinuating themselves betwixt him and his advanced guard.

At dawning Napoleon mounted his horse, in or-

der to reconnoitre, and incurred in the attempt a great risk of his life or freedom. It was about day-break, when, as attended by his staff and orderly soldiers, he crossed the little plain on the northern side of the Louja in order to gain the bridge, the level ground was suddenly filled with fugitives, in the rear of whom appeared some black masses. At first, the cries they made seemed to be those of *Vive l'empereur*; but the wild hurra of the Cossacks, and the swiftness of their advance, soon announced the children of the desert. "It is the Cossacks," said Rapp, seizing the reins of the emperor's bridle. "You must turn back." Napoleon refused to retreat, drew his sword, as did his attendants, and placed themselves on the side of the highway. Rapp's horse was wounded, and borne down by one of these lancers; but the emperor and his suite preserved their liberty by standing their ground, while the cloud of Cossacks, more intent on plunder than prisoners, past them within lance's length, without observing the inestimable prey which was within their grasp, and threw themselves upon some carriages which were more attractive. The arrival of the cavalry of the guard cleared the plain of this desultory but venturesome and pertinacious enemy; and Napoleon proceeded to cross the river and ascend the further bank, for the purpose of reconnoitring. In the meantime, the audacity of the Cossacks in their retreat was equal to the wild character of their advance. They halted between the intervals of the French cavalry to load their pistols and carabines, perfectly secure that if pressed, their horses, at a touch of the whip which is attached to their bridle, would outstrip the exhausted chargers of the French Imperial Guard.

When the plain was attained, Napoleon saw on the front, and barring the road to Kalouga, Koutousoff, strongly posted with upwards of 100,000 men, and, on the right, Platoff and six thousand Cossacks, with artillery. To this belonged the pulk which he had just encountered, and who were returning from the flanks of his line, loaded with booty, while others seemed to meditate a similar attack. He returned to his miserable head-quarters, after having finished his reconnoitring party.

A second council of war was held, in which Bonaparte, having heard the conflicting opinions of Murat, who gave his advice for attacking Koutousoff, and of Davoust, who considered the position of the Russian general as one which, covering a long succession of defiles, might be defended inch by inch, at length found himself obliged to decide between the angry chiefs, and with a grief which seemed to deprive him of his senses for a little while, gave the unusual orders—to retreat. Bonaparte's own personal experience had convinced him how much, in advancing, his flanks would be exposed to the Hettman and his Cossacks, who had mustered in great force in the neighbourhood of Medyn. Other intelligence informed him that his rear had been attacked by another body of Cossacks coming from Twer, and who belonged not to Koutousoff's army, but to another Russian division under the command of Winzengerode, which was advancing from the northward to re-occupy Moscow. This showed that the communications of the French were at the

enemy's mercy on the west and the north, on flank and in rear, and seems to have determined the emperor to give at length, and most reluctantly, the orders to retreat, for the purpose of returning to the frontiers by Vereia and Wiazma, the same road by which they had advanced.

It was very seldom that Napoleon resigned the settled purpose of his own mind, either to the advice of those around him, or to any combination of opposing circumstances. He usually received any objection founded on the difficulty of executing his orders, with an evasive answer, "*Ah, on ne peut pas!*" which, from the sarcastic mode in which he uttered the words, plainly showed that he imputed the alleged impossibility to the imbecility of the officer who used the apology. It might have been better for Napoleon, in many instances, had he somewhat abated this pertinacity of disposition; and yet it happened, that by yielding with unwonted docility to the advice of his generals upon the present occasion, he actually retreated at the very moment when the grand Russian army were withdrawing from the position in which Davoust had pronounced them unassailable. The reason of this retrograde movement, which involved the most serious risk, and which, had Napoleon been aware of it, might have yielded him access to the most fertile and unharassed provinces of Russia, was said to be Koutousoff's fears that the French, moving from their right flank, might have marched round the Russian army by the way of Medyn. The truth seems to be, that Koutousoff, though placed in command of the grand army, in order to indulge the soldiers with a general action, was slow and cautious by nature, and rendered more so by his advanced age. He forgot, that in war, to gain brilliant results, or even to prevent great reverses, some risks must be run; and having received just praise for his practised and cautious movements from the battle of Borodino till that of Mala-Yarowslavetz, he now carried the qualities of prudence and circumspection to the extreme, and shunned a general action, or rather the hazard of a general attack from the French, when he might certainly have trusted, first, in the chance (which turned out the reality) of Bonaparte's retreat; secondly, in the courage of his troops, and the strength of his position. "But Fortune," says Tacitus, "has the chief influence on warlike events;" and she so ordered it, that both the hostile armies retired at once. So that while Bonaparte retreated towards Borowsk and Vereia, the route by which he had advanced, the Russians were leaving open before him the road to Kalouga, to gain which he had fought, and fought in vain, the bloody battle of Mala-Yarowslavetz. Favoured, however, by their immense clouds of light cavalry, the Russians learned the retrograde movement of Napoleon long before he could have any certain knowledge of theirs; and in consequence, manœuvred from their left so as to approach the points of Wiazma and Gjat, by which the French must needs pass, if they meant to march on Smolensk.

At Vereia, where Napoleon had his head-quarters on the 27th October, he had the satisfaction to meet with Mortier, and that part of the Young Guard which had garrisoned the Kremlin. They brought

with them an important prisoner, whom chance, or rather his own imprudence, had thrown into their hands. We have said incidentally, that upon the French army evacuating Moscow, Winzengerode, with a considerable body of forces, advanced from Tver to regain possession of the city. All was vacant and silent, except where the French garrison lay deserted and moody in the Kremlin, with a few detached outposts. Winzengerode, with a single aide-de-camp, rode imprudently forward, and both were seized by the French soldiers. The general waved a white handkerchief, and claimed the privilege of a flag of truce, alleging that he came to summon the French marshal to surrender. But Mortier refused him the privilege he claimed, observing, plausibly, that it was not the custom of general officers to summon garrisons in person.

Before leaving Moscow, the French, by the especial command of Napoleon, prepared to blow up the ancient palace of the czars. As the Kremlin was totally useless as a fortification, even if Napoleon could have hoped ever to return to Moscow as a victor, this act of wanton mischief can only be imputed to a desire to do something personally displeasing to Alexander, because he had been found to possess a firmer character than his former friend had anticipated. The mode of executing this mandate, which, however, should be probably ascribed to the engineers, was a piece of additional barbarity. Aware that some of the Russians who were left behind, men of the lowest rank and habits, would crowd in to plunder the palace when the French retreated, they attached long slow-matches to the gunpowder which was stored in the vaults of the palace, and lighted them when the rear of the French column marched out. The French were but at a short distance, when the explosion took place, which laid a considerable part of the Kremlin in ruins, and destroyed at the same time, in mere wantonness, a number of wretches, whom curiosity or love of plunder had, as was anticipated, induced to crowd within the palace. The Russian troops poured in, destroyed the mines which had not yet exploded, and extinguished the fire which had already caught the building. The patriotic foresight of the Russian peasants was now made manifest. We have mentioned the extreme wants of the French in the desolate city. No sooner were the Russian flag hoisted, than these wants vanished, as if by magic. Eighteen hundred cars, loaded with bread, poured in from the neighbourhood, on the very day that saw Moscow re-occupied. The bread, and the mode of conveying it, had been in secret prepared by these rustic patriots.

We return to the movements of the French army. The dreadful explosion of the Kremlin shook the ground like an earthquake, and announced to Napoleon, then on his march against Koutousoff, that his commands had been obeyed. On the next day, a bulletin announced in a triumphant tone that the Kremlin, coeval with the Russian monarchy, *had existed*; and that Moscow was now but an impure laystall, while "the two hundred thousand persons which once formed her population wandered through the forests, subsisting on wild roots, or perishing for want of them." With yet more audacity, the

same official annunciation represents the retreat of the French as an advance on the road to victory. "The army expects to be put in motion on the 24th, to gain the Dwina, and to assume a position which will place it eighty leagues nearer to St Petersburg and to Wilna, a double advantage, since it will bring us nearer the mark we aim at, and the means by which it may be accomplished." While such splendid figments were circulated for the satisfaction of the people of Paris, the real question was, not whether the French were to approach St Petersburg, but by what means they were to get out of Russia with the semblance of an army remaining together.

Napoleon's spirit was observed to be soured by the result of the affair at Mala-Yarowslavetz. It was indeed an operation of the last consequence, since it compelled a broken and suffering army to retreat through a country already wasted by their own advance, and by the acts of the Russians, where the houses were burnt, the inhabitants fled, and the roads broken up, instead of taking the road by Kalouga, through a region which offered both the means of subsistence and shelter. When the advanced season of the year was considered, it might be said that the retreat upon Vereia sounded the death-knell of the French army. These melancholy considerations did not escape Bonaparte himself, though he endeavoured to disguise them from others, by asserting, in a bulletin dated from Borowsk, that the country around was extremely rich, might be compared to the best parts of France and Germany, and that the weather reminded the troops of the sun and the delicious climate of Fontainebleau. His temper was visibly altered. Among other modes of venting his displeasure, he bitterly upbraided his prisoner Winzengerode, who was then brought before him—"Who are you?" he said—"A man without a country!—You have ever been my enemy—You were in the Austrian ranks when I fought against them—I have become Austria's friend, and I find you in those of Russia—You have been a warm instigator of the war; nevertheless, you are a native of the Confederation of the Rhine—you are my subject—you are a rebel—Seize on him, gentlemen!—Let him be brought to trial!"

To this threat, which showed that Napoleon accounted the States of the Confederacy not as appertaining in sovereignty to the princes whose names they bore, but as the immediate subjects of France, from whom the French Emperor was entitled to expect direct fealty, Napoleon added other terms of abuse; and called Winzengerode an English hireling and incendiary, while he behaved with civility to his aide-de-camp Narishkin, a native Russian. This violence, however, had no other consequence than that of the dismissal of Winzengerode, a close prisoner, to Lithuania, to be from thence forwarded to Paris. The presence of a captive of rank and reputation, an aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Russia, was designed of course to give countenance to the favourable accounts which Napoleon might find it convenient to circulate on the events of the campaign. It was not, however, Winzengerode's fortune to make this disagreeable journey. He was, as will be hereafter mentioned, released in

Lithuania, when such an event was least to be hoped for.

Accounts had been received, tending to confirm the opinion that the Russian army were moving on Medyn, with the obvious purpose of intercepting the French army, or at least harassing their passage at Wiazma or at Gjat. By the orders of Napoleon, therefore, the army pressed forward on the last-named town. They marched on in three corps d'armée. Napoleon was with the first of these armies. The second was commanded by the Viceroy of Italy, Prince Eugène. The third, which was destined to act as a rear-guard, was led by Davoust, whose love of order and military discipline might be, it was hoped, some check upon the license and confusion of such a retreat. It was designed that one day's march should intervene between the movements of each of these bodies, to avoid confusion, and to facilitate the collecting subsistence; being a delay of two, or at most three days, betwixt the operations of the advanced guard and that of the rear.

It has been often asked, nor has the question ever been satisfactorily answered, why Napoleon preferred that his columns should thus creep over the same ground in succession, instead of the more combined and rapid mode of marching by three columns in front, by which he would have saved time, and increased, by the breadth of country which the march occupied, the means of collecting subsistence. The impracticability of the roads cannot be alleged, because the French army had come thither arranged in three columns, marching to the front abreast of each other, which was the reverse of their order in the retreat.

In the road, the army passed Borodino, the scene of the grand battle which exhibited so many vestiges of the French prowess, and of the loss they had sustained. This, the most sanguinary conflict of modern times, had been entirely without adequate advantages to the victors. The momentary possession of Moscow had annihilated every chance of an essential result by the catastrophe which followed, and the army which had been victorious at Borodino, was now escaping from their conquests, surrounded by danger on every hand, and already disorganized on many points, by danger, pain, and privation. At the convent of Kolotskoi, which had been the grand hospital of the French after the battle, many of the wounded were found still alive, though thousands more had perished for want of materials necessary for surgical treatment, food of suitable quality, bandages, and the like. The survivors crawled to the door, and extended their supplicating hands to their countrymen as they passed onwards on their weary march. By Napoleon's orders, such of the patients as were able to bear being moved were placed on the settlers' carts, while the rest were left in the convent, together with some wounded Russian prisoners, whose presence, it was hoped, might be a protection to the French.

Several of those who had been placed in the carriages did not travel very far. The sordid wretches to whom the carts and wains, loaded with the plunder of Moscow, belonged, got rid in many cases of the additional burden imposed on them, by lagging be-

hind the column of march in desolate places, and murdering the men entrusted to their charge. In other parts of the column, the Russian prisoners were seen lying on the road, their brains shot out by the soldiers appointed to guard them, but who took this mode of freeing themselves of the trouble. It is thus that a continued course of calamity renders men's minds selfish, ravenous, and fiendish, indifferent to what evil they inflict, because it can scarce equal that which they endure; as divines say of the condemned spirits, that they are urged to malevolent actions against men, by a consciousness of their own state of reprobation.

Napoleon, with his first division of the grand army, reached Gjatiz without any other inconvenience than arose from the state of the roads, and the distresses of the soldiery. From Gjatiz he advanced in two marches to Wiazma, and halted there to allow Prince Eugène and Marshal Davoust to come up; who had fallen five days' march to the rear, instead of three days' only, as had been directed. On the 1st November, the emperor again resumed his painful retreat, leaving, however, the corps of Ney at Wiazma to reinforce and relieve the rear-guard under Davoust, who, he concluded, must be worn out with the duty. He resumed with his Old Guard the road to Dorogobouje, on which town he thought it probable the Russians might be moving to cut him off, and it was most important to prevent them.

Another order of Napoleon's confirms his sense of the danger which had now begun to oppress him. He commanded the spoils of Moscow, ancient armour, cannon, and the great cross of Ivan, to be thrown into the lake of Semelin, as trophies which he was unwilling to restore, and unable to carry off. Some of the artillery, which the unfed horses were unable to drag forward, were also now necessarily left behind, though the circumstance was not communicated in every instance to Napoleon, who, bred in the artillery department, cherished, like many officers of that branch of service, a sort of superstitious reverence for his guns.

The emperor, and the van-guard of his army, had hitherto passed unopposed. It was not so with the centre and rear. They were attacked, during the whole course of that march, by clouds of Cossacks, bringing with them a species of light artillery mounted on sledges, which, keeping pace with their motions, threw showers of balls among the columns of the French; while the menaced charge of these irregular cavalry frequently obliged the march to halt, that the men might form lines or squares to protect themselves. The passage of streams where the bridges were broken down, and the horses and wagons were overturned on the precipitous banks, or in the miry fords, and where drivers and horses dropped down exhausted, added to this confusion when such obstacles occurred. The two divisions, however, having as yet seen no regular forces, passed the night of the 2d November in deceitful tranquillity, within two leagues of Wiazma, where Ney was lying ready to join them.

In that fatal night, Miloradovitch, one of the boldest, most enterprising, and active of the Russian generals, and whom the French were wont to call the Russian Murat, arrived with the van-guard

of the Russian regulars, supported by Platoff and many thousand Cossacks, and being the harbinger of Koutousoff, and the whole grand army of Russia.

The old Russian general, when he learned the French Emperor's plan of retreating by Gjatiz and Wiazma, instantly turning his own retreat into a movement to the left, arrived by cross-roads from Mala-Yarowslavetz. The Russians now reached the point of action at day-break, pushed through Prince Eugène's line of march, and insulated his van-guard, while the Cossacks rode like a whirlwind among the host of stragglers and followers of the army, and drove them along the plain at the lance's point. The viceroy was succoured by a regiment which Ney, though himself hardly pressed, dispatched to his aid from Wiazma, and his rear-guard was disengaged by the exertions of Davoust, who marched hastily forward to extricate them. The Russian artillery, which is superior in calibre, and carries farther than the French, manœuvred with rapidity, and kept up a tremendous cannonade, to which the French had no adequate means of replying. Eugène and Davoust made a most gallant defence; yet they would not have been able to maintain their ground, had Koutousoff, as was to have been expected, either come up in person, or sent a strong detachment to support his van-guard.

The battle lasted from seven in the morning till towards evening, when Eugène and Davoust pushed through Wiazma with the remains of their divisions, pursued by and almost mingled with the Russians, whose army marched into the town at the charging step, with drums beating, and all the indications of victory. The French divisions, under cover of the night, and having passed the river (which, like the town, is called Wiazma), established themselves in obscurity and comparative safety upon the left bank. The day had been disastrous to the French arms, though their honour remained unsullied. They had lost about four thousand men, their regiments were mouldered down to battalions, their battalions to companies, their companies to weak pickets.

All tacticians agree, that if Koutousoff had reinforced Miloradovitch, as warmly urged by Sir Robert Wilson, or if he had forced the town of Wiazma, which his numbers might have enabled him to do, both the centre and rear divisions of Napoleon's force, and probably the troops under Ney also, must have been inevitably cut off. But the aged general confided in the approach of the Russian winter, and declined to purchase, by the blood of his countrymen, a victory of which he held himself secured by the climate. The French were so far from any place where they could procure either food or shelter; they were so hemmed in, and confined to the desolated high-roads, which every column as it passed rendered more impracticable to the rest, that he refused to gain, at the sword's point, advantages which he deemed himself sure of possessing without effort. Determined, therefore, to avoid a general battle, yet to maintain his advantages over the French by manœuvring, Koutousoff, turning a deaf ear to the remonstrances, and even threats, of those who differed in opinion from him, removed his head-quarters to Krasnoi, leaving to Miloradovitch the duty of beating up the

rear of the French on their retreat, by following the course of the high-road, while the Hettman Platoff, flanking the French march with his Cossacks, took advantage of every opportunity to distress them.

In the meanwhile, the viceroy received orders from Napoleon to abandon the straight road to Smolensk, which was the route of the corps of Davoust and Ney, and to move northward on Dowkhowtchina and Poreczie, to afford countenance and support to Marshal Oudinot, now understood to be hard pressed by Wittgenstein, who, as we shall presently see, had regained the superiority in the north of Russia. The viceroy, in obedience to this order, began his march on the new route which was enjoined him, by marching himself upon Zasselie, closely pursued, watched, and harassed by his usual Scythian attendants. He was compelled to leave behind him sixty-four pieces of cannon; and these, with three thousand stragglers, fell into the prompt grasp of the pursuers.

A large cloud of Cossacks, with Platoff at their head, accompanied the movements of the viceroy and his Italian army. Whoever strayed from the column was inevitably their prey. Engène passed a night at Zasselie, without having as yet encountered any great misfortune. But in advancing from thence to Dowkhowtchina, the French had to cross the Wop, a river swelled by rains, while the passage to the ford was steep and frozen. Here the viceroy passed over his infantry with great difficulty, but was obliged to abandon twenty-three pieces of cannon and all his baggage to the Cossacks. The unhappy Italians, wetted from head to foot, were compelled to pass a miserable night in bivouac upon the other side; and many expired there, whose thoughts, when perishing so miserably, must have been on their own mild climate and delicious country. Next day, the shivering, half-naked, and persecuted column reached Dowkhowtchina, where they expected some relief; but their first welcome was from a fresh swarm of Cossacks, which rushed out from the gates with cannon. These were the advanced corps of the troops which had occupied Moscow, and were now pressing westward where their services were more necessary.

Notwithstanding their opposition, Prince Engène forced his way into the place with much gallantry, and took up quarters for the night. But having lost his baggage, the greater part of his artillery and ammunition, besides the utter destruction of his cavalry, he saw no prospect of being able to march forward to Vitepsk to support Oudinot, nor was he in a condition to have afforded him assistance, even if he had been in communication. In this situation of distress, the viceroy determined to rejoin the grand army, and for that purpose marched upon Wlodimerowa, and from thence to Smolensk, where, harassed by the Cossacks, he arrived in a miserable condition upon the 13th of November, having fallen in with Marshal Ney upon his march, as we shall afterwards mention.

The emperor, in the meantime, had halted at Stakawo during the 3d and 4th November. On the 5th he slept at Dorogobouje.

On the 6th November commenced that terrible Russian winter, of which the French had not yet

experienced the terrors, although the weather had been cold, frosty, and threatening. No sun was visible, and the dense and murky fog which hung on the marching column was changed into a heavy fall of snow in large broad flakes, which at once chilled and blinded the soldiers. The march, however, stumbled forward, the men struggling, and at last sinking, in the holes and ravines which were concealed from them by the new and disguised appearance of the face of nature. Those who yet retained discipline and their ranks stood some chance of receiving assistance; but amid the mass of the stragglers, men's hearts, intent upon self-preservation, became hardened and closed against every feeling of sympathy and compassion, the sentiments of which are sometimes excluded by the selfishness of prosperity, but are almost always destroyed by the egotism of general and overwhelming misfortune. A stormy wind also began to arise, and whirl the snow from the earth, as well as that from the heavens, into dizzy eddies around the soldiers' heads. There were many hurled to the earth in this manner, where the same snows furnished them with an instant grave, under which they were concealed until the next summer came, and displayed their ghastly remains in the open air. A great number of slight hillocks on each side of the road, intimated, in the meanwhile, the fate of these unfortunate men.

There was only the word Smolensk, which, echoed from man to man, served as a talisman to keep up the spirits of the soldiers. The troops had been taught to repeat that name, as indicating the place where they were once more to be welcomed to plenty and repose. It was counted upon as a dépôt of stores for the army, especially of such supplies as they had outstripped by their forced marches, first on Wilna, and afterwards on Moscow. They were now falling back, as was hoped and trusted, upon these resources, and continued their march with tolerable spirit, which even the snow-storm could not entirely depress. They reckoned also upon a reinforcement of 30,000 men under Victor, who were waiting their arrival at Smolensk; but a concurrence of evil tidings had made the services of that division necessary elsewhere.

On the same fatal 6th of November, Bonaparte received intelligence of two events, both of deep import, and which corresponded but too well with the storms around him. The one was the singular conspiracy of Malet, so remarkable for its temporary success, and its equally sudden discomfiture. This carried his mind to Paris, with the conviction that all could not be well with an empire where such an explosion could so nearly attain success. On the other hand, his thoughts were recalled to his present situation by the unpleasant intelligence that Wittgenstein had assumed the offensive, beaten St-Cyr, taken Polotsk and Vitepsk, and re-occupied the whole line of the Dwina. Here was an unexpected obstacle to his retreat, which he endeavoured to remove by ordering Victor to move from Smolensk with the division just mentioned, and instantly to drive Wittgenstein behind the Dwina;—not perhaps considering with sufficient accuracy whether the force which his marshal commanded was equal to the task.

Similar bad news came from other quarters. Four demi-brigades of recruits from France had arrived at Smolensk. Baraguay d'Hilliers, their general, had, by command from Bonaparte, sent forward these troops towards Ellnia, intimating at the time that they should clear the road towards Kalouga, by which last town he then expected the emperor to approach Smolensk. As Napoleon was excluded from the Kalouga road, these troops, as no longer useful at Ellnia, ought to have been drawn back on Smolensk; but Baraguay d'Hilliers had no certain information of this change of route. The consequence was, that the celebrated Russian partisans, Orloff-Dennizoff, Davidoff, Soslavin, and others, surprised these raw troops in their cantonments, and made them all prisoners, to the number of better than two thousand men. Other detachments of the French about the same time fell into the hands of the Russians.

At length the longed-for Smolensk was visible. At the sight of its strong walls and lofty towers, the whole stragglers of the army, which now included treble the number of those who kept their ranks, rushed headlong to the place. But instead of giving them ready admission, their countrymen in the town shut the gates against them with horror; for their confused and irregular state, their wild, dirty, and unshaven appearance, their impatient cries for entrance,—above all, their emaciated forms, and starved, yet ferocious aspects,—made them to be regarded rather as banditti than soldiers. At length, the Imperial Guards arrived and were admitted; the miscellaneous crowd rushed in after them. To the Guards, and some few others who had kept order, rations were regularly delivered; but the mass of stragglers, being unable to give any account of themselves or their regiments, or to bring with them a responsible officer, died, many of them, while they besieged in vain the doors of the magazines. Such was the promised distribution of food—the promised quarters were nowhere to be found. Smolensk, as is already recorded, had been burnt by the Russians, and no other covering was to be had than was afforded by miserable sheds reared against such blackened walls as remained yet standing. But even this was shelter and repose, compared to the exposed bivouac on wreaths of snow; and as the straggling soldiers were compelled by hunger to unite themselves once more with their regiments, they at length obtained their share in the regular distribution of rations, and an approach towards order and discipline began to prevail in the headmost division of the grand army of France.

The central part of the army, under Davoust, who had relinquished the rear-guard to Ney, continued to advance from Wiazma to Dorogobouje; but at this point his distress became extreme, from the combined influence of the storm, the enemy, and the disheartened condition of men driven from their standards by want of food, searching for it in vain, and afterwards unable from weakness to resume their ranks. Many fell into the hands of the incensed peasants, by whom they were either killed, or stripped naked and driven back to the high-road.

The rear-guard, under Ney, suffered yet more

than these. Every house had been burnt before their arrival, and their sufferings from the enemy were the severer, that they were the last French whom they had to work their revenge upon. Yet Ney continued to evince a degree of personal firmness and resolution which has been rarely witnessed. At the passage of the Dnieper, he was attacked by the enemy, and all was nearly lost in one general confusion, when the marshal, seizing a musket to encourage the few men who could be brought to act, succeeded, against all the hopes of the Russians, and equally against the despairing calculations of the French, in bringing over a part of his rear-guard. But he lost on this fatal spot a great part of his artillery, and a great number of his soldiers. We can give only one unvarying sketch of Ney's dreadful retreat. On every point he was attacked by the same wasting, wearying warfare, and every cessation from fighting was necessarily employed in pushing forward towards Smolensk, which he was approaching on the 13th of November, when suddenly the hills to his left were covered with a disorderly mob of fugitives, whom a band of Cossacks were pursuing and slaughtering at pleasure. Having succeeded in dispersing the Cossacks, the next apparition was that of the army of Italy, to which the flying stragglers belonged. This corps d'armée was on its return, as the reader is aware, from Dowkhowtchina towards Smolensk, and was as usual severely pushed at every step by the Cossacks. The passage of the Wop had stripped the soldiers of baggage, provisions such as they had, and artillery and cavalry. They kept their march, however, with sufficient regularity. It was only the stragglers whom the Cossacks chased before them, and wounded, took, and slew at pleasure.

These wretched fugitives no sooner saw Ney's army, than they flew to shelter themselves under its protection, and by doing so communicated their own terror to the marshal's ranks. All, both stragglers and soldiers, began to hurry towards the Dnieper, over which was a bridge, which their numbers soon choked up. Great loss was sustained, until Eugène and the indefatigable Ney again presented a defensive front, and repelled the assailants, who had again gathered around them. They were so near Smolensk, that Napoleon could send them refreshments and succour during the action. The viceroy and Ney at length extricated themselves from their persecutors, and entered Smolensk, where Davoust had before found refuge. Napoleon allowed his army, which was now entirely collected, five days to consume such supplies as were to be found in the place, and to prepare for the terrors of a farther retreat. But though such a delay was indispensable, the evil news which continued to arrive from every quarter, positively prohibited his prolonging this period of repose. It is now necessary to trace more particularly the incidents which had taken place on the extreme flanks of Napoleon's line of advance, on both of which, as we have already intimated, the Russians, powerfully reinforced, had assumed the offensive, with the apparent purpose of forming a communication with each other, and acting in conjunction, to intercept the retreat of the grand army.

Upon the 18th of August, St-Cyr having benten

Wittgenstein, and taken Polotsk, the war had languished in that quarter. The French army lay in an entrenched camp, well secured with barracks for shelter, and fortifications for defence. But in the partisan war which they carried on for two months, St-Cyr's army sustained great loss, while that of Wittgenstein was more than doubled by the arrival of recruits. Finally, General Steingel, with two divisions of the Russian army from Finland, amounting to 15,000, landed at Riga, and, after some inefficient movements against Macdonald, marched to the support of Wittgenstein. The Russian general, thus reinforced, began to act on the offensive with great vigour. On the 17th of October, the French outposts were driven into their entrenched camp at Polotsk. On the 18th, the camp itself was furiously attacked, and the redoubts by which it was protected were taken and retaken several times. The French remained in possession of them, but St-Cyr was wounded, and his situation became very precarious. In fact, the next day, 19th October, the attack was renewed by Wittgenstein on the right bank of the Dwina, while Steingel, advancing up the opposite bank, threatened to occupy Polotsk and its bridge, and thus to enclose St-Cyr in the entrenched camp.

Fortunately for the French general, night and a thick mist enabled him to cross the river to the left bank, and thus to effect a retreat, which Steingel was unable to prevent. But besides the disasters of the loss of the camp, and of the important place of Polotsk, which the Russians occupied on the 20th October, discord broke out between the Bavarian general Wrede and St-Cyr. When the latter was wounded, the command naturally devolved in course upon the Bavarian; but the other French generals refused to submit to this substitution, and St-Cyr was obliged, in spite of his wounds, to continue to act as commander-in-chief. Wrede, in the meanwhile, assumed an independence of movement quite unusual in an auxiliary general, who was acting with a French marshal; and, separating altogether from St-Cyr, fell back upon Vileika, near Wilna, and withdrew himself from action entirely.

The French division must have been cut off, had not Victor, who was then lying at Smolensk with a covering army of twenty-five thousand men, received, as lately mentioned, Napoleon's orders, dispatched on the 6th November, to advance and reinforce St-Cyr, who thus became once more superior to Wittgenstein. Victor was under orders, however, to run no unnecessary risk, but to keep as far as possible on the defensive; because it was to this army, and that under Schwartzberg, that Napoleon in a great measure trusted to clear the way for his retreat, and prevent his being intercepted ere he gained the Polish frontiers. But when Wittgenstein, even in the presence of Victor, took Vitepsk, and began to establish himself on the Dwina, Napoleon caused Oudinot, as a more enterprising soldier, to replace the Duke of Belluno; and ordered Eugène to move from Wiazma to Dowkhowtchina, for the purpose of reinforcing that army. Eugène's march, as we have formerly shown, was rendered useless, by his misfortune at crossing the river Wop; and he was compelled to move

towards Smolensk, where he arrived in a most dilapidated condition.

In the meantime, Wittgenstein received reinforcements, and not only kept Oudinot in complete check, but gradually advanced towards Borzoff, and threatened at that town, which lay directly in the course of Napoleon's retreat, to form a junction with the army of the Danube, which was marching northward with the same purpose of co-operation, and to the movements of which we have now to direct the reader's attention.

It has been mentioned, that General Tormazoff had, on the 12th of August, been defeated at Gorodeczna by the Austrians under Schwartzberg, and the French under Régulier, and that the Russians had fallen back beyond the Styr. Schwartzberg, satisfied with this advantage, showed no vehement desire to complete the disaster of his enemy. The French go on to bring an accusation against him of treachery, which we do not believe. But his heart was not in the war. He was conscious, that the success of Alexander would improve the condition of Austria, as well as of Europe in general, and he fought no harder than was absolutely necessary to sustain the part of a general of an auxiliary army, who felt by no means disposed to assume the character of a principal combatant.

While Tormazoff and the Austrians watched each other upon the Styr, two smaller corps of Russians and Poles were making demonstrations in the same country. Prince Bigraton, upon retreating from the banks of the Dwina, had not altogether deprived that neighbourhood of Russian troops. At Bobruisk he had left a considerable garrison, which had been blockaded first by the French cavalry under Latour Maubourg, and afterwards, when Latour Maubourg was summoned to join Napoleon, by the Polish General Dombrowski. The garrison was supported by a Russian corps under General Ertell. It was an instance of Napoleon's extreme unwillingness to credit anything that contradicted his wishes, that he persisted in believing, or desiring to have it believed, that the Russians on this point, which commanded still an access from Russia to Poland, were inferior to the Poles, whom he had opposed to them; and while Dombrowski was acting against Ertell, he overwhelmed the embarrassed general with repeated orders to attack and destroy the enemy, before whom he could scarce maintain his ground.

The armies were thus occupied, when Admiral Tchitchagoff, with fifty thousand Russians, whom the peace with the Turks permitted to leave Moldavia, advanced upon Volhynia, with the purpose of co-operating with Tormazoff and Ertell; and, finally, of acting in combination with Wittgenstein, for intercepting Bonaparte's retreat.

On the 14th September, this important junction betwixt the armies of Tormazoff and Tchitchagoff was effected; and the Russian army, increased to 60,000 men, became superior to all the force, whether of French, Austrians, or Poles, which could be opposed to them. They crossed the Styr, and moved forward on the Duchy of Warsaw, while Schwartzberg, not without loss, retreated to the banks of the Bug. His pursuers might have pressed

on him still closer, but for the arrival of Prince Czernicheff, the aide-de-camp of the emperor, who, escorted by a body of chosen Cossacks, had executed a perilous march, in order to bring fresh orders to Tormazoff and Tchitchagoff. The former was directed to repair to the grand army, to occupy the situation formerly held by Prince Bagration, while the command of the united Volhynian army was devolved upon Admiral Tchitchagoff, who, to judge by subsequent events, does not seem to have been, on great emergencies, very well fitted for so important a trust.

Prince Czernicheff then set out with his band of Scythians, to carry to the army of Wittgenstein tidings of the purposes and movements of that of Moldavia. The direct course between the Russian armies was held by the Franco-Austrian army. To escape this obstacle, Czernicheff took his course westwards, and, penetrating deep into Poland, made so long a circuit, as completely to turn the whole army of Schwartzenberg. Marching with extraordinary dispatch through the wildest and most secret paths, he traversed the interior of Poland, avoiding at once the unfriendly population and the numerous detachments of the enemy, and sustaining his cavalry, horses and men, in a way in which none but Cossacks, and Cossack horses, could have supported existence. We have good evidence, that this flying party, on one occasion, traveled nearly one hundred English miles in twenty-four hours.

This extraordinary expedition was marked by a peculiar and pleasing circumstance. The reader must recollect the capture of the German general Winzengerode before the Kremlin, and the ungenerous manner in which Bonaparte expressed himself to that officer. Winzengerode, with another Russian general, were dispatched, under a suitable guard, from Moscow to Wilna, in order to their being sent from thence to Paris, where the presence of two captives of such distinction might somewhat gild the gloomy news which the emperor was under the necessity of transmitting from Russia. When Winzengerode was prosecuting his melancholy and involuntary journey, far advanced into Poland, and out of all hope either of relief or escape, he saw by the side of a wood a figure, which retreated so suddenly as hardly gave even his experienced eye time to recognize a Cossack's cap and lance. A ray of hope was awakened, which was changed into certainty, as a band of Cossacks, bursting from the wood, overcame the guard, and delivered the prisoners. Czernicheff proceeded successfully on his expedition, embellished by this agreeable incident, and, moving eastward with the same speed, sagacity, and successful enterprise, joined Wittgenstein's army, then lying between Vitepsk and Tchakniki, with communications from the Moldavian army, and directions how Wittgenstein was to co-operate with them in the intended plan of cutting off Napoleon's return to Poland.

In virtue of the orders which he had received, Tchitchagoff advanced upon Schwartzenberg, from whom Napoleon might have first expected the service of a covering army, so soon as his broken and diminished troops should approach Poland. But when Tchitchagoff appeared in force, this Franco-

Austrian, or rather Austro-Saxon army, was, after some skirmishing, compelled to retire behind the Bug. The admiral left General Sacken, a brave and active officer, to observe Schwartzenberg and Régnier, and keep them at least in check, whilst he himself retrograded towards the Beresina, where he expected to be able to intercept Bonaparte.

Tchitchagoff succeeded, on the 14th November, in occupying Minsk; a most essential conquest at the moment, for it contained a very large proportion of those stores which had been destined to relieve the grand army, or rather its remains, so soon as they should approach Poland. This success was followed by another equally important. Count Lambert, one of Tchitchagoff's generals, marched against Borizoff, situated on the Beresina, at the very point where it was probable that Napoleon would be desirous to effect a passage. The valiant Polish general Dombrowski hastened to defend a place, in the loss of which the emperor's safety must stand particularly compromised. The battle began about day-break on the 21st November, and, after severe fighting, Lambert obtained possession of Borizoff, after a victory, in which Dombrowski lost eight cannon, and 2,500 prisoners. The Admiral Tchitchagoff removed his head-quarters thither, as directed by the combined plan for farther operations.

While Tchitchagoff marched eastward to his place of destination on the Beresina, Sacken, whom he had left in Volhynia, sensible of the importance of the service destined for the admiral, made every exertion to draw the whole attention of Schwartzenberg and Régnier upon himself. In this daring and generous scheme he completely succeeded. As the forces of the Austrian and the French generals were separated from each other, Sacken marched against Régnier, and not only surprised, but nearly made him prisoner. Nothing could have saved Régnier from destruction, except the alertness with which Schwartzenberg came to his assistance. The Austrian, with strong reinforcements, arrived nearly in the moment when his presence must have annihilated Sacken, who, not aware of the Austrians being so near, had, on the 15th November, engaged in a serious action with Régnier near Wolkowitz. The Russian suffered considerable loss, and effected a retreat with difficulty. He concentrated his army, however, and continued his retreat from point to point upon the position of Brzest, from which he had commenced his advance. In this manner, Sacken withdrew the attention of Schwartzenberg and the Austro-Saxon army to the banks of the Bug, at a moment when it ought to have been riveted on the decisive scenes which were about to take place on those of the Beresina.

The French writers complain of the Austrian general on this occasion. They cannot deny that Schwartzenberg was active and victorious; but they complain that his activity exerted itself in a quarter which could not greatly affect the issue of the campaign. Some tacticians account for this, by supposing that his secret instructions, given when the Emperor of Austria could not foresee that the personal safety of his son-in-law would be implicated, prohibited Schwartzenberg to extend his military operations beyond Volhynia and Lithuania.

From these details, it appears that Fortune was bending her blackest and most ominous frowns on the favourite of so many years. Napoleon was quartered, with the wretched relics of his grand army, amid the ruins of the burnt town of Smolensk, in which he could not remain, although his means of escape appeared almost utterly desperate. The grand army of the Russians waited on his flank to assail his columns the instant they were in motion; and should he escape a pursuing enemy, all the Polish towns in the front, where supplies had been provided for his relief, had been taken, and the two large armies of Tchitchagoff and Wittgenstein lay in position on the Beresina to intercept him. Hemmed in betwixt pursuers, and those who, in sportsman's phrase, were stationed to head him back, destitute of cavalry to oppose the nations of Cossacks which infested every motion, and having but little artillery to oppose to that of the Russians, all probability of escape seemed removed to an immeasurable distance.

CHAPTER LXXX.

Napoleon divides his army into four corps, which leave Smolensk on their retreat towards Poland.—Cautious proceedings of Koutousoff.—The viceroy's division is attacked by Mitoradovitch, and effects a junction with Napoleon at Krasnoi, after severe loss.—Koutousoff attacks the French at Krasnoi, but only by a distant cannonade.—The division under Davoust is reunited to Napoleon, but in a miserable state.—Napoleon marches to Liady, and Mortier and Davoust are attacked, and suffer heavy loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and artillery.—Details of the retreat of Ney.—He crosses the Losmina, with great loss of men and baggage, and joins Napoleon at Orca, with his division reduced to 1500 men.—The whole grand army is now reduced to 12,000 effective men, besides 30,000 stragglers.—Dreadful distress and difficulties of Bonaparte and his army.—Singular scene betwixt Napoleon, and Duroc, and Daru.—Napoleon moves towards Borzif, and falls in with the corps of Victor and Oudinot.—Koutousoff halts at Kopyn, without attacking Bonaparte.—Napoleon crosses the Beresina at Studzianka.—Partoureaux's division cut off by Wittgenstein.—Severe fighting on both sides of the river.—Dreadful losses of the French in crossing it.—According to the Russian official account, 36,000 bodies were found in the Beresina after the thaw.

COOPED up, as we have said, in the ruins of Smolensk, and the slender provision of food and supplies which that place offered to his army almost entirely exhausted, Napoleon had now seriously to consider in what direction he should make an effort to escape. As he had heard of the loss of Vitepsk, by which town he had advanced, and understood that Wittgenstein was in possession of the line of the Dwina, he naturally determined to take the road to Wilna, by Krasnoi, Borzif, and Minsk. The two latter towns were stored with the provisions which he so much wanted; and, ignorant as yet of what had happened on the south of Lithuania, he might expect to find the banks of the Beresina in possession of the Austro-Saxon army under Schwartzenberg.

For this effort he proceeded, as well as circum-

stances would admit, to reorganize his army. It was reduced to about 40,000 men, with a disproportioned train of baggage and of artillery, although much of the former, and three hundred and fifty cannon, had already been left behind. This force the emperor divided into four corps, which were to leave Smolensk, placing a day's interval betwixt the march of each. He himself led the van, with 6,000 of his Guard, and about as many soldiers, the relics of different corps, amalgamated into battalions as well as circumstances would permit. The emperor's division left Smolensk on the evening of the 13th, and morning of the 14th November.

The division of the viceroy Eugene, consisting of about the same number as that of Napoleon, but inferior in quality, as comprehending none of the Imperial Guard, could not be collected till late on the 15th November, when the wearied wretches were once more put into march, by promises of a safe arrival in that Lithuania, which so few of them were ever to see again.

On the 16th, Davoust, after some high words with Ney, who would have hurried his departure, set out with another fourth part of the Grand Army, approaching to, or exceeding, 10,000 men in number.

Ney remained till the 17th of November. As he had once more the perilous task of covering the retreat, which duty he had performed so admirably betwixt Wiazma and Smolensk, his division was fortified with about 4000 of the Imperial Guard, to whom, as better fed than the other troops, besides their high character as veterans, more could be trusted, even in the most desperate circumstances. Ere the French left the town, they obeyed the strict commands of the emperor, in blowing up the towers with which Smolensk was surrounded, that it might not again, as Napoleon expressed himself, form an obstacle to a French army. Such was the language of this extraordinary man, as if affecting to provide for re-entering into Russia, at a time when it was the only question whether he himself, or any individual of his army, should ever be able to leave the fatal country.—We must next attend to the motions of the Russians.

The general voice of the Russian army had demanded Prince Golitcheff Koutousoff, as a chief who would put an end to Barclay de Tolly's system of retreat, and oppose the invaders in a pitched battle. He had done so at Borodino, but it was his last effort of the kind. His character was naturally the reverse of enterprising. Age had increased his disposition to extreme prudence, and the success which attended his procrastinating and cautious measures, while stationed at Taroutino, in the neighbourhood of Moscow, had riveted him to his own system, of risking as little as possible. It was in vain pointed out to him, that the Russian troops were in high condition, and that against an enemy so utterly broken and dispirited as the French then were, everything might be trusted to those brave soldiers, who had not shrunk from an equal conflict with the same troops when in their vigour; and who, if then worsted, had left the enemy very little to boast of, having insulted his camp, and occupied the field of battle, even on the very night of his

victory. Could Suwarrow have been recalled from the dead, or even the noble Bagration (the god of the army, as his name signifies in Russian); or had Barclay de Tolly, Bennisgen, or Miloradovitch, been permitted to act when the moment of action approached, it seems probable that Napoleon would have revisited the Kremlin, not as a conqueror but as a prisoner. But Koutousoff, trusting to the climate of Russia, was contented to let the French army decay under its influence. He had determined not to encounter the slightest risk, but to glean up the wreck of the elements, rather than anticipate their work by the sword. His general plan was to maintain himself on the flank of Napoleon's army, and from time to time to attack them by his vanguard, but by no means to enter into a general action. He surrounded their corps with Cossacks, who brought with them light field-guns mounted on sledges, which did infinite damage on points where the heavy French guns could not be easily pointed, so as to reply to them. This system may be traced in the preceding pages, and still more in those which are about to follow. It has been applauded by many competent judges, as gaining everything without putting any thing in hazard; but it is ridiculed by others, and especially by the French, who acknowledge themselves obliged to the tardiness of Koutousoff, and the blunders of the Admiral Tchitchagoff, for the escape of the poor remnant of the grand army which was preserved, and especially for the personal safety of the emperor himself. With these explanations we resume our melancholy and momentous story.

Without any purpose of departing from his maxims of caution, Koutousoff commenced the attack on the retreating army by a movement which appeared to indicate a more vigorous plan of procedure. He put his army in motion towards Krasnoi, upon a parallel line with that of Bonaparte, moving on the left flank of the French, so as to place Napoleon's line of advance at his mercy, whenever he should think proper to assail it. At the same time, he detached several large bodies to operate on the march of the enemy's column.

Miloradovitch, with a large van-guard, pushed forward upon the high-road leading from Smolensk to Krasnoi. Bonaparte had already reached the latter point, at the head of his division, but Eugène, who brought up the rear of the column, was effectually cut off. They were summoned to lay down their arms, but the viceroy manfully rejected the proposal. Immediately, each surrounding hill poured forth, like a volcano, a torrent of fire upon them. The French and Italians maintained their ground with unavailing bravery. Numbers were killed, others made prisoners, and the division almost entirely destroyed.

Still the viceroy made his defence good, till night, the friend of the overmatched, approached to protect him; when, at the head of his division, diminished to one half, he quitted the high-road, leaving his fires burning to mislead the enemy, and, gaining the open fields, accomplished, with great loss and ineffable fatigue, his junction with Napoleon at Krasnoi, which he reached by a circuitous route. The challenge of a sentinel during this delicate manoeuvre might have

been utter destruction—and in fact they did encounter such a challenge. They were saved from the consequences by a ready-witted Pole, who, answering the sentinel in Russian, imposed silence on him, pretending that they were the corps of Owaroff, employed upon a secret expedition.

At length, upon the next morning (17th November), Eugène reached the head-quarters of his father-in-law, who had been very anxious on his account. When the diminished division of Eugène was united to that of the emperor, they did not exceed 15,000 men in total amount. Yet on being joined by Eugène, the active genius of Napoleon, in these most disadvantageous circumstances, displayed its ascendancy. He had caused General Roguet, with a detachment of the Young Guard, in the night between the 15th and 16th, to beat up the quarters of a Russian detachment, which approached his own too closely; and having thus taught the hunters to respect the lair of the lion, he embraced the audacious resolution of remaining at Krasnoi in defiance of the Russian army, till the detachments of Davoust and Ney should again join him. Whatever had been his reasons for separating from these divisions, he now saw the necessity of once more uniting his forces.

Even the cold and cautious spirit of Koutousoff could not miss the opportunity occasioned by this halt of 15,000 men, in the face of perhaps three times their number. But neither the persuasions of his own officers, nor the reproaches of Sir Robert Wilson, the English commissioner, could prevail on the old general to attack with the vivacity which the occasion demanded. He would only consent to wage a distant engagement with artillery. At day-break on the 17th, Eugène, whose forces the preceding battle had altogether disabled, was directed to take the advance towards Liady, the next miserable stage of the French army, while Bonaparte drew his sword, and saying he had already played the emperor, and must now once more be the general, led in person his 6000 guards, attended by Mortier at the head of 5000 soldiers more, to meet as great odds as it should please Koutousoff to dispatch against him.* In the sort of battle which followed, the Russians acted with great caution. The name of Napoleon almost alone protected his army. The French suffered, indeed, from the fire of 100 pieces of artillery, and from charges of cavalry, which they had no means of answering or repelling; but, though gaps were made in their line, and some of their squares were forced by the cavalry, yet neither success nor repulse could induce Koutousoff to hazard a serious attack upon Napoleon, for the purpose of altogether

* Colonel Boutourlin praises the address of Koutousoff, who, he says, managed with such skill as always to present a superior force to that which the French had upon the field of battle, although his army was on the whole inferior to that of Napoleon. Without admitting the exactness of the last statement, which there is considerable cause to dispute, little merit can be assumed for the Russian general's dexterity in obtaining a numerical superiority at Wiazma, Krasnoi, and elsewhere, when it is considered that Napoleon himself had divided his army into four columns, and placed one day's march betwixt each. The Russians had, therefore, only one column of ten or twelve thousand men to deal with at once.

destroying the invader and his army. Even Boutevillin, a friendly critic, where the reputation of the old Russian general is concerned, regrets he had not taken the bold course of placing his army across the direct line of Bonaparte's retreat, when the French, overcome at once by physical suffering and moral depression, must, even supposing them equal in numbers, have been extremely inferior to their opponents. Upon the whole, Koutousoff seems to have acted towards Napoleon and the Grand Army, as the Greenland fishers do to the whale, whom they are careful not to approach in his dying agonies, when pain, fury, and a sense of revenge, render the last struggles of the leviathan peculiarly dangerous.

The battle, or cannonade of Krasnoi, was concluded by the appearance of Davoust and his column, surrounded and followed by a large body of Cossacks, from whom he endeavoured to extricate himself by a precipitate march. When they came in sight of Krasnoi, most of the soldiers, who had been horribly harassed since they left Smolensk, broke their ranks, and hurried across the fields to escape the Russians, and gain the cover of the town, in the streets of which their officers rallied them with difficulty. In this miserable condition was the third corps of the army, according to its latest division, when it was reunited to the main body. Upon inquiring after Ney and the rear-guard, Napoleon had the mortification to learn that Ney was probably still at Smolensk, or, if upon the road, that he must be surrounded with difficulties out of which it was impossible he could extricate himself.

In the meantime, Napoleon learned that the Russians were acting with more vigour, and that Prince Galitzin was about to occupy Krasnoi; and further, that if he did not advance with all dispatch on Liady, he might probably find it in possession of the enemy. Gladly as Napoleon would have kept the field, in order to protect the approach of Ney, he now saw that such perseverance must necessarily expose himself and the remnant of his army to the greatest peril, without, in all human probability, being of use to his marshal. Under this conviction, he put himself at the head of the Old Guard, to march on as fast as possible, and secure Liady, and with it the passage of the Dnieper, from which he might otherwise have been excluded. Davoust and Mortier were left to defend Krasnoi, if practicable, till night-fall, and then to follow under cover of the darkness. The retreat of Napoleon seemed to remove the charm, which had chilled the Russians and warmed the French. A very fierce assault was made on the second and third divisions, and Mortier and Davoust, having both suffered greatly, made their escape to Liady with much difficulty. The French left on this fatal field forty-five pieces of cannon, upwards of six thousand prisoners, with a great number of slain, and as many wounded, who were necessarily left to the mercy of the Russians. To complete their losses, Ney's division of the army was, by the direction of the other columns upon Liady, left with the whole Russian army betwixt himself and Napoleon. The retreat of that celebrated soldier must next be narrated.

On the 17th of November, Ney, last of the invading army, left Smolensk at the head of seven or eight thousand fighting men, leaving behind 5,000 sick and wounded, and dragging along with them the remaining stragglers whom the cannon of Platoff, who entered the town immediately on Ney's departure, had compelled to resume their march. They advanced without much interruption till they reached the field of battle of Krasnoi, where they saw all the relics of a bloody action, and heaps of dead, from whose dress and appearance they could recognize the different corps in which they had served in Napoleon's army, though there was no one to tell the fate of the survivors. They had not proceeded much farther beyond this fatal spot, when they approached the banks of the Losmina, where all had been prepared at leisure for their reception. Miloradovitch lay here at the head of a great force; and a thick mist, which covered the ground, occasioned Ney's column to advance under the Russian batteries before being aware of the danger.

A single Russian officer appeared, and invited Ney to capitulate. "A marshal of France never surrenders," answered that intrepid general. The officer retired, and the Russian batteries opened a fire of grape-shot, at the distance of only two hundred and fifty yards, while at the concussion the mist arose, and showed the devoted column of French, with a ravine in front manned by their enemies, subjected on every side to a fire of artillery, while the hills were black with the Russian troops placed to support their guns. Far from losing heart in so perilous a situation, the French guards, with rare intrepidity, forced their way through the ravine of the Losmina, and rushed with the utmost fury on the Russian batteries. They were, however, charged in their turn with the bayonet, and such as had crossed the stream suffered dreadfully. In spite of this failure, Ney persevered in the attempt to cut his passage by main force through this superior body of Russians, who lay opposed to him in front. Again the French advanced upon the cannon, losing whole ranks, which were supplied by their comrades as fast as they fell. The assault was once more unsuccessful, and Ney, seeing that the general fate of his column was no longer doubtful, endeavoured at least to save a part from the wreck. Having selected about four thousand of the best men, he separated himself from the rest, and set forth under shelter of the night, moving to the rear, as if about to return to Smolensk. This, indeed, was the only road open to him, but he did not pursue it long; for as soon as he reached a rivulet, which had the appearance of being one of the feeders of the Dnieper, he adopted it for his guide to the banks of that river, which he reached in safety near the village of Syrokovenia. Here he found a single place in the river frozen over, though the ice was so thin that it bent beneath the steps of the soldiers.

Three hours were permitted, to allow stragglers from the column during the night-march to rally at this place, should their good fortune enable them to find it. These three hours Ney spent in profound sleep, lying on the banks of the river, and wrapped up in his cloak. When the stipulated time had

elapsed, the passage to the other side began and continued, although the motion of the ice, and the awful sound of its splitting into large cracks, prevented more than one from crossing at once. The waggons, some loaded with sick and wounded, last attempted to pass; but the ice broke with them, and the heavy plunge and stifed moaning, apprised their companions of their fate. The Cossacks, as usual, speedily appeared in the rear, gleaned up some hundreds of prisoners, and took possession of the artillery and baggage.

Ney had thus put the Dnieper betwixt him and the regulars of the Russian army, by a retreat which has few parallels in military history. But he had not escaped the Cossacks, who were spread abroad over the face of the country, and soon assembled around the remains of his column, with their light artillery and long lances. By these enemies they were several times placed in the utmost jeopardy; nevertheless, at the head of a reduced band of fifteen hundred men, the marshal fought his way to Orca, to which town Napoleon had removed from Liady, having crossed the Dnieper. Ney arrived on the 20th November, and found Eugène, Mortier and Davoust. The emperor was two leagues in advance when they met. Napoleon hailed Ney with the undisputed title, the bravest of the brave, and declared he would have given all his treasures to be assured of his existence. His comrades hastened to welcome and to relieve him, and being now in Poland, provisions and accommodation had become more plenty among them.

All Napoleon's grand army was now united. But the whole, which had at Smolensk amounted to forty thousand, consisted now of scarcely twelve thousand men who retained the name and discipline of soldiers, so much had want and the sword thinned the ranks of these invincible legions. There were besides, perhaps, thirty thousand stragglers of every description, but these added little or nothing to the strength of the army; and only served to encumber its numbers, as they were under no discipline, but plundered the country without mercy.

At this dreadful crisis, too, Napoleon had the mortification to learn the fall of Minsk, and the retreat of Schwartzenberg to cover Warsaw, which, of course, left him no hopes of receiving succour from the Austrians. He heard also that Victor and Oudinot had quarreled in what manner Wittgenstein should be attacked, and had on that account left him unattacked on any point. That general was therefore at freedom to threaten the left of the grand army, should it remain long on the Dnieper; while Koutousoff might resume, at his pleasure, his old station on Napoleon's left, and Tchitchagoff might occupy the Beresina in his front. In the bitterness of his heart the emperor exclaimed, "Thus it befalls, when we commit faults upon faults."

Minsk being out of the question, Napoleon's next point of direction was Borizoff. Here there was, over the Beresina, a bridge of three hundred fathoms in length, the possession of which appeared essential to his final escape from Russia. But while Napoleon was considering what should be his next movement, after crossing the Beresina at Borizoff, he was once more surprised with the additional evil tidings,

that this town also, with the bridge so necessary to him, was lost; that Borizoff was taken, as formerly mentioned, and Dombrowski defeated under its walls. "Is it then written," he said, looking upwards, and striking the earth with his cane, "Is it written that we shall commit nothing but errors?"

About the same gloomy period, Ségur relates the following anecdote:—Napoleon had stretched himself on a couch, and apparently slumbered, while his faithful servants, Duroc and Daru, sitting in his apartment, talked over their critical situation. In their whispered conversation, the words, "prisoner of state," reached the sleepless ear of Napoleon.

"How!" said he, raising himself, "do you think they would dare?"

In answer, Daru mentioned the phrase, well known to the emperor, of state policy, as a thing independent of public law or of morality.

"But France," said the emperor, to whom state policy sounded at present less pleasantly than when it was appealed to for deciding some great movement of his own,—“what will France say?"

"Who can answer that question, sire?" continued Duroc; but added, "it was his warmest wish that the emperor, at least, could reach France, were it through the air, if earth were stopped against his passage."

"Then I am in your way, I suppose?" said the emperor.

The reply was affirmative.

"And you," continued the emperor, with an affectation of treating the matter lightly, "have no wish to become a prisoner of state?"

"To be a prisoner of war is sufficient for me," said Daru.

Napoleon was silent for a time; then asked if the reports of his ministers were burnt.

"Not yet," was the reply.

"Then let them be destroyed," he continued, "for it must be confessed we are in a most lamentable condition."

This was the strongest sign he had yet given, of Napoleon's deep feeling of the situation to which he had reduced himself. In studying the map, to discover the fittest place to pass the Beresina, he approached his finger to the country of the Cossacks, and was heard to murmur, "Ah, Charles XII.; Pultawa." But these were only the momentary ejaculations dictated by a sense of his condition; all his resolutions were calmly and firmly taken, with a sense of what was due to himself and to his followers.

It was finally determined, that, in despite of Tchitchagoff and his army, which occupied the left bank, the passage of the Beresina should be attempted, at a place above Borizoff called Studzianka, where the stream was only fifty-five fathoms across, and six feet deep.

There were heights, it is true, on the opposite bank, surrounding a piece of meadow ground, and these the adventurers must look to find strongly occupied; so that those who adventured on the passage must expect to land in that marshy meadow, under a heavy fire from that position. Lastly, this perilous attempt must, in all probability, be made in the very

teeth of the Moldavian army. With Napoleon's ten or twelve thousand fighting men, and twice or three times the number of disorderly stragglers, the attempt to force such a passage would have been utter insanity. But the star of Napoleon had not yet set.

The first dawn of reviving fortune was marked by the success of Victor and Oudinot. They were advancing with the hope of saving Borzoff, when they received intelligence that Dombrowski was routed by Wittgenstein, and that the fragments of the Polish corps were close at hand, followed by the victorious Russians. Oudinot instantly gathered the scattered Poles under his protection, and moving on to meet the Russian advanced guard, they drove them back with considerable loss. Wittgenstein, in consequence of this check, found himself obliged to abandon Borzoff, and once more to place the Beresina betwixt himself and the French. But in repassing that river, he took care to destroy the bridge at Borzoff, so that the town, though secured by the French, was no longer useful to them as a place of passage, and the emperor, when he learned the news, was still compelled to abide by the plan of crossing, as he best could, at Studzianka. The task was rendered more easy, by the prospect of his scattered and broken army being reinforced by the troops of Victor and Oudinot, who were on the same side of the fatal river with himself, and might form an immediate junction with him.

Meantime, as a preparation for the march, the emperor limited all the officers, even of the highest rank, to one carriage; and ordered one half of the waggons to be destroyed, that all the horses and draught-oxen might be applied to getting forward the ammunition and artillery. There is reason to think these commands were very imperfectly obeyed. Another order, marking strongly the exigencies of the time, respected such officers as still retained their horses. The cavalry, under Latour Maubourg, had, since leaving Smolensk, been reduced from eighteen hundred to one hundred and fifty. To supply this deficiency, about five hundred officers, all who remained mounted, were formed into a body called the Sacred Squadron, to attend upon the emperor's person. Grouchy and Sebastiani had the command of this body, in which officers formed the privates, and generals of division served as captains. But it was not long ere fatigue and want of forage, no respecters of rank or condition, dismounted the greater part of the Sacred Squadron.

The army thus in some small degree reorganized, and refreshed by the better quarters and nourishment which they had received since the battle of Krasnoj, now plunged into the immense pine-forests which conceal the course of the Beresina, to disguise their adventurous march the more completely from the enemy. They were moving towards Borzoff, when loud shouts from the forest at first spread confusion among their ranks, under the idea of an unexpected attack; but this fear was soon changed into joy, when they found themselves on the point of uniting with the army of Victor and Oudinot, amounting to fifty thousand men, complete and provided with everything. Yet whatever the joy on the part of the grand army, it was at least equalled by the astonishment of their comrades, when they recog-

nized the remains of the innumerable host which had left them in such splendid equipment, and now returned in the guise, and with the gait and manner, of spectres raised from a church-yard. They filed past their happier comrades with squalid countenances, their uniform replaced by women's pelisses, or what various rags each could pick up; their feet bare and bleeding, or protected by bundles of filthy rags instead of shoes. All discipline seemed gone; the officer gave no command, the soldier obeyed none. A sense of common danger led them to keep together and to struggle forward, and mutual fatigue made them take repose by the same fires, but what else they had learned of discipline was practised rather by instinct than by duty, and in many cases was altogether forgotten.

The army of the two marshals, however, though scarce recovered from their astonishment, joined the ranks of the grand army, and, as if disorder had been infectious, very soon showed a disposition to get rid of that military discipline, which their new associates had flung aside.—Leaving Napoleon on his advance to the river, it is now necessary to notice the motions of the Russians.

The glory and the trophies of the march of the grand army had been enough entirely to satisfy Koutousoff. They were indeed sufficient to gorge such a limited ambition as that general might be supposed to possess at his advanced age, when men are usually more bent on saving than on winning. From the 15th to the 19th November, the Russians had obtained possession of 228 guns, had made 26,000 prisoners, of whom three hundred were officers, besides 10,000 men slain in battle, or destroyed by fatigue. Satisfied with such advantages, the cautious veteran proceeded by short journeys to Kopyn, on the Dnieper, without crossing that river, or attempting to second the defence of the Beresina by an attack on the rear of the enemy.

It is true, that the Russian army had sustained great losses; not less, it was said, than 30,000 sick and wounded, were for the present unable to serve, although the greater part of them afterwards recovered. It is no less true, that the Russian soldiers suffered greatly from want of hospitals, being unprovided for a struggle on such an extensive scale as Napoleon's invasion gave rise to. Nor can it be denied that Koutousoff's minute attention to the proper providing of his army with all necessaries was highly laudable. Yet we must still be of opinion, that an object so important as the capture of Bonaparte and the destruction of his army, would have vindicated, even if the soldier himself had been appealed to, two or three forced marches, with the hardships attending them. Such, however, was not Koutousoff's opinion; he halted at Kopyn, and contented himself with dispatching his Cossacks and light troops to annoy Napoleon's rear.

The danger not being pressing on the part of the Grand Army of Russia, Napoleon had only to apprehend the opposition of Tchitchagoff, whose army, about 35,000 men in all, was posted along the Beresina to oppose the passage of Bonaparte wherever it should be attempted. Unfortunately, the admiral was one of an ordinary description of people, who, having once determined in their own mind, that an

adversary entertains a particular design, proceed to act upon that belief as an absolute certainty, and can rarely be brought to reason on the possibility of his having any other purpose. Thus, taking it for granted that Napoleon's attempt to cross the Beresina would take place *below* Borizoff, Tchitchagoff could not be persuaded that the passage might be as well essayed *above* that town. Napoleon, by various inquiries and reports transmitted through the Jews, who, for money, served as spies on both sides, contrived to strengthen Tchitchagoff in the belief that he was only designing a feint upon Studzianka, in order to withdraw the attention of the Russians from the Upper Beresina. Never was a stratagem more successful.

On the very day when Napoleon prepared for the passage at Studzianka, Tchitchagoff, instead of noticing what was going forward beneath Borizoff, not only marched up the river with all the forces under his own immediate command, but issued orders to the division of Tschaplitz, which amounted to six thousand men, and at present watched the very spot where Napoleon meant to erect his bridges, to leave that position, and follow him in the same direction. These were the very orders which Bonaparte would have dictated to the Russian leader, if he had had his choice.

When the French arrived at Studzianka, their first business was to prepare two bridges, a work which was attended with much danger and difficulty. They laboured by night, expecting in the morning to be saluted with a cannonade from the Russian detachment under Tschaplitz, which occupied the heights already mentioned, on the opposite bank. The French generals, and particularly Marat, considered the peril as so imminent, that they wished Bonaparte to commit himself to the faith of some Poles who knew the country, and leave the army to its fate; but Napoleon rejected the proposal as unworthy of him. All night the French laboured at the bridges, which were yet but little advanced, and might have been easily demolished by the artillery of the Russians. But what was the joy and surprise of the French to see, with the earliest beams of the morning, that artillery, and those Russians, in full march retreating from their position! Availing himself of their disappearance, Bonaparte threw across a body of men, who swam their horses over the river, with each a voltigeur behind him. Thus a footing was gained on the other bank of this perilous stream. Great part of Victor's army had moved down the river towards Studzianka, while the last division lay still at Borizoff, of which town that marshal had possession. This constituted a rear-guard to protect the army of Napoleon during the critical moment of its passage, from the interruption which might be expected from the corps of Wittgenstein.

During the 26th and 27th, Napoleon pushed troops across the river, those of Oudinot forming the advance; and was soon so secure, that Tschaplitz, discovering his error, and moving back to regain his important position at Studzianka, found the French too strongly posted on the right bank of the Beresina, for his regaining the opportunity which he had lost. He halted, therefore, at Stakhowa, and waited

for reinforcements and orders. Meanwhile the passage of the Beresina continued, slowly indeed, for the number of stragglers and the quantity of baggage was immense; yet by noon Napoleon and his guards had crossed the river. Victor, whose division constituted the rear-guard of the grand army, had relieved the Imperial Guards in their post on the left bank; and Partouneaux, who formed the rear of the whole army, was moving from Borizoff, where he had been stationed with the purpose of fixing the enemy's attention upon the spot. No sooner had he left the town than it was again in the hands of the Russians, being instantly occupied by Platoff.

But the indefatigable Wittgenstein was in motion on the left bank, pressing forward as Victor closed up towards Napoleon; and, throwing himself between Studzianka and Borizoff, on a plain called Staroi-Borizoff, he cut off Partouneaux's division from the rest of the French army. That general made a gallant resistance, and attempted to force his way at the sword's point through the troops opposed to him. At length the Hettman Platoff, and the Russian partisan Sclavin, coming up, the French general found himself entirely overpowered, and, after a brave resistance, laid down his arms. Three generals, with artillery, and, according to the Russian accounts, about 7000 men, fell into the hands of the Russians,—a prize the more valuable, as the prisoners belonged chiefly to the unbroken and unexhausted division of Victor, and comprehended eight hundred fine cavalry in good order.

To improve this advantage, the Russians threw a bridge of pontoons across the Beresina at Borizoff, and Tchitchagoff and Wittgenstein having communicated, resolved upon a joint attack upon both banks of the river at once. With this purpose, upon the 28th of November, Admiral Tchitchagoff moved to Stakhowa, upon the right bank, to reinforce Tschaplitz, and assault that part of the French army which had crossed the Beresina; and Wittgenstein with Platoff marched towards Studzianka, to destroy the emperor's rear-guard, which no exertion on the part of Napoleon or his generals had yet been able to get across the river. Thus, the extraordinary good fortune of finding a place of passage, and of being enabled by an uncommon chance to complete his bridges without opposition, was so far from placing Napoleon in safety, that his dangers seemed only to multiply around him. But yet upon his side of the river, now the right bank, his own presence of mind, and the bravery of his soldiers, gave him a decided superiority, and the tardiness, to say the least, of Tchitchagoff's motions, insured his safety.

Tschaplitz, who seems to have been a brave and active officer, commenced the battle by advancing from Stakhowa. But he was worsted by the French, who were superior in numbers, and he received no succours from the admiral, though repeatedly demanded. * In this manner were the French enabled to force their way towards a village called Brilowan, through deep morasses, and over long bridges or

* The conduct of the admiral was so unaccountable on this occasion, that some attempted to explain it on his naval habits, and to suppose that he was prevented from sending the reinforcements by the wind being contrary.

railways, formed of the trunks of pine-trees, where a bold attack might have rendered their advance impossible. The least exertion on the part of Tchitchagoff might have caused these bridges to be burnt; and as combustibles were laid ready for the purpose, it required but, according to Ségur's expression, a spark from the pipe of a Cossack, to have set them on fire. The destruction of this railway, inclosing the French between the morass and the river, must have rendered the passage of the Beresina entirely useless. But it was not so decreed; and the French, under Oudinot, were enabled to preserve the means of a movement so essential to their safety. Meanwhile the scene on the left bank had become the wildest and most horrible which war can exhibit.

On the heights of Studzianka, Victor, who commanded the French rear-guard, amounting perhaps to 8,000 or 10,000 men, was prepared to cover the retreat over the bridges. The right of this corps d'armée rested on the river; a ravine full of bushes covered their front, but the left wing had no point of support. It remained, according to the military phrase, *in the air*, and was covered by two regiments of cavalry. Behind this defensive line were many thousands of stragglers, mingled with the usual followers of a camp, and with all those individuals who, accompanying, for various reasons, the French from Moscow, had survived the horrors of the march. Women, children, domestics, the aged and the infants, were seen among the wretched mass, and wandered by the side of this fatal river, like the fabled spectres which throng the banks of the infernal Styx, and seek in vain for passage. The want of order, which it was impossible to preserve, the breaking of the bridges, and the time spent in the repair—the fears of the unhappy wretches to trust themselves to the dangerous and crowded passages, had all operated to detain them on the right bank. The baggage, which, in spite of the quantity already lost, of the difficulty of transportation, and of Napoleon's precise orders, amounted still to a very great number of carts, wains, and the like, and which was now augmented by all that belonged to the troops of Oudinot and Victor, was seen, some filing towards the bridges, and the greater part standing in confusion upon the shore. The artillery itself, such as remained, was in no better state.

Such was the condition of matters at the bridge, when Wittgenstein, warm from his victory over Partouneaux, marching down the left bank of the Beresina, engaged in a fierce combat with the rear-guard under Victor; and the balls of the Russians began to fall among the mingled and disordered mass which we have endeavoured to describe. It was then that the whole body of stragglers and fugitives rushed like distracted beings towards the bridges, every feeling of prudence or humanity swallowed up by the animal instinct of self-preservation. The horrible scene of disorder was augmented by the desperate violence of those, who, determined to make their own way at all risks, threw down and trampled upon whatever came in their road. The weak and helpless either shrunk back from the fray, and sat down to wait their fate

at a distance, or, mixing in it, were thrust over the bridges, crushed under carriages, cut down perhaps with sabres, or trampled to death under the feet of their countrymen. All this while the action continued with fury, and, as if the heavens meant to match their wrath with that of man, a hurricane arose, and added terrors to a scene which was already of a character so dreadful.

About mid-day the French, still bravely resisting, began to lose ground. The Russians, coming gradually up in strength, succeeded in forcing the ravine, and compelling them to assume a position nearer the bridges. About the same time, the larger bridge, that constructed for artillery and heavy carriages, broke down, and multitudes were forced into the water. The scream of mortal agony, which arose from the despairing multitude, became at this crisis for a moment so universal, that it rose shrilly audible over the noise of the elements and the thunders of war, above the wild whistling of the tempest, and the sustained and redoubled hurrahs of the Cossacks. The witness from whom we have this information declares that the sound was in his ears for many weeks. This dreadful scene continued till dark, many being forced into the icy river, some throwing themselves in, betwixt absolute despair, and the faint hope of gaining the opposite bank by swimming, some getting across only to die of cold and exhaustion. As the obscurity came on, Victor, with the remainder of his troops, which was much reduced, quitted the station he had defended so bravely, and led them in their turn across. All night, the miscellaneous multitude continued to throng across the bridge, under the fire of the Russian artillery, to whom, even in the darkness, the noise which accompanied their march made them a distinct mark. *At day-break, the French engineer, General Eblé, finally set fire to the bridge. All that remained on the other side, including many prisoners, and a great quantity of guns and baggage, became the prisoners and the prey of the Russians. The amount of the French loss was never exactly known; but the Russian report, concerning the bodies of the invaders which were collected and burnt as soon as the thaw permitted, states that upwards of 36,000 were found in the Beresina.

CHAPTER LXXXI.

Napoleon determines to return to Paris—He leaves Smorgoni on 6th December—reaches Warsaw on the 10th.—Curious interview with the Abbé de Pradt—Arrives at Dresden on the 14th—and at Paris on the 18th, at midnight.—Dreadful state of the grand army, when left by Napoleon—Arrive at Wilna, whence they are driven by Cossacks, directing their flight upon Kovno.—Dissensions among the French generals.—Cautious policy of the Austrians under Schwartzberg.—Precarious state of Macdonald.—He retreats upon Tilist.—D'York separates his troops from the French.—Macdonald effects his retreat to Königsberg.—Close of the Russian expedition, with a loss on the part of the French of 450,000 men in killed and prisoners.—Discussion of the causes which led to this ruinous catastrophe.

WHEN the army of Bonaparte was assembled on the other side of the Beresina, they exhibited symp-

toms of total disorganization. The village of Brilwan, where they halted on the night of their passage, was entirely pulled down, that the materials might supply camp-fires; and a considerable part of Bonaparte's head-quarters was included in the same fate, his own apartment being with difficulty saved from the soldiery. They could scarcely be blamed for this want of discipline, for the night was deadly cold; and of the wet and shivering wretches who had been immersed in the icy river, many laid their heads down never to raise them more.

On the 29th November, the emperor left the fatal banks of the Beresina, at the head of an army more disorganized than ever; for few of Oudinot's corps, and scarcely any belonging to Victor's, who were yet remaining, were able to resist the general contagion of disorder. They pushed on without any regular disposition, having no more van-guard, centre, or rear, than can be ascribed to a flock of sheep. To outstrip the Russians was their only desire, and yet numbers were daily surprised by the partisans and Cossacks. Most fortunately for Napoleon, the precaution of the Duke of Bassano had dispatched to the banks of the Beresina a division of French, commanded by General Maison, who were sufficient to form a rear-guard, and to protect this disorderly and defenceless mass of fugitives. Thus they reached Malodeczno on the 3d December.

Here Bonaparte opened to his chief confidants his resolution to leave the army, and push forward to Paris. The late conspiracy of Malet had convinced him of the necessity of his presence there.* His remaining with an army, which scarce had existence in a military sense, could be of no use. He was near Prussia, where, from reluctant allies, the inhabitants were likely to be changed into bitter enemies. He was conscious of what he had meditated against the King of Prussia, had he returned victorious, and judged from his own purposes the part which Frederick was likely to adopt, in consequence of this great reverse in his fortunes.

This resolution being adopted, Napoleon announced that preparations for his departure should be made at Smorgoni, intending to remain at Malodeczno till he should be joined by General Maison with the rear-guard, which was left a day's march behind the main body. He now waited until it should close up with him. They came at last, but with Tachaplitz and the Russians at their heels. Intense cold (the thermometer being twenty degrees below zero) prevented anything more than skirmishes between them.

On the 5th December, Bonaparte was at Smorgoni, where he again received a welcome reinforcement, being joined by Loison, advancing at the head of the garrison of Wilna, to protect his retreat to that place, and whose opportune assistance gave a new rear-guard, to supply that commanded by Maison, which the war and weather had already rendered as incapable of effectual service, as those whom they had protected from the banks of the Beresina to Smorgoni. Loison had orders to take in his turn this destructive duty, for which purpose

he was to remain a day's march, as usual, behind the mass of what had been the army.

The order of the march to Wilna thus arranged, Napoleon determined on his own departure. Three sledges were provided; one of which was prepared to carry him and Caulaincourt, whose title the emperor proposed to assume while traveling incognito, although their figures were strikingly dissimilar, the Duke of Vicenza being a tall, raw-boned, stiff-looking man. In a general audience, at which were present the King of Naples, the viceroy, Berthier, and the marshals, Napoleon announced to them that he had left Murat to command the army, as generalissimo. He talked to them in terms of hope and confidence. He promised to check the Austrians and Prussians in their disposition for war, by presenting himself at the head of the French nation, and twelve hundred thousand men;—he said he had ordered Ney to Wilna, to reorganize the army, and to strike such a blow as should discourage the advance of the Russians;—lastly, he assured them of winter quarters beyond the Niemen. He then took an affectionate and individual farewell of each of his generals, and, stepping into his train, a lively emblem of the fishing-boat of Xerxes, he departed from Smorgoni at the late hour of ten at night.

With what feelings this extraordinary man left the remains of his army, we have no means even of guessing. His outward bearing, during his extreme distresses, had been in general that of the utmost firmness; so that such expressions of grief or irritation, as at times broke from him, were picked up and registered by those who heard them, as curious instances of departure from his usual state of composure. To preserve his tranquillity, he permitted no details to be given him of the want and misery with which he was surrounded. Thus, when Colonel d'Albignac brought news of Ney's distresses, after the battle of Winzma, he stopped his mouth by saying sharply, "He desired to know no particulars." It was of a piece with this resolution, that he always gave out orders as if the whole imperial army had existed in its various divisions, after two-thirds had been destroyed, and the remainder reduced to an undisciplined mob. "Would you deprive me of my tranquillity?" he said angrily to an officer, who thought it necessary to dwell on the actual circumstances of the army, when some orders, expressed in this manner, had been issued. And when the persevering functionary persisted to explain—thinking, perhaps, in his simplicity, that Napoleon did not know that which in fact he only was reluctant to dwell upon,—he reiterated angrily, "I ask you, sir, why you would deprive me of my tranquillity?"

It is evident, that Napoleon must have known the condition of his army as well as any one around him; but to admit that he was acquainted with that which he could not remedy, would have been acknowledging a want of power inconsistent with the character of one, who would willingly be thought rather the controller than the subject of Fate. Napoleon was none of those princes mentioned by Horace, who, in poverty and exile, lay aside their titles of majesty, and language of authority. The head-quarters of Smorgoni, and the residences of

* The reader will find the details of this singular attempt in Chapter LXXII.

Porto Ferrajo and St Helena, can alike bear witness to the tenacity with which he clung not only to power, but to the forms and circumstance attendant upon sovereignty, at periods when the essence of that sovereignty was either endangered or lost. A deeper glance into his real feelings may be obtained from the report of the Abbé de Pradt, which is well worth transcribing.

After narrowly escaping being taken by the Russian partisan Szelavín, at a hamlet called Youpranoui, Napoleon reached Warsaw upon the 10th December. Here the Abbé de Pradt, then minister of France to the Diet of Poland, was in the act of endeavouring to reconcile the various rumours which poured in from every quarter, when a figure like a spectre, wrapped in furs, which were stiffened by hoar-frost, stalked into his apartments, supported by a domestic, and was with difficulty recognized by the ambassador as the Duke of Vicenza.

"You here, Caulaincourt?" said the astonished prelate.—"And where is the emperor?"

"At the Hôtel d'Angleterre, waiting for you."

"Why not stop at the palace?"

"He travels incognito."

"Do you need anything?"

"Some Burgundy or Malaga."

"All is at your service—but whither are you traveling?"

"To Paris."

"To Paris!—but where is the army?"

"It exists no longer," said Caulaincourt, looking upwards.

"And the victory of the Beresina—and the six thousand prisoners?"*

"We got across, that is all—the prisoners were a few hundred men, who have escaped. We have had other business than to guard them."

His curiosity thus far satisfied, the Abbé de Pradt hastened to the hotel. In the yard stood three sledges in a dilapidated condition. One for the emperor and Caulaincourt, the second for two officers of rank, the third for the Mameluke Roustán and another domestic. He was introduced with some mystery into a bad inn's bad room, where a servant wench was blowing a fire made of green wood. Here was the emperor, whom the Abbé de Pradt had last seen when he played King of Kings among the assembled sovereigns of Dresden. He was dressed in a green pelisse, covered with lace and lined with furs, and, by walking briskly about the apartment, was endeavouring to obtain the warmth which the chimney refused. He saluted "Monsieur l'Ambassadeur," as he termed him, with gaiety. The abbé felt a movement of sensibility, to which he was disposed to give way, but, as he says, "The poor man did not understand me." He limited his expressions of devotion, therefore, to helping Napoleon off with his cloak. To us, it seems that Napoleon repelled the effusions of the Archbishop of Malines' interest, because he did not chuse to be the object either of his interest or his pity. He heard

from his minister, that the minds of the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy had been much changed since they had been led to despair of the regeneration of their country; and that they were already, since they could not be free Poles, studying how to reconcile themselves with their former governors of Prussia. The entrance of two Polish ministers checked the ambassador's communications. The conversation was maintained from that moment by Napoleon alone; or rather he indulged in a monologue, turning upon the sense he entertained that the failure of his Russian expedition would diminish his reputation, while he struggled against the painful conviction, by numbering up the plans by which he might repair his losses, and alleging the natural obstacles to which he had been obliged to succumb.

"We must levy ten thousand Poles," he said, "and check the advance of these Russians. A lance and a horse are all that is necessary. There is but a single step betwixt the sublime and the ridiculous."

The functionaries congratulated him on his escape from so many dangers.

"Dangers!" he replied; "none in the world. I live in agitation. The more I bustle the better I am. It is for kings of Cognac to fatten in their palaces—horseback and the fields are for me.—From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a single step.—Why do I find you so much alarmed here?"

"We are at a loss to gather the truth of the news about the army."

"Bah!" replied the emperor; "the army is in a superb condition. I have a hundred and twenty thousand men—I have beat the Russians in every action—they are no longer the soldiers of Friedland and Eylau. The army will recruit at Wilna—I am going to bring up three hundred thousand men—Success will render the Russians fool-hardy—I will give them battle twice or thrice upon the Oder, and in a month I will be again on the Niemen—I have more weight when on my throne, than at the head of my army.—Certainly I quit my soldiers with regret; but I must watch Austria and Prussia, and I have more weight seated on my throne than at the head of my army. All that has happened goes for nothing—a mere misfortune, in which the enemy can claim no merit—I beat them everywhere—they wished to cut me off at the Beresina—I made a fool of that ass of an admiral—(He could never pronounce the name Tchitchagoff)—I had good troops and cannon—the position was superb—five hundred toises of marsh—a river—"

This he repeated twice, then run over the distinction in the 29th bulletin between men of strong and feeble minds, and proceeded.—"I have seen worse affairs than this—At Marengo I was beaten till six o'clock in the evening—next day I was master of Italy—At Essling, that archduke tried to stop me—He published something or other—My army had already advanced a league and a half—I did not even condescend to make any disposition. All the world knows how such things are managed when I am in the field. I could not help the Danube rising sixteen feet in one night—Ah! without that, there would have been an end of the Austrian monarchy. But it was written in heaven that I should marry an archduchess. (This was

* This 'alludes to exaggerated reports circulated by Maret, Duke of Bassano, then residing at Wilna, of a pretended victory obtained by Napoleon, at the passage at Stedzianka.

said with an air of much gaiety.) In the same manner, in Russia, I could not prevent its freezing. They told me every morning that I had lost ten thousand horses during the night.—Well, farewell to you!" He bade them adieu five or six times in the course of the harangue, but always returned to the subject. "Our Norman horses are less hardy than those of the Russians—they sink under ten degrees of cold (beneath zero). It is the same with the men. Look at the Bavarians; there is not one left.—Perhaps it may be said that I stopped too long at Moscow; that may be true, but the weather was fine—the winter came on prematurely—besides, I expected peace. On the 5th October, I sent Lauriston to treat. I thought of going to St Petersburg, and I had time enough to have done so, or to have gone to the south of Russia, or to Smolensk. Well, we will make head at Wilna; Murat is left there. Ha, ha, ha! It is a great political game. Nothing venture, nothing win!—It is but one step from the sublime to the ludicrous. The Russians have shown they have character—their emperor is beloved by his people—they have clouds of Cossacks—it is something to have such a kingdom—the peasants of the crown love their government—the nobility are all mounted on horseback. They proposed to me to set the slaves at liberty, but that I would not consent to—they would have massacred every one. I made regular war upon the Emperor Alexander, but who could have expected such a blow as the burning of Moscow? Now they would lay it on us, but it was in fact themselves who did it. That sacrifice would have done honour to ancient Rome."

He returned to his favourite purpose of checking the Russians, who had just annihilated his grand army, by raising a large body of Polish lancers, to whom, as things stood, it would have been difficult to have proposed any adequate motive for exertion. The fire went out, and the counsellors listened in frozen despair, while, keeping himself warm by walking up and down, and by his own energies, the emperor went on with his monologue; now betraying, in spite of himself, feelings and sentiments which he would have concealed; now dwelling upon that which he wished others to believe; and often repeating, as the burden of his harangue, the aphorism which he has rendered immortal, concerning the vicinity of the sublime and the ludicrous.

His passage through Silesia being mentioned, he answered in a doubtful tone, "Ha, Prussia?" as if questioning the security of that route. At length he decided to depart in good earnest; cut short the respectful wishes for the preservation of his health with the brief assurance, that he "could not be in better health were the very devil in him;" and threw himself into the humble sledge which carried Cæsar and his fortunes. The horses sprung forward, nearly overturning the carriage as it crossed the court-yard gate, and disappeared in the darkness. Such is the lively account of the Abbé de Pradt, who declares solemnly, that on taxing his memory to the utmost, he accuses himself of neither want of accuracy nor forgetfulness. Napoleon does not deny that such a long conversation took place, but alleges that the abbé has caricatured it. In the meanwhile, he said he scratched an order for Mon-

sieur l'Ambassadeur to return immediately to Paris; which, considering what had happened in Russia, and was about to happen in Poland, could not but be a most welcome mandate, especially as it was likely to be soon enforced by the lances of the Cossacks.

Napoleon continued to pass on with as much speed as possible. He said, when at St Helena, that he was nigh being arrested in Silesia. "But the Prussians," he said, "passed the time in consulting which they ought to have employed in action. They acted like the Saxons, of whom Charles XII. said gaily, when he left Dresden, 'They will be deliberating to-day whether they should have arrested me yesterday.' If such an idea was entertained by any one, it may have been by some of the Tugend-Bund, who might think it no crime to seize on one who made universal liberty his spoil. But we do not believe that Frederick ever harboured the thought, while he continued in alliance with France.

Meanwhile, Napoleon continued his journey in secrecy, and with rapidity. On the 14th December he was at Dresden, where he had a long private conference with the good old king, who did not feel his gratitude to the emperor, as a benefactor, abated by his accumulated misfortunes. The interview—how different from their last—was held in the hotel where Bonaparte alighted, and where Augustus came to visit him incognito. On the 18th, in the evening, he arrived at Paris, where the city had been for two days agitated by the circulation of the 29th bulletin, in which the veil, though with a reluctant hand, was raised up to show the disasters of the Russian war.

It may not be thought minute to mention, that Napoleon and his attendant had difficulty in procuring admittance to the Tuileries at so late an hour. The empress had retired to her private apartment. Two figures muffled in furs entered the ante-room, and one of them directed his course to the door of the empress's sleeping-chamber. The lady in waiting hastened to throw herself betwixt the intruder and the entrance, but, recognizing the emperor, she shrieked aloud, and alarmed Maria Louisa, who entered the ante-room. Their meeting was extremely affectionate, and showed, that, amidst all his late losses, Napoleon had still domestic happiness within his reach.

We return to the grand army, or rather to the assemblage of those who had once belonged to it, for of an army it had scarce the semblance left. The soldiers of the Imperial Guard, who had hitherto made it their pride to preserve some degree of discipline, would, after the departure of Napoleon, give obedience to no one else. Murat, to whom the chief command had been delegated, seemed scarcely to use it, nor when he did was he obeyed. If Ney, and some of the marshals, still retained authority, they were only attended to from habit, or because the instinct of discipline revived when the actual battle drew near. They could not, however, have offered any effectual defence, nor could they have escaped actual slaughter and dispersion, had it not been for Loison's troops, who continued to form the

rear-guard, and who, never having been on the eastern side of the fatal Beresina, had, amid great suffering, still preserved sufficient discipline to keep their ranks, behave like soldiers, and make themselves be respected, not only by the Cossacks, but by Tschaplitz, Wittgenstein, and the Russians detached from the main army, who followed them close, and annoyed them constantly. The division of Loison remained like a shield, to protect the disorderly retreat of the main body.

Still, some degree of order is so essential to human society, that, even in that disorganized mass, the stragglers, which now comprehended almost the whole army, divided into little bands who assisted each other, and had sometimes the aid of a miserable horse, which, when it fell down under the burden of what they had piled on it, was torn to pieces and eaten, while life was yet palpitating in its veins. These bands had chiefs selected from among themselves. But this species of union, though advantageous on the whole, led to particular evils. Those associated into such a fraternity would communicate to none save those of their own party, a mouthful of rye-dough, which, seasoned with gunpowder for want of salt, and eaten with a bouillé of horse-flesh, formed the best part of their food. Neither would they permit a stranger to warm himself at their fires, and when spoil was found, two of these companies often, especially if of different countries, fought for the possession of it, and a handful of men was a sufficient temptation for putting to death the wretch who could not defend his booty. The prisoners, it is said (and we heartily wish the fact could be refuted), were parked every night, without receiving any victuals whatsoever, and perished, like impounded cattle, from want of food, cold, and the delicious fury which such treatment inspired. Among these unfortunates some became cannibals, and the same horrible reproach has been cast on the French themselves.

To enhance misfortunes so dreadful, the cold, which had been for some time endurable, increased on the 6th December, to the most bitter degree of frost, being twenty-seven or twenty-eight degrees below zero. Many dropped down and expired in silence, the blood of others was determined to the head by the want of circulation; it gushed at length from eyes and mouth, and the wretches sunk down on the gory snow, and were relieved by death. At the night bivouacs, the soldiers approached their frozen limbs to the fire so closely, that, falling asleep in that posture, their feet were scorched to the bone, while their hair was frozen to the ground. In this condition they were often found by the Cossacks, and happy were those upon whom the pursuers bestowed a thrust with the lance to finish their misery. Other horrors there were, which are better left in silence. Enough has been said to show, that such a calamity, in such an extent, never before darkened the pages of history. In this horrible retreat, twenty thousand recruits had joined the army since crossing the Beresina, where, including the corps of Oudinot and Victor, they amounted to eighty thousand men. But of this sum of eighty thousand men, one-half perished betwixt the Beresina and the walls of Wilna.

In such a plight did the army arrive at Wilna, where great provision had been made for their reception. The magazines were groaning with plenty, but, as at Smolensk, the administrators and commissioners, terrified for their own responsibility, dared not issue provisions to a disorderly mob, who could neither produce authority for drawing rations, nor give a regular receipt. The famished wretches fell down in the street before the magazines, and died there, cursing with their latest breath the ill-timed punctiliousness of office, which refused to starving men the morsel that might have saved their lives. In other places of the town, stores both of provision and liquor were broken open by the desperate soldiery, plundered, and wasted. Numbers became intoxicated, and to those, as they sunk down in the street, death came before sobriety. The sick who went to the hospitals found them crowded not only with the dying, but with dead, whose corpses were left to freeze or to putrefy on the stairs and in the corridors, and sometimes in the apartments of those who yet survived. Such were the comforts of Wilna, from which so much had been hoped.

Still, however, some of the citizens, moved by pity or terror, or from desire of gain (for many soldiers had still about their persons some remnants of the spoils of Moscow), were willing to give lodging and food to these exhausted phantoms, who begged such relief sometimes with furious threats and imprecations, sometimes in the plaintive tone of men ready to perish. Distributions began also to be made at the public stores; and men who for long had not eat a morsel of bread, or reposed themselves upon any better lair than the frozen earth, or under any other canopy save that of the snow-fraught sky, deemed it paradise to enjoy the most common household comforts, of which we think so little while we enjoy them, yet are miserable when they are abridged or withdrawn. Some wept for joy at receiving an ordinary loaf of bread, and finding themselves at liberty to eat it, seated, and under a roof.

On a sudden the repast, which seemed earnest of a return to safety and to social life, was disturbed by a distant cannonade, which came nigher and nigher—then by the fire of musketry—at length by their own drums beating to arms in the streets. Every alarm was in vain; even the Imperial Guard no longer attended to the summons. The soldiers were weary of their lives, and it seemed as if they would have been contented to perish like the Jews in the wilderness, with their food betwixt their teeth. At length, the distant hurra, and the nearer cry of Cossacks! Cossacks! which for some time had been their most available signal for marching, compelled them to tear themselves from their refreshment, and rush into the street. There they found their rear-guard and Loison, although they had been reinforced by the body of Bavarians commanded by Wrede, who had been left on the verge of Volhynia, hurrying into the town in disorder like men defeated, and learned that they had been driven back by Wittgenstein, with Platoff and other partisan leaders, who had followed them up to the gates.

Wilna, besides the immense magazines belonging to the French army, contained a vast deposit of wealth and property, which had been left there in

the advance upon Moscow, and, in particular, a quantity of treasure belonging to Napoleon. The town, though open, might have been made good till the magazines were destroyed and the baggage removed; but such was the confusion of the moment, that the Russians forced their way into the town by one access, whilst the French left it by another, directing their flight upon Kowno, with the most valuable part of their baggage, or such as could be most speedily harnessed. The inhabitants of the town, the lower orders that is, and particularly the Jews, now thought of propitiating the victors by butchering the wretches whom they had received into their houses; or, at best, stripping and thrusting them naked into the streets. For this inhumanity the Jews are said to have been afterwards punished by the Russians, who caused several of them to be hanged.

Meanwhile the flying column had attained a hill and defile, called Ponari, when the carriages became entangled, and at length one of the treasure-waggons being overturned, burst, and discovered its contents. All shadow of discipline was then lost; and, as if to anticipate the Russians, the French soldiers themselves fell upon the baggage, broke open the wains, and appropriated their contents. The Cossacks rode up during the fray, and so rich was the booty, that even they were content to plunder in company, suspending for the instant their national animosity, where there seemed wealth enough for all, and no time to lose in fighting. Yet, it is said that the privates of the Imperial Guard displayed a rare example of honour and discipline. The Count de Turenne, having beaten off the Cossacks who pressed in, distributed the private treasure of Napoleon among his Guard, the individuals of which afterwards restored them. "Not a single piece of money," says Ségur, "was lost." This, however, must be partly imagination; for many of the Guard fell after this, and the Cossacks, who became their executors, could have had little idea of making restitution.

It is not worth while to trace further the flight of this miserable body of wanderers. They arrived at length at Kowno, the last town of Russian Poland, Ney alone endeavouring to give them some military direction and assistance; while they were at every instant deserting him and themselves. At Kowno, it seems that about one thousand men were still under arms, about twenty times that number in total dispersion. The pursuit of the Russians appeared to cease after the fugitives had recrossed the Niemen on the ice; they did not chuse to push the war into Prussia.

At Gumbinnen, the remaining marshals and commanders held a council, in which Murat gave way to the stifled resentment he had long entertained against his brother-in-law. He had been displeased with Napoleon, for not severely repressing the insolence with which, as he conceived, he had been treated by Davoust, and at another time by Ney; and he openly inveighed against his relative as a madman, upon whose word no reliance was to be placed. In these moments of anger and mutiny, Murat blamed himself for rejecting the proposals of the English. Had he not done so, he said, he might

still have been a great king, like the sovereigns of Austria and Russia. "These kings," answered Davoust, bitterly, "are monarchs by the grace of God, by the sanction of time, and the course of custom. But you—you are only a king by the grace of Napoleon, and through the blood of Frenchmen. You are grossly ungrateful, and as such I will denounce you to the emperor." Such was this strange scene, of which the marshals were silent witnesses. It served to show how little unity there was in their councils, when the Master Spirit ceased to preside among them.

From Gumbinnen the French went to show their miseries at Königsberg. Everywhere they were coldly, yet not coarsely treated by the Prussians, who had before felt their oppression, but did not consider them in their present state as becoming objects of vengeance. At Königsberg they learnt the fate of their two extreme wings, which was of a nature to close all hopes.

On the right of the French original line of advance, Schwartzenberg had no sooner learned that the emperor was totally defeated, and his army irretrievably dispersed, than, in the quality of a mere auxiliary, he thought himself no longer entitled to hazard a single Austrian life in the quarrel. There was an armistice concluded between the Austrians and Russians, by the terms of which they agreed to manoeuvre as at a game of chess, but not to fight. Thus, when the Russians should gain such a position, as in actual war would have given them an advantage, the Austrians were under the engagement to retreat; and the campaign resembled nothing so much as a pacific field-day, in which two generals in the same service venture upon a trial of skill. Schwartzenberg, by his manoeuvres, protected the French corps under Régnier, as long as possible, obtained good terms for Warsaw, and gained for Régnier three days' advantage, when at last he ceased to cover the place. Having thus protected his allies to the last, he retired into the Austrian territories; and although Régnier was finally overtaken and surprised at Khalish, it could not be imputed to Schwartzenberg's desertion of him, but to his own making too long a halt to protect some Polish dépôts. The relics of Régnier's army, such at least as fled into the Austrian territories, were well received there, and afterwards restored to their own banners. Still the alliance with Austria, which in one sense had cost Napoleon so dear, was now dissolved, and his right wing totally dissipated by the defection of his allies. On the left wing matters had no better, or rather, they had a much worse appearance.

During the eventful six months of the Russian campaign, Macdonald, who commanded the left wing, had remained in Courland, with an army of about 30,000 men, of whom 22,000 were Prussians, the rest Germans of different countries. It would seem that Napoleon had been averse from the beginning to employ these unwilling auxiliaries upon any service where their defection might influence the other parts of his army. Yet they behaved well upon several occasions, when Macdonald had occasion to repel the attacks and sallies of the numerous garrison of Riga, and their active exertions enabled

him to save the park of heavy artillery destined for the siege of that place, which had almost fallen into the hands of the Russian general, Lewis, at Mittau, on the 29th of September. But on this occasion, though having every reason to be pleased with the soldiers, Macdonald saw room to suspect their leader, d'Yorck, of coldness to the French cause. That officer was, indeed, engaged in a service which at heart he detested. He was one of the Tugend-Bund, so often mentioned, an ardent Prussian patriot, and eager to free his native country from a foreign yoke. He therefore eagerly watched for a plausible opportunity when he might, without dishonour, disunite his forces from those of the French marshal.

About the beginning of December, the situation of Macdonald became precarious. Nothing was heard on every side, save of the rout and disasters of the French Grand Army, and the marshal anxiously expected orders for a retreat while it was yet open to him. But such was the confusion at the headquarters after the emperor's departure, that neither Murat nor Berthier thought of sending the necessary authority to Macdonald; and when they did, though the order to retreat might have reached him in five days, it was ten days on the road.

He commenced his retreat upon Tilsit, his vanguard consisting of Massenbach's Prussian division, chiefly cavalry, he himself following with the Bavarians, Saxons, etc., and d'Yorck bringing up the rear with 15,000 Prussians, the residue of that auxiliary army. In this order, with the Prussians divided into two corps, and his own posted between them, as if to secure against their combining, the marshal marched on in sufficient anxiety, but without complaint on his side, or difficulties on that of the Prussian general. But when the marshal, upon 28th January, arrived at Tilsit, which was in the line of their retreat, and had sent forward the cavalry of Massenbach as far as Regnitz, the troops of d'Yorck in the rear had detached themselves so far that Macdonald was obliged to halt for them. He sent letters to d'Yorck, pressing him to come up—he sent to the cavalry of Massenbach in the van, commanding them to return. From d'Yorck came no answer. At Regnitz, the French general, Bachelu, who had been sent to act as adjutant general with Massenbach's corps, could find no obedience. The colonels of the Prussian cavalry objected to the weather, and the state of the roads; they would not give the order to sound to horse; and when the horses were at length reluctantly ordered out and produced, the soldiers were equally restive, they would not mount. While the Prussian troops were in this state of mutiny, a Russian emissary was heard to press them to deliver up the Frenchman; but the soldiers, though resolved to leave Bachelu, would not betray him. The proposal shocked their feelings of honour, and they mounted and marched back to Tilsit, to restore Bachelu to Macdonald's army. But their purpose was unchanged. As at Regnitz they had refused to mount their horses, so at Tilsit they refused to alight. At length they were prevailed upon to dismount and retire to their quarters, but it was only a feint; for, shortly after they were supposed asleep, the Prussians mounted in great silence, and, with

Massenbach and their officers at their head, marched off to join their countrymen under d'Yorck.

That general had, now and for ever, separated his troops from the French. Upon 30th December, he had concluded an armistice with the Russian general, Dibbeitsch. By this agreement, the Prussian troops were to be cantoned in their own territories, and remain neutral for two months; at the end of that period, if their king so determined, they should be at liberty to rejoin the French troops. Both d'Yorck and Massenbach wrote to Macdonald announcing their secession from his army. D'Yorck contented himself with stating, that he cared not what opinion the world might form on his conduct; it was dictated by the purest motives, his duty to his troops and to his country. Massenbach expressed his respect and esteem for General Macdonald, and declared, that his reason for leaving him without an interview, was the fear he felt that his personal regard for the marshal might have prevented his obeying the call of duty.

Thus did a Prussian general first set the example of deserting the cause in which he served so unwillingly; an example which soon spread fast and far. It was a choice of difficulties on d'Yorck's side, for his zeal as a patriot was in some degree placed in opposition to the usual ideas of soldierly honour. But he had not left Macdonald till the marshal's safety, and that of the remainder of his army, was in some measure provided for. He was out of the Russian territory, and free, or nearly so, from Russian pursuit. D'Yorck had become neutral, but not the enemy of his late commander.

Here the question arises, how long were the Prussians to be held bound to sacrifice their blood for the foreigners, by whom they had been conquered, pillaged, and oppressed; and to what extent were they bound to endure adversity for those, who had uniformly trampled on them during their prosperity? One thing, we believe, we may affirm with certainty, namely that d'Yorck acted entirely on his own responsibility, and without any encouragement, direct or indirect, from his sovereign. Nay, there is room to suppose, that though the armistice of Tanzen was afterwards declared good service by the King of Prussia, yet d'Yorck was not entirely forgiven by his prince for having entered into it. It was one of the numerous cases, in which a subject's departing from the letter of the sovereign's command, although for that sovereign's more effectual service, is still a line of conduct less grateful than implicit obedience. Upon receiving the news, Frederick disavowed the conduct of his general, and appointed Massenbach and him to be sent to Berlin for trial. But the officers retained their authority, for the Prussian army and people considered their sovereign as acting under the restraint of the French troops under Augereau, who then occupied his capital.

Macdonald, with the remains of his army, reduced to about nine thousand men, accomplished his retreat to Königsberg after a sharp skirmish.

And thus ended the memorable Russian expedition, the first of Napoleon's undertakings in which he was utterly defeated, and of which we scarcely know whether most to wonder at the daring auda-

city of the attempt, or the terrific catastrophe. The loss of the grand army was total, and the results are probably correctly stated by Boutourlin, as follows:

Slain in battle.....	125,000
Died from fatigue, hunger, and the severity of the climate.....	132,000
Prisoners, comprehending 48 generals, 3000 officers, and upwards of 190,000 men.....	163,000
Total....	450,000

The relics of the troops which escaped from that overwhelming disaster, independent of the two auxiliary armies of Austrians and Prussians, who were never much engaged in its terrors, might be about forty thousand men, of whom scarcely ten thousand were Frenchmen. The Russians, notwithstanding the care that was taken to destroy these trophies, took seventy-five eagles, colours, or standards, and upwards of nine hundred pieces of cannon.

Thus had the greatest military captain of the age, at the head of an innumerable array, rushed upon his gigantic adversary, defeated his army, and destroyed, or been the cause of the destruction of his capital, only to place himself in a situation where the ruin of nearly the whole of his own force, without even the intervention of a general action, became the indispensable price of his safe return.

The causes of this total and calamitous failure lay in miscalculations, both moral and physical, which were involved in the first concoction of the enterprise, and began to operate from its very commencement. We are aware that this is, with the idolators of Napoleon, an unpalatable view of the case. They believe, according to the doctrine which he himself promulgated, that he could be conquered by the elements alone. This was what he averred in the twenty-ninth bulletin. Till the 6th November, he stated, that he had been uniformly successful. The snow then fell, and in six days destroyed the character of the army, depressed their courage, elated that of the "despicable" Cossacks, deprived the French of artillery, baggage, and cavalry, and reduced them, with little aid from the Russians, to the melancholy state in which they returned to Poland. This opinion Napoleon wished to perpetuate in a medal, on which the retreat from Moscow is represented by the figure of Eolus blowing upon the soldiers, who are shown shrinking from the storm, or falling under it. The same statement he always supported; and it is one of those tenets which his extravagant admirers are least willing to relinquish.

Three questions, however, remain to be examined, ere we can subscribe to this doctrine.—1. Does the mere fall of snow, nay, a march through a country covered with it, necessarily, and of itself, infer the extent of misfortune here attributed to its agency? —2. Was not the possibility of such a storm a contingency which ought in reason to have entered into Napoleon's calculations?—3. Was it the mere severity of the snow-storm, dreadful as it was, which occasioned the destruction of Bonaparte's army; or, did not the effects of climate rather come in to aid

various causes of ruin, which were inherent in this extravagant expedition from the very beginning, and were operating actively when the weather merely came to their assistance?

On the first question it is needless to say much. A snow, accompanied with hard frost, is not necessarily destructive to a retreating army. The weaker individuals must perish, but, to the army, it affords, if they are provided for the season, better opportunities of moving than rainy and open weather. In the snow, hard frozen upon the surface, as it is in Russia and Canada, the whole face of the country becomes a road; and an army, lightly equipped and having sledges instead of wains, may move in as many parallel columns as they will, instead of being confined, as in moist weather, to one high-road, along which the divisions must follow each other in succession. Such an extension of the front, by multiplying the number of marching columns, must be particularly convenient to an army, which, like that of Napoleon, is obliged to maintain itself as much as possible at the expense of the country. Where there are only prolonged columns, following each other over the same roads, the marauders from the first body must exhaust the country on each side; so that the corps which follow must send their purveyors beyond the ground which has been already pillaged, until at length the distance becomes so great, that the rearward must satisfy themselves with gleanings after the wasteful harvest of those who have preceded them. Supposing six, eight, or ten columns marching in parallel lines upon the same front, and leaving an interval betwixt each, they will cover six, eight, or ten times the breadth of country, and of course supply themselves more plentifully, as well as much more easily. Such columns, keeping a parallel front, can, if attacked, receive reciprocal aid by lateral movements more easily than when assistance must be sent from the van to the rear of one long moving line; and the march being lateral on such occasions, does not infer the loss of time, and other inconveniences, inferred by a countermarch from the front to support the rear. Lastly, the frost often renders bridges unnecessary, fills ravines, and makes morasses passable; thus compensating, in some degree, to a marching army, for the rigorous temperature to which it subjects them.

But, 2dly, It may be asked, if frost and snow are so irresistible and destructive in Russia, as to infer the destruction of whole armies, why did not these casualties enter into the calculations of so great a general entering on such an immense undertaking? Does it never snow in Russia, or is frost a rare phenomenon there in the month of November? It is said that the cold weather began earlier than usual. This, we are assured, was not the case; but at any rate it was most unwise to suffer the safety of an army, and an army of such numbers and importance, to depend on the mere chance of a frost setting in a few days sooner or later.

The fact is, that Napoleon, whose judgment was seldom misled save by the ardour of his wishes, had foreseen, in October, the coming of the frost, as he had been aware, in July, of the necessity of collecting sufficient supplies of food for his army, yet without making adequate provision against what he

knew was to happen, in either case. In the 22d bulletin it is intimated, that the Moskwa, and other rivers of Russia, might be expected to be frozen over about the middle of November, which ought to have prepared the emperor for the snow and frost commencing five or six days sooner; which actually took place. In the 26th bulletin, the necessity of winter quarters is admitted, and the emperor is represented as looking luxuriously around him, to consider whether he should chuse them in the south of Russia, or in the friendly country of Poland. The weather is then stated to be fine, "but on the first days of November cold was to be expected. Winter quarters, therefore, must be thought upon; the cavalry, above all, stand in need of them."

It is impossible that he, under whose eye, or by whose hand, these bulletins were drawn up, could have been surprised by the arrival of snow on the 6th November. It was a probability foreseen, though left unprovided for.

Even the most ordinary precaution, that of rough-shoeing the horses of the cavalry and the draught-horses, was totally neglected; for the bulletins complain of the shoes being smooth. This is saying, in other words, that the animals had not been new-shod at all; for French horses may be termed always rough-shod, until the shoes are grown old and worn smooth through use. If, therefore, frost and snow be so very dangerous to armies, Napoleon wilfully braved their rigour, and by his want of due preparations, brought upon himself the very disaster of which he complained so heavily.

Thirdly, Though unquestionably the severity of the frost did greatly increase the distress and loss of an army suffering under famine, nakedness, and privations of every kind, yet it was neither the first, nor in any respect the principal, cause of their disasters. The reader must keep in remembrance the march through Lithuania, in which, without a blow struck, Napoleon lost ten thousand horses at once, and nearly a hundred thousand men, when passing through a country which was friendly. Did this loss, which happened in June and July, arise from the premature snow, as it has been called, of the 6th of November? No, surely. It arose from what the bulletin itself describes as "the uncertainty, the distresses, the marches and countermarches of the troops, their fatigues and sufferances;" to the system, in short, of forced marches, by which, after all, Napoleon was unable to gain any actual advance. This cost him one-fourth, or nearly so, of his army, before a blow was struck. If we suppose that he left on both his flanks, and in his rear, a force of 100,000 men, under Macdonald, Schwartzemberg, Oudinot, and others, he commenced the actual invasion of Russia Proper with 200,000 soldiers. A moiety of this large force perished before he reached Moscow, which he entered at the head of less than 100,000 men. The ranks had been thinned by fatigue, and the fields of battle and hospitals must answer for the remainder. Finally, Napoleon left Moscow on the 19th October, as a place where he could not remain, and yet from which he saw no safe mode of exit. He was then at the head of about 120,000 men; so much was his army recruited by convalescents, the collection of

stragglers, and some reserves which had been brought up. He fought the unavailing though most honourably sustained battle of Mala-Yaroslavets; failed in forcing his way to Kalouga and Toulia; and, like a stag at bay, was forced back on the wasted and broken-up road to Smolensk by Borodino. On this road was fought the battle of Wiazma, in which the French loss was very considerable; and his columns were harassed by the Cossacks at every point of their march, and many thousands of prisoners were taken. Two battles so severely fought, besides the defeat of Murat and constant skirmishes, cost the French in killed and wounded (and every wounded man was lost to Napoleon), not less than 25,000 men; and so far had the French army been diminished.

This brought him to the 6th November, until which day not a flake had fallen of that snow to which all his disasters are attributed, but which in fact did not commence until he had in a great measure experienced them. By this time, also, his wings and reserves had undergone severe fighting and great loss, without any favourable results. Thus, well nigh three-fourths of his original army were destroyed, and the remnant reduced to a most melancholy and disorderly condition, before commencement of the storm to which he found it afterwards convenient to impute his calamities. It is scarcely necessary to notice, that when the snow did begin to fall, it found Napoleon not a victor, but a fugitive, quitting ground before his antagonists, and indebted for his safety, not to the timidity of the Russians, but to the over-caution of their general. The Cossacks, long before the snow-tempest commenced, were muttering against Koutousoff for letting these skeletons, as they called the French army, walk back into a bloodless grave.

When the severe frost came, it aggravated greatly the misery, and increased the loss, of the French army. But Winter was only the ally of the Russians; not as has been contended, their sole protectress. She rendered the retreat of the grand army more calamitous, but it had already been an indispensable measure, and was in the act of being executed at the lance-point of the Cossacks before the storms of the north contributed to overwhelm the invaders.

What, then, occasioned this most calamitous catastrophe? We venture to reply, that a moral error, or rather a crime, converted Napoleon's wisdom into folly; and that he was misled, by the injustice of his views, into the great political, nay, military errors, which he acted upon in his attempt to realize them.

We are aware there are many who think that the justice of a quarrel is of little moment, providing the aggressor has strength and courage to make good what his adversary murmurs against as wrong. With such reasoners, the race is uniformly to the swift, and the battle to the strong; and they reply to others with the profane jest of the King of Prussia, that the Deity always espouses the cause of the most powerful. But the maxim is as false as it is impious. Without expecting miracles in this later age, we know that the world is subjected to moral as well as physical laws, and that the breach of

the former frequently carries even a temporal punishment along with it. Let us try by this test the conduct of Napoleon in the Russian war.

The causes assigned for his breach with Russia, unjust in their essence, had been put upon a plan of settlement; yet his armies continued to bear down upon the frontiers of the Russian empire; so that to have given up the questions in dispute, with the French bayonets at his breast, would have been on the part of Alexander a surrender of the national independence. The demands of Napoleon, unjust in themselves, and attempted to be enforced by means of intimidation, it was impossible for a proud people, and a high-spirited prince, to comply with. Thus the first act of Bonaparte went to excite a national feeling, from the banks of the Borysthènes to the wall of China, and to unite against him the wild and uncivilized inhabitants of an extended empire, possessed by a love to their religion, their government, and their country, and having a character of stern devotion, which he was incapable of estimating. It was a remarkable characteristic of Napoleon, that when he had once fixed his opinion, he saw everything as he wished to see it, and was apt to dispute even realities, if they did not coincide with his preconceived ideas. He had persuaded himself, that to beat an army and subdue a capital, was, with the influence of his personal ascendancy, all that was necessary to obtain a triumphant peace. He had especially a confidence in his own command over the minds of such as he had been personally intimate with. Alexander's disposition, he believed, was perfectly known to him; and he entertained no doubt, that by beating his army, and taking his capital, he should resume the influence which he had once held over the Russian Emperor, by granting him a peace upon moderate terms, and in which the acknowledgment of the victor's superiority would have been the chief advantage stipulated. For this he hurried on by forced marches, losing so many thousands of men and horses in Lithuania, which an attention to ordinary rules would have saved from destruction. For this, when his own prudence, and that of his council, joined in recommending a halt at Vitepsk or at Smolensk, he hurried forward to the fight, and to the capture of the metropolis, which he had flattered himself was to be the signal of peace. His wishes were apparently granted. Borodino, the bloodiest battle of our battling age, was gained—Moscow was taken—but he had totally failed to calculate the effect of these events upon the Russians and their emperor. When he expected their submission, and a ransom for their capital, the city was consumed in his presence; yet even the destruction and destruction of Moscow could not tear the veil from his eyes, or persuade him that the people and their prince would prefer death to disgrace. It was his reluctance to relinquish the visionary hopes which egotism still induced him to nourish, that prevented his quitting Moscow a month earlier than he did. He had no expectation that the mild climate of Fontainebleau would continue to gild the ruins of Moscow till the arrival of December; but he could not forego the flattering belief, that a letter and proposal of pacification must at last fulfil the anticipations which he so ardently entertained.

It was only the attack upon Murat that finally dispelled this hope.

Thus a hallucination, for such it may be termed, led this great soldier into a train of conduct, which, as a military critic, he would have been the first to condemn, and which was the natural consequence of his deep moral error. He was hurried by this self-opinion, this ill-founded trust in the predominance of his own personal influence, into a gross neglect of the usual and prescribed rules of war. He put in motion an immense army, too vast in numbers to be supported either by the supplies of the country through which they marched, or by the provisions they could transport along with them. And when, plunging into Russia, he defeated her armies and took her metropolis, he neglected to calculate his line of advance on such an extent of base, as should enable him to consolidate his conquests, and turn to real advantage the victories which he attained. His army was but precariously connected with Lithuania when he was at Moscow, and all communication was soon afterwards entirely destroyed. Thus, one unjust purpose, strongly and passionately entertained, marred the councils of the wise, and rendered vain the exertions of the brave. We may read the moral in the words of Claudian,—

— Jam non ad culmina rerum
Injustos crevisse queror; tolluntur in altum,
Ut lapsu graviore ruant.

Claudian. in *Rufinum*, Lib. I, v. 21.

CHAPTER LXXXII.

Effects of Napoleon's return upon the Parisians.—Congratulations and addresses by all the public functionaries.—Conspiracy of Malet—very nearly successful.—How at last defeated.—The impression made by this event upon Bonaparte, both while in Russia, and on his return.—Discussions with the pope, who is brought to France, but remains inflexible.—State of affairs in Spain.—Napoleon's great and successful exertions to recruit his army.—Guards of Honour.—In the month of April, the army is raised to 350,000 men, independently of the troops left in garrison in Germany, and in Spain and Italy.

UPON the morning succeeding his return, which was like the sudden appearance of one dropped from the heavens, Paris resounded with the news; which had, such was the force of Napoleon's character, and the habits of subjection to which the Parisians were inured, the effect of giving a new impulse to the whole capital. If the impressions made by the 29th bulletin could not be effaced, they were carefully concealed. The grumblers suppressed their murmurs, which had begun to be alarming. The mourners dried their tears, or shed them in solitude. The safe return of Napoleon was a sufficient cure for the loss of five hundred thousand men, and served to assuage the sorrows of as many widows and orphans. The emperor convoked the Council of State. He spoke with apparent frankness of the misfortunes which had befallen his army, and imputed them all to the snow. "All had gone well," he said, "Moscow was in our power—every obstacle was overcome—the conflagration of the city had produced no change on the flourishing

condition of the French army; but winter has been productive of a general calamity, in consequence of which the army had sustained very great losses." One would have thought, from his mode of stating the matter, that the snow had surprised him in the midst of victory, and not in the course of a disastrous and inevitable retreat.

The *Moniteur* was at first silent on the news from Russia, and announced the advent of the emperor as if he had returned from Fontainebleau; but after an interval of this apparent coldness, like the waters of a river in the thaw, accumulating behind, and at length precipitating themselves over, a barrier of ice, arose the general gratulation of the public functionaries, whose power and profit must stand or fall with the dominion of the emperor, and whose voices alone were admitted to represent those of the people. The cities of Rome, Florence, Milan, Turin, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Mentz, and whatever others there were of consequence in the empire, joined in the general asseveration, that the presence of the emperor alone was all that was necessary to convert disquietude into happiness and tranquillity. The most exaggerated praise of Napoleon's great qualities, the most unlimited devotion to his service, the most implicit confidence in his wisdom, were the theme of these addresses. Their flattery was not only ill-timed, considering the great loss which the country had sustained; but it was so grossly exaggerated in some instances, as to throw ridicule even upon the high talents of the party to whom it was addressed, as daubers are often seen to make a ridiculous caricature of the finest original. In the few circles where criticism on these effusions of loyalty might be whispered, the authors of the addresses were compared to the duped devotee in Molière's comedy, who, instead of sympathizing in his wife's illness, and the general indisposition of his family, only rejoices to hear that Tartuffe is in admirable good health. Yet there were few even among these scoffers who would have dared to stay behind, had they been commanded to attend the emperor to Notre Dame, that Te Deum might be celebrated for the safe return of Napoleon, though purchased by the total destruction of his great army.

But it was amongst the public offices that the return of the emperor, so unexpectedly, produced the deepest sensation. They were accustomed to go on at a moderate rate with the ordinary routine of duty, while the emperor was on any expedition; but his return had the sudden effect of the appearance of the master in the school, from which he had been a short time absent. All was bustle, alertness, exertion, and anticipation. On the present occasion, double diligence, or the show of it, was exerted; for all feared, and some with reason, that their conduct on a late event might have incurred the severe censure of the emperor. We allude to the conspiracy of Malet, a singular incident, the details of which we have omitted till now.

During Bonaparte's former periods of absence, the government of the interior of France, under the management of Cambacérès, went on in the ordinary course, as methodically, though not so actively, as when Napoleon was at the Tuileries; the system of

administration was accurate, that of superintendence not less so. The obligations of the public functionaries were held as strict as those of military men. But during the length of Napoleon's absence on the Russian expedition, a plot was formed, which served to show how little firm was the hold which the system of the Imperial government had on the feelings of the nation, by what slight means its fall might be effected, and how small an interest a new revolution would have excited. It seemed that the emperor's power showed stately and stable to the eye, like a tall pine-tree, which, while it spreads its shade broad around, and raises its head to heaven, cannot send its roots, like those of the oak, deep into the bowels of the earth, but, spreading them along the shallow surface, is liable to be overthrown by the first assault of the whirlwind.

The final purpose of Malet is not known. He was of noble birth, and served in the mousquetaires of the royal household before the Revolution, which inclined many to think that he had the interest of the Bourbons in view. As, however, he had risen to the rank of général de brigade in the republican army, it is more probable that he belonged to the sect of Philadelphes.* In 1808, General Malet was committed to prison, as concerned in an intrigue against the emperor; and he was still under the restraint of the police, when he formed the audacious scheme which had so nearly succeeded. While under a confinement now lenient, in a *Maison de Santé*, he was able to execute, or procure to be executed, a forged paper, purporting to be a decree of the Senate, announcing officially the death of the emperor, the abolition of the imperial government, and the establishment of a provisional committee of administration. This document was to appearance attested by the official seal and signatures.

On the 23d of October, at midnight, he escaped from his place of confinement, dressed himself in his full uniform, and accompanied by a corporal in the dress of an aide-de-camp, repaired to the prison of La Force, where he demanded and obtained the liberation of two generals, Lahorie, and Guidal, who were confined under circumstances not dissimilar to his own. They went together to the barracks at the Minims, not then inhabited by any part of the truest and most attached followers of Napoleon, who, while his power was tottering at home, were strengthening with their bones the snows of Russia and the deserts of Spain, but by battalions of raw conscripts

* A secret society in the army, whose immediate object it was to overthrow the Imperial power, and whose ultimate purposes were not perhaps known to themselves. Their founder was Colonel Jacques Joseph Oudet, a Swiss,† at once a debauchee and an enthusiast, on the plan of his countryman Rousseau. He was shot the night before the battle of Wagram, not, as his followers alleged, by a party of Austrians, but by gendarmes, commissioned for that purpose. His sect continued to subsist, and Masséna did not escape suspicions of being implicated in its intrigues. There was a communication in their name to Lord Wellington, in May, 1800; but the negotiation was not of a character which the British general chose to encourage. — Southey's *History of the Peninsular War*, Vol. II, p. 303.

† Col. Oudet was a native of Franche-Comté. *Ed.*

and recruits. Here Malet assumed an air of absolute authority, commanded the drums to beat, ordered the troops on parade, and dispatched parties upon different services.

No one disputed his right to be obeyed, and Soulier, commandant of the troops, placed them at his absolute disposal, being partly, as he himself alleged, confused in mind by a fever which afflicted him at the time, partly, perhaps, influenced by a check for 100,000 francs, which was laid down upon his bed, to cover, it was said, a gratuity to the soldiers, and an issue of double pay to the officers. One division seized Savary, the minister of police, and conducted him to prison. Another party found it as easy to arrest the person of the prefect of police. A battalion of soldiers, under the same authority, occupied the Place de Grève, and took possession of the Hôtel de Ville; while Count Frochot, who had been for thirteen years the Prefect of the Seine, stupefied by the suddenness of the intelligence, and flattered perhaps, by finding his own name in the list of the provisional committee of government, had the complaisance to put the conspirators in possession of the tower of St-Jacques, from which the tocsin was usually sounded, and get an apartment in the Hôtel de Ville arranged for the reception of the new administration. But the principal conspirator, like Fiesco, at Genoa, perished at the moment when his audacious enterprise seemed about to be crowned with success. Hitherto, none had thought of disobeying the pretended decree of the Senate. Rumour had prepared all men for the death of the emperor, and the subsequent revolution seemed a consequence so natural, that it was readily acquiesced in, and little interest shown on the subject.

But Malet, who had himself gone to obtain possession of the head-quarters in the Place Vendôme, was unexpectedly resisted by General Hulm. Prepared for every circumstance, the desperado fired a pistol at the head of the general, and wounded him grievously; but, in the meanwhile, he was himself recognized by Laborde, chief of the military police, who, incredulous that his late captive would have been selected by the Senate for the important duty which he was assuming, threw himself on Malet, and made him prisoner. Thus ended the conspiracy. The soldiers, who had been its blind instruments, were marched back to the barracks. Malet, with twenty-four of his associates, most of them military men, were tried by a military tribunal, and twelve of them were shot in the plain of Grenelle, 29th of October. He met his death with the utmost firmness. The sun was rising on the Hôtel des Invalides, and the workmen were employed in gilding that splendid dome, for which Bonaparte had given express orders, in imitation, it was said, of those which he had seen in Moscow. The prisoner made some remarks upon the improvement which this would be to the capital. As he stepped towards the fatal ground, he said, mysteriously, but sternly, "You have got the tail, but you will not get the head." From this expression it has been gathered, that, as the conspiracy of the infernal machine, formed originally among the jacobins, was executed by the royalists, so this plot was the device of the royalists, though committed to the execution of re-

publican hands.* The truth, though it must be known to some now alive, has never been made public.

This was the news which reached Bonaparte on the fatal 6th of November, betwixt Wiazma and Smolensk, and which determined his retreat from the army at Smorgoni, and his rapid journey to Paris. It was not so much the conspiracy which alarmed him, as the supineness or levity with which the nation, at least, Paris, its capital, seemed ready to abandon the dynasty which he had hoped to render perpetual. He was even startled by the number of executions, and exclaimed against the indiscriminate severity with which so many officers had been led to death, although rather dupes than accomplices of the principal conspirator. "It is a massacre," he said; "a fusillade! What impression will it make on Paris?"

When Napoleon reached the metropolis, he found the Parisians as little interested in the execution of the criminals, as they had been in their ephemeral success. But the sting remained in his own mind, and on the first audience of his ministers, he exclaimed against ideology, or, in other words, against any doctrine which, appealing to the general feelings of patriotism or of liberty, should resist the indefeasible and divine right of the sovereign. He sounded the praises of Harlay and Molé, ministers of justice, who had died in protecting the rights of the crown; and exclaimed, that the best death would be that of a soldier who falls on the field of battle, if the end of the magistrate, who dies in defence of the throne and laws, was not still more glorious.

This key-note formed an admirable theme for the flourishes of the various counsellors of the sections, to whom the fate of Frochot, the peccant prefect, had been submitted with reference to the extent of his crime and his punishment. Not even the addresses to James II. of Britain (who had at least a hereditary right to the throne he occupied) poured forth such a torrent of professions, or were more indifferently backed with deeds, when the observant courtiers were brought to the proof, than did those of the French functionaries at this period.

"What is life," said the Count de Chabrol, who had been created Prefect of Paris in room of the timorous Frochot—"What is life, in comparison to the immense interests which rest on the sacred head of the heir of the empire? For me, whom an unexpected glance of your imperial eye has called from a distance to a post so eminent, what I most value in the distinction is the honour and right of setting the foremost example of loyal devotion."

It was the opinion of M. de Fontanes, senator, peer of France, and grand-master of the Imperial University, that "Reason pauses with respect before the mystery of power and obedience, and abandons all inquiry into its nature to that religion which made the persons of kings sacred, after the image of God himself. It is His voice which humbles anarchy and factions, in proclaiming the divine right of sovereigns; it is the Deity himself who has made it an unalterable maxim

* The *Memoirs of Fouché* contain a specific avowal to this effect. See *Mémoires de Fouché*, vol. I, pp. 219-220.

of France, an unchangeable article of the law of our fathers; it is Nature who appoints kings to succeed each other, while reason declares that the royalty itself is immutable. Permit, sire (he continued), that the University of Paris turn their eyes for a moment from the throne which you fill with so much glory, to the august cradle of the heir of your grandeur. We unite him with your majesty in the love and respect we owe to both; and swear to him beforehand the same boundless devotion which we owe to your majesty.*

In better taste, because with less affectation of eloquence, Monsieur Séguier, the President of the Court of Paris, contented himself with declaring, that the magistrates of Paris were the surest supports of the imperial authority—that their predecessors had encountered perils in defence of monarchy, and they in their turn were ready to sacrifice everything for the sacred person of the emperor, and for perpetuating his dynasty.

Under cover of these violent protestations, the unfortunate Frochot escaped, as a disabled vessel drops out of the line of battle under fire of her consorts. He was divested of his offices, but permitted to retire, either to prosecute his studies in ideology, or to indoctrinate himself into more deep acquaintance in the mysteries of hereditary right than he had hitherto shown himself possessed of.*

We have selected the above examples, not with the purpose of inquiring whether the orators (whom we believe, in their individual capacity, to have been men of honour and talents) did or did not redeem, by their after exertions, the pledges of which they were so profuse; but to mark with deep reprobation the universal system of assentation and simulation, to which even such men did not disdain to lend countenance and example. By such overstrained flatteries and protestations, counsellors are degraded and princes are misled—truth and sincere advice become nauseous to the ear of the sovereign, falsehood grows familiar to the tongue of the subject, and public danger is not discovered until escape or rescue has become impossible.

Yet it cannot be denied, that the universal tenor of these vows and protestations, supported by Bonaparte's sudden arrival and firm attitude, had the effect of suppressing for a time discontents, which were silently making way amongst the French people. The more unthinking were influenced by the tenor of sentiments which seemed to be universal through the empire; and, upon the whole, this universal tide of assentation operated upon the internal doubts, sorrows, discontents, and approaching disaffection of the empire, like an effusion of oil on the surface of a torrent, whose murmurs it may check, and whose bubbling ripples it may smooth to the eye, but the deep and dark energy of whose course the unction cannot in reality check or subdue.

To return to the current of our history. Bonaparte having tried the temper of his Senate, and not finding reason to apprehend any opposition among his subjects, proceeded, while straining every effort, as we shall presently see, for supporting foreign war, to take such means as were in his power for closing domestic wounds, which were the

* He obtained a pension on the restoration of Louis XVIII.

more dangerous that they bled inwardly, without any external effusion, to indicate their existence.

The chief of these dissensions was the dispute with the pope, which had occasioned, and continued to foster, so much scandal in the Gallican Church. We have mentioned already, that the pope, refusing to consent to any alienation of his secular dominions, had been forcibly carried off from Rome, removed to Grenoble, then brought back over the Alps to Savona, in Italy. Napoleon, who denied that he had authorized this usage towards the father of the church, yet continued to detain him at Savona. He was confined there until June, 1812. In the meantime, a deputation of the French bishops were sent with a decree by Napoleon, determining, that if his holiness should continue to refuse canonical institution to the French clergy, as he had done ever since the seizure of the city of Rome, and the patrimony of St Peter's, a council of prelates should be held for the purpose of pronouncing his deposition.

On 4th September, 1811, the holy father admitted the deputation, listened to their arguments with patience, then knelt down before them, and repeated the psalm, *Judica me, Domine*. When the prelates attempted to vindicate themselves, Pius VII. in an animated tone, threatened to fulminate an excommunication against any one who should attempt to justify his conduct. Then instantly recovering his natural benignity of disposition, he offered his hand to the offending bishops, who kissed it with reverence. The French prelates took leave sorrowfully, and in tears. Several of them showed themselves afterwards opposed to the views of Napoleon, and sustained imprisonment in consequence of their adhesion to what appeared to them their duty.

The chemists of our time have discovered, that some substances can only be decomposed in particular varieties of gas; and apparently it was, in like manner, found that the air of Italy only confirmed the inflexibility of the pope.

His holiness was hastily transported to Fontainebleau, where he arrived 19th June, 1812. The French historians boast, that the old man was not thrown into a dungeon, but, on the contrary, was well lodged in the palace, and was permitted to attend mass, —a wonderful condescension towards the head of the catholic religion. But still he was a captive. He abode at Fontainebleau till Napoleon's return from Russia; and it was on the 19th January, 1813, that the emperor, having left St-Cloud under pretext of a hunting-party, suddenly presented himself before his venerable prisoner. He exerted all the powers of influence which he possessed, and they were very great, to induce the pontiff to close with his propositions; and we readily believe that the accounts, which charge him with having maltreated his person, are not only unauthenticated, but positively false. He rendered the submission which he required more easy to the conscience of Pius VII., by not demanding from him any express cession of his temporal rights, and by granting a delay of six months on the subject of canonical instalment. Eleven articles were agreed on, and subscribed, by the emperor and the pope.

But hardly was this done ere the feud broke out

afresh. It was of importance to Napoleon to have the schism soldered up as soon as possible, since the pope refused to acknowledge the validity of his second marriage, and, of course, to ratify the legitimacy of his son. He, therefore, published the articles of treaty in the *Moniteur*, as containing a new Concordat. The pope complained of this, stating, that the articles published were not a Concordat in themselves, but only the preliminaries, on which, after due consideration, such a treaty might have been formed. He was indignant at what he considered as circumvention on the part of the Emperor of France, and refused to abide by the alleged Concordat. Thus failed Napoleon's attempt to close the schism of the church, and the ecclesiastical feuds recommenced with more acrimony than ever.

Looking towards Spain, Napoleon saw his affairs there in a better posture than he could have expected, after the battle of Salamanca, and the capture of Madrid. Lord Wellington, indifferently supported by the Spanish army, among whom quarrels and jealousies soon rose high, had been unable, from want of a sufficient battering-train, to take the fortress of Burgos; and was placed in some danger of being intercepted by Soult's army, who had raised the siege of Cadiz, while engaged with that under d'Erlon, with whom was the intrusive king. The English general, therefore, with his usual prudence, retreated into the territories of Portugal, and Napoleon, seeing that his army in Spain amounted to 270,000 men, thought them more than sufficient to oppose what forces Spain could present, with the regular allied army of perhaps 70,000 at most, under Lord Wellington's command. He withdrew, accordingly, one hundred and fifty skeletons of battalions, which he meant to make the means of disciplining his young conscripts.

It was now that the hundred cohorts, or one hundred thousand youths of the First Ban of National Guards, who had been placed in frontier garrisons, under the declaration that they were not, under any pretence, to go beyond the limits of France, were converted into ordinary soldiers of the line, and destined to fill up the skeleton corps which were brought from Spain. Four regiments of guards, one of Polish cavalry, and one of gendarmes, were at the same time withdrawn from the Peninsula. The sailors of the French fleet, whose services were now indeed perfectly nominal, were landed, or brought rather from the harbours and maritime towns in which they loitered away their time, and formed into corps of artillery. This reinforcement might comprehend 40,000 men. But while his credit continued with the nation, the conscription was Napoleon's best and never-failing resource, and with the assistance of a decree of the Senate, it once more placed in his hands the anticipation of the year 1814. This decree carried his levies of every kind to 350,000 men.

The remounting and recruiting of the cavalry was a matter of greater difficulty, and to that task was to be joined the restoration of the artillery and *matériel* of the army, all of which had been utterly destroyed in the late fatal retreat. But the vaults under the Tuileries were not yet exhausted, although they had contributed largely to the preparations for the campaign of the preceding year. A profusion of treasure

was expended; every artisan, whose skill could be made use of, was set to work; horses were purchased or procured in every direction; and such was the active spirit of Napoleon, and the extent of his resources, that he was able to promise to the legislative representatives, that he would, without augmenting the national burdens, provide the sum of three hundred millions of francs, which were wanted to repair the losses of the Russian campaign.

We must not forget, that one of the ways and means of recruiting the cavalry, was a species of conscription of a new invention, and which was calculated to sweep into the ranks of the army the youth of the higher ranks, whom the former draughts had spared, or who had redeemed themselves from the service by finding a substitute. Out of this class, hitherto exempted from the conscription, Napoleon proposed to levy ten thousand youths of the higher ranks, to be formed into four regiments of Guards of Honour, who were to be regarded much as the troops of the royal household under the old system. This idea was encouraged among the courtiers and assentators, who represented the well-born and well-educated youths, as eager to exchange their fowling-pieces for muskets, their shooting-dresses for uniforms, and their rustic life for the toils of war. Politicians saw in it something of a deeper design than the mere adding ten thousand to the mass of recruits, and conceived that this corps of proprietors was proposed with the view of bringing into the emperor's power a body of hostages, who should guarantee the fidelity of their fathers. The scheme, however, was interrupted, and for a time laid aside, owing to the jealousy of the Imperial Guard. These Prætorian Bands did not relish the introduction of such patrician corps as those proposed, whose privileges they conceived might interfere with their own; and accordingly the institution of the Guard of Honour was for some time suspended.

The wonderful energies of Napoleon's mind, and the influence which he could exert over the minds of others, were never so striking as at this period of his reign. He had returned to his seat of empire at a dreadful crisis, and in a most calamitous condition. His subjects had been ignorant, for six weeks, whether he was dead or alive, and a formidable conspiracy, which was all but successful, had at once shown that there was an awakening activity amongst his secret enemies, and an apathy and indifference amongst his apparent friends. When he arrived, it was to declare a dreadful catastrophe, of which his ambition had been the cause; the loss of five hundred thousand men, with all their arms, ammunition, and artillery; the death of so many children of France as threw the whole country into mourning. He had left behind him cold and involuntary allies, changing fast into foes, and foes, encouraged by his losses and his flight, threatening to combine Europe in one great crusade, having for its object the demolition of his power. No sovereign ever presented himself before his people in a situation more precarious, or overclouded by such calamities, arrived or in prospect.

Yet Napoleon came, and seemed but to stamp on the earth, and armed legions arose at his call; the

doubts and discontents of the public disappeared as mist at sun-rising, and the same confidence which had attended his prosperous fortunes revived in its full extent, despite of his late reverses. In the month of April, his army was increased, as we have seen, by three hundred and fifty thousand men, in addition to the great garrisons maintained in Dantzic, Thorn, Modlin, Zamosk, Czenstochau, Custrin, etc., augmented as they now were by the remains of the grand army, which had found refuge in these places of strength. He had, besides, an active levy of forces in Italy, and a very large army in Spain, notwithstanding all the draughts which his present necessity had made him bring out of that slaughter-house. Whether, therefore, it was Napoleon's purpose to propose peace or carry on war, he was at the head of a force little inferior to that which he had heretofore commanded.

Having thus given some account of the internal state of France, it is now necessary to look abroad, and examine the consequences of the Russian campaign upon Europe in general.

CHAPTER LXXXIII.

Murat leaves the grand army abruptly—Eugène appointed in his place.—Measures taken by the King of Prussia for his disenfranchisement—Arguments in his favour, opposed to those of the French historians—He leaves Berlin for Breslau.—Treaty signed between Russia and Prussia early in March.—Alexander arrives at Breslau on the 15th; on the 16th Prussia declares war against France.—Warlike preparations of Prussia—Universal enthusiasm throughout all the land—Blücher appointed generalissimo.—Vindication of the Crown Prince of Sweden for joining the confederacy against France.—Proceedings of Austria.—Unabated spirit and pretensions of Napoleon.—A regency is appointed in France during his absence, and Maria Louisa appointed regent, with nominal powers.

THE command of the relics of the grand army had been conferred upon Murat, when Napoleon left them at Smorgoni. It was too painful and disagreeable a nature to afford any food to the ambition of the King of Naples; nor did he accept it as an adequate compensation for various mortifications which he had sustained during the campaign, and for which, as has already been noticed, he nourished considerable resentment against his brother-in-law. Having, besides, more of the soldier than of the general, war lost its charms for him when he was not displaying his bravery at the head of his cavalry; and, to augment his impatience, he became jealous of the authority which his wife was exercising at Naples during his absence, and longed to return thither. He, therefore, hastily disposed of the troops in the various Prussian fortresses recently enumerated, where the French maintained garrisons, and suddenly left the army upon the 16th January. Napoleon, incensed at his conduct, announced his departure, and the substitution of Eugène, the Viceroy of Italy, in the general command of the army, with this note of censure:—"The viceroy is more accustomed to the management of military affairs on a large scale, and, besides, enjoys the full con-

fidence of the emperor." This oblique sarcasm greatly increased the coldness betwixt the two brothers-in-law.

Meantime, the Russians continued to advance without opposition into Prussia, being desirous, by their presence, to bring that country to the decision which they had long expected. The manner in which Prussia had been treated by France; the extreme contributions which had been levied from her; the threats which had been held out of altogether annihilating her as a state; the occupation of her fortresses, and the depriving her of all the rights of independence, constituted an abuse of the rights of conquest, exercised in consequence of superior force, which was sure to be ended so soon as that force ceased to be predominant. Napoleon, it is true, had the affectation to express confidence in the friendship of Prussia in his adversity, which he had never cultivated in prosperity. It would have been as reasonable in the patron of a Turkish cruiser, to expect his galley-slaves to continue, out of a point of honour, to pull the oars, after the chain was broken which fettered them to their benches.

Accordingly, King Frederick took his measures to shake himself free of the French yoke; but he did so with wisdom and moderation. Whatever wrongs the Prussians had sustained from the French, the King of Prussia had sought no means of avenging them, even when routed armies, falling back on his dominions in a defenceless condition, might have been destroyed, in their desolate state, by his peasantry alone. Popular violence, arising from the resentment of long-suffered injuries, did indeed practise cruelties on the French at Königsberg and elsewhere; but it was against the will of the government, which suppressed them as much as possible. The king did not take any measures to intercept the retreat even of Napoleon himself, although there was ground to expect he might have come to that resolution. He renewed the armistice concluded by d'York; he suffered the distressed and frozen remains of the grand army to augment the hostile garrisons which had occupied his own strongest fortresses. He observed, in short, all the duties of an ally, though an unwilling one, until the war, in which he was engaged as an auxiliary, was totally ended, by the defeat and dispersion of the army of his principal. It is the more proper to enter at large into this topic, because the French historians usually mention the conduct of the King of Prussia on this occasion as defection, desertion, or some such word, indicating a breach of faith. Nothing can be more unjust.

It was not, surely, to be expected, that Frederick was to submit his own dominions to the devastation of the Russians, by continuing a war in which his share was only secondary; nor was it rational to believe, that a country so much oppressed would neglect the means of emancipation which now presented themselves. It is, therefore, no marvel that Prussia should have taken this favourable opportunity for throwing off a yoke which she had found so oppressive. Nay, it is believed, on good grounds, that the course adopted by the King of Prussia was not only that of wisdom and patriotism, but even of necessity; for it is very probable, that, if he had re-

failed to lead his subjects against the French, they might, in that moment of excitation, have found some one else to have placed at the head of the government. He had, as we have already said, denounced the convention entered into by d'Yorck and Massenbach, and ordered them both to Berlin for the purpose of undergoing trial. But the generals had remained quietly in command of their troops, affording a strong example, that, had Frederick laboured ever so much for that purpose, it would have been vain, if not hazardous, to have opposed his royal authority to the impulse of the national spirit.

Before the king took his final resolution, he resolved, as a measure of prudence, to secure his own person, lest, like Ferdinand and the Spanish Bourbons, he should be seized upon as a hostage. He therefore suddenly left Berlin on 22d January, 1813, and betook himself to Breslau, where there were no French soldiery. Immediately afterwards he published an address to his people, calling his armies together, and giving the signal to the patriotism of thousands who longed to arise in arms. The French ambassador was, nevertheless, invited to follow the King to Breslau, where a variety of discussions immediately took place betwixt him and the Prussian cabinet.

To the complaints of exactions and oppressions of every kind, the French negotiators could only reply by reminding the Prussians, that Napoleon had, after decisive victory, suffered the nation to retain the name of independence, and the king to wear a precarious crown. A robber would have the same defence against restoring the booty he had acquired from a traveler, if he stated, that though he had despoiled, he had not murdered him. It was by the right of the strongest that France had acquired that influence over Prussia which she exercised so severely; and, according to the dictates of common sense and human nature, when the advantage was on Prussia's side she had a right to regain by strength what she had lost by weakness. Every obligation, according to the maxim of the civil law, is made void in the same manner in which it is rendered binding; as Arthegal, the emblematic champion of Justice, in Spenser's allegory, decrees as law, that what the sea has brought the sea may resume.

On the 1st of March, or about that period, Prussia, returning to a system which nothing but the extremity of her circumstances had ever interrupted, signed a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Russia. On the 15th March, the Emperor Alexander arrived at Breslau. The meeting was affecting betwixt the two sovereigns, who had been such intimate friends, and had always retained the same personal attachment for each other, although the circumstances of controlling necessity had made them enemies, at a period when it was of importance to Russia to have as few foes as possible, thrown into the scale against her. The King of Prussia wept. "Courage, my brother," said Alexander; "these are the last tears which Napoleon shall cause you to shed."

On the 16th March, Prussia declared war against France. There is, in the paper containing this denunciation, much reasoning respecting the extent of contributions due and received, which might have

been summed up in the declaration, that "France had made Prussia her subject and her slave, but that now Prussia was enabled to act for herself, and shake off the fetters which violence had imposed on her." This real note was touched, where the manifesto declares, that, "Abandoned to herself, and hopeless of receiving any effectual succour from an ally who had declined to render her even the demands of justice, Prussia must take counsel of herself, in order to raise anew and support her existence as a nation. It was in the love and courage of his people that the king sought means to extricate himself, and to restore to his monarchy the independence which is necessary to insure the future prosperity of the kingdom."

The Emperor Napoleon received that declaration of war, with the calmness of one by whom it had been for some time expected. "It was better," he said, "to have a declared enemy than a doubtful ally." By the Prussians at large it was heard with all the rapture of gratified hope, and the sacrifices which they made, not willingly only, but eagerly, show more completely than anything else can, the general hatred against France, and the feelings which that nation had excited during her career of success.

From a country so trampled down and exhausted as Prussia, it might have been thought slender means of warfare could be provided. But vengeance is like the teeth of the dragon, a seed which, where-soever sown, produces a crop of warriors. Freedom, too, was at stake; and when a nation is warring for its own rights, who shall place a limit to its exertions? Some preparation had been made by the monarch. The jealousy of France had limited the exercise of the Prussian militia to twenty-five thousand men yearly. But the government had contrived to double this amount, by calling out the militia twice in the year, and training on the second occasion the same number, but different individuals, from those who had been first summoned. Thus, a certain portion of discipline had become general among the Prussian youth, and, incited by the desire of their country's freedom, they rushed to battle against France as to a holy warfare. The means of providing artillery had also been sedulously augmented. This was not to be a war of posts or fortresses, but of fields of battle and of bayonets. Many, therefore, of the brass pieces of ordnance, which garnished the walls of such towns and fortresses as were yet unoccupied by the French, had been recast, and converted into field-pieces. Money was scarce, but England was liberal; and besides, the Prussian nobles and burghesses taxed themselves to the uttermost. Even the ladies gave up their diamonds and gold ornaments, for chains and bracelets beautifully wrought out of iron, the state enjoying the advantage of the exchange. In a future age, these relics, when found in the female casket, will be more valuable than the richest Indian jewels.

Meanwhile the resentment and desire of revenge, which had so long smouldered in the bosoms of the Prussians, broke forth with the force of a volcano. The youth of every description rushed to fill the ranks, the distinctions of birth were forgotten, nay, in a great measure abolished; no question was asked

at the Prussian, but whether he was able and willing to assist in the liberation of his country. The students, the cultivation of whose minds generally adds to their feeling for national freedom and national honour, arrayed themselves into battalions and squadrons. Some formed the Black Bands, who at this time distinguished themselves; others assumed the arms and dress of the Cossacks, whose name had become so terrible to the French. In general, these volunteers were formed into mounted and dismounted squadrons of chasseurs, whose appearance differed from that of the line only in their uniform being dark green, instead of blue. Their discipline, formed on a system devised by Scharnhorst, was admirably calculated to give fresh levies the degree of training and discipline necessary to render them serviceable, without pretending to give them the accuracy in details which experience alone can teach.

In a few weeks numerous armies were on foot, and Prussia, like a strong man rousing himself from slumber, stepped forward to assume her rank among independent nations. There could not be a greater contrast than between the same nation in her hour of presumption, her period of depression, and her present form of regeneration. To the battle of Jena the Prussians had marched as to an assured conquest, with a splendid army, well disposed, and admirably appointed, but conducted with that negligence which is inspired by a presumptuous degree of confidence, and that pride which goes before destruction. In the campaign of 1812, the Black Eagles stooping their dishonoured crests beneath those of France, they went, a discouraged and reluctant band of auxiliaries, to assist in the destruction of that power, whose subjugation they were well aware must lead to their own irremediable bondage. And now, such was the change of a few weeks, nay, not many days, that Prussia again entered the list with an army, still deficient in its material provisions, but composed of soldiers whose hearts were in the trim, whom misfortunes had taught caution, and oppression had roused to resistance; who knew by melancholy experience the strength of their powerful adversary, but were not the less disposed to trust in their own good swords and good cause.

A leader was selected, admirably formed by nature to command a national army at such a crisis. This was the celebrated Blücher, one of the few Prussian generals, who, even after the battle of Jena, continued to maintain the fame of the Great Frederick, under whom he had been trained, and to fight until every ray of hope had been entirely destroyed. This high-spirited and patriotic officer had remained in obscurity during the long period of the French domination. He was one of those ardent and inflexible characters that were dreaded by Napoleon, whose generosity, however it might display itself otherwise, was seldom observed to forgive those who had shown a steady and conscientious opposition to his power. Such men he held his enemies in every sense, personal as well as political; and, watched closely by the police, their safety could only be insured by living strictly retired. But now the old warrior sprang eagerly from his

obscure retreat, as in the ancient Roman shows a lion might have leaped from his dark den into the arena of the crowded amphitheatre, on which he was soon to act his terrible part. Blücher was, indeed, by character and disposition, the very man whom the exigence and the Prussian nation required to support a national war. He was not possessed of war as a science, nor skilled in planning out the objects of a campaign. Scharnhorst, and after him Gneissau, were intrusted with that part of the general's duty, as being completely acquainted with strategy; but, in the field of battle, no man possessed the confidence of his soldiers so completely as General Blücher. The first to advance, the last to retreat, he was seldom too much elated by victory, and never depressed by bad success. Defeated to-day, he was as ready to renew the battle to-morrow. In his army was no instance of whole divisions throwing down their arms, because they conceived their line broken or their flank turned. It was his system, that the greater part of fighting consists in taking and giving hard blows, and on all occasions he persecuted himself with a good grace to the bloody exercise. He was vigilant, too, as taught by the exercise of his youth in the light cavalry; and so enterprising and active, that Napoleon was heard to complain with his accustomed sneer, that "he had more trouble from that old dissipated hussar, than from all the generals of the allies beside." Deeply resenting the injuries of his country, and his own exile, Blücher's whole soul was in the war against France and her ruler; and, utterly devoid of the milder feelings of modern military leaders, he entered into hostilities with the embittered and personal animosity which Hannibal entertained of old against the Roman name and nation.* Such were the character and energies of the veteran to whom Prussia now confided the defence of her dearest rights, the leading of her youth, and the care of her freedom.

Sweden, or, we ought rather to say, the Crown Prince, had joined the confederacy, as already mentioned, and the spleen of Bonaparte, personal as well as public, had been directed even more against him than against the King of Prussia. The latter was represented as a rebellious and ungrateful vassal, the first as a refugee Frenchman who had renounced his country.

The last accusation, so grossly urged, was, if possible, more unreasonably unjust than the first. The ties of our native country, strict and intimate as they are, may be dissolved in more ways than one. Its lawful government may be overthrown, and the faithful subjects of that government, exiled to foreign countries for their adherence to it, may lawfully bear arms, which, in that case, are not directed against the home of their fathers, but against the band of thieves and robbers by which it is temporarily occupied. If this is not the case, what are we to think of the revolution of 1688, and the invasion of King William? In like manner, it is possible for

Sworn from his cradle Rome's relentless foe,

Such generous hate the Punic champion bore;

Thy lake, O Thrasymene, beheld it glow,

And Cannæ's walls and Trebia's crimson'd shore.

SHENSTONE.

a native of France or Britain so to link himself with another country, as to transfer to it the devotion which, in the general case, is only due to the land of his birth. In becoming the heir of the crown of Sweden, Bernadotte had become in fact a Swede; for no one, circumstanced as he was, is entitled, in interweaving his personal fortunes with the fate of the nation which adopts him, to make a reserve of any case in which he can be called to desert their interest for that of another country, though originally his own.

In assuming a French general for their Crown Prince, Sweden no doubt intended to give a pledge that she meant to remain on terms of amity with France; but it would be a wide step to argue from thence that it was her purpose to subject herself as a conquered province to that empire, and to hold the prince whom she had chosen to be no better than the lieutenant of Napoleon. This was indeed the construction which the French Emperor put upon the kingdoms of his own creation—Holland, Westphalia, Spain, and so forth. But in these countries the crowns were at least of his conferring. That of Sweden, on the other hand, was given by the Diet at Orebro, representing the Swedish people, to a person of their own election, nor had Bonaparte anything to do in it farther, than by consenting that a French subject should become King of Sweden; which consent, if available for anything, must be certainly held as releasing Bernadotte from every engagement to France, inconsistent with the duties of a sovereign to an independent kingdom.

When, therefore, at a period only a few months afterwards, Napoleon authorized piracies upon the Swedish commerce, and seized, with armed hand, upon the only portion of the Swedish territories which lay within his grasp, nothing could be more unreasonable than to require, that because the Crown Prince was born in Béarn, he should therefore submit to have war made upon him in his capacity of King of Sweden, without making all the resistance in his power. Supposing, what might easily have chanced, that Corsica had remained a constituent part of the British dominions, it would have been ridiculous to have considered Napoleon, when at the head of the French government, as bound by the duties of a liege subject of George III. simply because he was born at Ajaccio. Yet there is no difference betwixt the cases, excepting in the relative size and importance of France and Corsica; a circumstance which can have no influence upon the nature of the obligations incurred by those who are born in the two countries.

It may be readily granted, that a person in the situation of the Crown Prince must suffer as a man of feeling, when opposed to the ranks of his own countrymen. So must a judge, if unhappily called upon to sit in judgment and pronounce sentence upon a brother, or other near relation. In both cases, public duty must take place of private or personal sentiment.

While the powers of the North formed this coalition, upon terms better concerted, and with forces of a different character from those which had existed upon former less fortunate occasions, Austria looked upon the approaching strife with a hesitating

and doubtful eye. Her regard for a sovereign allied to her royal family by so close a tie as Napoleon, had not prevented her cabinet from feeling alarm at the overgrown power of France, and the ambition of her ruler. She had reluctantly contributed an auxiliary force to the assistance of France in the last campaign, and had taken the posture of a neutral so soon as circumstances permitted. The restoration of independence to the world must restore to Austria the provinces which she had lost, especially Illyria and the Tyrol, and at the same time her influence both in Italy and Germany. But this might be obtained from Napoleon disabled, and willing to purchase his ransom from the reprisals of allied Europe, by surrender of his pretensions to universal monarchy; and Austria therefore concluded it best to assume the office of mediator betwixt France and the allies, reserving to herself to throw her sword into the scales, in case the forces and ambition of Napoleon should again predominate; while, on the other hand, should peace be restored by a treaty formed under her auspices, she would at once protect the son-in-law of her emperor, regain her lost provinces and decayed influence, and contribute, by destroying the arrogant pretensions of France, to the return of tranquillity to Europe.

Otto, the French minister at Vienna, could already see in the Austrian administration a disposition to revive the ancient claims which had been annulled by the victories of Napoleon, and wrote to his court, even in the beginning of January, that they were already making a merit of not instantly declaring war against France. A mission of General Bubna to Paris put a more favourable character upon the interference of the Austrian ministers. He informed the French cabinet that the Emperor Francis was about to treat with France as a good ally, providing Austria was permitted also to treat with others as an independent nation.

It was in short the object of Austria, besides recovering her own losses (of which that cabinet, constantly tenacious of its objects, as it is well known to be, had never lost sight), to restore, as far as possible, some equilibrium of power, by which the other states, of which the European republic was composed, might become, as formerly, guarantees for the freedom and independence of each other. Such was not the system of Napoleon. He would gladly gratify any state who assisted him in hostilities against, and the destruction of another, with a handsome share of the spoil; but it was contrary to his policy to allow any one a protecting veto in behalf of a neutral power. It was according to his system, in the present case, to open to Austria his determination to destroy Prussia entirely, and to assure her of Silesia as her share of the booty, if she would be his ally in the war. But he found, to his surprise, that Austria had adopted a different idea of policy, and that she rather saw her interest in supporting the weak against the strong, than, while grasping at selfish objects, in winking at the engrossing ambition of the ruler of France. Neither did he leave the Austrian cabinet long in the belief, that his losses had in any degree lowered his lofty pretensions, or induced him to descend from the high claims which he had formed of universal sove-

rigoty. From his declarations to the Senate and representative body of France, one of two things was plain; either that no sense of past misfortunes, or fear of those which might arrive, would be of any avail to induce him to abandon the most unjustifiable of his usurpations, the most unreasonable of his pretensions; or else that he was determined to have his armed force re-established, and his sword once more in his hand; nay, that he had settled that a victory or two should wash out the memory of his retreat from Moscow, before he would enter into any treaty of pacification.

The notes in the *Moniteur*, during this winter of 1812-13, which were always written by himself, contained Bonaparte's bold defiance to Europe, and avowed his intention to maintain, abreast of each other, the two wars of Spain and Germany. He proposed at once to open the campaign in Germany (though he had lost the alliance both of Prussia and Austria), with an army of double the amount of that which marched against Russia, and to reinforce and keep up the armies of Spain at their complete establishment of 300,000 men. "If any one desired," he said, "the price at which he was willing to grant peace, it had been expressed in the Duke of Bassano's letter to Lord Castlereagh, before commencement of the campaign of 1812."

When that document is referred to, it will be found to contain no cession whatever on the part of France, but a proposal that England should yield up Spain (now almost liberated) to his brother Joseph, with the admission that Portugal and Sicily, none of which kingdoms Napoleon had the means of making a serious impression upon, might remain to their legitimate sovereigns. In other words, he would desist from pretensions which he had no means to make good, on condition that every point, which was yet doubtful, should be conceded in his favour.

It was extravagant to suppose that Britain, after the destruction occasioned by the Russian retreat, would accept terms which were refused when Napoleon was at the head of his fine army, and in the full hope of conquests. When, therefore, Austria offered herself as a mediator at the court of St James's, the English ministers contented themselves with pointing out the extravagant pretensions expressed by France, in documents understood to be authentic, and demanding that these should be disavowed, and some concessions made or promised by Napoleon, ere they would hamper themselves by any approach to a treaty.

Upon the whole, it was clear, that the fate of the world was once more committed to the chance of war, and that probably much more human blood must be spilled, ere any principles could be settled, on which a general pacification might be grounded.

A step of state policy was adopted by Napoleon, obviously to conciliate his father-in-law, the Austrian Emperor. A regency was established during his absence, and the empress, Maria Louisa, was named regent. But her authority was curtailed of all real or effectual power; for he reserved to himself exclusively the privilege of presenting all decrees to be passed by the Senate, and the empress had only the right to preside in that body.

CHAPTER LXXXIV.

State of the French grand army.—The Russians advance, and show themselves on the Elbe, joined everywhere by the inhabitants.—The French evacuate Berlin, and retreat on the Elbe.—The Crown Prince of Sweden joins the Allies, with 35,000 men.—Dresden is occupied by the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia.—Marshal Bessières killed on 1st May.—Battle of Lutitz fought on the 2d.—The Allies lose 20,000 men in killed and wounded, and the French keep the field, after very dreadful loss.—The Allies retire to Bautzen.—Hamburg taken possession of by the Danes and French.—Battle of Bautzen fought on the 20th and 21st May, with great loss on both sides, the French remaining masters of the field.—The allies retire in good order.—The French generals, Bruyeres and Duroc, killed on the 22d.—Grief of Napoleon for the death of the latter.—An armistice signed on 4th June.

WE must once more look out upon Germany, to which country, so long the scene on which were fought the quarrels of Europe, the success of the Russians, and the total discomfiture of the army of Napoleon, had again removed the war. We left the wrecks of the grand army thronging in upon the fortresses held by their countrymen in Prussia, where they were deposited as follows:

Into Thorn were thrown by Murat, before he left the grand army	6,000 men.
Into Modlin	8,000
Into Zamosc	4,000
Into Grandtztz, Prussians	6,000
Into Dantzic	30,000
	54,000

This total of fifty-four thousand men comprehended the sole remaining part of what Napoleon continued to call the Grand Army of Russia; in which country, however, not one-third of them had ever been, having been employed in Lithuania or Volhynia, and having thus escaped the horrors of the retreat. Almost all these troops were sickly, some distressingly so. The garrison towns were, however, filled with them, and put in a state of defence judged sufficient to have checked the advance of the Russians.

It would, in all probability, have done so upon any occasion of ordinary war; for Russia having not only gained back Lithuania, but taken possession of Warsaw, and that part of Poland which formerly belonged to Prussia, ought not, in a common case, to have endangered her success by advancing beyond the Vistula, or by plunging her armies into Silesia, leaving so many fortresses in the rear. But the condition of Prussia, waiting the arrival of the Russians as a signal for rising at once, and by her example encouraging the general insurrection of Germany, was a temptation too powerful to be resisted, although unquestionably there was a risk incurred in giving way to it. The various fortresses were therefore masked with a certain number of troops; and the Russian light corps advancing beyond the line even of the Oder, began to show themselves on the Elbe, joined everywhere by the inhabitants of the country, who, influenced by the doctrines of the

Tugend-Bund, and fired with detestation of the French, took arms wherever their deliverers appeared. The French everywhere retired, and Prince Eugène, evacuating Berlin, retreated upon the Elbe. It seemed as if the allies had come armed with lighted matches, and the ground had been strewn with gunpowder; so readily did the Germans rise in arms at the hurra of a body of Cossacks, or even at the distant gleam of their lances. The purpose of the war was not, however, to procure partial and desultory risings, from which no permanent benefit could be expected; but to prepare the means of occupying the north of Germany by an army conducted by one of the most celebrated generals of the age, and possessed of regular strength, sufficient to secure what advantages might be gained, and thus influence the final decision of the eventful campaign.

While the light troops of Russia and Prussia overran Germany, at least the eastern and northern provinces, the King of Sweden, in virtue of the convention into which he had entered at Abo, crossed over to Stralsund in the month of May, 1813, with a contingent amounting to 35,000 men, and anxiously awaited the junction which was to have placed under his command such corps of Russians and Germans as should increase his main body to 80,000 or 100,000. With such a force, the Crown Prince proposed to undertake the offensive, and thus to compel Napoleon, when he should take the field, to make head at once against this force upon his left flank, and defend himself in front against the advancing armies of Russia and Prussia. The proclamations of independence sent abroad by the allies made them friends wherever they came, and three flying corps, under Czernicheff, Tettenborn, and Winzengerode, spread along both sides of the Elbe. The French retreated everywhere, to concentrate themselves under the walls of Magdeburg, and other fortified places, of which they still held possession. Meantime, Hamburg, Lubeck, and other towns, declared for the allies, and received their troops with an alacrity, which, in the case of Hamburg, was severely punished by subsequent events.

The French general, Morand, endeavoured to put a stop to the stream of what was termed defection, and occupied Lüneburg, which had declared for the allies, with nearly four thousand men. His troops were already in the place, and about to proceed, it was said, to establish military tribunals, and punish the political crimes of the citizens, when the Russians, commanded by the active Czernicheff, suddenly appeared, forced their way sword in hand into the town, and on the 2d April, 1813, killed or took prisoners the whole of Morand's corps. The Viceroy Eugène attempted to impose some bounds on the audacity now manifested by the allies, by striking a bold blow upon his side. He marched suddenly from the neighbourhood of Magdeburg, with a view of surprising Berlin; but was himself surprised at Mœchern, driven back, defeated, and obliged to shut himself up in Magdeburg, where he was blockaded.

The predominance of the allies in the north of Germany seemed now so effectually ascertained, that the warmest adherents of France appeared dis-

posed to desert her cause. Denmark began to treat with the allies, and even on one occasion, as will be hereafter noticed, made a demonstration to join them in arms.

The King of Saxony, who had been always Napoleon's most sincere friend, dared not now abide the storm. He retreated to a place of security in Franconia, while his army separated themselves from the French, and, throwing themselves into Torgau, began to stipulate for a neutrality, which would probably have terminated, like that of d'Yorck, in their actually joining the allies.

Davoust retreated to the northwards, after blowing up the fine bridge at Dresden, amid the tumultuary opposition and execration of the inhabitants. Dresden itself soon after became the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, who were received with joyful acclamations by all classes of the citizens.

In like manner, three of the fortresses held by the French in Prussia—Thorn, Spandau, and Czenstochau—surrendered to the allies, and afforded hope that the French might be dislodged from the rest in the course of the summer. But the farther results of the activity of the allied generals were in a great measure prevented, or postponed, by the arrival of the numerous forces which Napoleon had so speedily levied to restore his late losses.

It would be severe to give the name of rashness to the conduct of the allies, in this bold advance into the middle and north of Germany. A great part of their power was of a moral character, and consisted in acting upon the feelings of the Germans, who were enchanted with the prospect of freedom and independence. Still there was much audacity in the allied monarchs venturing across the Elbe, and subjecting themselves to the encounter of Napoleon and his numerous levies, before their own resources had been brought forward. It was now, however, no time to dispute which plan ought to have been preferred; the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia had no other alternative than to follow out boldly that from which they could not now retreat.

Eugène, at the approach of the new French levies through the passes of the Thuringian mountains, removed from Magdeburg, and formed a junction with them on the Saale. The force in total might amount to 115,000 present in the field; the greater part, however, were new levies, and many almost mere boys. The allied army was collected towards Leipsic, and lay full in Napoleon's road to that city, and from thence to Dresden, which was the point on which he advanced.

It has been thought that the plains of Lutzen would have been the most advantageous field of battle for the allies, whose strength lay in their fine body of cavalry; to which it has been replied, that they expected to encounter Bonaparte on the other side of the Saale, and there to have obtained open ground for their cavalry, and a field fitting for their vengeance in the plains of Jena. But though the activity of the allies had of late been sufficient to distress Napoleon's lieutenants, it was not as yet adequate to match that of the emperor himself.

An important change had lately taken place in their army, by the death of the veteran Koutousoff,

in whose place Wittgenstein had succeeded to the supreme command.

Skirmishes took place at Weissenfels and Poserno, upon 29th April and 1st May, on which last day an event occurred distressing to Bonaparte's feelings. A contest took place in the defile of Rippach, near Poserna, which was only remarkable for the death of an excellent officer. Marshal Bessières, whose name the reader must remember as the leader of Napoleon's household troops, from the time they bore the humble name of Guides, until now that they were the Imperial Guard, and he their colonel-general, coming up to see how the action went, was killed by a cannon-shot. His body was covered with a white sheet, and the loss concealed as long as possible from the Guards, who were much attached to him. Upon a former occasion, when his horse was killed, Bonaparte told him he was obliged to the bullet, for making it known to him how much he was beloved, since the whole guard had wept for him. His time was, however, now come. He was sincerely lamented by Napoleon, who was thus, when the world was going harder against him than formerly, deprived of an early and attached follower.

But the war kept its pace. The French army continued to advance upon Leipsic on the south; the allies approached from the north to defend the place.

The centre of the French army was stationed at a village called Kaya. It was under the command of Ney. He was sustained by the Imperial Guard, with its fine artillery, drawn up before the well-known town of Lutzen, which, having seen the last conflict of Gustavus Adolphus, was now to witness a more bloody tragedy. Marmont, who commanded the right, extended as far as the defile of Poserna, and rested with his left upon the centre. The left wing of the French reached from Kaya to the Elster. As they did not expect to be brought to action in that place, or upon that day (May 2d), Napoleon was pressing forward from his right, Lauriston being at the head of the column, with the purpose of possessing himself of Leipsic, behind which he expected to see the army of the allies.

But these, encouraged by the presence of the Emperor Alexander and King of Prussia, had formed the daring resolution of marching southward along the left bank of the Elster during the night, transporting themselves to the right bank in the morning, and assaulting, with the choicest of their troops, under Blücher, the centre of the French, led by Ney. The fury of the attack was irresistible, and, in despite of a most obstinate defence, the allies obtained possession of Kaya, the point on which the centre of the French army rested. This was a crisis worthy of Napoleon's genius, and he was not wanting to himself. Assailed on the flank when in the act of advancing in column, he yet contrived, by a masterly movement, to wheel up his two wings, so as in turn to out-flank those of the enemy. He hurried in person to bring up his guard to support the centre, which was in fact nearly broken through. The combat was the more desperate and deplorable, that, on the one side, fought the flower of the Prussian youth, which had left their universities to sup-

port the cause of national honour and freedom; and, on the other, the young men of Paris, many of them of the best rank, who bravely endeavoured to sustain their country's long pre-eminent claim to victory. Both combated under the eyes of their respective sovereigns, maintained the honour of their country, and paid an ample tribute to the carnage of the day.

The battle lasted for several hours, before it could be judged whether the allies would carry their point by breaking through the French centre, or whether the French, before sustaining that calamity, would be able to wheel their wings upon the flanks of the allies. At length the last event began to be anticipated as the most probable. The distant discharge of musketry was seen on right and left closing inwards on the central tumult, and recognized for the fire of Macdonald and Bertrand, who commanded the French wings. At the same time the emperor made a successful struggle to recover the village of Kaya, and the allies, extricating themselves skillfully from the combat, led back their exhausted forces from between the forces, as we may term it, formed by the closing wings of Napoleon, without further loss than the carnage sustained in the field of battle. But that was immense. The allies lost twenty thousand men in killed and wounded. Among these was Scharnhorst, one of the best staff-officers in Europe, and who had organized with such ability the Prussian landwehr and volunteers. The Prince Leopold of Hesse-Homburg, and the Prince of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, nearly allied to the royal family of England, were also killed. The veteran Blücher was wounded, but, refusing to retire, had his wounds dressed upon the field of battle. Seven or eight French generals were also slain or wounded, and the loss of the French army was very severe.

Two circumstances greatly assisted to decide the fate of the action. General Bertrand, who was not come up when it began, arrived in time to act upon the left of the allies, and to permit Marmont, whose place he occupied, to unite himself, in the hour of need, to the defence of the centre. On the part of the allies, on the contrary, the division of Miloradovich, from some mistake or want of orders, never came into action. Few prisoners, and no artillery, were taken. The allies moved off in safety, protected by their fine cavalry, and the sole trophy of the victors was the possession of the bloody field.

But Napoleon had need of renown to animate his drooping partisans; and accordingly the battle was scarce ended ere the most exaggerated reports of the emperor's success were dispatched to every friendly court, and even so far as Constantinople. The very best of Napoleon's rhetorical ornaments were exhausted on this occasion. The battle of Lutzen was described as having, like a clap of thunder, pulverized all the schemes of the allies; and the cloudy train of intrigues, formed by the cabinet of St James's, as having been destroyed, like the Gordian knot under the sword of Alexander. The eloquence of Cardinal Maury, who said *Te Deum* on the occasion at Paris, was equally florid; until at length his wonder was raised so high, as scarce to admit that the hero who surmounted so many diffi-

culties, performed so many duties, united so much activity to so much foresight, such brilliancy of conception to such accuracy of detail, was only, after all, a mortal like himself and the congregation.

The battle of Lutzen had indeed results of importance, though inferior by far to those on which such high colouring was bestowed by the court chaplain and the bulletins. The allied monarchs fell back upon the Mulda, and all hope of engaging Saxony in the general cause was necessarily adjourned. The French troops were again admitted into Torgau by the positive order of their sovereign, notwithstanding the opposition of the Saxon general, Thielmann. The King of Saxony returned from Prague, his last place of refuge, and came to Dresden on the 12th. Napoleon made a military fête to receive the good old monarch, and conducted him in a kind of triumph through his beautiful capital. It could afford little pleasure at present to the paternal heart of Frederick Augustus; for while that part of Dresden which was on the left side of the Elbe was held by the French, the other was scarcely evacuated by the allies; and the bridge of boats, burnt to the water's edge, was still the subject of contest betwixt the parties—the French seeking to repair, the allies to destroy it.

Another consequence of the battle of Lutzen was, that the allies could no longer maintain themselves on the Elbe. The main army, however, only retired to Bautzen, a town near the sources of the Spree, about twelve French leagues from Dresden, where they selected a strong position. An army of observation, under Bulow, was destined to cover Berlin, should the enemy make any attempt in that direction; and they were thus in a situation equally convenient for receiving reinforcements, or retiring upon Silesia, in case of being attacked ere such succours came up. They also took measures for concentrating their army, by calling in their advanced corps in all directions.

One of the most unpleasant consequences was, their being obliged upon the whole line to withdraw to the right side of the Elbe. Czernicheff and Tettenborn, whose appearance had occasioned Hamburg, and other towns in that direction, to declare themselves for the good cause, and levy men in behalf of the allies, were now under the necessity of abandoning them to the vengeance of the French, who were certain to treat them as revolted subjects. The fate of Hamburg in particular, in itself a town so interesting, and which had distinguished itself by the number and spirit of the volunteers which were raised there in the cause of the allies, was peculiarly tantalizing.

No sooner were the main body of the allies withdrawn on the 9th May, than the place was fiercely attacked by Davoust at the head of 5000 or 6000 men, uttering denunciations of vengeance against the city for the part it had taken. When this force, which they possessed no adequate means of repelling, was in the act of approaching to storm the place, the alarmed citizens of Hamburg, to their own wonder, were supported by Danish artillery and gun-boats, sent from Altona to protect the city. This kindness had not been expected at the hand of the Danes, who had as yet been understood to be

the allies of France. But the reality was, that as the Danish treaty with the allies was still in dependence, it was thought that this voluntary espousal of the cause of their neighbour might have a good effect upon the negotiation. Something perhaps might arise from the personal zeal of Blücher, the commandant of Altona, who was a relation of the celebrated Prussian general. The Danes, however, after this show of friendship, evacuated Hamburg on the evening of the 12th of May, to return shortly after in a very different character; for it being in the interval ascertained that the allies were determined to insist upon Denmark's ceding Norway to Sweden, and the news of the battle of Lutzen seeming to show that Napoleon's star was becoming again pre-eminent, the Danish prince broke off his negotiation with the allies, and returned to his league, offensive and defensive, with France.

The hopes and fears of the citizens of Hamburg were doomed to be yet further tantalized. The Crown Prince of Sweden was at Stralsund with a considerable army, and 3000 Swedes next appeared for the purpose of protecting Hamburg. But as this Swedish army, as already mentioned, was intended to be augmented to the number of 90,000, by reinforcements of Russians and Prussians which had not yet appeared, and which the Crown Prince was soliciting with the utmost anxiety, he could not divide his forces without risking the grand objects for which this large force was to be collected, and the additional chance of his Swedish army, of whose blood he was justly and wisely frugal, being destroyed in detail. We may add to this, that from a letter addressed by the Crown Prince to Alexander, at this very period, it appears he was agitated with the greatest doubt and anxiety concerning the arrival of these important reinforcements, and justly apprehensive for the probable consequences of their being delayed. At such a crisis, therefore, he was in no condition to throw any part of his forces into Hamburg as a permanent garrison.

The reasons urged for withdrawing the Swedish troops seem sufficient, but the condition of the citizens of Hamburg was not the less hard, alternately deserted by Russians, Danes, and Swedes. On the 30th of May, 5000 Danes, now the allies of France, and 1500 French troops, took possession of the town in the name of Napoleon. They kept good discipline, and only plundered after the fashion of regular exactions; but this occupation was the prelude to a train of distresses, to which Hamburg was subjected during the whole continuance of the war. Meanwhile, though this forlorn city was lost for the time, the war continued in its neighbourhood.

The gallant Czernicheff, as if to avenge himself for the compulsory retreat of his Cossacks from Hamburg, contrived, near Halberstadt, to cut off a body of French infantry, forming a hollow square of musketry, and having fourteen field-pieces. It was seen on this occasion, that these sons of the desert were something very different from miserable hordes, as they were termed in the language with which the French writers, and Napoleon himself, indulged their spleen. At one shrill whoop of their commander, they dispersed themselves much in the

manner of a fan when thrown open; at another signal, each horseman, acting for himself, came on at full gallop. Thus they escaped in a considerable degree the fire of the enemy, which could not be pointed against any mass, penetrated the square, took the cannon, made prisoners near 1000 men, and piked or sabred more than seven hundred, not a Frenchman escaping from the field of battle. This skirmish was so successfully managed on Czernicheff's part, that a French force, much superior to his own, came up in time to see the execution done, but not to render assistance to their countrymen.

In the meanwhile Dresden was the scene of political negotiations, and its neighbourhood resounded with the din of war. Count Bubna, on the part of the Austrian Emperor, made the strongest remonstrances to Bonaparte on the subject of a general peace, while it seems probable that Napoleon endeavoured to dazzle the cabinet of Vienna with such views of individual advantage, as to make her declare without scruple for his side. The audiences of Count Bubna were prolonged till long past midnight, and matters of the last importance seemed to be under discussion.

The war was for a few days confined to skirmishes of doubtful and alternate success, maintained on the right bank of the Elbe. On the 12th May, Ney crossed the river near Torgau, and menaced the Prussian territories, directing himself on Spremberg and Hoyerswerder, as if threatening Berlin, which was only protected by Bulow and his army of observation. The purpose was probably, by exciting an alarm for the Prussian capital, to induce the allies to leave their strong position at Bautzen. But they remained stationary there, so that Napoleon moved forward to dislodge them in person. On the 18th May he quitted Dresden. In his road towards Bautzen, he passed the ruins of the beautiful little town of Bischoffswerder, and expressed particular sympathy upon finding it had been burnt by the French soldiery, after a rencounter near the spot with a body of Russians. He declared that he would rebuild the place, and actually presented the inhabitants with 100,000 francs towards repairing their losses. On other occasions, riding where the recently wounded had not been yet removed, he expressed, as indeed was his custom, for he could never view bodily pain without sympathy, a very considerable degree of sensibility.

"His wound is incurable, sire," said a surgeon, upon whom he was laying his orders to attend to one of these miserable objects.

"Try, however," said Napoleon; and added, in a suppressed voice,—"There will always be one fewer of them,"—meaning, doubtless, of the victims of his wars.

Napoleon's is not the only instance in which men have trembled or wept, at looking upon the details of misery which have followed in consequence of some abstract resolutions of their own.

Arriving at Bautzen on the 21st, the emperor in person reconnoitred the formidable position of the allies. They were formed to the rear of the town of Bautzen, which was too much advanced to make a part of their position, and had the Spree in their front.

Their right wing rested on fortified eminences, their left upon wooded hills. On their right, towards Hoyerswerder, they were watched by Ney and Lauriston, who, of course, were prepared to act in communication with Napoleon. But the allies disconcerted this part of the emperor's scheme with singular address and boldness. They surprised, by a movement from their right, a column of 7,000 Italians, and so entirely routed them, that those who escaped dispersed and fled into Bohemia; after which exploit, Barclay de Tolly and d'Yorck, who had commanded the attacking division, again united themselves with the main force of the allies, and resumed their place in the line.

Ney moved to the support of the Italians, but too late either for rescue or revenge. He united himself with the emperor about three in the afternoon, and the army accomplished the passage of the Spree at different points, in front of the allied army. Napoleon fixed his head-quarters in the deserted town of Bautzen; and his army, advancing towards the enemy slowly and with caution, bivouacked, with their line extending north and south, and their front to the allies. The latter concentrated themselves with the same caution, abandoning whatever points they thought too distant to be effectually maintained; their position covering the principal road towards Zittau, and that to Goerlitz; their right wing (Prussians) resting upon the fortified heights of Klein, and Klein Bautzen, which were the keys of the position, while the left wing (composed of Russians) was supported by wooded hills. The centre was rendered unapproachable by commanding batteries.

As it was vain to think of storming such a position in front, Napoleon had recourse to the manoeuvre of modern war, which no general better understood,—that of turning it, and thereby rendering it unserviceable. Ney was, therefore, directed to make a considerable circuit around the Russian extreme right, while their left was attacked more closely by Oudinot, who was to engage their attention by attempting to occupy the valleys, and debouching from the hills on which they rested. For this last attempt the Russians were prepared. Miloradovitch and the Prince of Wirtemberg made good the defence on this point with extreme gallantry, and the fortune of the day, notwithstanding the great exertions of Bonaparte, seemed to be with the allies. The next attempt was made on the fortified heights on the right of the allies, defended by the Prussians. Here also Napoleon encountered great difficulties, and sustained much loss. It was not till he brought up all his reserves, and combined them for one of those desperate exertions, which had so often turned the fate of battle, that he was able to succeed in his purpose. The attack was conducted by Soult, and it was maintained at the point of the bayonet. At the price of nearly four hours' struggle, in the course of which the heights were often gained, lost, and again retaken, the French remained masters of them.

At the very time when their right point of support was carried by the French, the corps of Ney, with that of Lauriston and that of Régnier, amounting to sixty thousand men, had established themselves in the enemy's rear. It was then that Blücher was

compelled to evacuate those heights which he had defended so long and so valiantly.

But although the allies were thus turned upon both flanks, and their wings in consequence forced in upon their centre, their retreat was as orderly as it had been after the battle of Lutzen. Not a gun was taken, scarce a prisoner made; the allies retired as if on the parade, placed their guns in position wherever the ground permitted, and repeatedly compelled the pursuers to deploy, for the purpose of turning them, in which operation the French suffered greatly.

The night closed, and the only decided advantage which Napoleon had derived from this day of carnage was the cutting off the allies from their retreat by the great roads on Silesia, and its capital Breslau, and driving them on the more impracticable roads near to the Bohemian frontier. But they accomplished this unfavourable change of position without being thrown into disorder, or prevented from achieving the same skilful defence by which their retreat had hitherto been protected.

The whole day of the 22d of May was spent in attacks upon the rear of the allies, which were always repelled by their coolness and military conduct. The Emperor Napoleon placed himself in the very front of the pursuing column, and exposed his person to the heavy and well-aimed fire by which Miloradovitch covered his retreat. He urged his generals to the pursuit, making use of such expressions as expressed his impetuosity. "You creep, scoundrel," was one which he applied to a general officer upon such an occasion. He lost patience, in fact, when he came to compare the cost of the battle with its consequences, and said, in a tone of bad humour, "What, no results after so much carnage—not a gun—not a prisoner?—these people will not leave me so much as a nail."

At the heights of Reichembach, the Russian rear-guard made a halt, and while the cuirassiers of the Guards disputed the pass with the Russian lancers, the French general, Bruyères, was struck down by a bullet. He was a veteran of the Army of Italy, and favoured by Bonaparte, as having been a companion of his early honours. But Fortune had reserved for that day a still more severe trial of Napoleon's feelings. As he surveyed the last point on which the Russians continued to make a stand, a ball killed a trooper of his escort close by his side. "Duroc," he said, to his ancient and faithful follower and confidant, now the grand marshal of his palace, "fortune has a spite at us to-day." It was not yet exhausted.

Some time afterwards, as the emperor with his suite rode along a hollow way, three cannon were fired. One ball shivered a tree close to Napoleon, and, rebounding, killed General Kirgener, and mortally wounded Duroc, whom the emperor had just spoken to. A halt was ordered, and for the rest of the day Napoleon remained in front of his tent, surrounded by his Guard, who pitied their emperor, as if he had lost one of his children. He visited the dying man, whose entrails were torn by the shot, and expressed his affection and regret. On no other but that single occasion was he ever observed so much exhausted, or absorbed by grief, as to decline

listening to military details, or giving military orders. "Everything to-morrow," was his answer to those who ventured to ask his commands. He made more than one decree in favour of Duroc's family, and impledged the sum of two hundred Napoleons in the hands of the pastor in whose house Duroc had expired, to raise a monument to his memory, for which he dictated a modest and affecting epitaph. In Bessières and Duroc, Napoleon lost two of his best officers and most attached friends, whose sentiments had more influence on him than others in whom he reposed less confidence. The double deprivation was of the worst omen for his fortunes.

In resuming the sum of the loss arising from the battle, we must observe that the French suffered most, because the strong position of the allies covered them from the fire. Nevertheless, the allies lost in slain and wounded about ten thousand men. It would take perhaps five thousand more to approximate the amount of the French loss.

On the day preceding that sanguinary battle, an armistice had been proposed by Count Nesselrode, in a letter to Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, in compliance, it was stated, with the wishes of the court of Vienna; it was seconded by a letter from Count Stadion to Talleyrand, whom, as well as Fouché, Napoleon had summoned to his presence, because, perhaps, he doubted the effect of their intrigues during his absence, and in his difficulties. This armistice was to be preliminary to a negotiation, in which Austria proposed to assume the character of mediator.

In the meanwhile Napoleon marched forward, occupied Breslau (from which the princesses of the Prussian royal family removed into Bohemia), and relieved the blockade of Glogau, where the garrison had begun to suffer by famine. Some bloody skirmishes were fought without any general result, and where Victory seemed to distribute her favours equally. But the main body of the allies showed no inclination to a third general engagement, and retreating upon Upper Silesia, not even the demonstration of advance upon Berlin itself could bring them to action.

The armistice was at length agreed upon, and signed on the 4th of June. Bonaparte showed either a sincere wish for peace, or a desire to be considered as entertaining such, by renouncing the possession of Breslau and Lower Silesia to the allies, which enabled them to regain their communications with Berlin. The interests of the world, which had been so long committed to the decision of the sword, seemed now about to be rested upon the arguments of a convention of politicians.

CHAPTER LXXXV.

Change in the results formerly produced by the French victories.—Despondency of the generals.—Decay in the discipline of the troops.—Views of Austria.—Arguments in favour of peace stated and discussed.—Pertinacity of Napoleon.—State of the French interior.—Aid from him by the slavery of the press.—Interview between Napoleon and the Austrian minister, Metternich.—Delays in the negotiations.—Plan of pacification proposed by Austria, on 7th August.—The armistice broken off on the

10th, when Austria joins the allies.—Sudden placability of Napoleon at this period—Ascribed to the news of the battle of Vittoria.

THE victories of Lutzen and Bautzen were so unexpected and so brilliant, that they completely dazzled all those who reposed a superstitious confidence in Bonaparte's star, who conceived that they again saw it reviving in all the splendour of its first rising. But the expressions of Augereau to Fouché, at Mentz, as the latter passed to join Bonaparte at Dresden, show what was the sense of Napoleon's best officers. "Alas!" he said, "our sun has set. How little do the two actions of which they make so much at Paris resemble our victories in Italy, when I taught Bonaparte the art of war which he now abuses! How much labour has been thrown away only to win a few marches onward! At Lutzen our centre was broken, several regiments disbanded, and all was lost but for the Young Guard. We have taught the allies to beat us. After such a butchery as that of Bautzen, there were no results, no cannon taken, no prisoners made. The enemy everywhere opposed us with advantage, and we were roughly handled at Reichenbach, the very day after the battle. Then one ball strikes off Bessières, another Duroc; Duroc, the only friend he had in the world. Bruyères and Kirgenere are swept away by spent bullets. What a war! it will make an end of all of us. He will not make peace; you know him as well as I do; he will cause himself to be surrounded by half a million of men, for, believe me, Austria will not be more faithful to him than Prussia. Yes, he will remain inflexible, and unless he be killed (as killed he will *not* be), there is an end of all of us."

It was, indeed, generally observed, that though the French troops had all their usual brilliancy of courage, and although their emperor showed all his customary talent, the former effect of both upon the allies seemed in a great measure lost. The rapidity with which Bonaparte's soldiers made their attacks was now repelled with steadiness, or anticipated with yet superior alertness; so that the French, who, during their course of victory, had become so secure as to neglect the precautions of sentinels and patrols, now frequently suffered for their carelessness. On the other hand, the allies chose their days and hours of battle, continued the conflict as long as they found convenient, suspended it when it became unfavourable, and renewed it when they saw cause. There was an end to the times when a battle decided the fate of a campaign, and a campaign the course of the war.

It was also seen, that though Bonaparte had been able to renew the numbers of his army, by an unparalleled effort of exertion, it was not even in *his* power to restore the discipline which the old soldiers had lost in the horrors of the Russian retreat, and which the young levies had never acquired. The Saxons and Silesians felt that the burdens which the presence of an armed force always must inflict, were no longer mitigated by the species of discipline which the French soldiers had formerly exercised amongst themselves, and which secured against wanton outrage, and waste of the plunder which

they seized. But now, it was an ordinary thing to see one body of soldiers treading down and destroying the provisions, for want of which the next battalion was perhaps starving. The courage and energy of the French soldier were the same, but the recollection of former distresses had made him more selfish and more wasteful, as well as more ferocious.

Those who saw matters under this disadvantageous light, went so far, though friends both to France and Napoleon, as to wish that neither the battle of Lutzen or Bautzen had been fought, since they became, in their consequences, the greatest obstacles to a settled pacification. Even Eugène Beauharnais used this despairing language. It is true, they allowed that these memorable conflicts had sustained, or even elevated, the emperor's military character, and that there was some truth in the courtly speech of Narbonne, who, when Napoleon desired to know what the people at Vienna thought of these actions, replied, "Some think you an angel, sire; some a devil; but all agree you are more than man." But, according to the sentiments of such persons, these encomiums on a point of the emperor's character, which had before rendered him sufficiently feared, and sufficiently hated, were only calculated to elevate his mind above prudential considerations, and to render his chance of effecting a permanent reconciliation with other nations more difficult, if not altogether impossible. The maxim of Europe at present seemed to be—

*Odi accipitrem qui semper vivit in armis.**

A point was now reached, when Bonaparte's talents as a soldier were rather likely to disturb a negotiation, which an opinion of his moderate views in future, could such have been entertained on plausible grounds, would certainly have influenced favourably. This was particularly felt by Austria, who, after having received so many humiliations from Napoleon, seemed now to be called upon to decide on his destiny. The views of that power could not be mistaken. She desired to regain her lost provinces, and her influence in Germany, and unquestionably would use this propitious hour to obtain both. But then she desired still farther, for the preservation of her dominion and of her influence, that France should desist from her dream of absolute dominion, and Napoleon from those extravagant claims of universal royalty, which he had hitherto broadly acted upon. To what purpose, was asked by the friends of peace, could it avail Bonaparte to maintain large armies in Germany? To what purpose keep possession of the fortified towns, even on the eastern frontier of that empire, excepting to show, that, whatever temporary advantage Napoleon might look for in an alliance with Austria, it was no part of his plan to abandon his conquests, or to sink from his claims of supreme dominion, into a co-ordinate prince, among the independent sovereigns of Europe.

If he meant to prosecute the war, they urged, that his lingering in Saxony and Prussia would certainly induce Austria to join the coalition against him; and that, supposing Dresden to be the pivot of his ope-

* I hate the hawk who always lives in war.

rations, he would be exposed to be taken in flank by the immense armies of Austria descending upon the valley of the Elbe, from the passes of the Bohemian mountains.

Another, and a very opposite course of measures would, said the same counsellors, be at once a guarantee to Austria, of the French Emperor's peaceable intentions, and tend to check and intimidate the other allies. Let Napoleon evacuate of free will the blockaded fortresses upon the Oder and Elbe, and thereby add to his army fifty thousand veteran troops. Let him, with these and his present army, fall back on the Rhine, so often acknowledged as the natural boundary of France. Who would dare to attack him on his own strong frontier, with such an army in front, and all the resources of France in his rear? Not Austria; for, if assured that Napoleon had abandoned his scheme to make France victorious, and limited his views to making her happy, that power would surely desire to maintain a dynasty connected with her own, on a throne which might become a protection and ornament to Europe, instead of being her scourge and terror. The northern nations, Russia, Prussia and Sweden, would have no motive to undertake so wild a crusade as a march to the Rhine; and Great Britain, her commerce restored, and the peace of the Continent established, could not, if she were desirous, find any sound reason for protracting the war which she had always carried on against the system, not the person, of Bonaparte, until events showed that they were indivisible. Thus, France, by assuming an attitude which expressed moderation as well as firmness, might cause the swords of the allies to drop from their hands without another drop of blood being shed.

Indeed, although it may appear, that by the course recommended Napoleon must have made great sacrifices, yet, as circumstances stood, he resigned claims dependent on the chance of war, rather than advantages in possession, and yielded up little or nothing that was firmly and effectually part of his empire. This will appear from a glance at the terms of the supposed surrender.

Spain he must have relinquished all claim to. But Napoleon had just received accounts of the decisive battle of Vittoria, which sealed the emancipation of the Peninsula; and he must have been aware, that in this long-contested point he would lose nothing of which the fate of war had not previously deprived him, and would obtain for the south-western provinces of France, protection against the army of the Duke of Wellington, which already threatened invasion.

Germany was indeed partly in Napoleon's possession, as far as the occupation of fortresses, and such treaties as he had imposed on his vassal princes, could give him influence. But the whole nation, in every city and province, was alienated from France and her ruler, on account of the paramount sovereignty which he had assumed, and the distresses which he had brought upon them by the unceasing demand of troops for distant expeditions, and by his continental system. Besides, the enfranchisement of Germany was the very question of war and peace; and that not being granted, Napo-

leon must have been well aware that he must fight out the battle with Russia, Prussia, and Sweden, the insurgent Germans ready to arise on every hand, and all the weighty force of Austria to back them. If peace was to be established on any terms, the destruction of the unnatural influence of France on the right side of the Rhine must have been an indispensable article, and it was better for Napoleon to make the cession voluntarily, than to wait till, through the insurrection of the people, and the discontent of the monarchs lately his dependents, the whole system should explode and go to pieces of itself.

England would, doubtless, insist on the liberation of Holland; yet even this could be no great sacrifice on the part of Napoleon, who would have retained Flanders, and the whole left side of the Rhine, from Huningen to Clèves, including the finest territories of the ancient Dukes of Burgundy, which had never belonged to the former Kings of France. The emancipation of Holland might have been also compensated, by the restoration of some of the French colonies. England has never made hard bargains on occasion of a general peace.

There might have been difficulties on the subject of Italy; but the near connexion betwixt the Emperors of Austria and France offered various means of accommodating these. Italy might, for example, have made an appanage for Eugène, or, in the case of such existing, for Bonaparte's second son, so as to insure the kingdoms of France and Italy passing into distinct and independent sovereignties in the next reign; or, it is believed, that if Austria had been absolutely determined to break off the treaty for this sole object, she would have found the belligerent powers inclined in their turn to act as mediators, and been herself compelled to listen to moderate terms.

From what has been said, it would appear that such cessions as have been hinted at would at once have put an end to the war, leaving Napoleon still in possession of the fairest kingdom of Europe, augmented to an extent of territory greatly beyond what her most powerful monarchs before him had ever possessed; while, on the other hand, the countries and claims which, in the case supposed, he was called upon to resign, resembled the wounded mast in the tempest, which the seaman cuts away purposely, as endangering the vessel which it has ceased to assist. But it unfortunately happened, that Bonaparte, generally tenacious of his own opinion, and particularly when his reputation was concerned, imagined to himself that he could not cut away the mast without striking the colours which were nailed to it; that he could not resign his high pretensions, however unreasonable, without dimming his personal glory, in the lustre of which he placed his happiness.

He would not, therefore, listen to those, who, with such arguments as we have above stated, pressed him to make a virtue of necessity, and assume a merit from giving up what he could not attempt to hold, without its being in all probability wrested from him. He persisted in maintaining the contrary, referred back to the various instances in which he had come off in triumph, when every other person had despaired of his safety, and had previously pro-

tested against the hazardous means which he used to ascertain it. This pertinacity did not arise solely out of the natural confidence in his own superiority, which always attends minds so powerful and so determined; it was fostered by the whole course of his life.

"At the age of thirty," he said of himself, "I had gained victories—I had influenced the world—I had appeared a national testament—had melted parties into one—had rallied a nation. I have, it must be allowed, been spoiled by success—I have always been in supreme command. From my first entrance into life I have enjoyed high power, and circumstances and my own force of character have been such, that from the instant I gained a superiority, I have recognized neither masters nor laws."*

To a confession so ingenuous, the historian can add nothing. It is no wonder, that one to whom luck had been uniformly favourable, should love the excitation of the play, and, making cast after cast in confidence of his own fortune, press the winning game until it became a losing one, instead of withdrawing from the table as prudence would have dictated, when the stakes deepened, and the luck began to change. Napoleon had established in his own mind, as well as that of others, an opinion, that he, in his proper person, enjoyed an amnesty from the ordinary chances of fortune.† This was a belief most useful to him as it was received by others, but dangerous in his own adoption of it; since it hindered him from listening in his own case to calculations, which in that of others he would have allowed to be well founded.

Both Talleyrand and Fouché gave their master the advantage of their experience on this occasion, and touched with less or more reserve upon the terror which his ambition had spread, and the determination of the allies, as well as Austria, not to make peace without such a guarantee as should protect them against future encroachments. Napoleon rejected their opinion and advice with disdain, imputing it to their doubts in the persevering exertions of his genius, or to an anxiety for their own private fortunes, which induced them to desire at all risks the end of the war.

His military counsellors endeavoured to enforce similar advice, with the same want of success. Berthier, with the assistance of the celebrated engineer, Rogniat, had drawn up a plan for removing the French army, reinforced with all the garrisons which they had in Germany, from the line of the Elbe to that of the Rhine.

"Good God!" exclaimed Bonaparte, as he glanced at the labours of his adjutant-general, "ten lost battles could not bring me so low as you would

have me stoop, and that, too, when I command so many strong places on the Elbe and Oder. Dresden is the point on which I will manoeuvre to receive all attacks, while my enemies develop themselves like a line of circumference round a centre. Do you suppose it possible for troops of various nations, and variously commanded, to act with regularity upon such an extensive line of operations? The enemy cannot force me back on the Rhine, till they have gained ten battles; but allow me only one victory, and I will march on their capitals of Berlin and Breslau, relieve my garrisons on the Vistula and Oder, and force the allies to such a peace as shall leave my glory un tarnished. Your defensive retreat does not suit me; besides, I do not ask you for plans, but for assistance to carry into execution my own projects."

Thus Napoleon silenced his military, as well as his civil counsellors. But there was one adviser whose mouth he had stopt, whose advice, if it could have reached him, would probably have altered his fatal resolution. One of Bonaparte's most impolitic as well as unjustifiable measures had been, his total destruction of every mode by which the public opinion of the people of France could be manifested. His system of despotism, which had left no manner of expression whatever, either by public meetings, by means of the press, or through the representative bodies, by which the national sentiments on public affairs could be made known, became now a serious evil. The manifestation of public opinion was miserably supplied by the voices of hired functionaries, who, like artificial fountains, merely returned back with various flourishes the sentiments with which they had been supplied from the common reservoir at Paris. Had free agents of any kind been permitted to report upon the state of the public mind, Napoleon would have had before him a picture which would have quickly summoned him back to France. He would have heard that the nation, blind to the evils of war while dazzled with victory and military glory, had become acutely sensible of them so soon as these evils became associated with defeats, and the occasion of new draughts on the population of France. He would have learned that the fatal retreat of Moscow, and this precarious campaign of Saxony, had awakened parties and interests which had long been dormant—that the name of the Bourbons was again mentioned in the west—that 50,000 recusant conscripts were wandering through France, forming themselves into bands, and ready to join any standard which was raised against the Imperial authority; and that in the Legislative Body, as well as the Senate, there was already organized a tacit opposition to his government, that wasted but a moment of weakness to show itself.

All this, and more, he would have learned; and must have been taught the necessity of concentrating his forces, returning to the frontiers of France, recovering the allegiance of those who hesitated, by accepting the best terms of peace which he could extort from the allies, and assuming on the Rhine such a firm attitude of defence as should at once overawe domestic dissatisfaction, and repel foreign invasion. But the least spark, by which the voice of France could find its way to the ears of her

* *Mémorial de St. Hélène*, vol. VII, p. 137.

† The following is a ludicrous instance. When the explosion of the infernal machine took place, a bystander rushed into a company, and exclaimed, "The first consul is blown up." An Austrian veteran chancing to be of the party, who had witnessed Napoleon's wonderful escapes during the Italian campaigns, exclaimed, in ridicule of the facile credulity of the news-monger, "He blown up!—Ah, you little know your man—I will wager at this moment he is as well as any of us. I know all his tricks many a day since."

sovereign, was effectually closed. The fate of Napoleon turned on this circumstance; for the sovereign who deprives himself of the means of collecting the general sense of the nation over which he rules, is like the householder who destroys his faithful mastiff. Both may, perhaps, alarm their master by baying without just cause, or at an inconvenient time; but when the hour of action comes, no other sentinel can supply the want of their vigilance.

The armistice now afforded an apt occasion for arranging a general peace, or rather (for that was the real purpose) for giving Austria an opportunity of declaring what were her real and definitive intentions in this unexpected crisis, which had rendered her to a great degree arbitress of the fate of Europe. Napoleon, from his first arrival in Saxony, had adopted a belief, that although Austria was likely to use the present crisis as an opportunity of compelling him to restore the Illyrian provinces, and perhaps other territories of which former wars had deprived her, yet that in the end, the family connexion, with the awe entertained for his talents, would prevail to hinder her cabinet from uniting their cause to that of the allies. An expression had dropt from the Austrian minister, Metternich, which would have altered this belief, had it been reported to him.

Maret, Duke of Bassano, had pressed the Austrian hard on the ties arising from the marriage, when the Austrian answered emphatically, "The marriage—yes, the marriage—it was a match founded on political considerations; *but*—"

This single brief word disclosed as much as does the least key when it opens the strongest cabinet—it made it clear that the connexion formed by the marriage would not prevent Austria from taking the line in the present dispute which general policy demanded. And this was soon seen when Count Metternich came to Dresden to have an audience of Napoleon.

This celebrated statesman and accomplished courtier had been very acceptable at the Tuileries, and Napoleon seems to have imagined him one of those persons whose gaiety and good humour were combined with a flexible character, liable to be mastered and guided by one of power and energy like his own. This was a great mistake. Metternich, a man of liveliness and address when in society, was firm and decisive in business. He saw that the opportunity of controlling the absolute power of France and of Bonaparte had at length arrived, and was determined, so far as Austria was concerned, and under his administration, that no partial views or advantages should prevent its being effectually employed. His interview with Napoleon took place at Dresden on the 28th June, and the following particulars are accredited:—

Napoleon always piqued himself on a plain, downright style of negotiation, or rather upon his system of at once announcing the only terms on which he would consent to negotiate. He would hear of no counter-project, and admit of no medium betwixt the resumption of hostilities, and acceptance of peace upon the terms which it suited him to dictate. This frank and unanswerable mode of treating

greatly tended to abridge the formalities of diplomacy; it had but this single disadvantage, that it was only suitable for the lips of a victor, whose renewal of war was to be, in all human probability, the resuming a career of victory. Such a tone of negotiation became the Roman Prætor, when he envired with a circle the feeble eastern monarch, and insisted on a categorical answer to the terms he had proposed, ere he should step beyond the line; and perhaps it became Napoleon, when, at Campo Formio, he threw down the piece of porcelain, declaring that the Austrian empire should be destroyed in the same manner, unless they instantly accepted his conditions. But the same abrupt dictatorial manner was less felicitously employed, when the question was to persuade Austria not to throw her force of 200,000 men into the scale of the allies, which already too equally balanced that of France; yet that ill-chosen tone may be observed in the following conference.

Napoleon upbraided Metternich with having favoured his adversaries, by being so tardy in opening the negotiation. He intimated that the Austrian minister perhaps staid away, in order that France might be reduced to a lower state than at the opening of the campaign; while now that he had gained two battles, Austria thrust in her mediation, that he might be prevented from following up his success. In claiming to be a negotiator, Austria, he said, was neither his friend nor his impartial judge—she was his enemy. "You were about to declare yourselves," he said, "when the victory at Lutzen rendered it prudent in the first place to collect more forces. Now you have assembled behind the screen of the Bohemian mountains 200,000 men under Schwartzenberg's command. Ah, Metternich! I guess the purpose of your cabinet. You wish to profit by my embarrassments, and seize on the favourable moment to regain as much as you can of what I have taken from you. The only question with you is, whether you will make most by allowing me to ransom myself, or by going to war with me?—You are uncertain on that point; and perhaps you only come here to ascertain which is your best course. Well, let us drive a bargain—How much is it you want?"

To this insulting commencement Metternich replied, that "the only advantage desired by his master, was to see that moderation and respect for the rights of nations which filled his own bosom, restored to the general councils of Europe, and such a well-balanced system introduced as should place the universal tranquillity under the guarantee of an association of independent states."

It was easy to see which way this pointed, and to anticipate the conclusion. Napoleon affected to treat it as a figure of speech, which was to cloak the private views of Austria. "I speak clearly," he said, "and come to the point. Will it suit you to accept of Illyria, and to remain neuter?—Your neutrality is all I require. I can deal with the Russians and Prussians with my own army."

"Ah, sire," replied Metternich, "it depends solely on your majesty to unite all our forces with yours. But the truth must be told. Matters are come to that extremity that Austria cannot remain

neutral—We must be with you, or against you.”

After this explicit declaration, from which it was to be inferred that Austria would not lay aside her arms, unless Bonaparte would comply with the terms which she had fixed upon as the conditions of a general pacification, and that she was determined to refuse all that might be offered as a bribe for her neutrality, the Emperor of France and the Austrian statesman retired into a cabinet, apart from the secretaries, where it is to be presumed Metternich communicated more specifically the conditions which Austria had to propose. Napoleon's voice was presently heard, exclaiming aloud, “What! not only Illyria, but half of Italy, the restoration of the pope, and the abandoning of Poland, and the resignation of Spain, and Holland, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and Switzerland! Is this your moderation? You hawk about your alliance from the one camp to the other, where the greatest partition of territory is to be obtained, and then you talk of the independence of nations! In plain truth, you would have Italy; Sweden demands Norway; Prussia requires Saxony; England would have Holland and Belgium—You would dismember the French empire; and all these changes to be operated by Austria's mere threat of going to war. Can you pretend to win, by a single stroke of the pen, so many of the strongest fortresses in Europe, the keys of which I have gained by battles and victories? And think you that I will be so docile as to march back my soldiers, with their arms reversed, over the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, and by subscribing a treaty, which is one vast capitulation, deliver myself, like a fool, into the hands of my enemies, and trust for a doubtful permission to exist, to their generosity? Is it when my army is triumphing at the gates of Berlin and Breslau, that Austria hopes to extort such a cession from me, without striking a blow or drawing a sword? It is an affront to expect it. And is it my father-in-law who entertains such a project? Is it he who sends you to me? In what attitude would he place me before the eyes of the French people! He is in a strange mistake if he supposes that a mutilated throne can, in France, afford shelter to his daughter and his grandson—Ah, Metternich,” he concluded, “what has England given you to induce you to make war on me?”

The Austrian minister disdaining to defend himself against so coarse an accusation, only replied by a look of scorn and resentment. A profound silence followed, during which Napoleon and Metternich traversed the apartment with long steps without looking at each other. Napoleon dropt his hat, perhaps to give a turn to this awkward situation. But Metternich was too deeply affronted for any office of courtesy, and the emperor was obliged to lift it himself. Bonaparte then resumed the discourse, in a more temperate strain, and said he did not yet despair of peace. He insisted that the congress should be assembled, and that, even if hostilities should recommence, negotiations for peace should, nevertheless, not be discontinued. And, like a wary trader when driving a bargain, he whispered Metternich, that his offer of Illyria was *not his last word*.

His last word, however, had been in reality

spoken, and both he and Metternich were fully acquainted with each other's views. Metternich had refused all private conditions which could be offered to detach Austria from the general cause, and Bonaparte had rejected as an insult any terms which went to lower him to a rank of equality with the other sovereigns of Europe. He would be Caesar or nothing. It did not mend the prospect of negotiation, that he had formally insulted one of the persons most influential in the Austrian councils. The chance of peace seemed farther off than ever.

Accordingly, all the proceedings at the Congress of Prague were lingering and evasive. The meeting had been fixed for the 6th July, and the dissolution was postponed till the 10th August, in order to allow time for trying to adjust the disputed claims. England had declined being concerned with the armistice, alleging she was satisfied that Napoleon would come to no reasonable terms. Caulaincourt, to whom Bonaparte chiefly trusted the negotiation, did not appear till the 25th July, detained, it was idly alleged, by his services as an officer of the palace. Austria spun out the time by proposing that the other commissioners should hold no direct intercourse, but only negotiate through the medium of the mediator. Other disputes arose; and in fact, it seems as if all parties manoeuvred to gain time, with a view to forward military preparations, rather than to avail themselves of the brief space allowed for adjusting the articles of peace. At length, so late as the 7th August, Austria produced her plan of pacification, of which the bases were the following:—1. The dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. 2. The re-establishment of the Hanseatic towns in their former independence. 3. The reconstruction of Prussia, assigning to that kingdom a frontier on the Elbe. 4. The cession to Austria of the maritime town of Trieste, with the Illyrian provinces. The emancipation of Spain and Holland, as matters in which England, no party to the congress, took chief interest, was not stirred for the present, but reserved for consideration at the general peace. A concluding article stipulated that the condition of the European powers, great and small, as might be settled at the peace, should be guaranteed to all and each of them, and not innovated upon except by general consent.

Bonaparte in return offered much, but most of his cessions were clogged with conditions, which at once showed how unwillingly they were made, and seemed, in most cases, to provide the means of annulling them when times should be favourable.

1. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw Napoleon agreed to yield up, but stipulated that Dantzic, with its fortifications demolished, should remain a free town, and that Saxony should be indemnified for the cession of the duchy, at the expense of Prussia and Austria. 2. The cession of the Illyrian provinces was agreed to, but the seaport of Trieste was reserved. 3. Contained a stipulation that the German Confederation should extend to the Oder. Lastly, the territory of Denmark was to be guaranteed.

Before this tardy agreement to grant some of the terms which the allies had demanded could arrive at Prague, the 19th of August, the day which con-

cluded the armistice, had expired, and Austria had passed from the friendship of France into the federation of the allies. On the night betwixt the 10th and 11th, rockets of a new and brilliant kind flickered in the air from height to height, betwixt Prague and Trachenberg, the head-quarters of the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia, to announce to these sovereigns that the armistice was broken off.

Metternich and Caulaincourt still continued their negotiations; and Napoleon seemed on a sudden sincerely desirous of the peace about which he had hitherto trifled. Metternich persisted in his demand of Trieste and the Hanse towns. He rejected the extension of the Confederation of the Rhine, as a demand made at a time so ill-chosen as to be nearly ridiculous; and he required that the independence of Germany should be declared free, as well as that of Switzerland.

Bonaparte at length consented to all these demands, which, if they had been admitted during his interview with Metternich, on the 28th June, or declared to the congress before the 10th August, must have availed to secure peace. It is probable, either that Napoleon was unwilling to make his mind up to consent to terms which he thought humiliating, or that he made the concessions at a time when they would not, in all likelihood, be accepted, in order that he might obtain the chance of war, yet preserve with his subjects the credit of having been willing to make peace.

It has been said, with much plausibility, that the allies, on their part, were confirmed in their resolution to demand high terms, by the news of the decisive battle of Vittoria, and the probability, that, in consequence, the Duke of Wellington's army might be soon employed in the invasion of France. Napoleon entertained the same impression, and sent Soult, the ablest of his generals, to make a stand, if possible, against the victorious English general, and protect at least the territory of France itself.*

CHAPTER LXXXVI.

Amount and distribution of the French army at the resumption of hostilities.—Of the armies of the allies.—Plan of the campaign on both sides.—Return of Morreau from America, to join the allies.—Attack on Dresden by the allies, on 26th August.—Napoleon arrives to its succour.—Battle continued on the 27th.—Death of General Morreau.—Defeat and retreat of the allies, with great loss—

* The court of Napoleon were amused at this time by an incident connected with Soult's departure. As he had been designed to command in the German campaign, this new destination compelled him to sell his horses, and make various other inconvenient sacrifices to the hurry of the moment. His wife, the Duchess of Dalmatia, a lady of a spirit equal to that of the great soldier to whom she was wedded, went boldly into the emperor's presence to state her grievances; to insist that her husband had been subjected to too much fatiguing service, and to remonstrate against his being employed in the Pyrenees. "Go, madam," said Napoleon, sternly; "remember that I am not your husband, and if I were, you dared not use me thus. Go, and remember it is a wife's duty to assist her husband, not to tease him." Such was (with every respect to the lady, who might, notwithstanding, do well to be angry) the Imperial "Taming of a Shrew."

Napoleon returns from the pursuit to Dresden, indisposed.—Vandamme attacks the allies at Culm—is opposed, and driven back towards Peterswald.—Singular conflict between the French and Prussians on the heights of Peterswald.—Vandamme is defeated and made prisoner, with great loss.—Effects of the victory of Culm on the allies—and on Napoleon.

AT no period during the armistice had the hopes of peace been so probable, as to suspend for a moment the most active preparations for war.

Napoleon, determined, as we have already seen, to render Dresden the centre of his operations, had exerted the utmost industry in converting that beautiful capital into a species of citadel. All the trees in the neighbourhood, including those which so much adorned the public gardens and walks, had been cut down, and employed in the construction of a chain of redoubts and field-works, secured by fosses and palisades, which were calculated to render the city very defensible. But, besides Dresden itself, with the neighbouring mountain-fortresses, the French emperor possessed as strongly fortified places, Torgau, Wittenburg, Magdeburg, and others on the Elbe, which secured him the possession of the rich and beautiful valley of that river. He had established an entrenched camp at the celebrated position of Pirna, and thrown a bridge of boats over the Elbe, near Koenigstein, for the purpose of maintaining a communication betwixt that mountain-fortress and the fort of Stolpen. This showed Napoleon's apprehension of an attack from the mountains of Bohemia, behind which the Austrians had been assembling their army. In this destined battle-ground Napoleon assembled the young conscripts, who continued to pour from the French frontier; and who, by a singularly ingenious species of combination, were learning the duties of their new condition, even while, with arms in their hands for the first time, they were marching to the field of action.*

In the beginning of August, Napoleon had assembled about 250,000 men in Saxony and Silesia. This great force was stationed so as best to confront the enemy on the points where they had assembled their troops. At Leipsic, there were collected 60,000 men, under command of Oudinot. At Leuenberg, Goldberg, Buntzlau, and other towns on the borders of Silesia, were 100,000 men, commanded by Macdonald. Another army of 50,000 were quartered in Lusatia, near Zittau. St-Cyr, with 20,000, was stationed near Pirna, to observe the mountains of Bohemia, and the passes through which the Elbe discharges its waters upon Saxony. In Dresden the emperor himself lay with his Guard, amounting to

* According to orders accurately calculated, the little bands of recruits, setting off from different points, or dépôts, on the frontier, met together at places assigned, and as their numbers increased by each successive junction, were formed first into companies, next into battalions, and last into regiments; learning, of course, to practise successively the duties belonging to these various bodies. When they joined the army, these combinations, which had but been adopted temporarily, were laid aside, the union of the marching battalion dissolved, and the conscripts distributed among old regiments, whose example might complete the discipline which they had thus learned in a general way.

25,000 men, the flower of his army. Besides these hosts, Bonaparte had a considerable army in Italy under the viceroy Eugène; and 25,000 Bavarians were assembled as an army of reserve, under general Wrede. Almost all his old lieutenants, who had fought, and won so often in his cause, were summoned to attend this important war; and even Murat, who had been on indifferent terms with his relative, came anew from his beautiful capital of Naples, to enjoy the pleasure of wielding his sabre against his old friends the Cossacks.

The preparations of the allies were upon a scale equally ample. The accession of the Austrians had placed at disposal in Bohemia 120,000 men, to whom the allies joined 80,000 Russians and Prussians, which brought the whole force to 200,000 men. Schwartzberg had been selected to command this, which was called the Grand Army of the Allies,—a judicious choice, not only as a fitting compliment to the Emperor of Austria, who had joined the confederacy at so critical a moment, but on account of Schwartzberg's military talents, his excellent sound sense, penetration, good humour, and placidity of temper; qualities essential in every general, but especially in him upon whom reposes the delicate duty of commanding an army composed of different nations. This large host lay in and about Prague, and, concealed by the chain of hills called the Erzgebirge, was ready to rush into Saxony so soon as an opportunity should offer of surprising Dresden.

The other moiety of the original invading army, amounting to 80,000, consisting of Russians and Prussians, called the Army of Silesia, and commanded by Blücher, defended the frontier of that country, and the road to Breslau. Nearer the gates of Berlin was the Crown Prince of Sweden, with an army consisting of 30,000 Swedes, and about 60,000 Prussians and Russians; the former being the corps of Bülow and Tauentzien; the latter those of Winzengerode and Woronzoff. Besides these armies, Walmoden, with a force consisting of 30,000 Russians, Prussians, and insurgent Germans, was at Schwerin, in the Duchy of Mecklenburg; Hiller, with 40,000 Austrians, watched the Italian army of the viceroy; and the Prince of Reuss confronted the Bavarian troops with an army equal in strength to Wrede's own.

The allies had agreed upon a plan of operations equally cautious and effective. It is believed to have been originally sketched by the Crown Prince of Sweden, and afterwards revised and approved by the celebrated Moreau. That renowned French general had been induced, by the complexion of matters in Europe, and the invitation of Russia, to leave America, join the camp of the allies, and bring all the knowledge of the art of war, for which he was so famous, to enlighten their military councils. His conduct in thus passing over to the camp of France's enemies, has been ably defended by some, as the act of a patriot who desired to destroy the despotism which had been established in his country, while others have censured him for arming against his native land, in revenge for unworthy usage which he had received from its ruler. Much of the justice of the case must rest upon what we

cannot know—the purpose, namely, of Moreau, in case of ultimate success. He certainly had not, as Bernadotte might plead, acquired such rights in, and such obligations to, another country, as to supersede the natural claims of his birth-place. Yet he might be justified in the eye of patriotism, if his ultimate object really was to restore France to a rational degree of liberty, under a regulated government; and such it is stated to have been. Any purpose short of this must leave him guilty of the charge of having sacrificed his duty to his country to his private revenge. He was, however, highly honoured by the Emperor of Russia in particular; and his presence was justly considered as a great accession to the council of war of the allies.

So many men of talent, and two of them masters of the French tactics, had no difficulty in divining the mode in which Bonaparte meant to conduct the present campaign. They easily saw that he intended to join his strong and effective reserve of the Guard to any of the armies placed on the frontier of Saxony, where a point of attack presented itself; and thus advance upon, overpower, and destroy the enemy whom he should find in front, as the hunted tiger springs upon the victim which he has selected out of the circle of hunters, who surround him with pretended spears. To meet this mode of attack, which might otherwise have been the means of the allied armies being defeated successively and in detail, it was resolved that the general against whom Bonaparte's first effort should be directed, should on no account accept of the proffered battle, but, withdrawing his troops before the emperor, should decoy him as far as possible in pursuit, while at the same time the other armies of the allies should advance upon his rear, destroy his communications, and finally effect their purpose of closing round him in every direction.

The grand army, commanded by Schwartzberg, was particularly directed to this latter task, because, while it would have been dangerous to Napoleon on that point to have sought them out by storming the mountain-passes of Bohemia, nothing could be more easy for Schwartzberg than to rush down upon Dresden when Bonaparte should leave that city uncovered, for however short an interval.

Blücher was the first who, advancing from Silesia, and menacing the armies of Macdonald and Ney, induced Bonaparte to march to join them with his Guard, and with a great body of cavalry commanded by Latour Maubourg. He left Dresden on the 15th August; he threw bridges over the Bober, and advanced with rapidity, bringing forward Macdonald's division in aid of his own force. But the Prussian general was faithful to the plan laid down. He made an admirable retreat across the Katzbach, admitting the French to nothing but skirmishes, in which the allies had some advantage. Finally, he established himself in a position on the river Neisse, near Jauer, so as to cover Silesia and its capital.

On the 21st August, Napoleon learned the interesting news, that while he was pressing forward on the retreating Prussians, Dresden was in the utmost danger of being taken. His Guards had instant orders to return to Saxony. He himself set

out early on the 23d. It was full time; for Schwartzenberg, with whom came the sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, as well as General Moreau, had descended from Bohemia, and, concentrating their grand army on the left bank of the Elbe, were already approaching the walls of Dresden, Napoleon's point of support, and the pivot of his operations. Leaving, therefore, to Macdonald the task of controlling Blücher, the emperor set out with the *élite* of his army; yet, with all the speed he could exert, very nearly came too late to save the object of his solicitude.

General St-Cyr, who had been left with about 20,000 men to observe the Bohemian passes, was in no condition to make a stand, when they poured out upon him six or seven times his own number. He threw himself with his troops into Dresden, in hopes, by means of its recent fortifications, to defend it until the arrival of Napoleon. The allies having found little resistance on their march, displayed their huge army before the city, divided into four columns, about four o'clock on the 25th August, and instantly commenced the assault. If they should be able to take Dresden before it could be relieved by Bonaparte, the war might be considered as nearly ended, since they would in that case obtain complete command of his line of communication with France, and have at their mercy his recruits and supplies of every kind.

The scheme of attack was excellently laid, but the allied generals did not pursue it with the necessary activity. The signal for onset should have been given instantly, yet they paused for the arrival of Kléna, with an additional corps d'armée, and the assault was postponed until next morning.

On the 26th, at break of day, the allies advanced in six columns, under a tremendous fire. They carried a great redoubt near the city-gate of Dippoldiswalde, and soon after another; they closed on the French on every point; the bombs and balls began to fall thick on the streets and houses of the terrified city; and, in engaging all his reserves, St-Cyr, whose conduct was heroic, felt he had yet too few men to defend works of such extent. It was at this crisis, while all thought a surrender was inevitable, that columns, rushing forward with the rapidity of a torrent, were seen advancing on Dresden from the right side of the Elbe, sweeping over its magnificent bridges, and pressing through the streets, to engage in the defence of the almost overpowered city. The Child of Destiny himself was beheld amidst his soldiers, who, far from exhibiting fatigue, notwithstanding a severe forced march from the frontiers of Silesia, demanded, with loud cries, to be led into immediate battle. Napoleon halted to reassure the King of Saxony, who was apprehensive of the destruction of his capital, while his troops, marching through the city, halted on the western side, at those avenues, from which it was designed they should debouch upon the enemy.

Two sallies were then made under Napoleon's eye, by Ney and Mortier. The one column, pouring from the gate of Plauen, attacked the allies on the left flank; the others, issuing from that of Pirna, assailed their right. The Prussians were dislodged from an open space, called the Great Garden,

which covered their advance upon the ramparts; and the war began already to change its face, the allies drawing off from the points they had attacked so fiercely, where they found them secured by these unexpected defenders. They remained, however, in front of each other, the sentinels on each side being in close vicinity, until next morning.

On the 27th of August, the battle was renewed under torrents of rain, and amid a tempest of wind. Napoleon, manœuvring with excellence altogether his own, caused his troops, now increased by concentration to nearly 200,000 men, to file out from the city upon different points, the several columns diverging from each other like the sticks of a fan when it is expanded; and thus directed them upon such points as seemed most assailable along the allies' whole position, which occupied the heights from Plauen to Strehlen. In this manner, his plan assisted by the stormy weather, which served to conceal his movements, he commenced an attack upon both flanks of the enemy. On the left he obtained an advantage, from a large interval left in the allied line, to receive the division of Kléna, who were in the act of coming up, but fatigued and exhausted with fatigue and bad weather, and their muskets rendered almost unserviceable. In the meanwhile, as a heavy cannonade was continued on both sides, Napoleon observed one of the batteries of the Young Guard slacken its fire. General Gourgaud, sent to inquire the cause, brought information that the guns were placed too low to reply with advantage to the enemy's fire from the high ground, and that the balls from the French battery were most of them lost in the earth. "Fire on, nevertheless," was the emperor's reply; "we must occupy the attention of the enemy on that point."

The fire was resumed, and from an extraordinary movement amongst the troops on the hill, the French became aware that some person of high rank had been struck down. Napoleon supposed that the sufferer must be Schwartzenberg. He paid him a tribute of regret, and added, with the sort of superstition peculiar to his mind, "*He*, then, was the victim whom the fatal fire at the ball indicated?" "I always regarded it as a presage—it is now plain whom it concerned."

Next morning, however, a peasant brought to Napoleon more precise accounts. The officer of distinction had both legs shattered by the fatal bullet—he was transported from the field on a bier composed of lances—the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia had expressed the greatest sorrow and solicitude. The man ended this account by bringing the fallen officer's dog, a greyhound, whose collar bore the name of Moreau. This great general died a few days afterwards, having suffered amputation of the wounded limbs, which he bore with great fortitude. His talents and personal worth were undisputed, and those who, more bold than we are, shall decide that his conduct in one instance too much resembled that of Coriolanus and the Constable of Bourbon, must yet allow that the fault,

* Given on account of the marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa.—See p. 498.

like that of those great men, was atoned for by an early and a violent death.

Moreau is said to have formed the plan on which the attack on Dresden was conducted. His death must, therefore, have disconcerted it. But besides this, the allies had calculated upon Bonaparte's absence, and upon the place being slightly defended. They were disappointed in both respects; and his sudden arrival at the head of a choice, if not a numerous army, had entirely changed the nature of the combat. They had become defenders at the very time when they reckoned on being assailants; and their troops, particularly the Austrians, who had in former wars received such dreadful cause to recollect the name of Napoleon, were discouraged. Even if they repelled the French into Dresden, they had provided no magazines of support in front of it, should the allied army be designed to remain there. Jomini, the celebrated Swiss engineer, who had exchanged, some short time before, the service of Napoleon for that of the Emperor Alexander, proposed the daring plan of changing the front of the army during the action, and attacking in force the left of the French, which might have turned the fortune of the day. But the experiment was thought, with some justice, too perilous to be attempted, with a discouraged and disordered army. A retreat was, therefore, resolved upon, and, owing to the weather, the state of the roads, and the close pursuit of the French, it was a disastrous one. The successful operations of the French had established the King of Naples on the western road to Bohemia, by Freyberg; and Vandamme, with a strong division, blocked up that which led directly southward up the Elbe, by Pirna.

The two principal roads being thus closed against Schwartzberg and his army, nothing remained for them but to retreat through the interval between these highways by such country paths as they could find, which, bad in themselves, had been rendered almost impassable by the weather. They were pursued by the French in every direction, and lost, what had of late been unusual, a great number of prisoners. Seven or eight thousand of the French were killed and wounded; but the loss of the allies was as great, while their prisoners, almost all Austrians, amounted to from 13,000 to 15,000. This is admitted by Bontourlin. The French carry the loss to 50,000, which is an obvious exaggeration; but half the number does not probably exceed the real extent of the loss. It is singular, however, that in such roads as have been described, the allies, out of more than one hundred guns which they brought into position, should have lost only twenty-six. It was, notwithstanding, a battle with important consequences, such as had not of late resulted from any of Napoleon's great victories. It proved, indeed, the last favour of an unmixt character which Fortune reserved for her ancient favourite, and it had all the dazzling rapidity and resistless strength of an unexpected thunderbolt.

Having seen this brilliant day to a close, Napoleon returned to Dresden on horseback, his grey capote and slouched hat streaming with water, while the indifferent appearance of his horse and furniture, his awkward seat and carriage, made a singular contrast

with those of Murat, whose bearing as a horseman was inimitable, and whose battle-dress was always distinguished by its theatrical finery.

The venerable King of Saxony received his deliverer with rapture, for to him, personally, Bonaparte certainly was such, though considered by many of his subjects in a very different light. Napoleon behaved generously after the action, distributing money amongst the citizens of Dresden, who had suffered from the cannonade, and causing the greatest care to be taken of the wounded and prisoners belonging to the allies.

The next morning this ever-vigilant spirit was again on horseback, directing his victorious troops in pursuit of the enemy. They were dispatched in different columns, to pursue the allies on the broken roads by which they were compelled to retreat, and to allow them no rest nor refuge. No frame, even of iron, could have supported the fatigues of both mind and body to which Napoleon had subjected himself within the last three or four days. He was perpetually exposed to the storm, and had rarely taken rest or refreshment. He is also stated to have suffered from having eaten hastily some food of a coarse and indigestible quality.* Through one or other, or the whole of these causes combined, Napoleon became very much indisposed, and was prevailed upon to return in his carriage to Dresden, instead of remaining at Pirna, more close in the rear of his pursuing battalions, to direct their motions. The French officers, at least some of them, ascribe to this circumstance, as the primary cause, a great, critical, and most unexpected misfortune, which befel his arms at this time.

On the 29th of August, the French still continued to push their advantages. The King of Naples, Marmont, and St-Cyr, were each pressing upon the pursuit of the columns of the allies, to which they had been severally attached. A corps d'armée, of about thirty thousand men, had been intrusted to the conduct of Vandamme, whose character as a general, for skill, determined bravery, and activity, was respected, while he was detested by the Germans on account of his rudeness and rapacity, and disliked by his comrades because of the ferocious obstinacy of his disposition.† With this man, who, not without some of the good qualities which distinguished Bonaparte's officers, presented even a caricature of the vices ascribed to them, the misfortunes of his master in this campaign were destined to commence.

* To be precise, — a shoulder of mutton, stuffed with garlic, was the only dinner which his attendants could procure for him on the 27th. Mahomet, who was a favourite of Napoleon, suffered by indulging in similar viands. But the shoulder of mutton, in the case of the Arabian prophet, had the condescension to give its consumer warning of its deleterious qualities, though not till he had eaten too much for his health.

† The Abbé de Pradt represents Vandamme at Warsaw as beating with his own hand a priest, the secretary of a Polish bishop, for not having furnished him with a supply of toky, although the poor man had to plead in excuse that King Jérôme had the day before carried off all that was in the cellar. A saying was ascribed to Bonaparte, "that if he had had two Vandammes in his service, he must have made the one hang the other."

Vandamme had advanced as far as Peterswald, a small town in the Eragebirge, or Bohemian mountains, forcing before him a column of Russians, feeble in number, but excellent in point of character and discipline, commanded by Count Ostermann, who were retreating upon Toplitz. This town was the point on which all the retiring, some of which might be almost termed the fugitive, divisions of the allies were directing their course. If Vandamme could have defeated Ostermann, and carried this place, he might have established himself, with his corps of 30,000 men, on the only road practicable for artillery, by which the allies could march to Prague; so that they must either have remained inclosed between his corps d'armée, and those of the other French generals who pressed on their rear, or else they must have abandoned their guns and baggage, and endeavoured to cross the mountains by such wild tracks as were used only by shepherds and peasants.

It was on the 29th, in the morning, that, noting under so strong a temptation as we have mentioned, Vandamme had the temerity to descend the hill from Peterswald, to the village of Culm, which is situated in a very deep valley betwixt that town and Toplitz. As he advanced towards Toplitz, it appeared that his plan was about to be crowned with success. The persons of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, the members of their cabinet, and the whole dépôt of the head-quarters of the allies, seemed now within his clutch, and, already alarmed, his expected prey were beginning to attempt their escape in different directions. Vandamme seemed within a hand's grasp of the prize; for his operation, if complete, must have totally disorganized the allied army, and the French might perhaps have pursued them to the very gates of Prague, nay, of Vienna. The French advanced guard was within half a league of Toplitz, when of a sudden Count Ostermann, who had hitherto retreated slowly, halted, like a wild boar brought to bay, and commenced the most obstinate and inflexible resistance. His troops were few, but, as already said, of excellent quality, being a part of the Imperial Russian Guard, whom their commander gave to understand that the safety of their father (as the Russians affectionately term the emperor) depended upon their maintaining their ground. Never was the saying of Frederick II., that the Russians might be slain but not routed, more completely verified. They stood firm as a grove of pines opposed to the tempest, while Vandamme led down corps after corps, to support his furious and repeated attacks, until at length he had brought his very last reserves from the commanding ground of Peterswald, and accumulated them in the deep valley between Culm and Toplitz. The brave Ostermann had lost an arm in the action, and his grenadiers had suffered severely; but they had gained the time necessary. Barclay de Tolly, who now approached the scene of action, brought up the first columns of the Russians to their support; Schwartzberg sent other succours; and Vandamme, in his turn, overpowered by numbers, retreated to Culm as night closed.

Prudence would have recommended to the French to have continued their retreat during the night to

the heights of Peterswald, but, expecting probably the appearance of some of the French columns of pursuit, morning found Vandamme in the valley of Culm, where night had set upon him. In the meantime, still greater numbers of the allied corps, which were wandering through these mountain regions, repaired to the banners of Schwartzberg and Barclay de Tolly, and the attack was renewed upon the French column at break of day on the 30th, with a superiority of force, with which it was fruitless to contend. Vandamme therefore disposed himself to retreat towards the heights of Peterswald, from which he had descended. But at this moment took place one of the most singular accidents which distinguished this eventful war.

Among other corps d'armée of the allies, which were making their way through the mountains, to rally to the main body as they best could, was that of the Prussian general, Kleist, who had evaded the pursuit of St-Cyr, by throwing himself into the wood of Schoenwald, out of which he debouched on the position of Peterswald, towards which Vandamme was making his retreat. While, therefore, Vandamme's retreating columns were ascending the heights, the ridge which they proposed to gain was seen suddenly occupied by the troops of Kleist, in such a state of disorder as announced they were escaped from some pressing scene of danger, or hurrying on to some hasty attack.

When the Prussians came in sight of the French, they conceived that the latter were there for the purpose of cutting them off, and instead of taking a position on the heights to intercept Vandamme, they determined, it would seem, to precipitate themselves down, break their way through his troops, and force themselves on to Toplitz. On the other hand, the French, seeing their way interrupted, formed the same conclusion with regard to Kleist's corps, which the Prussians had done concerning them; and each army being bent on making its way through that opposed to them, the Prussians rushed down the hill, while the French ascended it with a bravery of despair, that supplied the advantage of ground.

The two armies were thus hurled on each other like two conflicting mobs, enclosed in a deep and narrow road, forming the descent along the side of a mountain. The onset of the French horse, under Corbineau, was so desperate, that many or most of them broke through, although the acclivity against which they advanced would not in other circumstances have permitted them to ascend at a trot; and the guns of the Prussians were for a moment in the hands of the French, who slew many of the artillerymen. The Prussians, however, soon rallied, and the two struggling bodies, again mixing together, fought less for the purpose of victory or slaughter, than to force their way through each other's ranks, and escape in opposite directions. All became for a time a mass of confusion, the Prussian generals finding themselves in the middle of the French—the French officers in the centre of the Prussians. But the army of the Russians, who were in pursuit of Vandamme, appearing in his rear, put an end to this singular conflict. Generals Vandamme, Haxo, and Guyot, were made prison-

ers, with two eagles and 7000 prisoners, besides a great loss in killed and wounded, and the total dispersion of the army, many of whom, however, afterwards rejoined their eagles.

The victory of Culin, an event so unexpected and important in a military view, was beyond appreciation in the consequences which it produced upon the moral feelings of the allied troops. Before this most propitious event, they were retiring as a routed army, the officers and soldiers complaining of their generals, and their generals of each other. But now their note was entirely altered, and they could sing songs of triumph, and appeal to the train of guns and long columns of prisoners, in support of the victory which they claimed. The spirits of all were reconciled to the eager prosecution of the war, and the hopes of liberation spread wider and wider through Germany. The other French corps d'armée, on the contrary, fearful of committing themselves as Vandamme had done, paused on arriving at the verge of the Bohemian mountains, and followed no further the advantages of the battle of Dresden. The King of Naples halted at Sayda, Marmont at Zinnwalde, and St-Cyr at Liebenau. The headquarters of the Emperor Alexander remained at Toplitz.

Napoleon received the news of this calamity, however unexpected, with the imperturbable calmness which was one of his distinguishing qualities. General Corbineau, who commanded in the singular charge of the cavalry up the hill of Peterswald, presented himself before the emperor in the condition in which he escaped from the field, covered with his own blood and that of the enemy, and holding in his hand a Prussian sabre, which, in the thick of the mêlée, he had exchanged for his own. Napoleon listened composedly to the details he had to give. "One should make a bridge of gold for a flying enemy," he said, "where it is impossible, as in Vandamme's case, to oppose to him a bulwark of steel." He then anxiously examined the instructions to Vandamme, to discover if anything had inadvertently slipped into them, to encourage the false step which that general had taken. But nothing was found which could justify or authorize his advancing beyond Peterswald, although the chance of possessing himself of Toplitz must have been acknowledged as a strong temptation.

"This is the fate of war," said Bonaparte, turning to Murat. "Exalted in the morning, low enough before night. There is but one step between triumph and ruin." He then fixed his eyes on the map which lay before him, took his compass, and repeated, in a reverie, the following verses:—

*J'ai servi, commandé, vaincu quarante années ;
Du monde entre mes mains j'ai vu les destinées ;
Et j'ai toujours connu qu'en chaque événement
Le destin des états dépendait d'un moment.*

CHAPTER LXXXVII.

Military proceedings in the north of Germany, in which the French were generally unsuccessful.—Luckau submits to the Crown Prince of Sweden.—Battles of Gross-Beeren and the Kutzbach, where the French suffer

heavy loss in men and guns.—Operations of Ney upon Berlin.—He is defeated at Dennewitz on the 6th September.—Difficult and embarrassing situation of Napoleon.—He abandons all the right side of the Elbe to the allies.—Operations of the allies in order to effect a junction.—Counter-exertions of Napoleon.—The French generals averse to continuing the war in Germany.—Disensions between them and the emperor.—Napoleon at length resolves to retreat upon Leipzig.

THE advices which arrived at Dresden from the north of Germany were no balm to the bad tidings from Bohemia. We must necessarily treat with brevity the high deeds of arms performed at a considerable distance from Napoleon's person, great as was their influence upon his fortunes.

Marshal Blücher, it will be remembered, retreated across the river Katsbach, to avoid the engagement which the Emperor of France endeavoured to press upon him. The Crown Prince of Sweden, on the other hand, had his headquarters at Potsdam. Napoleon, when departing to succour Dresden, on the 21st of August, left orders for Oudinot to advance on Berlin, and for Macdonald to march upon Breslau, trusting that the former had force enough to conquer the Crown Prince, the latter to defeat Blücher.

Oudinot began to move on Berlin by the road of Wittenberg, on the very day when he received the orders. On the other hand, the Crown Prince of Sweden, concentrating his troops, opposed to the French general a total force of more than eighty thousand men, drawn up for the protection of Berlin. The sight of that fair city, with its towers and steeples, determined Oudinot to try his fortune with his ancient comrade in arms. After a good deal of skirmishing, the two armies came to a more serious battle on the 23d August, in which General Régnier distinguished himself. He commanded a corps which formed the centre of Oudinot's army, at the head of which he made himself master of the village of Gross-Beeren, which was within a short distance of the centre of the allies. The Prussian general, Bulow, advanced to recover this important post, and with the assistance of Borstel, who attacked the flank of the enemy, he succeeded in pushing his columns into the village. A heavy rain having prevented the muskets from being serviceable, Gross-Beeren was disputed with the bayonet. Yet towards nightfall, the two French divisions of Fournier and Guilleminot again attacked the village, took it, and remained in it till the morning. But this did not re-establish the battle, for Régnier having lost fifteen hundred men and eight guns, Oudinot determined on a general retreat, which he conducted in the face of the enemy with great deliberation. The Crown Prince obtained other trophies; Luckau, with a garrison of a thousand French, submitted to his arms on 28th August.

Besides these severe checks on the Prussian frontier, General Girard, in another quarter, had sustained a defeat of some consequence. He had sallied from the garrison of Magdeburg, after the battle of Gross-Beeren, with five or six thousand men. He was encouraged to this movement by the removal of the blockading brigade of Herscherberg, who, in obedience to orders, had joined the Crown

Prince to oppose the advance of Oudinot. But, after the battle of Gross-Beeren, as the Prussian brigade was returning to renew the blockade of Magdeburg, they encountered Girard and his division near Leibnitz, on 27th August. The French were at first successful, but Czernicheff having thrown himself on them with a large body of Cossacks, Girard's troops gave way, losing six cannons, fifteen hundred prisoners, and all their baggage.

During this active period, war had been no less busy on the frontiers of Silesia than on those of Bohemia and Brandenburg. Marshal Macdonald, as already mentioned, had received orders from Napoleon to attack Blücher and his Prussians, who had retired beyond the Katzbach, and occupied a position near a town called Jauer. In obedience to this order, the marshal had sent General Lauriston, who commanded his right wing, to occupy a position in front of Goldberg, with orders to dispatch a part of his division under General Puthod, to march upon Jauer, by the circuitous route of Schonau. The eleventh corps, which formed the centre of Macdonald's force, crossed the Katzbach at break of day, under his own command, and advanced towards Jauer, up the side of a torrent called the Wuthendé (i. e. raging) Neiss. The third corps, under Souham, destined to form the left wing, was to pass the Katzbach near Leibnitz, and then, moving southward, were to come upon the marshal's left. With this left wing marched the cavalry, under Sébastiani.

It chanced that, on this very 26th of August, Blücher, aware that Bonaparte was engaged at Dresden by the descent of the allies from Bohemia, thought it a good time to seek out his opponent and fight him. For this purpose, he was in the act of descending the river in order to encounter Macdonald, when the marshal, on his part, was ascending it, expecting to find him in his position near Jauer.

The stormy weather, so often referred to, with mist and heavy rain, concealed from each other the movements of the two armies, until they met in the fields. They encountered in the plains which extend between Wahlstadt and the Katzbach, but under circumstances highly unfavourable to the French marshal. His right wing was divided from his centre; Lauriston being at Goldberg, and fiercely engaged with the Russian general, Langeron, with whom he had come into contact in the front of that town; and Puthod at a much greater distance from the field of battle. Macdonald's left wing, with the cavalry, was also far in the rear. Blücher allowed no leisure for the junction of these forces. His own cavalry being all in front, and ready for action, charged the French without permitting them leisure to get into position; and when they did, their right wing indeed rested on the Wuthendé-Neiss, but the left, which should have been covered by Sébastiani's cavalry, was altogether unsupported.

Message on message was sent to hasten up the left wing; but a singular fatality prevented both the cavalry and infantry from arriving in time. Different lines of advance had been pointed out to Souham and Sébastiani; but Souham, hearing the firing, and impatient to place himself on the road which he thought likely to lead him most speedily into action, unluckily adopted that which was appointed for the

cavalry. Thus five thousand horse, and five times the number of infantry, being thrown at once on the same line of march, soon confused and embarrassed each other's motions, especially in passing the streets of a village called Kroitsch, a long and narrow defile, which the troops presently crowded to such a degree with foot and horse, baggage and guns, that there was a total impossibility of effecting a passage.

Macdonald, in the mean while, supported his high reputation by the gallantry of his resistance, though charged on the left flank, which these mistakes had left uncovered, by four regiments of cavalry, and by General Kurpoff, with a whole cloud of Cossacks. But at length the day was decidedly lost. The French line gave way, and falling back on the Wuthendé-Neiss, now doubly raging from torrents of rain, and upon the Katzbach, they lost a great number of men. As a last resource, Macdonald put himself at the head of the troops, who were at length debouching from the defile of Kroitsch; but they were driven back with great loss, and the skirmish in that quarter concluded the battle, with great loss to the French.

The evil did not rest here. Lauriston being also under the necessity of retreating across the Katzbach, while Puthod, who had been detached towards Schonau, was left on the right-hand side of that river, this corps was speedily attacked by the enemy, and all who were not killed or taken remained prisoners. The army which Bonaparte destined to act in Silesia, and take Breslau, was, therefore, for the present completely disabled. The French are admitted to have lost 15,000 men, and more than a hundred guns.

Though the battles of Gross-Beeren and the Katzbach were severe blows to Bonaparte's plan of maintaining himself on the Elbe, he continued obstinate in his determination to keep his ground, with Dresden as his central point of support, and attempted to turn the bad fortune which seemed to haunt his lieutenants (but which in fact arose from their being obliged to attempt great achievements with inadequate means), by appointing Ney to the command of the Northern Army, with strict injunctions to plant his eagles on the walls of Berlin. Accordingly, on the 6th September, Ney took charge of the army which Oudinot had formerly commanded, and which was lying under the walls of Wittenberg, and, in obedience to the emperor's orders, determined to advance on the Prussian capital. The enemy (being the army commanded by the Crown Prince) lay rather dispersed upon the grounds more to the east, occupying Jüterbock, Belzig, and other villages. Ney was desirous to avoid approaching the quarters of any of them, or to give the least alarm. That marshal's object was to leave them on the left, and, evading any encounter with the Crown Prince, to throw his force on the road from Torgau to Berlin, and enter into communication with any troops which Bonaparte might dispatch from Dresden upon the same point.

On examining the plan more closely, it was found to comprehend the danger of rousing the Prince of Sweden and his army upon one point, and that was at Dennewitz, the most southern village held by the

allies. It was occupied by Taubentzen with a large force, and could not be passed without the alarm being given. Dennewitz might, however, be masked by a sufficient body of troops, under screen of which the marshal and his main body might push forwards to Dahme, without risking an engagement. It was concluded, that the rapidity of their motions would be so great as to leave no time for the Crown Prince to concentrate his forces for interrupting them.

On the 5th, Ney marched from Wittenberg. On the 6th, the division of Bertrand, destined to mask Dennewitz, formed the left flank of the army. When they approached the village, Taubentzen, who commanded there, took the alarm, and drew up between Dennewitz and the French division. If Bertrand had only had to maintain himself for a short interval in that dangerous position, it would have been well, and he might have made head against Taubentzen, till the last file of Ney's army had past by; but by some miscalculation (which began to be more common now than formerly among the French officers of the staff), the corps of Bertrand was appointed to march at seven in the morning, while the corps which were to be protected by him did not move till three hours later. Bertrand was thus detained so long in face of the enemy, that his demonstration was converted into an action, his false attack into a real skirmish. Presently after the battle became sharp and serious, and the corps on both sides advancing to sustain them were engaged. Bulow came to support Taubentzen—Régnier advanced to repel Bulow—Guilleminot hastened up on the French side—and Borstel came to support the Russians. However unpremeditated, the battle became general, as if by common consent.

The Prussians suffered heavily from the French artillery, but without giving way. The Swedes and Russians at length came up, and the line of Ney began to yield ground. That general, who had hardly, though all his forces were engaged, made his post good against the Russians alone, despaired of success when he saw these new enemies appear. He began to retreat; and his first movement in that direction was a signal of flight to the 7th corps, composed chiefly of Saxons not over well inclined to the cause of Napoleon, and who therefore made it no point of honour to fight to the death in his cause. A huge blank was created in the French line by their flight; and the cavalry of the allies rushing in at the gap, the army of Ney was cut into two parts; one of which pushed forwards to Dahme with the marshal himself; the other, with Oudinot, retreated upon Scharnitz. Ney afterwards accomplished his retreat on Torgau. But the battle of Dennewitz had cost him ten thousand men, forty-three pieces of cannon, and abundance of warlike trophies, relinquished to the adversary, besides the total disappointment of his object in marching towards Berlin.

These repeated defeats of Gross-Beeren, the Katzbach, and Dennewitz, seemed to intimate that the French were no longer the invincibles they had once been esteemed; or at least, that when they yet worked miracles, it was only when Bonaparte was

at their head. Others saw the matter in a different point of view. They said that formerly, when means were plenty with Bonaparte, he took care that his lieutenants were supplied with forces adequate to the purposes on which they were to be employed. But it was surmised that now he kept the Guard and the *élite* of his forces under his own immediate command, and expected his lieutenants to be as successful with few and raw troops, as they had formerly been with numbers and veterans. It cannot, however, be said that he saved his own exertions; for during the month of September, while he persisted in maintaining the war in Saxony, although no affair of consequence took place, yet a series of active measures showed how anxious he was to bring the war to a decision under his own eye.

In perusing the brief abstract of movements which follows, the reader will remember, that it was the purpose of Bonaparte to bring the allies to a battle on some point, where, by superior numbers or superior skill, he might obtain a distinguished victory; while, on the other hand, it was the policy of the allies, dreading at once his talents and his despair, to avoid a general action; to lay waste the ground around the points he occupied; restrict his communications; raise Germany in arms around him; and finally, to encompass and hem him in when his ranks were grown thin, and the spirit of his soldiers diminished. Keeping these objects in his eye, the reader, with a single glance at the map, will conceive the meaning of the following movements on either side.

Having defused to Ney, as we have just seen, the task of checking the progress of the Crown Prince, and taking Berlin if possible, Bonaparte started in person from Dresden on the 3d September, in hopes of fetching a blow at Blücher, whose Cossacks, since the battle of the Katzbach, had advanced eastward, and intercepted a convoy even near Bautzen. But agreeably to the plan adopted at the general head-quarters of the allies, the Prussian veteran fell back and avoided a battle. Meanwhile Napoleon was recalled towards Dresden by the news of the defeat of Ney at Dennewitz, and the yet more pressing intelligence that the allies were on the point of descending into Saxony, and again arraying themselves under the walls of Dresden. The advanced guard of Wittgenstein had shown itself, it was said, at Pirna, and the city was a prey to new alarms. The French Emperor posted back towards the Elbe, and on the 9th came in sight of Wittgenstein. But the allied generals, afraid of one of those sudden strokes of inspiration, when Napoleon seemed almost to dictate terms to fate, had enjoined Wittgenstein to retreat in his turn. The passes of the Erzgebirge received him, and Bonaparte, following him as far as Peterswald, gazed on the spot where Vandamme met his unaccountable defeat, and looked across the valley of Culm to Toplitz, where his rival Alexander still held his head-quarters. With the glance of an eye, the most expert in military affairs, he saw the danger of involving himself in such impracticable defiles as the valley of Culm, and the roads which communicated with it, and resolved to proceed no farther.

Napoleon, therefore, returned towards Dresden, where he arrived on the 12th September. In his retreat, a trifling skirmish occurred, in which the son of Blücher was wounded, and made prisoner. A victory was claimed on account of this affair, in the bulletin. About the same period Blücher advanced upon the French troops opposed to him, endangered their communications with Dresden, and compelled them to retreat from Bautzen and Neustadt, towards Bischofswerder and Stolpen. While Bonaparte thought of directing himself eastward towards this indefatigable enemy, his attention was of new summoned southward to the Bohemian mountains. Count Lobau, who was placed in observation near Gieshübel, was attacked by a detachment from Schwartzberg's army. Napoleon hastened to his relief, and made a second attempt to penetrate into these mountain recesses, from which the eagles of the allies made such repeated descents. He penetrated, upon this second occasion, beyond Culm, and as far as Nollendorf, and had a skirmish with the allies, which was rather unfavourable to him. The action was broken off by one of the tremendous storms which distinguished the season, and Bonaparte again retreated towards Gieshübel. On his return to Dresden, he met the unpleasant news, that the Prince Royal was preparing to cross the Elbe, and that Bülow had opened trenches before Wittenberg; while Blücher, on his side, approached the right bank of the river, and neither Ney nor Macdonald had sufficient force to check their progress.

On the 21st September, Napoleon once again came in person against his veteran enemy, whom he met not far from Hartha; but it was once more in vain. The Prussian field-marshal was like the phantom knight of the poet. Napoleon, when he advanced to attack him, found no substantial body against which to direct his blows.

The emperor spent some hours at the miserable thrice-sucked village of Hartha, deliberating, probably, whether he should press on the Crown Prince or Blücher, and disable at least one of these adversaries by a single blow; but deterred by reflecting, that the time necessary for bringing either of them to action would be employed by Schwartzberg in accomplishing that purpose of seizing Dresden, which his movements had so frequently indicated.

Thus Napoleon could neither remain at Dresden without suffering the Crown Prince and Blücher to enter Saxony, and make themselves masters of the valley of the Elbe, nor make any distant movement against those generals, without endangering the safety of Dresden, and, with it, of his lines of communication with France. The last, as the more irreparable evil, he resolved to guard against, by retreating to Dresden, which he reached on the 24th. His marshals had orders to approach closer to the central point, where he himself had his headquarters; and all the right side of the Elbe was abandoned to the allies. It is said by Baron Odeleben, that the severest orders were issued for destroying houses, driving off cattle, burning woods, and rooting up fruit-trees, reducing the country in short to a desert (an evil reward for the confidence and fidelity of the old King of Saxony), but that

they were left unexecuted, partly owing to the humanity of Napoleon's lieutenants, and partly to the rapid advance of the allies. There was little occasion for this additional cruelty; for so dreadfully had these provinces been harassed and pillaged by the repeated passing and repassing of troops on both sides, that grain, cattle, and forage of every kind, were exhausted, and they contained scarce any other sustenance for man or beast, except the potatoe crop, then in the ground.

After his return to Dresden, on the 24th September, Napoleon did not leave it till the period of his final departure; and the tenacity with which he held the place has been compared by some critics to the wilful obstinacy which led to his tarrying so long at Moscow. But the cases were different. We have formerly endeavoured to show, that Napoleon's wisdom in the commencement of this campaign would have been to evacuate Germany, and, by consenting to its liberation, to have diminished the odium attached to his assumption of universal power. As, however, he had chosen to maintain his lofty pretensions at the expense of these bloody campaigns, it was surely prudent to hold Dresden to the last moment. His retreat from it, after so many losses and disappointments, would have decided the defection of the whole Confederation of the Rhine, which already was much to be dreaded. It would have given the allied armies, at present separated from each other, an opportunity to form a junction on the left side of the Elbe, the consequences of which could hardly fail to be decisive of his fate. On the other hand, while he remained at Dresden, Napoleon was in a condition to operate by short marches upon the communications of the allies, and might hope to the last that an opportunity would be afforded him of achieving some signal success against one or other of them, or perhaps of beating them successively, and in detail. The allied sovereigns and their generals were aware of this, and, therefore, as we have seen, acted upon a plan of extreme caution, for which they have been scoffed at by some French writers, as if it were the result of fear rather than of wisdom. But it was plain that the time for more decisive operations was approaching, and, with a view to such, each party drew towards them such reinforcements as they could command.

Bonaparte's soldiers had suffered much by fatigue and skirmishes, though no important battle had been fought; and he found himself obliged to order Angereau, who commanded about 16,000 men in the neighbourhood of Wurtzberg, to join him at Dresden. He might, however, be said to lose more than he gained by this supply; for the Bavarians, upon whose inclinations to desert the French cause Angereau's army had been a check, no sooner saw it depart, than an open and friendly intercourse took place betwixt their army and that of Austria, which lay opposed to them; negotiations were opened between their courts without much affectation of concealment; and it was generally believed, that only some question about the Tyrol prevented their coming to an immediate agreement.

The allies received, on their side, the reinforcement of no less than 60,000 Russians, under the

command of Bernigsen. The most of them came from the provinces eastward of Moscow; and there were to be seen attending them tribes of the wandering Baskirs and Tartars, figures unknown in European war, wearing sheep-skins, and armed with bows and arrows. But the main body consisted of regular troops, though some bore rather an Asiatic appearance. This was the last reinforcement which the allies were to expect; being the *arrière-ban* of the almost boundless empire of Russia. Some of the men had traveled from the wall of China to this universal military rendezvous.

Their utmost force being now collected, in numbers greatly superior to that of their adversary, the allies proceeded to execute a joint movement, by means of which they hoped to concentrate their forces on the left bank of the Elbe; so that if Napoleon should persist in remaining at Dresden, he might be cut off from communication with France. With this view Blücher, on the 3d October, crossed the Elbe near the junction of that river with the Schwarze Elster, defeated Bertrand, who lay in an entrenched camp to dispute the passage, and fixed his head-quarters at Düben. At the same time, the Crown Prince of Sweden in like manner transferred his army to the left bank of the Elbe, by crossing at Rossau, and entered into communication with the Silesian army. Thus these two great armies were both transferred to the left bank, excepting the division of Taubentzen, which was left to maintain the siege of Wittenberg. Ney, who was in front of these movements, having no means to resist such a preponderating force, retreated to Leipzig.

Simultaneously with the entrance of the Crown Prince and Blücher into the eastern division of Saxony from the north-west, the grand army of the allies was put in motion towards the same district, advancing from the south by Sebastian-Berg and Chemnitz. On the 5th October, the head-quarters of Prince Schwartzberg were at Marienberg.

These movements instantly showed Bonaparte the measures about to be taken by the allies, and the necessity of preventing their junction. This he proposed to accomplish by leaving Dresden with all his disposable force, attacking Blücher at Düben, and, if possible, annihilating that restless enemy, or, at least, driving him back across the Elbe. At the same time, far from thinking he was about to leave Dresden for ever, which he had been employed to the last in fortifying yet more strongly, he placed a garrison of upwards of 15,000 men in that city under St. Cyr. This force was to defend the city against any corps of the allies, which, left in the Bohemian mountains for that purpose, might otherwise have descended and occupied Dresden, so soon as Napoleon removed from it. The King of Saxony, his queen and family, preferred accompanying Napoleon on his adventurous journey, to remaining in Dresden, where a siege was to be expected, and where subsistence was already become difficult.

The same alertness of movement, which secured Blücher on other occasions, saved him in the present case from the meditated attack on Düben. On the 9th of October, hearing of Napoleon's ap-

proach, he crossed the Mulda, and formed a junction with the army of the Crown Prince, near Zorbig, on the left bank of that river. Napoleon, once more baffled, took up his head-quarters at Düben on the 10th. Here he soon learned that the Crown Prince and Blücher, apprehensive that he might interpose betwixt them and the grand army of Schwartzberg, had retreated upon the line of the Saale during the night preceding the 11th.—They were thus still placed on his communications, but beyond his reach, and in a situation to communicate with their own grand army.

But this movement to the westward, on the part of the allies, had this great inconvenience, that it left Berlin exposed, or inadequately protected by the single division of Taubentzen at Dessau. This did not escape the falcon eye of Napoleon. He laid before his marshals a more daring plan of tactics than even his own gigantic imagination had (excepting in the Moscow campaign) ever before conceived. He proposed to recross the Elbe to the right bank, and then resting his right wing on Dresden, and his left on Hamburg, there to maintain himself, with the purpose of recrossing the Elbe on the first appearance of obtaining a success over the enemy, dashing down on Silesia, and raising the blockade of the fortresses upon the Oder. With this purpose he had already sent Régier and Bertrand across the Elbe, though their ostensible mission had nothing more important than to raise the siege of Wittenberg.

The counsellors of the emperor were to a man dissatisfied with this plan. It seemed to them that remaining in Germany was only clinging to the defence of what could no longer be defended. They appealed to the universal disaffection of all the Germans on the Rhine, and to the destruction of the kingdom of Westphalia, recently effected by no greater force than Czernicheff, with a pulk of Cossacks. They noticed the almost declared defection of all their former friends, alluded to their own diminished numbers, and remonstrated against a plan which was to detain the army in a wasted country, inhabited by a population gradually becoming hostile, and surrounded with enemies whom they could not defeat, because they would never fight but at advantage, and who possessed the means of distressing them, while they had no means of retorting the injuries they received. This, they said, was the history of the last three months, only varied by the decisive defeats of Gross-Beeren, the Katzbach, and Dennewitz.

Napoleon remained from the 11th to the 14th of October at Düben, concentrating his own forces, waiting for news of the allies' motions, and remaining in a state of uncertainty and inactivity, very different from his usual frame of mind and natural habits. "I have seen him at that time," says an eye-witness, "seated on a sofa beside a table, on which lay his cards, totally unemployed, unless in scribbling mechanically large letters on a sheet of white paper." Consultations with his best generals, which ended without adopting any fixed determination, varied those unpleasant reveries. The councils were often

* Baron Odeleben, in his interesting *Circumstantial Notice of the Campaign in Saxony*.

seasons of dispute, almost of dissension. The want of success had made those dissatisfied with each other, whose friendship had been cemented by uniform and uninterrupted prosperity. Great misfortunes might have bound them together, and compelled them to regard each other as common sufferers. But a succession of failures exasperated their temper, as a constant drizzling shower is worse to endure than a thunder-storm.

Napoleon, while the marshals were dissatisfied with each other and with him, complained, on his part, that fatigue and discouragement had overpowered most of his principal officers; that they had become indifferent, lukewarm, awkward, and therefore unfortunate. "The general officers," he said, "desired nothing but repose, and that at all rates."

On the other hand, the marshals asserted that Napoleon no longer calculated his means to the ends which he proposed to attain—that he suffered himself to be deceived by phrases about the predominance of his star and his destiny—and ridiculed his declaration that the word Impossible was not good French. They said that such phrases were well enough to encourage soldiers; but that military councils ought to be founded on more logical arguments. They pleaded guilty of desiring repose; but asked which was to blame, the horse or the rider, when the over-ridden animal broke down with fatigue?

At length Napoleon either changed his own opinion, or deferred to that of his military advisers; the orders to Régnier and Bertrand to advance upon Berlin were annulled, and the retreat upon Leipzig was resolved upon. The loss of three days had rendered the utmost dispatch necessary, and Bonaparte saw himself obliged to leave behind him in garrison, Davoust at Hamburg, Lemaurois at Magdeburg, Lapoye at Wittenberg, and Count Narbonne at Torgau. Still he seems to have anticipated some favourable chance, which might again bring him back to the line of the Elbe. "A thunderbolt," as he himself expressed it, "alone could save him; but all was not lost while battle was in his power, and a single victory might restore Germany to its obedience."

CHAPTER LXXXVIII.

Napoleon reaches Leipzig on 16th of October.—Description of that town.—Statement of the French and allied forces.—Battle of Leipzig, commenced on 16th, and terminates with disadvantage to the French at night/fall.—Napoleon dispatches General Merfeldt (his prisoner) to the Emperor of Austria, with proposals for an armistice.—No answer is returned.—The battle is renewed on the morning of the 18th, and lasts till night, when the French are compelled to retreat, after immense loss on both sides.—They evacuate Leipzig on the 19th, the allies in full pursuit.—The retreat rendered more bloody by the blowing up of one of the bridges.—Prince Poniatowski drowned in the Elster.—25,000 French are made prisoners.—The allied sovereigns meet in triumph, at noon, in the great square at Leipzig.—King of Saxony sent under a guard to Berlin.—Reflections.

THE last act of the grand drama, so far as the scene lay in Germany, was now fast approaching. During the two first weeks of October, the various

movements of the troops had been of an indecisive character; but after the 14th, when the belligerent powers became aware of each other's plans, the corps of the allies, as well as those of the French, streamed towards Leipzig as to a common centre.

Leaving Düben, the emperor reached Leipzig early on the 15th of October, and received the agreeable information that his whole force would be in twenty-four hours under the walls; that the Grand Army of Austria was fast approaching; but that his demonstration against Berlin had alarmed Blücher, and therefore that marshal might be longer of advancing, from his anxiety to protect the Prussian capital. An opportunity of fighting the one army, without the presence of the other, was what Napoleon most anxiously desired.

In the meantime cannon were heard, and shortly after Murat brought an account of a desperate cavalry skirmish, in which each party claimed the victory. He himself, marked by the splendour of his dress, had with difficulty escaped from a young Prussian officer, who was killed by an orderly dragoon that waited upon the King of Naples. Another remarkable circumstance in this skirmish was, the distinguished behaviour of a Prussian regiment of cuirassiers. When complimented on their behaviour, they replied, "Could we do otherwise?—this is the anniversary of the battle of Jena." Such a spirit prevailed among the allies, nor is it to be supposed that that of the French was inferior. If the one had wrongs to avenge, the other had honours to preserve.

The venerable town of Leipzig forms an irregular square, surrounded by an ancient Gothic wall, with a terrace planted with trees. Four gates,—on the north those of Halle and Rastadt, on the east the gate of Grömm, and on the south that called St Peter's Gate,—lead from the town to the suburbs, which are of great extent, secured by walls and barriers. Upon the west side of the town, two rivers, the Pleisse and the Elster, wash its walls, and, flowing through meadows, divide themselves into several branches, connected by marshy islands. Leipzig cannot, therefore, be esteemed capable of approach by an enemy in that direction, excepting by a succession of bridges which cross those rivers and their connecting streams. The first of these bridges leads to a village called Lindeneau, and thence to Mark-Rastadt. It is close to the gate of the city which takes its name from that village. This road forms the sole communication betwixt Leipzig and the banks of the Rhine. On the east side, the river Partha makes a large semicircular bend around the city, inclosing extensive plains, with various heights and points of elevation, which make it well adapted for a military position; on the south the same species of ground continues, but more broken into eminences, one of which is called the Swedish Camp, from the wars, doubtless, of Gustavus Adolphus; another is called the Sheepwalk of Meusdorf; it is then bounded by the banks of the Pleisse. This line is marked by a variety of villages, which, in the fearful days which we are now to describe, gained a name in history. About the village of Connewitz begins the marshy ground, inundated by the Pleisse and Elster.

It was on this last line that, on the 15th October, the columns of the grand army of the allies were seen hastily advancing. Napoleon immediately made his arrangements for defence. Lindeneau, through which ran the Mark-Rastadt road, by which the French must retreat, was occupied by Bertrand. Poniatowski, advancing to the right bank of the Pleisse, held all the villages along the side of the river—Connewitz, Löfsnig, Dooblitz, and so on to Markleberg. As the line of defence swept to the eastward, Angereau was established on the elevated plain of Wachan. He was supported by Victor and Lauriston at a considerable village called Liebertwolkowitz. Cavalry were posted on the wings of these divisions. The Imperial Guards were placed in the rear as a reserve, at a village named Probstsheyda; and Macdonald occupied a gentle and sweeping rising ground, extending from Stœttertitz to Holtzhausen.

On the opposite, that is, the northern side of the city, Marmont occupied a line betwixt Mœchern and Enteritz. His troops were intended to make head against Blücher, whose approach from the north was momentarily to be apprehended. Almost all along the ground thus defended, but especially on the south front, the allies had prepared columns of attack; and the sentinels of both armies were, when evening fell, in some places within musket-shot of each other. Neither side, however, seemed willing to begin the battle, in which the great question was to be decided, whether France should leave other nations to be guided by their own princes, or retain the unnatural supremacy with which she had been invested by the talents of one great soldier.

The number of men who engaged the next morning, was said to be 136,000 French, omitting the corps of Souham, who was not engaged, and of Régnier, who was not yet come up. The allies are by the same accounts rated at 230,000, without counting the division of the Crown Prince, or that of Bennigsen, which had not as yet joined. Almost all the statements assign a predominating force to the allies of 80,000 or 100,000 men superior to their enemy. It thus appears that they had at last acted according to Napoleon's own idea of the art of war, which he defined as the art of assembling the greatest number upon a given point.

Napoleon himself visited all the posts, gave his last orders, and took the opportunity, as he frequently did on the eve of battle, to distribute eagles to those regiments of Angereau's division, which, being new levies, had not yet received these military emblems. The ceremony, performed with warlike pomp, may remind the reader of the ancient fashion of making knights on the eve of a battle. The soldiers were made to swear never to abandon their eagles; and the emperor concluded by saying, in a loud voice, "Yonder lies the enemy. Swear that you will rather die than permit France to be dishonoured."

"We swear it," exclaimed the battalions. "Long live the emperor!" And unquestionably they kept their word in the tremendous series of actions which followed.

Napoleon's preparations were made chiefly upon

the southern side of Leipsic. It has been supposed, though, we think, with small probability, that he scarce expected a serious attack upon the northern side at all. In the evening, however, of the 15th, three death-rockets (*feux de mort*), displaying long brilliant trains of white light, were observed to rise high in the southerly quarter of the heavens, and they were presently answered by four of a red colour, which were seen in the distant north. It was concluded that these were signals of communication between the grand army of the allies, and those of the Crown Prince and Blücher. The latter, therefore, must be at no incalculable distance.

Napoleon remained in the rear of his own Guards, behind the central position, almost opposite to a village called Gossa, which was occupied by the allies.

At break of day, on the 16th October, the battle began. The French position was attacked along all the southern front with the greatest fury. On the French right, the village of Markleberg was fiercely assaulted by Kleist, while the Austrian division of Merfeldt, making their way through the marshes to the left bank of the Pleisse, threatened to force themselves across that river. Poniatowski, to whom the defence was confided, was obliged to give ground, so that the emperor was compelled to bring up the troops under Souham, which had joined during the night, and which had been designed to support Marmont on the north of Leipsic. Marshal Victor defended the village of Wachan, in front of the position, against Prince Eugène of Wirtemberg. The town of Liebertwolkowitz was made good by Lauriston against Klénau. The allies made six desperate attempts on these points, but all were unsuccessful. They were now something in the condition of wrestlers who have exhausted themselves in vain and premature efforts; and Napoleon in turn, assuming the offensive, began to show his skill and power.

Macdonald was ordered to attack Klénau, and beat him back from Liebertwolkowitz, with the cavalry of Sébastiani; while two divisions deputed to sustain General Lauriston. It was about noon when this general advance took place along the centre of the French. It was for some time fearfully successful. The village of Gossa, hitherto occupied by the allies, and in the very centre of their line, was carried by the bayonet. The eminence called the Sheepwalk was also in danger of being lost, and the exertions of Macdonald put him in possession of the redoubt called the Swedish Camp. The desperate impetuosity of the French had fairly broken through the centre of the allies; and Napoleon, as if desirous not to lose a moment in proclaiming his supposed victory, sent the tidings to the King of Saxony, who commanded all the church-bells in the city to be rung for rejoicing, even while the close continued roar of the cannon seemed to give the lie to the merry peal. The King of Naples, in the meantime, with Latour Maubourg, and Kellermann, poured through the gap in the enemy's centre, and at the head of the whole body of cavalry thundered forward as far as Magdeburg, a village in the rear of the allies, bearing down General Raefskoi, with the grenadiers of the reserve, who

threw themselves forward to oppose their passage.

But at this imminent moment of peril, while the French cavalry were disordered by their own success, Alexander ordered the Cossacks of his Guard, who were in attendance on his person, to charge. They did so with the utmost fury, as fighting under the eye of their sovereign, disconcerted Bonaparte's manœuvre, and bore back with their long lances the dense mass of cavalry who had so nearly carried the day.

In the meantime, when the carnage was continuing on the southern side of Leipsic, a similar thunder of artillery commenced on the right, where Blücher had arrived before the city and suddenly came into action with Marmont, with at least three men for one. Breathless aides-de-camp came galloping to reclaim the troops of Souham, which, for the purpose of supporting Poniatowski, had been withdrawn from their original destination of assisting Marmont. They could not, however, be replaced, and Blücher obtained, in consequence, great and decided results. He took the village of Möckern, with twenty pieces of artillery, and two thousand prisoners; and when night separated the combat, had the advantage of having greatly narrowed the position of the enemy.

But the issue on the south side of Leipsic continued entirely indecisive, though furiously contested. Gossa was still disputed, taken and retaken repeatedly, but at length remained in possession of the allies. On the verge of the Pleisse, the combat was no less dreadful. The Austrians of Bianchi's division poured on Markleberg, close to the side of the river, with the most dreadful yells. Poniatowski, with Augereau's assistance, had the utmost difficulty in keeping his ground. From the left side of the Pleisse, Schwartzberg manœuvred to push a body of horse across the swampy river, to take the French in the rear of the position. But such of the cavalry as got through a very bad ford were instantly charged and driven back, and their leader, General Merfeldt, fell into the hands of the French. An Austrian division, that of Giulay, manœuvred on the left bank of the Pleisse, as far down as Lindennau, and the succession of bridges, which, we have said, forms on the western side the sole exit from Leipsic towards the Rhine. This was the only pass which remained for retreat to the French, should they fail in the dreadful action which was now fighting. Giulay might have destroyed these bridges; but it is believed he had orders to leave open that pass for retreat, lest the French should be rendered utterly desperate, when there was no anticipating what exertions they might be goaded to.

The battle, thus fiercely contested, continued to rage till nightfall, when the bloody work ceased as if by mutual consent. Three cannon-shot, fired as a signal to the more distant points, intimated that the conflict was ended for the time, and the armies on the southern line retired to rest, in each other's presence, in the very positions which they had occupied the night before. The French had lost the ground which at one period they had gained, but they had not relinquished one foot of their original position, though so fiercely attacked during the whole day by greatly superior numbers. On the north their defence had been less successful. Mar-

mont had been forced back by Blücher, and the whole line of defence on that side was crowded more near to the walls of Leipsic.

Napoleon, in the meantime, had the melancholy task of arranging his soldiers for a defence, sure to be honourable, and yet at length to be unavailing. Retreat became inevitable; yet, how to accomplish it through the narrow streets of a crowded city; how to pass more than one hundred thousand men over a single bridge, while double that number were pressing on their rear, was a problem which even Bonaparte could not solve. In this perplexity, he thought of appealing to the sentiments of affection which the Emperor of Austria must necessarily be supposed to entertain for his daughter and grandchild. The capture of General Merfeldt served opportunely to afford the means of communication with the better grace, as, after the battle of Austerlitz, this was the individual, who, on the part of the Emperor of Germany, had solicited a personal interview, and favourable terms from Napoleon. In a private interview with this officer, Napoleon received the confirmation of what he had long apprehended, the defection of the King of Bavaria, the union of his army with that of Austria, and their determination to intercept him on his return to the Rhine. This fatal intelligence increased his desire of peace, and he requested, yet in terms of becoming dignity, the intercession of his father-in-law. He was now willing to adopt the terms proposed at Prague. He offered to renounce Poland and Illyria. He would consent to the independence of Holland, the Hanse towns, and Spain; but he wished this last to be delayed till a general peace. Italy, he proposed, should be considered as independent, and preserved in its integrity. Lastly, as the price of the armistice to be immediately concluded, he was willing to evacuate Germany and retreat towards the Rhine.

These terms contained what, at an early part of the campaign, and voluntarily tendered, would have been gladly accepted by the allies. But Bonaparte's own character for ability and pertinacity; the general impression, that, if he relinquished his views for a time, it was only to recur to them in a more favourable season; and his terrible power of making successful exertions for that purpose, hardened the hearts of the allied sovereigns against what, from another (could any other save Bonaparte be supposed in his situation) would, in the like circumstances, have been favourably received. "Adieu, General Merfeldt," said Napoleon, dismissing his prisoner; "when, on my part, you name the word armistice to the two emperors, I doubt not that the voice which then strikes their ears will awaken many recollections." Words affecting by their simplicity, and which, coming from so proud a heart, and one who was reduced to ask the generosity which he had formerly extended, cannot be recorded without strong sympathy.

General Merfeldt went out, like the messenger from the ark, and long and anxiously did Bonaparte expect his return. But he was the raven envoy, and brought back no olive-branch. Napoleon did not receive an answer until his troops had recrossed the Rhine. The allies had engaged themselves solemnly to each other, that they would enter into no

treaty with him while an individual of the French army remained in Germany.

Bonaparte was now engaged in preparations for retreat; yet he made them with less expedition than the necessities of the time required. Morning came, and the enemy did not renew the attack, waiting for Bennigsen and the Prince Royal of Sweden. In the meanwhile, casks and materials of all kinds being plenty, and labourers to be collected to any extent, it seems, that, by some of the various modes known to military engineers,* temporary bridges might have been thrown over the Elster and the Pleisse, which were tranquil, still rivers, and the marshes betwixt them rendered sufficiently passable. Under far more disadvantageous circumstances Napoleon had bridged the Beresina within the space of twelve hours. This censure is confirmed by a most competent judge, the general of engineers, Rogniat, who affirms that there was time enough to have completed six bridges, had it been employed with activity. The answer, that he himself, as chief of the engineer department at the time, ought to have ordered and prepared these means of retreat, seems totally insufficient. Napoleon did not permit his generals to anticipate his commands on such important occasions. It is said, indeed, that the emperor had given orders for three bridges, but that, in the confusion of this dreadful period, that was seldom completely accomplished which Napoleon could not look after with his own eyes. Nothing of the kind was actually attempted, except at a place called the Judges' Garden; and that, besides having its access, like the stone bridge, through the town of Leipsic, was constructed of too slight materials. Perhaps Napoleon trusted to the effect of Merfeldt's mission; perhaps he had still latent hopes that his retreat might be unnecessary; perhaps he abhorred the thought of that manœuvre so much, as to lead him entirely to confide the necessary preparations to another; but certain it is, the exertion was not made in a manner suitable to the occasion. The village of Lindenau, on the left side of the river, was, nevertheless secured.

The 17th, as we have said, was spent in preparations on both sides, without any actual hostilities, excepting when a distant cannonade, like the growling of some huge monster, showed that war was only slumbering, and that but lightly.

At eight o'clock on the 18th of October, the battle was renewed with tenfold fury. Napoleon had considerably contracted his circuit of defence; on the external range of heights and villages, which had been so desperately defended on the 16th, the allies now found no opposition but that of outposts. The French were posted in an interior line nearer to Leipsic, of which Probstsheyda was the central point. Napoleon himself, stationed on an eminence called Thonberg, commanded a prospect of the whole field. Masses were drawn up behind the villages, which relieved their defenders from time to time with fresh troops; cannon were placed in their front and on their flanks, and every patch of wooded ground which afforded the least shelter was filled with tirailleurs. The battle then joined on all

sides. The Poles, with their gallant general, Poniatowski, to whom this was to prove the last of his fields, defended the banks of the Pleisse, and the villages connected with it, against the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, Bianchi, and Colloredo. In the centre, Barclay de Tolly, Wittgenstein, and Kleist, advanced on Probstsheyda, where they were opposed by the King of Naples, Victor, Augereau, and Lauriston, under the eye of Napoleon himself. On the left, Macdonald had drawn back his division from an advanced point called Holtzhausen, to a village called Stötteritz, which was the post assigned to him on the new and restricted line of defence. Along all this extended southern line, the fire continued furious on both sides, nor could the terrified spectators, from the walls and steeples of Leipsic, perceive that it either advanced or recoiled. The French had the advantage of situation and cover, the allies that of greatly superior numbers; both were commanded by the first generals of their country and age.

About two o'clock afternoon, the allies, under General Pirch and Prince Augustus of Prussia, forced their way headlong into Probstsheyda; the camp-followers began to fly; the noise of the tumult overcame almost the fire of the artillery. Napoleon, in the rear, but yet on the verge of this tumult, preserved his entire tranquillity. He placed the reserve of the Old Guard in order, led them in person to recover the village, and saw them force their entrance, ere he retreated to the eminence from which he observed the action. During the whole of this eventful day, in which he might be said to fight less for victory than for safety, this wonderful man continued calm, decided, collected, and supported his diminished and broken squadrons in their valiant defence, with a presence of mind and courage, as determined as he had so often exhibited in directing the tide of onward victory. Perhaps his military talents were more to be admired, when thus contending at once against fortune and the superiority of numbers, than in the most distinguished of his victories, when the fickle goddess fought upon his side.

The allies, notwithstanding their gallantry and their numbers, felt themselves obliged to desist from the murderous attacks upon the villages which cost them such immense loss; and drawing back their troops as they brought forward their guns and howitzers, contented themselves with maintaining a dreadful fire on the French masses as they showed themselves, and throwing shells into the villages. The French replied with great spirit; but they had fewer guns in position, and besides, their ammunition was falling short. Still, however, Napoleon completely maintained the day on the south of Leipsic, where he was present in person.

On the north side of Leipsic, the superiority of numbers, still greater than that which existed on the south, placed Ney in a precarious situation. He was pressed at once by the army of Blücher, and by that of the Crown Prince, which was now come up in force. The latter general forced his way across the Partha, with three columns, and at three different points; and Ney saw himself obliged to retreat, in order to concentrate his forces nearer Leipsic, and

* See Sir Howard Douglas's work on military bridges.

communicate by his right with the army of Napoleon.

The Russians had orders to advance to force this new position, and particularly to drive back the advanced guard of Régnier, stationed on an eminence called Heiterblick, betwixt the villages of Taucha and Pausdorf. On a sudden, the troops who occupied the French line on that point came forward to meet the allies, with their swords sheathed, and colours of truce displayed. This was a Saxon brigade, who, in the midst of the action, embraced the time and opportunity to desert the service of Napoleon, and declare for independence. These men had an unquestionable right to espouse the cause of their country, and shake off the yoke of a stranger, which Saxony had found so burdensome; but it is not while on the actual battle-ground that one side ought to be exchanged for the other; and those must be in every case accounted guilty of treachery, who, bringing their swords into the field for one party, shall suddenly, and without intimation given, turn them against the power in whose ranks they had stood.

The Russians, afraid of stratagem, sent the Saxon troops, about ten thousand in number, to the rear of the position. But their artillery were immediately brought into action; and having expended during that morning one half of their ammunition on the allies, they now bestowed the other half upon the French army. By this unexpected disaster, Ney was obliged to contract his line of defence once more. Even the valour and exertions of that distinguished general could not defend Schoenfeld. That fair village forms almost one of the northern suburbs of Leipsic. It was in vain that Bonaparte dispatched his reserves of cavalry to check the advance of the Crown Prince. He defeated all opposition that presented itself, and pressed Ney into a position close under the walls of Leipsic. The battle once more ceased on all points; and after the solemn signal of three cannon-shot had been heard, the field was left to the slain and the wounded.

Although the French army kept its ground most valiantly during the whole of this tremendous day, there was no prospect of their being able to sustain themselves any longer around or in Leipsic. The allies had approached so close to them, that their attacks might, on the third day, be expected to be more combined and simultaneous than before. The superiority of numbers became more efficient after the great carnage that had taken place, and that for the simple reason, that the army which had greatest numbers could best afford to lose lives. It is said also by Baron Fain, that the enormous number of 250,000 cannon-bullets had been expended by the French during the last four days, and that there only remained to serve their guns about 16,000 cartridges, which could scarce support a hot fire for two hours. This was owing to the great park of artillery having been directed on Torgau, another circumstance which serves to show how little Bonaparte dreamed of abandoning the Elbe when he moved from Dresden. To this the increasing scarcity of provisions is to be added; so that every thing combined to render Napoleon's longer stay at

Dresden altogether impossible, especially when the Bavarian general, now his declared enemy, was master of his communications with France.

The retreat, however necessary, was doomed inevitably to be disastrous, as is evident from the situation of the French army, cooped up by superior forces under the walls of a large town, the narrow streets of which they must traverse to reach two bridges, one of recent and hasty construction, by which they must cross the Pleisse, the Elster, and the marshy ground, streams, and canals, which divide them from each other; and then, added to this was the necessity of the whole army debouching by one single road, that which leads to Lindenau, and on which it would be impossible to prevent dreadful confusion. But there was no remedy for these evils; they must necessarily be risked.

The retreat was commenced in the night time, and Bonaparte, retiring in person to Leipsic, spent a third exhausting night in dictating the necessary orders for drawing the corps of his army successively within the town, and transferring them to the western bank of the two rivers. The French troops accordingly came into Leipsic from all sides, and filling the town with the ineffable confusion which always must attend the retreat of so large a body in the presence of a victorious enemy, they proceeded to get out of it as they best could, by the way prescribed. Macdonald, and Poniatowski, with their corps, were appointed to the perilous honour of protecting the rear.

"Prince," said Napoleon, to the brave Polish prince, "you must defend the southern suburb."

"Alas, sire," he answered, "I have but few soldiers left."

"Well, but you will defend them with what you have?"

"Doubt not, sire, but that we will make good our ground; we are all ready to die for your majesty's service."

Napoleon parted with this brave and attached prince, upon whom he had recently bestowed a marshal's baton. They never met again in this world.

The arrival of day-light had no sooner shown to the allies the commencement of the French retreat, than their columns began to advance in pursuit on every point, pushing forward, with all the animation of victory, to overtake the enemy in the suburbs and streets of Leipsic. The King of Saxony, the magistrates, and some of the French generals, endeavoured to secure the city from the dangers which were to be expected from a battle in the town, betwixt the rear-guard of the French and the advanced guard of the allies. They sent proposals, that the French army should be permitted to effect their retreat unmolested, in mercy to the unfortunate town. But when were victorious generals prevented from prosecuting military advantages, by the mere consideration of humanity? Napoleon, on his side, was urged to set fire to the suburbs, to check the pressure of the allies on his rear-guard. As this, however, must have occasioned a most extensive scene of misery, Bonaparte generously refused to give such a dreadful order, which, besides, could not have been executed without compromising the

safety of a great part of his own rear, to whom the task of destruction must have been committed, and who would doubtless immediately have engaged in an extensive scene of plunder. Perhaps, also, Napoleon might be influenced by the feeling of what was due to the confidence and fidelity of Frederick Augustus of Saxony, who, having been so long the faithful follower of his fortunes, was now to be abandoned to his own. To have set fire to that unhappy monarch's city, when leaving him behind to make terms for himself as he could, would have been an evil requital for all he had done and suffered in the cause of France; nor would it have been much better had Napoleon removed the Saxon King from his dominions, and destroyed all chance of his making peace with the irritated sovereigns, by transporting him along with the French army, in its calamitous retreat.

At nine o'clock Napoleon had a farewell interview with Frederick Augustus, releasing him formally from all the ties which had hitherto combined them, and leaving him at liberty to form such other alliances as the safety of his states might require. Their parting scene was hurried to a conclusion by the heavy discharge of musketry from several points, which intimated that the allies, forcing their way into the suburbs, were fighting hand to hand, and from house to house, with the French, who still continued to defend them. The King and Queen of Saxony conjured Bonaparte to mount his horse, and make his escape; but, before he did so, he discharged from their ties to France and to himself the King of Saxony's body-guard, and left them for the protection of the royal family.

When Napoleon attempted to make his way to the single point of exit, by the gate of Rastadt, which led to the bridge, or succession of bridges, so often mentioned, he found reason for thinking his personal safety in actual danger. It must be remembered, that the French army, still numbering nearly 100,000, were pouring into Leipsic, pursued by more than double that number, and that the streets were encumbered, with the dead and wounded, with artillery and baggage, with columns so wedged up that it was impossible for them to get forward, and with others, who, almost desperate of their safety, would not be left behind. To fight his way through this confusion, was impossible even for Napoleon. He and his suite were obliged to give up all attempts to proceed in the direct road to the bridge, and turning in the other direction, he got out of the city through St Peter's Gate, moved on until he was in sight of the advancing columns of the allies, then turning along the eastern suburb, he found a circuitous way to the bridges, and was enabled to get across. But the temporary bridge which we have before mentioned had already given way, so that there remained only the old bridge on the road to Lindenau, to serve as an exit to the whole French army. The furious defence which was maintained in the suburbs, continued to check the advance of the allies, otherwise the greater part of the French army must inevitably have been destroyed. But the defenders, themselves, with their brave commanders, were at length, after exhibiting prodigies of valour, compelled to retreat; and ere they could reach the banks of

the river, a dreadful accident had taken place.

The bridge, so necessary to the escape of this distressed army, had been mined by Bonaparte's orders, and an officer of engineers was left to execute the necessary measure of destroying it, so soon as the allies should approach in force sufficient to occupy the pass. Whether the officer to whom this duty was intrusted had fled, or had fallen, or had been absent from his post by accident, no one seems to have known; but at this critical period a sergeant commanded the sappers in his stead. A body of Swedish sharp-shooters pushed up the side of the river about eleven o'clock, with loud cries and huzzas, firing upon the crowds who were winning their way slowly along the bridge, while Cossacks and Huzars were seen on the southern side, rushing towards the same spot; and the troops of Saxony and Baden, who had now entirely changed sides, were firing on the French from the wall of the suburbs, which they had been posted to defend against the allies, and annoying the retreat which they had been destined to cover. The non-commissioned officer of engineers imagined that the retreat of the French was cut off, and set fire to the mine, that the allies might not take possession of the bridge for pursuing Napoleon.* The bridge exploded with a horrible noise.

This catastrophe effectually intercepted the retreat of all who remained still on the Leipsic side of the river, excepting some individuals who succeeded by swimming through the Pleisse and the Elster. Among these was the brave Marshal Macdonald, who surmounted all the obstacles opposed to his escape. Poniatowski, the gallant nephew of Stanislaus, King of Poland, was less fortunate. He was the favourite of his countrymen, who saw in their imagination the crown of Poland glittering upon his brow. He himself, like most of the Poles of sense and reflection, regarded these hopes as delusive; but followed Napoleon with unflinching zeal, because he had always been his friend and benefactor. Besides a thousand other acts of valour, Poniatowski's recent defence of the extreme right of the French position was as brilliant as any part of the memorable resistance at Leipsic.

* This story was at first doubted, and it was supposed that Napoleon had commanded the bridge to be blown up, with the selfish purpose of securing his own retreat. But, from all concurring accounts, the explosion took place in the manner, and from the cause, mentioned in the text. There is, notwithstanding, an obscurity in the case. A French officer of engineers, by name Colonel Montfort, was publicly announced as the person, through whose negligence or treachery the post was left to subordinate keeping. Nevertheless, it is said, that the only officer of that name, in the engineer service of Bonaparte's army, was actually at Metz when the battle of Leipsic took place. This is alluded to by General Grouchy, who, in a note upon his interesting Observations on General Gourgaud's Account of the Campaign of 1815, has this remarkable passage:—"One would wish to forget the bulletin, which, after the battle of Leipsic, delivered to the bar of public opinion, as preliminary to bringing him before a military commission, Colonel Montfort of the engineer service, gratuitously accused of the breaking down the bridge at Leipsic." Neither the colonel nor the non-commissioned officer were ever brought to a court-martial.

He had been twice wounded in the previous battles. Seeing the bridge destroyed, and the enemy's forces thronging forward in all directions, he drew his sabre, and said to his suite, and a few Polish cuirassiers, who followed him, "Gentlemen, it is better to fall with honour than to surrender." He charged accordingly, and pushed through the troops of the allied army opposed to him, in the course of which desperate attempt he was wounded by a musket-shot in the arm. Other enemies appeared; he threw himself upon them with the same success, making his way amongst them also, after receiving a wound through the cross of his decoration. He then plunged into the Pleisse, and, with the assistance of his staff-officers, got across that river, in which his horse was lost. Though much exhausted, he mounted another horse, and seeing that the enemy were already occupying the banks of the Elster with riflemen, he plunged into that deep and marshy river, to rise no more. Thus bravely died a prince, who, in one sense, may be termed the last of the Poles.*

The remainder of the French army, after many had been killed and drowned in an attempt to cross these relentless rivers, received quarter from the enemy. About 25,000 men were made prisoners, and as Napoleon seems only to have had about 200 guns at the battle of Hanau, many must have been abandoned in Leipsic and its neighbourhood. The quantity of baggage taken was immense.

The triumph of the allied monarchs was complete. Advancing at the head of their victorious forces, each upon his own side, the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden, met and greeted each other in the great square of the city, where they were soon joined by the Emperor of Austria. General Bertrand, the French commandant of the city, surrendered his sword to these illustrious personages. No interview took place between the allied monarchs and the King of Saxony. He was sent under a guard of Cossacks to Berlin, nor was he afterwards restored to his throne, until he had paid a severe fine for his adherence to France.

When reflecting upon these scenes, the rank and dignity of the actors naturally attract our observation. It seems as if the example of Bonaparte, in placing himself at the head of his armies, had in some respects changed the condition of sovereigns, from the reserved and retired dignity in which most had remained, estranged from the actual toils of government and dangers of war, into the less abstracted condition of sharing the risk of battle, and the labours of negotiation. Such scenes as those which passed at Leipsic on this memorable day, whether we look at the parting of Napoleon from Frederick Augustus, amid the firing and shouting of hostile armies, or the triumphant meeting of the allied sovereigns in the great square of Leipsic, had been for centuries only to be paralleled in romance. But considering how important it is to the people

that sovereigns should not be prompt to foster a love of war, there is great room for question whether the encouragement of this warlike propensity be upon the whole a subject for Europe to congratulate itself upon.

Policy and the science of war alike dictated a rapid and close pursuit after the routed French; but the allied army had been too much exhausted by the efforts required to gain the battle, to admit of its deriving the full advantage from success. There was a great scarcity of provisions around Leipsic; and the stores of the city, exhausted by the French, afforded no relief. The bridge which had been destroyed was as necessary for the advance of the allies as the retreat of Napoleon. Besides, it must be admitted that an allied army is always less decided and rapid in its movements than one which receives all its impulses from a single commander of strong and vigorous talents. Of this we shall see more proofs. But in the meantime, a great point was gained. The liberation of Germany was complete, even if Napoleon should escape the united armies of Austria and Bavaria, which lay still betwixt him and the banks of the Rhine. And indeed the battles which he fought for conquest terminated at Leipsic. Those which he afterwards waged were for his own life and the sceptre of France.

CHAPTER LXXXIX.

Details of the retreat of the French from Germany.—General defection of Napoleon's partisans.—Battle of Hanau fought on 30th and 31st October—in which the French are successful.—They prosecute their retreat.—Napoleon arrives at Paris on 9th November.—State in which he finds the public mind in the capital.—Fate of the French garrisons left in Germany.—Arrival of the allied armies on the banks of the Rhine.—Their exultation, which is universal throughout Germany.—The allies halt on the Rhine.—General view of Napoleon's political relations at the present period.—Italy.—Spain.—Restoration of Ferdinand.—Liberation of the pope, who returns to Rome.—Emancipation of Holland.

NAPOLEON was now on his retreat, and it proved a final one, from Germany towards France. It was performed with disorder enough, and great loss, though far less than that which had attended the famous departure from Moscow. The troops, according to Baron Odeleben, soured by misfortune, marched with a fierce and menacing air, and the Guards in particular indulged in every excess. In this disordered condition, Napoleon passed through Lutzen, late the scene of his brilliant success, now witness to his disastrous losses. His own courage was unabated; he seemed indeed pensive, but was calm and composed, indulging in no vain regrets, still less in useless censures and recriminations. Harassed as he passed the defiles of Eckartsberg, by the light troops of the allies, he pushed on to Erfurt, where he hoped to be able to make some pause, and restore order to his disorganized followers.

On the 23d of October, he reached that city, which was rendered by its strong citadel a convenient rallying point; and upon collecting the report of his losses, had the misfortune to find them much

* His body was found, and his obsequies performed with great military pomp; both the victors and vanquished attending him to the tomb, with every honour which could be rendered to his remains.

greater than he had apprehended. Almost all the German troops of his army were now withdrawn from it. The Saxons and the troops of Baden he had dismissed with a good grace; other contingents, which saw their sovereigns on the point of being freed from Napoleon's supremacy, withdrew of themselves, and in most cases joined the allies. A great many of those Frenchmen who arrived at Erfurt were in a miserable condition, and without arms. Their wretched appearance extorted from Bonaparte the peevish observation, "They are a set of scoundrels, who are going to the devil!—In this way I shall lose 80,000 men before I can get to the Rhine."

The spirit of defection extended even to those who were nearest to the emperor. Murat, discouraged and rendered impatient by the incessant misfortunes of his brother-in-law, took leave, under pretence, it was said, of bringing forces up from the French frontier, but in reality to return to his own dominions, without further allying his fortunes to those of Napoleon. Bonaparte, as if influenced by some secret presentiment that they should never again meet, embraced his old companion in arms repeatedly ere they parted.

The Poles who remained in Napoleon's army showed a very generous spirit. He found himself obliged to appeal to their own honour, whether they chose to remain in his service, or to desert him at this crisis. A part had served so long under his banners, that they had become soldiers of fortune, to whom the French camp served for a native country. But many others were men who had assumed arms in the Russian campaign, with the intention of freeing Poland from the foreign yoke under which it had so long groaned. The manner in which Napoleon had disappointed their hopes could not be forgotten by them; but they had too much generosity to revenge, at this crisis, the injustice with which they had been treated, and agreed unanimously that they would not quit Napoleon's service until they had escorted him safely beyond the Rhine, reserving their right then to leave his standard, of which a great many accordingly availed themselves.

Napoleon passed nearly two days at Erfurt, during which the reorganization of his troops advanced rapidly, as the magazines and stores of the place were sufficient to recruit them in every department. Their reassembled force amounted to about eighty thousand men. This, together with the troops left to their fate in the garrison towns in Germany, was all that remained of two hundred and eighty thousand, with which Napoleon had begun the campaign. The garrisons amounted to about eighty thousand, so that the loss of the French rose to one hundred and twenty thousand men. These garrisons, so imprudently left behind, were of course abandoned to their fate, or to the discretion of the enemy; Napoleon consoling himself with the boast, "that, if they could form a junction in the valley of the Elbe, eighty thousand Frenchmen might break through all obstacles." Instructions were sent to the various commanders, to evacuate the places they held, and form such a junction; but it is believed that none of them reached the generals to whom they were addressed.

It is probable that, but for the relief afforded by this halt, and the protection of the citadel and defences of Erfurt, Napoleon, in his retreat from Leipsic, must have lost all that remained to him of an army. He had received news, however, of a character to preclude his longer stay in this place of refuge. The Bavarian army, so lately his allies, with a strong auxiliary force of Austrians, amounting in all to fifty thousand, under Wrede, were hurrying from the banks of the Inn, and had reached Wurtzburg on the Maine, with the purpose of throwing themselves in hostile fashion between the army of Napoleon and the frontier of France. In addition to this unpleasant intelligence, he learned that the Austrians and Prussians were pressing forward, as far as Weimar and Langensalza, so that he was once more in danger of being completely surrounded. Urged by these circumstances, Napoleon left Erfurt on the 25th of October, amid weather as tempestuous as his fortunes.

An unfortunate determination of the allied councils directed Marshal Blücher to move in pursuit of Napoleon by Giessen and Wetzlar, and commanded him to leave the direct road to the banks of the Rhine, by Fulda and Gelnhausen, open for the march of an Austrian column, expected to advance from Schmalkald. The most active and energetic of the pursuers was thus turned aside from Napoleon's direct path of retreat, and the Austrians, to whom it was yielded, did not come up in time to overtake the retreating enemy. The French were still followed, however, by the arrival of Cossacks under their adventurous leaders, Platoff, Czernicheff, Orloff-Dennizoff, and Kowalski, who continued their harassing and destructive operations on their flanks and their rear.

In the meanwhile General Wrede, notwithstanding the inferiority of his forces to those of Bonaparte, persevered in his purpose of barring the return of Napoleon into France, and took up a position at Hanau for that purpose, where he was joined by the chiefs of the Cossacks already mentioned, who had pushed on before the advance of the French army, in hopes that they might afford Wrede their assistance. If Blücher and his troops had been now in the rear of Napoleon, his hour had in all probability arrived. But Wrede's force, of whom he had been unable to bring up above 45,000 men, was inferior to the attempt, almost always a dangerous one, of intercepting the retreat of a bold and desperate enemy upon the only road which can lead him to safety. It was upon a point, also, where the Bavarians had no particular advantage of position, which might have presented natural obstacles to the progress of the enemy.

Upon the 30th, the Bavarians had occupied the large wood of Lamboi, and were disposed in line on the right bank of a small river called the Kintzig, near a village named Neuboff, where there is a bridge. The French threw a body of light troops into the wood, which was disputed from tree to tree, the close fire of the sharp-shooters on both sides resembling that of a general *chasse*, such as is practised on the Continent. The combat was sustained for several hours without decided success, until Bonaparte commanded an attack in force on the left

of the Bavarians. Two battalions of the Guards, under General Curial, were sent into the wood to support the French tirailleurs; and the Bavarians, at the sight of their grenadier-caps, imagined themselves attacked by the whole of that celebrated body, and gave way. A successful charge of cavalry was at the same time made on Wrede's left, which made it necessary for him to retreat behind the Kintzig. The Austro-Bavarian army continued to hold Hanau; but as the main road to Frankfort does not lead directly through that town, but passes on the south side of it, the desired line of retreat was left open to Napoleon, whose business it was to push forward to the Rhine, and avoid farther combat. But the rear-guard of the French army, consisting of 18,000 men, under command of Mortier, was still at Gelnhausen; and Marmont was left with three corps of infantry to secure their retreat, while Bonaparte, with the advance, pushed on to Williamstadt, and from thence to Hockstadt, in the direction of Frankfort.

On the morning of the 31st, Marmont made a double attack upon the town of Hanau, and the position of Wrede. Of the first he possessed himself by a bombardment. The other attack took place near the bridge of Neuhoß. The Bavarians had at first the advantage, and pushed a body of 1000 or 1200 men across the Kintzig; but the instant attack and destruction of these by the bayonet impressed their general with greater caution. Wrede himself was at this moment dangerously wounded, and the Prince of Cettingen, his son-in-law, killed on the spot. General Fresnel, who succeeded Wrede in the command, acted with more reserve. He drew off from the combat; and the French, more intent on prosecuting their march to the Rhine than on improving their advantages over the Bavarians, followed the emperor's line of retreat in the direction of Frankfort.

An instance of rustic loyalty and sagacity was displayed during the action, by a German miller, which may serve to vary the recurring detail of military movements. This man, observing the fate of the battle, and seeing a body of Bavarian infantry hard pressed by a large force of French cavalry, had the presence of mind to admit the water into his mill stream when the Bavarians had passed its channel, and thus suddenly interposed an obstacle between them and the pursuers, which enabled the infantry to halt and resume their ranks. The sagacious peasant was rewarded with a pension by the King of Bavaria.

The loss of the French in this sharp action was supposed to reach to about 6000 men; that of the Austro-Bavarians exceeded 10,000. Escaped from this additional danger, Napoleon arrived at Frankfort upon the 30th October, and left, upon the 1st November, a town which was soon destined to receive other guests. On the next day he arrived at Mentz, which he left upon the 7th November, and arriving on the 9th at Paris, concluded his second unsuccessful campaign.

The emperor had speedy information that the temper of the public was by no means tranquil. The victory of Hanau, though followed by no other effect than that of getting clear of the enemy, who

had presumed to check the retreat of the emperor, alone shed a lustre on the arms of Napoleon, which they greatly needed, for his late successive misfortunes had awakened both critics and murmurers. The rupture of the armistice seemed to be the date of his declension, as indeed the junction of the Austrians enabled the allies to bear him down by restless numbers. Nine battles had been fought since that period, including the action at Culm, which, in its results, is well entitled to the name. Of these, Bonaparte only gained two—those of Dresden and Hanau; that at Wachau was indecisive; while at Gross-Beerem, at Jauer on the Katsbach, at Culm, at Dennewitz, at Mœchern, and at Leipsic, the allies obtained decisive and important victories.

The French had been still more unfortunate in the number of bloody skirmishes which were fought almost everywhere through the scene of war. They were outnumbered in cavalry, and especially in light cavalry; they were outnumbered, too, in light corps of infantry and sharpshooters; for the Germans, who had entered into the war with general enthusiasm, furnished numerous reinforcements of this description to the regular armies of the allies. These disasters, however they might be glossed over, had not escaped the notice of the French; nor was it the sight of a few banners, and a column of 4000 Bavarian prisoners, ostentatiously paraded, that prevented their asking, what was become of upwards of 200,000 soldiers—what charm had dissolved the Confederation of the Rhine—and why they heard rumours of Russians, Austrians, Prussians, Germans, on the east, and of English, Spanish, and Portuguese, on the south, approaching the inviolable frontiers of the Great Nation? During the bright sunshine of prosperity, a nation may be too much dazzled with victory; but the gloomy horizon, obscured by adversity, shows objects in their real colours.

The fate of the garrisons in Germany, which Bonaparte had so imprudently omitted to evacuate, was not such as to cure this incipient disaffection. The emperor had never another opportunity, during this war, to collect the veteran troops thus unhappily left behind, under his banner, though often missing them at his greatest need. The dates of their respective surrenders, referring to a set of detached facts, which have no influence upon the general current of history, may be as well succinctly recited in this place.

St-Cyr at Dresden, finding himself completely abandoned to his own slender resources, made on the 11th of November a capitulation to evacuate the place, with his garrison of 35,000 men (of whom very many were however invalids), who were to have a safe conduct to France, under engagement not to serve against the allies for six months. Schwarzenberg refused to ratify the capitulation, as being much too favourable to the besieged. He offered St-Cyr, who had already left Dresden, to replace him there in the same condition of defence which he enjoyed when the agreement was entered into. This was contrary to the rules of war; for how was it possible for the French commandant to be in the same situation as before the capitulation, when the enemy had

become completely acquainted with his means of defence, and resources? But the French general conceived it more expedient to submit, with his army, to become prisoners of war, reserving his right to complain of breach of capitulation.

Stettin surrendered on the 21st of November, after an eight months' blockade. Eight thousand French remained prisoners of war. Here the Prussians regained no less than three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery.

On the 29th of November, the important city of Dantzic surrendered, after trenches had been open before it for forty days. As in the case of Dresden, the sovereigns refused to ratify the stipulation, which provided for the return of the garrison to France, but made the commandant, Rapp, the same proposal which had been offered to the Marshal St-Cyr; which Rapp in like manner declined. About nine thousand French were therefore sent prisoners into Russia. But the Bavarians, Westphalians, and Poles, belonging to the garrison, were permitted to return to their homes. Many of them took service with the allies. The detention of this garrison must also be recorded against the allies as a breach of faith, which the temptation of diminishing the enemy's forces cannot justify.

After the battle of Leipsic, Taunentzein had been detached to blockade Wittenberg, and besiege Torgau. The latter place was yielded on the 26th December, with a garrison of ten thousand wretches, amongst whom a pestilential fever was raging. Zamosc, in the Duchy of Warsaw, capitulated on the 22d, and Modlin on the 25th of December.

At the conclusion of the year 1813, only the following places, situated in the rear of the allies, remained in the hands of the French;—Hamburg, Magdeburg, Wittenberg, Custrin, Glogau, with the citadels of Erfurt and of Wurtzburg, the French having in the last two instances evacuated the towns.

Two circumstances are remarkable concerning the capture of the surrendered fortresses. The first is the dismal state of the garrisons. The men, who had survived the Russian campaign, and who had been distributed into these cities and fortresses by Murat, were almost all, from the hardships they had endured, and perhaps from their being too suddenly accommodated with more genial food, subject to diseases which speedily became infectious, and spread from the military to the inhabitants. When the severities of a blockade were added to this general tendency to illness, the deaths became numerous, and the case of the survivors made them envious of those who died. So virulent was the contagion at Torgau, that the Prussians, to whom the place was rendered on the 26th December, did not venture to take possession of it till a fortnight afterwards, when the ravage of the pestilence began to decline. Thus widely extended, and thus late prolonged, were the fatal effects of the Russian expedition.

The other point worth notice is, that the surrender of each fortress rendered disposable a blockading army of the allies, proportioned to the strength of the garrisons, which ought, according to the rules of war, to be at least two to one.* Thus

* Three to one, according to the general rule of war, is

while thousands after thousands of the French were marched to distant prisons in Austria and Russia, an addition was regularly made to the armies of the allies, equal at least to double the number of those that were withdrawn from the French army.

While these successes were in the act of being obtained in their rear, the allied sovereigns of Russia and Prussia advanced upon the Rhine, the right bank of which was almost entirely liberated from the enemy. It is a river upon which all the Germans look with a national pride, that sometimes takes almost the appearance of filial devotion. When the advanced guard of the army of the allies first came in sight of its broad majestic flood, they hailed the Father River with such reiterated shouts, that those who were behind stood to their arms and pressed forward, supposing that an action was about to take place. The proud and exulting feeling of recovered independence was not confined to those brave men who had achieved the liberation of their country, but extended everywhere, and animated the whole mass of the population of Germany.

The retreat of the French armies, or their relics, across the land which they had so long over-ran, and where they had leveled and confounded all national distinctions, might be compared to the abatement of the great deluge, when landmarks, which had been long hid from the eye, began to be once more visible and distinguished. The reconstruction of the ancient sovereignties was the instant occupation of the allies.

From the very field of battle at Leipsic, the Electoral Prince of Hesse departed to assume, amid the acclamations of the inhabitants, the sovereignty of the territories of his fathers. The allies, on 2d November, took possession of Hanover and its dependencies in name of the King of England. The gallant Duke of Brunswick, whose courage, as well as his ardent animosity against Bonaparte, we have already had occasion to commemorate, returned at the same time into the possession of his hereditary estates; and the ephemeral kingdom of Westphalia, the appanage of Jérôme Bonaparte, composed out of the spoils of these principalities, vanished into air, like the palace of Aladdin in the Arabian tale.

Those members of the Confederacy of the Rhine, who had hitherto been contented to hold their crowns and coronets, under the condition of being liege vassals to Bonaparte, and who were as much tired of his constant exactions as ever a drudging fiend was of the authority of a necromancer, lost no time in renouncing his sway, after his talisman was broken. Bavaria and Wirtemberg had early joined the alliance,—the latter power the more willingly, that the Crown Prince had, even during Napoleon's supremacy, refused to acknowledge his sway. The lesser princes, therefore, had no alternative but to declare, as fast as they could, their adherence to the same cause. Their ministers thronged to the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns, where they were admitted to peace and fraternity on the same general terms; namely, that each state should contribute, within a certain period, a year's income of their territories, the proportion of a blockading army to the garrison which it masks. But where there is little apprehension of relief or of strong sorties, the number may be much reduced.

with a contingent of soldiers double in numbers to that formerly exacted by Bonaparte, for maintaining the good cause of the alliance. They consented willingly; for though the demand might be heavy in the meantime, yet, with the downfall of the French Emperor, there was room to hope for that lasting peace which all men now believed to be inconsistent with a continuance of his power.

Waiting until their reinforcements should come from the interior of Germany, and until the subordinate princes should bring forward their respective contingents of troops, and desirous also to give Napoleon another opportunity of treating, the allied sovereigns halted on the banks of the Rhine, and cantoned their army along the banks of that river. This afforded a space to discover, whether the lofty mind of Napoleon could be yet induced to bend to such a peace as might consist with the material change in the circumstances of Europe, effected in the two last campaigns. Such a pacification was particularly the object of Austria; and the greater hope was entertained of its being practicable, that the same train of misfortunes which had driven Napoleon beyond the Rhine, had darkened his political horizon in other quarters.

Italy, so long the scene of his triumphs, was now undergoing the same fate as his other conquests, and rapidly melting away from his grasp. At the beginning of the campaign, the Viceroy Eugène, with about forty-five thousand men, had defended the north of Italy, with great skill and valour, against the Austrian general, Hiller, who confronted him with superior forces. The frontiers of Illyria were the chief scene of their military operations. The French maintained themselves there until the defection of the Bavarians opened the passes of the Tyrol to the Austrian army, after which, Eugène was obliged to retire behind the Adige. The warlike Croats, declaring in favour of their ancient sovereigns of Austria, mutinied, and rose in arms on several points. The important seaport of Trieste was taken by the Austrians on the 21st of October. General Nugent had entered the mouth of the Po with an English squadron, with a force sufficient to occupy Ferrara and Ravenna, and organize a general insurrection against the French. It was known also, that Murat, who had begun to fear lest he should be involved in the approaching fall of Napoleon, and who remembered with more feeling the affronts which Napoleon had put upon him from time to time, than the greatness to which he had been elevated by him, was treating with the allies, and endeavouring to make a peace which should secure his own authority under their sanction. Thus, there was no point of view in which Italy could be regarded as a source of assistance to Bonaparte; on the contrary, that fair country, the subject of his pride and his favour, was in the greatest danger of being totally lost to him.

The Spanish Peninsula afforded a still more alarming prospect. The battle of Vittoria had entirely destroyed the usurped authority of Joseph Bonaparte, and Napoleon himself had become desirous to see the war ended, at the price of totally ceding the kingdom on which he had seized so unjustifiably, and which he had, in his fatal obstinacy, continued to grasp, like a furious madman holding a

hot iron until it has scorched him to the bone.

After that decisive battle, there was no obstacle in front to prevent the Duke of Wellington from entering France, but he chose first to reduce the strong frontier fortresses of St Sebastian and Pampeluna. The first capitulated finally on the 9th September; and notwithstanding the skill and bravery of Soult, which were exerted to the uttermost, he could not relieve Pampeluna. The English army, at least its left wing, passed the Bidassoa upon the 7th October, and Pampeluna surrendered on the 31st of the same month. Thus was the most persevering and the most hated of Bonaparte's enemies placed in arms upon the French soil, under the command of a general who had been so uniformly successful, that he seemed to move hand in hand with victory. It was but a slender consolation, in this state of matters, that Suchet, the Duke of Albufera, still maintained himself in Catalonia, his headquarters being at Barcelona. In fact it would have been of infinitely more importance to Bonaparte, had the marshal and those troops, who had not yet been discouraged by defeat, been on the north side of the Pyrenees, and ready to co-operate in defence of the frontiers of France.

To parry this pressing danger, Napoleon had recourse to a plan, which, had it been practised the year before, might have placed the affairs of Spain on a very different footing. He resolved, as we have hinted, to desist from the vain undertaking, which had cost himself so much blood and treasure; to undo his own favorite work; to resign the claims of his brother to the crown of Spain; and, by restoring the legitimate sovereign to the throne, endeavour to form such an alliance with him as might take Spain out of the list of his enemies, and perhaps add her to that of his friends. Had he had recourse to this expedient in the previous year, Ferdinand's appearance in Spain might have had a very important effect in embroiling the councils of the Cortes. It is well known that the unfortunate distinctions of royalists and liberals were already broken out among the Spaniards, and, from the colours in which his present majesty of Spain has since shown himself, there is great room to doubt whether he had either temper, wisdom, or virtue sufficient to act as a mediator betwixt the two classes of his subjects, of which both were inclined to carry their opposite opinions into extremes. It is more than probable that a civil war might even then have taken place, between the king, desirous of regaining the plenitude of authority conferred on him by the ancient constitution, and the Cortes, anxious to maintain the liberties which they had recently recovered, and carried, by their new constitution, to the extent of republican license. If such a war had arisen, King Ferdinand would probably have fallen into the snare prepared for him by Bonaparte, and called in his late jailer, in the capacity of his ally, against the Cortes, and perhaps also against the English, who, though not approving of the theoretical extravagances of the system of government, which had divided the patriots into two civil factions, must, nevertheless, have considered that assembly as the representatives of the Spanish people, and the allies with whom the British had formed

their league. Talleyrand is said to have recommended the liberation of Ferdinand at a much earlier period. He called the measure an olla podrida for Spain.

But Napoleon's present concession came too late, and was too evidently wrung from him by the most pressing necessity, to permit Ferdinand, however desirous of his liberty, to accept of it on the terms offered. The reader may, indeed, be curious to know in what language Napoleon could address the prince whose person he had seized, and imprisoned like a kidnapper, and on whose throne he had so long and so pertinaciously endeavoured to support a usurper. Perhaps, when writing the following letter, Bonaparte was himself sensible that his conduct admitted of no glossing over; he, therefore, came to the point, it will be observed, at once, trusting probably that the hope of being restored to his liberty and kingdom would be so agreeable in itself, that the captive monarch would not be disposed strictly to criticise the circumstances which had occasioned so pleasing an offer, or the expressions in which it was conveyed.

"My Cousin—The state of my empire and of my political situation leads me to put a final adjustment to the affairs of Spain. The English are exciting anarchy and jacobinism; they endeavour to overthrow the crown and the nobility, in order to establish a republic. I cannot, without being deeply affected, think on the destruction of a nation which interests me, both by its neighbourhood, and its common interest concerning maritime commerce. I wish to re-establish the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood, which have so long been established betwixt France and Spain. You will therefore listen to what the Count de la Forest will propose in my name," &c.

Considering the terms of this letter, and contrasting them with the manner in which the friendly relations alluded to had been broken off, and that in which the interest taken by Napoleon in the kingdom of Spain had been displayed, the hypocritical professions of the writer were too obviously dictated by necessity, to impose upon the meanest understanding. The answer of Ferdinand was not without dignity. He declined to treat without having an opportunity of consulting with the regency of Spain, and required permission to hear a deputation of his subjects, who might at once inform him of the actual state of affairs in Spain, and point out a remedy for the evils under which the kingdom suffered.

"If," said the prince, in his reply to Napoleon's proposal, "this liberty is not permitted to me, I prefer remaining at Valencey, where I have now lived four years and a half, and where I am willing to die, if such is God's pleasure." Finding the prince firm upon this score, Napoleon, to whom his freedom might be possibly some advantage, and when his captivity could no longer in any shape benefit him, consented that Ferdinand should be liberated, upon a treaty being drawn up between the Duke of San Carlos, as the representative of Ferdinand, and the Count de la Forest, as plenipotentiary of Napoleon; but which treaty should not be ratified until it had been approved of by the regency. The heads were briefly these:—1, Napoleon

recognized Ferdinand as the King of Spain and the Indies. 2, Ferdinand undertook that the English should evacuate Spain, and particularly Minorca and Ceuta. 3, The two governments became engaged to each other, to place their relations on the footing prescribed by the treaty of Utrecht, and which had been maintained until 1772. Lastly, the new king engaged to pay a suitable revenue to his father, and a jointure to his mother, in case of her survivance; and provision was made for re-establishing the commercial relations betwixt France and Spain.

In this treaty of Valencey, subscribed the 11th of December, 1813, the desire of Bonaparte to embroil Spain with her ally, Great Britain, is visible not only in the second article, but in the third. For as Napoleon always contended that his opposition to the rights exercised on the sea by the English had been grounded on the treaty of Utrecht, his reference to that treaty upon the present occasion shows that he had not yet lost sight of his continental system.

The regency of Spain, when the treaty of Valencey was laid before them, refused to ratify it, both in virtue of a decree of the Cortes, which, as early as January, 1811, declared that there should be neither truce nor negotiation with France, until the king should enjoy his entire liberty, and on account of their treaty with England, in which Spain engaged to contract no peace without England's concurrence. Thus obliged to renounce the hopes of fettering Spain, as a nation, with any conditions, Bonaparte at length released Ferdinand from his confinement, and permitted him to return to his kingdom upon his personal subscription of the treaty, trusting that, in the political alterations which his arrival might occasion in Spain, something might turn up to serve his own views, which could never be advanced by Ferdinand's continuing in confinement. Nothing of the kind, however, took place, nor is it needful either to detain the reader farther with the Spanish affairs, or again to revert to them. Ferdinand is said, by the French, to have received Napoleon's proposals with much satisfaction, and to have written a letter of thanks to the emperor for his freedom, obtained after nearly six years' most causeless imprisonment. If so, the circumstance must be received as evidence of Ferdinand's singularly grateful disposition, of which we believe there are few other examples to be quoted. The liberated monarch returned to his territories, at the conclusion of all this negotiation, in the end of March, 1814. The event is here anticipated, that there may be no occasion to return to it.

Another state-prisoner of importance was liberated about the same time. Nearly at the commencement of the year 1814, proposals had been transmitted, by the agency of Cardinal Maury and the Bishops of Evreux and Plaisance, to Pius VII., still detained at Fontainebleau. His liberation was tendered to him, and, on condition of his ceding a part of the territories of the church, he was to be restored to the remainder.

"The dominions of Saint Peter are not my property," answered the pontiff; "they belong to the church, and I cannot consent to their cession."

"To prove the emperor's good intentions," said the Bishop of Plaisance, "I have orders to announce your holiness's return to Rome."

"It must then be with all my cardinals," said Pius VII.

"Under the present circumstances that is impossible."

"Well, then, a carriage to transport me is all I desire—I wish to be at Rome to acquit myself of my duties as head of the church."

An escort, termed a guard of honour, attended him, commanded by a colonel, who treated his holiness with much respect, but seemed disposed to suffer no one to speak with him in private. Pius VII. convoked, however, the cardinals who were at Fontainebleau, to the number of seventeen, and took an affecting farewell. As the pope was about to depart, he commanded them to wear no decoration received from the French government; to accept no pension of their bestowing; and to assist at no festival to which they might be invited. On the 24th of January, Pius left Fontainebleau, and returned by slow journeys to Savona, where he remained from the 19th of February to the 19th of March. He reached Fiorenzuola on the 23d, where his French escort was relieved by an Austrian detachment, by whom the pontiff was received with all the usual honours; and he arrived at Rome on the 18th of May, amid the acclamations of thousands, who thronged to receive his benediction.

With such results terminated an act of despotic authority, one of the most impolitic, as well as unpopular, practised by Bonaparte during his reign. He himself was so much ashamed of it, as to disown his having given any orders for the captivity of the pontiff, though it was continued under his authority for five years and upwards. It was remarkable, that when the pope was taken from Rome as a prisoner, Murat was in possession of his dominions, as the connexion and ally of Bonaparte; and now his holiness found the same Murat and his army at Rome, and received from his hands, in the opposite character of ally of the Emperor of Austria, the redelivery of the patrimony of St Peter's in its full integrity.

Thus was restored to its ancient allegiance that celebrated city, which had for a time borne the title of SECOND in the French dominions. The revolution in Holland came also to augment the embarrassments of Napoleon, and dislocate what remained of the immense additions which he had attempted to unite with his empire. That country had been first impoverished by the total destruction of its commerce, under pretence of enforcing the continental system. It was from his inability to succeed in his attempt to avert this pest from the peaceful and industrious Dutchmen, that Louis Bonaparte had relinquished in disgust a sceptre, the authority of which was not permitted to protect the people over whom it was swayed.

The distress which followed, upon the introduction of these unnatural restrictions into a country, the existence of which depended on the freedom of its commerce, was almost incredible. At Amsterdam, the population was reduced from 220,000 to 109,000 souls. In the Hague, Delft, and else-

where, many houses were pulled down, or suffered to fall to ruin by the proprietors, from inability to pay the taxes. At Haarlem, whole streets were in desolation, and about five hundred houses were entirely dismantled. The preservation of the dikes was greatly neglected for want of funds, and the sea, breaking in at the Polders and elsewhere, threatened to resume what human industry had withdrawn from her reign.

The discontent of the people arose to the highest pitch, and their thoughts naturally reverted to the paternal government of the house of Orange, and the blessings which they had enjoyed under it. But with the prudence, which is the distinguishing mark of the national character, the Dutch knew, that until the power of France should be broken, any attempt at insurrection in Holland must be hopeless; they, therefore, contented themselves with forming secret confederations among the higher order of citizens in the principal towns, who made it their business to prevent all premature disturbances on the part of the lower classes, insinuating themselves, at the same time, so much into their favor, that they were sure of having them at their disposal, when a propitious moment for action should arise. Those intrusted with the secret of the intended insurrection acted with equal prudence and firmness; and the sagacious, temperate, and reasonable character of the nation was never seen to greater advantage than upon this occasion. The national guards were warmly disposed to act in the cause. The rumours of Bonaparte's retreat from Leipsic,

— for such an host

Fled not in silence through the affrighted deep,

united to prepare the public mind for resistance to the foreign yoke; and the approach of General Bulow towards the banks of the Yssel, became the signal for general insurrection.

On the 14th November, the Orange flag was hoisted at the Hague and at Amsterdam, amid the ancient acclamations of "Orange-boven" (Up with the Orange). At Rotterdam, a small party of the Dutch patriots, of the better class, waited on the prefect, Le Brun, Duke of Placentia, and, showing the orange cockade which they wore, addressed the French general in these words:—"You may guess from these colours the purpose which has brought us hither, and the events which are about to take place. You, who are now the weakest, know that we are the strongest—and we, the strongest, know that you are the weakest. You will act wisely to depart from this place in quiet; and the sooner you do so, you are the less likely to expose yourself to insult, and it may be to danger."

A revolution of so important a nature had never certainly been announced to the sinking party, with so little tumult, or in such courteous terms. The reply of General Le Brun was that of a Frenchman, seldom willing to be outdone in politeness:—"I have expected this summons for some time, and am very willing to accede to your proposal, and take my departure immediately." He mounted into his carriage accordingly, and drove through an immense multitude now assembled, without meeting any other

insult than being required to join in the universal cry of Orange-boven.

The Dutch were altogether without arms when they took the daring resolution to reconstruct their ancient government, and were for some time in great danger. But they were secured by the advance of the Russians to their support, while forces from England were sent over, to the number of 6,000 men, under General Graham, now Lord Lynedoch; so that the French troops, who had thrown themselves into two or three forts, were instantly blockaded, and prevented from disturbing the country by excursions.

No event during the war made a more general and deep impression on the mind of the British nation, than the liberation of Holland, which is well entitled by a recent author, "one of the most fortunate events which could at that moment have taken place. The rapidity with which the Dutch, from being obstacles to the invasion of France, became the instruments by which that undertaking was most facilitated, could only have been brought about through the detestable system of government which Bonaparte had pursued with them."*

Thus victory, having changed her course, like some powerful spring-tide, was now, in the end of the year 1813, receding at every point from the dominions which its strong and rapid onward course had so totally overwhelmed.

CHAPTER XC.

Preparations of Napoleon against the invasion of France.

—*Terms of peace offered by the allies, through the Baron de St-Aignan.*—*Bases of the treaty.*—*Congress held at Manheim.*—*Lord Castlereagh.*—*Manifesto of the allies.*—*Bonaparte's reply.*—*Its insincerity.*—*State of parties in France.*—1. *The adherents of the Bourbons—their chief partisans.*—2. *The old republicans.*—*The population of France, in general, wearied of the war, and desirous of the deposition of Bonaparte.*—*His unsuccessful attempts to arouse the national spirit.*—*Council of state extraordinary held, on November 11th, when new taxes are imposed, and a new conscription of 300,000 men decreed.*—*Gloom of the council, and violence of Bonaparte.*—*Report of the state of the nation presented to Napoleon by the Legislative Body.*—*His indignation on receiving it.*—*The Legislative Body is prorogued.*—*Commissioners sent to the departments to rouse the people—but in vain.*—*Unceasing activity of the emperor.*—*National Guard called out.*—*Napoleon, presenting to them his empress and child, takes leave of the people.*—*He leaves Paris for the armies on 25th January, 1814, full of melancholy presages.*

WHILE these scenes were passing in the vicinity of France, the emperor was using every effort to bring forward, in defence of her territory, a force in some degree corresponding to the ideas which he desired men should entertain of the Great Nation. He distributed the seventy or eighty thousand men whom he had brought back with him, along the line of the Rhine, unmoved by the opinions of those who deemed them insufficient in number to defend so

wide a stretch of frontier. Allowing the truth of their reasoning, he denied its efficacy in the present instance. Policy now demanded, he said, that there should be no voluntary abatement of the lofty pretensions to which France laid claim. The Austrians and Prussians still remembered the campaigns of the Revolution, and dreaded to encounter France once more in the character of an armed nation. This apprehension was to be kept up as long as possible, and almost at all risks. To concentrate his forces would be to acknowledge his weakness, to confess that he was devoid of means to supply the exhausted battalions; and, what might be still more imprudent, it was making the nation itself sensible of the same melancholy truth; so that, according to this reasoning, it was necessary to keep up appearances, however ill seconded by realities. The allied sovereigns, on the other hand, were gradually approaching to the right bank of the Rhine their immense masses, which, including the reserves, did not perhaps amount to less than half a million of men.

The scruples of the Emperor of Austria, joined to the respect entertained for the courage of the French, and the talents of their leader, by the coalition at large, influenced their councils at this period, and before resuming a train of hostilities which must involve some extreme conclusion, they resolved once more to offer terms of peace to the Emperor of France.

The agent selected on this occasion was the Baron de St-Aignan, a French diplomatist of reputation, residing at one of the German courts, who, falling into the hands of the allies, was set at liberty, with a commission to assure the French Emperor of their willingness to enter into a treaty on equal terms. The English government also publicly announced their readiness to negotiate for a peace, and that they would make considerable concessions to obtain so great a blessing. Napoleon, therefore, had another opportunity for negotiating, upon such terms as must indeed deprive him of the unjust supremacy among European councils which he had attempted to secure, but would have left him a high and honourable seat among the sovereigns of Europe. But the pertinacity of Napoleon's disposition qualified him ill for a negotiator, unless when he had the full power in his own hand to dictate the terms. His determined firmness of purpose, in many cases a great advantage, proved now the very reverse, as it prevented him from anticipating absolute necessity, by sacrificing, for the sake of peace, something which it was actually in his power to give or retain. This tenacity was a peculiar feature of his character. He might, indeed, be brought to give up his claims to kingdoms and provinces which were already put beyond his power to recover; but when the question regarded the cession of anything which was still in his possession, the grasp of the lion itself could scarce be more unrelaxing. Hence, as his misfortunes accumulated, the negotiations between him and the allies came to resemble the bargain driven with the King of Rome, according to ancient history, for the books of the Sybils. The price of peace, like that of these mysterious volumes, was raised against him upon every renewal of the conferences. This cannot surprise any one who considers, that, in pro-

* *Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814, p. 49.*

portion to the number of defeats sustained and power diminished, the demands of the party gaining the advantage must naturally be heightened.

This will appear from a retrospect to former negotiations. Before the war with Russia, Napoleon might have made peace upon nearly his own terms, providing they had been accompanied with a disavowal of that species of superior authority, which, by the display of his armies on the frontiers of Poland, he seemed disposed to exercise over an independent and powerful empire. There was nothing left to be disputed between the two emperors, excepting the point of equality, which it was impossible for Alexander to yield up, in justice to himself and to his subjects.

The congress at Prague was of a different complexion. The fate of war, or rather the consequence of Napoleon's own rashness, had lost him an immense army, and had delivered from his predominant influence both Prussia and Austria; and these powers, united in alliance with Russia and England, had a title to demand, as they had the means of enforcing, such a treaty as should secure Prussia, from again descending into a state which may be compared to that of Helots or Gibeonites; and Austria from one less directly dependent, but by the continuance of which she was stripped of many fair provinces, and exposed along her frontier to suffer turmoil from all the wars which the too well-known ambition of the French empire might awaken in Germany. Yet even then the terms proposed by Prince Metternich stipulated only the liberation of Germany from French influence, with the restoration of the Illyrian provinces. The fate of Holland, and that of Spain, were remitted till a general peace, to which England should be a party. But Bonaparte, though Poland and Illyria might be considered as lost, and the line of the Elbe and Oder as indefensible against the assembled armies of the allies, refused to accept these terms, unless clogged with the condition that the Hanse towns should remain under French influence; and did not even transmit this qualified acquiescence to a treaty, until the truce appointed for the purpose of the congress had expired.

After gaining six battles, and after the allies had redeemed their pledge that they would not hear of farther negotiation while there was a French soldier in Germany except as a prisoner, or as belonging to the garrison of a blockaded fortress, it was natural that the demands of the confederated sovereigns should rise; more especially as England, at whose expense the war had been in a great measure carried on, was become a party to the conferences, and her particular objects must now be attended to in their turn.

The terms, therefore, proposed to Napoleon, on which peace and the guarantee of his dynasty might be obtained, had risen in proportion to the success of his enemies.

The Earl of Aberdeen, well known for his literature and talents, attended, on the part of Great Britain, the negotiations held with the Baron de St-Aignan. The bases of the treaty proposed by the allies were—that France, divesting herself of all the unnatural additions with which the conquests of Bonaparte had invested her, should return to her

natural limits, the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, which of course left her in possession of the rich provinces of Belgium. The independence of Italy, Germany, and Holland, were absolutely stipulated. Spain, whom the power of Great Britain, seconded by her own efforts, had nearly freed of the French yoke, was to be in like manner restored to independence, under Ferdinand.

Such were the outlines of the terms proposed. But it is generally admitted, that if Bonaparte had shown a candid wish to close with them, the stipulations might have been modified, so as to be more agreeable to him than they sounded in the abstract. There were ministers in the cabinet of the allied sovereigns who advised an acquiescence in Eugène Beauharnais, of whom a very favourable opinion was entertained, being received as king of the upper part of Italy, while Murat retained the southern half of that peninsula. The same counsellors would not have objected to holding Holland as sufficiently independent, if the conscientious Louis Bonaparte were placed at its head. As for Spain, its destinies were now beyond the influence of Napoleon, even in his own opinion, since he was himself treating with his captive at Valencey, for re-establishing him on the throne. A treaty, therefore, might possibly have been achieved by help of skilful management, which, while it affirmed the nominal independence of Italy and Holland, would have left Napoleon in actual possession of all the real influence which so powerful a mind could have exercised over a brother, a son-in-law, and a brother-in-law, all indebted to him for their rise to the rank they held. His power might have been thus consolidated in the most formidable manner, and his empire placed in such security, that he could fear no aggression on any quarter, and had only to testify pacific intentions towards other nations, to insure the perfect tranquillity of France, and of the world.

But it did not suit the high-soaring ambition of Napoleon to be contented with such a degree of power as was to be obtained by negotiation. His favourite phrase on such occasions, which indeed he had put into the mouth of Maria Louisa upon a recent occasion, was, that he could not occupy a throne, the glory of which was tarnished. This was a strange abuse of words; for if his glory was at all impaired, as in a military point of view it certainly was, the depreciation arose from his having lost many great battles, and could not be increased by his acquiescing in such concessions as his defeats rendered necessary. The loss of a battle necessarily infers, more or less, some censure on the conduct of a defeated general; but it can never dishonour a patriotic prince to make such sacrifices as may save his people from the scourge of a protracted and losing warfare. Yet let us do justice to the memory of a man so distinguished. If a merited confidence in the zeal and bravery of his troops, or in his own transcendent abilities as a general, could justify him in committing a great political error, in neglecting the opportunity of securing peace on honourable terms, the events of the strangely-varied campaign of 1814 show sufficiently the ample ground there was for his entertaining such an assurance.

At this period, Maret, Duke of Bassano, invited

the allies to hold a congress at Manheim, for considering the preliminaries of peace; and, on the part of Great Britain, Lord Castlereagh, a cabinet minister, was sent over to represent her on this important occasion. Faction, which, in countries where free discussion is permitted, often attaches its censure to the best and worthiest of those to whose political opinions it is opposed, has calumniated this statesman during his life, and even after his death. This is one of the evils, at the expense of which freedom is purchased; and it is purchased the more cheaply, that the hour of confutation fails not to come. Now, when his power can attract no flattery, and excite no odium, impartial history must write on the tomb of Castlereagh, that his undaunted courage, manly steadiness, and deep political sagacity, had the principal share in infusing that spirit of continued exertion and unabated perseverance into the councils of the allies, which supported them through many intervals of doubt and indecision, and finally conducted them to the triumphant conclusion of the most eventful contest which Europe ever saw.

In the meanwhile, both parties proclaimed their anxiety for peace, well aware of the advantageous opinion which the French public in particular could not fail to entertain of that party, which seemed most disposed to afford the world the blessings of that state of rest and tranquillity, which was now universally sighed for.

A manifesto was published by the allied monarchs, in which they complain, unreasonably certainly, of the preparations which Bonaparte was making for recruiting his army, which augmentation of the means of resistance, whether Napoleon was to look to peace or war, was equally justifiable, when the frontiers of France were surrounded by the allied armies. The rest of this state paper was in a better, because a truer tone. It stated that victory had brought the allies to the Rhine, but they meant to make no farther use of their advantages than to propose to Napoleon a peace, founded on the independence of France, as well as upon that of every other country. "They desired," as this document stated, "that France should be great, powerful, and happy, because the power of France is one of the fundamental bases of the social system in Europe. They were willing to confirm to her an extent of territory, greater than she enjoyed under her ancient kings; but they desired, at the same time, that Europe should enjoy tranquillity. It was, in short, their object to arrange a pacification on such terms as might, by mutual guarantees, and a well-arranged balance of power, preserve Europe in future from the numberless calamities, which, during twenty years, had distracted the world." This public declaration seemed intended to intimate that the war of the coalition was not as yet directed against the person of Napoleon, or his dynasty, but only against his system of arbitrary supremacy. The allies further declared, that they would not lay down their arms until the political state of Europe should be finally arranged on unalterable principles, and recognized by the sanctity of treaties.

The reply of Bonaparte is contained in a letter from Caulaincourt to Metternich, dated 2d Decem-

ber. It declared that Bonaparte acquiesced in the principle which should rest the proposed pacification on the absolute independence of the states of Europe, so that neither one nor another should in future arrogate sovereignty or supremacy in any form whatsoever, either upon land or sea. It was therefore declared, that his majesty adhered to the general bases and abstracts communicated by Monsieur St-Aignan. "They will involve," the letter added, "great sacrifices on the part of France, but his majesty would make them without regret, if, by like sacrifices, England would give the means of arriving at a general peace, honourable for all concerned."

The slightest attention to this document shows that Napoleon, in his pretence of being desirous for peace on the terms held out in the proposals of the allies, was totally insincere. His answer was artfully calculated to mix up with the diminution of his own exorbitant power, the question of the maritime law, on which England and all other nations had acted for many centuries, and which gives to those nations that possess powerful fleets, the same advantage which those that have great armies enjoy by the law martial. The rights arising out of this law maritime had been maintained by England at the end of the disastrous American war, when the Armed Neutrality was formed for the express purpose of depriving her, in her hour of weakness, of this bulwark of her naval power. It had been defended during the present war against all Europe, with France and Napoleon at her head. It was impossible that Britain should permit any challenge of her maritime rights in the present moment of her prosperity, when not only her ships rode triumphant on every coast, but her own victorious army was quartered on French ground, and the powerful hosts of her allies, brought to the field by her means, were arrayed along the whole frontier of the Rhine. The Emperor of the French might have as well proposed to make the peace which Europe was offering to him depend upon Great Britain's ceding Ireland or Scotland.

Neither can it be pretended that there was an indirect policy in introducing this discussion as an apple for discord, which might give cause to dissension among the allies. Far from looking on the maritime law, as exercised by Britain, with the eyes of jealousy, with which it might at other times have been regarded, the continental nations remembered the far greater grievances which had been entailed on them by Bonaparte's memorable attempt to put down that law by his anti-commercial system, which had made Russia herself buckle on her armour, and was a cause, and a principal one, of the general coalition against France. As Bonaparte, therefore, could have no hope to obtain any advantage, direct or indirect, from mixing up the question of maritime rights with that of the general settlement of the Continent, and as mere spleen and hatred to Great Britain would be scarce an adequate motive in a mind so sagacious, we must suppose this inadmissible stipulation to have been thrown in for the purpose of enabling him to break off the negotiation when he pleased, and cast upon the English the unpopularity attending the breach of it. It is very true, that Es-

had had offered to make sacrifices for obtaining a general peace; but these sacrifices, as was seen by the event, regarded the restoration to France of conquered colonies, not the cession of her own naval rights, which, on no occasion whatsoever, a minister of Britain will, can, or dare, permit to be brought into challenge. Accordingly, the acceptance by Bonaparte of the terms transmitted by St-Aignan being provided with a slip-knot, as it were, by which he could free himself from the engagement at pleasure, was considered, both by the allies, and by a large proportion of the people of France, as elusory, and indicating no serious purpose of pacification. The treaty therefore languished, and was not fairly set on foot until the chance of war had been again appealed to.

In the meanwhile, the allies were bringing up their reserves as fast as possible, and Bonaparte on his side was doing all he could to recruit his forces. His measures for this purpose had been adopted long before the present emergency. As far back as the 9th October, the Empress Maria Louisa, in the character of regent, presided in a meeting of the Senate, held for the purpose of calling for fresh recruits to the armies. She was an object of interest and compassion to all, when announcing the war which had broken out betwixt her father and her husband; but the following injudicious censure upon her country was put into the mouth of the young sovereign, without much regard to delicacy. "No one," she said, "can know so well as I what the French will have to dread, if they permit the allies to be conquerors." The closing paragraph was also much criticised, as attaching more importance to the personal feelings of the sovereign, than ought to have been exclusively ascribed to them in so great a public extremity. "Having been acquainted for four years with the inmost thoughts of my husband, I know with what sentiments he would be afflicted if placed on a tarnished throne, and wearing a crown despoiled of glory." The decree of the Senate, passive as usual, appointed a levy of two hundred and eighty thousand conscripts.

When Bonaparte arrived at St-Cloud, after having brought the remains of his once great army to Mentz, his affairs were even in a worse state than had been anticipated. But before we proceed to detail the measures which he took for redeeming them, it is necessary to take notice of two parties in the state, who, in consequence of the decay of the Imperial power, were growing gradually into importance.

The first were the adherents of the Bourbons, who, reduced to silence by the long-continued successes of Bonaparte, still continued to exist, and now resumed their consequence. They had numerous partisans in the west and south of France, and many of them still maintained correspondence with the exiled family. The old noblesse, amongst whom such as did not attach themselves to the court and person of Napoleon continued to be staunch royalists, had acquired, or rather regained, a considerable influence in Parisian society. The superior elegance of their manners, the seclusion, and almost mystery of their meetings, their courage and their misfortunes, gave an interest to these relics of the history of France, which was increased

by the historical remembrances connected with ancient names and high descent. Bonaparte himself, by the restoration of nobility as a rank, gave a dignity to those who had possessed it for centuries, which his own new creations could not impart. It is true that, in the eye of philosophy, the great man who first merits and wins a distinguished title is in himself infinitely more valuable and respectable than the obscure individual who inherits his honours at the distance of centuries; but then he is valued for his personal qualities, not for his noblesse. No one thought of paying those marshals, whose names and actions shook the world, a greater degree of respect when Napoleon gave them titles. On the contrary, they will live in history, and be familiar to the imagination, by their own names, rather than those arising from their peerages. But the science of heraldry, when admitted as an arbitrary rule of society, reverses the rule of philosophy, and ranks nobility, like medals, not according to the intrinsic value of the metal, but in proportion to its antiquity. If this was the case with even the heroes who had hewed a soldier's path to honours, it was still more so with the titles granted by Bonaparte, "upon carpet consideration," and the knights whom he dubbed with unhacked rapier. It might be truly said of these, that

Their fire-new stamp of honour scarce was current.

When, therefore, the republican fury died away, and Bonaparte directed the respect of the people at large towards title and nobility, a distinct and superior influence was acquired by those who possessed such honours by hereditary descent. Napoleon knew this, and courted, and in some degree feared, the remainder of the old noblesse, who, unless he could decidedly attach them to his own interest, were exposed to surveillance and imprisonment on circumstances of slight suspicion. They became, however, so circumspect and cautious, that it was impossible to introduce the spies of the police into their *salons* and private parties. Still Napoleon was sensible of the existence of this party, and of the danger which might attend upon it, even while his followers had forgot perhaps that the Bourbons continued to live. "I thought him mad," said Ney (whose head, according to Fouché, could not embrace two political ideas), "when, taking leave of the army at Smorgoni, he used the expression, 'The Bourbons will make their own of this.'"^{*}

This party began now to be active, and a royalist confederation organized itself in the centre of France as early as the month of March, 1813. The most distinguished members are said to have been the Dukes of Duras, Tremouille, and Fitzjames; Messrs de Polignac, Ferrand, Adrien de Montmorency, Stothène de La Rochefoucault, Sesmaison, and La Roche-Jacquelin. Royalist commanders had been nominated in different quarters—Count Suzannet in the Lower Poitou, Duras in Orleans and Tours, and the Marquis de Rivière in the province of Berri. Bordeaux was full of royalists,

^{*} "Les Bourbons s'en tiraient." *Mémoires de Fouché*, vol. II, p. 149.

most of them of the mercantile class, who were ruined by the restrictions of the continental system, and all waited anxiously a signal for action.

Another internal faction, noways desirous of the return of the Bourbons, yet equally inimical to the power of Napoleon, consisted of the old republican statesmen and leaders, with the more zealous part of their followers. These could not behold with indifference the whole fruits of the Revolution, for which so much misery had been endured, so much blood spilled, so many crimes committed, swept away by the rude hand of a despotic soldier. They saw, with a mixture of shame and mortification, that the issue of all their toils and all their systems had been the monstrous concoction of a military despotism, compared with which every other government in Europe might be declared liberal, except perhaps that of Turkey. During the monarchy, so long represented as a system of slavery, public opinion had in the parliaments zealous advocates, and an opportunity of making itself known; but in Imperial France all was mute, except the voice of hired functionaries, mere trumpets of the government, who breathed not a sound but what was suggested to them. A sense of this degraded condition united in secret all those who desired to see a free government in France, and especially such as had been active in the commencement of the Revolution.

This class of politicians could not desire the return of the family in whose exile they had been active, and had therefore cause to fear the re-action with which such an event might be attended; but they wished to get rid of Napoleon, whose government seemed to be alike inconsistent with peace and with liberty. The idea of a regency suggested itself to Fouché and others, as a plausible mode of attaining their purpose. Austria, they thought, might be propitiated by giving Maria Louisa the precedence in the council of regency as guardian of her son, who should succeed to the crown when he came to the age of majority. This expedient, it was thought, would give an opportunity, in the meanwhile, to introduce free principles into the constitution. But while it does not appear how these theorists intended to dispose of Napoleon, it is certain that nothing but his death, captivity, or perpetual exile, would have prevented such a man from obtaining the full management of a regency, in which his wife was to preside in the name of his son.

A great part of the population of France, without having any distinct views as to its future government, were discontented with that of Bonaparte, which, after having drained the country of men and wealth, seemed about to terminate, by subjecting it to the revenge of incensed Europe. When these were told that Bonaparte could not bear to sit upon a tarnished throne, or wear a crown of which the glory was diminished, they were apt to consider how often it was necessary that the best blood of France should be expended in washing the one, and restoring the brilliancy of the other. They saw in Napoleon a bold and obstinate man, conscious of having overcome so many obstacles, that he could not endure to admit the existence of any which might be insurmountable. They beheld him obstinately

determined to retain everything, defend everything, venture everything, without making the least sacrifice to circumstances, as if he were in his own person independent of the laws of Destiny, to which the whole universe is subjected. These men felt the oppression of the new taxes, the terrors of the new conscription,* and without forming a wish as to the mode in which he was to be succeeded, devoutly desired the emperor's deposition. But when an end is warmly desired, the means of attaining it soon come to occupy the imagination; and thus many of those who were at first a sort of general malcontents, came to attach themselves to the more decided faction either of the royalists or liberalists.

These feelings, varying between absolute hostility to Napoleon, and indifference to his fate, threw a general chilliness over the disposition to resist the invasion of the strangers, which Bonaparte had reckoned on as certain to render the war national amongst so high-spirited a people as the French. No effort was spared to dispel this apathy, and excite them to resistance; the presses of the capital and the provinces all adopted the tone suggested by the government, and called forth every one to rise in mass, for defence of the country. But although, in some places, the peasants were induced to take arms, the nation at large showed a coldness, which can only be accounted for by the general idea which prevailed, that the emperor had an honourable peace within his power, whenever he should be disposed to accept of it.

In the meantime, new burdens were necessary to pay the expenses of the approaching campaign, and recruit the diminished ranks of the army. Napoleon, indeed, supplied from his own hoards a sum of thirty millions of francs; but, at the same time the public taxes of the subject were increased by one moiety, without any appeal to, or consultation with, the Legislative Body, who, indeed, were not sitting at the time. In a Council of State extraordinary, held on the 11th November, two days after his return to Paris, Napoleon vindicated the infliction of this heavy augmentation on a discontented and distressed country. "In ordinary times," he said, "the contributions were calculated at one-fifth of the income of the individual; but according to the urgency of events, there was no reason why it should not rise to a fourth, a third, or a half of the whole income. In fact," he concluded, "the contribution had no bounds; and if there were any laws intimating the contrary, they were ill-considered laws, and undeserving of attention."

* It has been given as sufficient answer to these complaints, that Bonaparte is falsely accused of having drained France of her youth, since, upon the whole, the population is stated to have, on the contrary, increased. This may be the case; but it is no less certain that the wars of Bonaparte consumed at least a million of conscripts, and it does not occur to us that the population of a country increases under such circumstances, like the growth of a tree subjected to much pruning; still less that the general result would satisfy parents for the slaughter of their children, any more than the sorrow of a mother who had lost her infant would be assuaged by the information that her next-door neighbour had been safely delivered of twins.

There was then read to the Council a decree of the Senate for a new conscription of three hundred thousand men, to be levied upon those who had escaped the conscription of former years, and who had been considered as exempted from the service. There was a deep and melancholy silence. At length a counsellor spoke, with some hesitation, though it was only to blame the introductory clause of the senatorial decree, which stated the invasion of the frontiers as the cause of this large levy. It was, he suggested, a declaration too much calculated to spread alarm.

"And wherefore," said Napoleon, giving way to his natural vehemence, and indicating, more strongly than prudence warranted, the warlike and vindictive purposes which exclusively occupied his breast,—"wherefore should not the whole truth be told? Wellington has entered the south; the Russians menace the northern frontier; the Prussians, Austrians, and Bavarians threaten the east. Shame!—Wellington in France, and we have not risen in mass to drive him back. All my allies have deserted me; the Bavarians have betrayed me—They threw themselves on my rear to cut off my retreat—But they have been slaughtered for their pains. No peace—none till we have burned Munich. A triumvirate is formed in the north, the same which made a partition of Poland. I demand of France three hundred thousand men—I will form a camp of a hundred thousand at Bordeaux—another at Metz—another at Lyons. With the present levy, and what remains of the last, I will have a million of men. But I must have grown men—not these boy-conscripts, to encumber the hospitals, and die of fatigue upon the highways—I can reckon on no soldiers now save those of France itself."

"Ah, sire," said one of the assentators, glad to throw in a suggestion which he supposed would suit the mood of the time, "that ancient France must remain to us inviolate."

"And Holland!" answered Napoleon, fiercely. "Abandon Holland! sooner yield it back to the sea. Counsellors, there must be an impulse given—all must march—You are fathers of families, the heads of the nation; it is for you to set the example. They speak of peace; I hear of nothing but peace, when all around should echo to the cry of war."

This was one of the occasions on which Bonaparte's constitutional vehemence overcame his political prudence. We might almost think we hear the voice of the Scandinavian deity Thor, or the war-god of Mexico, clamorous for his victims, and demanding that they be unblemished, and worthy of his bloody altar. But Bonaparte was unable to inspire others with his own martial zeal; they only foresaw that the nation must, according to the system of its ruler, encounter a most perilous danger, and that, even in case of success, when Napoleon reaped laurels, France would only gather cypress. This feeling was chiefly predominant in the Legislative Body assembly; as every representative, which emanates however remotely from the people, has a natural aptitude to espouse their cause.

It is true, that the emperor had, by every precaution in his power, endeavoured to deprive this part of the state, the only one which had retained the

least shadow of popular representation, of everything approaching to freedom of debate or right of remonstrance, and, by a recent act of despotic innovation, had even robbed them of the power of choosing their own president. He is said also to have exerted his authority over individuals by a practice similar to that practised by James the Second upon members of parliament, called *closeting*, admitting individuals of the Legislative Body to private interviews, and condescending to use toward them that personal intercession, which, coming from a sovereign, it is so difficult to resist. But these arts proved unsuccessful, and only tended to show to the world that the Legislative Body had independence enough to intimate their desire for peace, while their sovereign was still determined on war. A commission of five of their members, distinguished for wisdom and moderation, were appointed to draw up a report upon the state of the nation, which they did in terms respectful to Napoleon, but such as plainly indicated their conviction that he would act wisely to discontinue his schemes of external ambition, to purchase peace by disclaiming them, and at the same time to restore to the subject some degree of internal liberty. They suggested, that in order to silence the complaints of the allied monarchs, which accused France of aiming at general sovereignty, the emperor should make a solemn and specific declaration, abjuring all such purposes. They reminded him, that when Louis XIV. desired to restore energy to the nation, he acquainted them with the efforts he had made to obtain peace, and the effect answered his wishes. They recommended the example to Napoleon. It was only necessary, they said, that the nation should be assured, that the war was to be continued for the sole object of the independence of the French people and territory, to reanimate public spirit, and induce all to concur in the general defence. After other arguments, tending to enforce the same advice, the report concluded with recommending that his majesty should be supplicated to maintain the active and constant execution of the laws, which preserve to Frenchmen the rights of liberty, and security both of person and property, and to the nation the free exercise of its political privileges.

Like the mute prince, who recovered his speech when his father's life was endangered, the extremity of the national distress thus gave the power of remonstrance to a public body, which had hitherto been only the passive agents of the will of a despotic sovereign. Yet, comparing the nature of the remonstrance with the period of extremity at which it was made, Napoleon must have felt somewhat in the situation of the patriarch of Uz, the friends of whose former prosperity came in the moment of his greatest distresses with reproaches instead of assistance. The Legislative Body had been at least silent and acquiescent during the wonderful period of Bonaparte's success, and they now chose that of his adversity to give him unpalatable advice, instead of aiding in this emergency to inspire the nation with confidence. A philosophical monarch would nevertheless have regarded the quality of the course recommended more than the irritating circumstances of time and manner in which it was given; and

would have endeavoured, by frank confidence and concessions, to reconcile himself with the Legislative Body. An artful and Machiavelian despot would have temporised with the deputies, and yielded for the time, with the purpose of afterwards recovering, at a fitting period, whatever point he might at present be obliged to cede. But Napoleon, too impetuous for either policy or philosophy, gave way to the full vehemence of a resentment, which, though unreasonable and imprudent, was certainly, considering those to whom it was addressed, by no means unnatural. He determined instantly to prorogue the assembly, which had indicated such symptoms of opposition. Their hall was, therefore, shut against them, and guarded with soldiers, while the deputies, summoned before the throne of the emperor, received the following singular admonition :—"I have prohibited the printing of your address, because it is seditious. Eleven parts of you are good citizens, but the twelfth consists of rebels, and your commissioners are of the number. Lainé corresponds with the Prince Regent of England; the others are hot-headed fools, desirous of anarchy, like the girondins, whom such opinions led to the scaffold. Is it when the enemy are on the frontiers that you demand an alteration of the constitution? Rather follow the example of Alsace and Franche-Comté, where the inhabitants ask for leaders and arms to drive the invaders back. You are not the representatives of the people—You are only the representatives of the individual departments. . . . Yet you seek in your address to draw a distinction betwixt the sovereign and the people. I—I am the only real representative of the people. Which of you could support such a burden?—The throne is merely a piece of wood covered with velvet. I—I alone hold the place of the people. If France desires another species of constitution, which does not suit me, I will tell her to seek another monarch. It is at me the enemies aim, more than at France; but are we, therefore, to sacrifice a part of France? Do I not sacrifice my self-love, and my feelings of superiority, to obtain peace? Think you I speak proudly? If I do, I am proud because I have courage, and because France owes her grandeur to me. Yes—your address is unworthy of the Legislative Body, and of me. Begone to your homes. I will cause your address to be published in the *Moniteur*, with such notes as I shall furnish. Even if I had done wrong, you ought not to have reproached me with it thus publicly. People do not wash their dirty linen before the world. To conclude, France has more need of me than I have of France."

With this philippic, which we have but slightly compressed, he spurned the members of the Legislative Body from his presence. It displays in a remarkable degree his natural vehemence of temper; his view of the constitution as a drama, in which he filled up every part, and performed at once the part of the prince and of the people; his consciousness of his own extraordinary powers, which he boldly weighed in the balance against all France; and the coarse and mean taste of some of his expressions. The suspension of the Legislative Body, the only part, we repeat, of the Imperial constitution which had the least pretence to a popular origin, was not

qualified to increase the confidence of the public, who now saw want of unity between the emperor and the popular representatives, added to the other threatening circumstances of the time, and became yet more distracted in their opinions, and unwilling to exert themselves for the common defence.

To give a more favourable impulse to the mind of the nation, Napoleon had recourse to an expedient, which, in the time of the Republic, had been attended with universal effect. He sent special commissioners, twenty-seven in number, into the different departments, to arouse the dormant energies of the inhabitants, and induce them to take up arms. But the senators and counsellors, chosen for this purpose, were altogether void of the terrible energies of the republican proconsuls; and, though endowed like them with the most arbitrary powers, they had neither the furious zeal, nor the contempt of all the prejudices of humanity, which had been displayed by those ferocious demagogues. Their mission, therefore, produced but little effect. The conscription, too, failed to be the ready source of levies which it had so often proved. The lance had been so often used, that the blood no longer followed it so readily.

The unceasing activity of Napoleon laboured to supply these deficiencies. By day he was incessantly engaged in actively reviewing troops, inspecting stores, and all the preparations for a desperate resistance. By night, the lights were seen to glimmer late and long in the windows of his private apartment, in the upper story of the Tuileries. He succeeded in levying twelve fresh regiments, and prepared to augment his veteran force by withdrawing Suchet from Catalonia, and making draughts from Soult's army on the frontiers which he designed to supply by fresh levies.

The *Moniteur*, and the other newspapers, magnified the success of the emperor's exertions, described armies in reserve which had no existence, and dilated upon the *beau désespoir* which was driving all France to arms, while in fact, most of the provinces waited with apathy the events of the war.

One of the strongest symptoms of Napoleon's own consciousness of approaching danger, was his calling out and arming the National Guard of Paris, a force to which he would not have appealed, save in the case of the last necessity, but to which he now felt himself obliged to have recourse. Aware, however, that to mark any want of confidence in the armed citizens at this moment, would be to give occasion to the disaffection which he dreaded, he solemnized his departure to the frontier by convoking a meeting of the officers of the National Guard at the Tuileries. He appeared among them with his empress and his infant child, and in a tone which penetrated every bosom, announced that, being about to place himself at the head of his army, he committed to the faith of the citizens of Paris the security of his capital, his wife, and his child. Whatever complaints might be justly entertained against Napoleon's political conduct, none were so ungenerous as to remember them at that moment. Many of the officers shared in the emotion which he testified, and some mingled their tears with those of the alarmed and sorrowing empress.

This scene took place on the 23d of January; on the 25th Napoleon left that abode of royalty, to which he was doomed not to return until he had undergone strange changes of fortune. His mind was agitated with unusual apprehensions and anticipations of misfortune; feeling also, what was unsuspected by many, that the real danger of his situation arose from the probability of the nation's wishing to recal the Bourbons. He had even, according to his own account, resolved to arrest "the person of a man of great influence,"* whom he supposed most likely to promote this design. His counsellors persuaded him to forbear this arbitrary action at a moment when his power was becoming daily more obnoxious, and reminded him that the suspected person had as much reason to fear the restoration of the Bourbons as he himself had. The emperor yielded the point, but not without strongly repeating his fears that his advisers and himself would both have to repent of it; and not without charging Cambacérès to make sure of that individual's person, in case any crisis should take place in the capital.

Thus, full of melancholy presages, he hastened to the field, where he had but inadequate means to oppose to the accumulated force which was now precipitating itself upon France.

CHAPTER XCI.

Declaration of the views of the allies in entering France.

—*They enter Switzerland, and take possession of Geneva.*—*Prince Schwarzenberg crosses the Rhine.*—*Apathy of the French.*—*Junction of Blücher with the grand army.*—*Proceedings of the Crown Prince of Sweden.*—*Tardiness of the allies.*—*Inferiority of Napoleon's numerical force.*—*Battles of Brienne—and La Rothière.*—*Difficulties of Bonaparte, during which he meditates to resign the crown.*—*He makes a successful attack on the Silesian army at Champaubert.*—*Blücher is compelled to retreat.*—*The grand army of the allies carries Nogent and Montereau—attacked by Napoleon, and Schwarzenberg sends him a letter of remonstrance.*—*Montereau is taken by storm.*—*Bonaparte's violence to his generals.*—*The Austrians resolve on a general retreat, as far as Nancy and Langres.*—*Their motives.*—*Consequent indignation and excesses of the Austrian troops.*—*Answer of Napoleon to the letter of Prince Schwarzenberg.*—*Prince Wenceslaus sent to Bonaparte's head-quarters, to treat for an armistice.*—*The French bombard and enter Troyes on 2d February.*—*Execution of Gouault, a royalist.*—*A decree of death is denounced against all wearing the Bourbon emblems and all emigrants who should join the allies.*—*Retrospect of movements upon the frontiers.*

It was time that Bonaparte should appear in the field in person, for the eastern frontiers of his empire, assaulted on every point, were yielding an almost unresisted entrance to the invading armies. The allied sovereigns had commenced their operations upon a system, as moderate and prudent in a political point of view, as it was bold and decisive considered under a military aspect.

* Talleyrand is intimated; for Fouché, to whom the description might otherwise have applied, was not at this time in or near Paris.

They had not been too much elated by the successes of the late campaign. These had been bought at a high price, and events had shown, that if Napoleon could be resisted and defeated, it could only be by outnumbering his veteran armies, and accumulating such force against him as even his skill and talents should find irresistible. They recollected, also, the desperate efforts of which France and Frenchmen were capable, and were prudently desirous to express the moderation of their purpose in such a form as should have no chance of being mistaken.

Their manifestoes disclaimed the intention of dictating to France any particular form of government. They only desired that she should remain within the limits of her ancient territory, a peaceful member of the European commonwealth, allowing to other states, as well as claiming for herself, the full immunities of freedom and independence. The allied sovereigns desired that there should be an end put to the system which decided the fate of kingdoms, not according to the better right, but the longest sword. They wished a total suppression of all domination of the powerful over the weak; of all pretext of usurpation founded on alleged natural boundaries, or, in other words, on the claim of a powerful state to rend from a weak one whatever suited its convenience to possess. In a word, they aimed at the restoration of the balance of power, which had been long the political object of the wisest statesmen in Europe. It is singular, that the three nations who were now united to oppose the aggressions of Bonaparte, had themselves been the first to set an example of violent and unprincipled spoliation in the partition of Poland; and that they had reaped an abundant punishment in the measure of retribution dealt to them by the instrumentality of the very man, whose lawless outrages they, in their turn, were now combined to chastise.

With respect to the nature of the changes which might take place in the internal arrangements of France, in order to bring about the restoration of the balance of power, the allied monarchs professed themselves indifferent. If Napoleon should reconcile himself to the general pacification they proposed, they did not pretend any right to state objections to his remaining in authority. It was the military system of usurpation, not the person of Bonaparte, against which they made war. If, on the other hand, France could not return to a state of peace without a change of her ruler, it was for France herself to consider what that change should be. The allied sovereigns were determined she should no longer work her uncontrolled will upon other states; but they left her at full liberty to adopt what government, and what sovereign she pleased, within her own territories.

At the same time, having limited the purpose of their armament to such a just and moderate object, the allies resolved to put such activity in their measures as to satisfy the French that they had the power of enforcing their demands; and for that purpose they determined to enter the frontier. From Basle to Mentz, from Mentz to the mouth of the Scheldt, the frontier of France and Belgium is defended by the Rhine, a strong natural boundary in

itself, and covered by a triple row of a hundred and forty fortresses, some of them of the very first class. Above Basle, where the Rhine divides France from Switzerland, the frontier is more accessible. But then this upper line could not be acted upon without violating the neutrality which Switzerland had asserted, which Bonaparte had admitted as affording protection for the weakest part of the threatened frontier, and which, upon their own principle of respecting the rights of neutrals, the allies were under a sort of necessity of acknowledging. Nevertheless, the extreme facility of entering France on this side led Austria and Prussia to form the wish to set aside scruples, and disregard the neutrality of Switzerland.

These two powers remembered how little respect Napoleon had shown to neutral rights in the campaign of Ulm, when he marched without hesitation through the Prussian territories of Aispach and Bareuth, in order to accomplish the demolition of the Austrian army; nor did they fail to quote his forcible interference in the affairs of the Cantons of Switzerland, at an earlier period of his history. Russia did not for some time acquiesce in this reasoning; but when some plausible grounds were alleged of breach of neutrality on the part of the Swiss, the scruples of Alexander were removed; and it was resolved that the Austrian grand army should traverse the Swiss territory for the purpose of entering France. They halted before Geneva, and took possession of the town, or rather it was yielded to them by the citizens.

The Canton of Berne, also, which resented some alterations made by Napoleon to the prejudice of their feudal claims upon the Pays de Vaud, received the Austrians not as intruders but as friends. Bonaparte, in his manifestoes, insisted vehemently upon the injustice of this aggression upon the territories of the Swiss. Undoubtedly the transaction was of a questionable character; but it was inconsistent in Napoleon to declaim against it, since in the case of the arrest of the Duke d'Enghien, he had laid it down as national law, that the violation of the territory of Baden was an offence pleadable by no other than the sovereign of that territory. On his own doctrine, therefore, it was incompetent in any other nation to resent on behalf of the Swiss that which the Swiss did not resent for themselves.

Upon the 21st of December, Marshal Prince Schwartzberg crossed the Rhine with the Austrian army at four points, and advanced upon Langres, as had been previously agreed. Moving with the extreme slowness and precision which characterize Austrian manoeuvres, paying always the same respect to fortresses without garrisons, and passing without guards, as if they had been in a posture of defence, the Austrians, instead of reaching Langres on 27th December, did not arrive till the 17th January, 1814. A serious intention had been for some time manifested to defend the place, and it was even garrisoned by a detachment of Bonaparte's Old Guard. The approach of the numerous Austrian reinforcements, however, rendered the preparations for defence of the town unavailing, and Langres was evacuated by all the French troops, saving about three hundred men, who surrendered to Ge-

neral Ginlay on the 17th. A division of the Austrians was immediately advanced to Dijon.

The apathy of the French at this period, may be estimated from the following circumstance:—Dijon, summoned by a flying party of cavalry, returned for answer, that a town containing thirty thousand inhabitants, could not with honour surrender to fifteen hussars, but that if a respectable force appeared before its walls, they were ready to give up the keys of their city. This reasonable request was complied with, and Dijon surrendered on 19th January.

The city of Lyons, the second in the empire, had itself nearly fallen into the hands of the Austrians, but the inhabitants showed a disposition to defend the town, and being reinforced with troops sent to secure a place of such importance, the Austrian general Bubna retired from under its walls. It is allowed, that more activity on the part of the allies might have saved this repulse, which was of considerable importance. It was the only one which they had yet sustained.

While the grand army, under Schwartzberg, was thus advancing into France, the Army of Silesia, which was the name given to that commanded by the veteran Blücher, consisting, as formerly, of Prussians and Russians, had made equal progress, though against greater resistance and more difficulties. His army advanced in four columns, or grand divisions, blocking the strong frontier fortresses of Metz, Sarre-Louis, Thionville, Luxembourg, and others, passing the defiles of the Vosges, and pushing forward to Joinville, Vitry, and St. Dizier. The army of Silesia was thus placed in communication with the grand army, the advanced divisions of which had penetrated as far into France as Bar-sur-Aube.

There was yet a third army of the allies, called that of the North of Europe. It was originally commanded by the Prince Royal of Sweden, and consisted of Swedes, Russians, and Germans. But the Crown Prince, whose assistance had been of such material consequence during the campaign of 1813, did not, it appears, take an active share in that of 1814. There may have been two reasons, and weighty ones, for this inactivity. To assist in driving the French out of Germany, seemed a duty which the Prince of Sweden could not as such decline, when the welfare of Sweden demanded it. But an invasion of his native soil might seem to Bernadotte a service unpleasing and unpopular in itself, and in which he could not be so rightfully engaged, at least while the freedom of Germany and the north opened another field of exertions, where his military efforts could be attended with no injury to his personal feelings. Denmark was still in arms, and Davoust still held out at Hamburg; and the presence of the Swedish army and its leader was necessary to subdue the one, and clear the north from the other. It must also be remembered that Sweden, a poor kingdom, was not in a condition to sustain a war at a great distance from its frontier, and arising out of causes in which it was more remotely concerned. Her armies could not be recruited with the same ease as those of the greater powers; and Bernadotte, therefore, rather chose to incur the censure

of being supposed cold in the cause of his confederates, than the risk of losing the only body of troops which Sweden had been able to fit out, and upon preserving which his throne probably depended. The allied sovereigns, however, directed, that while the Crown Prince remained in the north, a part of the Russian and Prussian corps, who were placed under his command, should be ordered to march towards France, for the purpose of augmenting the force which they already possessed in Holland and Belgium. The Crown Prince having, by a short war with Denmark, compelled that power to yield up her ancient possession of Norway, left Bennigsen to continue the siege of Hamburg, and advanced in person to Cologne, to assist in the complete liberation of Belgium.

The French troops, which had been drawn together, had been defeated at Merxem by General Bulow and Sir Thomas Graham; and, although the French flag was still flying at Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, Holland might be considered as liberated. General Winzengerode, at the head of the Russian troops, and the Saxons, under Thielmann, being the corps detached, as above-mentioned, from the army of the north of Germany, soon reached the Low Countries, and entered into communication with Bulow. General Sir Thomas Graham, with the English and Saxons, and with such Dutch and Flemish troops as could be collected, was left to blockade Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp, whilst Bulow and Winzengerode were at liberty to enter France on the northern frontier: and thus, in the hour of need, which soon afterwards arrived, they were to act as a reserve to the army of Silesia under Blücher. They pushed on as far as Laon.

These advances, which carried the armies of the allies so far into the bosom of France, and surrounded with blockades the frontier fortresses of that kingdom, were not made without an honourable though ineffectual opposition, on such points where the French military could make any stand against the preponderating numbers of the invaders. The people of the country in general neither welcomed nor opposed the allies. In some places they were received with acclamation—in a few others some opposition was tendered—they encountered desperate resistance nowhere. The allies did all that discipline could to maintain strict order among their troops; but where there were so many free corps,—Hulans, Croats, and Cossacks,—whose only pay is what they can plunder, occasional transgressions necessarily took place. The services of these irregular troops were, however, indispensable. The Cossacks, in particular, might be termed the eyes of the army. Accustomed to act in small parties when necessary, they threaded woods, swam rivers, and often presented themselves unexpectedly in villages many miles distant from the main army to which they belonged, thus impressing the French with an idea of the numbers and activity of the allies far beyond the truth. These Arabs of the North, as Napoleon termed them, always announced their party as the advanced guard of a considerable force, for whom they ordered provisions and quarters to be prepared; and thus awed the inhabitants into acquiescence in their demands. They are not

reported to have been cruel, unless when provoked, but were not in general able to resist temptations to plunder. The excursions of these and other light troops were of course distressing to the French territory.

On the other hand, in two or three cases, armed citizens in the towns, summoned by small parties of the allies, fired upon flags of truce, and thus justified severe reprisals. It was said to be by Bonaparte's strict orders that such actions were committed, the purpose being if possible, to excite deadly hatred betwixt the French and the allies. Indeed, in the reverse of the circumstances in which each had formerly stood, Napoleon and the Austrian generals seemed to have exchanged system and sentiments. He now, as the Archduke Charles did in 1809, called out every peasant to arms; while Schwartzberg, like Napoleon at that earlier period, denounced threats of military execution, without mercy or quarter, to every rustic who should obey the summons. The impartial historian must proclaim, in the one case as in the other, that the duty of resistance in the defence of our native country, does not depend on the character of a man's weapons, or the colour of his coat; and that the armed citizen is entitled, equally with the regular soldier, to the benefit of the laws of war, so long as he does not himself violate them. But from these various causes, it was plain that the present apathy of the French people was only temporary, and that some sudden and unforeseen cause was not unlikely to rouse so sensitive and high-spirited a people into a state of general resistance, by which the allies could not fail to be great sufferers. Rapidity in their movements was the most obvious remedy against such a danger; but this was the military quality least proper to coalitions, where many people must be consulted; and, besides, was inconsistent with the well-known habits of the Germans, but especially of the Austrians.

It seems also, that the allies, having safely formed an almost complete military line from Langres to Châlons, found themselves at some loss how to use their advantages. Nothing could be better situated than their present position, for such a daring enterprise as was now termed a *hourra* upon Paris; and as all the high-roads, departing from various points of the extensive line which they held, converged on the capital as a common centre, while the towns and villages, through which these roads passed, afforded an ample supply of provisions, this march might have been accomplished almost without opposition, but for the tardy movements of the grand army. The real weakness of Napoleon had been disguised by the noisy and exaggerated rumours concerning his preparations; and now when the allies learned that such an opportunity had existed, they learned, at the same time, that it was well nigh lost, or at least that the road to Paris must first be cleared by a series of bloody actions. In these the allies could not disguise from themselves the possibility of their receiving severe checks; and under this apprehension they began to calculate the consequences of such a defeat, received in the centre of France, as that which they had suffered under the walls of Dresden. There was

here no favourable screen of mountains to secure their retreat, no strong positions for checking a pursuing army, as in the case of Vandamme, and turning a defeat into a victory. The frontier which they had passed was penetrated, not subdued—its fortresses, so strong and numerous, were in the greater part masked, not taken—so that their retreat upon the Rhine must be exposed to all the dangers incident to passing in disorder through a country in complete possession of the enemy.

General councils of war seldom agree upon recommending bold measures. In this sense Solomon says, that in the multitude of counsellors there is safety; meaning that the most cautious, if not the wisest measures, are sure to have the approbation of the majority.

Accordingly, this spirit predominating in the councils of the allies, led to a degree of uncertainty in their movements on this momentous occasion, which, as is usual, endeavoured to disguise itself under the guise of prudence. They resolved that the grand army should halt a short space at Langres, in hopes either that Napoleon, renewing the negotiation, the scene of which was now to be transferred to Châtillon-sur-Seine, would avert his present danger, by acquiescing in the terms of the allies; or that the French nation, an event still less likely to happen, would become tired of the military monarch, whose ambition had brought such distress upon the country. In the meanwhile, the allies declined the offers of such royalists as came forward in the name, and for the interest of the exiled family, uniformly replying, that they would give no weight to any expression of the sentiments of the French people, unless it was made in some quarter of the kingdom where it could not be supposed to be influenced by the presence of the allied army. They trusted chiefly at that moment to the effect of negotiation with the present possessor of the throne.

But Napoleon, as firmly determined in his purpose as the allies were doubtful, knowing himself to be the soul of his army, and absolute lord of his own actions, felt all the advantage which a bold, active, and able swordsman has in encountering an opponent, whose skill is less distinguished, and whose determination is more flexible than his own. The allies had presented in the grand army a front of 97,000 men, Marshal Blücher one of 40,000, affording a disposable force of 137,000. To oppose this the French Emperor had only, of old troops, independent of those under Suchet in Catalonia, under Soult near Bayonne, and also of garrisons, about 50,000 men; nor could he hope to add to them more than 70,000 conscripts. Nay, in fact his levies, so far as they could be brought into the field, fell greatly short of this number; for the allies were in possession of a considerable part of the kingdom of France, and, in this moment of general confusion, it was impossible to enforce the law of conscription, which was at all times obnoxious. It was soon proved, that he who so lately had led half-a-million of men to the Vistula, and 300,000 to the banks of the Elbe, could not now muster, for the protection of the capital of his own empire, a disposable force of more than 70,000 men.

The defensive war had no doubt considerable

advantages to one who knew so well how to use them. The highways, by which the allies must advance, formed a half or quarter circle of rays, converging, as already mentioned, on Paris as a centre. A much smaller army might, therefore, oppose a large one, because, lying between Paris and the enemy, they must occupy the same roads by a much shorter line of communication than the invaders who were farther from the centre, where the roads diverged to a greater distance from each other. With this advantage of collocation to balance a great inferiority in numerical force, Bonaparte advanced to play for the most momentous stake ever disputed, with a degree of military skill which has never been matched.

Arrived at Châlons on the 26th January, Bonaparte took the command of such an army as he had been able to assemble, by the concentration of the troops under the Marshals Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, and Ney, all of whom had retreated from the frontier. So much were the French corps d'armée reduced, that these great and distinguished generals, who, in former times, would have commanded 60,000 or 70,000 men each, had under them all, when concentrated, but a total of 52,000, to which Napoleon was only able to add about 20,000 brought from Paris. But no one ever understood better than Bonaparte the great military doctrine, that victory does not depend on the comparative result of numerical superiority in general, but on the art of obtaining such a superiority on the field of action itself.

Blücher was, as usual, the foremost in advance, and Napoleon resolved to bestow on this active and inveterate enemy the terrible honour of his first attack, hoping to surprise the Silesian corps d'armée before it could receive succour from the army of Schwartzberg. The marshal was apprised of the emperor's purpose, and lost no time in concentrating his forces at the village of Brienne, near the source of the Aube. This is a small village, seated on the ascent of a hill. The place has but two streets, one of which ascends to the château, occupied formerly as a Royal Academy for young persons designed for the army; the other conducts to Arcis-sur-Aube. The château is partly surrounded by a park or chase. It was at the military school of Brienne that Napoleon acquired the rudiments of that skill in the military art with which he had almost prostrated the world, and had ended by placing it in array against him; and it was here he came to commence what seemed his last series of efforts for victory;—like some animals of the chase, who, when hard pressed by the hunters, are said to direct their final attempts at escape upon the points from which they have first started.

The alert movements of Napoleon surpassed the anticipation of Blücher. He was at table with his staff in the château. General Alsouff, a Russian, occupied the town of Brienne, and General Sacken's corps was drawn up in columns, on the road from Brienne to La Rothière. At once a horrible tumult was heard. The Russian cavalry, two thousand in number, were completely driven in by those of Napoleon, and at the same moment Ney attacked the village; while a body of French grenadiers, who, favoured by the wooded and broken character of

the ground, had been enabled to get into the park, threatened to make prisoners all who were in the château. Blücher, with his officers, had barely time to reach a postern, where they were under the necessity of leading their horses down a stair, and in that way made their escape with difficulty. The bold resistance of Alsouffé defended the town against Ney, and Sacken advanced to Alsouffé's assistance. The Cossacks also fell on the rear of the French in the park, and Bonaparte's own safety was compromised in the *mêlée*. Men were killed by his side, and he was obliged to draw his sword in his own defence. At the very moment of attack, his attention was engaged by the sight of a tree, which he recollected to be the same under which, during the hours of recreation at Brienne, he used, when a schoolboy, to peruse the *Jerusalem Delivered* of Tasso. If the curtain of fate had risen before the obscure youth, and discovered to him in the same spot, his own image as Emperor of France, contending against the Scythians of the desert for life and power, how wonderful would have seemed the presage, when the mere concurrence of circumstances strikes the mind of those who look back upon it with awful veneration for the hidden ways of Providence! Lefebvre Desnouettes fell, dangerously wounded, in charging at the head of the guards. The village caught fire, and was burned to the ground; but it was not until eleven at night that the Silesian army ceased to make efforts for recovering the place, and that Blücher, retreating from Brienne, took up a position in the rear of that village, and upon that of La Rothière.

The result of the battle of Brienne was indecisive, and the more unsatisfactory to Bonaparte, as the part of Blücher's force engaged did not amount to 20,000 men, and the sole advantage gained over them, was that of keeping the field of battle. Napoleon's principal object, which was to divide Blücher from the grand army, had altogether failed. It was necessary, however, to proclaim the engagement as a victory, and much pains was taken to represent it as such. But when it was afterwards discovered to be merely a smart skirmish, without any material results, the temporary deception only served to injure the cause of Napoleon.

On the 1st of February, Blücher, strongly reinforced from the grand army, prepared in his turn to assume the offensive. It would have been Napoleon's wish to have avoided an engagement; but a retreat across the Aube, by the bridge of l'Esmon, which was the only mode of passing that deep and scarce fordable river, would have exposed his rear to destruction. He therefore risked a general action. Blücher attacked the line of the French on three points, assaulting at once the villages of La Rothière, Dienville, and Chaumont. The conflict, in which the Prince Royal of Württemberg distinguished himself, was hard fought during the whole day, but in the evening the French were repulsed on all points, and Bonaparte was compelled to retreat across the Aube, after losing 4,000 prisoners, and no less than seventy-three guns. Ney, by the emperor's orders, destroyed the bridge at l'Esmon. The allies were not aware of the amount of their advantage, and suffered the French to retire unmolested.

A general council of war, held at the castle of Brienne, now resolved that the two armies (although having so lately found the advantage of mutual support) should separate from each other, and that Blücher, detaching himself to the northward, and uniting under his command the division of d'York and Kleist, both of whom had occupied St-Dizier and Vitry, should approach Paris by the Marne; while Prince Schwartzberg and the grand army should descend on the capital by the course of the Seine. The difficulty of finding provisions for such immense armies was doubtless in part the cause of this resolution. But it was likewise recommended by the success of a similar plan of operations at Dresden, and afterwards at Leipsic, where the enemies of Bonaparte approached him from so many different quarters, as to render it impossible for him to make head against one army, without giving great opportunity of advantage to the others.

Bonaparte reached Troyes, on which he retreated after crossing the Aube, in a disastrous condition; but his junction with his Old Guard, whose appearance and high state of appointments restored courage to the dejected troops who had been beaten at La Rothière, gave a new impulse to the feelings of his army, and restored the young levies to confidence. He resolved, taking advantage of the division of the two armies of the allies, to march upon that of Blücher. But, in order to disguise his purpose, he first sent a small division upon Bar-sur-Seine, to alarm the Austrians with an attack upon their right wing. Schwartzberg immediately apprehended that Bonaparte was about to move with his whole force in that direction; a movement which in fact would have been most favourable for the allies, since it would have left the road to Paris undefended, and open to the whole. But, terrified by the idea that his left flank might be turned or forced, the Austrian general moved his chief strength in that direction; thus at once suspending his meditated march on the Seine, and increasing the distance betwixt the grand army and that of Silesia. Bonaparte having deceived Schwartzberg by this successful feint, evacuated Troyes, leaving the Marshals Victor and Oudinot to oppose the Austrians with very inadequate means, while he directed his own march against Blücher.

Blücher, in the meanwhile, having left Napoleon in front of the grand army, and not doubting that the Austrians would find him sufficient employment, hurried forward to the Marne, forced Macdonald to retreat from Châteaun-Thierry, and advanced his head-quarters to Vertus; while Sacken, who formed his van-guard, pushed his light troops as far as Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and was nearer to Paris than was the emperor himself. General d'York had advanced as far as Meaux, and Paris was in the last degree of alarm.

Even Bonaparte himself was so much struck by the inextricable situation of his affairs after the defeat of La Rothière, that a thought occurred to him, which posterity, excepting on his own avowal, would hardly give credit to. The plan which suggested itself was that of sacrificing his own authority to the peace of France, and of abdicating the crown in favour of the Bourbons, while he had yet the

means of resistance in his possession. He felt he had reigned and combated long enough for his own glory, and justly thought that the measure of his renown would be filled up by such an act of generous self-denial. But a maxim occurred to him (suggested, he says, by Mr Fox), that restored monarchs could never forgive those who had occupied their place. Probably his thoughts turned also to the murder of the Duke d'Enghien; for there was no other point of personal offence betwixt Bonaparte and the exiled family, which their restoration, if the event took place by his intervention, might not have fully atoned for. If our conjecture be real, it serves to show how such a crime operates in its consequences to obstruct its perpetrator in future attempts to recover the path of virtue and honour. Had Napoleon been really capable of the generous act of self-denial which he meditated, he must have been ranked, in despite of the doubtful points of his character, as one of the greatest men who ever lived.

But the spirit of egotism and suspicion prevailed, and the hopes of accomplishing the discomfiture and defeat of the Silesian army appeared preferable to meriting, by one act of disinterested devotion, the eternal gratitude of Europe; and the philosopher and friend of humanity relapsed into the warrior and conqueror. There is, no doubt, something meritorious in the conceiving of great and noble resolutions, even although they remain unrealised. But this patriotism of the imagination does not rise to a higher scale of merit, than the sensibility of those who cannot hear a tale of sorrow without weeping, but whose sympathy never assumes the expensive form of actual charity.

The army of Napoleon was now to be transferred from the high-road leading from Paris to Troyes, to that leading from Châlons to Paris, on which Blücher was operating, and that by flank marches through an impracticable country; but which, if they could be accomplished, would enable the French Emperor to attack the Silesian army at unawares in flank and rear. The lateral cross-roads, which connect one highway with another through France, are generally scarce passable in winter, even for the purpose of ordinary communication, much less for an army with its carriages and artillery. Bonaparte had to traverse a country intersected with thickets, marshes, drains, ditches, and impediments of every kind; the weather was execrable, and but for the extraordinary exertions of the Mayor of Barbonne, who collected five hundred horses to extricate the guns, they must have been abandoned on the road. But by dint of perseverance, Bonaparte accomplished this forced march, on 10th of February, and the flank of the Silesian army was in consequence placed at his mercy. They were moving on without the least suspicion of such an attack. Sacken led the advance, the Russian general Alsouff followed, and Blücher himself brought up the rear with the main body. All intent upon the advance to Paris, they were marching with careless haste, and had suffered such large intervals to take place betwixt their divisions, as to expose them to be attacked in detail.

Bonaparte fell upon the central division of Alsouff, at Champaubert, surrounded, defeated, and

totally dispersed them, taking their artillery, and 2000 prisoners, while the remainder of the division fled into the woods, and attempted to escape individually. The whole force of the emperor was now interposed between the advanced guard under Sacken, and the main body under Blücher. It was first directed towards the former, whom Napoleon encountered sooner than he expected, for Sacken, on hearing of the action at Champaubert, instantly counter-marched his division to assist Alsouff, or at least to rejoin Blücher; but he was overwhelmed by the superior force of the French, and having lost one-fourth of his division, about 5000 men, was forced to leave the high-road, upon which Blücher was advancing, and retreat by that on Château-Thierry. At this village Sacken was joined by General d'York and Prince William of Prussia; but, still unable to make a stand, they could only secure a retreat by destroying the bridge over the Marne. War began now to show itself in its most hideous forms. The stragglers and fugitives, who could not cross the bridge before its destruction, were murdered by the peasantry, while the allied soldiers, in revenge, plundered Château-Thierry, and practised every excess of violence. The defeat of Sacken took place on the 12th of February.

Blücher, in the meanwhile, ignorant of the extent of the force by which his van-guard had been attacked, pressed forward to their support, and, in a wide and uninclosed country, suddenly found himself in the front of the whole army of Napoleon, flushed with the double victory which they had already gained, and so numerous as to make a retreat indispensable on the part of the Prussians. Blücher, if surprised, remained undismayed. Having only three regiments of cavalry, he had to trust for safety to the steadiness of his infantry. He formed them into squares, protected by artillery, and thus commenced his retreat by alternate divisions; those battalions which were in motion to the rear, being protected by the fire of the others then standing fast, and covering them with theirs while they retired in turn. The French cavalry, though so strong as to operate at once on the flanks and rear, failed in being able to break a single square. After the Prussians had retired several leagues in this manner, fighting every foot of their way, they were nearly intercepted by a huge column of French horse, which, having made a circuit so as to pass them, had drawn up on the causeway to intercept their retreat. Without a moment's hesitation, Blücher instantly attacked them with such a murderous fire of infantry and artillery, as forced them from the high-road, and left the passage free. The Prussians found the village of Etoges, through which they were obliged to pass, also occupied by the enemy; but here also they cleared their way by dint of fighting. This expedition of the Marne, as it is called, is always accounted one of Napoleon's military chefs-d'œuvre; for a flank march, undertaken through such a difficult country, and so completely successful, is not perhaps recorded in history. On the other hand, if Blücher lost any credit by the too great security of his march, he regained it by the masterly manner in which he executed his retreat. Had the army which he commanded in person shared the

fate of his van-guard, it is probable there would have been no campaign of Paris.

The Parisians, in the meantime, saw at length actual proofs that Napoleon had been victorious. Long columns of prisoners moved through their streets, banners were displayed, the cannon thundered, the press replied, and the pulpit joined, in extolling and magnifying the dangers which the citizens had escaped, and the merits of their preserver.

In the midst of the joy natural on such an occasion, the Parisians suddenly learned that the town of Fontainebleau was occupied by Hungarian hussars, and that not Cossacks only, but Tartars, Baskirs, and Kalmucks, tribes of a wild and savage aspect, a kind of Asiatic ogres, to whom popular credulity imputed a taste for the flesh of children, had appeared in the neighbourhood of Nangis. These renewed signs of approaching danger, arose from the grand army of the allies having carried, at the point of the bayonet, Nogent and Montereau, and advanced the head-quarters of the monarchs to Poot-sur-Seine. This alarm to Paris was accompanied by another. Schwartzberg, learning the disasters on the Marne, not only pushed forward from three directions on the capital, but dispatched forces from his right towards Provins, to threaten Napoleon's rear and communications. Leaving the pursuit of Blücher, the emperor countermarched on Meaux, and, marching from thence to Guignes, he joined the army of Oudinot and Victor, who were retreating before Schwartzberg. He here found the reinforcements which he had drawn from Spain, about 20,000 in number, tried and excellent troops. With this army he now fronted that of Schwartzberg, and upon the 17th February, commenced the offensive, at all points, and with success, possessing himself of Nangis, and nearly destroying the corps under Count Pahlen at Mormant. The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg was forced to retreat to Montereau.

So alarmed were the allies at the near approach of their terrible enemy, that a message was sent to Napoleon from the allied sovereigns, by Prince Schwartzberg's aide-de-camp, Count Parr, stating their surprise at his offensive movement, since they had given orders to their plenipotentiaries at Châtillon to sign the preliminaries of peace, on the terms which had been assented to by the French envoy, Caulaincourt.

This letter, of which we shall hereafter give a more full explanation, remained for some days unanswered, during which Napoleon endeavoured to push his advantages. He recovered the bridge at Montereau, after a desperate attack, in which the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg signalized himself by the valour of his defence. In the course of the action, Napoleon returned to his old profession of an artilleryman, and pointed several guns himself, to the great delight of the soldiers. They trembled, however, when the fire attracted the attention of the enemy, whose balls began to be aimed at the French battery. "Go, my children," said Bonaparte, ridiculing their apprehensions; "the ball is not cast that is to kill me."

Having taken the place by storm, Bonaparte, dis-

satisfied with the number of men he had lost, loaded with reproaches some of his best officers. Montbrun was censured for want of energy, and Digeon for the scarcity of ammunition with which the artillery was served; but it was chiefly on Victor, the Duke of Belluno, that his resentment discharged itself. He imputed to him negligence, in not having attacked Montereau on the day before the action, when it was unprovided for resistance; and he ordered him to retire from the service. The marshal endeavoured to obtain a hearing in his own defence, but for some time could not succeed in checking the stream of reproaches. At length they were softened into a charge of broken health, and the love of repose, incident to wounds and infirmities. "The best bed," said the emperor, "which the quarters afford, must now be sought out for the once indefatigable Victor." The marshal felt the charge more severely in proportion as it became moderated within what was probably the bounds of truth; but he would not consent to quit the service.

"I have not," he said, "forgot my original trade. I will take a musket. Victor will become a private in the Guard."—Bonaparte could not resist this mark of attachment. He held out his hand—"Let us be friends," he replied. "I cannot restore to you your corps d'armée, which I have given to Gérard; but I will place you at the head of two divisions of the Guard. Go—assume your command, and let there be no more of this matter betwixt us."

It was upon such occasions, when he subdued his excited feelings to a state of kindness and generosity, that Bonaparte's personal conduct seems to have been most amiable.

The allies, in the meantime, remembering, perhaps, though somewhat of the latest, the old fable of the bunch of arrows, resolved once more to enter into communication with the Silesian army, and, concentrating near Troyes, to accept of battle, if Bonaparte should offer it. The indefatigable Blücher had already recruited his troops, and, being reinforced by a division of the army of the north, under Langeron, moved southward from Châlons, to which he had retreated after his disaster at Montmirail, to Méry, a town situated upon the Seine, to the north-east of Troyes, to which last place the allied monarchs had again removed their headquarters. Here he was attacked with fury by the troops of Bonaparte, who made a desperate attempt to carry the bridge and town, and thus prevent the proposed communication between the Silesian army and that of Schwartzberg. The bridge, which was of wood, was set fire to in the struggle. The sharpshooters fought amid its blazing and cracking beams. The Prussians, however, kept possession of Méry.

A council of war was now held by the allies. Blücher urged the fulfilment of their original purpose of hazarding an action with Napoleon. But the Austrians had again altered their mind, and determined on a general retreat as far as the line between Nancy and Langres; the very position on which the allies had paused when they first entered France. The principal cause alleged for this retrograde movement, by which they must cede half the ground they had gained since their entering France,

was, that Augereau, who had hitherto contented himself with his successful defence of Lyons, had been recruited by considerable bodies of troops from the army of Suchet, which had been employed in Catalonia. Thus reinforced, the French marshal was now about to assume the offensive against the Austrian forces at Dijon, act upon their communications with Switzerland, and raise in a mass the warlike peasantry of the departments of the Doubs, the Haute-Saône, and the Vosges. To prevent such consequences, Schwartzenberg sent General Bianchi to the rear with a large division of his forces, to support the Austrians at Dijon; and conceived his army too much weakened by this detachment to retain his purpose of risking a general action. It was therefore resolved that if the headquarters of the grand army were removed to Langres, those of Blücher should be once more established on the Marne, where, strengthened by the arrival of the northern army, which was now approaching from Flanders, he might resume his demonstration upon Paris, in case Bonaparte should engage himself in the pursuit of the grand army of the allies.

This retrograde movement gave much disgust to the Austrian soldiers, who considered it as the preface to a final abandonment of the invasion. Their resentment showed itself, not only in murmurs and in tearing out the green boughs with which, as in sign of victory, they usually ornament their helmets and schakos, but also, as is too frequently the case in similar instances, in neglect of discipline, and excesses committed on the country.

To diminish the bad effects arising from this discontent among the troops, Schwartzenberg published an order of the day, commanding the officers to enforce the strictest discipline, and at the same time explain to the army that the present retreat was only temporary, and that on joining with its reserves, which had already crossed the Rhine, the grand army would instantly resume the offensive, while Field-Marshal Blücher, at present moving northward, so as to form a junction with Winzengerode and Bulow, should at the same time attack the rear and flank of the enemy. The publishing this plan of the campaign went far to rouse the dejected confidence of the Austrian army.

On the evening of the 22d February, an answer to the letter of Schwartzenberg was received, but it was addressed exclusively to the Emperor of Austria, and while its expressions of respect are bestowed liberally on that power, the manner in which the other members of the coalition are treated shows unabated enmity, ill-concealed under an affectation of contempt. The Emperor of France expressed himself willing to treat upon the basis of the Frankfort declaration, but exclaimed against the terms which his own envoy, Canlincourt, had proposed to the plenipotentiaries of the other powers. In short, the whole letter indicated, not that Napoleon desired a general peace with the allies, but that it was his anxious wish to break up the coalition, by making a separate peace with Austria. This counteracted in spirit and letter the purpose of the confederates, distinctly expressed in their communication to Napoleon.

The Emperor Francis and his ministers were re-

solved not to listen to any proposals which went to separate the Austrian cause from that of their allies. It was therefore at first resolved that no answer should be sent to the letter; but the desire of gaining time for bringing up the reserves of the grand army, who were approaching the Swiss frontier under the direction of the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, as also for the union of the army of the north, under Bulow and Winzengerode, with that of Silesia, determined them to accept the offer of a suspension of hostilities. Under these considerations, Prince Wenceslaus of Lichtenstein was sent to the headquarters of Napoleon, to treat concerning an armistice. The emperor seemed to be in a state of high hope, and called upon the Austrians not to sacrifice themselves to the selfish views of Russia, and the miserable policy of England. He appointed Count Flahault his commissioner to negotiate for a line of demarcation, and directed him to meet with the envoy from the allies at Lusigny, on 24th February.

On the night of the 23d, the French bombarded Troyes, which the allied troops evacuated according to their latest plan of the campaign. The French entered the town on the 24th, when the sick and wounded, left behind by the allies, were dragged out to grace Napoleon's triumph; and a scene not less deplorable, but of another description, was performed at the same time.

Amid the high hopes which the entrance of the allies into France had suggested to the enemies of Bonaparte's government, five persons, the chief of whom were the Marquis de Widraches, and the Chevalier de Gouault, had displayed the white cockade, and other emblems of loyalty to the exiled family. They had received little encouragement to take so decided a step either from the Crown Prince of Wirtemberg, or from the Emperor Alexander; both of whom, although approving the principles on which these gentlemen acted, refused to sanction the step they had taken, or to warrant them against the consequences. It does not appear that their declaration had excited any corresponding enthusiasm in the people of Troyes or the neighbourhood; and it would have been wiser in Napoleon to have overlooked such a trifling movement, which he might have represented as arising from the dotage of loyalty, rather than to have, at this critical period, called the public attention to the Bourbons, by denouncing and executing vengeance upon their partisans. Nevertheless Napoleon had scarce entered Troyes, when the Chevalier de Gouault (the other royalists having fortunately escaped) was seized upon, tried by a military commission, condemned, and immediately shot.* He died with the utmost firmness, exclaiming, *Vive le roi!* A violent and ill-timed decree promulgated the penalty of death against all who should wear the decorations of the Bourbons, and on all emigrants who should join the allies. The severity of the measure, so contrary to Napoleon's general conduct, of late years, towards the Bourbons and their followers, whom he had for a long period scarce even alluded to, made the

* It has been said that Napoleon had been persuaded to save his life. But the result was similar to the execution of Clarence.

world ascribe his unusual ferocity to an uncommon state of apprehension; and thus it gave farther encouragement to those into whom it was intended to strike terror.

At this period of the retreat of Schwartzberg from Troyes, and the movement of Blücher towards the Marne, we must leave the armies which were contending in the interior of France, in order to retrace those movements upon the frontiers, which, though operating at a distance, tended at once to reinforce the invading armies, and to cripple Napoleon's means of defence.

It is difficult for the inhabitants of a peaceful territory to picture to themselves the miseries sustained by the country which formed the theatre of this sanguinary contest. While Bonaparte, like a tiger hemmed in by hounds and hunters, now menaced one of his foes, now sprung furiously upon another, and while, although his rapid movements disconcerted and dismayed them, he still remained unable to destroy the individuals whom he had assailed, lest, while aiming to do so, he should afford a fatal advantage to those who were disengaged,—the scene of this desultory warfare was laid waste in the most merciless manner. The soldiers on both parts, driven to desperation by rapid marches through roads blocked with snow, or trodden into swamps, became reckless, and pitiless; and, straggling from their columns in all directions, committed every species of excess upon the inhabitants. These evils are mentioned in the bulletins of Napoleon, as well as in the general orders of Schwartzberg.

The peasants, with their wives and children, fled to caves, quarries, and woods, where the latter were starved to death by the inclemency of the season, and want of sustenance; and the former, collecting into small bodies, increased the terrors of war by pillaging the convoys of both armies, attacking small parties of all nations, and cutting off the sick, the wounded, and the stragglers. The repeated advance and retreat of the different contending parties exasperated these evils. Every fresh band of plunderers which arrived was savagely eager after spoil, in proportion as the gleanings became scarce. In the words of Scripture, what the locust left was devoured by the palmer-worm—what escaped the Baskirs, and Kirgass, and Croats, of the Volga, and Caspian and Turkish frontier, was seized by the half-clad and half-starved conscripts of Napoleon, whom want, hardship, and an embittered spirit, rendered as careless of the ties of country and language, as the others were indifferent to the general claims of humanity. The towns and villages, which were the scenes of actual conflict, were frequently burnt to the ground; and this not only in the course of the actions of importance which we have detailed, but in consequence of innumerable skirmishes fought in different points, which had no influence, indeed, upon the issue of the campaign, but increased incalculably the distress of the invaded country, by extending the terrors of battle, with fire, famine, and slaughter for its accompaniments, into the most remote and sequestered districts. The woods afforded no concealment, the churches no sanctuary; even the grave itself gave no cover to the relics of mortality. The villages were everywhere burnt, the farms wasted

and pillaged, the abodes of man, and all that belongs to peaceful industry and domestic comfort, desolated and destroyed. Wolves, and other savage animals, increased fearfully in the districts which had been laid waste by human hands, with ferocity congenial to their own. Thus were the evils, which France had unsparingly inflicted upon Spain, Prussia, Russia, and almost every European nation, terribly retaliated within a few leagues of her own metropolis; and such were the consequences of a system, which, assuming military force for its sole principle and law, taught the united nations of Europe to repel its aggressions by means yet more formidable in extent than those which had been used in supporting them.

CHAPTER XCII.

Retrospect of military events on the French frontiers.—Defection of Murat, who declares in favour of the allies—Its consequences.—Augereau is compelled to abandon Gex and Franche-Comté.—The north of Germany and Flanders lost to France.—Carnot intrusted with the command of Antwerp.—Bergen-op-Zoom nearly taken by Sir Thomas Graham, but lost by the disorder of the troops in the moment of success.—The allies take, and evacuate Soissons.—Bulow and Winzengerode unite with Blücher.—The Duke of Wellington forces his way through the Pays des Gavés.—State of the royalists in the west of France.—Discontent of the old republicans with Napoleon's government.—Views of the different members of the alliance as to the dynasties of the Bourbons and of Napoleon.—Proceedings of the Dukes of Berri and Angoulême, and Monsieur, the two latter of whom enter France.—The French defeated by Wellington at Orthez.—Bordeaux is voluntarily surrendered to Marshal Beresford by the inhabitants, who mount the white cockade.—Details of the Negotiations of Châtillon.—Treaty of Chaumont, by which the allies bind themselves of new to carry on the war with vigour.—Napoleon presents a singularly unreasonable counter-project at Châtillon.—Congress at Châtillon broken up.

WHILE Napoleon was struggling, in the campaign of Paris, for his very existence as a monarch, events were taking place on the frontiers, by all of which his fate was more or less influenced, and in almost all of them unfavourably. Of these events we must give a brief detail, mentioning, at the same time, the influence which they individually produced upon the results of the war.

The defence of Italy had been committed to Prince Eugène Beauharnais, the viceroy of that kingdom. He was entirely worthy of the trust, but was deprived of any means that remained to him of accomplishing his task, by the defection of Murat. We have often had occasion to describe Murat as distinguished on the field of battle—rather an undaunted and high-mettled soldier than a wise commander. As a sovereign he had little claim to distinction. He was good-tempered, but vain; limited in capacity, and totally uninformed. Napoleon had not concealed his contempt of his understanding, and after the retreat from Russia, had passed an oblique, but most intelligible censure on him, in a public bulletin. In writing to the wife of Murat, and his own sister, Napoleon had mentioned her husband disparagingly, as one who was brave

only on the field of battle, but elsewhere as weak as a monk or a woman. Caroline, in answer, cautioned her brother to treat her husband with more respect. Napoleon, unaccustomed to suppress his sentiments, continued the same line of language and conduct.

Meanwhile Murat, in his resentment, listened to terms from Austria, in which, by the mediation of that state, which was interested in the recovery of her Italian provinces, England was with difficulty induced to acquiesce. In consequence of a treaty formed with Austria, Murat declared himself in favour of the allies, and marched an army of 30,000 Neapolitans to Rome, for the purpose of assisting in the expulsion of the French from Italy. He speedily occupied Ancona and Florence. There was already in Italy an army of 30,000 Austrians, with whom the viceroy had fought the indecisive battle of Roverbello, after which he retreated to the line of the Adige, on which he made a precarious stand, until the war was concluded. The appearance of Murat's army on the side of Austria, though he confined himself to a war of proclamations, was calculated to end all French influence in Italy. Counter-revolutionary movements, in some of the cantons of Switzerland, and in the mountains of Savoy, tended also to close the door through which Bonaparte had so often transferred the war into the Italian peninsula, and from its northern provinces into the heart of Austria herself.

The defection of Murat had the further effect of disconcerting the measures which Napoleon had meditated for recovery of the south-eastern frontier of France. Augereau had received orders to advance from Lyons, and receive the reinforcements which Eugène was to have dispatched from Italy across the Alps. These, it was calculated, would have given the French marshal a decisive superiority, which might have enabled him to ascend towards the sources of the Saône, call to arms the hardy peasantry of the Vosgesian mountains, interrupt the communications of the Austrian army, and excite a national and guerilla warfare in the rear of the allies.

To stimulate more highly the energies of his early comrade in arms, Napoleon caused the Empress Maria Louisa to wait upon the young Duchess of Castiglione (the marshal's wife), to prevail on her to use her influence with her husband, to exert all his talents and nodacity in the present crisis. It was a singular feature of declension of power, when it was thought that the command of the emperor, imposed upon one of his marshals, might require being enforced by the interposition of a lady; or rather, it implied that Napoleon was sensible that he was requiring of his officer something which no ordinary exertions could enable him to perform. He wrote, however, to Augereau himself, conjuring him to remember his early victories, and to forget that he was upwards of fifty years old. But exhortations, whether by a sovereign or lady, cannot supply the want of physical force.

Augereau was unable to execute the task imposed upon him, from not receiving the Italian reinforcements, which, as matters stood in Italy, Eugène could not possibly spare. Detachments from Su-

chef's Spanish veterans did indeed join the marshal at Lyons, and enable him to advance on General Bubna, whom he compelled to retreat to Geneva. But the arrival of General Bianchi, with a strong reinforcement which Schwartzenberg had dispatched for that purpose, restored the ascendancy of the allied armies on that frontier, especially as the Prince of Hesse-Homburg also approached from Switzerland at the head of the Austrian reserves. This last general had no difficulty in securing the passes of the Saône. Augereau in consequence was compelled to abandon the country of Gex and Franche-Comté, and again to return under the walls of Lyons. Napoleon was not more complaisant to his old comrade and tutor, than he had been to the other marshals in this campaign, who had not accomplished tasks which they had not the means to achieve. Augereau was publicly censured as being inactive and unenterprising.

The north of Germany and Flanders were equally lost to France, and French interest. Hamburg indeed still held out. But, as we have already said, it was besieged, or rather blockaded, by the allies, under Bennigsen, to whom the Crown Prince of Sweden had left that charge, when he himself, having put an end to the war with Denmark, had advanced towards Cologne, with the purpose of assisting in clearing Belgium of the French, and then entering France from that direction, in support of the Silesian army. The Crown Prince showed no personal willingness to engage in the invasion of France. The causes which might deter him have been already conjectured. The royalists added another, that he had formed views of placing himself at the head of the government of France, which the allied monarchs declined to gratify. It is certain that, whether from motives of prudence or estrangement, he was, after his arrival in Flanders, no longer to be considered as an active member of the coalition.

In the meantime Antwerp was bravely and scientifically defended by the veteran republican Carnot. This celebrated statesman and engineer had always opposed himself to the strides which Napoleon made towards arbitrary power, and had voted against his election to the situation of consul for life, and that of emperor. It does not appear that Napoleon resented this opposition. He had been obliged to Carnot before his unexampled rise, and afterwards he was so far mindful of him, as to cause his debts to be paid at a moment of embarrassment. Carnot, on his part, took the invasion of France as a signal for every Frenchman to use his talents in the public defence, and, offering his services to the emperor, was intrusted with the command of Antwerp.

Bergen-op-Zoom was also still occupied by the French. This city, one of the most strongly fortified in the world, was nearly taken by a coup-de-main, by Sir Thomas Graham. After a night-attack of the boldest description, the British columns were so far successful, that all ordinary obstacles seemed overcome. But their success was followed by a degree of disorder which rendered it unavailing, and many of the troops who had entered the town were killed, or obliged to surrender. Thus an enterprise, ably

planned and bravely executed, miscarried even in the moment of victory, by accidents for which neither the general nor the officers immediately in command could be justly held responsible. General Graham was, however, reinforced from England, and was still enabled, with the help of the Swedes and Daues, as well as Dutch and Flemish corps, to check any sallies from Bergen or from Antwerp.

The liberation of the Low Countries being so nearly accomplished, Bulow pressed forward on La Fère, and finally occupied Laon. Here, upon the 26th of February, he formed a junction with Winzengerode, who, bequeathing Joliers, Vanloo, and Maestricht, to the observation of the Crown Prince, marched through the forest of Ardennes. Soissons offered a show of desperate resistance, but, the commandant being killed, the place was delivered up. This was on the 13th February, and the allies ought to have held this important place. But in their haste to join Prince Blücher, they evacuated Soissons, which Mortier caused to be presently re-occupied by a strong French garrison. The possession of this town became shortly afterwards a matter of great consequence. In the meantime Bulow and Winzengerode, with their two additional armies, entered into communication with Blücher, of whom they now formed the rear-guard, and more than restored to him the advantage he had lost by the defeats at Moutmirail and Champaubert.

On the south-western frontier the horizon seemed yet darker. The Duke of Wellington having entered Spain, was about to force his way through the strong country, called the Pays des Gaves, the land, that is, of the ravines formed by rivers and torrents. He maintained such severe discipline, and paid with such regularity for the supplies which he needed from the country, that he was voluntarily furnished with provisions of every kind; while the army of Soult, though stationed in the marshal's own country, obtained none, save the scanty and unwilling means of military requisition. In consequence of this strict discipline, the presence of the British troops was far from being distressing to the country; and some efforts made by General Harispe, to raise guerillas among his countrymen, the Basques, to act on the Duke of Wellington's rear, became totally ineffectual. The small seaport town of St-Jean de Luz supplied the English army with provisions and reinforcements. The activity of English commerce speedily sent cargoes of every kind into the harbour, where before were only to be seen a few fishing-boats. The goods were landed under a tariff of duties settled by the Duke of Wellington; and so ended the continental system.

In the meantime, the state of the west of France was such as held out the highest political results to the British, in case they should be able to overcome the obstacles presented by the strong entrenched camp at Bayonne, on which Soult rested his right flank, extending a line of great strength upon the Adour and the neighbouring gaves.

We have mentioned already the confederacy of royalists, which was now in full activity, and extended by faithful agents through the whole west of France. They were now at their post, and preparing everything for an explosion. The police of

Bonaparte were neither ignorant of the existence or purpose of this conspiracy, but they were unable to obtain such precise information as should detect and crush it. The two Messrs de Polignac were deeply engaged, and, becoming the subjects of suspicion, it was only by a dexterous and speedy flight from Paris that they eluded captivity; or perhaps death. They succeeded in reaching the army of the allies, and were, it is believed, the first who conveyed to the Emperor Alexander an exact state of the royal party in the interior of France, particularly in the capital, which made a powerful impression on the mind of that prince.

Throughout the west of France there started up a thousand agents of a party, which were now to awake from a sleep of twenty years. Bordeaux, with its loyal mayor, Count Lynch, and the greater part of its citizens, was a central point of the association. A great part of the inhabitants were secretly regimented and embodied, and had arms in their possession, and artillery, gunpowder, and ball, concealed in their warehouses. The celebrated La Roche-Jacquelin, made immortal by the simple and sublime narrative of his consort, solicited the cause of the royalists at the English headquarters, and made repeated and perilous journeys from thence to Bordeaux, and back again. Saintonge and La Vendée were organized for insurrection by a loyal clergyman, the Abbé Jaquelt. The brothers of Roche-Aymon prepared Périgord for a struggle. The Duke of Duras had engaged a thousand gentlemen in Touraine. Lastly, the Chouans had again prepared for a rising under the Count de Vitray, and Tranquille, a celebrated leader called *le capitaine sans peur*. Numerous bands of refractory conscripts, rendered desperate by their state of outlawry, were ready at Angers, Nantes, and Orleans, to take arms in the cause of the Bourbons, under the Count de Lorge, Monsieur d'Airc, Count Charles d'Autichamp, the Count de Suzannet, and Cadoudal, brother of the celebrated Georges, and his equal in courage and resolution. But all desired the previous advance of the *Blue-Flints*, as they called the English, their own being of a different colour. Trammelled by the negotiation at Châtillon, and various other political impediments, and anxious especially not to lead these high-spirited gentlemen into danger by encouraging a premature rising, the English ministers at home, and the English general in France, were obliged for a time to restrain rather than encourage the forward zeal of the royalists.

Such caution was the more necessary, as there existed at the same time another conspiracy, also directed against Bonaparte's person, or at least his authority; and it was of importance that neither should explode until some means could be found of preventing their checking and counteracting each other. This second class of malcontents consisted of those, who, like Bonaparte himself, owed their political consequence to the Revolution; and who, without regard to the Bourbons, were desirous to get free of the tyranny of Napoleon. These were the disappointed and degraded republicans, the deceived constitutionalists, all who had hoped and expected that the Revolution would have paved the way for a free government, in which the career of

preferment should be open to talents of every description,—a lottery in which, doubtless, each hoped that his own abilities would gain some important prize. The sceptre of Napoleon had weighed harder upon this class than even upon the royalists. He had no dislike to the principles of the latter, abstractedly considered; he felt some respect for their birth and titles, and only wished to transfer their affections from the house of Bourbon, and to attach them to that of Napoleon. Accordingly, he distributed employments and honours among each of the old noblesse as could be brought to accept them, and obviously felt pride in drawing to his court names and titles, known in the earlier periods of French history. Besides, until circumstances shook his throne, and enlarged their means of injuring him, he considered the number of the royalists as small, and their power as despicable. But from those active spirits, who had traded in revolution after revolution for so many years, he had much more both to fear and to dislike, especially as they were now understood to be headed by his ex-minister Talleyrand, with whose talents, both for scheming and executing political changes, he had so much reason to be acquainted. To this class of his enemies he imputed the hardy attempt which was made, not without prospect of success, to overthrow his government during his absence in Russia. "You have the tail, but not the head," had been the words of the principal conspirator, when about to be executed; and they still rung in the ears of Bonaparte. It was generally supposed, that his long stay in Paris, ere he again took the field against the allies, was dictated by his fear of some similar explosion to that of Malet's conspiracy. Whether these two separate classes of the enemies of Bonaparte communicated with each other, we have no opportunity of knowing, but they both had intercourse with the allies. That of Talleyrand's faction was, we believe, maintained at the court of London, through means of a near relation of his own, who visited England shortly before the opening of the campaign of which we treat. We have no doubt, that through some similar medium Talleyrand held communication with the Bourbons; and that, in the same manner as the English Restoration was brought about by a union between the cavaliers and presbyterians, there was even then upon foot some treaty of accommodation, by which the exiled monarch was, in regaining the crown, to have the assistance of those, whom, for want of another name, we shall call constitutionalists, it being understood that his government was to be established on the basis of a free model.

It was of the greatest importance that both these factions should be cautious in their movements, until it should appear what course the allied monarchs were about to pursue in the impending negotiation with Bonaparte. The issue of this was the more dubious, as it was generally understood, that though the sovereigns were agreed on the great point of destroying, on the one hand, the supremacy of France, and, on the other, in leaving her in possession of her just weight and influence, they entertained a difference of opinion as to the arrangement of her future government.

The Prince Regent of England, from the gene-

rosity of his own disposition, as well as from a clear and comprehensive view of future possibilities, entertained views favourable to the Bourbons. This illustrious person justly conjectured, that free institutions would be more likely to flourish under the restored family, who would receive back their crown under conditions favourable to freedom, than under any modification of the revolutionary system, which must always, in the case of Bonaparte's being permitted to reign, be felt as implying encroachments on his imperial power. The Bourbons, in the case presumed, might be supposed to count their winnings, in circumstances where the tenacious and resentful mind of Napoleon would brood over his losses; and it might be feared, that with a return of fortune he might struggle to repair them. But there were ministers in the British cabinet who were afraid of incurring the imputation of protracting the war by announcing England's adoption of the cause of the Bourbons, which was now of a date somewhat antiquated, and to which a sort of unhappy fatality had hitherto been annexed. England's interest in the royal cause was, therefore, limited to good wishes.

The Emperor Alexander shared in the inclination which all sovereigns must have felt towards this unhappy family, whose cause was in some degree that of princes in general. It was understood that Moreau's engagement with the Russian monarch had been founded upon an express assurance on the part of Alexander, that the Bourbons were to be restored to the crown of France under the limitations of a free constitution. Prussia, from her close alliance with Russia, and the personal causes of displeasure which existed betwixt Frederick and Napoleon, was certain to vote for the downfall of the latter.

But the numerous armies of Austria, and her vicinity to the scene of action, rendered her aid indispensable to the allies, while the alliance betwixt her Imperial house and this once fortunate soldier threw much perplexity into their councils. It was believed that the Emperor of Austria would insist upon Bonaparte's being admitted to treat as Sovereign of France, providing the latter gave sufficient evidence that he would renounce his pretensions to general supremacy; or, if he continued unreasonably obstinate, that the Emperor Francis would desire that a regency should be established, with Maria Louisa at its head. Either course, if adopted, would have been a death-blow to the hopes of the exiled family of Bourbon.

Amid this uncertainty, the princes of the house of Bourbon gallantly determined to risk their own persons in France, and try what their presence might do to awake ancient remembrances at a crisis so interesting.

Although the British ministry refused to afford any direct countenance to the schemes of the Bourbon family, they could not, in ordinary justice, deny the more active members of that unhappy race the freedom of acting as they themselves might judge most for the interest of their cause and adherents. To their applications for permission to depart for France, they received from the British ministry the reply, that the princes of the house of Bourbon

were the guests, not the prisoners, of Britain; and although the present state of public affairs precluded her from expressly authorizing any step which they might think proper to take, yet they were free to quit her territories, and return to them at their pleasure. Under a sanction so general, the Duke d'Angoulême set sail for St-Jean de Luz, to join the army of the Duke of Wellington; the Duke de Berri for Jersey to correspond with the royalists of Brittany; and Monsieur for Holland, from which he gained the frontiers of Switzerland, and entered France in the rear of the Austrian armies. The movements of the two last princes produced no effects of consequence.

The Duke de Berri passed in the Isle of Jersey, on receiving some unpleasant communications from France respecting the strength of the existing government, and on discovering, it is said, a plot to induce him to land at a point, where he must become the prisoner of Bonaparte,

Monsieur entered France, and was received at Vesoul with great enthusiasm. But this movement was not encouraged by the Austrian commandants and generals; and Monsieur's proposal to raise corps of royalists in Alsace and Franche-Comté was treated with coldness, approaching to contempt. The execution of Gouault at Troyes, and the decree of death against the royalists, struck terror into the party, which was increased by the retrograde movement of the grand army. The enterprise of Monsieur, therefore, had no immediate result, though undoubtedly his presence had a decisive effect in consequence of ultimate events; and the restoration would hardly have taken place, without that prince having so adventured his person.

The arrival of the Duke d'Angoulême in the army of the Duke of Wellington had more immediate consequences. His royal highness could only be received as a volunteer, but the effect of his arrival was soon visible. La Roche-Jacquelin, who had dedicated to the royal cause his days and nights, his fortune and his life, soon appeared in the British camp, urging the general to direct his march on the city of Bordeaux, which, when delivered from the vicinity of Soult's army, would instantly declare itself for the Bourbons, and be followed, by the rising of Guienne, Anjou, and Languedoc. Humanity, as well as policy, induced the Duke of Wellington still to hesitate. He knew how frequently patriotic enthusiasm makes promises beyond its power to fulfil; and he cautioned the zealous envoy to beware of a hasty declaration, since the conferences at Châtillon were still continued, and there was a considerable chance of their ending in a peace between the allies and Napoleon. La Roche-Jacquelin, undeterred by remonstrances, continued to urge his suit with such intelligence and gallantry, as to receive at last the encouraging answer, "Remain a few days at headquarters, and you shall see us force the Gaves."

Here, accordingly, commenced a series of scientific manoeuvres, commencing 14th February, by which the Duke of Wellington, pressing step by step on that part of the French army which were on the left side of the Adour, drove them successively beyond the Gave de Mauléon, and the Gave

d'Oléron. On the right side of the latter gave, the French took a position on very strong ground in front of the town of Orthez, where, joined by Clausel and a strong reinforcement, Soult endeavoured to make a stand. The Duke of Wellington commenced his attack on the enemy's right, storming and taking the village by which it was commanded. The desperate resistance which the enemy made on this point occasioned one of those critical movements, when a general is called upon, in the heat of battle, to alter all previous arrangements, and in the moment of doubt, confusion, and anxiety, to substitute new combinations to supersede those which have been planned in the hours of cool premeditation. A left attack upon a chain of heights extending along General Soult's left, was substituted for that to which Wellington had at first trusted for victory.

At the same time, the appearance of General Hill's division, who had forded the river, or gave, above Orthez, and threatened the enemy's flank and rear, made the defeat complete. For some time Marshal Soult availed himself of the alertness of his troops, by halting and taking new positions, to preserve at least the form of a regular retreat; but at length, forced from one line to another by the manoeuvres of the British, sustaining new losses at every halt, and menaced by the rapid approach of General Hill's division, his retreat became a flight, in which the French suffered great loss. Whole battalions of conscripts dispersed entirely, and many left their muskets regularly piled, as if intimating their fixed resolution to retire altogether from the contest.

Another action near Aire, by General Hill, and the passage of the Adour, under Bayonne, by the Honourable Sir John Hope, a manoeuvre which might well be compared to a great battle fought, gave fresh influence to the British arms. Bayonne was invested, the road to Bordeaux laid open, and Soult, left with scarce the semblance of an army, retreated towards Tarbes, to secure a junction with such French corps as might be returning from Spain.

The battle of Orthez, with the brilliant and masterly manoeuvres which preceded and followed it, served to establish the superiority of the British forces in points wherein they had till then been deemed most deficient. Since the victories in Spain, it was no longer uncommon to hear a French officer allow, that in the extreme tug of conflict the English soldier, from physical strength and high energy of character, had perhaps some degree of superiority over his own impetuous but less persevering countryman. But he uniformly qualified such a stretch of candour, by claiming for the French superior skill in contriving, and promptitude in executing, those previous movements, on which the fate of battles usually depends. The victory of Salamanca, though gained over a general distinguished as a tactician, and in consequence of a previous contest of manoeuvres, was not admitted to contradict the opinion with which Frenchmen were generally impressed. Yet since the commencement of the campaign on the Adour, the French army, though under command of the celebrated Soult (*le vieux renard*, as he was familiarly called by his soldiers), was checked,

turned, out-marched, and out-flanked upon every occasion; driven from position to position, in a country that affords so many of peculiar strength, without having it in their power to injure their victors by a protracted defence; and repeatedly defeated, not by main force or superiority of numbers, but by a combination of movements, at once so boldly conceived and so admirably executed, as left throughout the whole contest the palm of science, as well as of enduring energy and physical hardihood, with the British soldier. These victories, besides adding another laurel to the thick-woven chaplet of the English general, had the most decisive effect on the future events of the war, as well as upon the public mind in the south of France.

Bordeaux being thus left to follow the inclinations of the inhabitants, and encouraged by the approach of an English detachment of 15,000 men, under Field-marshal Beresford, poured out its multitudes to receive the Duke d'Angoulême. The numbers which thronged out of the city were computed to be at least 10,000 persons. The mayor, Count Lynch, in a short speech, told the English general that if he approached as a conqueror, he needed not his interposition to possess himself of the keys of Bordeaux; but if he came as an ally of their lawful sovereign, he was ready to tender them up, with every token of love, honour, and affection. Field-marshal Beresford reiterated his promises of protection, and expressed his confidence in the loyalty of the city of Bordeaux. The mayor then uttered the long-forgotten signal cry of *Vive le roi!* and it was echoed a thousand times from the thousands around. Count Lynch then, pulling the three-coloured cockade from his hat, assumed the white cockade of the Bourbons. All imitated his example, and at a concerted signal the old ensign of loyalty streamed from the steeples and towers of the city, amid general acclamation.

The enthusiasm with which the signals of loyalty were adopted, and the shouts of *Vive le roi* repeated on all hands, mingled with blessings upon the heads of the English and their leaders, formed a scene which those who witnessed it will not speedily forget. It was a renewal of early affections and attachments, which seemed long dead and forgotten,—a general burst of feelings the more generous and affecting, because they were not only as disinterested as spontaneous, but might eventually be deeply fraught with danger to those who expressed them. Yet they were uttered with a generous enthusiasm, that placed the actors far above the apprehension of personal consequences.

The same lively acclamations hailed the entrance of the Duke d'Angoulême into this fine city. At the prince's entry, the inhabitants crowded round him with enthusiasm. The archbishop and clergy of the diocese recognized him; *Te Deum* was sung in full pomp, while the united banners of France, Britain, Spain, and Portugal, were hoisted on the walls of the town. Lord Dalhousie was left commandant of the British; and if excellent sense, long experience, the most perfect equality of temper, and unshaken steadiness, be necessary qualities in so delicate a trust, the British army had not one more fit for the charge.

Brilliant as these tidings were, they excited in Britain the most cruel apprehensions for the fate which Bordeaux might incur, if this declaration should unhappily prove to be premature. The treaty at Châtillon seemed to approach a termination, and vessels are said to have been dispatched to the Gironde, to favour the escape of such citizens as might be most obnoxious to the vengeance of Bonaparte. Many of those who wished most for British success were tempted to regret that the victory of Orthez had taken place; so great were their apprehensions for those who had been encouraged by that success, to declare against the government of Napoleon ere his power of injuring them was at an end. That we may see how far those fears were warranted, we shall hastily review the progress of this remarkable negotiation, of which, however, the secret history is not even now entirely known.

The propositions for peace had begun with the communication of the Baron de St-Aignan, which had been discussed at Frankfort. The terms then proposed to Napoleon were, that, abandoning all his wider conquests, France should retire within the course of the Rhine and the barrier of the Alps. Napoleon had accepted these conditions as a basis, under a stipulation, however, which afforded a pretext for breaking off the treaty at pleasure, namely, that France was to be admitted to liberty of commerce and navigation; an implied challenge of the maritime law, as exercised by the British. To this, the Earl of Aberdeen, the able and accomplished representative of Britain, replied, that France should enjoy such liberty of commerce and navigation as she had any right to expect. A subject of debate, and a most important one, was thus left open; and perhaps neither of those powers were displeased to possess a means of disturbing the progress of the treaty, according to what should prove the events of the war.

Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, the minister of foreign affairs, was the representative of Napoleon at Châtillon, upon this most important occasion. His first instructions, dated 4th January, 1814, restricted him to the basis proposed at Frankfort, which assigned Belgium to France, thus conceding to the latter what Napoleon now called her natural boundaries, although it certainly did not appear why, since victory had extended her frontiers by so many additional kingdoms, defeat should not now have the natural effect of retrenching them. But after the inauspicious commencement of the campaign, by the battle of Brienne, in which Napoleon gained little, and that of La Rothière, in which he was defeated, he saw that as peace, like the Books of the Sybils (to the sale of which the negotiation has been compared), would rise in price, circumstances might render it necessary, also, that peace should be made by Caulaincourt without communication with Napoleon. Depending upon the events of war, it might be possible that a favourable day, nay, an hour being suffered to elapse, might put the treaty out of his reach. For these reasons, Caulaincourt was intrusted, over and above his instructions, with a definitive and unlimited carte-blanche, in which he was empowered to "bring the negotiation to a happy issue, to save the capital, and

prevent the hazards of a battle, on which must rest the last hopes of the nation."

Caulaincourt reached Châtillon-sur-Seine, which had been declared neutral for the purpose of the conferences. At this memorable congress, Count Stadion represented Austria, Count Razumowski Russia, Baron Humboldt Prussia, and Great Britain had three commissioners present, namely, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart. Every politeness was shown on the part of the French, who even offered the English ministers the advantage of corresponding directly with London by the way of Calais; a courtesy which was declined with thanks.

The commissioners of the allies were not long in expressing what Napoleon's fears had anticipated. They declared that they would no longer abide by the basis proposed at Frankfurt. "To obtain peace, France must be restricted within her ancient limits," which excluded the important acquisition of Belgium. Baron Pain gives us an interesting account of the mode in which Napoleon received this communication. He retired for a time into his own apartment, and sent for Berthier and Maret. They came—he gave them the fatal dispatch—they read, and a deep silence ensued. The two faithful ministers flung themselves at their master's feet, and with tears in their eyes implored him to give way to the necessity of the time. "Never," he replied, "will I break the oath by which I swore, at my coronation, to maintain the integrity of the territories of the Republic, and never will I leave France less in extent than I found her. It would not only be France that would retreat, but Austria and Prussia who would advance. France indeed needs peace, but such a peace is worse than the most inveterate war. What answer would I have to the republicans of the state, when they should demand from me the barrier of the Rhine? No—write to Caulaincourt that I reject the treaty, and will rather abide the brunt of battle." Shortly after he is said to have exclaimed, "I am yet nearer to Munich than they are to Paris."

His counsellors were not discouraged. In a cooler moment, the ministers who watched his pillow obtained from him permission that the treaty should proceed. He directed that the articles proposed by the allies should be sent to Paris, and the advice of each privy counsellor taken individually upon the subject. With one exception, that of Count Lacuée de Cessac, all the privy counsellors agreed that the terms proposed at Châtillon ought to be subscribed to. Thus sanctioned, Caulaincourt, on the 9th of February, wrote to the commissioners of the allies, that if an immediate armistice were entered into, he was ready to consent that France should retreat within her ancient limits, according to the basis proposed. He offered, also, that France should cede instantly, on condition of the armistice being granted, some of the strong places, which their acceptance of the terms offered obliged her to yield up. But this offer of ceding the fortresses was clogged with secret conditions, to be afterwards explained. The allies declared their readiness to adhere to these preliminaries, and for a day the war might be considered as ended.

But in the meantime, the successes which Napoleon obtained over Blücher at Montmirail and Champaubert, had elevated him in his own opinion above the necessity in which he stood after the battle of Brienne. From the field of battle at Châtillon-Thierry, he wrote to Caulaincourt to assume an attitude less humiliating among the members of the congress; and after the defeat of the Prince of Württemberg, at the bridge of Montereau, and the retreat of the grand army from Troyes, he seems to have entirely resolved to break off the treaty.

When Schwartzberg, as we have seen, demanded the meaning of Napoleon's offensive movement, contrary to what had been agreed upon by the congress at Châtillon, he answered, by the letter to the Emperor of Austria, in which he rejected the conditions to which Caulaincourt had agreed, and reprobated them as terms which, if known in Paris, would excite general indignation. "It would realize," he said, "the dream of Burke, who desired to make France disappear from the map of Europe. It was placing England* in possession of Antwerp and the Low Countries, neither of which he would ever surrender."

In the same spirit, and at the same time, Napoleon wrote from Nangis to Caulaincourt, that, "when he had given him carte-blanche, it was for the purpose of saving Paris, and Paris was now saved; it was for avoiding the risk of a battle,—that risk was over, and the battle won; he therefore revoked the extraordinary powers with which his ambassador was invested."

We will not stop to inquire into the diplomatic question, whether Caulaincourt had not effectually exercised, on 9th February, those powers which were not recalled until the 17th, seven days after; and, consequently, whether his master was not bound, by the act of his envoy, beyond the power of retracting. Enough remains to surprise us in Napoleon's headstrong resolution to continue the war, when, in fact, it was already ended upon terms which had been recommended by all his counsellors, one excepted. His obligation to the Republic of France, to maintain the integrity of its territories, could scarcely remain binding on one, by whom that very republic had been destroyed; and at any rate, no such engagement can bind a sovereign from acting in extremity as the safety of the community requires. Far less could the terms be said to dishonour France, or strike her out of the map of Europe, unless her honour and existence, which had flourished for twelve centuries, depended upon an acquisition which she had made within twenty years. But the real case was, that Bonaparte always connected the loss of honour with the surrender of whatever he conceived himself to have a chance of being able to retain. Every cession was to be wrung from him; he would part with nothing willingly; and, like a child with its toys, that of which there was any attempt to deprive him became immediately the most valuable of his possessions. Antwerp, indeed, had a particular right

* This alluded to the match, then supposed to be on the tapis, betwixt the late Princess Charlotte of Wales and the Prince of Orange.

to be considered as inestimable. The sums he had bestowed on its magnificent basins, and almost impregnable fortifications, were immense. He had always the idea that he might make Antwerp the principal station of a large navy. He clung to this vision of a fleet, even at Elba and St Helena, repeating often, that he might have saved his crown if he would have resigned Antwerp at Châtillon; and no idea was more riveted in his mind, than that his refusal was founded on patriotic principles.* Yet the chief value of Antwerp lay in the event of another war with Great Britain, for which Bonaparte was thus preparing, while the question was, how the present hostilities were to be closed; and surely, the possibility of a navy which had no existence, should not have been placed in competition with the safety of a nation deeply imperiled by the war now waging in the very centre of his kingdom. This he saw in a different light from that of calm reason. "If I am to receive flagellation," he said, "let it be at least under terms of compulsion."

Lastly, the temporary success which he had attained in the field of battle was of a character, which, justly considered, ought not to have encouraged the French Emperor to continue war, but, on the contrary, might have furnished a precious opportunity for making peace, before the very sword's point was at his throat. The conditions which he might have made in this moment of temporary success would have had the appearance of being gracefully ceded, rather than positively extorted by necessity. And it may be added, that the allies, startled by their losses, would have probably granted him better terms; and certainly, remembering his military talents, would have taken care to observe those which they might fix upon. The reverse, therefore, in the month of February, which obscured the arms of the combined monarchs, resembled the cloud, which, in Byron's tale, is described as passing over the moon, to afford an impatient renegade the last and limited term for repentance.† But the heart of Napoleon, like that of Alp, was too proud to profit by the interval of delay thus afforded to him.

The truth seems to be, that Bonaparte never seriously intended to make peace at Châtillon; and while his negotiator, Caulaincourt, was instructed to hold out to the allies a proposal to cede the frontier fortresses, he received from the Duke of Bassano the following private directions: "The emperor desires that you would avoid explaining yourself clearly upon everything which may relate to delivering up the fortresses of Antwerp, Mentz, and Alexandria, if you should be obliged to consent to those cessions; his majesty intending, even though he should have ratified the treaty, to be guided by the military situation of affairs:—wait till the last moment. The bad faith of the allies in respect to

the capitulations of Dresden, Dantzic, and Gœrœm, authorizes us to endeavour not to be duped. Refer, therefore, these questions to a military arrangement, as was done at Presburg, Vienna, and Tilsit. His majesty desires that you would not lose sight of the disposition which he will feel, *not to deliver up those three keys of France*, if military events, on which he is willing still to rely, should permit him not to do so, *even if he should have signed the cession of all these provinces*. In a word, his majesty wishes to be able, after the treaty, to be guided by existing circumstances, to the last moment. He orders you to burn this letter as soon as you have read it."

The allies showed, on their side, that the obstinacy of Napoleon had increased, not diminished, their determination to carry on the war. A new treaty, called that of Chaumont, was entered into upon the 1st of March, between Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, by which the high contracting parties bound themselves each to keep up an army of 150,000 men, with an agreement on the part of Great Britain to advance four millions to carry on the war, which was to be prosecuted without relaxation, until France should be reduced within her ancient limits; and what further indicated the feelings of both parties, the military commissioners, who had met at Lasigay to settle the terms of an armistice, broke up, on pretence of being unable to agree upon a suitable line of demarcation.

The principal negotiation continued to languish at Châtillon, but without much remaining hope being entertained, by those who were well-informed on either side, of the result being favourable.

On the 7th March, Rumigny, a clerk of Bonaparte's cabinet, brought to the emperor, on the evening of the bloody battle of Craonne, the ultimatum of the allies, insisting that the French envoy should either proceed to treat upon the basis they had offered, namely, that France should be reduced within her ancient limits, or that Caulaincourt should present a *contre-projet*. His plenipotentiary requested instructions; but it appears that Bonaparte, too able not to see the result of his pertinacity, yet too haughty to recede from it, had resolved, in sportsman's phrase, to die hard. The 10th day of March having passed over, without any answer arriving from Bonaparte to Caulaincourt, the terms assigned to him for declaring his ultimatum was extended for five days; the plenipotentiary of France hoping, probably, that some decisive event in the field of battle would either induce his master to consent to the terms of the allies, or give him a right to obtain better.

It is said that, during this interval, Prince Wenceslaus of Lichtenstein was again dispatched by the Emperor Francis to the head-quarters of Napoleon as a special envoy, for the purpose of conjuring him to accommodate his ultimatum to the articles settled as the basis of the conferences, and informing him that otherwise the Emperor Francis would lay aside those family considerations, which had hitherto prevented him from acceding to the dispositions of the other allied powers in favour of the dynasty of Bourbon. It is added, that Bonaparte seemed at first silenced and astounded by this intimation; but, im-

* *Mémorial de Ste-Hélène*, vol. VII, pp. 106-7.

† There is a light cloud by the moon—

"T is passing, and will pass full soon—

If, by the time its vapoury sail

Hath ceased her shrouded orb to veil,

Thy heart is not within thee changed,

Then God and man are both avenged.

Siege of Corinth.

meditely recovering himself, treated it as a vain threat held out to intimidate him, and said it would be most for the interest of Austria to join in procuring him a peace on his own terms, since otherwise he might again be forced to cross the Rhine. The Austrian prince retired without reply; and from that moment, it has been supposed, the emperor resigned his son-in-law, without further effort in his favour, to the consequences of his own ill-timed obstinacy.

Caulaincourt, in the meantime, played the part of an able minister and active negotiator. He kept the negotiation as long afloat as possible, and, in the meanwhile, used every argument to induce his master to close with the terms of the allies. At length, however, he was compelled to produce a *contre-projet*, which he hoped might have at least the effect of prolonging the negotiation.

But the plan he offered was not only too vague to serve the purpose of amusing the allies, but too inconsistent with the articles adopted by all parties as the basis of the conference, to be a moment listened to. He demanded the whole line of the Rhine—he demanded great part of that of the Waal, and the fortress of Nimeguen, which must have rendered the independence of Holland purely nominal—he required Italy, and even Venice, for Eugene Beauharnais, although this important article was not only in absolute contradiction to the basis of the treaty, but peculiarly offensive and injurious to Austria, whom it was so much Bonaparte's interest to conciliate. The possession of Italy embraced, of course, that of Switzerland, either directly or by influence; so that in future wars Austria would lie open to the incursions of France along her whole frontier, and, while concluding a victorious treaty upon French ground, would have been placed in a worse situation than by that which Bonaparte himself dictated to her at Campo Formio! There were stipulations, besides, for indemnities to Jérôme, the phantom-king of Westphalia; to Louis, Grand Duke of Berg; and to Eugène, in compensation of his alleged rights on the Grand Duchy of Frankfort. Nay, as if determined to show that nothing which he had ever done, even though undone by himself, should now be considered as null, without exacting compensation at the expense of the rest of Europe, Bonaparte demanded an indemnity for his brother Joseph, not indeed for the crown of Spain, but for that very throne of Naples, from which he had himself displaced him, in order to make room for Murat! The assembled congress received this imperious communication with equal surprise and displeasure. They instantly declared the congress dissolved; and thus terminated the fears of many, who considered Europe as in greater danger from any treaty that could be made with Bonaparte, than from the progress of his arms against the allies.

It was the opinion of such men, and their number was very considerable, that no peace concluded with Napoleon could be permanent, and that any immediate terms of composition could be only an armed truce, to last until the Emperor of France should feel himself able to spend the remainder of his life in winning back again the conquests which he had spent the earlier part of it in gaining. They insisted that this was visible, from his breaking off

the treaty on the subject of Antwerp; the chief utility of which, to his empire, must have been in the future wars which he meditated with Britain. It was seeking war through peace, not peace by war. Such reasoners were no doubt in many cases prejudiced against Napoleon's person, and inclined to consider his government as a usurpation. But others amongst them allowed that Napoleon, abstractedly considered, was not a worse man than other conquerors, but that a run of success so long uninterrupted had made war and conquest so familiar to his soul, that, to use an expression of the poet, the "earthquake voice of victory" was to him the necessary and indispensable breath of life. This passion for battle, they said, might not make Napoleon hateful as a man, for much, far too much, allowance is made in modern morality for the thirst of military fame; but it must be allowed that it rendered him a most unfit monarch for those with whose blood that thirst was to be stanching. Such reflections are, however, foreign to our present purpose.

It was not the least remarkable contingency in these momentous transactions, that as Caulaincourt left Châtillon, he met the secretary of Bonaparte posting towards him with the full and explicit powers of treating which he had so long vainly solicited. Had Napoleon adopted this final decision of submitting himself to circumstances but one day earlier, the treaty of Châtillon might have proceeded, and he would have continued in possession of the throne of France. But it was too late.

CHAPTER XCIII.

Difficulties of Bonaparte—He marches upon Blücher; who is in possession of Silesia—Attacks the place without success.—Battle of Craonne, on 7th March, attended by no decisive result.—Blücher retreats on Laon.—Battle of Laon on the 9th.—Napoleon is compelled to withdraw on the 11th, with great loss.—He attacks Rheims, which is evacuated by the Russians.—Defeat at Bar-sur-Aube of the French divisions under Oudinot and Gérard, who, with Macdonald, are forced to retreat upon the great road to Paris.—Schwarzenberg wishes to retreat behind the Aube—but the Emperor Alexander and Lord Castlereagh opposing the measure, it is determined to proceed upon Paris.—Napoleon occupies Arcis.—Battle of Arcis on the 20th.—Napoleon is joined, in the night after the battle, by Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard.—Nevertheless he retreats along both sides of the Aube, with little loss.

THE sword was now again brandished, not to be sheathed or reposed, until the one party or the other should be irretrievably defeated.

The situation of Bonaparte, even after the victory of Montereau, and capture of Troyes, was most discouraging. If he advanced on the grand army of the allies, which he had in front, there was every likelihood that they would retire before him, wasting his force in skirmishes, without a possibility of his being able to force them to a general action; while, in the meantime, it might be reckoned for certain that Blücher, master of the Marne, would march upon Paris. On the contrary, if Napoleon moved with his chief force against Blücher, he had, in like manner, to apprehend that Schwarzenberg

would resume the route upon Paris by way of the valley of the Seine. Thus, he could make no exertion upon the one side, without exposing the capital to danger on the other.

After weighing all the disadvantages on either side, Napoleon determined to turn his arms against Blücher, as most hostile to his person, most rapid in his movements, and most persevering in his purposes. He left Oudinot, Macdonald, and Gérard, in front of the grand army, in hopes that, however inferior in numbers, they might be able to impose upon Schwartzberg a belief that Napoleon was present in person, and thus either induce the Austrian to continue his retreat, or at least prevent him from resuming the offensive. For this purpose the French troops were to move on Bar-sur-Aube, and occupy, if practicable, the heights in that neighbourhood. The soldiers were also to use the cry of *Vive l'empereur*, as if Napoleon had been present. It was afterwards seen, that as the marshals did not command 40,000 men in all, including a force under Macdonald, it was impossible for them to discharge effectually the part assigned them. In the meanwhile, Napoleon himself continued his lateral march on Blücher, supposing it possible for him, as formerly, to surprise his flank, as the Prussian marched upon Paris. For this purpose he moved as speedily as possible to La Ferté-Gaucher, where he arrived 1st March; but Sacken and d'York, who would have been the first victims of this manoeuvre, as their divisions were on the left bank of the Marne, near to Meaux, crossed the river at La Ferté-sous-Journe, and formed a junction with Blücher, who now resolved to fall back on the troops of Bülow and Winzengerode. These generals were, it will be remembered, advancing from the frontiers of Belgium.

A sudden hard frost rendered the country passable, which had before been in so swampy a condition as to render marching very difficult. This was much to the advantage of the Prussians. Napoleon detached the forces, under Marmont and Mortier, whom he had united with his own, to press upon and harass the retreat of the Prussian field-marshal; while he himself, pushing on by a shorter line, possessed himself of the town of Fismes, about half way betwixt Rheims and Soissons. The occupation of this last place was now a matter of the last consequence. If Blücher should find Soissons open to him, he might cross the Marne, extricate himself from his pursuers without difficulty, and form his junction with the army of the north. But if excluded from this town and bridge, Blücher must have hazarded a battle on the most disadvantageous terms, having Mortier and Marmont on his front, Napoleon on his left flank, and in his rear, a town, with a hostile garrison and a deep river.

It was almost a chance, like that of the dice, which partly possessed this important place. The Russians had taken it * on 13th February, but being immediately evacuated by them, it was on the 19th occupied by Mortier, and garrisoned by five hundred Poles, who were imagined capable of the most determined defence. On the 2d March, however, the

commandant, intimidated by the advance of Bülow's army of 30,000 men, yielded up Soissons to that general, upon a threat of an instant storm, and no quarter allowed. The Russian standards then waved on the ramparts of Soissons, and Blücher, arriving under its walls, acquired the full power of uniting himself with his rear-guard, and giving or refusing battle at his pleasure, on the very moment when Bonaparte, having turned his flank, expected to have forced on him a most disadvantageous action.

The emperor's wrath exhaled in a bulletin against the inconceivable baseness of the commandant of Soissons, who was said to have given up so important a place when he was within hearing of the cannonade of the 2d and 3d, and must thereby have known the approach of the emperor. In the heat of his wrath, he ordered Soissons to be assaulted and carried by storm at all risk; but it was defended by General Langeron, with 10,000 Russians. A desperate conflict ensued, but Langeron retained possession of the town.

Abandoning this project, Napoleon crossed the Aisne at Bery-au-Bac, with the purpose of attacking the left wing of Blücher's army, which, being now concentrated, was strongly posted betwixt the village of Craonne and the town of Laon, in such a manner as to secure a retreat upon the very strong position which the latter town affords. Blücher imagined a manoeuvre, designed to show Bonaparte that his favourite system of turning an enemy's flank had its risks and inconveniences. He detached ten thousand horse under Winzengerode, by a circuitous route, with orders that when the French commenced their march on Craonne, they should move round and act upon their flank and rear. But the state of the roads, and other impediments, prevented this body of cavalry from getting up in time to execute the intended manoeuvre.

Meantime, at eleven in the morning of the 7th March, the French began their attack with the utmost bravery. Ney assaulted the position on the right flank, which was defended by a ravine, and Victor, burning to show the zeal which he had been accused of wanting, made incredible exertions in front. But the assault was met by a defence equally obstinate, and the contest became one of the most bloody and best-sustained during the war. It was four in the afternoon, and the French had not yet been able to dislodge the Russians on any point, when the latter received orders from Blücher to withdraw from the disputed ground, and unite with the Prussian army on the splendid position of Laon, which the marshal considered as a more favourable scene of action. There were no guns lost, or prisoners made. The Russians, in despite of a general charge of the French cavalry, retreated as on the parade. As the armies, considering the absence of Winzengerode with the detachment of cavalry, and of Langeron with the garrison of Soissons, were nearly equal, the indecisive event of the battle was the more ominous. The slain and wounded were about the same number on both sides, and the French only retained as a mark of victory the possession of the field of battle.

Napoleon himself followed the retreat of the Russians as far as an inn between Craonne and Laon,

* See page 633.

called l'Ange Gardien, where he reposed for the night. He indeed never more needed the assistance of a guardian angel, and his own appears to have deserted his charge. It was here that Rumigny found him when he presented the letter of Caulaincourt, praying for final instructions from the emperor; and it was here he could only extract the ambiguous reply, that if he must submit to the *bastinado*, it should be only by force. At this cabaret, also, he regulated his plan for attacking the position of Blücher on the next morning, and thus ridding himself finally, if possible, of that Silesian army, which had been his object of disquietude for forty-two days, during the course of which, scarce two days had passed without their being engaged in serious conflict, either in front or rear. He received valuable information for enabling him to make the projected attack, from a retired officer, Monsieur Bussy de Bellay, who had been his school-fellow at Brienne, who lived in the neighbourhood, and was well acquainted with the ground, and whom he instantly rewarded with the situation of an aide-de-camp, and a large appointment. When his plan for the attack was finished, he is said to have exclaimed, "I see this war is an abyss without a bottom, but I am resolved to be the last whom it shall devour."

The town of Laon is situated upon a table-land, or eminence flattened on the top, which rises very abruptly above a plain extending about a league in length. The face of the declivity is steep, shelving, almost precipitous, and occupied by terraces serving as vineyards. Bulow defended this town and bank. The rest of the Silesian army was placed on the plain below; the left wing, composed of Prussians, extending to the village of Athies; the right, consisting of Russians, resting on the hills between Thiers and Semonville.

Only the interval of one day elapsed between the bloody battle of Craonne and that of Laon. On the 9th, availing himself of a thick mist, Napoleon pushed his columns of attack to the very foot of the eminence on which Laon is situated, possessed himself of two of the villages, termed Sémilly and Ardon, and prepared to force his way up the hill towards the town. The weather cleared, the French attack was repelled by a tremendous fire from terraces, vineyards, windmills, and every point of advantage. Two battalions of Yagers, the impetus of their attack increased by the rapidity of the descent, recovered the villages, and the attack of Laon in front seemed to be abandoned. The French, however, continued to retain possession in that quarter of a part of the village of Clacy. Thus stood the action on the right and centre. The French had been repulsed all along the line. On the left Marshal Marmont had advanced upon the village of Athies, which was the key of Blücher's position in that point. It was gallantly defended by d'York and Kleist, supported by Sacken and Langeron. Marmont made some progress, notwithstanding this resistance, and night found him bivouacking in front of the enemy, and in possession of part of the disputed village of Athies. But he was not destined to remain there till day-break.

Upon the 10th, at four in the morning, just as

Bonaparte, arising before day-break, was calling for his horse, two dismounted dragoons were brought before him, with the unpleasing intelligence that the enemy had made a *hourra* upon Marmont, surprised him in his bivouack, and cut to pieces, taken, or dispersed his whole division, and they alone had escaped to bring the tidings. All the marshal's guns were lost, and they believed he was himself either killed or prisoner. Officers sent to reconnoitre brought back a confirmation of the truth of this intelligence, excepting as to the situation of the marshal. He was on the road to Rheims, near Corbeny, endeavouring to rally the fugitives. Notwithstanding this great loss, and as if in defiance of bad fortune, Napoleon renewed the attack upon Clacy and Sémilly; but all his attempts being fruitless, he was induced to relinquish the undertaking, under the excuse that the position was found impregnable. On the 11th, he withdrew from before Laon, having been foiled in all his attempts, and having lost thirty guns, and nearly ten thousand men. The allies suffered comparatively little, as they fought under cover.

Napoleon halted at Soissons, which, evacuated by Langeron when Blücher concentrated his army, was now again occupied by the French. Napoleon directed its defences to be strengthened, designing to leave Mortier to defend the place against the advance of Blücher, which, victorious as he was, might be instantly expected.

While at Soissons, Napoleon learned that St-Priest, a French emigrant, and a general in the Russian service, had occupied Rheims, remarkable for the venerable cathedral in which the kings of France were crowned. Napoleon instantly saw that the possession of Rheims would renew the communication betwixt Schwartzenberg and Blücher, besides neutralizing the advantages which he himself expected from the possession of Soissons. He moved from Soissons to Rheims, where, after an attack which lasted till late in the night, the Russian general being wounded, his followers were discouraged, and evacuated the place. The utmost horrors might have been expected during a night attack, when one army forced another from a considerable town. But in this instance we have the satisfaction to record, that the troops on both sides behaved in a most orderly manner. In his account of the previous action, Napoleon threw in one of those strokes of fatality which he loved to introduce. He endeavoured to persuade the public, or perhaps he himself believed, that St-Priest was shot by a ball from the same cannon which killed Moreau.

During the attack upon Rheims, Marmont came up with such forces as he had been able to rally after his defeat at Athies, and contributed to the success of the assault. He was, nevertheless, received by Napoleon with bitter reproaches, felt severely by a chief, of whose honour and talents no doubt had been expressed through a long life of soldiership.

Napoleon remained at Rheims three days, to repose and recruit his shattered army, which was reinforced from every quarter where men could be collected. Janssens, a Dutch officer, displayed a particular degree of military talent in bringing a

body of about 4000 men, draughted from the garrisons of the places on the Moselle, to join the army at Rheims; a movement of great difficulty, considering he had to penetrate through a country which was in a great measure possessed by the enemy's troops.

The halt of Napoleon at Rheims was remarkable, as affording the last means of transacting business with his civil ministers. Hitherto, an auditor of the Council of State had weekly brought to the Imperial head-quarters the report of the ministers, and received the orders of the emperor. But a variety of causes rendered this regular communication during the rest of the campaign, a matter of impossibility. At Rheims, also, Napoleon addressed to Caulaincourt a letter, dated 17th March, by which he seems to have placed it in the power of that plenipotentiary to comply in full with the terms of the allies. But the language in which it is couched is so far from bearing the precise warrant necessary for so important a concession, that there must remain a doubt whether Caulaincourt would have felt justified in acting upon it, or whether, so acting, Napoleon would have recognized his doing so, if circumstances had made it convenient for him to disown the treaty.*

While Napoleon was pursuing, fighting with, and finally defeated by Blücher, his lieutenant-generals were not more fortunate in front of the allied grand army. It will be recollected that the Marshals Oudinot and Gérard were left at the head of 25,000 men, exclusive of the separate corps under Macdonald, with orders to possess themselves of the heights of Bar-sur-Aube, and prevent Schwartzberg from crossing that river. They made the movement in advance accordingly, and after a sharp action, which left the town in their possession, they were so nigh to the allied troops, who still held the suburbs, that a battle became unavoidable, and the marshals had no choice save of making the attack, or of receiving it. They chose the former, and gained, at first, some advantages from the very audacity of their attempt; but the allies had now been long accustomed to stand their ground under greater disasters. Their numerous reserves were brought up, and their long train of artillery got into line. The French, after obtaining a temporary footing on the heights of Verdonfai, were charged and driven back in disorder. Some fine cavalry, which had been brought from the armies in Spain, was destroyed by the overpowering cannonade. The French were driven across the Aube, the town of Bar-sur-Aube was taken, and the defeated marshals could only rally their forces at the village of Vandœuvre, about half-way between Bar and Troyes.

* The words alleged to convey such extensive powers as totally to recal and alter every former restriction upon Caulaincourt's exercise of his own opinion, are contained, as above stated, in a letter from Rheims, dated 17th March, 1814. * I have charged the Duke of Bassano to answer your letter in detail. I give you directly the authority to make such concessions as shall be indispensable to maintain the continuance (*activité*) of the negotiations, and to arrive at a knowledge of the ultimatum of the allies; it being distinctly understood that the treaty shall have for its immediate result the evacuation of our territory, and the restoring prisoners on both sides."

The defeat of Oudinot and Gérard obliged Marshal Macdonald, who defended the line of the river above Bar, to retreat to Troyes, from his strong position at La Ferté-sur-Aube. He therefore fell back towards Vandœuvre. But though these three distinguished generals, Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, had combined their talents, and united their forces, it was impossible for them to defend Troyes, and they were compelled to retreat upon the great road to Paris. Thus, the head-quarters of the allied monarchs were, for the second time during this changeful war, established in the ancient capital of Champagne; and the allied grand army recovered, by the victory of Bar-sur-Aube, all the territory which they had yielded up in consequence of Bonaparte's success at Montereau. They once more threatened to descend the Seine upon Paris, being entitled to despise any opposition offered by a feeble line, which Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, endeavoured to defend on the left bank.

But Schwartzberg's confidence in his position was lowered, when he heard that Napoleon had taken Rheims; and that, on the evening of the 17th, Ney, with a large division, had occupied Châlons-sur-Marne. This intelligence made a deep impression on the Austrian council of war. Their tactics being rigidly those of the old school of war, they esteemed their army turned whenever a French division occupied such a post as interposed betwixt them and their allies. This indeed is in one sense true; but it is equally true, that every division so interposed is itself liable to be turned, if the hostile divisions betwixt which it is interposed take combined measures for attacking it. The catching, therefore, too prompt an alarm, or considering the consequences of such a movement as irretrievable, belongs to the pedantry of war, and not to its science.

At midnight, a council was held for the purpose of determining the future motions of the allies. The generalissimo recommended a retreat behind the line of the Aube. The Emperor Alexander opposed this with great steadiness. He observed, with justice, that the protracted war was driving the country people to despair, and that the peasantry were already taking up arms, while the allies only wanted resolution, certainly neither opportunity nor numbers, to decide the affair by a single blow.

So many were the objections stated, and so difficult was it to bring the various views and interests of so many powers to coincide in the same general plan, that the emperor informed one of his attendants, he thought the anxiety of the night must have turned half his hair grey. Lord Castlereagh was against the opinion of Schwartzberg, the rather that he concluded that a retreat behind the Aube would be a preface to one behind the Rhine. Taking it upon him, as became the minister of Britain at such a crisis, he announced to the allied powers, that, so soon as they should commence the proposed retreat, the subsidies of England would cease to be paid to them.

It was, therefore, finally agreed to resume offensive operations, for which purpose they proposed to diminish the distance betwixt the allied grand army and that of Silesia, and resume such a communica-

tion with Blücher as might prevent the repetition of such disasters as those of Montmirail and Montereau. With this view, it was determined to descend the Aube, unite their army at Arcis, offer Napoleon battle, should he desire to accept it, or move boldly on Paris if he should refuse the proffered action. What determined them more resolutely, from this moment, to approach the capital as soon as possible, was the intelligence which arrived at the headquarters by Messieurs de Polignac. These gentlemen brought an encouraging account of the progress of the royalists in the metropolis, and of the general arrangements which were actively pursued for uniting with the interest of the Bourbons that of all others, who, from dislike to Bonaparte's person and government, or fear that the country, and they themselves, must share in his approaching ruin, were desirous to get rid of the imperial government. Talleyrand was at the head of the confederacy, and all were resolved to embrace the first opportunity of showing themselves, which the progress of the allies should permit. This important intelligence, coming from such unquestionable authority, strengthened the allies in their resolution to march upon Paris.

In the meantime, Napoleon being at Rheims, as stated, on the 15th and 16th March, was alarmed by the news of the loss of the battle of Bar, the retreat of the three marshals beyond the Seine, and the demonstrations of the grand army to cross that river once more. He broke up, as we have seen, from Rheims on the 17th, and sending Ney to take possession of Châlons, marched himself to Eprenay, with the purpose of placing himself on the right flank, and in the rear of Schwartzberg, in case he should advance on the road to Paris. At Eprenay, he learned that the allies, alarmed by his movements, had retired to Troyes, and that they were about to retreat upon the Aube, and probably to Langres. He also learned that the Marshals Macdonald and Oudinot had resumed their advance so soon as their adversaries began to retreat. He hastened to form a junction with these persevering leaders, and proceeded to ascend the Aube as high as Bar, where he expected to throw himself into Schwartzberg's rear, having no doubt that his army was retiring from the banks of the Aube.

In these calculations, accurate as far as the information permitted, Bonaparte was greatly misled. He conceived himself to be acting upon the retreat of the allies, and expected only to find a rear-guard at Arcis; he was even talking jocularly of making his father-in-law prisoner during his retreat. If, contrary to his expectation, he should find the enemy, or any considerable part of them, still upon the Aube, it was, from all he had heard, to be supposed his appearance would precipitate their retreat towards the frontier. It has also been asserted, that he expected Marshal Macdonald to make a corresponding advance from the banks of the Seine to those of the Aube; but the orders had been received too late to admit of the necessary space being traversed so as to arrive on the morning of the day of battle.

Napoleon easily drove before him such bodies of light cavalry, and sharp-shooters, as had been left by the allies, rather for the purpose of reconnoitring

than of making serious opposition. He crossed the Aube at Plancy, and moved upwards, along the left bank of the river, with Ney's corps, and his whole cavalry, while the infantry of his guard advanced upon the right; his army being thus, according to the French military phrase, *à cheval*, upon the Aube. The town of Arcis had been evacuated by the allies upon his approach, and was occupied by the French on the morning of the 20th March. That town forms the outlet of a sort of defile, where a succession of narrow bridges across a number of drains, brooks, and streamlets, the feeders of the river Aube, and a bridge in the town crosses the river itself. On the other side of Arcis is a plain, in which some few squadrons of cavalry, resembling a reconnoitring party, were observed manœuvring.

Behind these horse, at a place called Clermont, the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg, whose name has been so often honourably mentioned, was posted with his division, while the élite of the allied army was drawn up on a chain of heights still farther in the rear, called Ménéil la Comtesse. But these forces were not apparent to the van-guard of Napoleon's army. The French cavalry had orders to attack the light troops of the allies; but these were instantly supported by whole regiments, and by cannon, so that the attack was unsuccessful; and the squadrons of the French were repulsed and driven back on Arcis at a moment, when, from the impediments in the town and its environs, the infantry could with difficulty debouch from the town to support them. Napoleon showed, as he always did in extremity, the same heroic courage which he had exhibited at Lodi and Brienne. He drew his sword, threw himself among the broken cavalry, called on them to remember their former victories, and checked the enemy by an impetuous charge, in which he and his staff-officers fought hand to hand with their opponents, so that he was in personal danger from the lance of a cossack, the thrust of which was averted by his aide-de-camp, Girardin. His Mameluke Roustan fought stoutly by his side, and received a gratuity for his bravery. These desperate exertions afforded time for the infantry to debouch from the town. The Imperial Guards came up, and the combat waxed very warm. The superior numbers of the allies rendered them the assailants on all points. A strongly-situated village in front, and somewhat to the left of Arcis, called Torcy-le-Grand, had been occupied by the French. This place was repeatedly and desperately attacked by the allies, but the French made good their position. Arcis itself was set on fire by the shells of the assailants, and night alone separated the combatants, by inducing the allies to desist from the attack.

In the course of the night, Bonaparte was joined by Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gérard, with the forces with which they had lately held the defensive upon the Seine; and the anxious question remained, whether, thus reinforced, he should venture an action with the grand army, to which he was still much inferior in numbers. Schwartzberg, agreeably to the last resolution of the allies, drew up on the heights of Ménéil la Comtesse, prepared to receive battle. On consideration of the superior strength of the enemy, and of the absence of some troops not

yet come up, Napoleon finally determined not to accept a battle under such disadvantageous circumstances. He, therefore, commenced a retreat, the direction of which was doomed to prove the crisis of his fate. He retired as he had advanced, along both sides of the Aube; and though pursued and annoyed in this movement (which was necessarily executed through Arcis and all its defiles), his rear-guard was so well conducted, that he sustained little loss. A late author,* who has composed an excellent and scientific work on this campaign, has remarked,—“In concluding the account of the two days thus spent by the contending armies in presence of each other, it is equally worthy of remark, that Bonaparte, with a force not exceeding 25,000 or 30,000 men, should have risked himself in such a position in front of 80,000 of the allies, as that the latter should have allowed him to escape them with impunity.” The permitting him to retreat with so little annoyance has been censured in general by all who have written on this campaign.

CHAPTER XCIV.

Plans of Bonaparte in his present difficulties considered.

—Military and political questions regarding Paris.—Napoleon determines to pass to the rear of the eastern frontier, and crosses the Marne on 22d March.—Retrospect of events in the vicinity of Lyons, etc.—The allies advance upon Paris.—Defeats of the French in various quarters.—Marmont and Mortier, with their discouraged and broken forces, retreat under the walls of Paris.—Paris, how far defensible.—Exertions of Joseph Bonaparte.—The Empress Maria Louisa, with the civil authorities of government, leave the city.—Attack of Paris on the 30th, when the French are defeated on all sides.—A truce is applied for, and accorded.—Joseph Bonaparte flies, with all his attendants.

THE decline of Napoleon's waning fortunes having been such as to turn him aside from an offered field of battle, and to place him betwixt two armies, each superior in number to his own, called now for a speedy and decisive resolution.

The manoeuvres of Schwartzemberg and Blücher tended evidently to form a junction; and when it is considered, that Bonaparte had felt it necessary to retreat from the army of Silesia before Laon, and from the grand army before Arcis, it would have been frenzy to wait till they both closed upon him. Two courses, therefore, remained:—either to draw back within the closing circle which his enemies were about to form around him, and, retreating before them until he had collected his whole forces, make a stand under the walls of Paris, aided by whatever strength that capital possessed, and which his energies could have called out; or, on the contrary, to march eastward, and, breaking through the same circle, to operate on the rear of the allies, and on their lines of communication. This last was a subject on which the Austrians had expressed such feverish anxiety, as would probably immediately induce them to give up all thoughts of advancing,

and march back to the frontier. Such a result was the rather to be hoped, because the continued stay of the allies, and the passage and repassage of troops through an exhausted country, had worn out the patience of the hardy peasantry of Alsace and Franche-Comté, whom the exactions and rapine, inseparable from the movements of a hostile soldiery, had now roused from the apathy with which they had at first witnessed the invasion of their territory. Before Lyons, Napoleon might reckon on being reinforced by the veteran army of Suchet, arrived from Catalonia; and he would be within reach of the numerous chain of fortresses, which had garrisons strong enough to form an army, if drawn together.

The preparations for arranging such a force, and for arming the peasantry, had been in progress for some time. Trusty agents, bearing orders concealed in the sheaths of their knives, the collars of their dogs, or about their persons, had been detached to warn the various commandants of the emperor's pleasure. Several were taken by the blockading troops of the allies, and hanged as spies, but others made their way. While at Rheims, Bonaparte had issued an order for rousing the peasantry, in which he not only declared their arising in arms was an act of patriotic duty, but denounced as traitors the mayors of the districts who should throw obstructions in the way of a general levy. The allies, on the contrary, threatened the extremity of military execution on all the peasantry who should obey Napoleon's call to arms. It was, as we formerly observed, an excellent exemplification, how much political opinions depend on circumstances; for, after the second capture of Vienna, the Austrians were calling out the levée-en-masse, and Napoleon, in his turn, was threatening to burn the villages, and execute the peasants, who should dare to obey.

While Napoleon was at Rheims, the affairs of the north-east frontier seemed so promising, that Ney offered to take the command of the insurrectionary army; and, as he was reckoned the best officer of light troops in Europe, it is not improbable he might have brought the levée-en-masse on that warlike border, to have fought like the French national forces in the beginning of the Revolution. Bonaparte did not yield to this proposal. Perhaps he thought so bold a movement could only succeed under his own eye.

But there were two especial considerations which must have made Napoleon hesitate on adopting this species of back-game, designed to redeem the stake which it was impossible to save by the ordinary means of carrying on the bloody play. The one was the military question, whether Paris could be defended, if Napoleon was to move to the rear of the allied army, instead of falling back upon the city with the army which he commanded. The other question was of yet deeper import, and of a political nature. The means of the capital for defence being supposed adequate, was it likely that Paris, a town of seven hundred thousand inhabitants, divided into factions unaccustomed to the near voice of war, and startled by the dreadful novelty of their situation, would submit to the sacrifices which a successful defence of the city must in every event have re-

* *Memoirs of the Operations of the Allied Armies in 1813 and 1814*: Murray, London, 1822.

quired? Was, in short, their love and fear of Bonaparte so great, that without his personal presence, and that of his army, to encourage, and at the same time overawe them, they would willingly incur the risk of seeing their beautiful metropolis destroyed, and all the horrors of a sack inflicted by the mass of nations whom Napoleon's ambition had been the means of combining against them, and who proclaimed themselves the enemies, not of France, but of Bonaparte?

Neither of these questions could be answered with confidence. Napoleon, although he had embodied 30,000 National Guards, had not provided arms for a third part of the number. This is hinted at by some authors, as if the want of these arms ought to be imputed to some secret treason. But this accusation has never been put in any tangible shape. The arms never existed, and never were ordered; and although Napoleon had nearly three months' time allowed him, after his return to Paris, yet he never thought of arming the Parisians in general. Perhaps he doubted their fidelity to his cause. He ordered, it is said, two hundred cannon to be provided for the defence of the northern and eastern line of the city, but neither were these obtained in sufficient quantity. The number of individuals who could be safely intrusted with arms was also much limited. Whether, therefore, Paris was, in a military point of view, capable of defence or not, must have, in every event, depended much on the strength of the military force left to protect it. This Napoleon knew must be very moderate. His hopes were therefore necessarily limited by circumstances, to the belief that Paris, though incapable of a protracted defence, might yet hold out for such a space as might enable him to move to its relief.

But, secondly, as the means of holding out Paris were very imperfect, so the inclination of the citizens to defend themselves at the expense of any considerable sacrifice, was much doubted. It was not in reason to be expected that the Parisians should imitate the devotion of Zargossa. Each Spanish citizen, on that memorable occasion, had his share of interest in the war which all maintained—a portion, namely, of that liberty and independence for which it was waged. But the Parisians were very differently situated. They were not called on to barricade their streets, destroy their suburbs, turn their houses into fortresses, and themselves into soldiers, and expose their property and families to the horrors of a storm; and this not for any advantage to France or themselves, but merely that they might maintain Napoleon on the throne. The ceaseless, and of late the losing wars, in which he seemed irretrievably engaged, had rendered his government unpopular; and it was plain to all, except perhaps himself, that he did not stand in that relation to the people of Paris, when citizens are prepared to die for their sovereign. It might have been as well expected that the frogs in the fable would, in case of invasion, have risen in a mass to defend King Serpent. It is probable that Bonaparte did not see this in the true point of view; but that, with the feelings of self-importance which sovereigns must naturally acquire from their situation, and which, from his high actions and distinguished talents, he, of all

sovereigns, was peculiarly entitled to indulge,—it is probable that he lost sight of the great disproportion betwixt the nation and an individual; and forgot, amid the hundreds of thousands which Paris contains, what small relation the number of his own faithful and devoted followers bore, not only to those who were perilously engaged in factions hostile to him, but to the great mass, who, in Hotspur's phrase, loved their own shops or bars better than his house.

Thirdly, the consequences of Paris being lost, either from not possessing, or not employing, the means of defence, were sure to be productive of irretrievable calamity. Russia, as had been shown, could survive the destruction of its capital, and perhaps Great Britain's fate might not be decided by the capture of London. But the government of France had, during all the phases of the Revolution, depended upon the possession of Paris, a capital which has at all times directed the public opinion of that country. Should the military occupation of this most influential of all capitals bring about, as was most likely, a political and internal revolution, it was greatly to be doubted, whether the emperor could make an effectual stand in any other part of his dominions.

It must be candidly admitted, that this reasoning, as being subsequent to the fact, has a much more decisive appearance than it could have had when subjected to the consideration of Napoleon. He was entitled, from the feverish anxiety hitherto shown by the Austrians, upon any approach to flank movements, and by the caution of their general proceedings, to think that they would be greatly too timorous to adopt the bold step of pressing onward to Paris. It was more likely that they would follow him to the frontier, with the purpose of preserving their communications. Besides, Napoleon at this crisis had but a very slender choice of measures. To remain where he was, between Blücher and Schwartzberg, was not possible; and in advancing to either flank, he must have fought with a superior enemy. To retreat upon Paris, was sure to induce the whole allies to pursue in the same direction; and the encouragement which such a retreat must have given to his opponents, might have had the most fatal consequences. Perhaps his partisans might have taken more courage during his absence, from the idea that he was at the head of a conquering army, in the rear of the allies, than during his actual presence, if he had arrived in Paris in consequence of a compulsory retreat.

Bonaparte seems, as much from a sort of necessity as from choice, to have preferred breaking through the circle of hunters which hemmed him in, trusting to strengthen his army with the garrisons drawn from the frontier fortresses, and with the warlike peasantry of Alsace and Franche-Comté, and, thus reinforced, to advance with rapidity on the rear of his enemies, ere they had time to execute, or perhaps to arrange, any system of offensive operations. The scheme appeared the more hopeful, as he was peremptory in his belief that his march could not fail to draw after him, in pursuit, or observation at least, the grand army of Schwartzberg; the general maxim, that the war could

only be decided where he was present in person, being, as he conceived, as deeply impressed by experience upon his enemies as upon his own soldiers.

Napoleon could not disguise from himself, what indeed he had told the French public, that a march, or, as he termed it, a *fourra* upon Paris, was the principal purpose of the allies. Every movement made in advance, whether by Blücher or Schwartzemberg, laid this for its object. But they had uniformly relinquished the undertaking, upon his making any demonstration to prevent it; and therefore he did not suspect them of a resolution so venturesome as to move directly upon Paris, leaving the French army unbroken in their rear, to act upon their line of communication with Germany. It is remarked, that those chess-players who deal in the most venturesome gambits are least capable of defending themselves when attacked in the same audacious manner; and that, in war, the generals whose usual and favourite tactics are those of advance and attack, have been most frequently surprised by the unexpected adoption of offensive operations on the part of their enemy. Napoleon had been so much accustomed to see his antagonists bend their attention rather to parry blows than to aim them, and was so confident in the dread impressed by his rapidity of movement, his energy of assault, and the terrors of his reputation, that he seems to have entertained little apprehension of the allies adopting a plan of operations which had no reference to his own, and which, instead of attempting to watch or counteract his movements in the rear of their army, should lead them straight forward to take possession of his capital. Besides, notwithstanding objections have been stated, which seemed to render a *permanent* defence impossible, there were other considerations to be taken into view. The ground to the north of Paris is very strong, the National Guard was numerous, the lower part of the population of a military character, and favourable to his cause. A defence, if resolute, however brief, would have the double effect of damping the ardour of the assaults, and of detaining them before the walls of the capital, until Bonaparte should advance to its relief, and thus place the allies between two fires. It was not to be supposed that the surrender of Paris would be the work of a single day. The unanimous voice of the journals, of the ministers of the police, and of the thousands whose interest was radically and deeply entwisted with that of Bonaparte, assured their master on that point. The movement to the rear, therefore, though removing him from Paris, which it might expose to temporary alarm, might not, in Bonaparte's apprehension, seriously compromise the security of the capital.

The French Emperor, in executing this decisive movement, was extremely desirous to have possessed himself of Vitry, which lay in the line of his advance. But as this town contained a garrison of about 5000 men, commanded by an officer of resolution, he returned a negative to the summons; and Napoleon, in no condition to attempt a *coup de main* on a place of some strength, passed the Marne on the 22d of March, over a bridge of rafts constructed at Frignicourt, and continued his movement towards the eastern frontier, increasing the distance at every

step betwixt him and his capital, and at the same time betwixt him and his enemies.

In the meantime, events had taken place in the vicinity of Lyons, tending greatly to limit any advantages which Napoleon might have expected to reap on the south-eastern part of the frontier towards Switzerland, and also to give spirits to the numerous enemies of his government in Provence, where the royalists always possessed a considerable party.

The reinforcements dispatched by the Austrians under General Bianchi, and their reserves, brought forward by the Prince of Hesse-Homburg, had restored their superiority over Augereau's army. He was defeated at Mâcon on the 11th of March, in a battle which he had given for the purpose of maintaining his line on the Saône. A second time, he was defeated on the 18th at St. Georges, and obliged to retire in great disorder, with scarce even the means of defending the Isère, up which river he retreated. Lyons, thus uncovered, opened its gates to Bianchi; and, after all that they had heard concerning the losses of the allies, the citizens saw with astonishment and alarm an untouched body of their troops, amounting to 60,000 men, defile through their streets. This defeat of Augereau was probably unknown to Napoleon, when he determined to march to the frontiers, and thought he might reckon on co-operation with the Lyonnese army. Though, therefore, the emperor's movement to St. Dizier was out of the rules of ordinary war, and though it enabled the allies to conceive and execute the daring scheme which put an end to the campaign, yet it was by no means hopeless in its outset; or, we would rather say, was one of the few alternatives, which the crisis of his affairs left to Bonaparte, and which, judging from the previous vacillation and cautious timidity displayed in the councils of the allies, he had no reason to apprehend would have given rise to the consequences that actually followed.

The allies, who had in their latest councils wound up their resolution to the decisive experiment of marching on Paris, were at first at a loss to account for Napoleon's disappearance, or to guess whether he had gone. This occasioned some hesitation and loss of time. At length, by the interception of a French courier, they found dispatches addressed by Bonaparte to his government at Paris, from which they were enabled to conjecture the real purpose and direction of his march. A letter, in the emperor's own hand, to Maria Louisa, confirmed the certainty of the information. The allies resolved to adhere, under this unexpected change of circumstances, to the bold resolution they had already formed. To conceal the real direction of his march, as well as to open communications with the Silesian army, Schwartzemberg, moving laterally, transferred his headquarters to Vitry, where he arrived on the 24th, two days after it had been summoned by Napoleon. Blücher, in the meantime, approached his army from Laon to Châlons, now entirely re-organized after the two bloody battles which it had sustained.

As a necessary preparation for the advance, General Dacca was left on the Aube, with a division of Austrians, for the purpose of defending their dépôts,

keeping open their communications, and guarding the person of the Emperor Francis, who did not perhaps judge it delicate to approach Paris in arms, with the rest of the sovereigns, while the city was nominally governed by his own daughter as regent. Dacca had also in charge, if pressed, to retreat upon the Prince of Hesse-Homburg's army, which was in triumphant possession of Lyons.

This important arrangement being made, another was adopted equally necessary to deceive and observe Napoleon. Ten thousand cavalry were selected, under the enterprising generals, Winzengerode and Czernicheff, who, with fifty pieces of cannon, were dispatched to hang on Bonaparte's march, to obstruct his communications with the country he had left, intercept couriers from Paris, or information respecting the motions of the allied armies, and to present on all occasions such a front, as, if possible, might impress him with the belief that their corps formed the van-guard of the whole army of Schwartzberg. The Russian and Prussian light troops meanwhile scoured the roads, and intercepted, near Sommepeux, a convoy of artillery and ammunition belonging to Napoleon's rear-guard, when twenty pieces of cannon, with a strong escort, fell into their hands. They also cut off several couriers, bringing important dispatches to Napoleon from Paris. One of these was loaded with as heavy tidings as ever were destined to afflict falling greatness. This packet informed Napoleon of the descent of the English in Italy; of the entry of the Austrians into Lyons and the critical state of Augereau; of the declaration of Bordeaux in favour of Louis; of the demonstrations of Wellington towards Toulouse; of the disaffected state of the public mind, and the exhausted condition of the national resources. Much of these tidings was new to the allied sovereigns and generals; but it was received by them with very different sensations from which the intelligence was calculated to inflict upon him for whom the packet was intended.

Blucher, in the meanwhile, so soon as he felt the opposition to his movements diminished by the march of Bonaparte from Châlons to Arcis, had instantly resumed the offensive, and driven the corps of Mortier and Marmont, left to observe his motions, over the Marne. He passed the Aisne near Bervau-Bac, repossessed himself of Rheims by blowing open the gates and storming the place, and, having gained these successes, moved towards Châlons and Vitry. His course had hitherto been south-eastward, in order to join with Schwartzberg; but he now received from the King of Prussia the welcome order to turn his march westward, and move straight upon Paris. The grand army adopted the same direction, and thus they moved on in corresponding lines, and in communication with each other.

While Bonaparte, retiring to the east, prepared for throwing himself on the rear of the allies, he was necessarily, in person, exposed to the same risk of having his communications cut off, and his supplies intercepted, which it was the object of his movement to inflict upon his enemy. Marmont and Mortier, who retreated before Blucher over the Marne, had orders to move upon Vitry, probably because that movement would have placed them in the rear of

Schwartzberg, had he been induced to retreat from the line of the Aube, as Napoleon expected he would. But as a very different course had been adopted by the allies, from that which Napoleon had anticipated, the two marshals found themselves unexpectedly in front of their grand army near La Fère Champenoise. They were compelled to attempt a retreat to Sézanne, in which, harassed by the numerous cavalry of the allies, they sustained heavy loss.

While the cavalry were engaged in pursuit of the marshals, the infantry of the allies were approaching the town of La Fère Champenoise, when a heavy fire was heard in the vicinity, and presently appeared a large column of infantry, advancing chequer-wise and by intervals, followed and repeatedly charged by several squadrons of cavalry, who were speedily recognized as belonging to the Silesian army. The infantry, about 5000 in number, had left Paris with a large convoy of provisions and ammunition. They were proceeding towards Montmirail, when they were discovered and attacked by the cavalry of Blucher's army. Unable to make a stand, they endeavoured, by an alteration of their march, to reach La Fère Champenoise, where they expected to find either the emperor, or Marmont and Mortier. It was thus their misfortune to fall upon Scylla in seeking to avoid Charybdis. The column consisted entirely of young men, conscripts or national guards, who had never before been in action. Yet neither the necessity of their condition, nor their unexpected surprise in meeting first one, and then a second army of enemies, where they looked only for friends, could induce these spirited young men to surrender. Rappatel, the aide-de-camp of Moreau, and entertained in the same capacity by the Emperor Alexander, was shot, while attempting, by the orders of the emperor, to explain to them the impossibility of resistance. The French say, that the brother of Rappatel served in the company from which the shot came which killed the unfortunate officer. The artillery at length opened on the French on every side; they were charged by squadron after squadron; the whole convoy was taken, and the escort were killed, wounded, or made prisoners.

Thus, the allies continued to advance upon Paris, while the shattered divisions of Mortier and Marmont, hard pressed by the cavalry, lost a rear-guard of 1500 men near La Ferté-Gaucher. At Crécy they parted into two bodies, one retreating on Meaux, the other on Lagny. They were still pursued and harassed; and at length, the soldiers becoming desperate, could hardly be kept together, while the artillerymen cut the traces of their guns, and mounted their draught-horses, to effect their escape. It is computed that the French divisions between La Fère Champenoise and Lagny, lost 8000 men, and eighty guns, besides immense quantities of baggage and ammunition. Indeed, surrounded as they were by overpowering numbers, it required no little skill in the generals, as well as bravery and devotion in the soldiers, to keep the army from dissolving entirely. The allies, gaining advantages at every step, moved on with such expedition, that when, on the 27th March, they took

up their head-quarters at Coulommiers, they had marched upwards of seventy miles in three days.

An effort was made, by about 10,000 men of the National Guards, to stop a column of the army of Silesia, but it totally failed; General Horne galloping into the very centre of the French mass of infantry, and making prisoner the general who commanded them with his own hand. When Blücher approached Meaux, the garrison (a part of Mortier's army) retreated, blowing up a large powder magazine. This was on the 28th March, and on the evening of the same day, the van-guard of the Silesian army pushed on as far as Claye, from whence, not without a sharp action, they dislodged a part of the divisions of Marmont and Mortier. These marshals now retreated under the walls of Paris, their discouraged and broken forces forming the only regular troops, excepting those of the garrison, which could be reckoned on for the defence of the capital.

The allied armies moved onward, on the same grand point, leaving, however, Generals Wrede and Sacken, with a corps d'armée of 30,000 men, upon the line of the Marne, to oppose any attempt which might be made for annoying the rear of the army, and thus relieving the metropolis.

Deducing this covering army, the rest of the allied forces moved in columns along the three grand routes of Meaux, Lagny, and Soissons, thus threatening Paris along all its north-eastern quarter. The military sovereigns and their victorious armies were now in sight of that metropolis, whose ruler and his soldiers had so often and so long lorded it in theirs; of that Paris, which, unsatisfied with her high rank among the cities of Europe, had fomented constant war until all should be subjugated to her empire; of that proud city, who boasted herself the first in arms and in science, the mistress and example of the civilized world, the depository of all that is wonderful in the fine arts, and the dictatress as well of taste as of law to continental Europe.

The position of Paris, on the north-eastern frontier, which was thus approached, is as strongly defensible, perhaps, as can be said of any fortified town in the world. Art, however, had added little to the defence of the city itself, except a few wretched redoubts (called by the French *tambours*), erected for protection of the barriers. But the external line was very strong, as will appear from the following sketch. The heights which environ the city on the eastern side, rise abruptly from an extensive plain, and form a steep and narrow ridge, which sinks again as suddenly upon the eastern quarter of the town, which it seems to screen as with a natural bulwark. The line of defence which they afford is extremely strong. The southern extremity of the ridge, which rests upon the wood of Vincennes, extending southward to the banks of the river Marne, is called the heights of Belleville and Romainville, taking its name from two delightful villages which occupy it, Belleville being nearest, and Romainville most distant from Paris. The heights are covered with romantic groves, and decorated by many pleasant villas, with gardens, orchards, vineyards, and plantations. These, which in peaceful times are a favourite resort of the gay Parisians, on their parties of pleasure, were now to

be occupied by other guests, and for far different purposes. In advance of these heights, and protected by them, is the village of Pantin, situated on the great road from Bondy. To the left of Romainville, and more in front of Belleville, is a projecting eminence, termed the Butte de Chaumont. The ridge there sinks, and admits a half-finished aqueduct, called the Canal de l'Ourcq. The ground then again rises into the bold and steep eminence, called Montmartre, from being the supposed place of the martyrdom of St Denis, the patron of France. The declivity of this steep hill is a level plain, extending to the river Seine, through which runs the principal northern approach to Paris, from the large village of St-Denis. The most formidable preparations had been made for maintaining this strong line of defence, behind which the city lay sheltered. The extreme right of the French forces occupied the wood of Vincennes, and the village of Charenton upon the Marne, and was supported by the troops stationed on the heights of Belleville, Romainville, and on the Butte de Chaumont, which composed the right wing. Their centre occupied the line formed by the half-finished Canal de l'Ourcq, was defended by the village of La Villette, and a strong redoubt on the farm of Rouvroi, mounted with eighteen heavy guns, and by the embankments of the canal, and still farther protected by a powerful artillery planted in the rear, on the heights of Montmartre. The left wing was thrown back from the village called Mousseaux, near the north-western extremity of the heights, and prolonged itself to that of Neuilly, on the Seine, which was strongly occupied by the extreme left of their army. Thus, with the right extremity of the army resting upon the river Marne, and the left upon the Seine, the French occupied a defensive semicircular line, which could not be turned, the greater part of which was posted on heights of uncommon steepness, and the whole defended by cannon, placed with the utmost science and judgment, but very deficient in point of numbers.

The other side of Paris is almost defenceless; but, in order to have attacked on that side, the allies must have previously crossed the Seine; an operation successfully practised in the following year, but which at that period, when their work, to be executed at all, must be done suddenly, they had no leisure to attempt, considering the great probability of Napoleon's coming up in their rear, recalled by the danger of the capital. They were, therefore, compelled to prefer a sudden and desperate attack upon the strongest side of the city, to the slower, though more secure measure, of turning the formidable line of defence which we have endeavoured to describe.

Three times, since the allies crossed the Rhine, the capital of France had been menaced by the approach of troops within twenty miles of the city, but it had uniformly been delivered by the active and rapid movements of Napoleon. Encouraged by this recollection, the citizens, without much alarm, heard for the fourth time that the Cossacks had been seen at Meaux. Stilled rumours, however, began to circulate, that the divisions of Marmont and Mortier had sustained severe loss, and were in full retreat

on the capital; a fact speedily confirmed by the long train of wounded who entered the barriers of the city, with looks of consternation and words of discouragement. Then came crowds of peasants, flying they knew not whither, before an enemy whose barbarous rapacity had been so long the theme of every tongue, bringing with them their half-naked and half-starved families, their teams, their carts, and such of their herds and household goods as they could remove in haste. These unfortunate fugitives crowded the Boulevards of Paris, the usual resort of the gay world, adding, by exaggerated and contradictory reports, to the dreadful ideas which the Parisians already conceived of the approaching storm.

The government, chiefly directed by Joseph Bonaparte, in the name of his sister-in-law Maria Louisa, did all they could to encourage the people, by exaggerating their means of defence, and maintaining with effrontery, that the troops which approached the capital composed but some isolated column which by accident straggled towards Paris, while the emperor was breaking, dividing, and slaughtering, the gross of the confederated army. The light could not be totally shut out, but such rays as were admitted were highly coloured with hope, having been made to pass through the medium of the police and public papers. A grand review of the troops, destined for the defence of the capital, was held upon the Sunday preceding the assault. Eight thousand troops of the line, being the garrison of Paris, under General Girard, and 30,000 National Guards, commanded by Hulin, governor of the city, passed in order through the stately court of the Tuileries, followed by their trains of artillery, their corps of pioneers, and their carriages for baggage and ammunition. This was an imposing and encouraging spectacle, until it was remembered that these forces were not designed to move out to distant conquest, the destination of many hundreds of thousands which in other days had been paraded before that palace; but that they were the last hope of Paris, who must defend all that she contained by a battle under her walls. The remnants of Marmont and Mortier's corps d'armée made no part of this parade. Their diminished battalions, and disordered state of equipment, were ill calculated to inspire courage into the public mind. They were concentrated and stationed on the line of defence already described, beyond the barriers of the city. But the marshals themselves entered Paris, and gave their assistance to the military councils of Joseph Bonaparte.

Preparations were made by the government to remove beyond the Loire, or at least in that direction. Maria Louisa had none of the spirit of an Amazon, though graced with all the domestic virtues. She was also placed painfully in the course of a war betwixt her husband and father. Besides, she obeyed, and probably with no lack of will, Napoleon's injunctions to leave the capital, if danger should approach. She left Paris, therefore, with her son, who is said to have shown an unwillingness to depart, which, in a child, seemed to have something ominous in it. Almost all the civil authorities of Bonaparte's government left the city at the same

time, after destroying the private records of the high police, and carrying with them the crown jewels, and much of the public treasure. Joseph Bonaparte remained, detaining with him, somewhat, it is said, against his inclination, Cambacérès, the chancellor of the emperor, whom, though somewhat too unwieldy for the character, Napoleon had, in one of his latest councils, threatened with the honours and dangers of the colonelcy of a battalion. Joseph himself had the talents of an accomplished man, and an amiable member of society, but they do not seem to have been of a military description. He saw his sister-in-law depart, attended by a regiment of 700 men, who some writers have alleged had been better employed in defence of the city; forgetting of what importance it was to Napoleon that the person of the empress should be protected alike against a roving band of Hulus or Cossacks, or the chance of some civic mutiny. These arrangements being made, Joseph published, on the morning of the 29th, a proclamation, assuring the citizens of Paris that "he would remain with them;" he described the enemy as a single straggling column which had approached from Meaux, and required them by a brief and valorous resistance to sustain the honour of the French name, until the arrival of the emperor, who, he assured the Parisians, was in full march to their succour.

Between three and four o'clock on the next eventful morning the drums beat to arms, and the National Guard assembled in force. But of the thousands which obeyed the call, a great part were, from age, habits, and want of inclination, unfit for the service demanded from them. We have also already alluded to the scarcity of arms, and certainly there were very many of those citizen-soldiers, whom, had weapons been more plenty, the government of Bonaparte would not have intrusted with them.

Most of the National Guard, who were suitably armed, were kept within the barrier until about eleven o'clock, and then, as their presence became necessary, were marched to the scene of action, and arrayed in a second line behind the regular troops, so as rather to impose upon the enemy, by an appearance of numbers, than to take a very active share in the contest. The most serviceable were, however, draughted to act as sharp-shooters, and several battalions were stationed to strengthen particular points of the line. The whole of the troops, including many volunteers, who actively engaged in the defence of the city, might be between 10,000 and 20,000.

The proposed assault of the allies was to be general and simultaneous, along the whole line of defence. The Prince Royal of Wirtemberg was to attack the extreme right of the French, in the wood of Vincennes, drive them from the banks of the Marne and the village of Charenton, and thus turn the heights of Belleville on the right. The Russian general, Raefskoi, making a flank movement from the public road to Meaux, was to direct three strong columns, with their artillery and powerful reserves, in order to attack in front the important heights of Belleville and Romainville, and the villages which give name to them. The Russian and Prussian body-guards had charge to attack the centre of the enemy, posted upon the Canal de l'Ourcq, the re-

serves of which occupied the eminence called Montmartre. The army of Silesia was to assail the left of the French line, so as to turn and carry the heights of Montmartre from the north-east. The third division of the allied army, and a strong body of cavalry, were kept in reserve. Before the attack commenced, two successive flags of truce were dispatched to summon the city to capitulate. Both were refused admittance, so that the intention of the defenders of Paris appeared fixed to hazard an engagement.

It was about eight o'clock, when the Parisians, who had assembled in anxious crowds at the barriers of St-Denis and of Vincennes, the outlets from Paris, corresponding with the two extremities of the line, became sensible, from the dropping succession of musket-shots, which sounded like the detached pattering of large drops of rain before a thunder-storm, that the work of destruction was already commenced. Presently platoons of musketry, with a close and heavy fire of cannon, from the direction of Belleville, announced that the engagement had become general on that part of the line.

General Raefskoi had begun the attack by pushing forward a column, with the purpose of turning the heights of Romainville on the right; but its progress having been arrested by a heavy fire of artillery, the French suddenly became the assailants, and, under the command of Marmont, rushed forward and possessed themselves of the village of Pantin, in advance of their line; an important post, which they had abandoned on the preceding evening, at the approach of the allied army. It was instantly recovered by the Russian grenadiers, at the point of the bayonet; and the French, although they several times attempted to resume the offensive, were driven back by the Russians on the villages of Belleville and Ménilmontant, while the alliance pushed forward through the wood of Romainville, under the acclivity of the heights. The most determined and sustained fire was directed upon them from the French batteries along the whole line. Several of these were served by the youths of the Polytechnic School, boys from twelve to sixteen years of age, who showed the greatest activity and the most devoted courage. The French infantry rushed repeatedly in columns from the heights, where opportunities occurred, to check the progress of the allies. They were as often repulsed by the Russians, each new attempt giving rise to fresh conflicts and more general slaughter, while a continued and dispersed combat of sharp-shooters took place among the groves, vineyards, and gardens of the villas, with which the heights are covered. At length, by order of General Barclay de Tolly, the Russian commander-in-chief, the front attack on the heights was suspended until the operations of the allies on the other points should permit it to be resumed at a cheaper risk of loss. The Russian regiments which had been dispersed as sharp-shooters, were withdrawn and again formed in rank, and it would seem that the French seized his opportunity to repossess themselves of the village of Pantin, and to assume a momentary superiority in the contest.

Blücher had received his orders late in the morning, and could not commence the attack so early as

that upon the left. About eleven o'clock, having contented himself with observing and blockading a body of French troops, who occupied the village of St-Denis, he directed the columns of General Laageron against the village of Aubervilliers, and, having surmounted the obstinate opposition which was there made, moved them by the road of Clichy, right against the extremity of the heights of Montmartre, whilst the division of Kleist and d'York marched to attack in flank the villages of La Villette and Pantin, and thus sustain the attack on the centre and right of the French. The defenders, strongly entrenched and protected by powerful batteries, opposed the most formidable resistance, and, as the ground was broken and impracticable for cavalry, many of the attacking columns suffered severely. When the divisions of the Silesian army, commanded by Prince William of Prussia, first came to the assistance of the original assailants upon the centre, the French concentrated themselves on the strong post of La Villette, and the farm of Rouvroi, and continued to offer the most desperate resistance in defence of these points. Upon the allied left wing the Prussian Guards, and those of Baden, threw themselves with rival impetuosity into the village of Pantin, and carried it at the point of the bayonet. During these advantages, the Prince Royal of Württemberg, on the extreme left of the allies, had forced his way to Vincennes, and threatened the right of the French battalions posted at Belleville, as had been projected in the plan of the attack. General Raefskoi renewed the suspended assault upon these heights in front, when he learned that they were thus in some measure turned in flank, and succeeded in carrying those of Romainville, with the village. Marmont and Oudinot in vain attempted a charge upon the allied troops, who had thus established themselves on the French line of defence. They were repulsed and pursued by the victors, who, following up their advantage, possessed themselves successively of the villages of Belleville and Ménilmontant, the Butte de Chaumont, and the fine artillery which defended this line.

About the same time the village of Charonne, on the right extremity of the heights, was also carried, and the whole line of defence occupied by the right wing of the French fell into possession of the allies. Their light horse began to penetrate from Vincennes as far as the barriers of Paris, and their guns and mortars upon the heights were turned upon the city. The centre of the French army, stationed upon the Canal de l'Ourcq, had hitherto stood firm, protected by the redoubt at Rouvroi, with eighteen heavy pieces of cannon, and by the village of La Villette, which formed the key of the position. But the right flank of their line being turned by those troops who had become possessed of Romainville, the allies overwhelmed this part of the line also, and carrying by assault the farm of Rouvroi, with its strong redoubt, and the village of La Villette, drove the centre of the French back upon the city. A body of French cavalry attempted to check the advance of the allied columns, but were repulsed and destroyed by a brilliant charge of the black hussars of Brandenburg. Meanwhile the right wing of the Silesian army approached close to the foot of Mont-

martre, and Count Langeron's corps was preparing to storm this last remaining defensible post, when a flag of truce appeared, to demand a cessation of hostilities.

It appears that, in the morning, Joseph Bonaparte had shown himself to the defenders riding along the lines, accompanied by his staff, and had repeated, to all the corps engaged, the assurance that he would live and die with them. There is reason to think, that, if he did not quite credit that such extensive preparations for assault were made by a single division of the allies, yet he believed he had to do with only one of their two armies, and not with their united force. He was undeceived by a person named Peyre, called, by some, an engineer officer attached to the staff of the governor of Paris, and, by others, a superintendant belonging to the corps of fire-men in that city. Peyre, it seems, had fallen into the hands of a party of Cossacks the night before, and was carried in the morning to the presence of the Emperor Alexander, at Bondy. In his route he had an opportunity of calculating the immense force of the armies now under the walls of Paris. Through the medium of this officer, the Emperor Alexander explained the intentions of the allied sovereigns, to allow fair terms to the city of Paris, provided it was proposed to capitulate ere the barriers were forced; with the corresponding intimation, that if the defence were prolonged beyond that period, it would not be in the power either of the emperor, the King of Prussia, or the allied generals, to prevent the total destruction of the town.

M. Peyre, thus erected into a commissioner and envoy of crowned heads, was set at liberty, and with danger and difficulty found his way into the French lines, through the fire which was maintained in every direction. He was introduced to Joseph, to whom he delivered his message, and showed proclamations to the city of Paris, with which the Emperor Alexander had intrusted him. Joseph hesitated, at first inclining to capitulate, then pulling up resolution, and determining to abide the chance of arms. He continued irresolute, blood flowing fast around him, until about noon, when the enemy's columns threatening an attack on Montmartre, and the shells and bullets from the artillery, which was in position to cover the attempt, flying fast over the heads of himself and his staff, he sent Peyre to General Marmont, who acted as commander-in-chief, with permission to the marshal to demand a cessation of arms. At the same time Joseph himself fled with his whole attendants; thus abandoning the troops, whom his exhortations had engaged in the bloody and hopeless resistance, of which he had solemnly promised to partake the dangers. Marmont, with Moncey, and the other generals who conducted the defence, now saw all hopes of making it good at an end. The whole line was carried, excepting the single post of Montmartre, which was turned, and on the point of being stormed on both flanks, as well as in front; the Prince Royal of Wirtemberg had occupied Charenton, with its bridge over the Marne, and pushing forward on the high-road from thence to Paris, his advanced posts were already skirmishing at the barrier, called the Trône; and a party of Cossacks had been with

difficulty repulsed from the Faubourg St-Antoine, on which they made a *hourra*. The city of Paris is merely surrounded by an ordinary wall, to prevent smuggling. The barriers are not much stronger than any ordinary turnpike-gate, and the stockade with which they had been barricaded could have been cleared away by a few blows of the pioneers' axes. Add to this, that the heights commanding the city, Montmartre excepted, were in complete possession of the enemy; that a bomb or two, thrown probably to intimidate the citizens, had already fallen in the Faubourg Montmartre and the *Chaussée d'Antin*; and that it was evident that any attempt to protract the defence of Paris must be attended with utter ruin to the town and its inhabitants. Marshal Marmont, influenced by these considerations, dispatched a flag of truce to General Barclay de Tolly, requesting a suspension of hostilities, to arrange the terms on which Paris was to be surrendered. The armistice was granted, on condition that Montmartre, the only defensible part of the line which the French still continued to occupy, should be delivered up to the allies. Deputies were appointed on both sides, to adjust the terms of surrender. These were speedily settled. The French regular troops were permitted to retire from Paris unmolested, and the metropolis was next day to be delivered up to the allied sovereigns, to whose generosity it was recommended.

Thus ended the assault of Paris, after a bloody action, in which the defenders lost upwards of 4000 in killed and wounded, and the allies, who had to storm well-defended batteries, redoubts, and entrenchments, perhaps about twice the number. They remained masters of the line at all points, and took nearly one hundred pieces of cannon. When night fell, the multiplied and crowded watch-fires, that occupied the whole chain of heights on which the victors now bivouacked, indicated to the astonished inhabitants of the French metropolis, how numerous and how powerful were the armies into whose hands the fate of war had surrendered them.

CHAPTER XCV.

State of parties in Paris.—Royalists—Revolutionists—Bonapartists.—Talleyrand—his plans and views.—Châteaubriand—Influence of his eloquence in favour of the royalists.—Mission to the allied sovereigns from the royalists.—Their answer.—Efforts of the Bonapartists.—Feelings of the lowest classes in Paris—of the middle ranks.—Neutrality of the National Guard.—Growing strength and confidence of the royalists.—They issue proclamations, and white cockades.—Crowds assemble at the Boulevards to witness the entrance of the allies.—Mutability of the French character.—The allies are received with shouts of welcome.—Their army retires to quarters, and the Cossacks bivouac in the Champs Elysées.

THE battle was fought and won; but it remained a high and doubtful question in what way the victory was to be improved, so as to produce results of far greater consequence than usually follow from the mere military occupation of an enemy's capital. While the mass of the inhabitants were at rest, exhausted by the fatigues and anxieties of the day,

many secret conclaves, on different principles, were held in the city of Paris upon the night after the assault. Some of these even yet endeavoured to reorganize the means of resistance, and some to find out what modern policy has called a *mezzo-termine*, some third expedient, between the risk of standing by Napoleon and that of recalling the banished family.

The only middle mode which could have succeeded would have been a regency under the empress; and Fouché's Memoirs state, that if he had been in Paris at the time, he might have succeeded in establishing a new order of things upon such a basis. The assertion may be safely disputed. To Austria, such a plan might have had some recommendations; but to the sovereigns and statesmen of the other allied nations, the proposal would only have appeared a device to obtain immediate peace, and keep the throne, as it were, in commission, that Bonaparte might ascend it at his pleasure.*

We have the greatest doubts whether, among the ancient chiefs of the Revolution, most of whom had, as hackneyed tools, lost credit in the public eye, both by loss of principle and political inconsistency, there remained any who could have maintained a popular interest in opposition to that of the royalists on the one hand, and the Bonapartists on the other. The few who remained steady to their democratic principles, Napoleon had discredited and thrown into the shade; and he had rendered many of the others still more inefficient, by showing that they were accessible to bribery and to ambition, and that ancient demagogues could, without much trouble, be transmuted into supple and obsequious courtiers. Their day of power and interest was past, and the exaggerated vehemence of their democratic opinions had no longer any effect on the lower classes, who were in a great proportion attached to the empire.

The royalists, on the other hand, had been long combining and extending their efforts and opinions, which gained, chiefly among the higher orders, a sort of fashion which those of the democrats had

* The passage is curious, whether we regard it as really emanating from Fouché, or placed in the mouth of that active revolutionist by some one who well understood the genius of the party. "Had I been at Paris at that time (the period of the siege, namely), the weight of my influence, doubtless, and my perfect acquaintance with the secrets of every party, would have enabled me to give these extraordinary events a very different direction. My preponderance, and the promptness of my decision, would have predominated over the more slow and mysterious influence of Talleyrand. That elevated personage could not have made his way unless we had been harnessed to the same car. I would have revealed to him the ramifications of my political plan, and in spite of the odious policy of Savary, the ridiculous government of Cambacérès, the lieutenantcy of the poppet Joseph, and the base spirit of the Senate, we would have breathed new life into the carcase of the Revolution, and those degraded patricians would not have thought of acting exclusively for their own interests. By our united impulse, we would have pronounced before the interference of any foreign influence, the dethronement of Napoleon, and proclaimed the regency, of which I had already traced the basis. This conclusion was the only one which could have preserved the Revolution and its principles." *Mémoires de Fouché*, vol. II, pp. 252-3.

lost. Talleyrand was acceptable to them, as himself noble by birth, and he knew better than any one how to apply the lever to unfasten the deep foundations of Napoleon's power. Of his address, though not successful in the particular instance, Las Cases gives us a curious specimen. Talleyrand desired to sound the opinion of Decrès, about the time of the crisis of which we are treating. He drew that minister towards the chimney, and opening a volume of Montesquieu, said, as if in the tone of an ordinary conversation, "I found a passage here this morning, which struck me in an extraordinary manner: here it is, in such a book and chapter, page so and so. *When a prince has raised himself above all laws, when his tyranny becomes insupportable, there remains nothing to the oppressed subject except—*"

"It is quite enough," said Decrès, placing his hand upon Talleyrand's mouth, "I will hear no more. Shut your book." And Talleyrand closed the book, as if nothing remarkable had happened.

An agent of such extraordinary tact was not frequently baffled, in a city, and at a time, when so many were, from hope, fear, love, hatred, and all the other strongest passions, desirous, according to the Roman phrase, of a new state of things. He had been unceasingly active, and eminently successful, in convincing the royalists, that the king must purchase the recovery of his authority by consenting to place the monarchy on a constitutional footing; and in persuading another class, that the restoration of the Bourbons was the most favourable chance for the settlement of a free system of government. Nor did this accomplished politician limit his efforts to those who had loyalty to be awakened, and a love of liberty to be rekindled, but extended them through a thousand ramifications, through every class of persons. To the bold he offered an enterprise requiring courage; to the timid (a numerous class at the time), he showed the road of safety; to the ambitious, the prospect of gaining power; to the guilty, the assurance of indemnity and safety. He had inspired resolution even into the councils of the allies. A note from him to the Emperor Alexander, in the following words, is said to have determined that prince to persevere in the march upon Paris. "You venture nothing," said this laconic billet, "when you may safely venture everything—Venture once more."

It is not to be supposed that Talleyrand wrought in this deep intrigue without active coadjutors. The Abbé de Pradt, whose lively works have so often given some interest to our pages, was deeply involved in the transactions of that busy period, and advocated the cause of the Bourbons against that of his former master. Beurnonville and other senators were engaged in the same cabals.

The royalists, on their own part, were in the highest state of activity, and prepared to use their utmost exertions to obtain the mastery of the public spirit. At this most critical moment all was done by Monsieur de Châteaubriand, which eloquence could effect, to appeal to the affections, perhaps even the prejudices of the people, in his celebrated pamphlet, entitled, *Bonaparte and the Bourbons*. This vigorous and affecting comparison between the

days when France was in peace and honour under her own monarchs, contrasted with those in which Europe appeared in arms under her walls, had been written above a month, and the manuscript was concealed by Madame de Châteaubriand in her bosom. It was now privately printed. So was a proclamation by Monsieur, made in the name of his brother, the late King of France. Finally, in a private assembly of the principal royalists, amongst whom were the illustrious names of Rohan, Rochefoucault, Montmorency, and Noailles; it was resolved to send a deputation to the allied sovereigns, to learn, if possible, their intention. Monsieur Douhet, the gentleman intrusted with this communication, executed his mission at the expense of considerable personal danger, and returned into Paris with the answer, that the allies had determined to avoid all appearance of dictating to France respecting any family or mode of government, and that although they would most joyfully and willingly acknowledge the Bourbons, yet it could only be in consequence of a public declaration in their favour. At the same time, Monsieur Douhet was furnished with a proclamation of the allies, signed Schwartzenberg, which, without mentioning the Bourbons, was powerfully calculated to serve their cause. It declared the friendly intention of the allies towards France, and represented the power of the government which now oppressed them, as the only obstacle to instant peace. The allied sovereigns, it was stated, sought but to see a salutary government in France, who would cement the friendly union of all nations. It belonged to the city of Paris to pronounce their opinion, and accelerate the peace of the world.

Furnished with this important document, which plainly indicated the private wishes of the allies, the royalists resolved to make an effort on the morning of March 31st. It was at first designed they should assemble five hundred gentlemen in arms; but this plan was prudently laid aside, and they determined to relinquish all appearance of force, and address the citizens only by means of persuasion.

In the meantime, the friends of the Imperial government were not idle. The conduct of the lower classes, during the battle on the heights, had assumed an alarming character. For a time they had listened with a sort of stupefied terror to the distant thunders of the fight, beheld the wounded and fugitives crowd in at the barriers, and gazed in useless wonder on the hurried march of troops moving out in haste to reinforce the lines. At length the numerous crowds which assembled in the Boulevards, and particularly in the streets near the Palais Royal, assumed a more active appearance. There began to emerge from the suburbs and lanes those degraded members of the community whose slavish labour is only relieved by coarse debauchery, invisible for the most part to the more decent classes of society, but whom periods of public calamity or agitation bring into view, to add to the general confusion and terror. They gather in times of public danger, as birds of ill omen and noxious reptiles are said to do at the rising of a tropical hurricane, and their fellow-citizens look with equal disgust and dread upon faces and figures, as strange to them as if they had issued from some distant and savage

land. Paris, like every great metropolis, has her share, and more than her share, of this unwholesome population. It was the frantic convocations of this class which had at once instigated and carried into effect the principal horrors of the Revolution, and they seemed now resolved to signalize its conclusion by the destruction of the capital. Most of these banditti were under the influence of Bonaparte's police, and were stimulated by the various arts which his emissaries employed. At one time horsemen galloped through the crowd, exhorting them to take arms, and assuring them that Bonaparte had already attacked the rear of the allies. Again they were told, that the King of Prussia was made prisoner, with a column of 10,000 men. At other times, similar emissaries, announcing that the allies had entered the suburbs, and were sparing neither sex nor age, exhorted the citizens, by placards pasted on the walls, to shut their shops, and prepare to defend their houses.

This invitation to make the last earthly sacrifices in behalf of a military despot, to which Zaragossa had submitted in defence of her national independence, was ill received by the inhabitants. A free state has millions of necks, but a despotic government is in the situation desired by the Imperial tyrant—it has but one. When it was obvious that the Emperor Napoleon had lost his ascendancy, no shopkeeper in Paris was fool enough to risk in his cause his shop, his family, and his life, or to consent to measures for preserving the capital, which were to commence by abandoning to the allied troops and the scum of their own population all that was to him individually worth fighting for. The placards we have mentioned were pulled down, therefore, as fast as they were pasted up; and there was an evident disposition, on the part of the better class of citizens and the National Guards, to discourage all counsels which tended to stimulate resistance to the desperate extremity therein recommended.

Nevertheless, the state of the capital continued very alarming, the lower classes exhibiting alternately the symptoms of panic terror, of fury, and of despair. They demanded arms, of which a few were distributed to them; and there is no doubt, that had Napoleon arrived among them in the struggle, there would have been a dreadful battle, in which Paris, in all probability, would have shared the fate of Moscow. But when the cannonade ceased, when the flight of Joseph, and the capitulation of the city became publicly known, this conflict of jarring passions died away into silence, and the imperturbable and impassive composure of the National Guard maintained the absolute tranquillity of the metropolis.

On the morning of the 31st, the royalists were seen in groups in the Place Louis Quinze, the Garden of the Tuileries, the Boulevards, and other public places. They distributed the proclamations of the allies, and raised the long-forgotten cry of *Vive le roi!* At first, none save those engaged in the perilous experiment, durst echo back a signal so dangerous; but by degrees the crowds increased, the leaders got on horseback, and distributed white cockades, lilies, and other emblems of loyalty, dis-

playing banners at the same time, made out of their own handkerchiefs. The ladies of their party came to their assistance. The Princess of Léon, Viscountess of Châteaubriand, Countess of Choiseul, and other women of rank, joined the procession, distributing on all hands the emblems of their party, and tearing their dress to make white cockades, when the regular stock was exhausted. The better class of the bourgeois began to catch the flame, and remembered their old royalist opinions, and by whom they were defeated on the celebrated day of the Sections, when Bonaparte laid the foundation of his fame, in the discomfiture of the National Guard. Whole picquets began to adopt the white, instead of the three-coloured cockade; yet the voices were far from unanimous, and on many points parties of different principles met and skirmished together in the streets. But the tendency to discord was diverted, and the attention of the Parisians of all classes and opinions, suddenly fixed upon the imposing and terrible spectacle of the army of the allies, which now began to enter the city.

The sovereigns had previously received, at the village of Pantin, the magistrates of Paris, and Alexander had expressed himself in language still more explicit than that of their proclamation. He made war, he said, on Napoleon alone; one who had been his friend, but relinquished that character to become his enemy, and inflict on his empire great evils. He was not however come to retaliate those injuries, but to make a secure peace with any government which France might select for herself. "I am at peace," said the emperor, "with France, and at war with Napoleon alone."

These gracious expressions were received with the more gratitude by the citizens of Paris, that they had been taught to consider the Russian prince as a barbarous and vindictive enemy. The measure of restoring the Bourbons seemed now to be regarded by almost every one, not particularly connected with the dynasty of Napoleon, like a haven on the leeward, unexpectedly open to a tempest-tossed and endangered vessel. There was no loss of honour in adopting it, since the French received back their own royal family—there was no compulsion, since they received them upon their own free choice. They escaped from a great and imminent danger, as if it had been by a bridge of gold.

An immense crowd filled the Boulevards (a large wide open promenade, which, under a variety of distinctive names, forms a circuit round the city), in order to witness the entrance of the allied sovereigns and their army, whom, in the succession of four-and-twenty hours, this mutable people were disposed to regard as friends rather than enemies,—a disposition which increased until it amounted to enthusiasm for the persons of those princes, against whom a bloody battle had been fought yesterday under the walls of Paris, in evidence of which mortal strife, there still remained blackening in the sun the unburied thousands who had fallen on both sides. There was in this a trait of national character. A Frenchman submits with a good grace, and apparent or real complaisance, to that which he cannot help; and it is not the least advantage of his philosophy, that it entitles him afterwards to

plead that his submission flowed entirely from goodwill, and not from constraint. Many of those who, on the preceding day, were forced to fly from the heights which defend Paris, thought themselves at liberty next morning to maintain, that the allies had entered the capital only by their consent and permission, because they had joined in the plaudits which accompanied their arrival. To vindicate, therefore, their city from the disgrace of being entered by force, as well as giving way to the real enthusiasm which was suddenly inspired by the exchange of the worst evils which a conquered people have to dread for the promised blessings of an honourable peace and internal concord, the Parisians received the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia with such general and unremitting plaudits, as might have accompanied their triumphal entrance into their own capitals. Even at their first entrance within the barriers, we learn from Sir Charles Stewart's official dispatch, the crowd was already so enormous, as well as the acclamations so great, that it was difficult to move forward; but before the monarchs had reached the Porte St-Martin to turn on the Boulevards, there was a moral impossibility of proceeding; all Paris seemed to be assembled and concentrated in one spot—one spring evidently directed all their movements. They thronged around the monarchs, with the most unanimous shouts of *Vive l'Empereur Alexandre!*—*Vive le Roi de Prusse!* mingled with the loyal exclamations, *Vive le roi!*—*Vive Louis XVIII!*—*Vivent les Bourbons!* To such unexpected unanimity might be applied the words of Scripture, quoted by Clarendon on a similar occasion,—"God had prepared the people, for the thing was done suddenly." The procession lasted several hours, during which 50,000 chosen troops of the Silesian and grand army filed along the Boulevards in broad and deep columns, exhibiting a whole forest of bayonets, mingled with long trains of artillery, and preceded by numerous regiments of cavalry of every description. Nothing surprised those who witnessed this magnificent spectacle, more than the high state of good order and regular equipment in which the men and horses appeared. They seemed rather to resemble troops drawn from peaceful quarters to some grand or solemn festival, than regiments engaged during a long winter campaign in constant marches and counter-marches, as well as in a succession of the fiercest and most sanguinary conflicts, and who had fought a general action but the day before. After making the circuit of half of Paris by the interior Boulevards, the monarchs halted in the Champs Elysées, and the troops passed in review before them as they were dismissed to their quarters in the city. The Cossacks of the guard established their bivouac in the Champs Elysées themselves, which may be termed the Hyde Park of Paris, and which were thus converted into a Scythian encampment.

CHAPTER XCVI.

Fears of the Parisians.—Proceedings of Napoleon.—He is informed of the dissolution of the congress at Châtillon.—Operations of the French cavalry in rear of the allies.—Capture of the Austrian baron Weissenberg.—

The Emperor Francis is nearly surprised.—Napoleon hastens on to Paris, and reaches Troyes on the night of the 29th March.—Opinion of Macdonald as to the possibility of relieving Paris.—Napoleon leaves Troyes on the 30th, and meets Belliard, a few miles from Paris, in full retreat.—Conversation betwixt them.—He determines to proceed to Paris, but is at length dissuaded—and dispatches Caulaincourt to the metropolis, to receive terms from the allied sovereigns.—He himself returns to Fontainebleau.

WHEN the enthusiasm attending the entrance of the allies, which had converted a day of degradation into one of joy and festivity, began to subside, the perilous question occurred to those who found themselves suddenly embarked in a new revolution, Where were Napoleon and his army, and what means did his active and enterprising genius possess of still re-establishing his affairs, and taking vengeance on his revolted capital? That terrible and evil spirit, who had so long haunted their very dreams, and who had been well termed the Nightmare of Europe, was not yet conjured down, though for the present he exercised his ministry elsewhere. All trembled for the consequence of his suddenly returning in full force, combined either with the troops of Angereau, or with the garrisons withdrawn from the frontier fortresses. But their fears were without foundation; for though he was not personally distant, his powers of inflicting vengeance were now limited.—We proceed to trace his progress after his movement eastward, from the neighbourhood of Vitry to St-Dizier, which had permitted the union of the two allied armies.

Here he was joined by Caulaincourt, who had to inform him of the dissolution of the congress at Châtillon, with the addition, that he had not received his instructions from Rheims, until the diplomatists had departed. Those subsequently dispatched by Count Frochot he had not received at all.

Meanwhile, Napoleon's cavalry commenced the proposed operations in the rear of the allies, and made prisoners some persons of consequence, who were traveling, as they supposed, in perfect security, between Troyes and Dijon. Among these was Baron Weissemberg, who had long been the Austrian envoy at the court of London. The Emperor Francis was nearly surprised in person by the French light troops. He was obliged to fly in a *drosky*, a Russian carriage, attended only by two domestics, from Bar-sur-Aube to Châtillon, and from thence he retreated to Dijon. Napoleon showed every civility to his prisoner, Weissemberg, and dispatched him to the Emperor of Austria, to solicit once more his favourable interference. The person of the present King of France (then Monsieur) would have been a yet more important capture, but the forays of the light cavalry did not penetrate so far as to endanger him.

On the 24th March, Napoleon halted at Doulevant, to concentrate his forces, and gain intelligence. He remained there also on the 25th, and employed his time in consulting his maps, and in dictating new instructions for Caulaincourt, by which he empowered him to make every cession. But the hour of safety was past. Upon the morning of the 26th, Napoleon was roused by the intelligence, that the

allies had attacked the rear of his army under Macdonald, near St-Dizier. He instantly hastened to the support of the marshal, concluding that his own scheme had been successful, and that his retreat to the eastward had drawn after him the grand army of the allies. The allies showed a great number of cavalry with flying guns, but no infantry. Napoleon ordered an attack on them, in which the French were successful, the allies falling back after slight opposition. He learned from the prisoners, that he had been engaged, not with Schwartzberg, but with Blücher's troops. This was strange intelligence. He had left Blücher threatening Meaux, and now he found his army on the verge of Lorraine.

On the 27th, by pushing a reconnoitring party as far west as Vitry, Napoleon learned the real state of the case; that both the allied armies had marched upon Paris; and that the cavalry with which he had skirmished were 10,000 men under Winzengerode, left behind by the allies as a curtain to screen their motions, and engage his attention. Every word in this news had a sting in it. To hasten after the allies, to surprise them, if possible, ere the cannon on Montmartre were yet silenced, was the most urgent thought that ever actuated the mind even of Napoleon, so accustomed to high and desperate risks. But the direct route on Paris had been totally exhausted of provision, by the march and counter-march of such large armies. It was necessary to go round by Troyes, and, for that purpose, to retrograde as far as Doulevant. Here he received a small billet in cipher, from the postmaster-general, Lavalette, the first official communication he had got from the capital during ten days. "The partisans of the stranger," these were the contents, "are making head, seconded by secret intrigues. The presence of Napoleon is indispensable, if he desires to prevent his capital from being delivered to the enemy. There is not a moment to be lost." The march was precipitated accordingly.

At the bridge of Doulevant, on the banks of the Aube, the emperor received dispatches, informing him that an assault on Paris was hourly to be expected. Napoleon dismissed his aide-de-camp, Dejean, to ride post to Paris, and spread the news of his speedy arrival. He gave him two bulletins, describing in extravagant colours a pretended victory at Arcis, and the skirmish at St-Dizier. He then advanced to Troyes, which he reached on that same night (29th March), the Imperial Guard marching fifteen leagues in one day. On the 30th, Marshal Macdonald gave to Berthier the following sound and striking opinion:—"It is too late," he said, "to relieve Paris; at least by the route we follow. The distance is fifty leagues; to be accomplished by forced marches, it will require at least four days; and then in what condition for combat is the army like to arrive, for there are no dépôts or magazines, after leaving Bar-sur-Seine. The allies, being yesterday at Meaux, must have pushed their advanced guards up to the barriers by this time. There is no good reason to hope that the united corps of the Dukes of Treviso and Ragusa could check them long enough to allow us to come up. Besides, at our approach, the allies will not fail to defend the passage of the Marne. I am then of opinion, that if

Paris fall under the power of the enemy, the emperor should direct his march on Sens, in order to retreat upon Angereau, unite our forces with his, and, after having reposed our troops, give the enemy battle on a chosen field. If Providence has then decreed our last hour, we will at least die with honour, instead of being dispersed, pillaged, taken, and slaughtered, by Cossacks." Napoleon's anxiety for the fate of his capital did not permit him to hearken to this advice; though it seems the best calculated to have placed him in a condition, either to make a composition with the allies, or to carry on a formidable war in their rear.

From Troyes, Napoleon dispatched to Paris another aide-de-camp, General Girardin, who is said to have carried orders for defending the city to the last, and at all risks,—an accusation, however, which, considering the mass of unimaginable mischief that such an order must have involved, is not to be received without more proof than we have been able to obtain.

On the 30th March, Napoleon left Troyes, and, finding the road entirely unoccupied by the enemy, threw himself into a post-carriage, and traveled on at full speed before his army, with a very slight attendance. Having in this way reached Villeneuve l'Archevêque, he rode to Fontainebleau on horseback, and, though it was then night, took a carriage for Paris, Berthier and Caulaincourt accompanying him. On reaching an inn, called La Cour de France, at a few miles' distance from Paris, he at length met ample proof of his misfortune in the person of General Belliard, with his cavalry. The fatal intelligence was communicated.

Leaping from his carriage, Napoleon turned back with Belliard, exclaiming,—“What means this? Why here with your cavalry, Belliard? And where are the enemy?”—“At the gates of Paris.”—“And the army?”—“It is following me.”—“Where are my wife and son?—where Marmont?—where Mortier?”—“The empress set out for Rambouillet, and thence for Orleans. The marshals are busy completing their arrangements at Paris.” He then gave an account of the battle; and Napoleon instantly ordered his carriage for Paris. They had already proceeded a mile and a half on the road. The same conversation proceeded, and we give it as preserved, because it marks the character of the principal personage, and the tone of his feelings, much better than these can be collected from his expressions upon more formal occasions, and when he had in view some particular purpose.*

General Belliard reminded him there were no longer any troops in Paris. “It matters not,” said Napoleon; “I will find the National Guard there. The army will join me to-morrow, or the day after, and I will put things on a proper footing.”—“But I must repeat to your majesty, you cannot go to Paris. The National Guard, in virtue of the treaty, mount guard at the barriers, and though the allies are not

to enter till seven o'clock in the morning, it is possible they may have found their way to the outposts, and that your majesty may find Russian or Prussian parties at the gates, or on the Boulevards.”—“It is all one—I am determined to go there—My carriage!—Follow me with your cavalry.”—“But, sire, your majesty will expose Paris to the risk of storm or pillage. More than 20,000 men are in possession of the heights—for myself, I have left the city in consequence of a convention, and cannot therefore return.”—“What is that convention? who has concluded it?”—“I cannot tell, sire; I only know from the Duke of Treviso that such exists, and that I must march to Fontainebleau.”—“What is Joseph about?—Where is the minister at war?”—“I do not know; we have received orders from neither of them during the whole day. Each marshal acted on his own responsibility. They have not been seen to-day with the army.—At least not with the Duke of Treviso's corps.”—“Come, we must to Paris—nothing goes right when I am absent—they do nothing but make blunders.”

Berthier and Caulaincourt joined in trying to divert the emperor from his purpose. He never ceased demanding his carriage. Caulaincourt announced it, but it did not come up. Napoleon strode on with hurried and unequal steps, asking repeated questions concerning what had been already explained. “You should have held out longer,” he said, “and tried to wait for the arrival of the army. You should have raised Paris, which cannot surely like the entrance of the Russians. You should have put in motion the National Guard, whose disposition is good, and intrusted to them the defence of the fortifications which the minister has caused to be erected, and which are well furnished with artillery. Surely the citizens could have defended these, while the troops of the line fought upon the heights and in the plain?”—“I repeat to you, sire, that it was impossible. The army of 15,000 or 18,000 men has resisted one of 100,000 for four hours, expecting your arrival. There was a report of it in the city, which spread to the troops. They redoubled their exertions. The National Guard has behaved extremely well, both as sharp-shooters and in defence of the wretched redoubts which protected the barriers.”—“It is astonishing. How many cavalry had you?”—“Eighteen hundred horse, sire, including the brigade of Dautencourt.”—“Montmartre, well fortified and defended by heavy cannon, should have been impregnable.”—“Luckily, sire, the enemy were of your opinion, and approached the heights with much caution. But there was no occasion, we had not above seven six-pounders.”—“What can they have made of my artillery? I ought to have had more than two hundred guns, and ammunition to serve them for a month.”—“The truth is, sire, that we had only field-artillery, and at two o'clock we were obliged to slacken our fire for want of ammunition.”—“Go, go—I see every one has lost their senses. This comes of employing people who have neither common sense nor energy. Well! Joseph imagines himself capable of conducting an army; and Clarke, a mere piece of routine, gives himself the airs of a great minister; but the one is no better than a —, and the other a —, or a traitor,

* It is taken from a work which has remarkable traces of authenticity, entitled *Mémoires, pour servir à l'Histoire de la Campagne de 1814*, par le Général Koch. See also, *Memoirs of the Operations of the Allied Armies*, already quoted.

for I begin to believe what Savary said of him."—The conversation going on in this manner, they had advanced a mile farther from the Cour de France, when they met a body of infantry under General Curial. Napoleon inquired after the Duke of Treviso, to whose corps d'armée they belonged, and was informed he was still at Paris.

It was then, that, on the pressing remonstrances of his officers, who saw that in going on to Paris he was only rushing on death or captivity, Napoleon at length turned back; and having abandoned the strong inflexible impulse which would have carried him thither at all adventures, he seems to have considered his fate as decided, or at least to have relaxed considerably in the original vehemence which he opposed to adversity.

He returned to the Cour de France, and gave orders for disposing the forces, as they should come up, on the heights of Longjumeau, behind the little river of Essone. Desirous, at the same time, of renewing the negotiation for peace, which, on successes of an ephemeral description, he had broken off at Châtillon, Napoleon dispatched Caulaincourt to Paris, no longer to negotiate, but to receive and submit to such terms as the allied sovereigns might be inclined to impose upon him. He returned to Fontainebleau the same night. He did not take possession of any of the rooms of state, but chose a private and more retired apartment. Among the many strange transactions which had taken place in that venerable and ancient palace, its halls were now to witness one the most extraordinary.

CHAPTER XC VII.

The allied sovereigns issue a proclamation that they will not treat with Bonaparte.—A Provisional Government is named by the Conservative Senate, who also decree the forfeiture of Napoleon.—This decree is sanctioned by declarations from all the public bodies in Paris.—The legality of these proceedings discussed.—Feelings towards Napoleon, of the lower classes, and of the military.—On 4th April, Bonaparte issues a document, abdicating the throne of France.—His subsequent agitation, and wish to continue the war.—The deed is finally dispatched.

WHILE Napoleon breathed nothing save the desire of recovering by war what war had taken from him, or at least that of making such a peace as should leave him at the head of the French government, political events were taking place in Paris which pointed directly at the overthrow of his power.

His great military talents, together with his extreme inflexibility of temper, had firmly impressed the allied monarchs with the belief, that no lasting peace could be made in Europe while he remained at the head of the French nation. Every concession which he had seemed willing to make at different times, had been wrung from him by increasing difficulties, and was yielded with such extreme reluctance, as to infer the strongest suspicion that they would all be again resumed should the league of the allies be dissolved, or their means of opposing his purposes become weaker. When, therefore, Cau-

laincourt came to Paris on the part of his master, with power to subscribe to all and each of the demands by the allies, he was not indeed explicitly refused audience; but, before he was admitted to a conference with the Emperor Alexander, to whom his mission was addressed, the sovereigns had come under engagements which precluded them altogether from treating with Napoleon.

When the Emperor of Russia halted, after the progress of the allied sovereigns through the city, it was at the hotel of Talleyrand. He was scarcely arrived there ere the principal royalists, and those who had acted with them, waited on him to crave an audience. Besides the Emperor Alexander, the King of Prussia, and Prince Schwartzemberg, were present General Pozzo di Borgo, Nesselrode, Lichtenstein, the Duke Dalberg, Baron Louis, the Abbé de Pradt, and others. Three points were discussed. 1. The possibility of a peace with Napoleon, upon sufficient guarantees. 2. The plan of a regency. 3. The restoration of the Bourbons.

The first proposition seemed inadmissible. The second was carefully considered. It was particularly urged that the French were indifferent to the cause of the Bourbons—that the allied monarchs would observe no mark of recollection of them exhibited by the people of France—and that the army seemed particularly averse to them. The united testimony of the French gentlemen present was offered to repel these doubts; and it was at length agreed, that the third proposition,—the restoration of the ancient family, and the ancient limits,—should be the terms adopted for the settlement of France. A proclamation was immediately dispersed, by which the sovereigns made known their determination not to treat with Bonaparte or any of his family.

But more formal evidence, in the shape of legal procedure, was necessary to establish the desire of the French people to coincide in the proposed change of government. The public assembly which ought naturally to have taken the lead in such an important affair, was the Legislative Body, in whom Napoleon's constitution vested some ostensible right of interference when the state was in danger; but so far had the emperor been from recognizing such a power in practice, that the instant when that assembly assumed the right of remonstrating with him, though in the most respectful terms, he suspended their functions, and spurned them from the footstool of his throne, informing them, that not they, but He, was the representative of the people, from whom there lay no appeal, and beside whom no body in the state possessed power and efficacy. This legislative council, therefore, being dispersed and prorogued, could not take the initiative upon the present occasion.

The searching genius of Talleyrand sought an organ of public opinion where few would have looked for it,—in the Conservative Senate, namely, whose members had been so long the tools of Bonaparte's wildest projects, and the echoes of his most despotic decrees,—that very body, of which he himself said, with equal bitterness and truth, that they were more eager to yield up national rights than he had been to demand the surrender, and that a sign from him had always been an order for the Senate, who hastened uniformly to anticipate and exceed his demands.

Yet when, on the summons of Talleyrand, who knew well with whom he was dealing, this Senate was convoked, in a meeting attended by sixty-six of their number, forming a majority of the body, they at once, and without hesitation, named a Provisional Government, consisting of Talleyrand, Bournonville, Jaucourt, Dalberg, and the Abbé de Montesquieu; men recommended by talents and moderation, and whose names, known in the Revolution, might, at the same time, be a guarantee to those who dreaded a renovation of the old despotic government with the restoration of the ancient race of kings.

On the 2d and 3d of April, the axe was laid to the roots. A decree of the Senate sent forth the following statement:—1st, That Napoleon, after governing for some time with prudence and wisdom, had violated the constitution, by raising taxes in an arbitrary and lawless manner, contrary to the tenor of his oath.—2d, That he had adjourned without necessity the Legislative Body, and suppressed a report of that assembly, besides disowning its right to represent the people.—3d, That he had published several unconstitutional decrees, particularly those of 5th March last, by which he endeavoured to render national a war, in which his own ambition alone was interested.—4th, That he had violated the constitution by his decrees respecting state prisons.—5th, That he had abolished the responsibility of ministers, confounded together the different powers of the state, and destroyed the independence of judicial authorities.—6th, That the liberty of the press, constituting one of the rights of the nation, had been uniformly subjected to the arbitrary censure of his police; while, at the same time, he himself had made use of the same engine to fill the public ear with invented fictions, false maxims, doctrines favourable to despotism, and insults upon foreign governments.—7th, That he had caused acts and reports, adopted by the Senate, to be altered by his own authority, before publication.—8th, That instead of reigning, according to his oath, for the honour, happiness, and glory of the French nation, he had put the finishing stroke to the distresses of the country, by a refusal to treat on honourable conditions—by the abuse which he had made of the means intrusted to him in men and money—by abandoning the wounded, without dressing or sustenance—and by pursuing measures, of which the consequences have been the ruin of towns, the depopulation of the country, famine and pestilence. From all these inductive causes, the Senate, considering that the imperial government, established by the decree of 28th Floréal, in the year XII, had ceased to exist, and that the manifest desire of all Frenchmen was to obtain an order of things, of which the first result should be peace and concord among the great members of the European family: therefore, the Senate declared and decreed, 1st, That Napoleon Bonaparte had forfeited the throne, and the right of inheritance established in his family.—2d, That the people and army of France were disengaged and freed from the oath of fidelity, which they had taken to Napoleon and his constitution.

About eighty members of the Legislative Body, at the summons of the Provisional Government, assembled on the 3d April, and formally adhered to

the above decree of forfeiture. The consequences of these bold measures showed, either that Napoleon had in reality never had more than a slight hold on the affections of the people of France, or, that the interest they took in his fortunes had been in a great degree destroyed by the fears and passions excited by the immediate crisis. Even before the Senate could reduce its decree into form, the council-general of the department of the Seine had renounced Napoleon's authority, and imputed to him alone the present disastrous state of the country. The decree of the Senate was followed by declarations from all the public bodies in and around Paris, that they adhered to the Provisional Government, and acquiesced in the decree of forfeiture. Numerous individuals, who had been favoured and enriched by Bonaparte, were among the first to join the tide when it set against him. But it had been always his policy to acquire adherents, by addressing himself rather to men's interests than to their principles; and many of his friends so gained, naturally became examples of the politic observation, "that if a prince places men in wealthy circumstances, the first thing they think of, in danger, is how to preserve the advantages they have obtained, without regard to his fate to whom they owe them."

We do not believe that it occurred to any person while these events were passing, to question either the formality or the justice of the doom of forfeiture against Napoleon; but time has called out many authors, who, gained by the brilliancy of Napoleon's reputation, and some of them bound to him by ties of gratitude or friendship, have impugned, more or less directly, the formality of the Senate's procedure, as well as the justice of their sentence. We, therefore, feel it our duty to bestow some considerations upon this remarkable event in both points of view.

The objection proposed against the legality of the Senate's acting as the organ of the people, in pronouncing the doom of forfeiture, rests upon the idea, that the right of dethroning the sovereign, who shall be guilty of oppression beyond endurance, can only be exercised in a peculiar and formal manner, or, as our law-phrase goes, "according to the statute made and provided in that case." This seems to take a narrow view of the subject. The right of redressing themselves under such circumstances does not belong to, and is not limited by, any peculiar forms of civil government. It is a right which belongs to human nature under all systems whatsoever. It exists in every government under the sun, from that of the Dey of Algiers to the most free republic that ever was constructed. There is, indeed, much greater latitude for the exercise of arbitrary authority, in some governments than in others. An Emperor of Morocco may, with impunity, bathe his hands to the elbows in the blood of his subjects, shed by his own hand; but even in this the most absolute of despotisms, there are peculiar limits which cannot be passed by the sovereign without the exercise of the natural right of resistance on the part of his subjects, although their system of government be as arbitrary as words can declare it to be, and the emperor is frequently dethroned and slain by his own guards.

In limited governments, on the other hand, like that of Great Britain, the law imposes bounds, beyond which the royal authority shall not pass; but it makes no provision for what shall take place, should a monarch, as in the case of James II., transgress the social compact. The constitution averts its eyes from contemplating such an event—indeed, it is pronounced impossible; and when the emergency did arrive, and its extrication became a matter of indispensable necessity, it was met and dealt with as a concurrence of circumstances which had not happened before, and ought never to be regarded as being possible to occur again. The foreigner who peruses our constitution for the forms of procedure competent in such an event as the Revolution, might as well look in a turnpike act for directions how to proceed in a case resembling that of Phaeton.

If the mode of shaking off an oppressive yoke, by declaring the monarchy abdicated or forfeited, be not a fixed form in a regular government, but left to be provided for by a convention or otherwise, as a case so calamitous and so anomalous should demand, far less was it to be supposed that a constitution like that of France, which Bonaparte had studiously deprived of every power and means of checking the executive, should contain a regular form of process for declaring the crown forfeited. He had been as careful as despot could, to leave no bar in existence before which the public might arraign him; but will it be contended, that the public had therefore forfeited its natural right of accusing and of obtaining redress? If he had rendered the Senate the tame drudges which we have described, and prorogued the Legislative Body by an arbitrary coup d'état, was he therefore to escape the penalty of his misgovernment? On the contrary, the nation of France, like Great Britain at the time of the Revolution 1688, was to proceed as it best could in taking care, *Ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*. The Senate was not, perhaps, the best organ for expressing public opinion, but it was the only one Napoleon had left within reach, and therefore it was seized upon and made use of. That it was composed of men who had so long gone on with Napoleon's interest, and now were able to keep up in course with him no longer, made his misrule even yet more glaring, and the necessity of the case more evident.

It is of far more importance to be enabled to form an accurate judgment respecting the justice of the sentence of forfeiture pronounced against this eminent man, than upon its mere formality. That we may examine this question with the impartiality it deserves, we must look upon it not only divested of our feelings as Britons, but as unconnected with the partisans either of the Bourbons or of Bonaparte. With these last there could be no room either for inquiry or conviction. The royalist must have been convinced that Napoleon deserved, not deprivation only, but death also, for usurping the throne of his rightful sovereign; and the Bonapartist, on the other hand, would hold it cowardly treason to desert the valiant emperor, who had raised France to such a state of splendour by his victories, more especially to forsake him in the instant when Fortune was

looking black upon his cause. There could be no argument between these men, save with their good swords in a fair field.

But such decided sentiments were not entertained upon the part of the great bulk of the French nation. A large number of the middle classes, in particular, remembering the first terrors of the Revolution, had showed their willingness to submit to the yoke which gradually assumed a despotic character rather than, by a renewed struggle for their liberties, to run the risk of reviving the days of Terror and Proscription. It is in the person of such an individual, desirous of the honour and advantage of his country, and anxious, at the same time, for the protection of his own family and property, that we now endeavour to consider the question of Napoleon's forfeiture.

The mind of such a person would naturally revert to the period, when Bonaparte, just returned from Egypt, appeared on the stage like a deity descending to unloose a perplexing knot, which no human ingenuity could extricate. Our citizen would probably admit that Napoleon used the sword a little too freely in severing the intricacies of the noose; or, in plain words, that the cashiering the Council of Five Hundred, at the head of his grenadiers, was an awkward mode of ascending to power in a country which still called itself free. This feeling, however, would be greatly overbalanced by recollecting the use which was made of the power thus acquired; the subjugation, to wit, of foreign enemies, the extinction of civil dissensions, the protection of property, and, for a time, of personal liberty also. Napoleon's having elevated France from the condition of a divided and depressed country, in the immediate apprehension of invasion, into that of arbitress of Europe, would at once justify committing the chief authority to such able hands, and excuse the means he had used for attaining it; especially in times when the violent and successive changes under which they had long suffered had made the nation insensible to irregularities like those attached to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. Neither would our citizen probably be much shocked at Napoleon's assuming the crown. Monarchy was the ancient government of France, and successive changes had served to show that they could not fix on any other form of constitution, labour how they would, which was endowed with the same degree of permanence. The Bourbons had, indeed, the claim by birth to mount that throne, were it to be again erected. But they were in exile, separated by civil war, party prejudices, the risk of reaction, and a thousand other difficulties, which seemed at the time absolutely insurmountable. Bonaparte was standing under the canopy, he grasped the regal sceptre in his hand; his assuming the royal seat passed almost as a matter of course.

Our supposed Parisian has next to review a course of years of such brilliancy as to baffle criticism, and charm reason to silence, till the undertakings of the emperor seem to rise above each other in wonder, each being a step towards the completion of that stupendous pyramid, of which the gradations were to be formed by conquered provinces, until the refractory and contumacious isle of Britain should be added to complete the pile,

on the top of which was destined to stand the armed form of Napoleon, trampling the world under his foot. This is the noble work which France and her monarch were in the act of achieving. It requires the sacrifice of children or relatives to fill their ranks; they go where Honour calls and Victory awaits them. These times, however, are overclouded; there come tidings that the stone heaved by such portentous exertions so high up the hill, has at length recoiled on him who laboured to give it a course contrary to nature. It is then that the real quality of the fetters, hitherto gilded over by success, begins to be felt, and the iron enters into the soul. The parent must not weep aloud for the child—the emperor required his service;—the patriot must not speak a word on public affairs—the dungeon waits for him.

While news of fresh disasters from Spain and Moscow were every day arriving, what comfort could a citizen of France find in adverting to past victories? These had brought on France the hatred of Europe, the tears of families, the ruin of fortunes, general invasion, and well nigh national bankruptcy. Every year had the children of France undergone decimation—taxes, to the amount of fifteen hundred millions of francs yearly, had succeeded to the four hundred millions imposed under the reign of the Bourbons—the few remaining ships of France rotted in her harbours—her bravest children were slaughtered on their native soil—a civil war was on the point of breaking out—one half of France was overrun by the foreign enemy. Was this most melancholy state of the country brought about in defending strongly, but unfortunately, any of the rights of France? No—She might have enjoyed her triumphs in the most profound peace. Two wars with Spain and Russia, which gave fire to this dreadful train of calamities, were waged for no national or reasonable object, but merely because one half of Europe could not satisfy the ambition of one man. Again, our citizen inquires, whether, having committed the dreadful error of commencing these wars, the emperor has endeavoured to make peace with the parties injured? He is answered, that repeated terms of peace have been offered to Napoleon, upon condition of ceding his conquest, but that he had preferred hazarding the kingdom of France, to yielding up that which he termed his *glory*, a term which he successively conferred on whatever possession he was required to surrender; that even at Châtillon, many days passed when he might have redeemed himself by consenting that France should be reduced within the limits which she enjoyed under the Bourbons; but that the proposal, when half admitted, had been retracted by him in consequence of some transient success; and finally, that in consequence of this intractability and obstinacy, the allied sovereigns had solemnly declared they would not enter into treaty with him, or those who acted with him. Our citizen would naturally look about for some means of escaping the impending danger, and would be informed that the peace which the allied princes refused to Bonaparte, they held out with ready hand to the kingdom of France under any other government. He would learn that, if these terms were accepted, there was

every prospect that a secure and lasting peace would ensue; if refused, the inevitable consequence would be a battle between two large armies fought under the walls of Paris, which city was almost certain to be burnt, whichever party got the advantage.

In consequence of this information, the citizen of Paris would probably be able to decide for himself. But if he inquired at a jurist, he would be informed that Napoleon held the crown not by right of blood, but by the choice, or rather permission of the people, as an administrator bound to manage for their best advantage.

Now every legal obligation may be unloosed in the same way in which it is formed. If, therefore, Napoleon's government was no longer for the advantage of France, but, on the contrary, tended plainly to her ruin, she had a right to rid herself of him, as of a servant unfit for duty, or as if mariners had taken aboard their vessel a comrade intruded to act as pilot, but who had proved a second Jonas, whom it was necessary to sacrifice to appease a storm which had come upon them through his misconduct. Upon such reasoning, certainly neither unwise nor unpatriotic, the burghers of Paris, as well as all those who had anything to lose in the struggle, may be supposed to have acted.

The lower, or rather the lowest class of inhabitants, were not accessible to the same arguments. They had been bequeathed to Bonaparte as an heirloom of the Republic, of which he has been truly called the heir. His police had industriously maintained connexions amongst them, and retained in pay, and in dependence on the government, their principal leaders. Names had changed around men of that ignorant condition, without their feeling their situation much altered. The Glory of France was to them as inspiring a watch-word as the Rights of Man had been; and their quantum of soaps per day, when employed, as they frequently were, upon the public works, was no bad exchange for Liberty and Equality, after they had arrived at the discovery of the poor cobbler, who exclaimed,—“Fine Liberty, indeed, that leaves me cobbling shoes as she found me!” Bulletins and *Moniteurs* which trumpeted the victories of Napoleon, were as animating and entertaining to the inhabitants of the suburbs as the speeches of republican orators; for in such triumphs of a nation, the poor have a share as ample as their wealthier neighbours. The evils of the war were also less felt by the poor. Their very poverty placed them beneath taxation, and the children, of whom they were bereaved by the conscription, they must otherwise have parted with, in all probability, that they might seek subsistence elsewhere. In the present circumstances, the hatred to foreigners, proper to persons of their class, came to aid their admiration of Bonaparte. In a battle, they had something to gain and nothing to lose, saving their lives, of which their national gallantry induced them to take small heed. Had Napoleon been in Paris, he might have made much use of this force. But in his absence, the weight of property, prudently directed, naturally bore down the ebullitions of those who had only brute strength to throw into the balance, and the overwhelming force of the allied army kept the suburbs in subjection.

The disposition of the military was a question of deep importance. Accustomed to follow Napoleon through every climate, and every description of danger, unquestionably their attachment to his person was of the most devoted and enthusiastic kind. But this can only be said in general of the regimental officers, and the soldiers. The marshals, and many of the generals, were tired of this losing war. These, with many also of the inferior officers, and even of the soldiers, began to consider the interest of their general, and that of France, as having become separated from each other. It was from Paris that the changes had emanated by which the army was governed during every revolutionary crisis; and they were now required to engage in an undertaking which was likely to be fatal to that metropolis. To advance upon the allies, and fight a battle under the capital, was to expose to destruction the city, whose name to every Frenchman has a sacred and inviolable sound. The marshals in particular, were disgusted with a contest, in which each of them had been left successively without adequate means of resistance, to stem, or attempt to stem, a superior force of the enemy; with the certainty, at the same time, to be held up to public censure in the next bulletin in case of failure, though placed in circumstances which rendered success impossible. These generals were more capable than the army at large of comprehending the nature of the war in which they were likely to be engaged, and of appreciating the difficulties of a contest which was to be maintained in future without money, ammunition, or supplies, excepting such as should be extorted from that part of the country over which they held military possession; and this, not only against all the allies now in France, and the insurgent corps of royalists in the west, but also against a second or reserved line of three or four hundred thousand Russians, Austrians, and other allied troops, which had not yet crossed the frontier.

Besides, the soldiers with which an attack upon the allied army must have been undertaken, were reduced to a disastrous condition, by their late forced marches, and the want of succours and supplies of every description; the cavalry were in a great measure dismounted; the regiments not half complete; the horses unshod; the physical condition of the army bad, and its moral feelings depressed, and unfit for enterprise. The period seemed to have arrived, beyond which Napoleon could not maintain his struggle, without destruction to himself, to Paris, and to France. These sentiments were commonly entertained among the French general officers. They felt their attachment to Napoleon placed in opposition to the duty they owed their country by the late decree of the Senate, and they considered the cause of France as the most sacred. They had received intelligence from Beaumontville of what had passed at Paris, and considering the large proportion of the capital which had declared against Bonaparte, and that an assault on Paris must have occasioned much effusion of French blood, and have become the signal of civil war, the marshals and principal general officers agreed they could not follow Napoleon in such an attack on the city, or against the allies' line of defence around it, both because, in a mili-

tary point of view, they thought the attempt desperate, considering the state of the army, and because, in a political position, they regarded it as contrary to their duty as citizens.

In the night betwixt the 2d and 3d of April, Caulaincourt returned from his mission to Paris. He reported, that the allies persisted in their determination to entertain no treaty with Bonaparte; but he was of opinion, that the scheme of a regency by the empress, as the guardian of their son, might even yet be granted. Austria, he stated, was favourable to such an arrangement, and Russia seemed not irreconcilably averse to it. But the abdication of Bonaparte was a preliminary condition. As this news circulated among the marshals, it fixed them in their resolution not to march against Paris, as, in their opinion, the war ought to be ended by this personal sacrifice on the part of Napoleon.

Bonaparte had not, probably, expected this separation between the duties of a soldier and of a citizen. On the 4th April, he reviewed a part of his troops, addressed them on the display of the white colours in France by some factious persons, reminded them that the three-coloured cockade was that of victory and honour, and that he intended to march on the capital, to punish the traitors by whom it had been vilified. He was answered by shouts of "Paris, Paris!" and had no reason to fear that the troops would hesitate to follow him in his last effort. The orders were given to advance the Imperial quarters from Fontainebleau to Essonne.

But after the review was over, Berthier, Ney, Macdonald, Caulaincourt, Oudinot, Bertrand, and other officers of the highest rank, followed the emperor into his apartment, and explained to him the sentiments which they entertained on the subject of the proposed movement, their opinion that he ought to negotiate on the principle of personal abdication, and the positive determination which most of them had formed, on no account to follow him in an attack upon Paris.

There is no doubt that, by an appeal to officers of an inferior rank and consideration, young Seids, who knew no other virtue than a determined attachment to their chief, through good or evil, Napoleon might have filled up, in a military point of view, the vacancy which the resignation of the marshals must have created in his list of generals. But those who urged to him this unpleasant proposal, were the fathers of the war, the well-known brave and beloved leaders of large armies. Their names might be individually inferior to his own; but with what feelings would the public hear that he was deprived of those men, who had been so long the pride and dread of war? and what were likely to be the sentiments of the soldiery, upon whom the names of Ney, Macdonald, Oudinot, and others, operated like a war-trumpet?

With considerable reluctance, and after long debate, Napoleon assumed the pen, and, acquiescing in the reasoning pressed upon him, wrote the following words, which we translate as literally as possible, as showing Napoleon's power of dignity of expression, when deep feeling predominated over his affectation of antithesis and orientalism of composition:—

"The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, the Emperor Napoleon, faithful to his oath, declares that he is ready to descend from the throne, to quit France, and even to relinquish life, for the good of the country, which is inseparable from the rights of his son, from those of the regency in the person of the empress, and from the maintenance of the laws of the empire. Done at our Palace of Fontainebleau, 4th April, 1814."

Caulaincourt and Ney were appointed to be bearers of this important document, and commissioners to negotiate with the allies, concerning the terms of accommodation to which it might be supposed to lead. Caulaincourt was the personal representative of Napoleon; and Ney, who had all along been zealous for the abdication, was a plenipotentiary proposed by the rest of the marshals. Napoleon, it is said, wished to add Marmont; but he was absent with the troops quartered at Essonne, who, having been withdrawn in consequence of the treaty of Paris, were disposed of in that position. Macdonald was suggested as the third plenipotentiary, as an officer whose high character best qualified him to represent the army. Napoleon hesitated; for though he had employed Macdonald's talents on the most important occasions, he knew that the marshal disliked upon principle the arbitrary character of his government; and they had never stood to each other in any intimate or confidential relation. He consulted his minister, Maret. "Send the Duke of Tarentum," replied the minister. "He is too much a man of honour not to discharge, with religious fidelity, any trust which he undertakes." Marshal Macdonald's name was added to the commission accordingly.

When the terms were in the act of being adjusted, the marshals desired to know upon what stipulations they were to insist on Napoleon's personal behalf. "Upon none"—said Bonaparte. "Do what you can to obtain the best terms for France; for myself, I ask nothing." They were instructed particularly to obtain an armistice until the treaty should be adjusted. Through the whole scene Bonaparte conducted himself with firmness; but he gave way to a natural emotion when he had finally signed the abdication. He threw himself on a sofa, hid his face for a few minutes, and then looking up, with that smile of persuasion which he had so often found irresistible, he implored his brethren of the field to annul the resolutions they had adopted, to destroy the papers, and follow him yet again to the contest. "Let us march," he said; "let us take the field once more! We are sure to beat them, and to have peace on our own terms." The moment would have been invaluable to a historical painter. The marshals were deeply affected, but could not give way. They renewed their arguments on the wretched state of the army,—on the reluctance with which the soldiers would move against the Senate,—on the certainty of a destructive civil war,—and on the probability that Paris would be destroyed. He acquiesced once more in their reasoning, and permitted them to depart on their embassy.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

Victor, and others of the French marshals, give in their adhesion to the Provisional Government.—Marmont enters into a separate convention, but assists at the conference held at Paris, leaving Souham second in command of his army.—The commanders have an interview with the Emperor Alexander.—Souham enters, with his army, into the lines of the allies; in consequence, the allied sovereigns insist upon the unconditional submission of Napoleon.—His behaviour on learning this result—and reluctant acquiescence.—The terms granted to him—Considerations as to their policy. Disapprobation of Lord Castlereagh.—General desertion of Napoleon.—The Empress Maria Louisa returns to her father's protection.—Death of Josephine.—Singular statement made by Baron Fain, Napoleon's secretary, of the emperor's attempt to commit suicide.—After this he becomes more resigned.—His views respecting the best policy of the Bourbons, as his successors.—Leaves Fontainebleau, on his journey to Elba, on 20th April.

THE plenipotentiaries of Napoleon had been directed to confer with Marmont at Essonne, in their road to the capital. They did so, and obtained information there which rendered their negotiation more pressing. Several of the generals who had not been at Fontainebleau, and had not had an opportunity of acting in conjunction with the military council which assembled there, had viewed the act of the Senate, adhered to by the other public bodies, as decisively closing the reign of Bonaparte, or as indicating the commencement of a civil war. Most of them were of opinion, that the interest of an individual, whose talents had been as dangerous to France as the virtues of Cesar had been to Rome, ought not to be weighed against the welfare of the capital and the whole nation. Victor, Duke of Belluno, had upon these principles given in his personal adhesion to the Provisional Government, and his example was followed by many others.

But the most important proselyte to the royal cause was the Marshal Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, who, lying at Essonne with ten or twelve thousand men, formed the advance of the French army. Conceiving himself to have the liberty of other Frenchmen, to attend at this crisis to the weal of France, rather than to the interest of Napoleon alone, and with the purpose of saving France from the joint evils of a civil and domestic war, he made use of the position in which he was placed, to give a weight to his opinion, which that of no other individual could have possessed at the moment. Marshal Marmont, after negotiation with the Provisional Government on the one hand, and Prince Schwartzberg on the other, had entered into a convention on his own account, and that of his corps d'armée, by which he agreed to march the division which he commanded within the lines of cantonnement held by the allies, and thus renounced all idea of further prosecuting the war. On the other hand, the marshal stipulated for the freedom and honourable usage of Napoleon's person, should he fall into the hands of the allies. He obtained also a guarantee, that his corps d'armée should be permitted to retreat

into Normandy. This convention was signed at Chevilly upon 3d April.

This step has been considered as a defection on the part of General Marmont; but why is the choice of a side, betwixt the Provisional Government and the emperor, more a desertion in that general than in any other of the marshals or authorities who presently after took the very same step? And if the Duke of Ragusa by that means put further bloodshed out of question, ought it not to be matter of rejoicing (to borrow an expression of Talleyrand's on a similar occasion), that the marshal's watch went a few minutes faster than those of his colleagues?

When Macdonald and Ney communicated to Marmont that they were bearers of Napoleon's abdication, and that he was joined with them in commission, that marshal asked why he had not been summoned to attend with the others at Fontainebleau, and mentioned the convention which he had entered into, as acting for himself. The Duke of Tarentum expostulated with him on the disadvantage which must arise from any disunion on the part of the principal officers of the army. Respecting the council at Fontainebleau, he stated it had been convened under circumstances of such sudden emergency, that there was no time to summon any other than those marshals who were close at hand, lest Napoleon had in the meanwhile moved forward the army. The commissioners entreated Marmont to suspend the execution of the separate convention, and to come with them to assist at the conferences to be held at Paris. He consented, and mounted into Marshal Ney's carriage, leaving General Souham, who, with all the other generals of his division, two excepted, were privy to the convention, in command of his corps d'armée, which he gave orders should remain stationary.

When the marshals arrived in Paris, they found the popular tide had set strongly in favour of the Bourbons; their emblems were everywhere adopted; and the streets resounded with *Vive le roi*. The populace seemed as enthusiastic in their favour as they had been indifferent a few days before. All boded an unfavourable termination for their mission, so far as respected the proposed regency.

The names and characters of the commissioners instantly obtained their introduction to the Emperor Alexander, who received them with his natural courtesy. "On the general subject of their mission," he said, "he could not treat but in concert with his allies." But he enlarged on the subject of Napoleon personally. "He was my friend," he said; "I loved and honoured him. His ambition forced me into a dreadful war, in which my capital was burnt, and the greatest evils inflicted on my dominions. But he is unfortunate, and these wrongs are forgotten. Have you nothing to propose on his personal account? I will be his willing advocate." The marshals replied, that Napoleon had made no conditions for himself whatever. The emperor would hardly believe this until they showed him their instructions, which entirely related to public affairs. The emperor then asked if they would hear a proposal from him. They replied with suitable respect and gratitude. He then mentioned the plan, which was afterwards adopted; that Bonaparte should

retain the Imperial title over a small territory, with an ample revenue, guards, and other emblems of dignity. "The place," continued the Emperor of Russia, "may be Elba, or some other island." With this announcement the commissioners of Bonaparte were dismissed for the evening.

Marshal Marmont had done all in his power to stop the military movement which he had undertaken to execute, thinking it better, doubtless, to move hand in hand with his brethren, than to act singly in a matter of such responsibility; but accident precipitated what he desired to delay. Napoleon had summoned to his presence Count Souham, who commanded the division at Essonne in Marmont's absence. No reason was given for this command, nor could anything be extracted from the messenger, which indicated the purpose of the order. Souham was therefore induced to suspect, that Napoleon had gained intelligence of the Convention of Chevilly. Under this apprehension, he called the other generals who were in the secret to a midnight council, in which it was determined to execute the convention instantly by passing over with the troops within the lines of the allies, without awaiting any farther orders from Marshal Marmont. The division was put in movement upon the 5th of April, about five o'clock, and marched for some time with much steadiness, the movement being, as they supposed, designed for a flank attack on the position of the allies; but when they perceived that their progress was watched, without being interrupted, by a column of Bavarian troops, they began to suspect the real purpose. When this became known, a kind of mutiny took place, and some Polish lancers broke off from the main body, and rode back to Fontainebleau; but the instinct of discipline prevailed, and the officers were able to bring the soldiery into their new quarters at Versailles. They were not, however, reconciled to the measure in which they had been made partakers, and in a few days afterwards broke out into an actual mutiny, which was not appeased without considerable difficulty.

Meanwhile the commissioners of Bonaparte were admitted to a conference with the allied sovereigns and ministers in full council, but which, it may be conjectured, was indulged to them more as a form, than that the allies might treat with due respect the representatives of the French army, than with any purpose on the part of the sovereigns of altering the plan to which they had pledged themselves by a proclamation, upon the faith of which thousands had already acted. However, the question whether to adopt the projected regency, or the restoration of the Bourbons, as a basis of agreement, was announced as a subject of consideration to the meeting. The marshals pleaded the cause of the regency. The Generals Beurnonville and Dessolles were heard in reply to the commissioners from Fontainebleau, when, ere the debate had terminated, news arrived of the march of Marmont's division to Versailles. The commissioners were astounded with this unexpected intelligence; and the emperor took the opportunity to determine that the allies would not treat with Bonaparte save on the footing of unconditional abdication. With this answer, mitigated with the offer of an independent principality for their an-

cient commander, the marshals returned to Fontainebleau, while the Senate busied themselves to arrange the plan of a free constitution, under which the Bourbons were to be called to the throne.

Napoleon, in the retirement of Fontainebleau, mused on the future with little hope of advantage from the mission of the marshals. He judged that the sovereigns, if they listened to the proposal of a regency, would exact the most formidable guarantees against his own interference with the government; and that under his wife Maria Louisa, who had no talent for public business, France would probably be managed by an Austrian committee. He again thought of trying the chance of war, and might probably have settled on the purpose most congenial to his nature, had not Colonel Gourgaud brought him the news that the division of Marmont had passed into the enemy's cantonments on the morning of the 5th April. "The ungrateful man!" he said. "But he is more to be pitied than I am." He ought to have been contented with this reflection, for which, even if unjust to the marshal, every one must have had sympathy and excuse. But the next day he published a sort of appeal to the army on the solemnity of a military engagement, as more sacred than the duty of a patriot to his country; which he might more gracefully have abstained from, since all knew already to what height he carried the sentiments of arbitrary power.

When the marshals returned, he listened to the news of the failure of their negotiation, as a termination which he had expected. But to their surprise, recollecting his disinterested behaviour when they parted, he almost instantly demanded what provision had been made for him personally, and how he was to be disposed of? They informed him that it was proposed he should reside as an independent sovereign, "in Elba, or somewhere else." Napoleon paused for a moment. "Somewhere else?" he exclaimed. "That must be Corsica. No, no,—I will have nothing to do with Corsica.—Elba? Who knows anything of Elba? Seek out some officer who is acquainted with Elba. Look out what books or charts can inform us about Elba."

In a moment he was as deeply interested in the position and capabilities of this little islet, as if he had never been Emperor of France, nay, almost of the world. But Bonaparte's nature was egotistical. He well knew how little it would become an emperor resigning his crown to be stipulating for his future course of life, and had reason to conclude, that by playing his character with magnanimity, he might best excite a corresponding liberality in those with whom he treated. But when the die was cast, when his fate seemed fixed, he examined with minuteness what he must afterwards consider as his sole fortune. To turn his thoughts from France to Elba, was like the elephant, which can transport artillery, applying his trunk to gather pins. But Napoleon could do both easily, because he regarded these two objects, not as they differed from each other, but as they belonged, or did not belong, to himself.

After a night's consideration, the fallen chief took his resolution, and dispatched Caulaincourt and Macdonald once more to Paris, to treat with the allies upon the footing of an unconditional abdication

of the empire. The document was couched in these words:—"The allied powers having proclaimed that the Emperor Napoleon is the sole obstacle to the re-establishment of peace in Europe, he declares that he renounces for himself and his heirs the throne of France and Italy, because there is no personal sacrifice, not even that of life itself, which he is not ready to make for the interest of France."

Notwithstanding his having adopted this course, Napoleon, until the final adjustment of the treaty, continued to nourish thoughts of breaking it off. He formed plans for carrying on the war beyond the Loire—for marching to join Augereau—for penetrating into Italy, and uniting with Prince Eugène. At one time he was very near again summoning his troops to arms, in consequence of a report too hastily transmitted by a general much attached to him (General Alix, we believe), stating that the Emperor of Austria was displeased at the extremities to which they urged his son-in-law, and was resolved to support him. On this report, which proved afterwards totally unfounded, Napoleon required the marshals to give him back his letter of abdication. But the deed having been formally executed, and duly registered and delivered, the marshals held themselves bound to retain it in their own hands, and to act upon it as the only means of saving France at this dreadful crisis.

Bonaparte reviewed his Old Guard in the courtyard of the castle; for their numbers were so diminished that there was space for them in that narrow circuit. Their zealous acclamations gratified his ears as much as ever; but when he looked on their diminished ranks, his heart failed; he retired into the palace, and summoned Oudinot before him. "May I depend on the adhesion of the troops?" he said.—Oudinot replied in the negative, and reminded Napoleon that he had abdicated.—"Ay, but under conditions," said Napoleon.—"Soldiers do not understand conditions," said the marshal; "they look upon your power as terminated."—"Then on that side all is over," said Napoleon; "let us wait the news from Paris."

Macdonald, Caulaincourt, and Ney, soon afterwards arrived at Fontainebleau, with the treaty which they had concluded on the bases already announced by the Emperor of Russia, who had taken the principal share in drawing it up. Under his sanction, the commissioners had obtained such terms as never before were granted to a dethroned monarch, and which have little chance to be conceded to such a one in future, while the portentous consequences are preserved by history. By these conditions, Bonaparte was to remain emperor, but his sway was to be limited to the island of Elba, in the Mediterranean, in extent twenty leagues, and containing about twelve thousand inhabitants. He was to be recognized as one of the crowned heads of Europe—was to be allowed body-guards, and a navy on a scale suitable to the limits of his dominions; and to maintain this state, a revenue of six millions of francs, over and above the revenues of the Isle of Elba, were settled on him. Two millions and a half were also assigned in pensions to his brothers, Josephine, and the other members of his family,—a revenue more splendid than ever King of

England had at his personal disposal. It was well argued, that if Bonaparte deserved such advantageous terms of retirement, it was injustice to dethrone him. In other points, the terms of this treaty seemed as irreconcilable with sound policy as they are with all former precedents. The name, dignity, military authority, and absolute power of an emperor, conferred on the potentate of such Lilliputian domains, were ludicrous if it was supposed that Napoleon would remain quiet in his retreat, and hazardous if he should seek the means of again agitating Europe.

It was no compliment to Bonaparte's taste to invest him with a poor shadow of his former fortune, since for him the most honourable retirement would have been one which united privacy with safety and competence, not that which maintained a vain parade around him, as if in mockery of what he had formerly been. But time fatally showed, what many augured from the beginning, that so soon as his spirit should soar beyond the narrow circle into which it had been conjured, the imperial title and authority, the assistance of devoted body-guards and experienced counsellors, formed a stake with which, however small, the venturesome gamester might again enter upon the hazardous game of playing for the kingdoms he had lost. The situation of Elba, too, as the seat of his new sovereignty, so near to Italy, and so little removed from France, seemed calculated on purpose to favour his resurrection at some future period as a political character.

The other stipulations of this extraordinary treaty divided a portion of revenue secured to Napoleon among the members of his family. The most rational was that which settled upon Maria Louisa and her son the duchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, in full sovereignty. Except this, all the other stipulations were to be made good at the expense of France, whose Provisional Government were never consulted upon the terms granted.

It was not till the bad effects of this singular treaty had been experienced, that men inquired why and on what principle it was first conceded. A great personage has been mentioned as its original author. Possessed of many good and highly honourable qualities, and a steady and most important member of the great European confederacy, it is doing the memory of the Emperor Alexander no injury to suppose, that he remembered his education under his French tutor, La Harpe, and was not altogether free from its effects. With these there always mingles that sort of showy sensibility which delights in making theatrical scenes out of acts of beneficence, and enjoying in full draughts the popular applause which they are calculated to excite. The contagious air of Paris,—the shouts,—the flattery,—the success to a point hitherto unhopcd for,—the wish to drown unkindness of every sort, and to spread a feast from which no one should rise discontented,—the desire, to sum up all in one word, to show MAGNANIMITY in the hour of success, seem to have laid Alexander's heart more open than the rules of wisdom or of prudence ought to have permitted. It is generous to give, and more generous to pardon; but to bestow favours and forgiveness at the same mo-

ment, to secure the future fortune of a rival who lies prostrate at his feet, to hear thanks and compliments on every hand, and from the mouths even of the vanquished, is the most fascinating triumph of a victorious sovereign. It is only the consequences which teach him how thrifless and unprofitable a prodigality of beneficence often proves, and that in the attempt so to conduct great national measures that they shall please and satisfy every one, he must necessarily encroach on the rules both of justice and wisdom, and may occasion, by a thoughtless indulgence of romantic sensibility, new trains of misfortune to the whole civilized world. The other active parties in the treaty were the King of Prussia, who had no motive to scan with peculiar scrutiny a treaty planned by his ally the Emperor Alexander, and the Emperor of Austria, who could not in delicacy object to stipulations in favour of his son-in-law.

The marshals, on the other hand, gladly received what probably they never would have stipulated. They were aware, that the army would be conciliated with every mark of respect, however incongruous, which could be paid to their late emperor, and perhaps knew Bonaparte so well as to believe that he might be gratified by preserving the external marks of imperial honour, though upon so limited a scale. There was one power whose representative foresaw the evils which such a treaty might occasion, and remonstrated against them. But the evil was done, and the particulars of the treaty adjusted, before Lord Castlereagh came to Paris. Finding that the Emperor of Russia had acted for the best, in the name of the other allies, the English minister refrained from risking the peace which had been made in such urgent circumstances, by insisting upon his objections. He refused, however, on the part of his government, to become a party to the treaty farther than by acceding to it so far as the territorial arrangements were concerned; but he particularly declined to acknowledge, on the part of England, the title of emperor, which the treaty conferred on Napoleon.

Yet, when we have expressed with freedom all the objections to which the treaty of Fontainebleau seems liable, it must be owned, that the allied sovereigns showed policy in obtaining an accommodation on almost any terms, rather than renewing the war, by driving Napoleon to despair, and inducing the marshals, from a sense of honour, again to unite themselves with his cause.

When the treaty was read over to Napoleon, he made a last appeal to his marshals, inviting them to follow him to the Loire or to the Alps, where they would avoid what he felt an ignominious composition. But he was answered by a general silence. The generals whom he addressed knew but too well that any efforts which he could make must be rather in the character of a roving chieftain, supporting his condottieri by the plunder of the country, and that country their own, than that of a warlike monarch, waging war for a specific purpose, and at the head of a regular army. Napoleon saw their determination in their looks, and dismissed the council, promising an answer on an early day, but in the meantime declining to ratify the treaty, and demanding back his

abdication from Caulaincourt; a request which that minister again declined to comply with.

Misfortunes were now accumulating so fast around Napoleon, that they seemed of force sufficient to break the most stubborn spirit.

Gradually the troops of the allies had spread as far as the banks of the Loire. Fontainebleau was surrounded by their detachments; on every side the French officers, as well as soldiers, were leaving his service; he had no longer the power of departing from the palace in safety.

Paris, so late the capital in which his will was law, and where to have uttered a word in his disparagement would have been thought worse than blasphemy, was become the scene of his rival's triumph and his own disgrace. The shouts which used to wait on the emperor were now welcoming to the Tuileries Monsieur, the brother of the restored king, who came in character of lieutenant-general of the kingdom;—the presses, which had so long laboured in disseminating the praises of the emperor, were now exerting all their art and malice in exposing his real faults, and imputing to him such as had no existence. He was in the condition of the huntsman who was devoured by his own hounds.

It was yet more affecting to see courtiers, dependents, and even domestics, who had lived in his smiles, dropping off under different pretexts to give in their adhesion to the Bourbons, and provide for their own fortune in the new world which had commenced at Paris. It is perhaps in such moments, that human nature is seen in its very worst point of view; since the basest and most selfish points of the character, which, in the train of ordinary life, may never be awakened into existence, show themselves, and become the ruling principle, in such revolutions. Men are then in the condition of well-bred and decorous persons, transferred from an ordinary place of meeting to the whirlpool of a crowd, in which they soon demean themselves with all the selfish desire of their own safety or convenience, and all the total disregard for that of others, which the conscious habits of politeness have suppressed, but not eradicated.

Friends and retainers dropt from the unfortunate Napoleon, like leaves from the fading tree; and those whom shame or commiseration yet detained near his person waited but some decent pretexts, like a rising breath of wind, to sweep them also away.

The defection included all ranks, from Berthier, who shared his bosom councils, and seldom was absent from his side, to the Mameluke Roustan, who slept across the door of his apartment, and acted as a body-guard. It would be absurd to criticise the conduct of the poor African,* but the fact and mode of Berthier's departure must not escape notice. He asked permission to go to Paris about some business, saying he would return next day. "He will not return," said Napoleon, calmly, to the Duke of Bassano—"What!" said the minister, "can these be the adieux of Berthier?"—"I tell you, yes—he will

return no more." The abdicated sovereign had, however, the consolation of seeing, that the attachment of several faithful servants was only tried and purified by adversity, as gold is by fire.

The family connexions, and relatives of Napoleon, as well as his familiar friends, were separated from him in this general wreck. It will not be forgotten, that on the day before the battle of Paris, several members of Napoleon's administration set out with the Empress Maria Louisa, to escape from the approaching action. They halted at Blois, where they were joined by Joseph, and other members of the Bonaparte family. For some time this reunion maintained the character and language of a council of regency, dispersed proclamations, and endeavoured to act as a government. The news of the taking of Paris, and the subsequent events, disposed Joseph and Jérôme Bonaparte to remove themselves to the provinces beyond the Loire. But Maria Louisa refused to accompany them, and while the point was yet contested, Count Schouwalow, one of the Austrian ministers, arrived to take her under his protection. The ephemeral regency then broke up, and fled in different directions; the brothers of Bonaparte taking the direction of Switzerland, while Cardinal Fesch and the mother of Napoleon retreated to Rome.

Maria Louisa made more than one effort to join her husband, but they were discouraged on the part of Napoleon himself, who, while he continued to ruminate on renewing the war, could not desire to have the empress along with him in such an adventure. Shortly afterwards, the Emperor of Austria visited his daughter and her son, then at Rambouillet, and gave her to understand that she was, for some time at least, to remain separate from her husband, and that her son and she were to return to Vienna along with him. She returned, therefore, to her father's protection.

It must be also here mentioned, as an extraordinary addition to this tale of calamity, that Joséphine, the former wife of Bonaparte, did not long survive his downfall. It seemed as if the Obi-woman of Martinique had spoken truth; for at the time when Napoleon parted from the sharer of his early fortunes, his grandeur was on the wane, and her death took place but a few weeks subsequent to his being dethroned and exiled. The Emperor of Russia had visited this lady, and showed her some attention, with which Napoleon, for reasons we cannot conjecture, was extremely displeased. She was amply provided for by the treaty of Fontainebleau, but did not survive to reap any benefit from the provision, as she shortly after sickened and died at her beautiful villa of Malmaison. She was buried on the 3d of June, at the village of Rueil. A vast number of the lower class attended the obsequies; for she had well deserved the title of patroness of the poor.

While we endeavour to sum the mass of misfortunes with which Bonaparte was overwhelmed at this crisis, it seems as if Fortune had been determined to show that she did not intend to reverse the lot of humanity, even in the case of one who had been so long her favourite, but that she retained the power of depressing the obscure soldier, whom she had raised to be almost King of Europe, in a degree

* The man had to plead his desire to remain with his wife and family, rather than return to a severe personal thralldom.

as humiliating as his exaltation had been splendid. All that three years before seemed inalienable from his person was now reversed. The victor was defeated, the monarch was dethroned, the ransom of prisoners was in captivity, the general was deserted by his soldiers, the master abandoned by his domestics, the brother parted from his brethren, the husband severed from the wife, and the father torn from his only child. To console him for the fairest and largest empire that ambition ever lorded it over, he had, with the mock name of emperor, a petty isle, to which he was to retire, accompanied by the pity of such friends as dared express their feelings, the unreprieved execrations of many of his former subjects, who refused to regard his present humiliation as an amends for what he had made them suffer during his power, and the ill-concealed triumph of the enemies into whose hands he had been delivered.

A Roman would have seen, in these accumulated disasters, a hint to direct his sword's point against his breast; a man of better faith would have turned his eye back on his own conduct, and having read, in his misuse of prosperity, the original source of those calamities, would have remained patient and contrite under the consequences of his ambition. Napoleon belonged to the Roman school of philosophy; and it is confidently reported, especially by Baron Fain, his secretary, though it has not been universally believed, that he designed, at this extremity, to escape from life by an act of suicide.

The emperor, according to this account, had carried with him, ever since the retreat from Moscow, a packet containing a preparation of opium, made up in the same manner with that used by Condorcet for self-destruction. His valet-de-chambre, in the night betwixt the 12th and 13th of April, heard him arise and pour something into a glass of water, drink, and return to bed. In a short time afterwards, the man's attention was called by sobs and stifled groans; an alarm took place in the chateau—some of the principal persons were roused, and repaired to Napoleon's chamber. Yvan, the surgeon who had procured him the poison, was also summoned; but hearing the emperor complain that the operation of the potion was not quick enough, he was seized with a panic terror, and fled from the palace at full gallop. Napoleon took the remedies recommended, and a long fit of stupor ensued, with profuse perspiration. He awakened much exhausted, and surprised at finding himself still alive; he said aloud, after a few moments' reflection, "Fate will not have it so;" and afterwards appeared reconciled to undergo his destiny, without similar attempts at personal violence. There is, as we have already hinted, a difference of opinion concerning the cause of Napoleon's illness, some imputing it to indigestion. The fact of his having been very much indisposed is, however, indisputable. A general of the highest distinction transacted business with Napoleon on the morning of the 13th of April. He seemed pale and dejected, as from recent and exhausting illness. His only dress was a night-gown and slippers, and he drank from time to time a quantity of tisan, or some such liquid, which was placed beside him, saying he had

suffered severely during the night, but that his complaint had left him.

After this crisis, and having ratified the treaty which his marshals had made for him, Napoleon appeared more at his ease than he had been for some time before, and conversed frankly with his attendants upon the affairs of France.

He owned, that, after all, the government of the Bourbons would best suit France, as tending to reconcile all parties. "Louis," he said, "has talents and means; he is old and infirm; he will not, I think, chuse to give his name to a bad reign. If he is wise, he will occupy my bed, and content himself with changing the sheets. But," he continued, "he must treat the army well, and take care not to look back on the past, otherwise his reign will be of brief endurance."

He also mentioned the inviolability of the sale of the national domains, as the woof upon which the whole web depended; not one thread of it, he said, and the whole will be unraveled. Of the ancient noblesse and people of fashion, he spoke in embittered language, saying they were an English colony in the midst of France, who desired only their own privileges, and would act as readily for as against him.

"If I were in Louis's situation," he said, "I would not keep up the Imperial Guard. I myself have treated them too well, not to have insured their attachment; and it will be his policy to dismiss them, giving good pensions to such officers and soldiers as chuse to retire from service, and preferment in the line to others who incline to remain. This done, he should chuse another guard from the army at large."

After these remarkable observations, which, in fact, contained an anticipation of much that afterwards took place, Napoleon looked around upon his officers, and made them the following exhortation:—"Gentlemen, when I remain no longer with you, and when you have another government, it will become you to attach yourselves to it frankly, and serve it as faithfully as you have served me. I request, and even command you to do this; therefore, all who desire leave to go to Paris have my permission to do so, and those who remain here will do well to send in their adhesion to the government of the Bourbons." Yet, while Napoleon used this manful and becoming language to his followers, on the subject of the change of government, it is clear that there lurked in his bosom a persuasion that the Bourbons were surrounded with too many difficulties to be able to surmount them, and that Destiny had still in reserve for him a distinguished part in the annals of Europe.

In a private interview with Macdonald, whose part in the abdication we have mentioned, he expressed himself warmly satisfied with his conduct, regretting that he had not more early known his value, and proposed he should accept a parting gift. "It is only," he said, anticipating the marshal's objections, "the present of a soldier to his comrade." And indeed it was chosen with great delicacy, being a beautiful Turkish sabre, which Napoleon had himself received from Ibrahim Bey while in Egypt.

Napoleon having now resigned himself entirely to his fate, whether for good or evil, prepared, on the 20th April, to depart for his place of retreat. But first, he had the painful task of bidding farewell to the body in the universe most attached to him, and to which he was probably most attached,—his celebrated Imperial Guard. Such of them as could be collected were drawn out before him in review. Some natural tears dropped from his eyes, and his features had the marks of strong emotion while reviewing for the last time, as he must then have thought likely, the companions of so many victories. He advanced to them on horseback, dismounted, and took his solemn leave. "All Europe," he said, "had armed against him; France herself had deserted him, and chosen another dynasty. He might," he said, "have maintained with his soldiers a civil war of years, but it would have rendered France unhappy. Be faithful," he continued (and the words were remarkable), "to the new sovereign whom France has chosen. Do not lament my fate; I will always be happy while I know you are so. I could have died—nothing was easier—but I will always follow the road of honour. I will record with my pen the deeds we have done together. I cannot embrace you all, but I embrace your general—(he pressed the general to his bosom).—Bring hither the eagle—(he embraced the standard, and concluded).—Beloved eagle, may the kisses I bestow on you long resound in the hearts of the brave!—Adieu, my children,—Adieu, my brave companions,—Surround me once more—Adieu." Drowned in grief, the veteran soldiers heard the farewell of their dethroned leader; sighs and murmurs broke from their ranks, but the emotion burst out in no threats or remonstrances. They appeared resigned to the loss of their general, and to yield, like him, to necessity.

CHAPTER XCIX.

Commissioners appointed to escort Napoleon.—He leaves Fontainebleau on the 20th April.—His interview with Augereau at Valence.—Expressions of popular dislike towards Napoleon in the south of France.—Fears for his personal safety.—His own alarm, agitation, and precautions.—He arrives at Fréjus—and embarks on board the Undaunted, with the British and Austrian commissioners.—Arrives at Elba on 4th May—and lands at Porto Ferrajo.

UPON his unpleasant journey, Napoleon was attended by Bertrand and Drouet, honourably faithful to the adverse fortunes of the master who had been their benefactor when in prosperity. Four delegates from the allied powers accompanied him to his new dominions. Their names were,—General Schouvalow, on the part of Russia; the Austrian general, Kohler; Colonel Sir Niel Campbell, as representing Great Britain; and the General Baron Truchsess Waldbourg, as the commissioner of Prussia. Napoleon received the three first with much personal civility, but seemed to resent the presence of the representative of Prussia, a country which had been at one time the subject of his scorn, and always

of his hatred. It galled him that she should assume an immediate share in deciding upon his fate.

He received the English commissioner with particular expressions of esteem, saying he desired to pass to Elba in an English vessel, and was pleased to have the escort of an English officer. "Your nation," he said, "has an elevated character, for which I have the highest esteem. I desired to raise the French people to such a pitch of sentiment, but ——" He stopt, and seemed affected. He spoke with much civility to the Austrian general, Kohler, but expressed himself somewhat bitterly on the subject of Russia. He even hinted to the Austrian, that should he not be satisfied with his reception in Elba, he might possibly chuse to retire to Great Britain; and asked General Kohler, whether he thought he would not receive protection from them. "Yes, sire," replied the Austrian, "the more readily, that your majesty has never made war in that country."

Napoleon proceeded to give a farewell audience to the Duke of Bassano, and seemed nettled when an aide-de-camp, on the part of General Bertrand, announced that the hour fixed for departing was arrived. "Good," he said. "This is something new.—Since when is it that our motions have been regulated by the watch of the grand marshal? We will not depart till it is our pleasure—perhaps we will not depart at all." This, however, was only a momentary sally of impatience.

Napoleon left Fontainebleau the 20th April, 1814, at eleven o'clock in the morning. His retinue occupied fourteen carriages, and required relays of thirty pairs of post-horses. On the journey, at least during its commencement, he affected a sort of publicity, sending for the public authorities of towns, and investigating into the state of the place, as he was wont to do on former occasions. The cries of *Vive l'empereur* were frequently heard, and seemed to give him fresh spirits. On the other hand, the mayors and sub-prefects, whom he interrogated concerning the decay of many of the towns, displeased him by ascribing the symptoms of dilapidation to the war, or the conscription; and in several places the people wore the white cockade, and insulted his passage with shouts of *Vive le roi*.

In a small barrack near Valence, Napoleon, upon 24th April, met Augereau, his old companion in the campaigns of Italy, and in some degree his tutor in the art of war. The marshal had resented some of the reflections which occurred in the bulletins, censuring his operations for the protection of Lyons. When, therefore, he issued a proclamation to his army, on the recent change, he announced Napoleon as one who had brought on his own ruin, and yet dared not die. An angry interview took place, and the following words are said to have been exchanged between them:—"I have thy proclamation," said Napoleon. "Thou hast betrayed me."—"Sire," replied the marshal, "it is you who have betrayed France and the army, by sacrificing both to a frantic spirit of ambition."—"Thou hast chosen thyself a new master," said Napoleon.—"I have no account to render to you on that score," replied the general.—"Thou hast no courage," replied Bonaparte.—"Thou hast none," replied the general;

and turned his back, without any mark of respect, on his late master.*

At Montélimart, the exiled emperor heard the last expressions of regard and sympathy. He was now approaching Provence, a region of which he had never possessed the affections, and was greeted with execrations and cries of,—"Perish the tyrant!"—"Down with the butcher of our children!" Matters looked worse as they advanced. On Monday, 25th April, when Sir Niel Campbell, having set out before Napoleon, arrived at Avignon, the officer upon guard anxiously inquired if the escort attending the emperor was of strength sufficient to resist a popular disturbance, which was already on foot at the news of his arrival. The English commissioner entreated him to protect the passage of Napoleon by every means possible. It was agreed that the fresh horses should be posted at a different quarter of the town from that where it was natural to have expected the change. Yet the mob discovered and surrounded them, and it was with difficulty that Napoleon was saved from popular fury. Similar dangers attended him elsewhere, and, in order to avoid assassination, the ex-emperor of France was obliged to disguise himself as a postilion, or a domestic, anxiously altering from time to time the mode of his dress; ordering the servants to smoke in his presence; and inviting the commissioners, who traveled with him, to whistle or sing, that the incensed people might not be aware who was in the carriage. At Orgon, the mob brought before him his own effigy dabbled with blood, and stopped his carriage till they displayed it before his eyes; and, in short, from Avignon to La Calade, he was grossly insulted in every town and village, and, but for the anxious interference of the commissioners, he would probably have been torn to pieces. The unkindness of the people seemed to make much impression on him. He even shed tears. He showed also more fear of assassination than seemed consistent with his approved courage; but it must be recollected, that the danger was of a new and peculiarly horrible description, and calculated to appal many to whom the terrors of a field of battle were familiar. The bravest soldier might shudder at a death like that of the De Witts. At La Calade he was equally nervous, and exhibited great fear of poison. When he reached Aix, precautions were taken by detachments of gendarmes, as well as by parties of the allied troops, to insure his personal safety.† At a château called Bouillidou, he had an interview with his sister Pauline. The curiosity of the lady of the house, and two or three females, made them also find their way to his presence. They saw a gentleman in an Austrian uniform. "Whom do you wish to see,

ladies?"—"The Emperor Napoleon."—"I am Napoleon."—"You jest, sir," replied the ladies.—"What! I suppose you expected to see me look more mischievous? Oh yes—confess that, since fortune is adverse to me, I must look like a rascal, a miscreant, a brigand. But do you know how all this has happened? Merely because I wished to place France above England."

At length he arrived at Fréjus, the very port that received him, when, coming from Egypt, he was on the verge of commencing that astonishing career, now about to terminate, to all earthly appearance, at the very point from which he had started. He shut himself up in a solitary apartment, which he traversed with impatient and hasty steps, sometimes pausing to watch from the window the arrival of the vessels, one of which was to transport him from France, as it then seemed, for ever. The French frigate, the *Dryade*, and a brig called the *Inconstant*, had come from Toulon to Fréjus, and lay ready to perform this duty. But, reluctant perhaps to sail under the Bourbon flag, Napoleon preferred embarking on board his Britannic Majesty's ship the *Undaunted*, commanded by Captain Usher. This vessel being placed at the direction of the British commissioner, Sir Niel Campbell, he readily acquiesced in Napoleon's wish to have his passage in her to Elba. It was eleven at night on the 28th ere he finally embarked, under a salute of twenty-one guns. "Adieu, Caesar, and his fortune," said the Russian envoy. The Austrian and British commissioners accompanied him on his voyage.*

During the passage, Bonaparte seemed to recover his spirits, and conversed with great frankness and ease with Captain Usher and Sir Niel Campbell. The subject chiefly led to high-coloured statements of the schemes which he had been compelled to leave unexecuted, with severe strictures on his enemies, and much contempt for their means of opposition. The following particulars are amusing, and, so far as we know, have never appeared:—

He was inquisitive about the discipline of the vessel, which he commended highly, but assured Captain Usher, that, had his power lasted for five years longer, he would have had three hundred sail of the line. Captain Usher naturally asked how they were to be manned. Napoleon replied, that he had resolved on a naval conscription in all the seaports and sea-coast frontier of France, which would man his fleet, which was to be exercised in the Zuyder-Zee, until fit for going to the open sea. The British officer scarce suppressed a smile as he replied, that the marine conscripts would make a sorry figure in a gale of wind.

To the Austrian envoy, Napoleon's constant sub-

* *Itinéraire de Bonaparte*, p. 35. Augereau was an old republican, and had been ready to oppose Bonaparte on the day he dissolved the Legislative Body. He submitted to him during his reign, but was a severe censurer of his excessive love of conquest.—See p. 568.

† This, indeed, had been previously arranged, as troops in considerable numbers were posted for his protection at Grenoble, Gap, and Sisteron, being the road by which he was expected to have traveled; but, perhaps with a view to try an experiment on his popularity, he took the route we have detailed.

* The Prussian commissioner wrote an account of their journey, called *Itinéraire de Bonaparte, jusqu'à son embarquement à Fréjus*: Paris, 1815. The facts are amply confirmed by the accounts of his fellow-travelers. Napoleon always reckoned the pamphlet of General Truchsess Waldbourg, together with the account of De Pradt's Embassy to Poland, as the works calculated to do him most injury. Perhaps he was sensible that during this journey he had behaved beneath the character of a hero, or perhaps he disliked the publication of details, which inferred his extreme unpopularity in the south of France.

ject was the enlarged power of Russia, which, if she could by any means unite Poland into a healthful and integral part of her army, would, he stated, overwhelm Europe.

On a subsequent occasion, the emperor favoured his auditors with a new and curious history of the renewal of the war with England. According to this edition, the Isle of Malta was a mere pretext. Shortly after the peace of Amiens, he said, Mr Addington, then the English prime minister, proposed to him a renewal of Mr Pitt's commercial treaty with France; but that he, Napoleon, desirous to encourage the interior industry of France, had refused to enter into such a treaty, excepting upon terms of reciprocity; namely, that if France received so many millions of English import, England was to be obliged to take in return the same quantity of French productions. These terms were declined by Mr Addington, on which Napoleon declared there should be no treaty at all, unless his principles were adopted. "Then," replied Mr Addington, as quoted by Bonaparte, "there must be hostilities; for, unless the people of England have the advantages of commerce on the terms they are accustomed to, they will force me to declare war."—And the war took place accordingly, of which, he again averred, England's determination to recover the advantages of the treaty of commerce between Vergennes and Pitt, was the real cause.

"Now," he continued, kindling, as he spoke, "England has no power which can oppose her system. She can pursue it without limits. There will be a treaty on very unequal terms, which will not afford due encouragement to the manufactures of France. The Bourbons are poor devils—" he checked himself,—“they are grands-seigneurs, content to return to their estates and draw their rents; but if the people of France see that, and become discontented, the Bourbons will be turned off in six months.” He seemed again to recollect himself like one who thinks he has spoken too much, and was perceptibly more reserved for the rest of the day.

This curious ebullition was concocted according to Napoleon's peculiar manner of blending what might be true in his narrative, with what was intended to forward his own purpose, and mingling it with so much falsehood and delusion, that it resembled what the English poet says of the Catholic Plot,

Some truth there was, but mix'd and dash'd with lies.

It is probable that, after the peace of Amiens, Lord Sidmouth might have wished to renew the commercial treaty; but it is absolutely false that Napoleon's declining to do so had any effect upon the renewal of hostilities. His prophecy that his own downfall would be followed by the English urging upon France a disadvantageous commercial treaty, has proved equally false; and it is singular enough that he who, on board the *Undaunted*, declared, that entering into such a measure would be the destruction of the Bourbons, should, while at St Helena, ridicule and censure Lord Castlereagh for not having secured to Britain that commercial supremacy, the granting of which he had represented as

the probable cause of such a result. Thus did his colouring, if not his facts, change according to the mood of the moment.

While on board the *Undaunted*, Napoleon spoke with great freedom of the facility with which he had outwitted and defeated the allies during the last campaign. "The Silesian army," he said, "had given him most trouble. The old devil, Blücher, was no sooner defeated than he was willing to fight again." But he considered his victory over Schwarzenberg as certain, save for the defection of Marmont. Much more he said, with great apparent frankness, and seemed desirous to make himself in every respect agreeable to his companions on board. Even the seamen, who at first regarded him with wonder, mixed with suspicion, did not escape the charm of his affability, by which they were soon won over, all excepting the boatswain Flinton, a tar of the old school, who could never hear the emperor's praises without muttering the vulgar but expressive phrase, "*Humbug*."*

With the same good-humour, Napoleon admitted any slight jest which might be passed, even at his own expense. When off Corsica, he proposed that Captain Usher should fire a gun to bring-to a fishing-boat, from which he hoped to hear some news. Captain Usher excused himself, saying such an act of hostility towards a neutral would *denationalize* her, in direct contradiction of Napoleon's doctrine concerning the rights of nations. The emperor laughed heartily. At another time, he amused himself by supposing what admirable caricatures his voyage would give rise to in London. He seemed wonderfully familiar with that species of satire, though so peculiarly English.

Upon the 4th of May, when they arrived within sight of Porto Ferrajo, the principal town of Elba, which has a very fine harbour, they found the island in some confusion. The inhabitants had been recently in a state of insurrection against the French, which had been quieted by the governor and the troops giving in their adhesion to the Bourbon government. This state of things naturally increased Napoleon's apprehensions, which had never entirely subsided since the dangers he underwent in Provence. Even on board the *Undaunted*, he had requested that a sergeant of marines might sleep each night on the outside of his cabin-door, a trusty domestic also mounting guard within. He now showed some unwillingness, when they made the island, to the ship running right under the batteries; and when he first landed in the morning, it was at an early hour, and in disguise, having previously obtained from Captain Usher, a sergeant's party of marines to attend him.

Having returned on board to breakfast, after his incognito visit to his island, the Emperor of Elba, as he may now be styled, went on shore in form, about two o'clock, with the commissioners, receiving, at leaving the *Undaunted*, a royal salute. On the beach, he was received by the governor, Prefect,

* The honest boatswain, however, could understand and value what was solid in Napoleon's merits. As he had to return thanks in name of the ship's company, for 200 louis with which the emperor presented them, he wished "his honour good health, and better luck the next time."

and other official persons, with such means of honour as they possessed, who conducted him to the Hôtel de Ville in procession, preceded by a wretched band of fiddlers. The people welcomed him with many shouts. The name of Bonaparte had been unpopular among them as Emperor of France, but they anticipated considerable advantages from his residing among them as their own particular sovereign.

CHAPTER C.

Elba—Napoleon's mode of life and occupation there.—Effects produced by his residence at Elba upon the adjoining Kingdom of Italy.—He is visited by his mother and the Princess Pauline—and by a Polish lady.—Sir Niel Campbell the only commissioner left at Elba.—Napoleon's conversations on the state of Europe.—His pecuniary difficulties—and fears of assassination.—His impatience under these causes of complaint.—Molloy nature of his court.—He withdraws himself within courtiers from intercourse with Sir Niel Campbell.—Symptoms of some approaching crisis.—A part of the Old Guard disbanded, who return to France.—Napoleon escapes from Elba.—Fruitless pursuit by Sir Niel Campbell.

ELBA, to the limits of which the mighty empire of Napoleon was now contracted, is an island opposite to the coast of Tuscany, about sixty miles in circumference. The air is healthy, excepting in the neighbourhood of the salt-marshes. The country is mountainous, and, having all the florid vegetation of Italy, is, in general, of a romantic character. It produces little grain, but exports a considerable quantity of wines; and its iron ore has been famous since the days of Virgil, who describes Elba as

Insula inexhaustis chalybum generosa metallis.

There are also other mineral productions. The island boasts two good harbours, and is liberally productive of vines, olives, fruits, and maize. Perhaps, if an empire could be supposed to exist within such a brief space, Elba possesses so much both of beauty and variety, as might constitute the scene of a summer-night's dream of sovereignty. Bonaparte seemed to lend himself to the illusion, as, accompanied by Sir Niel Campbell, he rode in his usual exploring mood, around the shores of his little state. He did not fail to visit the iron mines, and being informed the annual produce was 500,000 francs, "These, then," he said, "are mine." But being reminded that he had conferred that revenue on the Legion of Honour, he exclaimed, "Where was my head when I gave such a grant! But I have made many foolish decrees of that sort."

One or two of the poorer class of inhabitants knelt, and even prostrated themselves when they met him. He seemed disgusted, and imputed this humiliating degree of abasement to the wretchedness of their education, under the auspices of the monks. On these excursions he showed the same apprehension of assassination which had marked his journey to Fréjus. Two couriers, well armed, rode before him, and examined every suspicious spot. But as he climbed a mountain above Ferrajo, and saw the ocean approach its feet in almost every direction, the expression broke from him, accompanied with a

good-humoured smile, "It must be confessed my isle is very little."

He professed, however, to be perfectly resigned to his fate; often spoke of himself as a man politically dead, and claimed credit for what he said upon public affairs, as having no remaining interest in them. He professed his intentions were, to devote himself exclusively to science and literature. At other times, he said he would live in his little island, like a justice of peace in a country town in England.

The character of Napoleon, however, was little known to himself, if he seriously thought that his restless and powerful mind could be satisfied with the investigation of abstract truths, or amused by the leisure of literary research. He compared his abdication to that of Charles V., forgetting that the Austrian Emperor's retreat was voluntary, that he had a turn towards mechanical pursuits, and that, even with these means of solace, Charles became discontented with his retirement. The character of Bonaparte was, on the contrary, singularly opposed to a state of seclusion. His propensities continued to be exactly of the same description at Elba, which had so long terrified and disquieted Europe. To change the external face of what was around him; to imagine extensive alterations, without accurately considering the means by which they were to be accomplished; to work within his petty province such alterations as its limits permitted; to resume, in short, upon a small scale, those changes which he had attempted upon that which was most magnificent; to apply to Elba the system of policy which he had exercised so long in Europe, was the only mode in which he seems to have found amusement and exercise for the impatient energies of a temper, accustomed from his early youth to work upon others, but apt to become lethargic, sullen, and discontented, when it was compelled, for want of other exercise, to recoil upon itself.

During the first two or three weeks of his residence in the island of Elba, Napoleon had already planned improvements, or alterations and innovations at least, which, had they been to be carried into execution with the means which he possessed, would have perhaps taken his lifetime to execute. It was no wonder, indeed, accustomed as he had been to speak the word, and to be obeyed, and to consider the improvements which he meditated as those which became the head of a great empire, that he should not have been able to recollect that his present operations respected a petty islet, where magnificence was to be limited, not only by utility, but by the want of funds.

In the course of two or three days' traveling, with the same rapidity which characterized his movements in his frequent progresses through France, and showing the same impatience of rest or delay, Napoleon had visited every spot in his little island, mines, woods, salt-marshes, harbours, fortifications, and whatever was worthy of an instant's consideration, and had meditated improvements and innovations respecting every one of them. Till he had done this he was impatient of rest; and, having done so, he lacked occupation.

One of his first, and perhaps most characteristic,

proposals, was to aggrandize and extend his Lilliputian dominions by occupation of an uninhabited island, called Rianosa, which had been left desolate on account of the frequent descents of the corsairs. He sent thirty of his guards, with ten of the independent company belonging to the island, upon this expedition—(what a contrast to those which he had formerly directed!) sketched out a plan of fortifications, and remarked, with complacency, "Europe will say that I have already made a conquest."

In an incredibly short time Napoleon had also planned several roads, had contrived means to convey water from the mountains to Porto Ferrajo, designed two palaces, one for the country, the other in the city, a separate mansion for his sister Pauline, stables for one hundred and fifty horses, a lazaretto, buildings for accommodation of the tunny fishery, and salt-works on a new construction at Porto Longone. The Emperor of Elba proposed, also, purchasing various domains, and had the price estimated; for the inclination of the proprietor was not reckoned essential to the transaction. He ended by establishing four places of residence in the different quarters of the island; and as his amusement consisted in constant change and alteration, he traveled from one to another with the restlessness of a bird in a cage, which springs from perch to perch, since it is prevented from winging the air, its natural element. It seemed as if the magnitude of the object was not so much the subject of his consideration, providing it afforded immediate scope for employing his constant and stimulated desire of activity. He was like the thorough-bred gamester, who, deprived of the means of depositing large stakes, will rather play at small game than leave the table.

Napoleon placed his court also upon an ambitious scale, having more reference to what he had so long been, than to what he actually now had been reduced to, while, at the same time, the furniture and internal accommodations of the imperial palace were meaner by far than those of an English gentleman of ordinary rank. The proclamation of the French governor, on resigning his authority to Napoleon, was well and becomingly expressed; but the spiritual mandate of the Vicar-general Arrighi, a relation of Bonaparte's, which was designed to congratulate the people of Elba on becoming the subjects of the Great Napoleon, was extremely ludicrous. "Elevated to the sublime honour of receiving the anointed of the Lord," he described the exhaustless wealth which was to flow in upon the people, from the strangers who came to look upon the hero. The exhortation sounded as if the isle had become the residence of some non-descript animal, which was to be shorn for money.

The interior of Napoleon's household, though reduced to thirty-five persons, still held the titles, and affected the rank, proper to an imperial court, of which it will be presently seen the petty sovereign made a political use. He displayed a national flag, having a red bend dexter in a white field, the bend bearing three bees. To dignify his capital, having discovered that the ancient name of Porto Ferrajo was Comopoli (*i. e.* the city of Como), he commanded it to be called Comopoli, or the city of all nations.

His body-guard, of about 700 infantry and 80 cavalry, seemed to occupy as much of Napoleon's attention as the grand army did formerly. They were constantly exercised, especially in throwing shot and shells; and, in a short time, he was observed to be anxious about obtaining recruits for them. This was no difficult matter, where all the world had so lately been in arms, and engaged in a profession which many, doubtless, for whom a peaceful life had few charms, laid aside with regret, and longed to resume.

As early as the month of July, 1814, there was a considerable degree of fermentation in Italy, to which the neighbourhood of Elba, the residence of several members of the Bonaparte family, and the sovereignty of Murat, occasioned a general resort of Bonaparte's friends and admirers. Every day this agitation increased, and various arts were resorted to for disseminating a prospect of Napoleon's future return to power. Sundry parties of recruits came over to Elba from Italy to enlist in his guards, and two persons employed in this service were arrested at Leghorn, in whose possession were found written lists, containing the names of several hundred persons willing to serve Napoleon. The species of ferment and discontent thus produced in Italy was much increased by the impolitic conduct of Prince Rossignoli, the civil governor of Tuscany, who re-established in their full force every form and regulation formerly practised under the Dukes of Tuscany, broke up the establishment of the Museum, which had been instituted by Bonaparte's sister, and, while he returned to all the absurdities of the old government, relaxed none of the imposts which the French laid on.

Napoleon's conduct towards the refugees who found their way to Elba may be judged from the following sketch. On the 11th of July, Colomboni, commandant of a battalion of the 4th regiment of the line in Italy, was presented to the emperor as newly arrived. "Well, Colomboni, your business in Elba?"—"First, to pay my duty to your majesty; secondly, to offer myself to carry a musket among your guards."—"That is too low a situation; you must have something better," said Napoleon, and instantly named him to an appointment of 1200 francs yearly, though it appears the emperor himself was then in great distress for money.

About the middle of summer, Napoleon was visited by his mother, and his sister the Princess Pauline. At this time, too, he seems to have expected to be rejoined by his wife Maria Louisa, who, it was said, was coming to take possession of her Italian dominions. Their separation, with the incidents which happened before Paris, was the only subject on which he appeared to lose temper. Upon these topics he used strong and violent language. He said, that interdicting him intercourse with his wife and son excited universal reprobation at Vienna—that no such instance of inhumanity and injustice could be pointed out in modern times—that the empress was detained a prisoner, an orderly officer constantly attending upon her—finally, that she had been given to understand before she left Orleans, that she was to obtain permission to join him at the island of Elba, though it was now denied

her. It was possible, he proceeded, to see a shade of policy, though none whatever of justice, in this separation. Austria had meant to unite the child of her sovereign with the Emperor of France, but was desirous of breaking off the connexion with the Emperor of Elba, as it might be apprehended that the respect due to the daughter of the house of Hapsburg would, had she resided with her husband, have reflected too much lustre on the abdicated sovereign.

The Austrian commissioner, General Kohler, on the other hand, insisted that the separation took place by the Empress Maria Louisa's consent, and even at her request; and hinted that Napoleon's desire to have her society was dictated by other feelings than those of domestic affection. But allowing that Napoleon's view in so earnestly desiring the company of his wife might be political, we can see neither justice nor reason in refusing a request, which would have been granted to a felon condemned to transportation.

We have not thought it necessary to disturb the narrative of important events by noticing details which belong rather to romance; but as we are now treating of Napoleon in his more private character, a mysterious circumstance may be mentioned. About the end of August, 1814, a lady arrived at the Isle of Elba, from Leghorn, with a boy about five or six years old. She was received by Napoleon with great attention, but at the same time with an air of much secrecy, and was lodged in a small and very retired villa, in the most remote corner of the island; from whence, after remaining two days, she re-embarked for Naples. The Elbese naturally concluded that this must have been the Empress Maria Louisa and her son. But the individual was known by those near Napoleon's person to be a Polish lady from Warsaw, and the boy was the offspring of an intrigue betwixt her and Napoleon several years before. The cause of her speedy departure might be delicacy towards Maria Louisa, and the fear of affording the court of Vienna a pretext for continuing the separation of which Napoleon complained. In fact, the Austrians, in defence of their own conduct, imputed irregularities to that of Bonaparte; but the truth of these charges would be no edifying subject of investigation.

About the middle of May, Baron Kohler took farewell of Napoleon, to return to Vienna. He was an Austrian general of rank and reputation; a particular friend and old schoolfellow of Prince Schwartzemberg. The scene of Napoleon's parting with this gentleman was quite pathetic on the emperor's side. He wept as he embraced General Kohler, and entreated him to procure, if possible, his reunion with his wife and child—called him the preserver of his life—regretted his poverty, which prevented his bestowing on him some valuable token of remembrance—finally, folding the Austrian general in his arms, he held him there for some time, repeating expressions of the warmest attachment. This sensibility existed all upon one side; for an English gentleman, who witnessed the scene, having asked Kohler afterwards what he was thinking of while locked in the emperor's embraces—"Of Judas Iscariot," answered the Austrian.

After the departure of Baron Kohler, Colonel Sir

Niel Campbell was the only one of the four commissioners who continued to remain at Elba by orders of the British Cabinet. It was difficult to say what his office really was, or what were his instructions. He had neither power, title, nor means, to interfere with Napoleon's motions. The emperor had been recognized by a treaty—wise or foolish, it was too late to ask—as an independent sovereign. It was therefore only as an envoy that Sir Niel Campbell could be permitted to reside at his court; and as an envoy also, not of the usual character, for settling affairs concerning the court from which he was dispatched, but in a capacity not generally avowed, the office, namely, of observing the conduct of that at which he was sent to reside. In fact, Sir Niel Campbell had no direct or ostensible situation whatever, and of this the French minister of Elba soon took advantage. Drouot, the Governor of Porto Ferrajo, made such particular inquiries into the character assumed by the British envoy, and the length of his stay, as obliged the latter to say that his orders were to remain in Elba till the breaking up of the congress, which was now settling the affairs of Europe; but if his orders should direct him to continue there after that period, he would apply to have his situation placed on some recognized public footing, which he did not doubt would be respectable.

Napoleon did not oppose or murmur at the continued, though equivocal, residence of Sir Niel Campbell at Elba; he affected, on the contrary, to be pleased with it. For a considerable time he even seemed to seek the society of the British envoy, held frequent intercourse with him, and conversed with apparent confidence upon public affairs. The notes of such conversations are now before us; and though it is, on the one hand, evident that Napoleon's expressions were arranged, generally speaking, on a premeditated plan, yet, on the other, it is equally certain, that his ardent temperament, when once engaged in discourse, led him to discover more of his own private thoughts than he would on cool reflection have suffered to escape him.

On the 16th September, 1814, for example, Sir Niel Campbell had an audience of three hours, during which, Napoleon, with his habitual impatience of a sedentary posture, walked from one end of the room to the other, and talked incessantly. He was happy, he said, that Sir Niel remained in Elba *pour rompre la chimère* (to destroy, namely, the idea that he, Bonaparte, had further intention of disturbing the peace of Europe). "I think," he continued, "of nothing beyond the verge of my little isles. I could have supported the war for twenty years, if I had chosen. I am now a deceased person, occupied with nothing but my family, my retreat, my house, my cows, and my poultry." He then spoke in the highest terms of the English character, protesting it had always had his sincere admiration, notwithstanding the abuse directed against it in his name. He requested the British envoy to lose no time in procuring him an English Grammar.—It is a pity Mr Hinton, the boatswain, was not present, to have accompanied this eulogy with his favourite circulation.

In the rest of the conversation the Elbese Emperor was probably more serious. He inquired with

eagerness after the real state of France. Sir Niel Campbell informed him that all the information he had been able to collect ascribed great wisdom and moderation to the sovereign and government; but allowed that those who had lost good appointments, the prisoners of war who had returned from abroad, and great part of the army who remained embodied, were still attached to Napoleon. In answer, Bonaparte seemed to admit the stability of the throne, supported as it was by the marshals and great officers; but he derided the idea of affording France the benefit of a free constitution. He said, the attempt to imitate that of Great Britain was a farce, a caricature. It was impossible, he observed, to imitate the two Houses of Parliament, for that respectable families, like those composing the aristocracy of England, did not now exist in France. He talked with bitterness of the cession of Belgium, and of France being deprived of Antwerp. He himself spoke, he observed, as a spectator, without hopes or interest, for he had none; but thus to have mortified the French showed an ignorance of the national character. Their chief feeling was for pride and glory, and the allies need not look forward to a state of satisfaction and tranquillity under such circumstances as France was now placed in. "The French," he said, "were conquered only by a great superiority of number, therefore were not humiliated; and the population had not suffered to the extent alleged, for he had always spared their lives, and exposed those of Italians, Germans, and other foreigners." He remarked that the gratitude of Louis XVIII. to Great Britain was offensive to France, and that he was called in derision the King of England's Viceroy.

In the latter months of 1814, Sir Niel Campbell began to become sensible that Napoleon desired to exclude him from his presence as much as he possibly could, without positive rudeness. He rather suddenly entrenched himself within all the forms of an imperial court; and without affording the British envoy any absolute cause of complaint, or even any title to require explanation, he contrived, in a great measure, to debar him from opportunities of conversation. His only opportunity of obtaining access to Napoleon was on his return from short absences to Leghorn and Florence, when his attendance on the levee was matter of etiquette.

On such occasions, the tenor of Napoleon's prophecies was minatory of the peace of Europe. He spoke perpetually of the humiliation inflicted upon France, by taking from her Belgium and his favourite object, Antwerp. On the 30th of October, while enlarging on these topics, he described the irritable feelings of the nation, saying, every man in France considered the Rhine to be their natural boundary, and nothing could alter this opinion. There was no want, he said, of a population in France, martial beyond any other nation, by natural disposition, by the consequences of the Revolution, and by the idea of glory. Louis XIV., according to his account, notwithstanding all the misfortunes he had brought upon the nation, was still beloved, on account of the éclat of his victories, and the magnificence of his court. The battle of Rosbach had brought about the Revolution. Louis XVIII. totally mistook the character of the French in supposing, that either by

argument, or by reasoning, or indulging them with a free constitution, he could induce them to sink into a state of peaceful industry. He insisted that the Duke of Wellington's presence at Paris was an insult on the French nation; that very strong discord prevailed in the country, and that the king had but few friends, either in the army or among the people. Perhaps the king might try to get rid of a part of the army by sending them to St Domingo, but that, he observed, would be soon seen through; he himself had made a melancholy trial, with the loss of 30,000 men, which had proved the inutility of such expeditions.

He then checked himself, and endeavoured to show that he had no personal feeling or expectation from the revolutions he foretold. "I am a deceased man," he said; "I was born a soldier; I have mounted a throne; I have descended from it; I am prepared for any fate. They may transport me to a distant shore, or they may put me to death here; I will spread my bosom open to the poniard. When merely General Bonaparte, I had property of my own acquiring—I am now deprived of all."

On another occasion, he described the ferment in France, which he said he had learned from the correspondence of his guards with their native country, and so far forgot the character of a defunct person, as to say plainly, that the present disaffection would break out with all the fury of the former revolution, and require his own resurrection. "For then," he added, "the sovereigns of Europe will soon find it necessary, for their own repose, to call on me to tranquillize matters."

This species of conversation was perhaps the best which could have been adopted, to conceal his secret purpose from the British commissioner. Sir Niel Campbell, though not without entertaining suspicions, judged it, upon the whole, unlikely that he meditated anything eccentric, unless a tempting opening should present itself on the part of France or Italy.

Napoleon held the same species of language to others as well as the British resident. He was affable, and even cordial (in appearance), to the numerous strangers whom curiosity led to visit him; spoke of his retirement as Dioclesian might have done in the gardens of Salouica; seemed to consider his political career as ended, and to be now chiefly anxious to explain such passages of his life as met the harsh construction of the world. In giving free and easy answers to those who conversed with him, and especially to Englishmen of rank, Bonaparte found a ready means of communicating to the public such explanations concerning his past life, as were best calculated to serve his wishes. In these he palliated, instead of denying, the scheme of poisoning his prisoners in Syria, the massacre at Jaffa, the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, and other enormities. An emperor, a conqueror, retired from war, and sequestered from power, must be favourably listened to by those who have the romantic pleasure of hearing him plead his own cause. Milder editions of his measures began to be circulated in Europe, and, in the curiosity to see and admire the captive sovereign, men forgot the ravages which he had committed while at liberty.

As the winter approached, a change was discernible in Napoleon's manners and habits. The alterations which he had planned in the island no longer gave him the same interest; he renounced, from time to time, the severe exercise in which he had at first indulged, used a carriage rather than his horse, and sunk occasionally into fits of deep contemplation, mingled with gloomy anxiety.

He became, also, subjected to uneasiness, to which he had hitherto been a stranger, being that arising from pecuniary inconveniences. He had plunged into expenses with imprudent eagerness, and without weighing the amount of his resources against the cost of the proposed alterations. The ready money which he brought from France seems to have been soon exhausted, and to raise supplies, he commanded the inhabitants of his island to pay up, in the month of June, the contributions of the last year. This produced petitions, personal solicitations, and discontent. It was represented to him, that, so poor were the inhabitants of the island, in consequence of want of sale for their wine for months past, that they would be driven to the most extreme straits if the requisition should be persisted in. In some of the villages, the tax-gatherers of the emperor were resisted and insulted. Napoleon, on his side, sent part of his troops to quarter upon the insurgent peasantry, and to be supported by them at free cost, till the contributions should be paid up.

Thus we recognize, in his government of this miniature state, the same wisdom, and the same errors, by which Bonaparte won and lost the empire of the world. The plans of improvements and internal ameliorations which he formed were probably very good in themselves, but he proceeded to the execution of that which he had resolved with too much and too reckless precipitation; too much of a determination to work his own pleasure, and too little concern for the feelings of others.

The compositions proving a weak resource, as they were scarce to be extracted from the miserable islanders, Napoleon had recourse to others, which must have been peculiarly galling to a man of his haughty spirit. But as his revenue, so far as tangible, did not exceed 380,000 francs, and his expenditure amounted to at least a million, he was compelled to lower the allowances of most of his retinue; to reduce the wages of the miners to one-fourth; to raise money by the sale of the provisions laid up for the garrisons; nay, even by selling a train of brass artillery to the Duke of Tuscany. He disposed, also, of some property, a large house which had been used as a barrack, and he went the length of meditating the sale of the Town-House at Porto Ferrajo.

We have said, that Napoleon's impatience to execute whatsoever plans occurred to his fertile imagination, was the original cause of these pecuniary distresses. But they are not less to be imputed to the unfair and unworthy conduct of the French ministry. The French administration were, of all others, most intimately bound in conscience, honour, and policy, to see the treaty of Fontainebleau, as forming the footstool by which Louis XVIII. mounted his restored throne, distinctly observed towards

Napoleon. The sixth article of that treaty provides an annuity, or revenue of two millions five hundred thousand francs, to be registered on the Great Book of France, and paid without abatement or deduction to Napoleon Bonaparte. This annual provision was stipulated by the Marshals Macdonald and Ney, as the price of Napoleon's resignation, and the French ministers could not refuse a declaration of payment without gross injustice to Bonaparte, and at the same time a severe insult to the allied powers. Nevertheless, far from this pension being paid with regularity, we have seen no evidence that Napoleon ever received a single remittance to account of it. The British resident observing how much the emperor was harassed by pecuniary straits, gave it, not once but repeatedly, as his opinion, "that, if these difficulties pressed upon him much longer, so as to prevent him from continuing the external show of a court, he was perfectly capable of crossing over to Piombino with his troops, or committing any other extravagance." This was Sir Niel Campbell's opinion on 31st October, 1814, and Lord Castlereagh made strong remonstrances on the subject, although Great Britain was the only power among the allies, who, being no principal party to the treaty of Fontainebleau, might safely have left it to those states who were. The French were not ashamed to defend their conduct on the technical objection, that the pension was not due until the year was elapsed; a defence which we must consider as evasive, since such a pension is of an alimentary nature, the termly payments of which ought to be paid in advance. The subject was mentioned again and again by Sir Niel Campbell, but it does not appear that the French administration desisted from a course, which, whether arising from a spirit of mean revenge, or from avarice, or from being themselves embarrassed, was at once dishonourable and impolitic.

Other apprehensions agitated Bonaparte's mind. He feared the Algerine pirates, and requested the interference of England in his behalf. He believed, or affected to believe, that Brulart, the Governor of Corsica, who had been a captain of Chouans, the friend of Georges, Pichegru, &c. was sent thither by Louis XVIII.'s administration, for the purpose of having him assassinated, and that fitting agents were dispatched from Corsica to Elba for that purpose. * Above all, he pretended to be informed of a design to dispense with the treaty of Fontainebleau, and to remove him from his place of refuge, to be

* Bonaparte had particular reason to dread Brulart. This Chouan chief had been one of the numbers who laid down their arms on Napoleon assuming the consulate, and who had been permitted to reside at Paris. A friend of Brulart, still more obnoxious than himself, was desirous of being permitted to return from England, to which he had emigrated. He applied to Napoleon through Brulart, who was directed by the emperor to encourage his friend to come over. Immediately on his landing in France, he was seized and executed. Brulart fled to England in grief and rage, at being made the means of deceiving his friend to death. In the height of his resentment he wrote a letter to Napoleon, threatening him with death by his hand. The recollection of this menace alarmed Bonaparte, when he found Brulart so near him as Corsica.

imprisoned at St Helena or St Lucie. It is not impossible that these fears were not altogether feigned; for though there is not an iota of evidence tending to show that there was reason for believing the allies entertained such an unworthy thought, yet the report was spread very generally through France, Italy, and the Mediterranean, and was encouraged, doubtless, by those who desired once more to place Bonaparte in action. He certainly expressed great anxiety on the subject, sometimes declaring he would defend his batteries to the last; sometimes affecting to believe that he was to be sent to reside in England, a prospect which he pretended not to dislike personally, while he held out sufficient reasons to prevent the course from being adopted. "He concluded," he said, "he should have personal liberty, and the means of removing prejudices entertained against his character, which had not yet been fully cleared up;" but ended with the insinuation, that, by residing in England, he would have easier communication with France, where there were four of his party to every single Bourbonist. And when he had exhausted these topics, he returned to the complaints of the hardship and cruelty of depriving him of the society of his wife and child.

While Bonaparte, chafed by poverty, and these other subjects of complaint, tormented too by the restlessness of a mind impatient of restraint, gave vent to expressions which excited suspicion, and ought to have recommended precaution, his court began to assume a very singular appearance, quite the opposite of that usually exhibited in the courts of petty sovereigns upon the Continent. In the latter there is an air of antiquated gravity, which pervades the whole establishment, and endeavours to supply the want of splendour and of real power. The heavy apparatus designed for the government of an independent state is applied to the management of a fortune not equal to that of many private gentlemen; the whole course of business goes slowly and embarrassedly on, and, so that appearances are maintained in the old style of formal grandeur, the sovereign and his counsellors dream neither of expedition, conquest, or any other political object.

The court of Porto Ferrajo was the reverse of all this. Indeed, the whole place was, in one sense, deserving of the name of *Cosmopoli*, which Napoleon wished to impose on it. It was like the court of a great barrack, filled with military, gendarmes, police officers of all sorts, refugees of every nation, expectants and dependents upon the court, domestics and adventurers, all connected with Bonaparte, and holding or expecting some benefit at his hand. Rumours of every kind were buzzed about through this miscellaneous crowd, as thick as notes in sunshine. Suspicious characters appeared, and disappeared again, without affording any trace of their journey or object. The port was filled with ships from all parts of Italy. This indeed was necessary to supply the island with provisions, when crowded with such an unusual degree of population; and, besides, vessels of all nations visited Porto Ferrajo, from the various motives of curiosity or speculation, or being compelled by contrary winds. The four armed vessels of Napoleon, and seventeen belonging to the service of the miners, were con-

stantly engaged in voyages to every part of Italy, and brought over, or returned to the Continent, Italians, Sicilians, Frenchmen, and Greeks, who seemed all active, yet gave no reason for their coming or departure. Dominico Etori, a monk who had escaped from his convent, and one Theologos, a Greek, were considered as agents of some consequence among this group.

The situation of Sir Niel Campbell was now very embarrassing. Napoleon, affecting to be more tenacious than ever of his dignity, not only excluded the British envoy from his own presence, but even threw obstacles in the way of his visiting his mother and sister. It was, therefore, only from interviews with Napoleon himself that he could hope to get any information, and to obtain these Sir Niel was, as already noticed, obliged to absent himself from the island of Elba occasionally, which gave him an opportunity of desiring an audience, as he went away and returned. At such times as he remained on the island, he was discountedenanced, and all attention withdrawn from him; but in a way so artful, as to render it impossible for him to make a formal complaint, especially as he had no avowed official character, and was something in the situation of a guest, whose uninvited intrusion has placed him at his landlord's mercy.

Symptoms of some approaching catastrophe could not, however, be concealed from the British resident. Napoleon had interviews with his mother, after which she appeared deeply distressed. Sir was heard also to talk of three deputations which he had received from France. It was besides accounted a circumstance of strong suspicion, that discharges and furloughs were granted to two or three hundred of Napoleon's Old Guard, by the medium of whom, as was too late discovered, the allegiance of the military in France was corrupted and seduced, and their minds prepared for what was to ensue. We cannot suppose that such a number of persons were positively intrusted with the secret; but every one of them was prepared to sound forth the praises of the emperor in his exile, and all entertained and disseminated the persuasion, that he would soon appear to reclaim his rights.

At length Mariotti, the French consul at Leghorn, and Spannoki, the Tuscan governor of that town, informed Sir Niel Campbell that it was certainly determined at Elba, that Bonaparte, with his guards, should embark for the Continent. Sir Niel was at Leghorn when he received this intelligence, and had left the Partridge sloop of war to cruise round Elba. It was naturally concluded that Italy was the object of Napoleon, to join with his brother-in-law Murat, who was at that time, fatally for himself, raising his banner.

On the 25th of February, the Partridge having come to Leghorn, and fetched off Sir Niel Campbell, the appearance, as the vessel approached Porto Ferrajo on her return, of the national guard on the batteries, instead of the crested grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, at once apprised the British resident of what had happened. When he landed, he found the mother and sister of Bonaparte in a well-assumed agony of anxiety about the fate of their emperor, of whom they affected to know no-

thing, except that he had steered towards the coast of Barbary. They appeared extremely desirous to detain Sir Niel Campbell on shore. Resisting their entreaties, and repelling the more pressing arguments of the governor, who seemed somewhat disposed to use force to prevent him from re-embarking, the British envoy regained his vessel, and set sail in pursuit of the adventurer. But it was too late; the Partridge only attained a distant sight of the flotilla, after Bonaparte and his forces had landed.

The changes which had taken place in France, and had encouraged the present most daring action, form the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER CI.

Retrospect.—Restoration of the Bourbons displeasing to the soldiery, but satisfactory to the people.—Terms favourable to France granted by the allies.—Discontents about the manner of conceding the charter.—Other grounds of dissatisfaction.—Apprehensions lest the church and crown lands should be resumed.—Resuscitation of the jacobin faction.—Increased dissatisfactions in the army.—The claims of the emigrants mooted in the Chamber of Delegates.—Marshal Macdonald's proposal.—Financial difficulties.—Restrictions on the press.—Reflections on this subject.

WE must now look back to the re-establishment of the Bourbons upon the throne in 1814, an event which took place under circumstances so uncommon as to excite extravagant expectations of national felicity; expectations which, like a premature and profuse display of blossom, diminished the chance of the fruit ripening, and exasperated the disappointment of over sanguine hopes. For a certain time all had been gay and rose-coloured. The French possess more than other nations the art of enjoying the present, without looking back with regret on the past, or forward to the future with unfavourable anticipations. Louis XVIII., respectable for his literary acquirements, and the practice of domestic virtues, amiable also from a mixture of *bonhomie*, and a talent for saying witty things, was received in the capital of his kingdom with acclamations, in which the soldiers alone did not cordially join. They indeed appeared with gloomy, sullen, and discontented looks. The late Imperial, now Royal Guard, seemed, from the dark ferocity of their aspect, to consider themselves rather as the captives who were led in triumph, than the soldiers who partook of it.

But the higher and middling classes in general, excepting those who were direct losers by the dethronement of Napoleon, hailed with sincere satisfaction the prospect of peace, tranquillity, and freedom from vexatious exactions. If they had not, as they could hardly be supposed to have, any personal zeal for the representatives of a family so long strangers to France, it was fondly hoped the absence of this might be supplied by the unwonted prospect of ease and security which their accession promised. The allied monarchs, on their part, did everything to favour the Bourbon family, and relaxed most of the harsh and unpalatable conditions which they had annexed to their proposed treaty with Bona-

parte; as if to allow the legitimate heir the credit with his people, of having at once saved their honour, and obtained for them the most advantageous terms.

The French readily caught at these indulgences, and, with the aptitude they possess of accommodating their feelings to the moment, for a time seemed to intimate that they were sensible of the full advantage of the change, and were desirous to make as much of it as they possibly could. There is a story of a French soldier in former times, who, having insulted his general in a fit of intoxication, was brought before him next morning, and interrogated, whether he was the person who had committed the offence. The accused replied *he* was not, for that the impudent rascal had gone away before four in the morning,—at which hour the culprit had awaked in a state of sobriety. The French people, like the arch rogue in question, drew distinctions between their present and former selves, and seemed very willing to deny their identity. They were no longer they said, either the republican French, who had committed so many atrocities in their own country, or the imperial French, who had made such devastation in other nations; and God forbid that the sins of either should be visited upon the present regenerate race of royalist Frenchmen, loyal to their native princes, and faithful to their allies, who desired only to enjoy peace abroad and tranquillity at home.

These professions, which were probably serious for the time, backed by the natural anxiety of the monarch to make, through his interest with the allied powers, the best terms he could for his country, were received as current without strict examination. It seemed that Bonaparte, on his retirement to Elba, had carried away with him all the offences of the French people, like the scape-goat, which the Levitical law directed to be driven into the Wilderness, loaded with the sins of the children of Israel. There was, in all the proceedings of the allied powers, not only moderation, but a studied delicacy, observed towards the feelings of the French, which almost savoured of romantic generosity. They seemed as desirous to disguise their conquest, as the Parisians were to conceal their defeat. The treasures of art, those spoils of foreign countries which justice loudly demanded should be restored to their true owners, were confirmed to the French nation, in order to gratify the vanity of the metropolis. By a boon yet more fatal, announced to the public in one of those moments of romantic, and more than questionable generosity, which we have alluded to, the whole French prisoners of war in the mass, and without inquiry concerning their principles, or the part they were likely to take in future internal divisions, were at once restored to the bosom of their country. This was in fact treating the French nation as a heedless nurse does a spoiled child, when she puts into its hands the knife which it cries for. The fatal consequences of this improvident indulgence appeared early in the subsequent year.

The Senate of Napoleon, when they called the Bourbons to the throne, had not done so without making stipulations on the part of the nation, and also upon their own. For the first purpose they

framed a decree, under which they "called to the throne Louis Stanislas Xavier, brother of the last king," but upon condition of his accepting a constitution of their framing. This assumed right of dictating a constitution, and naming a king for the nation, was accompanied by another provision, declaring the Senate hereditary, and confirming to themselves, and their heirs for ever, the rank, honours, and emoluments, which in Napoleon's time they only enjoyed for life.

The king refused to acknowledge the right of the Senate, either to dictate the terms on which he should ascend a throne, his own by hereditary descent, and to which he had never forfeited his claim; or to engross, as their own exclusive property, the endowments provided to their order by Bonaparte. He, therefore, assumed the crown as the lineal and true representative of him by whom it was last worn; and issued his own constitutional charter as a concession which the spirit of the times demanded, and which he had himself no desire to withhold.

The objections to this mode of proceeding were, practically speaking, of no consequence. It signified nothing to the people of France, whether the constitution was proposed to the king by the national representatives, or by the king to them, so that it contained, in an irrevocable form, a full ratification of the national liberties. But for the king to have acknowledged himself the creature of the Senate's election, would have been at once to recognize every ephemeral tyranny, which had started up and fretted its part on the revolutionary stage; and to have sanctioned all subsequent attempts at innovation, since they who make kings and authorities must have the inherent right to dethrone and annul them. It should not be forgotten how the British nation acted on the great occasions of the Restoration and Revolution; recognizing, at either crisis, the right of blood to succeed to the crown, whether vacant by the murder of Charles I., or the abdication of James II. In principle, too, it may be observed, that in all modern European nations, the king is nominally the source both of law and justice; and that statutes are promulgated, and sentences executed in his name, without inferring that he has the despotic right either to make the one, or to alter the other. Although, therefore, the constitution of France emanated in the usual form of a royal charter, the king was no more empowered to recal or innovate its provisions, than King John to abrogate those of the English Magna Charta. Monsieur, the king's brother, had promised in his name, upon his solemn entrance to Paris, that Louis would recognize the basis of the constitution prepared by the Senate. This pledge was fully redeemed by the charter, and wise men would have been more anxious to secure the benefits which it bestowed, than scrupulously to cavil on the mode in which they had been conferred.

In fact, Louis had adopted not only the form most consonant to ancient usage, but that which he thought most likely to satisfy both the royalists and the revolutionary party. He ascended the throne as his natural right; and, having done so, he willingly granted to the people, in an irrevocable form,

the substantial principles of a free constitution. But both parties were rather displeased at what they considered as lost, than gratified at what they gained by this arrangement. The royalists regarded the constitution, with its concessions, as a voluntary abandonment of the royal prerogative, while the revolutionary party exclaimed, that the receiving the charter from the king as an act of his will, was in itself a badge of servitude; and that the same royal prerogative which had granted these privileges might, if recognized, be supposed to reserve the power of diminishing or resuming them at pleasure. And thus it is, that folly, party-spirit, pride, and passion, can misrepresent the best measures, and so far poison the public mind, that the very granting the object of their desires shall be made the subject of new complaints.

The formation of the ministry gave rise to more serious grounds of apprehension and censure. The various offices of administration were, upon the restoration, left in possession of persons selected from those who had been named by the Provisional Government. All the members of the Provisional State Council were called to be royal ministers of the state. Many of these, though possessed of reputed talents, were men hackneyed in the changes of the Revolution; and were not, and could not be, intrusted with the king's confidence beyond the bounds of the province which each administered.

Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs, whose talents and experience might have given him claim to the situation of prime minister, was unpopular from his political versatility; and it was judged, after a time, most expedient to send him to the congress at Vienna, that his diplomatic skill might be employed in arranging the exterior relations of France with the other powers of Europe. Yet the absence of this consummate statesman was of great prejudice to the king's affairs. His having preserved life, distinction, and frequently power, during so many revolutionary changes, proved, according to the phrase of the old Earl of Pembroke, that he was born of the willow, not of the oak. But it was the opinion of the wisest men in France, that it was not fair, considering the times in which he lived, to speak of his attachment to, or defection from individuals, but to consider the general conduct and maxims which he recommended relative to the interests of France. It has been truly said, that, after the first errors and ebullitions of republican zeal, if he were measured by this standard, he must be judged favourably. The councils which he gave to Napoleon were all calculated, it was said, for the good of the nation, and so were the measures which he recommended to the king. Much of this is really true; yet, when we think of the political consistency of the Prince of Beneventum, we cannot help recollecting the personal virtue of a female follower of the camp, which consisted in strict fidelity to the grenadier company.

Dupont was promoted to the situation of minister at war, owing, perhaps, to the persecution he had undergone from Bonaparte, in consequence of his surrender at Baylen to the Spaniards. - Soult was afterwards called to this important office; how recommended, it would be vain to inquire. When

Napoleon heard of his appointment from the English resident, he observed, that it would be a wise and good one, if no *patriotic* party should show itself in France; but if such should arise, he intimated plainly that there would be no room for the Bourbons to rest faith upon Soult's adherence to their cause; and so it proved.

To add still farther to the inconveniences of this state of administration, Louis XVIII. had a favourite, although he had no prime minister. Count Blacas d'Aulps, minister of the household, an ancient and confidential attendant of the royal person during his exile, was understood to be the channel through which the king's wishes were communicated to the other ministers; and his protection was supposed to afford the surest access to the favours of the crown.

Without doing his master the service of a premier, or holding either the power or the responsibility of that high situation, De Blacas had the full share of odium usually attached to it. The royalists, who pressed on him for grants which were in the departments of other ministers, resented his declining to interfere in their favour, as if, having satisfied his own ambition, he had become indifferent to the interest of those with whom he had been a joint sufferer during the emigration. The opposite party, on the other hand, represented Count Blacas as an absolute minister, an emigrant himself, and the patron of emigrants; a royalist of the highest class, and an enemy, of course, to all the constitutional stipulations in favour of liberty. Thus far it is certain, that the unpopularity of Monsieur de Blacas, with all ranks and parties in the state, had the worst possible influence on the king's affairs, and as his credit was ascribed to a blind as well as an obstinate attachment on the part of Louis, the monarch was of course involved in the unpopularity of the minister of the household.

The terms of the peace, as we have already hinted, had been studiously calculated to recommend it to the feelings of the French people. France was, indeed, stripped of that extended sway which rendered her dangerous to the independence of other European nations, and reduced, generally speaking, to the boundaries which she occupied on the 1st of January, 1792. Still the bargain was not harshly driven. Several small additions were left with her on the side of Germany and the Netherlands, and on that of Savoy she had the considerable towns of Chambéry, Annecy, Avignon, with the Comtat-Venaissin and Montebelliard, included in her territories. But these concessions availed little; and, looking upon what they had lost, many of the French people, after the recollections had subsided of their escape from a dreadful war, were naturally, however unreasonably, disposed to murmur against the reduction of their territories, and to insist that Belgium, at least, should have remained with them. This opinion was encouraged and pressed by the Bonapartists, who considered the cession of that country with the more evil eye, because it was understood to have been a point urged by England.

Yet if England played a proud, it was also a generous part. She had nothing to stipulate, nothing of which to demand restitution, for she had sustained

no territorial loss during the whole period of hostilities. The war, which had nearly ruined most other nations, had put Britain in possession of all the colonies of France, and left the latter country neither a ship nor a port in the East or West Indies; and, to sum the whole, it was not in the power of united Europe to take from England by force any one of the conquests which she had thus made. The question, therefore, only was, what Britain was voluntarily to cede to an enemy who could give her no equivalent, excepting the pledge to adopt better principles, and to act no longer as the disturber of Europe. The cessions were such in number and amount, as to show that England was far above the mean and selfish purpose of seeking a colonial monopoly, or desiring to destroy the possibility of commercial rivalry. All was restored to France, excepting only Tobago and the Mauritius.

These sacrifices, made in the spirit of peace and moderation, were not made in vain. They secured to Britain the gratitude and respect of other states, and, giving to her councils that character of justice and impartiality which constitutes the best national strength, they placed her in a situation of more influence and eminence in the civilized world, than the uncontrolled possession of all the cotton-fields and sugar islands of the east and west could ever have raised her to. Still, with respect to France in particular, the peace was not recommended by the eminence to which it had raised England. The rivalry, so long termed national, and which had been so carefully fostered by every state paper or political statement which Bonaparte had permitted to be published, rankled even in generous and honourable minds; and so prejudiced are the views of passion, that by mistaking each other's national feelings, there were many Frenchmen induced to believe that the superiority attained by Great Britain was to a certain degree an insult and degradation to France.

Everything, indeed, which ought to have soothed and gratified the French people, was at last, by irritated feelings and artful misrepresentation, converted into a subject of complaint and grievance.

The government of Napoleon had been as completely despotic as it could be rendered in a civilized country like France, where public opinion forbade its being carried to barbaric extreme. On the contrary, in the charter, France was endowed with most of the elementary principles of a free and liberal constitution. The king had adopted, in all points of a general and national tendency, the principles proposed in the rejected constitutional act of the Senate.

The Chamber of Peers and Chamber of Deputies were the titles applied to the aristocratical and popular branches of the constitution, instead of the Senate and Legislative Body. Their public duties were divided something like those of the Houses of Peers and Commons in England. The independence of the judicial order was recognized, and the military were confirmed in their rank and revenues. The Chamber of Peers was to be nominated by the king, with power to his majesty to create its members for life, or hereditary, at his pleasure. The income of the suppressed Senate was resumed, and vested in the crown, excepting confiscated property,

which was restored to the lawful owners. The catholic religion was declared to be that of the state, but all other christian sects were to be protected. The king's authority was recognized as head of the army, and the power of making peace and war was vested in him exclusively. The liberty of the press was established, but under certain restraints. The conscription was abolished—the responsibility of ministers recognized; and it may be said, in general, that a constitution was traced out, good so far as it went, and susceptible of receiving the farther improvements which time and experience might recommend. The charter was presented to the Legislative Body by the king in person, with a speech, which announced that the principles which it recognized were such as had been adopted in the will of his unfortunate brother, Louis XVI.

Yet though this charter contained a free surrender of great part of the royal rights which the old race of Bourbons had enjoyed, as well as of all the arbitrary power which Napoleon had usurped, we have seen that it was unacceptable to an active and influential party in the state, who disdained to accept security for property and freedom under the ancient forms of a feudal charter, and contended that it ought to have emanated directly from the will of the sovereign people. We have no hesitation in saying, that this was as reasonable as the conduct of a spoiled child, who refuses what is *given* to him, because he is not suffered to *take* it; or the wisdom of a hungry man, who should quarrel with his dinner, because he does not admire the shape of the dish in which it is served up.

This is the common-sense view of the subject. If the constitution contained the necessary guarantees of political freedom, and security of life and property; if it was to be looked to as the permanent settlement and bulwark of the liberties of France, and considered as a final and decided arrangement, liable indeed to be improved by the joint consent of the sovereign, and the legal representatives of the subject, but not to be destroyed by any or all of these authorities, it was a matter of utter unimportance, whether the system was constructed in the form of a charter granted by the king, or that of conditions dictated to him by the subject. But if there was to be a retrospect to the ephemeral existence of all the French constitutions hitherto, excepting that under which Bonaparte had enthralled the people, then perhaps the question might be entertained, whether the feudal or the revolutionary form was most likely to be innovated; or, in other words, whether the conditions attached to the plan of government now adopted were most likely to be innovated upon by the king, or by the body who represented the people.

Assuming the fatal doctrine, that the party in whose name the conditions of the constitution are expressed, is entitled to suspend, alter, or recal them, sound policy dictated that the apparent power of granting should be ascribed to the party least able and willing to recal or innovate upon the grant which he had made. In this view of the case, it might be reckoned upon that the king, unsupported unless by the royalists, who were few in number, unpopular from circumstances, and for the present divested, excepting nominally, of the great instru-

ment of achieving despotic power, the undisputed command, namely, of the army, would be naturally unwilling to risk the continuance of his authority by any attempt to innovate upon those conditions, which he had by his own charter assured to the people. On the contrary, conditions formed and decreed by the Senate of Bonaparte might, on the popular party's resuming the ascendancy, be altered or recalled by the Chambers with the same levity and fickleness which the people of France, or at least those acting as their representatives, had so often displayed. To give permanence to the constitution, therefore, it was best it should emanate from the party most interested in preserving it, and least able to infringe it; and that undoubtedly, as France stood at the time, was the sovereign. In Great Britain, the constitution is accounted more secure, because the king is the source of law, of honour, and of all ministerial and executive power: whilst he is responsible to the nation through his ministers, for the manner in which that power is exercised. An arrangement of a different kind would expose the branches of the legislature to a discordant struggle, which ought never to be contemplated as possible.

The zealous liberalists of France were induced, however, to mutiny against the name under which their free constitution was assigned them, and to call back Bonaparte, who had abolished the very semblance of freedom, rather than to accept, at the hands of a peaceful monarch, the degree of liberty which they themselves had acquired. The advantages which they gained will appear in the sequel.

Thus setting out with varying and contradictory opinions of the nature and origin of the new constitution, the parties in the state regarded it rather as a fortress to be attacked and defended, than as a temple in which all men were called to worship.

The French of this period might be divided into three distinct and active parties—royalists; liberals of every shade, down to republicans; and Bonapartists. And it becomes our duty to say a few words concerning each of these.

The ROYALISTS, while they added little real strength to the king by their numbers, attracted much jealous observation from their high birth and equally high pretensions; embroiled his affairs by their imprudent zeal; embittered his peace by their just and natural complaints; and drew suspicion on his government at every effort which he made to serve and relieve them. They consisted chiefly of the emigrant nobles and clergy.

The former class were greatly reduced in number by war and exile; inasmuch, that to the House of Peers, consisting of one hundred and seventy and upwards, the ancient nobles of France supplied only thirty. The rest were the fortunate marshals and generals, whom the wars of the Revolution had raised to rank and wealth; and the statesmen, many of whom had attained the same station by less honourable means of elevation. The old noblesse, after their youth had been exhausted, their fortunes destroyed, and their spirits broken, while following through foreign countries the adverse fortunes of the exiled Bourbons, beheld the restoration, indeed, of the monarchy, but were themselves recalled to

France only to see their estates occupied, and their hereditary offices around the person of the monarch filled, by the fortunate children of the Revolution. Like the disappointed English cavaliers, they might well complain that though none had wished more earnestly for the return of the legitimate prince, yet none had shared so little in the benefits attending it. By a natural, and yet a perverse mode of reasoning, the very injuries which the nobility had sustained, rendered them the objects of suspicion to the other ranks and parties of the state. They had been the companions of the king's exile, were connected with him by the ties of friendship, and had near access to his person by the right of blood. Could it be in nature, it was asked, that Louis could see their sufferings without attempting to relieve them; and how could he do so in the present state of France, unless at the expense of those who occupied or aspired to civil and military preferment, or of those who had acquired during the Revolution the national domains which those nobles once possessed? Yet the alarm was founded rather on suspicion than on facts. Of the preferment of emigrants in the army, we shall speak hereafter; but in the civil departments of the state, few of the old noblesse obtained office. To take a single example, in the course of eleven months there were thirty-seven prefects nominated to the departments, and the list did not comprehend a single one of those emigrants who returned to France with Louis; and but very few of those whose exile had terminated more early. The nobles felt this exclusion from royal favour, and expressed their complaints, which some, yet more imprudently, mingled with threatening hints, that their day of triumph might yet arrive. This language, as well as the air of exclusive dignity and distance which they affected, as if, the distinction of their birth being all that they had left to them, they were determined to enforce the most punctilious deference to that, was carefully remarked and recorded against the king.

The noblesse were supposed to receive particular encouragement from the princes of the blood, while, upon the whole, they were rather discouraged than brought forward or distinguished by Louis, who, as many of them spared not to say, was disposed to act upon the ungenerous maxim of courting his enemies, and neglecting those who could not upon principle become anything save his friends. They did not, perhaps, make sufficient allowance for the great difficulties which the king incurred in governing France at so critical a period.

The state of the clergy is next to be considered. They were, generally speaking, sincerely attached to the king; and had they been in possession of their revenues, and of their natural influence upon the public mind, their attachment would have been of the utmost consequence. But without this influence, and without the wealth, or at least the independence, on which it partly rests, they were as useless, politically speaking, as a key which does not fit the lock to which it is applied. This state of things, unfortunate in many respects, flowed from a maxim adopted during the Revolution, and followed by Bonaparte, who had his reasons for fearing the influence of the clergy. "We will not put down

the ecclesiastical establishment by force; we will starve it to death." Accordingly, all grants and bequests to the church had been limited and qualified by so many conditions and restrictions, as to intercept that mode of acquisition so fruitful in a catholic country; while, on the other hand, the salary allowed by the state to each officiating curate was only five hundred livres (£26 16s. 8d.) yearly. No doubt each community were permitted to subscribe what they pleased in addition to this miserable pittance; but in France, when the number of those who care for no religion at all, and of those whose zeal will not lead them the length of paying for it, is deducted, the remainder will afford but a small list of subscribers. The consequence was, that at the period of the restoration, many parishes were, and had been for years, without any public worship. Ignorance had increased in an incalculable degree. "We are informed," was the communication from Bonaparte to one of his prefects, "that dangerous books are distributed in your department."—"Were the roads sown with them," was the answer returned by the prefect, "your majesty need not fear their influence; we have not a man who would or could read them."—When we add to this the relaxed state of public morals, the pains taken in the beginning of the Revolution to eradicate the sentiments of religion, and render its professors ridiculous, and the prevalence of the military character, so conspicuous through France, and so unfavourable to devotion; and when it is further remembered that all the wealth of the church had fallen into the hands of the laity, which were fast clenched to retain it, and trembling at the same time lest it should be wrested from them,—the reader may, from all these causes, form some notion of the low ebb of religion and of the church in France.

The disposition of the king and royal family to restore the formal observances of the Romish church, as well as to provide the suitable means of educating in future those designed for the ministry, and other religious institutions, excited among the Parisians a feeling of hatred and contempt. It must be owned, also, that though the abstract motive was excellent, there was little wisdom in attempting to bring back the nation to all those mummeries of popish ceremonial, which, long before the Revolution, only subsisted through inveterate custom, having lost all influence on the public mind.

This general feeling was increased by particular events. Alarming tumults took place, on the subject of enforcing a rule unworthy of christianity and civilization, by which theatrical performers are declared in a constant state of excommunication. The rites of sepulture being refused to Mademoiselle Raucour, an actress, but a person of decent character and morals, occasioned a species of insurrection, which compelled from the government an order for interring her with the usual forms.

The enforcing of the more regular observation of the Sabbath, an order warranted alike by religion and good morals, gave also great offence to the inhabitants of the capital. The solemn obsequies performed for the death of Louis XVI. and his un-

fortunate queen, when their remains were transferred from their hasty grave to the royal mausoleum at Saint-Denis,—a fraternal action, and connected with the forms of the catholic church,—was also construed to the king's prejudice, as if, by the honour paid to these poor relics, he had intended to mark his hatred of the Revolution, and his recollection of the injuries he had sustained from it. Some honours and attention bestowed on the few surviving chiefs of La Vendée were equally the subject of misrepresentation. In short, whatever Louis XVIII. did, which had the least appearance of gratifying those who had lost all for his sake, was accounted an act of treason against freedom and the principles of the Revolution.

None of the circumstances we have noticed had, however, so much effect upon the public feeling as the fear which prevailed, that Louis, in his veneration for religion and its members, might be led to form some scheme of resuming the church lands, which, having been confiscated by the decrees of the National Assembly, were now occupied by a host of proprietors, who watched, with vigilant jealousy, incipient measures, which they feared might end in resumption of their property. Imprudent priests added to this distrust and jealousy, by denunciations against those who held church lands, and by refusing to grant them absolution unless they made restitution or compensation for them. This distrust spread far wider than among the actual proprietors of national domains. For if these were threatened with resumption of the property they had acquired under authority of the existing government for the time, it was most probable, that the divine right of the clergy to a tithe of the produce of the earth might next have been brought forward,—a claim involving the interest of every landholder and farmer in France to a degree almost incalculable.

It is plain, from what we have stated, that the royalist party, whether lay or clerical, were so little in a condition to be effectually serviceable to the king in the event of a struggle, that, while their adherence and their sufferings claimed his attachment and gratitude, every mark which he afforded them of those feelings was calculated to render his government suspected and unpopular.

Whilst the royalists rather sapped and encumbered than supported the throne to which they adhered, their errors were carefully pointed out, circulated, and exaggerated, by the jacobin, or, as they called themselves, the PATRIOTIC PARTY. This faction, small in numbers, but formidable from their audacity, their union, and the dreadful recollection of their former power and principles, consisted of ex-generals, whose laurels had faded with the republic; ex-ministers and functionaries, whose appointments and influence had not survived the downfall of the Directory; men of letters, who hoped again to rule the state by means of proclamations and journals; and philosophers, to whose vanity or enthusiasm abstract principles of unattainable liberty, and undesirable equality, were dearer than all the oceans of blood, and extent of guilt and misery, which they had already cost, and were likely again to

occasion. It cannot be denied, that, in the discussion of the original rights of humanity, and constitutions of society, several of this party showed distinguished talent, and that their labours were calculated to keep up a general love of liberty, and to promote inquiry into the principles upon which it is founded. Unfortunately, however, their theoretical labours in framing constitutions diverted their attention from the essential points of government, to its mere external form, and led them, for example, to prefer a republic, where every species of violence was practised by the little dictator of the day, to a limited monarchy, under which life, person, and property, were protected. The chiefs of this party were men of that presumptuous and undoubting class, who, after having failed repeatedly in political experiments, were as ready as ever again to undertake them, with the same unhesitating and self-deceptive confidence of success. They were never satisfied even with what they themselves had done; for as there is no end of aiming at an ideal perfection in any human establishment, they proceeded with alterations on their own work, as if what Butler says of religion had been true in politics, and that a form of government

was intended

For nothing else but to be mended.

Danger did not appal the sages of this school. Many of them had been familiar with, and hardened to the perils of the most desperate revolutionary intrigues, by their familiar acquaintance with the springs which set each in motion, and were ready to recommence their desperate labours with as little forethought, as belongs to the labourers in a powder-mill, which has exploded ten times during their remembrance, and destroyed the greater number of their comrades. In the character of these self-entitled philosophers and busy agitators, vanity as well as egotism were leading principles. The one quality persuaded them, that they might be able, by dint of management, to avert danger from themselves; and the other rendered them indifferent respecting the safety of others.

During the government of Bonaparte, this jacobinical party was repressed by a strong hand. He knew, by experience of every sort, their restless, intriguing, and dangerous disposition. They also knew and feared his strength, and his unscrupulous use of it. The return of the Bourbons called them into life, like the sun which thaws the frozen adder; but it was only to show how they hated the beams which revived them. The Bourbon dynasty, with all the remembrances it combined, seemed to this faction the very opposite to their favourite revolution; and they studied with malignant assiduity the degree of liberty afforded by the national charter, not in order to defend or to enjoy it, but to discover how it might be made the vantage-ground for overthrowing both the throne and the constitution.

Carnot and Fouché, formidable names, and revolutionists from their youth upward, were the ostensible leaders of this active party, and most of the surviving revolutionists rallied under their standards. These agitators had preserved some influence over the lees of the people, and were sure to find the

means of augmenting it in the moment of popular commotion. The rabble of a great town is democratical and revolutionary by nature; for their vanity is captivated with such phrases as the sovereignty of the people, their sense of poverty and licentious fury tempted by occasion for uproar, and they regard the restraints of laws and good order as their constant and natural enemies. It is upon this envenomed and corrupted mass of evil passions that the experimental philosophers of the Revolution have always exercised their chemical skill. Of late, however, the intercourse between the philosophers of the Revolution and this class of apt and docile scholars had been considerably interrupted. Bonaparte, as we have hinted, restrained with a strong hand the teachers of the revolutionary school; while, by the eclat of his victories, his largesses, and his expensive undertakings, in which many workmen were employed, he debarred from them great part of their popular disciples, who may be said, with the inconsequence and mutability belonging to their habits, principles, and temper, to have turned imperialists, without losing their natural aptitude to become jacobins again on the next tempting opportunity.

The party of imperialists, or BONAPARTISTS, if we lay the army out of view, was small and unimportant. The public functionaries, whom the king had displaced from the situations of emolument which they held under the emperor,—courtiers, prefects, commissioners, clerks, and commissaries,—whose present means and future hopes were cut off, were of course disobliged and discontented men, who looked with a languishing eye towards the island of Elba. The immediate family connexions, favourites, and ministers of the late emperor, confident in the wealth which most of them had acquired, and resenting the insignificance to which they were reduced by the restoration of the Bourbons, lent to this party the activity which money, and the habit of political intrigue, can at all times communicate. But the real and tremendous strength of the Bonapartists lay in the attachment of the existing army to its abdicated general. This was the more formidable, as the circumstances of the times, and the prevailing military character of the French nation, had raised the soldiers from their proper and natural character of servants of the state, into a distinct deliberative body, having interests of their own, which were in their nature incompatible with those of the commonwealth; since the very profession of arms implies an aptitude to a state of war, which, to all other ranks in the state, the army itself excepted, may indeed be a necessary and unavoidable evil, but never can be a real advantage.

The king could not be accused of neglecting to cultivate the affections, soothe the prejudices, and gratify the wishes of the army. The fact is, that the unprecedented difficulties of his situation forced him to study how to manage by flattery, and by the most imprudent indulgences and favours, the only part of his subjects, who, according to the rules of all well-governed states, ought to be subjected to absolute authority. Every effort was made to gratify the feelings of the troops, and the utmost exertions were made to remount, re-establish, and re-clothe

them. Their ranks were augmented by upwards of 150,000 prisoners of war, whose minds were in general actuated by the desire of avenging the dishonour and hardships of their defeat and captivity, and whose presence greatly increased the discontent as well as the strength of the French army.

While the king cultivated the affections of the common soldiers with very imperfect success, he was more fortunate in attaching to himself the marshals, whom he treated with the utmost respect and kindness. They were gratified by his attentions, and, having most of them some recent reason to complain of Napoleon, it is possible that, had they possessed absolute, or even very extensive interest with the army, that disturbance in the state of the nation which ensued could not possibly have taken place. But while Napoleon had preserved towards the marshals the distance at which a sovereign keeps subjects, he was often familiar with the inferior officers and soldiers, and took care to keep himself in their eye, and occupy their attention personally. He desired that his generals should resemble the hilt of the sword, which may be changed at pleasure, while the army was the blade itself, and retained the same temper notwithstanding such partial alteration. Thus, the direct and personal interest of the emperor superseded, in the soldier's bosom, all attachment to his lieutenants.

It would be wasting time to show reasons, why the French army should have been attached to Napoleon. They could not be supposed to forget the long career of success which they had pursued under his banner, the pensions granted in foreign countries which were now retrenched, and the licensed plunder of their emperor's unceasing campaigns. At present, they conceived the king proposed to reduce their numbers so soon as he could with safety, and imagined their very existence was about to be at stake.

Nor was it only the selfish interests of the army which rendered them discontented. The sense of honour, as it was called, or rather the vanity of military ascendancy and national aggrandizement, had been inspired by Bonaparte into all classes of his subjects, though they were chiefly cherished by his companions in arms. According to their opinion, the glory of France had risen with Bonaparte, and sunk with him for ever; not, as they fondly contended, through the superior force of the enemy, but by the treachery of Marmont, and the other generals whom Napoleon trusted. This sentiment passed from the ranks of the soldiers into other classes of society, all of which are in France deeply susceptible of what is represented to them as national glory; and it was again echoed back to the soldiers from fields, from workshops, from manufactories. All began to agree, that they had received the Bourbons from the hands of foreign conquerors; and that the king's reign had only commenced, because France had been conquered, and Paris surrendered. They remembered that the allies had declared the restoration of the ancient family was combined with the restriction of France within the ancient limits; and that, accordingly, the first act of Monsieur, as lieutenant of the kingdom, had been to order the surrender of upwards of fifty fortresses beyond the

frontiers, which Bonaparte, it was supposed, would have rendered the means of reacquiring the conquests, of which fortune or treachery had for a time bereft him. The meanest follower of the camp affected to feel his share in the national disgrace of losing provinces, to which France had no title save that of military usurpation. The hope that the government would at least endeavour to reconquer Belgium, so convenient for France, and which, as they contended, fell within her natural boundaries, served for a time to combat these feelings; but when it was perceived plainly, that the government of France neither could nor would engage in external war, for this or any other object, the discontent of the army became universal, and they might be pronounced ripe for any desperate enterprise.

Among the soldiers, the late Imperial Guards were distinguished for their sullen enmity to the new order of things, and deemed themselves insulted at the guard of the king's person being committed to a body of household troops, selected as approved loyalists. The army were also much disgusted, that the decorations of the Legion of Honour had been distributed with a profusion, which seemed intended to diminish its value. But the course of promotion was the deepest source of discontent. The princes of the blood royal had been early declared colonels-general by the king; and the army soon discovered, or supposed they discovered, that under their auspices the superior ranks of the army were likely to be filled by the emigrant nobility, whose military service was considered as having been continued, while they were in attendance upon the king during his exile. The most indecent competition was thus excited between those whose claims were founded on their devoted attachment to the house of Bourbon, and those who had borne arms against that family, but still in the service of France. The truth is, that the derangement of the finances, and the jealousy of the ministers, each of whom claimed the exclusive patronage of his own department, left the king no means so ready for discharging his debts of gratitude, and affording the means of subsistence to his ancient friends and adherents, as by providing for them in the army. The measure, though perhaps unavoidable, was in many respects undesirable. Old men, past the age of service, or young men who had never known it, were, in virtue of these claims, placed in situations, to which the actual warriors conceived they had bought a title by their laurels and their scars. The appearance of the superannuated emigrants, who were thus promoted to situations ill-suited to age and infirmity, raised the ridicule and contempt of Bonaparte's soldiers, while the patrician haughtiness, and youthful presumption, of the younger nobles, excited their indignation. The agents and friends of Bonaparte suffered not these passions to cool. "There is a plot of the royalists against you," was incessantly repeated to the regiments, upon which these new officers were imposed. "The Bourbons cannot think themselves safe while those who shared the triumphs of Napoleon have either honour or existence. Your ranks are subjected to the command of dotards, who have never drawn a sword in battle,

or who have served only in the emigrant bands of Condé, or among the insurgent Chouans and Vendéens. What security have you against being disbanded on a day's notice? And if the obligations of the government to you bind them, as it would seem, so slightly, will you consider yours to them as of a stricter description?" Such insinuations, and such reasoning, inflamed the prejudices of the army; disaffection spread generally through their ranks, and, long before the bold attempt of Napoleon, his former soldiery were almost universally prepared to aid him in the recovery of his power.

The state of active political parties in France we have thus described; but, as is usual, the mass of the population were somewhat indifferent to their principles, unless in moments of excitation. Parties in a state are to the people at large what the winds are to the ocean. That which predominates for the time rolls the tide in its own direction; the next day it is hushed, and the waves are under a different influence. The people of France at large were averse to the republicans, or jacobins. They retained too awful an impression of the horrors of the tyranny exercised by these political fanatics, to regard them otherwise than with terror. They were as little Bonapartists; because they dreaded the restless temper of him who gave name to this faction, and saw that while he was at the head of the French government, the state of war must be perpetual. They could not be termed royalists, for they comprehended many with whom the name of Bourbon had lost its charms; and a very large proportion of the country had their fortune and prosperity so intimately connected with the Revolution, that they were not disposed to afford any countenance to the re-establishment of the monarchy on its ancient footing.

Upon the whole, this class of Frenchmen, who may be called moderates or constitutionalists, and who contained the great bulk of the men of property, substance, and education, hoped well of the king's government. His good sense, humanity, love of justice, moderation, and other valuable qualities, recommended him to their esteem, and they thought his restoration might be considered as the guarantee of a lasting peace with the other nations of Europe. But they dreaded and deprecated that counter-revolutionary *re-action*, as the established phrase was, which was regarded as the object of the princes of the blood, the nobility, and the clergy. The property of many of the constitutionalists was vested in national domains, and they watched with doubt and fear every step which the emigrant nobility and clergy seemed disposed to take for recovery of their former rights.

On this subject the moderate party were sensitively jealous, and the proceedings which took place in the Chamber of Deputies threw striking light on the state of the public mind. We must, therefore, turn the reader's attention in that direction.

A petty riot, concerning precedence, had arisen in a church called Durnac, between the seigneur of the parish and the mayor of the commune. The mayor brought the affair before the Chamber of Deputies by a violent petition, in which he gene-

realized his complaint against the whole body of emigrants, whom he accused of desiring to place themselves above the constituted authorities, and to treat France as a conquered country. The Chamber, 20th November, 1814, treated the language of the petition as calumnious, and the squabble as unworthy of their notice. But the debate called forth expressions which intimated a suspicion that there existed a dark and secret system, which tended to sow the seeds of discord and anarchy among the citizens, and to resuscitate pretensions incompatible with the laws. "It was," said the member who made this statement, "important to impress every class of Frenchmen with the great idea, that there was no safety for France, for the king, for every member of society, but in the maintenance of those constitutional principles on which were founded the laws for protecting the whole."

The claims of the emigrants for restoration of their forfeited property were, abstractedly, as just and indubitable as that of the king to the throne. But the political considerations in which they were involved rendered any general attempt to enforce those claims the certain signal of civil war; a civil war almost certain to end in a second expatriation, both of the royal family and their followers. In this dilemma, government seems to have looked anxiously for some means of compromise which might afford relief to the emigrants, without innovating on that article of the charter which ratified the sale of national domains. Monsieur Ferrand brought forward in the Chamber of Deputies, a motion for the restoration of such estates of emigrants as yet remained unsold. But this involved a question respecting the rights of the much more numerous class whose property had been seized upon by the state, and disposed of to third parties, to whom it was guaranteed by the charter. Since these gentlemen could not be restored *ex jure*, to their estates, as was proposed towards their more fortunate brethren, they had at least a title to the price which had been surrogated in place of their property, of which price the nation had still possession.

These proposals called forward Monsieur Durbach, who charged Ferrand with the fatal purpose of opening the door on the vast subject of national domains. "Already," continued the orator, "the two extremities of the kingdom have resounded with the words of the minister, as with the claps which precede the thunderbolt. The effect which they have produced has been so rapid and so general, that all civil transactions have been at once suspended. A general distrust and excessive fear have caused a stagnation, the effects of which even the royal treasury has felt. The proprietors of national property can no longer sell or mortgage their estates. They are suddenly reduced to poverty in the very bosom of wealth. Whence arises this calamity? The cause of it is the declaration of the minister, that the property they possess does not legally belong to them. For this is, in fact, the consequence of his assertion, that the law recognizes in the emigrants a right to property which always existed."

The celebrated Marshal Macdonald, a friend at once of monarchy and freedom, of France and the

Bourbons, undertook to bring forward a plan for satisfying the emigrants, as far as the condition of the nation permitted; and giving, at the same time, some indemnity for the pensions assigned by Bonaparte to his veteran soldiers, which, during his reign, had been paid from countries beyond the verge of France, until after the retreat from Moscow, when they ceased to be paid at all. The marshal's statement of the extent of the sale of the national domains shows how formidable the task of undoing that extensive transference of property must necessarily have been; the number of persons directly or indirectly interested in the question of their security, amounting to nine or ten millions. "Against this Colossus," continued the marshal, "whose height the eye cannot measure, some impotent efforts would affect to direct themselves; but the wisdom of the king has foreseen this danger, even for the sake of those imprudent persons who might have exposed themselves to it." He proceeded, in a very eloquent strain, to eulogize the conduct of the emigrants, to express respect for their persons, compassion for their misfortunes, honour for their fidelity, and proceeded to observe, that the existence of these old proprietors, as having claims on the estates which had been acquired by others, placed them in a situation which ought not to exist. He therefore proposed that the nation should satisfy the claims of these unfortunate gentlemen, if not in full, at least upon such terms of composition as had been applied to other national obligations. Upon this footing, he calculated that an annuity of twelve millions of livres yearly would pay off the claims of the various emigrants of all descriptions. He next drew a picture of the distressed veteran soldiers; pensioners of the state who had been reduced to distress by the discontinuance of their pensions, bought with their blood in a thousand battles. Three millions more of livres he computed as necessary to discharge this sacred obligation.

There was wisdom, manliness, and generosity in the plan of Marshal Macdonald; and, could it have been carried into decisive execution, it would have greatly appeased the fears and jealousies of the proprietors of national domains, and shown an impartiality betwixt the claims of the emigrants and those of the army, which ought to have conciliated both. Unhappily, funds were wanting, and the royal government, so far from being able to incur a new expense of sixteen millions yearly, was not in a condition to discharge the various demands upon them, without continuing the oppressive tax of *les droits réunis*.

It is, indeed, on the subject of finance and taxation, that almost all revolutions among civilized nations have been found to hinge; and there is scarce any judging how long actual oppression may be endured, so long as it spares the purse of individuals, or how early a heavy tax, even for the most necessary objects, will excite insurrection. Without the heavy taxation of the Spaniards, the Dutch would scarcely have rebelled against them; it was imposts which fired the blood of the Swiss against the Austrians; without the stamp-act the American revolution might have been long postponed; and but for

the disorder of the French finances, Louis XVI. need never have summoned together the National Assembly. France was now again agitated by one of those fever fits, which arise from the sensitiveness of the subject's pulse.

A report on the state of the public finances, by the Abbé de Montesquieu, had given a singular instance of Bonaparte's deceptive policy. Annual expositions of national receipt and expenditure had been periodically published since he assumed the reins of government, which were, to outward appearance, unchallengeably accurate; and, as they seemed to balance each other, afforded the fair prospect that the revenues of the state being realized, the expenses could not fall into arrear. But in reality, a number of extraordinary expenses were withheld from the view of the public, while, on the other hand, the produce of the taxes was overestimated. Thus the two budgets of 1812 and 1813, upon close examination, exhibited a deficit of upwards of three hundred and twelve millions of francs, or thirteen millions sterling. Bonaparte was not ignorant of this fact, but concealed it from the eyes of the nation, in hopes of replacing it, as in his more successful days, by foreign tribute, and, in the meantime, supplied himself by the anticipation of other funds; as an unfaithful book-keeper makes up a plausible balance to meet the eye of his master, and covers his peculations by his dexterity in the use of ciphers. Upon the whole, the debts of France appeared to have increased in the course of thirteen years to the extent of 1,645,469,000 francs, or more than sixty-eight millions and a half of sterling money.

These financial involvements accorded ill with the accomplishment of an unfortunate and hasty promise of Mon sieur, that the severe and pressing taxes called *les droits réunis* should be abolished, which had been made when he first entered France, and while, betwixt hope and despair, he essayed every inducement for the purpose of drawing adherents to the royal cause. On the other hand, the king, upon ascending the throne, had engaged himself, with perhaps too much latitude, to pay all the engagements which the state had contracted under the preceding government. To redeem both of these pledges was impossible, for without continuing this very obnoxious and oppressive tax, the crown could not have the means of discharging the national debt. A plan was in vain proposed by Jalabert to replace this oppressive excise by a duty on wines; the motion was referred to a committee of the Chamber of Deputies, but the substitution seems to have been found impossible. Louis naturally made the promise of his brother give way to his own more deliberate engagement. But it is not the less true, that by continuing to levy *les droits réunis*, many, not otherwise disinclined to the royal government than as it affected their purses, were enabled to charge the king with breach of faith towards his subjects, and would listen to no defence upon a topic on which few people are disposed to hear reason against their own interest.

There remained yet another subject of alarm and dread, to excite the minds not only of those who were desirous of revolution, or, according to the Roman phrase, *cupidi novarum rerum*; but of

others, who, devotedly attached to the welfare of France, desired to see her enjoy, under the sway of a legitimate monarch, the exercise of national liberty. They had the misfortune to see that liberty attacked in the point where it is most sensitive, namely, by imposing restraints upon the public press.

Bonaparte had made it part of his system to keep this powerful engine in his own iron hand, well aware that his system of despotism could not have subsisted for six months, if his actions had been exposed to the censure of the public, and his statements to contradiction and to argument. The Bourbons having unloosed the chain by which the liberty of the press was confined, the spirit of literary and political controversy rushed out with such demoniacal violence, as astonished and terrified those who had released it from confinement. The quantity of furious abuse poured out against the Bourbons might have authorized the authors to use the words of Caliban,—

You taught me language, and my profit on't
Is—I know how to curse.

Eager to repress the spirit which displayed itself so unequivocally, a motion was made on the 4th of July, 1814, for establishing a censorship upon pamphlets under a certain length, and placing all journals and newspapers under the direction of government.

This important subject was discussed with great manliness and talent in the assembly; but it is one of the many political maxims which the British receive as theorems, that, without absolute freedom of the public press (to be exercised always on the peril of such as misuse it), there can neither be enlightened patriotism nor liberal discussion; and that, although the forms of a free constitution may be preserved where this liberty is restricted, they will soon fail to have the necessary beneficial effects in protecting the rights of the community and the safety of individuals. The liberty of the press affords a channel through which the injured may challenge his oppressor at the bar of the nation; it is the means by which public men may, in case of misconduct, be arraigned before their own and succeeding ages; it is the only mode in which bold and undisguised truth can press its way into the cabinets of monarchs; and it is the privilege, by means of which he, who vainly lifts his voice against the corruptions or prejudices of his own time, may leave his counsels upon record as a legacy to impartial posterity. The cruelty which would deafen the ear and extinguish the sight of an individual, resembles, in some similar degree, his guilt, who, by restricting the freedom of the press, would reduce a nation to the deafness of prejudice and the blindness of ignorance. The downfall of this species of freedom, as it is the first symptom of the decay of national liberty, has been in all ages followed by its total destruction, and it may be justly pronounced that they cannot exist separately; or, as the elegiac poet has said of his hero and the country to which he belonged—

Ille tibi superesso negat; tu non potes illi.

We must own, at the same time, that as no good comes to us unmix'd with evil, the unlimited freedom of the press is attended with obvious inconve-

niences, which, when a nation is in a certain state of excitation, render the exercise of it peculiarly dangerous. This is especially the case when a people, as then in France, are suddenly released from a state of bondage, and disposed, "like youthful colts broke loose," to make the most extravagant use of their liberty. With minds unprepared for discussion; with that degree of political misinformation which has done this age more dire mischief than absolute ignorance itself could have effected; subject to be influenced by the dashing pamphleteer, who soothes their prevailing passions, as the orations of their popular demagogues soothed those of the Athenians,—it has been the opinion of many statesmen, that to withhold from such a nation the freedom of the press, is a measure justifiable alike by reason and necessity. We proportion, say these reasoners, liberty to the power of enjoying it. The considerate and the peaceful we suffer to walk at liberty, and armed, if their occasions require it; but we restrain the child, we withhold weapons from the ruffian, and we fetter the maniac. Why, therefore, they ask, should a nation, when in a state of fever, be supplied, without restriction, with the indulgences which must necessarily increase the disorder? Our answer is ready,—that, granting the abuse of the liberty of the press to exist in the most fearful latitude (and we need not look to France for examples), the advantages derived from it are so inestimable, that, to deprive us of them, would be as if an architect should shut up the windows which supply light and air to a mansion, because a certain proportion of cold, and perhaps of rain, may force their way in at the apertures. Besides, we acknowledge ourselves peculiarly jealous of the sentiments of the members of every government on this delicate subject. Their situation renders them doubtful friends to a privilege, through which alone they can be rendered amenable to the public for the abuse of their power, and through which also they often see their just and temperate exercise of authority maligned and misconstrued. To princes, also, the license of the press is, for many reasons, distasteful. To put it under regulation, seems easy and desirable, and the hardship on the community not greater (in their account), than the enforcing of decent respect and subordination,—of the sort of etiquette, in short, which is established in all courts, and which forbids the saying, under any pretext, what may be rude or disagreeable to a sovereign, or even unpleasing to be heard. Under these circumstances, and in the present state of France, men rather regretted than wondered that the ministers of Louis XVIII. were disposed to place restrictions on the freedom of the press, or that they effected their purpose of placing the light of nations under a censorial hand.

But the victory thus obtained brought additional evils on the government. The law was evaded under various devices; the works which it was intended to intercept, acquired circulation and importance from the very circumstance of their being prohibited; while the whole tenor of the measure impressed many who had otherwise been friendly to the Bourbon family, with distrust respecting their designs upon the national liberty.

Thus split into parties, oppressed with taxes, vexed with those nameless and mysterious jealousies and fears, which form the most dangerous subjects of disagreement, because alike incapable of being explained and confuted, France was full of inflammable materials; and the next chapter will show that there was not wanting a torch to give kindling to them.

CHAPTER CII.

Carnot's memorial on public affairs.—Fouché fails to obtain the favour of the king, and joins the jacobins.—Various projects of that party; which finally joins the Bonapartists.—Active intrigues commenced.—Congress of Vienna—Murat, alarmed at its proceedings, opens an intercourse with Napoleon.—Plans of the conspirators.—Bonaparte's escape from Elba—He lands at Cannes, and advances through France—Is joined, at Grenoble, by 3000 troops—Halts at Lyons, appoints a ministry, and issues several decrees.—Dismay of the royal government.—Intrigues of Fouché.—Treachery of Ney.—Revolt of the Bourbon army at Melun.—The king leaves Paris, and Bonaparte arrives there.—His reception.

CARNOT has been repeatedly mentioned in this history as having been the associate and colleague of Robespierre during the whole Reign of Terror. His admirers pretend that, charging himself only with the conduct of the foreign war, he left to his brethren of the Committee of Public Safety the sole charge of those measures, for which no human language affords epithets of sufficient horror, through which they originally rose to power, and by which they maintained it. According to these fond advocates, their hero held his course through the Reign of Terror unsullied by a bloody spot, as Arethusa rolled her waters through the ocean without mingling with its waves! and the faith of most readers will swallow the ancient miracle as easily as the modern. Carnot, however, had the independence of spirit to oppose Napoleon's seizure of the throne, and remained in obscurity until 1814, when he employed his talents as an engineer in defence of Antwerp. He gave in, late and reluctantly, his adherence to the restoration, and was confirmed in his rank of inspector-general of engineers. But this did not prevent him from being extremely active in conspiring the downfall of the monarch to whose allegiance he had submitted himself, and who afforded him subsistence and rank.

Carnot gave his opinion upon public affairs in a memorial, made public in September, 1814, which was at once an apology for the jacobin party, and a direct attack on the reigning dynasty. This document we must necessarily consider at some length, as it conveys the ostensible reasons on which the author, and many thousands besides, having in their anxious consideration the interests of the freedom of France, thought these interests would be best provided for by destroying the sway of a mild and somewhat feeble monarch, whose reign was identified with peace and tranquillity, in order to recal to the throne an absolute sovereign, ruling on military principles only, and whose first step under the

canopy of state must necessarily be followed by war with all Europe.

In this singular, and, as it proved, too effective production, every fault committed by the restored family is exaggerated; and they, with the nobles, their personal adherents, are, under a thin and contemptuous veil of assumed respect towards the king, treated alike as fools, who did not understand how to govern France, and as villains, who meditated her ruin. The murder of the king is, with irony as envenomed as unjust, stated to have been occasioned, not by the violence and cruelty of his persecutors, but by the pusillanimity of his nobility, who first provoked the resentment of the nation, and then fled from the kingdom, when, if they had loved their sovereign, they should have rallied around him. This plea, in the mouth of a regicide, is as if one of a band of robbers should impute an assassination not to their own guilty violence, but to the cowardice of the domestics of the murdered, by whom that violence might have been resisted. No one also knew better than Carnot by what arts Louis XVI. was induced by degrees to abandon all means of defence which his situation afforded him, and to throw himself upon the sworn faith and allegiance of those by whom he was condemned to death. As whimsical and unlogical were the examples and arguments referred to by Carnot in support of the condemnation of Louis. Cicero, it seems, says in his Offices, "We hate all those we fear, and we wish for the death of those we hate." On this comprehensive ground, Carnot vindicates the orator's approbation of the death of Cæsar, notwithstanding the clemency of the usurper; and Cato, indeed (continues the colleague of Robespierre), went farther, and did not think it possible there should be a good king. Of course, not Louis XVI. alone, but all monarchs, might be justly put to death in Carnot's estimation; because they are naturally the objects of fear to their subjects—because we hate those we fear—and because, according to the kindred authority of Shylock, no man hates the thing he would not kill. The doctrine of regicide is said to be confirmed in the Old Testament; families were massacred,—monarchs proscribed,—intolerance promulgated, by the ministers of a merciful Deity: wherefore, then, should not the jacobins put Louis XVI. to death? If it was alleged, that the persons of kings were inviolable by the laws of all civil governments, those of usurpers certainly were not so protected; and what means were there, said Carnot, for positively distinguishing between a usurper and a legitimate king? The difficulty of making such a distinction was no doubt a sufficient vindication of the judges of Louis XVI.

Trash like this had scarce been written since the club-room of the jacobins was closed. But the object of Carnot's pamphlet was not to excuse a deed (which he would probably have rather boasted of as laudable), but by the exaggerations of his eloquence, and the weight of his influence with the public, to animate the fury of the other parties against the Bonapartes and their adherents. The king was charged with having been ungrateful to the call of the nation (a call which assuredly he would never have heard but for the cannon of the allies),—

with having termed himself king by the grace of God,—with resigning Belgium when Carnot was actually governor of Antwerp,—with preferring Chouans, Vendéans, emigrants, Cossacks, or Englishmen, to the soldiers whose victories had kept him in exile, and in consequence of whose defeat alone he had regained the throne of his fathers. The emigrants are represented as an exasperated, yet a contemptible faction. The people, it is said, care little about the right of their rulers,—about their quarrels,—their private life, or even their political crimes, unless as they affect themselves. All government, of course, has its basis in popular opinion; but, alas! in actual history, "the people are only regarded," says Monsieur Carnot, "as the victims of their chiefs; we witness nothing but the contest of subjects for the private interest of their princes,—kings, who are themselves regicides and parricides,—and priests who incite mankind to mutual slaughter. The eye can but repose on the generous efforts of some brave men who consecrate themselves to the deliverance of their fellow-countrymen; if they succeed, they are called heroes,—if they fail, they are traitors and demagogues." In this and other passages, the author plainly intimated what spirits were at work, and what was the object of their machinations. The whole pamphlet was designed as a manifesto to the French public, directly, yet distinctly, announcing the existence of a formidable conspiracy, the principles on which its members proceeded, and their grounds for expecting success.

Carnot himself affected to say, that the memorial was only designed for circulation among his private connexions. But it would not have answered the intended purpose had it not been printed and dispersed with the most uncommon assiduity. Small carts traversed the Boulevards, from which it was hawked about among the people, in order to avoid the penalties which booksellers and stationers might have incurred by dealing in an article so inflammatory. Notwithstanding these evasions, the printers and retailers of this diatribe were prosecuted by government; but the *juges d'instruction* refused to confirm the bill of indictment, and this failure served to encourage the jacobin faction. The official proceedings, by which the ministers endeavoured to suppress the publication, irritated rather than intimidated those who took interest in it. It argued, they said, at once a timorous and a vindictive spirit to oppress the inferior agents in an alleged libel, while the ministers dared not bring to trial the avowed author. In this unquestionably they argued justly, for the measures corresponded with that policy, which would rather assail the liberty of the press, than bring to fair trial and open punishment those by whom it is misused.

It would have been as impossible for Fouché to have lived amid such a complicated scene of political intrigue, without mingling in it, as for the sparks to resist flying upwards. He was, however, ill-placed for the character he desired to act. After having lent Bonaparte his aid to betray and dethrone the Directors, he had long meditated how to dethrone and betray Bonaparte, and substitute in his place a regency, or some form of government under

which he might expect to act as prime minister. In this undertaking, he more than once ran the peril of life, and was glad to escape with an honourable exile. We have already stated that he had missed the most favourable opportunity for availing himself of his political knowledge, by his absence from Paris when it was taken by the allies. Fouché endeavoured, however, to obtain the notice of the restored monarch and his government, and to render his services acceptable to Louis. When the celebrated revolutionist appeared in the ante-chamber on his first attendance at court, he observed a sneer on the countenance of some royalists who were in waiting, and took the hint to read them a lesson, showing, that a minister of police, even when he has lost his office, is not a person to be jested with. "You, sir," said he to a gentleman, "seem proud of the lilies with which you are adorned. Do you recollect the language you held respecting the Bourbon family some time since in such a company?—And you, madam," he continued, addressing a lady, "to whom I gave a passport to England, may perhaps wish to be reminded of what then passed betwixt us on the subject of Louis XVIII." The laughers were conscience-struck, and Fouché was introduced into the cabinet.

The plan which Fouché recommended to the king was, as might have been expected, astucious and artificial in a high degree. He advised the king to assume the national cockade and three-coloured flag; to occupy the situation of chief of the Revolution. This, he said, would be the same sacrifice by Louis XVIII. as the attending on the mass by Henry IV.—He might have added, it was the sacrifice actually made by Louis XVI., who lost his life in requital.—What Fouché aimed at by this action is evident. He desired to place the king in a situation where he must have relied exclusively on the men of the Revolution, with whom he could not have communicated save by the medium of the Duke d'Otranto, who thus would become prime minister at the first step. But in every other point of view, the following that advice must have placed the king in a mean and hypocritical attitude, which must have disgusted even those whom it was adopted to conciliate.

By assuming the colours of the Revolution, the King of France must necessarily have stained himself with the variation of each of its numerous changes. It is true, that the Revolution had produced many excellent improvements in France, affecting both the theory and the practice of government. These the sovereign was bound carefully to preserve for the advantage of the nation. But while we are grateful for the advantages of increased health and fertility that may follow a tornado, and treasure up the valuable things which an angry ocean may cast upon the shore, none but a blinded heathen worships the tempest, or sacrifices to the fugious waves. The king, courting the murderers of his brother, could inspire, even in them, nothing save disgust at his hypocrisy, while it would justly have forfeited the esteem and affection, not of the royalists alone, but of all honest men.

Further to recommend himself to the Bourbons, Fouché addressed a singular epistle to Napoleon,

in which he endeavoured to convince him, that the title of sovereign, in the paltry islet of Elba, did not become him who had possessed an immense empire. He remarked to Napoleon, that the situation of the island was not suitable to his purpose of retirement, being near so many points where his presence might produce dangerous agitation. He observed, that he might be accused, although he was not criminal, and do evil without intending it, by spreading alarm. He hinted that the King of France, however determined to act with justice, yet might be instigated by the passions of others to break through that rule. He told the Ex-Emperor of France, that the titles which he retained were only calculated to augment his regret for the loss of real sovereignty. Nay, that they were attended with positive danger, since it might be thought they were retained only to keep alive his pretensions. Lastly, he exhorted Napoleon to assume the character of a private individual, and retire to the United States of America, the country of Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson.

Fouché could scarcely expect that this monitory epistle should have much effect upon his once imperial master; he knew human nature and Bonaparte too well. But as it might tell to advantage with the royal family, he sent a copy of it to Monsieur, with a corresponding commentary, the object of which was to point out (what, indeed, circumstances had made evident), that the tranquillity of the countries and sovereigns of Europe could never be secured while Napoleon remained in his present condition, and that his residence in the Isle of Elba was to France what Vesuvius is to Naples. The practical inference to be derived from this was, that a gentle degree of violence to remove the person of Napoleon would have been a stroke of state policy, in case the Ex-Emperor of France should not himself have the patriotic virtue to remove himself to America. The honourable and generous prince, to whom Fouché had addressed himself, had too noble a mind to adopt the hint; and this attempt to ingratiate himself with the Bourbon family entirely failed. But plotting was Fouché's element; and it seems to have signified little to him whom he had for partners, providing he had a stake in the political game. He retired to his country-house, and engaged himself with his old friends of the jacobin party, who were not a little glad to avail themselves of his extensive acquaintance with all the ramifications of political intrigue.

It was the policy of this party to insist upon the faults of the royal family, and enlarge on their prejudices against the men and measures of that period when France was successful in foreign war, against the statesmen who directed, and the soldiers who achieved, her gigantic enterprises. The king, they said, had suffered misfortune without having learned wisdom; he was incapable of stepping beyond the circle of his Gothic prejudices; France had received him from the hand of foreign conquerors, surrounded by an emaciated group of mendicant nobles, whose pretensions were as antiquated and absurd as their decorations and manners. His government went to divide, they alleged, the French into two classes, opposed to each other in merits as

in interests;—the emigrants, who alone were regarded by Louis as faithful and willing subjects; and the rest of the nation, in whom the Bourbons saw, at best, but repentant rebels. They asserted, that, too timid as yet to strike an open blow, the king and his ministers sought every means to disqualify and displace all who had taken any active share in the events of the Revolution, and to evade the general promise of amnesty. Under pretext of national economy, they were disbanding the army, and removing the officers of government,—depriving thus the military and civil servants of France of the provision which their long services had earned. Louis, they said, had insulted the glory of France, and humiliated her heroes, by renouncing the colours and symbols under which twenty-five years had seen her victorious; he had rudely refused a crown offered to him by the people, and snatched it as his own right by inheritance, as if the dominion of men could be transferred from father to son like the property of a flock of sheep. The right of Frenchmen to chuse their own ruler was hereditary and intransmissible; and the nation, they said, must assert it, or sink to be the contempt, instead of being the pride at once and dread, of Europe.

Such was the language which nettled, while it alarmed, the idle Parisians, who forgot at the moment that they had seen Napoleon take the crown from the altar at Notre Dame, and place it on his own head, with scarcely an acknowledgment to God, and not the shadow of any towards the nation. The departments were assailed by other arts of instigation. The chief of these was directed to excite the jealousy so often alluded to, concerning the security of the property of national domains. Not content with urging everywhere that a revocation of the lands of the church and emigrants was impending over the present proprietors, and that the clergy and nobles did not even deign to conceal their hopes and designs, a singular device was in many instances practised to enforce the belief of such assertions. Secret agents were dispatched into the departments where property was advertised for sale. These emissaries made inquiries as if in the character of intending purchasers, and where the property appeared to have been derived from revolutionary confiscation, instantly objected to the security as good for nothing, and withdrew their pretended offers;—thus impressing the proprietor, and all in the same situation, with the unavoidable belief, that such title was considered as invalid, owing to the expected and menaced revocation of the Bourbon government.

It is generally believed that Bonaparte was not originally the object designed to profit by these intrigues. He was feared and hated by the jacobin party, who knew what a slender chance his iron government afforded of their again attempting to rear their fantastic fabrics, whether of a pure republic, or a republican monarchy. It is supposed their eyes were turned in preference towards the Duke of Orleans. They reckoned probably on the strength of the temptation, and they thought, that in supplanting Louis XVIII., and placing his kinsman in his room, they would obtain, on the one hand, a king who should hold his power by and through

the Revolution, and, on the other, that they would conciliate both foreign powers and the constitutionalists at home, by chusing their sovereign out of the family of Bourbon. The more cautions of those concerned in the intrigue recommended, that nothing should be attempted during the life of the reigning monarch; others were more impatient and less cautious; and the prince alluded to received an intimation of their plan in an unsigned billet, containing only these words,—“We will act it without you; we will act it in spite of you; we will act it for you;”* as if putting it in his choice to be the leader or victim of the intended revolution.

The Duke of Orleans was too upright and honourable to be involved in this dark and mysterious scheme; he put the letter which he had received into the hands of the king, and acted otherwise with so much prudence, as to destroy all the hopes which the revolutionary party had founded upon him. It was necessary to find out some other central point. Some proposed Eugène Beauharnais as the hero of the projected movement; some projected a provisional government; and others desired that the republican model should be once more adopted. But none of these plans were likely to be favoured by the army. The cry of *Vive la République* had become antiquated; the power once possessed by the jacobins of creating popular commotion was greatly diminished; and although the army was devoted to Bonaparte, yet it was probable that in a civil commotion in which he had no interest, they would follow the marshals or generals who commanded them, in opposition to any insurrection merely revolutionary. If, on the contrary, the interests of Napoleon were put in the van, there was no fear of securing the irresistible assistance of the standing army. If he came back with the same principles of absolute power which he had formerly entertained, still the jacobins would get rid of Louis and the charter, the two chief objects of their hatred: the former as a king given by the law, the latter as a law given by the king.

These considerations speedily determined the jacobin party on a union with the Bonapartists. The former were in the condition of a band of house-breakers, who, unable to force an entrance into the house which they have the purpose to break into, renew their undertaking, and place at their head a brother of the same profession, because he has the advantage of having a crow-bar in his hand. When and how this league was formed,—what sanction the jacobin party obtained that Bonaparte, dethroned as a military despot, was to resume his dignity under constitutional restrictions, we have no opportunity of knowing. But, so soon as the coalition was formed, his praises were sung forth on all sides, especially by many who had been, as jacobins, his most decided enemies; and a great part of the French public were disposed to think of Bonaparte at Elba more favourably than Napoleon in the Tuileries. Gradually, even from the novelty and peculiarity of his situation, he began to excite a very different interest from that which attached to the despot

* * *Nous le ferons sans vous; nous le ferons malgré vous; nous le ferons pour vous.*

who levied so many conscriptions and sacrificed to his ambition so many millions of victims. Every instance of his activity, within the little circle of his dominions, was contrasted by his admirers with the constitutional inertness of the restored monarch. Excelling as much in the arts of peace as in those of war, it wanted but (they said) the fostering hand and unwearied eye of Napoleon to have rendered France the envy of the universe, had his military affairs permitted the leisure and opportunity which the Bourbons now enjoyed. These allegations, secretly insinuated, and at length loudly murmured, had their usual effects upon the fickle temper of the public; and, as the temporary enthusiasm in favour of the Bourbons faded into indifference and aversion, the general horror of Bonaparte's ambitions and tyrannical disposition began to give way to the recollection of his active, energetic, and enterprising qualities.

This change must soon have been known to him who was its object. An expression is said to have escaped from him during his passage to Elba, which marked at least a secret feeling that he might one day recover the high dignity from which he had fallen. "If Marius," he observed, "had slain himself in the marshes of Minturnæ, he would never have enjoyed his seventh consulate." What was perhaps originally but the vague aspirations of an ardent spirit striving against adversity, became, from the circumstances of France, a plausible and well-grounded hope. It required but to establish communications among his numerous and zealous partisans, with instructions to hold out such hopes as might lure the jacobins to his standard, and to profit by and inflame the growing discords and divisions of France; and a conspiracy was almost ready formed, with little exertion on the part of him who soon became its object and its centre.

Various affiliations and points of rendezvous were now arranged to recruit for partisans. The ladies of the ex-emperor's court, who found themselves humiliated at that of the king by the preference assigned to noble birth, were zealous agents in these political intrigues; for offended pride hesitates at no measures for obtaining vengeance. The purses of their husbands and lovers were of course open to these fair intriguers, and many of them devoted their jewels to forward the cause of revolution. The chief of these female conspirators was Hortensia Beauharnais, wife of Louis Bonaparte, but now separated from her husband, and bearing the title of the Duchess of St-Leu. She was a person of considerable talents, and of great activity and address. At Nanterre, Neuilly, and St-Leu, meetings of the conspirators were held, and Madame Amelin, the confidante of the duchess, is said to have assisted in concealing some of the principal agents.

The Duchess of Bassano, and the Duchess of Montebello (widow of Marshal Lannes), were warmly engaged in the same cause. At the meetings held in the houses of these intriguing females, the whole artillery of conspiracy was forged and put in order, from the political lie, which does its work if believed but for an hour, to the political song or squib, which, like the fire-work from which it derives its name, expresses love of frolic or of mischief, according to

the nature of the materials amongst which it is thrown. From these places of rendezvous the agents of the plot sallied out upon their respective rounds, furnished with every lure that could rouse the suspicious landholder, attract the idle Parisian, seduce the *Ideologue*, who longed to try the experiments of his Utopian theories upon real government, and above all, secure the military,—from the officer, before whose eyes truncheons, coronets, and even crowns, were disposed in ideal prospect, to the grenadier, whose hopes only aimed at blood, brandy, and free quarters.

The lower orders of the populace, particularly those inhabiting the two great suburbs of St-Marceau and St-Antoine, were disposed to the cause from their natural restlessness and desire of change; from the apprehension that the king would discontinue the expensive buildings in which Bonaparte was wont to employ them; from a jacobinical dislike to the lawful title of Louis, joined to some tender aspirations after the happy days of liberty and equality; and lastly, from the disposition which the leers of society everywhere manifest to get rid of the law, their natural curb and enemy. The influence of Richard le Noir was particularly useful to the conspirators. He was a wealthy cotton-manufacturer, who combined and disciplined no less than three thousand workmen in his employment, so as to be ready at the first signal of the conspirators. Le Noir was called by the royalists *Santerre the Second*; being said to aspire, like that celebrated suburban brewer, to become a general of *sans-culottes*. He was bound to Bonaparte's interest by his daughter having married General Lefebvre Desnouettes, who was not the less the favourite of Napoleon that he had broken his parole, and fled from England when a prisoner of war. Thus agitated like a lake by a subterranean earthquake, revolutionary movements began to show themselves amongst the populace. At times, under pretence of scarcity of bread or employment, tumultuous groups assembled on the terrace of the Tuileries, with clamours which reminded the Duchesse d'Angoulême of those that preceded the imprisonment and death of her parents. The police dispersed them for the moment; but if any arrests were made, it was only of such wretches as shouted when they heard others shout, and no efforts were made to ascertain the real cause of symptoms so alarming.

The police of Paris was at this time under the direction of Monsieur Dandré, formerly a financier. His loyalty does not seem to have been doubted, but his prudence and activity are very questionable; nor does he seem ever to have been completely master either of the duties of his office, or the tools by which it was to be performed. These tools, in other words, the subordinate agents and officers and clerks, the whole machinery as it were of the police, had remained unchanged since that dreadful power was administered by Savary, Bonaparte's head spy and confidential minister. This body, as well as the army, felt that their honourable occupation was declined in emolument and importance since the fall of Bonaparte, and looked back with regret to the days when they were em-

played in agencies, dark, secret, and well-recompensed, unknown to a peaceful and constitutional administration. Like evil spirits employed by the spells of a benevolent enchanter, these police-officers seem to have served the king grudgingly and unwillingly; to have neglected their duty, when that could be done with impunity; and to have shown that they had lost their activity and omniscience, so soon as embarked in the service of legitimate monarchy.

Under the connivance, therefore, if not with the approbation of the police, conspiracy assumed a more open and daring aspect. Several houses of dubious fame,* but especially the Café Montansier, in the Palais Royal, were chosen as places of rendezvous for the subordinate satellites of the cause, where the toasts given, the songs sung, the tunes performed, and the language held, all bore allusion to Bonaparte's glories, his regretted absence, and his desired return. To express their hopes that this event would take place in the spring, the conspirators adopted for their symbol the violet; and afterwards applied to Bonaparte himself the name of Corporal Violet. The flower and the colour were publicly worn as a party distinction, before it would seem the court had taken the least alarm; and the health of Bonaparte, under the name of Corporal Violet, or Jean d'Épée, was pledged by many a royalist without suspicion of the concealed meaning.

Paris was the centre of the conspiracy; but its ramifications extended through France. Clubs were formed in the chief provincial towns. Regular correspondences were established between them and the capital,—an intercourse much favoured, it has been asserted, by Lavalette, who, having been long director-general of the posts under Bonaparte, retained considerable influence over the subordinate agents of that department, none of whom had been displaced upon the king's return. It appears from the evidence of Monsieur Ferrand, director-general under the king, that the couriers, who, like the soldiers and police-officers, had found more advantage under the imperial than under the royal government, were several of them in the interest of their old master. And it is averred, that the correspondence relating to the conspiracy was carried on through the royal post-office, contained in letters sealed with the king's seal, and dispatched by public messengers wearing his livery.

Such open demonstrations of treasonable practices did not escape the observation of the royalists, and they appear to have been communicated to the ministers from different quarters. Nay, it has been confidently stated, that letters, containing information of Napoleon's intended escape, were actually found in the bureau of one minister, unopened and unread. Indeed, each of these official personages seems scrupulously to have entrenched himself within the routine of his own particular department, so that what was only of general import to the whole was not considered as the business of any one in particular. Thus, when the stunning catastrophe had happened, each endeavoured to shift the blame from himself, like the domestics in a large and ill-regulated family; and although all acknowledged that gross

negligence had existed elsewhere, no one admitted that the fault lay with himself. This general infatuation surprises us upon retrospect; but Heaven, who frequently punishes mankind by the indulgence of their own foolish or wicked desires, had decreed that peace was to be restored to Europe by the extermination of that army to whom peace was a state so odious; and for that purpose it was necessary that they should be successful in their desperate attempt to dethrone their peaceful and constitutional sovereign, and to reinstate the despotic leader, who was soon to lead them to the completion of their destiny, and of his own.

While the royal government in France was thus gradually undermined and prepared for an explosion, the rest of Europe resembled an ocean in the act of settling after a mighty storm, when the partial wrecks are visible, heaving on the subsiding swell, which threatens yet further damage ere it be entirely lulled to rest.

The congress of representatives of the principal states of Europe had met at Vienna, in order to arrange the confused and complicated interests which had arisen out of so prolonged a period of war and alteration. The lapse of twenty-five years of constant war and general change had made so total an alteration, not merely in the social relations and relative powers of the states of Europe, but in the habits, sentiments, and principles of the inhabitants, that it appeared altogether impossible to restore the original system as it existed before 1792. The Continent resembled the wrecks of the city of London, after the great conflagration in 1666, when the boundaries of individual property were so completely obliterated and confounded, that the king found himself obliged, by the urgency of the occasion, to make new, and in some degree arbitrary, distributions of the ground, in order to rebuild the streets upon a plan more regular, and better fitted to the improved condition of the age. That which proved ultimately an advantage to London, may perhaps produce similar good consequences to the civilized world, and a better and more permanent order of things may be expected to arise out of that which has been destroyed. In that case, the next generation may reap the advantages of the storms with which their fathers had to contend. We are, however, far from approving some of the unceremonious appropriations of territory which were made upon this occasion, which, did our limits admit of entering into the discussion, carried, we think, the use of superior force to a much greater extent than could be justified on the principles upon which the allies acted.

Amid the labours of the congress, their attention was turned on the condition of the kingdom of Naples; and it was urged by Talleyrand, in particular, that allowing the existence of the sovereignty of Murat in that beautiful kingdom, was preserving, at the risk of future danger to Europe, an empire, founded on Napoleon's principles, and governed by his brother-in-law. It was answered truly, that it was too late to challenge the foundation of Murat's right of sovereignty, after having gladly accepted and availed themselves of his assistance, in the war against Bonaparte. Talleyrand, by exhibiting to

the Duke of Wellington a train of correspondence between Bonaparte, his sister Caroline, and Murat, endeavoured to show that the latter was insincere, when seeming to act in concert with the allies. The duke was of opinion, that the letters did not prove treachery, though they indicated what was to be expected, that Murat took part against his brother-in-law and benefactor, with considerable reluctance. The matter was now in agitation before the congress; and Murat, conceiving his power in danger, seems to have adopted the rash expedient of changing sides once more, and again to have renewed his intercourse with Napoleon. The contiguity of Elba to Naples rendered this a matter of little difficulty; and they had, besides, the active assistance of Pauline, who went and came between Italy and her brother's little court. Napoleon, however, at all times resolutely denied that he had any precise share or knowledge of the enterprise which Murat meditated.

The King of France, in the meanwhile, recalled by proclamation all Frenchmen who were in the Neapolitan service, and directed the title of King Joachim to be omitted in the royal almanack.

Murat, alarmed at this indication of hostile intentions, carried on a secret correspondence with France, in the course of which a letter was intercepted, directed to the King of Naples, from General Excelmans, professing, in his own name and that of others, devoted attachment, and assuring him that thousands of officers, formed in his school and under his eye, would have been ready at his call, had not matters taken a satisfactory turn. In consequence of this letter, Excelmans was in the first place put on half-pay and sent from Paris, which order he refused to obey. Next he was tried before a court-martial, and triumphantly acquitted. He was admitted to kiss the king's hand, and swear to him fidelity *à toute épreuve*. How he kept his word will presently appear. In the meantime the king had need of faithful adherents, for the nets of conspiracy were closing fast around him.

The plot formed against Louis XVIII. comprehended two enterprises. The first was to be achieved by the landing of Napoleon from Elba, when the universal good-will of the soldiers, the awe inspired by his name and character, and the suspicious and insinuations spread widely against the Bourbons, together with the hope of recovering what the nation considered as the lost glory of France, were certain to insure him a general good reception. A second, or subordinate branch of the conspiracy, concerned the insurrection of a body of troops under General Lallemand, who were quartered in the north-east of France, and to whom was committed the charge of intercepting the retreat of the king and royal family from Paris, and, seizing them, to detain them as hostages at the restored emperor's pleasure.

It is impossible to know at what particular period of his residence at Elba, Napoleon gave an express command to what was proposed, and disposed himself to assume the part destined for him in the extraordinary drama. We should suppose, however, his resolution was adopted about that time when his manner changed completely towards the British

envoy residing at his little court, and when he assumed the airs of inaccessible and imperial state, to keep at a distance, as an inconvenient observer, Sir Niel Campbell, to whom he had before seemed rather partial. His motions after that time have been described, so far as we have access to know them. It was on Sunday, 26th February, that Napoleon embarked with his guards on board the flotilla, consisting of the *Inconstant* brig, and six other small vessels, upon one of the most extraordinary and adventurous expeditions which was ever attempted. The force, with which he was once more to change the fortunes of France, amounted but to about a thousand men. To keep the undertaking secret, his sister Pauline gave a ball on the night of his departure, and the officers were unexpectedly summoned, after leaving the entertainment, to go on board the little squadron.

In his passage Napoleon encountered two great risks. The first was from meeting a royal French frigate who hailed the *Inconstant*. The guards were ordered to put off their caps, and go down below, or lie upon the deck, while the captain of the *Inconstant* exchanged some civilities with the commander of the frigate, with whom he chanced to be acquainted; and being well known in these seas, was permitted to pass on without farther inquiry. The second danger was caused by the pursuit of Sir Niel Campbell, in the Partridge sloop of war, who, following from Elba, where he had learned Napoleon's escape, with the determination to capture or sink the flotilla, could but obtain a distant view of the vessels as they landed their passengers.

This was on the first of March, when Napoleon, causing his followers once more to assume the three-coloured cockade, disembarked at Cannes, a small seaport in the gulf of Juan, not far from Fréjus, which had seen him land, a single individual, returned from Egypt, to conquer a mighty empire; had beheld him set sail, a terrified exile, to occupy the place of his banishment; and now again witnessed his return, a daring adventurer, to throw the dice once more for a throne or a grave. A small party of his guard presented themselves before Antibes, but were made prisoners by General Corsin, the governor of the place.

Undismayed by a circumstance so unfavourable, Napoleon instantly began his march at the head of scarce a thousand men, towards the centre of a kingdom from which he had been expelled with execrations, and where his rival now occupied in peace an hereditary throne. For some time the inhabitants gazed on them with doubtful and astonished eyes, as if uncertain whether to assist them as friends, or to oppose them as invaders. A few peasants cried *Vive l'empereur!* but the adventurers received neither countenance nor opposition from those of the higher ranks. On the evening of 2d March, a day and a half after landing, the little band of invaders reached Cérénou, having left behind them their small train of artillery, in order to enable them to make forced marches. As Napoleon approached Dauphiné, called the cradle of the Revolution, the peasants greeted him with more general welcome, but still no proprietors appeared, no clergy, no public functionaries. But they were now near to those by whom

the success or ruin of the expedition must be decided.

Soulé, the minister at war, had ordered some large bodies of troops to be moved into the country betwixt Lyons and Chambéry, to support, as he afterwards alleged, the high language which Talleyrand had been of late holding at the congress, by showing that France was in readiness for war. If the marshal acted with good faith in this measure, he was at least most unfortunate; for, as he himself admits, even in his attempt at exculpation, the troops were so placed as if they had been purposely thrown in Bonaparte's way, and proved unhappily to consist of corps peculiarly devoted to the ex-emperor's person. On the 7th of March, the 7th regiment of the line, commanded by Colonel Labédoyère, arrived at Grenoble. He was young, nobly born, handsome, and distinguished as a military man. His marriage having connected him with the noble and loyal family of Damas, he procured preferment and active employment from Louis XVIII. through their interest, and they were induced even to pledge themselves for his fidelity. Yet Labédoyère had been engaged by Cambrone deep in the conspiracy of Elba, and used the command thus obtained for the destruction of the monarch by whom he was trusted.

As Napoleon approached Grenoble, he came into contact with the outposts of the garrison, who drew out, but seemed irresolute. Bonaparte halted his own little party, and advanced almost alone, exposing his breast, as he exclaimed, "He who will kill his emperor, let him now work his pleasure." The appeal was irresistible—the soldiers threw down their arms, crowded round the general who had so often led them to victory, and shouted *Vive l'empereur!* In the meanwhile, Labédoyère, at the head of two battalions, was sallying from the gates of Grenoble. As they advanced, he displayed an eagle, which, like that of Marius, worshipped by the Roman conspirator, had been carefully preserved to be the type of civil war; at the same time, he distributed among the soldiers the three-coloured cockades, which he had concealed in the hollow of a drum. They were received with enthusiasm. It was in this moment that *Maréchal de camp* Des Villiers, the superior officer of Labédoyère, arrived on the spot, alarmed at what was taking place, and expostulated with the young military fanatic and the soldiers. He was compelled to retire. General Marchand, the loyal commandant of Grenoble, had as little influence on the troops remaining in the place; they made him prisoner, and delivered up the city to Bonaparte.—Napoleon was thus at the head of nearly three thousand soldiers, with a suitable train of artillery, and a corresponding quantity of ammunition. He acted with a moderation which his success could well afford, and dismissed General Marchand uninjured.

When the first news of Napoleon's arrival reached Paris, it excited surprise rather than alarm; but when he was found to traverse the country without opposition, some strange and combined treason began to be generally apprehended. That the Bourbons might not be wanting to their own cause, Monsieur, with the Duke of Orleans, set out for

Lyons, and the Duke d'Angoulême repaired to Nîmes. The legislative bodies, and most of the better classes, declared for the royal cause. The residents of the various powers hastened to assure Louis of the support of their sovereigns. Corps of volunteers were raised, both among the royalists and the constitutional or moderate party. The most animating proclamations called the people to arms. An address by the celebrated Benjamin Constant, one of the most distinguished of the moderate party, was remarkable for its eloquence. It placed in the most striking light the contrast between the lawful government of a constitutional monarch, and the usurpation of an Attila, or Genghis, who governed only by the sword of his Mamelukes. It reminded France of the general detestation with which Bonaparte had been expelled from the kingdom, and proclaimed Frenchmen to be the scorn of Europe, should they again stretch their hands voluntarily to the shackles which they had burst and hurled from them. All were summoned to arms, more especially those to whom liberty was dear; for in the triumph of Bonaparte, it must find its grave for ever.—"With Louis," said the address, "was peace and happiness;—with Bonaparte, war, misery, and desolation." Even a more animating appeal to popular feeling was made by a female on the staircase of the Tuileries, who exclaimed, "If Louis has not men enough to fight for him, let him call on the widows and childless mothers who have been rendered such by Napoleon."

Notwithstanding all these demonstrations of zeal, the public mind had been much influenced by the causes of discontent which had been so artfully enlarged upon for many months past. The decided royalists were few, the constitutionalists lukewarm. It became every moment more likely, that not the voice of the people, but the sword of the army, must determine the controversy. Soulé, whose conduct had given much cause for suspicion, which was augmented by his proposal to call out the officers who since the restoration had been placed on half-pay, resigned his office, and was succeeded by Clarke, Duke of Feltre, less renowned as a soldier, but more trustworthy as a subject. A camp was established at Melun—troops were assembled there—and as much care as possible was used in selecting the troops to whom the royal cause was to be intrusted.

In the meantime, Fortune had not entirely abandoned the Bourbons. That part of the Bonapartist conspiracy which was to have been executed in the north was discovered and disconcerted. Lefebvre Desnouettes, discredibly known in England by his breach of parole, with the two Generals Lallemand, were the agents in this plot. On the 10th March, Lefebvre Desnouettes marched forward his regiment to join Bonaparte; but the officers having discovered his purpose, he was obliged to make his escape from the arrest with which he was threatened. The two Lallemands put the garrison of Lille, to the number of six thousand men, in motion, by means of forged orders, declaring there was an insurrection in Paris. But Marshal Mortier, meeting the troops on the march, detected

and defeated the conspiracy, by which, had it taken effect, the king and royal family must have been made prisoners. The two Lallemands were taken, and to have executed them on the spot as traitors might have struck a wholesome terror into such officers as still hesitated; but the ministers of the king did not possess energy enough for such a crisis.

The progress of Bonaparte, in the meantime, was uninterrupted. It was in vain that, at Lyons, Monsieur and the Duke of Orleans, with the assistance of the advice and influence of Marshal Macdonald, endeavoured to retain the troops in their duty, and the inhabitants in their allegiance to the king. The latter, chiefly manufacturers, afraid of being undersold by those of England in their own market, shouted openly, *Vive l'empereur*. The troops of the line remained silent and gloomy. "How will your soldiers, behave?" said Monsieur to the colonel of the 13th dragoons. The colonel referred him to the men themselves. They answered candidly, that they would fight for Napoleon alone. Monsieur dismounted, and addressed the soldiers individually. To one veteran, covered with scars, and decorated with medals, the prince said, "A brave soldier like you, at least, will cry, *Vive le roi!*"—"You deceive yourself," answered the soldier. "No one here will fight against his father—I will cry, *Vive Napoleon!*" The efforts of Macdonald were equally vain. He endeavoured to move two battalions to oppose the entry of Bonaparte's advanced guard. So soon as the troops came in presence of each other, they broke their ranks, and mingled together in the general cry of *Vive l'empereur!* Macdonald would have been made prisoner, but the forces whom he had just commanded would not permit this consummation of revolt. Monsieur was obliged to escape from Lyons, almost alone. The guard of honour formed by the citizens, to attend the person of the second of the Bourbon family, offered their services to Napoleon; but he refused them with contempt, while he sent a cross of honour to a single dragoon, who had the loyalty and devotion to attend Monsieur in his retreat.

Bonaparte, now master of the ancient capital of the Gauls, and at the head of seven thousand men, was acknowledged by Mâcon, Châlons, Dijon, and almost all Burgundy. Marseilles, on the contrary, and all Provence, declared against the invader, and the former city set a price upon his head.

Napoleon found it necessary to halt at Lyons for the refreshment of his forces; and, being joined by some of the civilians of his party, he needed time also to organize his government and administration. Hitherto, the addresses which he had published had been of a military character, abounding with the oriental imagery which Bonaparte regarded as essential to eloquence, promising that victory should move at the charging step, and that the eagle should fly with the national colours from steeple to steeple, till she perched on the towers of Notre Dame. The present decrees were of a different character, and related to the internal arrangement of his projected administration.

Cambacérés was named his minister of justice; Fouché, that of police (a boon to the revolutionists); Davoust was made minister of war. Decrees upon

decrees issued forth, with a rapidity which showed how Bonaparte had employed those studious hours at Elba, which he was supposed to have dedicated to the composition of his Memoirs. They ran in the name of Napoleon, by the grace of God, Emperor of France, and were dated on the 13th of March, although not promulgated until the 21st of that month. The first of these decrees abrogated all changes in the courts of justice, and tribunals, which had taken place during the absence of Napoleon. The second displaced all officers belonging to the class of emigrants, and introduced into the army by the king. The third suppressed the order of St Louis, the white flag and cockade, and other royal emblems, and restored the three-coloured banner, and the imperial symbols of Bonaparte's authority. The same decree abolished the Swiss Guard and the household troops of the king. The fourth sequestered the effects of the Bourbons. A similar ordinance sequestered the restored property of emigrant families, and was so artfully worded as to represent great changes of property having taken place in this manner. The fifth decree of Lyons suppressed the ancient nobility and feudal titles, and formally confirmed proprietors of national domains in their possessions. The sixth declared sentence of banishment against all emigrants not erased from the list previous to the accession of the Bourbons, to which was added confiscation of their property. The seventh restored the Legion of Honour, in every respect as it had existed under the emperor, uniting to its funds the confiscated revenues of the order of St Louis. The eighth and last decree was the most important of all. Under pretence that emigrants who had borne arms against France, had been introduced into the body of the peers, and that the Chamber of Deputies had already sat for the legal time, it dissolved both Chambers, and convoked the Electoral Colleges of the Empire, in order that they might hold, in the ensuing month of May, an extraordinary assembly of the Champ-de-Mai. This convocation, for which the inventor found a name in the history of the ancient Franks, was to have two objects: First, to make such alterations and reformations in the constitution of the empire as circumstances should render advisable; secondly, to assist at the coronation of the empress and of the King of Rome.

We cannot pause to criticise these various enactments. In general, however, it may be remarked, that they were admirably calculated to serve Napoleon's cause. They flattered the army, and at the same time heated their resentment against the emigrants, by insinuating that they had been sacrificed by Louis to the interest of these his followers. They held out to the republicans a speedy prospect of confiscations, proscriptions, and revolutions of government; while the imperialists were gratified with a view of ample funds for pensions, offices, and honorary decorations. To the proprietors of national domains was promised security; to the Parisians, the spectacle of the Champ-de-Mai; and to all France, peace and tranquillity, since the arrival of the empress and her son, so confidently asserted to be at hand, must be considered as a pledge of the friendship of Austria. Russia was also said to be

friendly to Napoleon, and the conduct of Alexander towards the members of Bonaparte's family was boldly appealed to as evidence of the fact. England, it was averred, befriended him, else how could he have escaped from an isle surrounded by her naval force? Prussia, therefore, alone, might be hostile and unappassé; but, unsupported by the other belligerent powers, Prussia must remain passive, or would soon be reduced to reason. The very pleasure in mortifying one, at least, of the late victors of Paris, gave a zest and poignancy to the revolution, which the concurrence of the other great states would, according to Bonaparte, render easy and peaceful. Such news were carefully disseminated through France by Napoleon's adherents. They preceded his march, and prepared the minds of men to receive him as their destined master.

On the 13th, Bonaparte recommenced his journey, and, advancing through Mâcon, Châlons, and Dijon, he reached Auxerre on the 17th March. His own mode of traveling rather resembled that of a prince, who, weary of the fatigue of state, wishes to extricate himself as much as possible from its trammels, than that of an adventurer coming at the head of an army of insurgents, to snatch a crown from the head of the lawful monarch who wore it. He traveled several hours in advance of his army, often without any guard, or, at most, attended only by a few Polish lancers. The country through which he journeyed was favourable to his pretensions. It had been severely treated by the allies during the military manœuvres of the last campaign, and the dislike of the suffering inhabitants extended itself to the family who had mounted the throne by the influence of these strangers. When, therefore, they saw the late emperor among them alone, without guards, inquiring, with his usual appearance of active interest, into the extent of their losses, and making liberal promises to repair them, it is no wonder that they should rather remember the battles he had fought in their behalf against the foreigners, than think on the probability that his presence among them might be the precursor of a second invasion.

The revolutionary fever preceded Bonaparte like an epidemic disorder. The 14th regiment of lancers, quartered at Auxerre, trampled under foot the white cockade at the first signal; the sixth regiment of lancers declared also for Napoleon, and, without waiting for orders, drove a few soldiers of the household troops from Montereau, and secured that important post, which commands the passage of the Seine.

The dismay of the royal government at the revolt of Lyons was much increased by false tidings which had been previously circulated, giving an account of a pretended victory obtained by the royalist party in front of that town. The conspiracy was laid so deep, and extended so widely through every branch of the government, that those concerned contrived to send this false report to Paris in a demi-official form, by means of the telegraph. It had the expected effect, first, in suspending the preparations of the loyal party, and afterwards in deepening the anxiety which overwhelmed them, when Monsieur, returning almost unattended, brought the news of his bad success.

At this moment of all but desperation, Fouché offered his assistance to the almost defenceless king. It is probable, that the more he reflected on the character of his old master, Napoleon, the deeper became his conviction, that they knew each other too well ever to resume an attitude of mutual confidence. Nothing deterred, therefore, by the communications which he had opened with the imperialists, he now demanded a secret audience of the king. It was refused, but his communications were received through the medium of two confidential persons deputed by Louis. Fouché's language to them was that of a bold empiric, to whom patients have recourse in a moment of despair, and who confidently undertakes the most utterly hopeless cases. Like such, he exacted absolute reliance on his skill—the most scrupulous attention to his injunctions—the most ample reward for his promised services; and as such, too, he spoke with the utmost confidence in the certainty of his remedy, whilst observing a vague yet studious mystery about the ingredients of which it was composed, and the mode in which it would operate. He required of Louis XVIII., that he should surrender all the executive authority to the Duke of Orleans, and all the ministerial offices to himself and those whom he should appoint; which two conditions being granted, he undertook to put a period to Bonaparte's expedition. The Memoirs of this bold intriguer affirm, that he meant to assemble all that remained of the revolutionary party, and oppose the doctrines of liberty and equality to those of the glory of France, in the sense understood by Bonaparte. What were the means that such politicians, so united, had to oppose to the army of France, Fouché has not informed us; but it is probable, that, to stop the advance of 10,000 armed men, against whom the revolutionists could now scarce even array the mob of the suburbs, the ex-minister of police must have meditated the short sharp remedy of Napoleon's assassination, for accomplishing which, he, if any man, could have found trusty agents.

The king having refused proposals, which went to preserve his sceptre by taking it out of his hands, and by further unexplained means the morality of which was liable to just suspicion, Fouché saw himself obliged to carry his intrigues to the service of his old master. He became, in consequence, so much an object of suspicion to the royalists, that an order was issued for his arrest. To the police agents, his own old dependents, who came to execute the order, he objected against the informality of their warrant, and stepping into his closet, as if to draw a protest, he descended by a secret stair into his garden, of which he scaled the wall. His next neighbour, into whose garden he escaped, was the Duchess of St. Leu; so that the fugitive arrived, as if by a trick of the stage, in the very midst of a circle of chosen Bonapartists, who received him with triumph, and considered the mode of his coming among them as a full warrant for his fidelity.*

* In the *Mémoires de Fouché*, it is avowed that this order of arrest was upon no political ground, but arose from the envy of Savary, who, foreseeing that Fouché would be restored to the situation of minister of police, which he

Louis XVIII., in his distress, had recourse to the assistance of another man of the Revolution, who, without possessing the abilities of Fouché, was perhaps, had he been disposed to do so, better qualified than he to have served the king's cause. Marshal Ney was called forth to take the command of an army destined to attack Napoleon in the flank and rear, as he marched towards Paris, while the forces at Melun opposed him in front. He had an audience of the king on the 9th of March, when he accepted his appointment with expressions of the most devoted faith to the king, and declared his resolution to bring Bonaparte to Paris like a wild beast in an iron cage. The marshal went to Beaunçon, where, on the 11th March, he learned that Bonaparte was in possession of Lyons. But he continued to make preparations for resistance, and collected all the troops he could from the adjoining garrisons. To those who objected the bad disposition of the soldiers, and remarked that he would have difficulty in inducing them to fight, Ney answered determinedly, "They *shall* fight; I will take a musket from a grenadier and begin the action myself;—I will run my sword to the hilt in the first who hesitates to follow my example." To the minister at war he wrote, that all were dazzled by the activity and rapid progress of the invader; that Napoleon was favoured by the common people and the soldiers; but that the officers and civil authorities were loyal, and he still hoped "to see a fortunate close of this mad enterprise."

In these dispositions, Ney advanced to Lons le Saulnier. Here, on the night betwixt the 13th and 14th March, he received a letter from Napoleon, summoning him to join his standards, as "bravest of the brave," a name which could not but awake a thousand remembrances. He had already sounded both his officers and soldiers, and discovered their unalterable determination to join Bonaparte. He therefore had it only in his choice to retain his command by passing over to the emperor, or else to return to the king, without executing anything which might seem even an effort at realizing his boast, and also without the army over which he had asserted his possession of such influence.

Marshal Ney was a man of mean birth, who, by the most desperate valour, had risen to the highest ranks in the army. His early education had not endowed him with a delicate sense of honour, or a high feeling of principle, and he had not learned either as he advanced in life. He appears to have been a weak man, with more vanity than pride, and who, therefore, was likely to feel the loss of power more than the loss of character. He accordingly resolved upon adhering to Napoleon. Sensible of the incongruity of changing his side so suddenly, he affected to be a deliberate knave, rather than he would content himself with being viewed in his real character, of a volatile, light-principled, and inconsiderate fool. He pretended that the expedition of Napoleon had been long arranged between himself and the other marshals. But we are willing

rather to suppose that this was matter of mere invention, than to think that the protestations poured out at the Tuileries, only five days before, were, on the part of this unfortunate man, the effusions of premeditated treachery.

The marshal now published an order of the day, declaring that the cause of the Bonapartes was lost for ever. It was received by the soldiers with rapture, and Bonaparte's standard and colours were instantly displayed. Many of the officers, however, remonstrated, and left their commands. One, before he went away, broke his sword in two, and threw the pieces at Ney's feet, saying, "It is easier for a man of honour to break iron than to infringe his word."

Ney was received by Napoleon with open arms. His defection did incalculable damage to the king's cause, tending to show that the spirit of treason which possessed the common soldiers had ascended to and infected the officers of the highest rank in the army.

The king, in the meanwhile, notwithstanding these unpromising circumstances, used every exertion to induce his subjects to continue in their allegiance. He attended in person the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, and was received with such enthusiastic marks of applause, that one would have thought the most active exertions must have followed. Louis next reviewed the National Guards, about 25,000 men, who made a similar display of loyalty. He also inspected the troops of the line, 6000 in number, but his reception was equivocal. They placed their caps on their bayonets in token of respect, but they raised no shout.

Some of those about Louis's person continued to believe that these men were still attached to the king, or that, at any rate, they ought to be sent to the camp at Melun, which was the last remaining point upon which the royal party could hope to make a stand.

As a last resource, Louis convoked a general council at the Tuileries on the 18th March. The generals present declared there could be no effectual opposition offered to Bonaparte. The royalist nobles contradicted them, and, after some expressions of violence had been uttered, much misbecoming the royal presence, Louis was obliged to break up the meeting, and prepare himself to abandon a capital, which the prevalence of his enemies, and the disunion of his friends, left him no longer any chance of defending.

Meantime the two armies approached each other at Melun; that of the king was commanded by the faithful MacDonald. On the 20th, his troops were drawn up in three lines to receive the invaders, who were said to be advancing from Fontainebleau. There was a long pause of suspense, of a nature which seldom fails to render men more accessible to strong and sudden emotion. The glades of the forest, and the acclivity which ascends to it, were full in view of the royal army, but presented the appearance of a deep solitude. All was silence, except when the regimental bands of music, at the command of the officers, who remained generally faithful, played the airs of *Vive Henri Quatre*,—*O Richard*,—*La Belle Gabrielle*, and other tunes

himself desired, on account of the large sums which were placed at the disposal of that functionary, hoped, in this manner, to put his rival out of his road.

connected with the cause and family of the Bourbons. The sounds excited no corresponding sentiments among the soldiers. At length about noon a galloping of horse was heard. An open carriage appeared, surrounded by a few hussars, and drawn by four horses. It came on at full speed; and Napoleon, jumping from the vehicle, was in the midst of the ranks which had been formed to oppose him. His escort threw themselves from their horses, mingled with their ancient comrades, and the effect of their exhortations was instantaneous on men, whose minds were already half made up to the purpose which they now accomplished. There was a general shout of *Vive Napoléon!*—The last army of the Bourbons passed from their side, and no further obstruction existed betwixt Napoleon and the capital, which he was once more—but for a brief space—to inhabit as a sovereign.

Louis XVIII. had anticipated too surely the defection which took place, to await the consequence of its actual arrival. The king departed from Paris, escorted by his household, at one in the morning of the 20th March. Even at that untimely hour, the palace was surrounded by the National Guards, and many citizens, who wept and entreated him to remain, offering to spend the last drop of their blood for him. But Louis wisely declined accepting of sacrifices, which could now have availed nothing. Escorted by his household troops, he took the way to Lille. Marshal Macdonald, returning from the fatal position of Melun, assumed the command of this small body, which was indeed augmented by many volunteers, but such as considered their zealous wishes, rather than their power of rendering assistance. The king's condition was, however, pitied and respected, and he passed through Abbeville, and other garrison towns, where the soldiers received him with sullen respect; and though indicating that they intended to join his rival, would neither violate his person nor insult his misfortunes. At Lille he had hoped to make a stand, but Marshal Mortier, insisting upon the dissatisfied and tumultuary state of the garrison, urged him to proceed, for the safety of his life; and, compelled to a second exile, he departed to Ostend, and from thence to Ghent, where he established his exiled court. Marshal Macdonald took leave of his majesty on the frontiers, conscious that by emigrating he must lose every prospect of serving in future either France or her monarch. The household troops, about two hundred excepted, were also disbanded on the frontiers. They had been harassed in their march thither by some light horse, and, in their attempt to regain their homes in a state of dispersion, some were slain, and almost all were plundered and insulted.

In the meanwhile, the revolution took full effect at Paris. Lavalette, one of Bonaparte's most decided adherents, hastened from a place of concealment to assume the management of the post-office in the name of Napoleon, an office which he had enjoyed during his former reign. He was thus enabled to intercept the royal proclamations, and to announce to every department officially the restoration of the emperor. Excelsmans, the oath of fealty to the king, *à toute épreuve*, scarce dry upon his lips, took down

the white flag, which floated on the Tuileries, and replaced the three-coloured banner.

It was late in the evening ere Napoleon arrived in the same open carriage, which he had used since his landing. There was a singular contrast betwixt his entry and the departure of the king. The latter was accompanied by the sobs, tears, and kind wishes of those citizens who desired peace and tranquillity, by the wailing of the defenceless, and the anxious fears of the wise and prudent. The former entered amid the shouts of armed columns, who, existing by war and desolation, welcomed with military acclamations the chief, who was to restore them to their element. The inhabitants of the suburbs cheered in expectation of employment and gratuities, or by instigation of their ringleaders, who were chiefly under the management of the police, and well prepared for the event. But among the immense crowds of the citizens of Paris, who turned out to see this extraordinary spectacle, few or none joined in the gratulation. The soldiers of the guard resented their silence, commanded the spectators to shout, struck with the flat of their swords, and pointed their pistols at the multitude, but could not even by these military means extort the expected cry of Liberty and Napoleon, though making it plain by their demeanour, that the last, if not the first, was returned to the Parisians. In the court of the Carrousel, and before the Tuileries, all the adherents of the old imperial government, and those who, having deserted Napoleon, were eager to expiate their fault, by now being first to acknowledge him, were assembled to give voice to their welcome, which atoned in some degree for the silence of the streets. They crowded around him so closely, that he was compelled to exclaim,—“My friends, you stifle me!” and his adjutants were obliged to support him in their arms up the grand staircase, and thence into the royal apartments, where he received the all-hail of the principal advisers and abettors of this singular undertaking.

Never, in his bloodiest and most triumphant field of battle, had the terrible ascendancy of Napoleon's genius appeared half so predominant as during his march, or rather his journey, from Cambray to Paris. He who left the same coast, disguised like a slave, and weeping like a woman, for fear of assassination, returned in grandeur like that of the returning wave, which, the farther it has retreated, is rolled back on the shore with the more terrific and overwhelming violence. His looks seemed to possess the pretended power of northern magicians, and blunted swords and spears. The bravest of the Brave, who came determined to oppose him as he would a wild beast, recognized his superiority when confronted with him, and sunk again into his satellite. Yet the lustre with which Napoleon shone was not that of a planet duly moving in its regular sphere, but that of a comet, inspiring forebodings of pestilence and death, and,

—with fear of change,

Perplexing nations.

The result of his expedition was thus summed up by one of the most eloquent and best-informed British statesmen.*

* Sir James Mackintosh.

"Was it," said the accomplished orator, "in the power of language to describe the evil? Wars which had raged for twenty-five years throughout Europe; which had spread blood and desolation from Cadix to Moscow, and from Naples to Copenhagen; which had wasted the means of human enjoyment, and destroyed the instruments of social improvement; which threatened to diffuse among the European nations the dissolute and ferocious habits of a predatory soldiery,—at length, by one of those vicissitudes which bid defiance to the foresight of man, had been brought to a close, upon the whole happy beyond all reasonable expectation, with no violent shock to national independence, with some tolerable compromise between the opinions of the age and the reverence due to ancient institutions; with no too signal or mortifying triumph over the legitimate interests or avowable feelings of any numerous body of men, and, above all, without those retaliations against nations or parties which beget new convulsions, often as horrible as those which they close, and perpetuate revenge and hatred and blood from age to age. Europe seemed to breathe after her sufferings. In the midst of this fair prospect, and of these consolatory hopes, Napoleon Bonaparte escaped from Elba; three small vessels reached the coast of Provence; their hopes are instantly dispelled; the work of our toil and fortitude is undone; the blood of Europe is spilt in vain—

Ibi omnis effusus labor!"

CHAPTER CIII.

Various attempts to organize a defence for the Bourbons fail.—Bonaparte, again reinstated on the throne of France, is desirous of continuing the peace with the allies—but no answer is returned to his letters.—Treaty of Vienna.—Grievances alleged by Bonaparte in justification of the step he had taken.—Debates in the British House of Commons, on the renewal of war.—Murat occupies Rome with 50,000 men—his proclamation summoning all Italians to arms.—He advances against the Austrians—is repulsed at Occhio-Bello—defeated at Tolentino—flies to Naples, and thence, in disguise, to France—where Napoleon refuses to receive him.

WHEN Paris was lost, the bow of the Bourbons was effectually broken; and the attempts of individuals of the family to make a stand against the evil hour was honourable indeed to their own gallantry, but of no advantage to their cause.

The Duke d'Angoulême placed himself at the head of a considerable body of troops, raised by the town of Marseilles, and the royalists of Provence. But, being surrounded by General Gilly, he was obliged to lay down his arms, on condition of amnesty to his followers, and free permission to himself to leave France. General Crouchy refused to confirm this capitulation, till Bonaparte's pleasure was known. But the restored emperor, not displeased, it may be, to make a display of generosity, permitted the Duke d'Angoulême to depart by sea from Cette, only requiring his interference with Louis XVIII. for returning the crown-jewels which the king had removed with him to Ghent.

The Duke of Bourbon had retired to La Vendée to raise the warlike royalists of that faithful province. But it had been previously occupied by soldiers attached to Bonaparte, so judiciously posted as to render an insurrection impossible; and the duke found himself obliged to escape by sea from Nantes.

The Duchess d'Angoulême, the only remaining daughter of Louis XVI., whose childhood and youth had suffered with patient firmness such storms of adversity, showed on this trying occasion that she had the active as well as passive courage becoming the descendant of a long line of princes. She threw herself into Bordeaux, where the loyalty of Count Lynch, the mayor, and of the citizens in general, promised her determined aid, and the princess herself stood forth amongst them, like one of those heroic women of the age of chivalry, whose looks and words were able in moments of peril to give double edge to men's swords, and double constancy to their hearts. But unhappily there was a considerable garrison of troops of the line in Bordeaux, who had caught the general spirit of revolt. General Clausel also advanced on the city with a force of the same description. The duchess made a last effort, assembled around her the officers, and laid their duty before them in the most touching and pathetic manner. But when she saw their coldness, and heard their faltering excuses, she turned from them in disdain:—"You fear," she said—"I pity you, and release you from your oaths." She embarked on board an English frigate, and Bordeaux opened its gates to Clausel, and declared for the emperor. Thus, notwithstanding the return of Napoleon was far from being acceptable to the French universally, or even generally, all open opposition to his government ceased, and he was acknowledged as emperor within about twenty days after he landed on the beach at Cannes, with a thousand followers.

But though he was thus replaced on the throne, Napoleon's seat was by no means secure, unless he could prevail upon the confederated sovereigns of Europe to acknowledge him in the capacity of which their united arms had so lately deprived him. It is true, he had indirectly promised war to his soldiers, by stigmatizing the cessions made by the Bourbons of what he called the territory of France. It is true, also, that then, and till his death's day, he continued to entertain the rooted idea that Belgium, a possession which France had acquired within twenty years, was an integral portion of that kingdom. It is true, Antwerp and the five hundred sail of the line which were to be built there, continued through his whole life to be the very Dalilah of his imagination. The cause of future war was, therefore, blazing in his bosom. But yet at present he felt it necessary for his interest to assure the people of France, that his return to the empire would not disturb the treaty of Paris, though it had given the Low Countries to Holland. He spared no device to spread reports of a pacific tendency.

From the commencement of his march, it was affirmed by his creatures that he brought with him a treaty concluded with all the powers of Europe for twenty years. It was repeatedly averred, that Maria Louisa and her son were on the point of arriving in France, dismissed by her father as a pledge of

reconciliation; and when she did not appear, it was insinuated that she was detained by the Emperor Francis, as a pledge that Bonaparte should observe his promise of giving the French a free constitution. To such barefaced assertions he was reduced, rather than admit that his return was to be the signal for renewing hostilities with all Europe.

Meantime Napoleon hesitated not to offer to the allied ministers his willingness to acquiesce in the treaty of Paris; although, according to his uniform reasoning, it involved the humiliation and disgrace of France. He sent a letter to each of the sovereigns, expressing his desire to make peace on the same principles which had been arranged with the Bourbons. To these letters no answers were returned. The decision of the allies had already been adopted.

The congress at Vienna happened fortunately not to be dissolved, when the news of Bonaparte's escape from Elba was laid before them by Talleyrand on the 11th March. The astonishing, as well as the sublime, approaches to the ludicrous, and it is a curious physiological fact, that the first news of an event which threatened to abolish all their labours, seemed so like a trick in a pantomime, that laughter was the first emotion it excited from almost every one. The merry mood did not last long; for the jest was neither a sound nor a safe one. It was necessary for the congress, by an unequivocal declaration, to express their sentiments upon this extraordinary occasion. This declaration appeared on the 13th March, and, after giving an account of the fact, bore the following denunciation:—

"By thus breaking the convention which had established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte destroys the only legal title on which his existence depended; and, by appearing again in France with projects of confusion and disorder, he has deprived himself of the protection of the law, and has manifested to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.

"The powers consequently declare, that Napoleon Bonaparte has placed himself without the pale of civil and social relations, and that, as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world, he has rendered himself liable to public vengeance. They declare at the same time, that, firmly resolved to maintain entire the treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814, and the dispositions sanctioned by that treaty, and those which they have resolved on, or shall hereafter resolve on, to complete and to consolidate it, they will employ all their means, and will unite all their efforts, that the general peace, the object of the wishes of Europe, and the constant purpose of their labours, may not again be troubled; and to provide against every attempt which shall threaten to replunge the world into the disorders of revolution."

This manifesto was instantly followed by a treaty betwixt Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, renewing and confirming the league entered into at Chaumont. The first article declared the resolution of the high contracting parties to maintain and enforce the treaty of Paris, which excluded Bonaparte from the throne of France, and to enforce the decree of outlawry issued against him as above mentioned.

2. Each of the contracting parties agreed to keep

constantly in the field an army of 150,000 men complete, with the due proportion of cavalry and artillery. 3. They agreed not to lay down their arms but by common consent, until either the purpose of the war should have been attained, or Bonaparte should be rendered incapable of disturbing the peace of Europe. After other subordinate articles, the 7th provided, that the other powers of Europe should be invited to accede to the treaty; and the 8th, that the King of France should be particularly called upon to become a party to it. A separate article provided, that the King of Great Britain should have the option of furnishing his contingent in men, or of paying instead at the rate of £30 sterling per annum for each cavalry soldier, and £20 per annum for each infantry soldier, which should be wanting to make up his complement. To this treaty a declaration was subjoined, when it was ratified by the Prince Regent, referring to the eighth article of the treaty, and declaring that it should not be understood as binding his Britannic Majesty to prosecute the war, with the view of forcibly imposing on France any particular government. The other contracting powers agreed to accept of the accession of his royal highness, under this explanation and limitation.

This treaty of Vienna may be considered in a double point of view, first, upon principle, and secondly, as to its mode of expression; and it was commented upon in both respects in the British House of Commons. The expediency of the war was denied by several of the opposition members on account of the exhausted state of Great Britain, but they generally admitted that the escape of Bonaparte gave a just cause for the declaration of hostilities. The great statesman and juriconsult, whom we have already quoted, delivered an opinion for himself, and those with whom he acted, couched in the most positive terms.

"Some insinuations," said Sir James Mackintosh, "had been thrown out, of differences of opinion on his side of the house, respecting the evils of this escape. He utterly denied them. All agreed in lamenting the occurrence which rendered the renewal of war so probable, not to say certain. All his friends, with whose sentiments he was acquainted, were of opinion, that, in the theory of public law, the assumption of power by Napoleon had given to the allies a just cause of war against France. It was perfectly obvious, that the abdication of Napoleon, and his perpetual renunciation of the supreme authority, was a condition, and the most important condition, on which the allies had granted peace to France. The convention of Fontainebleau, and the treaty of Paris, were equally parts of the great compact which re-established friendship between France and Europe. In consideration of the safer and more inoffensive state of France, when separated from her terrible leader, confederated Europe had granted moderate and favourable terms of peace. As soon as France had violated this important condition, by again submitting to the authority of Napoleon, the allies were doubtless released from their part of the compact, and re-entered into their beligerent rights."

The provocations pleaded by Bonaparte (which

seem to have been entirely fanciful, so far as respects any design on his freedom), were, first, The separation from his family. But this was a question with Austria exclusively; for what power was to compel the Emperor Francis to restore his daughter, after the fate of war had flung her again under his paternal protection? Napoleon's feelings in his situation were extremely natural, but those of the emperor cannot be blamed, who considered his daughter's honour and happiness as interested in separating her from a man, who was capable of attempting to redeem his broken fortunes by the most desperate means. Much would depend upon the inclination of the illustrious person herself; but even if some degree of paternal restraint had been exerted, could Napoleon really feel himself justified in renewing a sort of Trojan war with all the powers in Europe, in order to recover his wife, or think, because he was separated from her society by a flinty-hearted father, that he was therefore warranted in invading and subduing the kingdom of France? The second article of provocation, and we admit it as a just one, was that Napoleon was left to necessities to which he ought not to have been subjected, by France withholding his pension till the year should elapse. This was a ground of complaint, and a deep one; but against whom? Surely not against the allies, unless Bonaparte had called upon them to make good their treaty; and had stated, that France had failed to make good those obligations, for which he had their guarantee. England, who was only an accessory to the treaty, had nevertheless already interfered in Bonaparte's behalf, and there can be no doubt that redress would have been granted by the contracting parties, who could not in decency avoid enforcing a treaty, which had been of their own forming. That this guarantee gave Napoleon a right to appeal and to complain, cannot be denied; but that it gave him a right to proceed by violence, without any expostulation previously made, is contrary to all ideas of the law of nations, which enacts, that no aggression can constitute a legitimate cause of war, until redress has been refused. This, however, is all mere legal argument. Bonaparte did not invade France, because she was deficient in paying his pension. He invaded her, because he saw a strong prospect of regaining the throne; nor do we believe that millions of gold would have prevailed on him to forego the opportunity.

His more available ground of defence, however, was, that he was recalled by the general voice of the nation of France; but the whole facts of the case contradicted this statement. His league with the revolutionists was made reluctantly on their part, nor did that party form any very considerable portion of the nation. "His election," according to Grattan, "was a military election; and when the army disposed of the civil government, it was the march of a military chief over a conquered nation. The nation did not rise to assist Louis, or resist Bonaparte, because the nation could not rise against the army. The mind of France, as well as her constitution, had completely lost, for the present, the power of resistance. They passively yielded to superior force."

In short, the opinion of the House of Commons

was so unanimous on the disastrous consequences of Napoleon's quitting Elba, that the minority brought charges against ministers for not having provided more effectual means to prevent his escape. To these charges it was replied, that Britain was not his keeper; that it was impossible to maintain a line of blockade around Elba; and if it had been otherwise, that Britain had no right to interfere with Bonaparte's motions, so far as concerned short expeditions unconnected with the purpose of escape; although it was avowed, that if a British vessel had detected him in the act of going to France with an armed force, for the purpose of invasion, the right of stopping his progress would have been exercised at every hazard. Still, it was urged, they had no title either to establish a police upon the island, the object of which should be to watch its acknowledged emperor, or to maintain a naval force around it, to apprehend him in case he should attempt an escape. Both would have been in direct contradiction of the treaty of Fontainebleau, to which Britain had acceded, though she was not one of the contracting parties.

The style of the declaration of the allies was more generally censured in the British Parliament than its warlike tone. It was contended, that, by declaring Napoleon an outlaw, it invoked against him the daggers of individuals, as well as the sword of justice. This charge of encouraging assassination was warmly repelled by the supporters of ministry. The purpose of the proclamation, it was said, was merely to point out Napoleon to the French nation, as a person who had forfeited his civil rights, by the act of resuming, contrary to treaty, a position in which, from his temper, habits, and talents, he must again become an object of suspicion and terror to all Europe. His inflexible resolution, his unbounded ambition, his own genius, his power over the minds of others,—those great military talents, in short, which, so valuable in war, are in peace so dangerous, had afforded reasons for making the peace of Paris, by which Napoleon was personally excluded from the throne. When Napoleon broke that peace, solemnly concluded with Europe, he forfeited his political rights, and in that view alone the outlawry was to be construed. In consequence of these resolutions, adopted at Vienna and London, all Europe rang with the preparations for war; and the number of troops with which the allies proposed to invade France were rated at no less than one million and eleven thousand soldiers.*

Before proceeding further, it is requisite to say a few words on the subject of Murat. He had been for some time agitated by fears naturally arising from the attack made upon his government at the congress, by Talleyrand. The effect had not, it was true, induced the other powers to decide against him; but he seems to have been conscious that the reports of General Nugent and Lord William Rensselaer, concurred in representing him as having acted in the last campaign, rather the part of a trimmer betwixt two parties, than that of a con-

* The contingents of the various powers were as follows:—Austria 300,000 men; Russia 225,000; Prussia 236,000; States of Germany 150,000; Great Britain 50,000; Holland 50,000; in all, 1,011,000 soldiers.

federate, sincere, as he professed to be, in favour of the allies. Perhaps his conscience acknowledged this truth, for it certainly seems as if Eugène might have been more hardly pressed, had Murat been disposed to act with energy in behalf of the allies. He felt, therefore, that the throne of Tancred tottered under him, and rashly determined that it was better to brave a danger, than to allow time to see whether it might not pass away. Murat had held intercourse with the Isle of Elba, and cannot but have known Bonaparte's purpose when he left it; but he ought, at the same time, to have considered, that if his brother-in-law met with any success, his own alliance would become essential to Austria, who had such anxiety to retain the north of Italy, and must have been purchased on his own terms.

Instead, however, of waiting for an opportunity of profiting by Napoleon's attempt, which could not have failed to arrive, Murat resolved to throw himself into the fray and carve for himself. He placed himself at the head of an army of 50,000 men, and, without explaining his intentions, occupied Rome, the pope and cardinals flying before him; threatened the whole line of the Po, which the Austrian force was inadequate to maintain; and on 31st of March, addressed a proclamation to all Italians, summoning them to rise in arms for the liberation of their country. It seemed now clear, that the purpose of this son of a pastry-cook amounted to nothing else, than the formation of Italy into one state, and the placing himself on the throne of the Cæsars. The proclamation was signed Joachim Napoleon, which last name, formerly laid aside, he re-assumed at this critical period. The appeal to the Italians was in vain. The feuds among the petty states are so numerous, their pretensions so irreconcilable, and their weakness has made them so often the prey of successive conquerors, that they found little inviting in the proposal of union, little arousing in the sound of independence. The proclamation, therefore, had small effect, except upon some of the students at Bologna. Murat marched northward, however, and, being much superior in numbers, defeated the Austrian general Bianchi, and occupied Modena and Florence.

Murat's attitude was now an alarming one to Europe. If he should press forward into Lombardy, he might co-operate with Bonaparte, now restored to his crown, and would probably be reinforced by thousands of the veterans of the Viceroy Eugène's army. Austria, therefore, became desirous of peace, and offered to guarantee to him the possession of the kingdom of Naples, with an addition he had long coveted, the marches, namely, of the Roman See. Britain, at the same time, intimated, that, having made truce with Joachim at the instance of Austria, it was to last no longer than his good intelligence with her ally. Murat refused the conditions of the one power, and neglected the remonstrances of the other. "It was too late," he said; "Italy deserves freedom, and she shall be free." Here closed all hopes of peace; Austria declared war against Murat, and expedited the reinforcements sent into Italy; and Britain prepared a descent upon his Neapolitan dominions, where Ferdinand still continued to have many adherents.

Murat's character as a tactician was far inferior to that which he deservedly bore as a soldier in the field of battle, and he was a still worse politician than a general. A repulse sustained in an attempt to pass the Po near Occhio-Bello seems to have disconcerted the plan of his whole campaign, nor did he find himself able to renew the negotiations which he had rashly broken off. He seemed to acknowledge, by his military movements, that he had attempted a scheme far beyond his strength and understanding. He retreated upon his whole line, abandoning Parma, Reggio, Modena, Florence, and all Tuscany, by which last movement he put the Austrians in possession of the best and shortest road to Rome. In consequence, he was pressed on his retreat in front and rear, and compelled to give battle near Tolentino. It was sustained for two days (2d and 3d of May), but the Neapolitans could not be brought into close action with the iron-nerved Austrians. It was in vain that Murat placed field-pieces in the rear of his attacking columns, with orders to fire grape on them should they retreat; in vain that he himself set the example of the most desperate courage. The Neapolitan army fled in dispersion and discomfiture. Their guns, ammunition, treasure, and baggage, became the spoil of the Austrians; and in traversing the mountains of Abruzzo, Murat lost half his army without stroke of sword.

The defeated prince was pursued into his Neapolitan dominions, where he learned that the Calabrians were in insurrection, and that an English fleet, escorting an invading army from Sicily, had appeared in the bay of Naples. His army, reduced to a handful by repeated skirmishes, in which he had behaved with such temerity as to make his followers think he desired death, was directed to throw itself into Capua. He himself, who had left Naples splendidly appareled, according to his custom, and at the head of a gallant army, now entered its gates attended only by four lancers, alighted at the palace, and appeared before the queen, pale, haggard, disheveled, with all the signs of extreme fatigue and dejection. His salutation was in the affecting words, "Madam, I have not been able to find death." He presently found, that remaining at Naples, which was about to fall into other hands, would compromise his liberty, perhaps his life. He took leave of his queen, whom circumstances were about to deprive of that title, cut off his hair, and, disguising himself in a grey frock, escaped to the little island of Ischia, and reached, on 25th May, Cannes, which had received Napoleon a few weeks before. His wife immediately afterwards, alarmed by the tendency of the Neapolitan mob to insurrection, surrendered herself to Commodore Campbell, of the *Tremendous*, and was received on board his vessel.

A courier announced Murat's arrival in France to Bonaparte, who, instead of sending consolation to his unhappy relative, is said to have asked with bitter scorn, "Whether Naples and France had made peace since the war of 1814?" The answer seems to imply, that although the attempts of Joachim and Napoleon coincided in time, and in other circumstances, so punctually as to make it evident they had been undertaken in concert, yet that there

had been no precise correspondence, far less any formal treaty, betwixt the adventurous brothers. Indeed Napoleon at all times positively denied that he had the least accession to Murat's wildly-concerted project (*levée de bouclier*), and affirmed that it was essentially injurious to him. Napoleon's account was, that when he retired to Elba, he took farewell of Murat by letter, forgiving all that had passed between them, and recommending to his brother-in-law to keep on good terms with the Austrians, and only to check them if he saw them likely to advance on France. He offered also to guarantee his kingdom. Murat returned an affectionate answer, engaging to prove himself, in his conduct towards Napoleon, more an object of pity than resentment, declining any other guarantee than the word of the emperor, and declaring that the attachment of his future life was to make amends for the past defection. "But it was Murat's fate to ruin us every way," continued Napoleon; "once by declaring against us, and again by unadvisedly taking our part." He encountered Austria without sufficient means, and, being ruined, left her without any counterbalancing power in Italy. From that time it became impossible for Napoleon to negotiate with her.

Receiving the emperor's account as correct, and allowing that the brothers-in-law played each his own part, it was not to be supposed that they acted entirely without a mutual understanding. Each, indeed, was willing to rest on his own fortunes, well knowing that his claim to the other's assistance would depend chiefly upon his success, and unwilling, besides, to relinquish the privilege of making peace, should it be necessary, at the expense of disowning the kindred enterprise of his brother-in-law. Notwithstanding the splendid details which the *Moniteur* gave of Murat's undertaking, while it yet seemed to promise success, it is certain that Bonaparte endeavoured to propitiate Austria, by the offer of abandoning Murat; and that Murat, could his offers have obtained a hearing after the repulse of Occhio-Bello, was ready once more to have deserted Napoleon, whose name he had so lately reassumed. Involved in this maze of selfish policy, Murat had now the mortification to find himself contemned by Napoleon, when he might, indeed, be a burden, but could afford him no aid. Had he arrived at Milan as a victor, and extended a friendly hand across the Alps, how different would have been his reception! But Bonaparte refused to see him in his distress, or to permit him to come to Paris, satisfied that the sight of his misery would be a bitter contradiction to the fables which the French journals had, for some time, published of his success. Fouché sent him a message, much like that which enjoined the dishonoured ambassadors of Solomon to tarry at Jericho till their beards grew. It recommended to Murat to remain in seclusion, till the recollection of his disgrace should be abated by newer objects of general interest.

Bonaparte had sometimes entertained thoughts of bringing Murat to the army, but was afraid of shocking the French soldiers, who would have felt disgust and horror at seeing the man who had betrayed France. "I did not," he said to his followers at St Helena, "think I could carry him through, and

yet he might have gained us the victory; for there were moments during the battle (of Waterloo), when to have forced two or three of the English squares might have insured it, and Murat was just the man for the work. In leading a charge of cavalry, never was there an officer more determined, more brave, and more brilliant."

Murat was thus prohibited to come to the court of the Tuileries, where his defection might have been forgiven, but his defeat was an inexpiable offence. He remained in obscurity near Toulon, till his fate called him elsewhere, after the decisive battle of Waterloo.* From this episode, for such, however important, it is in the present history, we return to France and our immediate subject.

CHAPTER CIV.

Bonaparte's attempts to conciliate Britain.—Plot to carry off Maria Louisa fails.—State of feeling in France with regard to Bonaparte's return—the army—the Jacobins—the constitutionalists.—Fouché and Sieyès made peers.—Freedom of the press granted, and outraged.—Independent conduct of Comte, editor of le Censeur.—Disaffections among the lower orders.—Part of them attached to Bonaparte.—These assemble before the Tuileries, and applaud the emperor.—Festival of the Federates.—New constitution.—It is received with dissatisfaction.—Meeting of the Champ-de-Mai to ratify it.—Bonaparte's address to the Chambers of Peers and Representatives.—The spirit of Jacobinism predominant in the latter.

WHILE Murat was struggling and sinking under his evil fate, Bonaparte was actively preparing for the approaching contest. His first attempt, as we have already seen, was to conciliate the allied powers. To satisfy Great Britain, he passed an act abolishing the slave trade, and made some regulations concerning national education, in which he spoke highly of the systems of Bell and Lancaster. These measures were favourably construed

* It is well known that Joachim Murat, escaping with difficulty from France, fled to Corsica, and might have obtained permission to reside upon parole in the Austrian territories, safe and unmolested. He nourished a wild idea, however, of recovering his crown, which induced him to reject these terms of safety, and invade the Neapolitan territories at the head of about two hundred men. That his whole expedition might be an accurate parody on that of Bonaparte to Caunes, he published swaggering proclamations, mingled with a proper quantum of falsehood. A storm dispersed his flotilla. He himself, October 8th, landed at a little fishing town near Monte Leone. He was attacked by the country people, fought as he was wont, but was defeated and made prisoner, tried by martial law, and condemned. The Sicilian royal family have shown themselves no forgiving race, otherwise mercy might have been extended to one, who, though now a private person, had been so lately a king, that he might be pardoned for forgetting that he had no longer the power of making peace and war without personal responsibility. Murat met his fate as became *le beau sabreur*. He fastened his wife's picture on his breast, refused to have his eyes bandaged, or to use a seat, received six balls through his heart, and met the death which he had braved with impunity in the thick of many conflicts, and sought in vain in so many others.

by some of our legislators, and that they were so, is a complete proof that Bonaparte understood the temper of our nation. To suppose that, during his ten months of retirement, his mind was actively employed upon the miseries of the negroes, or the deplorable state of ignorance to which his own measures, and the want of early instruction, had reduced the youth of France, would argue but little acquaintance with his habits of ambition. To believe, on the contrary, that he would, at his first arrival in France, make any apparent sacrifices which might attract the good-will of his powerful and dangerous neighbours, is more consonant with his schemes, his interest, and his character. The path which he chose to gain the esteem of Britain was by no means injudicious. The abolition of negro slavery, and the instruction of the poor, have (to the honour of our legislature) been frequent and anxious subjects of deliberation in the House of Commons; and to mankind, whether individually or collectively, no species of flattery is more pleasing than that of assent and imitation. It is not a little to the credit of our country, that the most avowed enemy of Britain strove to cultivate our good opinion, not by any offers of national advantage, but by appearing to concur in general measures of benevolence, and attention to the benefit of society. Yet, upon the whole, the character of Napoleon was too generally understood, and the purpose of his apparent approximation to British sentiments too obviously affected, for serving to make any general or serious impression in his favour.

With Austria, Napoleon acted differently. He was aware that no impression could be made on the Emperor Francis, or his minister Metternich, and that it had become impossible, with their consent, that he should fulfil his promise of presenting his wife and son to the people on the Champ-de-Mai. Stratagem remained the only resource; and some Frenchmen at Vienna, with those in Maria Louisa's train, formed a scheme of carrying off the Empress of France and her child. The plot was discovered and prevented, and the most public steps were immediately taken, to show that Austria considered all ties with Bonaparte as dissolved for ever. Maria Louisa, by her father's commands, laid aside the arms and liveries of her husband, hitherto displayed by her attendants and carriages, and assumed those of the house of Austria. This decisive event put an end to every hope so long cherished by Napoleon, that he might find some means of regaining the friendship of his father-in-law.

Nor did the other powers in Europe show themselves more accessible to his advances. He was, therefore, reduced to his own partisans in the French nation, and those won over from other parties, whom he might be able to add to them.

The army had sufficiently shown themselves to be his own, upon grounds which are easily appreciated. The host of public official persons, to whom the name under which they exercised their offices was indifferent, provided the salary continued to be attached to them, formed a large and influential body. And although we, who have never, by such mutations of our political system, been put to the trial of either abandoning our means of living, or submitting

to a change of government, may, on hearing quoted names of respectability and celebrity who adopted the latter alternative, exclaim against French versatility, a glance at Britain during the frequent changes of the 17th century may induce us to exchange the exclamation of poor France! for that of poor human nature! The professors of Cromwell's days, who piously termed themselves followers of Providence, because they complied with every change that came uppermost; and the sect of time-servers, including the honest patriot, who complained at the Restoration that he had complied with seven forms of government during the year, but lost his office by being too late of adhering to the last,—would have made in their day a list equally long, and as entertaining, as the celebrated *Dictionnaire des Girouettes*. In matters dependent upon a sudden breeze of sentiment, the mercenary Frenchman is more apt to tack about than the phlegmatic and slowly-moved native of Britain; but when the steady trade-wind of interest prevails for a long season, men in all nations and countries show the same irresistible disposition to trim their sails by it; and in politics as in morals, it will be well to pray against being led into temptation.

Besides those attached to him by mere interest, or from gratitude and respect for his talents, Napoleon had now among his adherents, or rather allies, not as a matter of choice, but of necessity, the Jacobin party, who had been obliged, though unwillingly, to adopt him as the head of a government, which they hoped to regenerate. To these were to be added a much larger and more respectable body, who, far from encouraging his attempt, had testified themselves anxious to oppose it to the last, but who, conceiving the cause of the Bourbons entirely lost, were willing to adhere to Bonaparte, on condition of obtaining a free constitution for France. Many of these acted, of course, on mixed motives; but if we were asked to form a definition of them, we should be induced to give the same, which, laying aside party spirit, we would ascribe to a right English whig, whom we conceive to be a man of sense and moderation, a lover of laws and liberty, whose chief regard to particular princes and families is founded on what he apprehends to be the public good; and who differs from a sensible Tory so little, that there is no great chance of their disputing upon any important constitutional question, if it is fairly stated to both. Such, we believe, is the difference betwixt rational constitutionalists and royalists in France; and undoubtedly, while all the feelings of the latter induced them to eye with abhorrence the domination of a usurper, there must have been many of the former, who, fearing danger to the independence of France from the intervention of foreign powers, conceived, that by advocating the cause of Napoleon, they were in some degree making a virtue of necessity, and playing an indifferent game with as much skill as the cards they held would permit. Many patriotic and sensible men, who had retained a regard for liberty during all the governments and all the anarchies which had subsisted for twenty years, endeavoured now to frame a system of government, grounded upon something like freedom, upon the difficulties of Bonaparte. Pressed

as he was from abroad, and unsupported at home, save by the soldiery, he would, they conceived, be thrown by necessity under the protection of the nation, and obliged to recruit his adherents by complying with public opinion, and adopting a free government. Under this persuasion a great number of such characters, more or less shaded by attachment to a moderate and limited monarchy, were prepared to acknowledge Bonaparte's re-established authority, in so far as he should be found to deserve it, by concessions on his part.

The conduct and arguments of another portion of the friends of the constitution rather resembled that which might have been adopted in England by moderate and intelligent Tories. Such men were not prepared to resign the cause of their lawful monarch, because fortune had for a time declared against him. They were of opinion that, to make a constitution permanent, the monarch must have his rights ascertained and vindicated, as well as those of the people; and that if a usurper was to be acknowledged upon any terms, however plausible, so soon as he had cut his way to success by his sword, the nation would be exposed to perpetual revolutions. Louis, these men might argue, had committed no crime whatever; he was only placed in circumstances which made some persons suppose he might possibly be tempted to meditate changes on the constitution, and on the charter which confirmed it. There was meanness in deserting a good and peaceable king at the command of a revolted army, and a discarded usurper. They regretted that their prince must be replaced by foreign bayonets; yet it was perhaps better that a moderate and peaceful government should be restored even thus, than that the French nation should continue to suffer under the despotic tyranny of their own soldiery. Those reasoners ridiculed the idea of a free constitution, which was to be generated betwixt Bonaparte, who, in his former reign never allowed freedom of thought, word, or action, to exist unexpressed, and the old revolutionists, who, during their period of power, could be satisfied with no degree of liberty, until they destroyed every compact which holds civil society together, and made the country resemble one great bedlam, set on fire by the patients, who remained dancing in the midst of the flames.

Such we conceive to have been the principles on which wise and moderate men on either side acted during this distracted period. It is easy to suppose, that their opinions must have been varied by many more and less minute shades, arising from temperament, predilections, prejudices, passions, and feelings of self-interest, and that they were on either side liable to be pushed into exaggeration, or, according to the word which was formed to express that exaggeration,—into ultraism.

Meantime, Napoleon did all that was possible to conciliate the people's affection, and to show himself sincerely desirous of giving France the free constitution which he had promised. He used the advice of Carnot, Siéyes, and Fouché, and certainly profited by several of their lessons. He made it, notwithstanding, a condition, that Carnot and Siéyes should accept each a title and a seat in his House of Peers, to show that they were completely recon-

ciled to the imperial government; and both the ancient republicans condescended to exchange the *bonnet rouge* for a coronet, which, considering their former opinions, sate somewhat awkwardly upon their brows.

But although the union of the imperialists and popular party had been cemented by mutual hatred of the Bourbons, and was still kept together by apprehension of the king's adherents within, and his allies on the exterior, seeds of discord were soon visible between the emperor and the popular leaders. While the former was eager once more to wield with full energy the sceptre he had recovered, the latter were continually reminding him, that he had only assumed it in a limited and restricted capacity, as the head of a free government, exercising, indeed, its executive power, but under the restraint of a popular constitution. Napoleon, in the frequent disputes which arose on these important points, was obliged to concede to the demagogues the principles which they insisted upon. But then, for the safety of the state, involved in foreign and domestic dangers, he contended it was necessary to invest the chief magistrate with a vigour beyond the law, a dictatorial authority, temporary in its duration, but nearly absolute in its extent, as had been the manner in the free states of antiquity, when the republic was in imminent danger. Carnot and Fouché, on the other hand, considered, that although it seemed natural, and might be easy, to confer such power at the present moment, the resumption of it by the nation, when it was once vested in the hands of Bonaparte, would be a hopeless experiment. The emperor, therefore, and his ministers, proceeded to their mutual tasks with no mutual confidence; but, on the contrary, with jealousy, thinly veiled by an affectation of deference on the side of Bonaparte, and respect on that of his counsellors.

The very first sacrifice which the emperor gave to freedom proved an inconvenient one to his government. This was nothing less than the freedom of the press. It is true, that the influence of his minister of police managed by indirect means to get possession of most of the journals; so that of sixty writers, employed generally, if not constantly, in periodical composition, five only were now found friendly to the royal cause. The other pens, which a few days before described Napoleon as a species of ogre, who had devoured the youth of France, now wrote him down a hero and a liberator. Still, when the liberty of the press was once established, it was soon found impossible to prevent it from asserting its right of utterance; and there were found authors to advocate the cause of the Bourbons, from principle, from caprice, from the love of contradiction.

Napoleon, who always showed himself sensitively alive to the public censure, established inspectors of the booksellers. The minister of police, a friend of liberty, but, as Comte, the editor of *le Censeur*, neatly observed, only of liberty after the fashion of Monsieur Fouché, used every art in his power to prevent the contagion of freedom from spreading too widely. This Monsieur Comte was a loud, and probably a sincere advocate of freedom, and had been a promoter of Bonaparte's return, as likely to advance the good cause. Seeing the prevailing influ-

ence of the military, he published some severe remarks on the undue weight the army assumed in public affairs, which he hesitated not to say, was bringing France to the condition of Rome, when the empire was disposed of by the Prætorian guards. This stung to the quick—the journal was seized by the police, and the minister endeavoured to palliate the fact in the *Moniteur*, by saying that though seized, it had been instantly restored. But Comte was not a man to be so silenced; he published a contradiction of the official statement, and declared that his journal had not been restored. He was summoned the next day before the prefect, alternately threatened and wheedled, upbraided at one moment with ungrateful resistance to the cause of the emperor, and requested the next to think of something in which government might serve him. Steeled against every proffer and entreaty, Comte only required to be permitted to profit by the restored liberty of the press; nor could the worthy magistrate make him rightly understand that when the emperor gave all men liberty to publish what pleased themselves, it was under the tacit condition that it should also please the prefect and minister of police. Comte had the spirit to publish the whole affair.

In the meanwhile, proclamations of Louis, forbidding the payment of taxes, and announcing the arrival of 1,200,000 men under the walls of Paris, covered these walls every night in spite of the police. A newspaper, called the *Lily*, was also secretly but generally circulated, which advocated the royal cause. In the better classes of society, where Bonaparte was feared and hated, lampoons, satires, pasquinades glided from hand to hand, turning his person, ministers, and government, into the most bitter ridicule. Others attacked him with eloquent invective, and demanded what he had in common with the word Liberty, which he now pretended to connect with his reign. He was, they said, the sworn enemy of liberty, the assassin of the Republic, the destroyer of French freedom which had been so dearly bought; the show of liberty which he held was a trick of legerdemain, executed under protection of his bayonets. Such was his notion of liberty when he destroyed the national representation at St. Cloud—Such was the freedom he gave when he established an oriental despotism in the enlightened kingdom of France—such, when abolishing all free communication of sentiments among citizens, and proscribing every liberal and philosophical idea under the nickname of Ideology. "Can it be forgotten," they continued, "that heaven and hell are not more irreconcilable ideas, than Bonaparte and Liberty?—The very word Freedom," they said, "was proscribed under his iron reign, and only first gladdened the ears of Frenchmen after twelve years of humiliation and despair, on the happy restoration of Louis XVIII.—Ah, miserable impostor!" they exclaimed, "when would he have spoke of liberty, had not the return of Louis familiarized us with freedom and peace." The spirit of disaffection spread among certain classes of the lower rank. The market-women (*dames de la halle*), so formidable during the time of the Fronde, and in the early years of the Revolution, for their opposition to the court, were now royalists, and, of course, clamorous on the

side of the party they espoused. They invented, or some loyal rhymers composed for them, a song,* the burden of which demanded back the king, as their father of Ghent. They ridiculed, scolded and mobbed the commissaries of police, who endeavoured to stop these musical expressions of disaffection: surrounded the chief of their number, danced around him, and chaunted the obnoxious burden, until Fouché being ashamed to belie the new doctrines of liberty of thought, speech, and publication, his agents were instructed to leave these Amazons undisturbed on account of their political sentiments.

While Bonaparte was unable to form an interest in the saloons, and found that even the *dames de la halle* were becoming discontented, he had upon his side the militia of the suburbs; those columns of pikemen so famous in the Revolution, whose furious and rude character added to the terrors, if not the dignity, of his reign. Let us not be accused of a wish to depreciate honest industry, or hold up to contempt the miseries of poverty. It is not the poverty, but the ignorance and the vice of the rabble of great cities, which render them always disagreeable, and sometimes terrible. They are entitled to protection from the laws, and kindness from the government; but he who would use them as political engines, invokes the assistance of a blatant beast with a thousand heads, well furnished with fangs to tear and throats to roar, but devoid of tongues to speak reason, ears to hear it, eyes to see, or judgment to comprehend it.

For a little time after Bonaparte's return, crowds of artisans of the lowest order assembled under the windows of the Tuileries, and demanded to see the emperor, whom, on his appearance, they greeted with shouts, as *le grand entrepreneur*, or general employer of the class of artisans, in language where the coarse phraseology of their rank was adorned with such flowers of rhetoric as the times of terror had coined. Latterly the numbers of this assembly were maintained by a distribution of a few sous to the shouters.

However disgusted with these degrading exhibitions, Bonaparte felt he could not dispense with this species of force, and was compelled to institute a day of procession, and a solemn festival, in favour of this description of persons, who, from the mode in which they were enrolled, were termed *Federates*.

On 14th May, the motley and ill-arranged ranks which assembled on this memorable occasion exhibited, in the eyes of the disgusted and frightened spectators, all that is degraded by habitual vice and hardened by stupidity and profligacy. The portentous procession moved on along the Boulevards to the court of the Tuileries, with shouts, in which the praises of the emperor were mingled with imprecations, and with the revolutionary songs (long silenced in Paris),—the *Marseillaise Hymn*, the *Carnagrole*, and the *chant du départ*. The appearance of the men, the refuse of manufactories, of work-houses, of jails; their rags, their filth, their drunkenness; their ecstasies of blasphemous rage,

* *Donnez-mous notre paire de pants, equivalent in pronunciation to notre Père de Gand.*

and no less blasphemous joy, stamped them with the character of the willing perpetrators of the worst horrors of the Revolution. Bonaparte himself was judged by close observers to shrink with abhorrence from the assembly he had himself convoked. His guards were under arms, and the field-artillery loaded, and turned on the Place du Carrousel, filled with the motley crowd, who, from the contrasted colour of the corn-porters and charcoal-men distinguished in the group, were facetiously called his Grey and Black Mousquetaires. He hastened to dismiss his hideous minions, with a sufficient distribution of praises and of liquor. The National Guards conceived themselves insulted on this occasion, because compelled to give their attendance along with the federates. The troops of the line felt for the degraded character of the emperor. The haughty character of the French soldiers had kept them from fraternizing with the rabble, even in the cause of Napoleon. They had been observed, on the march from Cannes, to cease their cries of *Vive l'empereur*, when, upon entering any considerable town, the shout was taken up by the mob of the place, and to suspend their acclamations, rather than mingle them with those of the pekins, whom they despised. They now muttered to each other, on seeing the court which Bonaparte seemed compelled to bestow on these degraded artisans,—that the conqueror of Marengo and Wagram had sunk into the mere captain of a rabble. In short, the disgraceful character of the alliance thus formed between Bonaparte and the leers of the people was of a nature incapable of being glossed over even in the flattering pages of the *Moniteur*, which, amidst a flourishing description of this memorable procession, was compelled to admit, that, in some places, the name of the emperor was incongruously mingled with expressions and songs, which recalled an era *unfortunately too famous*.

Fretted by external dangers and internal disturbances, and by the degrading necessity of appearing every night before a mob, who familiarly hailed him as *Père la Violette*, and, above all, galled by the suggestions of his philosophical counsellors, who, among other innovations, wished him to lay aside the style of emperor for that of President, or Grand General of the Republic, Napoleon, to rid himself at once of occupations offensive to his haughty disposition, withdrew from the Tuileries to the more retired palace of the Élysée Bourbon, and seemed on a sudden to become once more the emperor he had been before his abdication. Here he took into his own hands, with the assistance of Benjamin Constant and other statesmen, the construction of a new constitution. Their system included all those checks and regulations which are understood to form the essence of a free government, and greatly resembled that granted by the royal charter.* Nevertheless, it was extremely

ill received by all parties, but especially by those who expected from Napoleon a constitution more free than that which they had dissolved by driving Louis XVIII. from the throne. There were other grave exceptions stated against this scheme of government.

First, The same objection was stated against this imperial grant which had been urged with so much vehemence against the royal charter, namely, that it was not a compact between the people and the sovereign, in which the former called the latter to the throne under certain conditions, but a recognition by the sovereign of the liberties of the people. The meeting of the Champ-de-Mai had indeed been summoned,—as intimated in the decrees from Lyons,—chiefly with the purpose of forming and adopting the new constitution; but, according to the present system, they were only to have the choice of adopting or rejecting that which Napoleon had prepared for them. The disappointment was great among those philosophers who desired “better bread than is made of wheat;” and could not enjoy liberty itself, unless it emanated directly from the will of the people, and was sanctioned by popular discussion. But Napoleon was determined that the convention on the 10th May should have no other concern in the constitution, save to accept it when offered. He would not intrust such an assembly with the revision of the laws by which he was to govern.

Secondly, This new constitution, though presenting an entirely new basis of government, was published under the singular title of an “Additional Act to the Constitutions of the Empire,” and thereby constituted a sort of appendix to a huge mass of unrepealed organic laws, many of them inconsistent with the additional act in tenor and in spirit.

Those who had enjoyed the direct confidence of the emperor while the treaty was framing, endeavoured

Their number is unlimited.

The Second Chamber is elected by the people, and is to consist of 629 members—none are to be under 25 years. The president is appointed by the members, but approved of by the emperor.

Members to be paid at the rate settled by the Constituent Assembly.

It is to be renewed every five years.

The emperor may prorogue, adjourn, or dissolve the house of representatives.

Sittings to be public.

The electoral colleges are maintained.

Land tax and direct taxes to be voted only for a year; indirect may be for several years.

No levy of men for the army, nor any exchange of territory, but by a law.

Taxes to be proposed by the Chamber of Representatives.

Ministers to be responsible.

Judges to be irremovable.

Juries to be established.

Right of petition is established—freedom of worship—invulnerability of property.

The last article says, that “the French people declare that they do not mean to delegate the power of restoring the Bourbons, or any prince of that family, even in case of the exclusion of the imperial dynasty.”

* The following is an abridgment of its declarations:—The legislative power resides in the emperor and two Chambers.

The Chamber of Peers is hereditary, and the emperor names them.

voured to persuade themselves that Napoleon meant fairly by France, yet confessed they had found it difficult to enlighten his ideas on the subject of a limited monarchy. They felt, that though the emperor might be induced to contract his authority, yet what remained in his own hand would be wielded as arbitrarily as ever; and likewise that he would never regard his ministers otherwise than as the immediate executors of his pleasure, and responsible to himself alone. He would still continue to transport his whole chancery at his stirrup, and transmit sealed orders to be executed by a minister whom he had not consulted on their import.*

The royalists triumphed on the publication of this additional act: "Was it for this," they said, "you broke your oaths, and banished your monarch, to get the same, or nearly similar laws imposed on you by a Russian ukase or a Turkish firman, which you heretofore enjoyed by charter, in the same manner as your ancestors, called freemen by excellence, held their rights from their limited sovereigns; and for this have you exchanged a peaceful prince, whose very weakness was your security, for an ambitious warrior, whose strength is your weakness? For this have you a second time gone to war with all Europe—for the additional act and the Champ-de-Mai?"

The more determined republicans, besides their particular objections to an Upper House, which the emperor could fill with his own minions, so as effectually to control the representatives of the people, found the proposed constitution utterly devoid of the salt which should savour it. There was no acknowledgment of abstract principles; no dissertation concerning the rights of government and the governed; no metaphysical discussions on the origin of laws; and they were as much mortified and disappointed as the zealot who hears a discourse on practical morality, when he expected a sermon on the doctrinal points of theology. The unfortunate additional act became the subject of attack and railery on all sides; and was esteemed to possess in so slight a degree the principle of durability, that a bookseller being asked for a copy by a customer, replied, He did not deal in *periodical publications*.†

Under these auspices the Champ-de-Mai was opened, and that it might be in all respects incongruous, it was held on the 1st of June. Deputies were supposed to attend from all departments, not, as it had been latterly arranged, to canvass the new constitution, but to swear to observe it; and not to receive the Empress Maria Louisa and her son as the pledge of twenty years' peace, but to behold the fatal eagle, the signal of instant and bloody war, distributed by the emperor to the soldiers.

Napoleon and his brothers, whom he had once more collected around him, figured, in quaint and

fantastic robes, in the Champ-de-Mai; he as emperor, and they as princes of the blood,—another subject of discontent to republicans. The report of the votes was made, the electors swore to the additional act, the drums rolled, the trumpets flourished, the cannon thundered. But the acclamations were few and forced. The emperor seemed to view the scene as an empty pageant, until he was summoned to the delivery of the eagles to the various new-raised regiments; and then, amid the emblems of past, and, as might be hoped, the auguries of future victories, he was himself again. But, on the whole, the Champ-de-Mai was, in the language of Paris, *une pièce tombée*, a condemned farce, which was soon to be succeeded by a bloody tragedy.

The meeting of the Chambers was the next subject of interest. The Chamber of Peers did not present, like the corresponding assembly in Britain, members of long descent, ample fortunes, independence of principle, and education corresponding to their rank of hereditary legislators. It consisted in the princes of Napoleon's blood royal, to whom was added Jancien, long estranged from his brother's councils, but who now, instigated by fraternal affection, or tired of literary leisure, having presented his epic poem to a thankless and regardless public, endeavoured to save his brother in his present difficulties, as by his courage and presence of mind he had assisted him during the revolution of Brémair. There were about one hundred other dignitaries, more than one half of whom were military men, including two or three old jacobins, such as Siéyes and Carnot, who had taken titles, decorations, and rank, inconsistently with the tenor of their whole life. The rest had been the creators of Bonaparte's former reign, with some men of letters devoted to his cause, and recently ennobled. This body, which could have no other will than that of the emperor, was regarded by the republicans and constitutionalists with jealousy, and by the citizens with contempt. Bonaparte himself expressed his opinion of it with something approaching the latter sentiment. He had scarce formed his tools, before he seems to have been convinced of their inefficiency, and of the little influence which they could exercise on the public mind.*

It was very different with the second Chamber, in which were posted the ancient men of the Revolution, and their newer associates, who looked forward with hope that Bonaparte might yet assume the character of a patriot sovereign, and by his military talents save France for her sake, not for his own. The latter class comprehended many men, not only of talent, but of virtue and public spirit; with too large a proportion, certainly, of those who vainly desired a system of republican liberty, which so many years of bloody and fruitless experiment should have led even the most extravagant to abandon, as inconsistent with the situation of the country, and the genius of the French nation.

The dispute of the Chamber of Representatives with the executive government commenced on

* *Letters from Paris, written during the Last Reign of Napoleon*, vol. 1, p. 197.

† It was subjected, notwithstanding, with the usual success to the electoral bodies, whose good-nature never refused a constitution which was recommended by the existing government. The number of those who gave their votes were more than a million; being scarce a tenth part, however, of those who had qualifications.

* The punsters of Paris selected Labédoyère, Drouot, Ney, and Lallemand, as the *quatre pairs fides* (*pretenses*), while Vandamme and others were termed the *pairs effés*.

June 4th, the first day of their sitting; and, like those of their predecessors, upon points of idle etiquette. They chose Lanjuinais for their president; a preference which, alighting on one who had been the defender of Louis XVI., the active and determined resister of the power of Robespierre, and, especially, the statesman who drew up the list of crimes in consequence of which Napoleon's forfeiture had been declared in 1814, could not be acceptable to the emperor. Napoleon being applied to for confirmation of the election, referred the committee for his answer to the chamberlain, who, he stated, would deliver it the next day by the page in waiting. The Chamber took fire, and Napoleon was compelled to return an immediate though reluctant approval of their choice. The next remarkable indication of the temper of the Chamber, was the *extempore* effusion of a deputy, named Sibuet, against the use of the epithets of duke, count, and other titles of honour, in the Chamber of Representatives. Being observed to read his invective from notes, which was contrary to the form of the Chamber, Sibuet was silenced for the moment as out of order; but the next day, or soon afterwards, having got his speech by heart, the Chamber was under the necessity of listening to him, and his motion was got rid of with difficulty. On the same day, a list of the persons appointed to the peerage was demanded from Carnot, in his capacity of minister, which he declined to render till the session had commenced. This also occasioned much uproar and violence, which the president could scarce silence by the incessant peal of his bell. The oath to be taken by the deputies was next severely scrutinized, and the imperialists carried with difficulty a resolution, that it should be taken to the emperor and the constitution, without mention of the nation.

The second meeting, on June 7th, was as tumultuous as the first. A motion was made by Félix Lepelletier, that the Chamber should decree to Napoleon the title of Saviour of his Country. This was resisted on the satisfactory ground, that the country was not yet saved; and the Chamber passed to the order of the day by acclamation.

Notwithstanding these open intimations of the reviving spirit of jacobinism, or at least of opposition to the imperial sway, Napoleon's situation obliged him for the time to address the unruly spirits which he had called together with the confidence which it was said necromancers found it needful to use towards the dangerous fiends whom they had evoked. His address to both Chambers was sensible, manly, and becoming his situation. He surrendered, in their presence, all his pretensions to absolute power, and professed himself a friend to liberty; demanded the assistance of the Chambers in matters of finance, intimated a desire of some regulations to check the license of the press, and required from the representatives an example of confidence, energy, and patriotism, to encounter the dangers to which the country was exposed. The peers replied in corresponding terms. Not so the Second Chamber; for notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the imperialists; their reply bore a strong tincture of the sentiments of the opposite party. The Chamber promised, indeed, their unanimous support in repelling the foreign

enemy; but they announced their intention to take under their consideration the constitution, as recognized by the additional act, and to point out its defects and imperfections, with the necessary remedies. They also added a moderating hint, directed against the fervour of Napoleon's ambition. "The nation," they said, "nourishes no plans of aggrandizement. Not even the will of a victorious prince will lead them beyond the boundaries of self-defence." In his rejoinder, Napoleon did not suffer these obnoxious hints to escape his notice. He endeavoured to school this refractory assembly into veneration for the constitution, which he declared to be "the pole-star in the tempest;" and judiciously observed, "there was little cause to provide against the intoxications of triumph, when they were about to contend for existence. He stated the crisis to be imminent, and cautioned the Chamber to avoid the conduct of the Roman people in the latter ages of the empire, who could not resist the temptation of engaging furiously in abstract discussions, even while the battering-rams of the common enemy were shaking the gates of the capital."

Thus parted Bonaparte and his chambers of legislature; he to try his fortune in the field of battle, they to their task of altering and modifying the laws, and inspiring a more popular spirit and air into the enactments he had made, in hopes that the dictatorship of the jacobins might be once again substituted for the dictatorship of the emperor. All men saw that the imperialists and republicans only waited till the field was won, that they might contend for the booty; and so little was the nation disposed to sympathize with the active, turbulent, and bustling demagogues by whom the contest was to be maintained against the emperor, that almost all predicted with great unconcern their probable expulsion, either by the sword of Bonaparte or the Bourbons.

CHAPTER CV.

Preparations to renew the war.—Positions of the allied forces, amounting in the whole to one million of men.—Bonaparte's force not more than 200,000.—Conscription not ventured upon.—National Guard—their reluctance to serve.—Many provinces hostile to Napoleon's cause.—Fouché's report makes known the wide-spread disaffection.—Insurrection in La Vendée quelled.—Military resources of France.—Napoleon's plan of campaign.—Paris placed in a complete state of defence.—The frontier-passes and towns fortified also.—Generals who accept command under Napoleon.—He announces his purpose to measure himself with Wellington.

WE are now to consider the preparations made for the invasion of France along the whole eastern frontiers—the means of the resistance which the talents of the emperor presented to his numerous enemies—and the internal situation of the country itself.

While the events now commemorated were passing in France, the allies made the most gigantic preparations for the renewal of war. The chancellor of the exchequer of England had achieved a loan of thirty-six millions, upon terms surprisingly moderate, and the command of this treasure had put

the whole troops of the coalition into the most active advance.

The seat of the congress had been removed from Vienna to Frankfort, to be near the theatre of war.

The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the King of Prussia, had once more placed themselves at the head of their respective armies. The whole eastern frontier was menaced by immense forces. One hundred and fifty thousand Austrians, disengaged from Murat, might enter France through Switzerland, the Cantons having acceded to the coalition. An army equal in strength menaced the higher Rhine. Schwartzberg commanded the Austrians in chief, having under him Bellegarde, and Frimont, Bianchi, and Vincent. Two hundred thousand Russians were pressing towards the frontiers of Alsace. The Archduke Constantine was nominated generalissimo, but Barclay de Tolly, Sacken, Laugeron, etc., were the efficient commanders. One hundred and fifty thousand Prussians, under Blücher, occupied Flanders, and were united with about eighty thousand troops, British, or in British pay, under the Duke of Wellington. There were also to be reckoned the contingents of the different princes of Germany, so that the allied forces were grossly computed to amount to upwards of one million of men. The reader must not, however, suppose, that such an immense force was, or could be, brought forward at once. They were necessarily disposed on various lines for the convenience of subsistence, and were to be brought up successively in support of each other.

To meet this immense array, Napoleon, with his usual talent and celerity, had brought forward means of surprising extent. The regular army, diminished by the Bourbons, had been, by calling out the retired officers, and disbanded soldiers, increased from something rather under 100,000 men, to double that number of experienced troops, of the first quality. But this was dust in the balance; and the mode of conscription was so intimately connected with Napoleon's wars of conquest and disaster, that he dared not propose, nor would the Chamber of Representatives have agreed to have recourse to the old and odious resource of conscription, which, however, Bonaparte trusted he might still find effectual in the month of June, to the number of 300,000. In the meantime, it was proposed to render movable, for active service, two hundred battalions of the National Guard, choosing those most fit for duty, which would make a force of 112,000 men. It was also proposed to levy as many federates, that is, volunteers of the lower orders, as could be brought together in the different departments. The levy of the National Guards was ordered by an imperial decree of the 5th April, 1815, and commissioners chiefly of the jacobin faction, were sent down into the different departments, Bonaparte being well pleased at once to employ them in their own sphere, and to get rid of their presence at Paris. Their efforts were, however, unable to excite the spirit of the country; for they had either survived their own energies, or the nation had been too long accustomed to their mode of oratory, to feel any responsive impulse. Liberty and fraternity was no longer a rallying sound, and the summons to arms, by decrees as

peremptory as those relating to the conscription, though bearing another name, spread a general spirit of disgust through many departments in the north of France. There and in Brittany, the disaffection of the inhabitants appeared in a sullen, dogged stubbornness, rather than in the form of active resistance to Napoleon's decrees. The National Guards refused to parade, and, if compelled to do so, took every opportunity to desert and return home; so that it often happened that a battalion, which had mustered six hundred men, dwindled down to a fifth before they had marched two leagues.

In the departments of La Sarthe, Maine et Loire, and Loire-Inférieure, the white flag was displayed, and the tree of liberty, which had been replanted in many places after the political regeneration of Bonaparte, was cut down. The public mind in many provinces displayed itself as highly unfavourable to Napoleon.

A report, drawn up by Fouché, stated in high-coloured language the general disaffection. Napoleon always considered this communication as published with a view of prejudicing his affairs; and as that versatile statesman was already in secret correspondence with the allies, it was probably intended as much to encourage the royalists, as to dismay the adherents of Napoleon. This arch-intrigue, whom, to use an expression of Junius, treachery itself could not trust, was at one moment nearly caught in his own toils; and although he carried the matter with infinite address, Napoleon would have made him a prisoner, or caused him to be shot, but for the intimation of Carnot, that if he did so his own reign would not last an hour longer.*

* The particulars of this intrigue show with what anxiety, and at what risk, Fouché waded, swam, or dived, among the troubled waters which were his element. An agent of Prince Metternich had been dispatched to Paris to open a communication with Fouché on the part of the Austrian government. Falling under suspicion, from some banking transaction, this person was denounced to Bonaparte as a suspicious person, and arrested by his interior police, which, as there cannot be too much precaution in a well-managed state, watched, and were spies upon, the general police under Fouché. The agent was brought before Bonaparte, who threatened to cause him to be shot to death on the very spot, unless he told him the whole truth. The man then confessed that Metternich sent him to Fouché, to request the latter to send a secure agent to Bâle, to meet with a confidential person on the part of the Austrian minister, whom Fouché's envoy was to recognize by a peculiar sign, which the informer also made known. "Have you fulfilled your commission so far as concerns Fouché?" said the emperor. — "I have," answered to Austrian agent. — "And has he dispatched any one to Bâle?" — "That I cannot tell." — The agent was detained in a secret prison. Baron Fleury de Chaboulon, an auditor, was instantly dispatched to Bâle, to represent the agent whom Fouché should have sent thither, and fathom the depth and character of the intrigue betwixt the French and Austrian ministers. Fouché soon discovered that the agent sent to him by Metternich was missing, conjectured his fate, and instantly went to seek an audience of the emperor. Having mentioned other matters, he seemed to recollect himself, and begged pardon, with affected unconcern, for not having previously mentioned an affair of some consequence, which, nevertheless, he had forgotten amid the hurry of business. "An agent had come to him

Thus Bonaparte was already in a great measure reduced to the office of generalissimo of the state; and there were not wanting many, who dared to entreat him to heal the wounds of the country by a second abdication in favour of his son,—a measure which the popular party conceived might avert the impending danger of invasion.

In the meantime, about the middle of May, a short insurrection broke out in La Vendée, under d'Autichamp, Suzannet, Sapineau, and especially the brave La Roche-Jacquelin. The war was neither long nor bloody, for an overpowering force was directed against the insurgents, under Generals Lamarque and Travot. The people were ill prepared for resistance, and the government menaced them with the greatest severities, the instructions of Carnot to the military having a strong tincture of his ancient education in the school of terror. Yet the Chamber of Deputies did not in all respects sanction the severities of the government. When a member, called Leguevel, made a motion for punishing with pains and penalties the royalists of the west, the assembly heard him with patience and approbation propose that the goods and estates of the revolted (whom he qualified as brigands, priests, and royalists) should be confiscated; but when he added, that not only the insurgents themselves, but their relations in the direct line, whether ascendants or descendants, should be declared outlaws, a general exclamation of horror drove the orator from the tribune.

After a battle near La Roche Servière, which cost the brave La Roche-Jacquelin his life, the remaining chiefs signed a capitulation, by which they disbanded their followers, and laid down their arms, at the very time when holding out a few days would have made them acquainted with the battle of Waterloo. Released from actual civil war, Napoleon now had leisure to prepare for the external conflict.

The means resorted to by the French government, which we have already alluded to, had enabled Carnot to represent the national means in a most respectable point of view. By his report to the two chambers, he stated, that on 1st April, 1814, the army had consisted of 450,000 men, who had been reduced by the Bourbons to 175,000. Since the return of Napoleon, the number had been increased to 375,000 combatants of every kind; and before the 1st of August, was expected to amount to half a

million. The Imperial Guards, who were termed the country's brightest ornament in time of peace, and its best bulwark in time of war, were recruited to the number of 40,000 men.

Stupendous efforts had repaired, the report stated, the losses of the artillery during the three disastrous years of 1812, 1813, 1814. Stores, ammunition, arms of every kind, were said to be provided in abundance. The remounting of the cavalry had been accomplished in such a manner as to excite the surprise of every one. Finally, there was, as a body in reserve, the whole mass of sedentary National Guards, so called, because they were not among the chosen bands which had been declared movable. But the bulk of these were either unfit for service, or unwilling to serve, and could only be relied on for securing the public tranquillity. Corps of federates had been formed in all the districts where materials could be found of which to compose them.

From these forces Napoleon selected a grand army to act under his personal orders. They were chosen with great care, and the preparation of their matériel was of the most extensive and complete description. The numbers in gross might amount to 150,000; as great a number of troops, perhaps, as can conveniently move upon one plan of operations, or be subjected to one generalissimo. A large deduction is to be made to attain the exact amount of his effective force.

Thus prepared for action, no doubt was made that Bonaparte would open the campaign, by assuming offensive operations. To wait till the enemy had assembled their full force on his frontier, would have suited neither the man nor the moment. It was most agreeable to his system, his disposition, and his interest, to rush upon some separate army of the allies, surprise them, according to his own phrase, in *delict*, and, by its dispersion or annihilation, give courage to France, animate her to fresh exertions in his cause, intimidate the confederated powers, and gain time for sowing in their league the seeds of disunion. Even the royalists, whose interest was so immediately connected with the defeat of Bonaparte, were dismayed by witnessing his gigantic preparations, and sadly anticipated victories as the first result, though they trusted that, as in 1814, he would be at length worn out, by force of numbers and reiterated exertions.

from the Austrian government," he said, "requesting him to send a confidential person to Bâle, to a correspondent of Metternich, and he now came to ask whether it would be his majesty's pleasure that he should avail himself of the opening, in order to learn the secret purposes of the enemy." Napoleon was not deceived by this trick. There were several mirrors in the room, by which he could perceive and enjoy his perfidious minister's ill-concealed embarrassment. "Monsieur Fouché," he said, "it may be dangerous to treat me as a fool; I have your agent in safe custody, and penetrate your whole intrigue. Have you sent to Bâle?"—"No, sire."—"The happier for you; had you done so, you should have died."—Fleury was unable to extract anything of consequence from Werner, the confidant of Metternich, who met him at Bâle. The Austrian seemed to expect communications from Fouché, without being prepared to make them. Fleury touched on the plan of assassinating Bonaparte, which Werner re-

jected with horror, as a thing not to be thought of by Metternich or the allies. They appointed a second meeting, but in the interim, Fouché made the Austrian aware of the discovery, and Baron Fleury, on his second journey to Bâle, found no Mr Werner to meet him.

Bonaparte gives almost the same account of this intrigue in his *St Helena Conversations*, as Fouché in his *Memoirs*. But Napoleon does not mention Carnot's interposition to prevent Fouché from being put to death without process of law. "You may shoot Fouché to-day," said the old Jacobin, "but to-morrow you will cease to reign. The people of the Revolution permit you to retain the throne only on condition you respect their liberties. They account Fouché one of their strongest guarantees. If he is guilty, he must be legally proceeded against." Bonaparte, therefore, gaining no proof against Fouché by the mission of Fleury, was fain to shut his eyes on what he saw but too well.

But though all guessed at the mode of tactics which Napoleon would employ, there was a difference of opinion respecting the point on which his first exertions would be made; and in general it was argued, that, trusting to the strength of Lille, Valenciennes, and other fortified places on the frontiers of Flanders, his first real attack, whatever diversion might be made elsewhere, would take place upon Manheim, with the view of breaking asunder the Austrian and Russian armies as they were forming, or rather of attacking them separately, to prevent their communication in line. If he should succeed in thus overwhelming the advance of the Austrians and Russians, by directing his main force to this one point, before they were fully prepared, it was supposed he might break up the plan of the allies for this campaign.

But Bonaparte was desirous to aim a decisive blow at the most enterprising and venturesome of the invading armies. He knew Blücher, and had heard of Wellington; he therefore resolved to move against those generals, while he opposed walls and fortified places to the more slow and cautious advance of the Austrian general, Schwarzenberg, and trusted that distance might render ineffectual the progress of the Russians.

According to this general system, Paris, under the direction of General Haxo, was, on the northern side, placed in a complete state of defence, by a double line of fortifications, so that, if the first were forced, the defenders might retire within the second, instead of being compelled, as in the preceding year, to quit the heights, and fall back upon the city. Montmartre was very strongly fortified. The southern part of the city on the opposite side of the Seine was only covered with a few field-works; time, and the open character of the ground, permitting no more. But the Seine itself was relied upon as a barrier, having proved such in 1814.

On the frontiers, similar precautions were observed. Entrenchments were constructed in the five principal passes of the Vosgesian mountains, and all the natural passes and strong-holds of Lorraine were put in the best possible state of defence. The posts on the inner line were strengthened with the greatest care. The fine military position under the walls of Lyons was improved with great expense and labour. A *tête-de-pont* was erected at Les Brotteaux; a draw-bridge and barricade protected the suburb La Guillotière; redoubts were erected between the Saône and Rhône, and upon the heights of Pierre-en-Cise and the Quarter of St John. Guise, Vitry, Soissons, Château-Thierry, Langres, and all the towns capable of any defence, were rendered as strong as posts, palisades, redoubts, and field-works, could make them. The Russian armies, though pressing fast forward, were not as yet arrived upon the line of operations; and Napoleon doubtless trusted that these impediments, in front of the Austrian line, would arrest any hasty advance on their part, since the well-known tactics of that school declare against leaving in their rear fortresses or towns possessed by the enemy, however insignificant or slightly garrisoned, or however completely they might be masked.

About now to commence his operations, Napo-

leon summoned around him his best and most experienced generals. Soult, late minister of war for Louis XVIII., was named major-general. He obeyed, he says, not in any respect as an enemy of the king, but as a citizen and soldier, whose duty it was to obey whosoever was at the head of the government, as that of the Vicar of Bray subjected him in ghostly submission to each head of the church *pro tempore*. Ney was ordered to repair to the army at Lille, "if he wished," so the command was expressed, "to witness the first battle." MacDonald was strongly solicited to accept a command, but declined it with disdain. Davoust, the minister at war, undertook to remove his scruples, and spoke to him of what his honour required. "It is not from you," replied the marshal, "that I am to learn sentiments of honour," and persisted in his refusal. D'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme, Gérard, and Mouton Duvernet, acted as lieutenant-generals. The cavalry was placed under the command of Grouchy (whom Napoleon had created a marshal). Pajol, Exelmans, Milhaud, and Kellermann, were his seconds in command. Flahaut, Dejean, Labédoyère, and other officers of distinction, acted as the emperor's aides-de-camp. The artillery were three hundred pieces; the cavalry approached to twenty-five thousand men; the Guard to the same number; and there is little doubt that the whole army amounted in effective force to nearly 130,000 soldiers, in the most complete state as to arms and equipment, who now marched to a war which they themselves had occasioned, under an emperor of their own making, and bore both in their hearts and on their tongues the sentiments of death or victory.

For the protection of the rest of the frontier during Napoleon's campaign in Flanders, Sacchi was intrusted with the command on the frontiers of Switzerland, with directions to attack Montmelian as soon as possible after the 14th of June, which day Bonaparte had fixed for the commencement of hostilities. Masséna was ordered to repair to Metz to assume the government of that important fortress, and the command of the 3d and 4th divisions. All preparations being thus made, Napoleon at length announced what had long occupied his secret thoughts. "I go," he said, as he threw himself into his carriage to join his army, "I go to measure myself with Wellington."

But although Napoleon's expressions were those of confidence and defiance, his internal feelings were of a different complexion. "I no longer felt," as he afterwards expressed himself in his exultation, "that complete confidence in final success, which accompanied me on former undertakings. Whether it was that I was getting beyond the period of life when men are usually favoured by fortune, or whether the impulse of my career seemed impeded in my own eyes, and to my own imagination, it is certain that I felt a depression of spirit. Fortune, which used to follow my steps to load me with her bounties, was now a severe deity, from whom I might snatch a few favours, but for which she exacted severe retribution. I had no sooner gained an advantage than it was followed by a reverse." With such feelings, not certainly unwarranted by the circumstances under which the campaign was

undertaken, nor disproved by the event, Napoleon undertook his shortest and last campaign.

CHAPTER CVI.

Army of Wellington covers Brussels—that of Blücher concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse.—Napoleon reviews his grand army on 14th June.—Advances upon Charleroi—His plan to separate the armies of the two opposing generals fails.—Interview of Wellington and Blücher at Briè.—British army concentrated at Quatre-Bras.—Napoleon's plan of attack.—Battle of Ligny, and defeat of Blücher on 16th June.—Action at Quatre-Bras on the same day—the British retain possession of the field.—Blücher eludes the French pursuit.—Napoleon joins Ney.—Retreat of the British upon Waterloo, where the Duke of Wellington resolves to make a stand.—Localities of that celebrated field.

THE triple line of strong fortresses possessed by the French on the borders of Belgium served Napoleon as a curtain, behind which he could prepare his levies and unite his forces at pleasure, without any possibility of the allies or their generals being able to observe his motions, or prepare for the attack which such motions indicated. On the other hand the frontier of Belgium was open to his observation, and he knew perfectly the general disposal of the allied force.

If the French had been prepared to make their meditated attack upon Flanders in the month of May, they would have found no formidable force to oppose them, as at that time the armies of the Prussian general, Kleist, and the hereditary Prince of Orange, did not, in all, exceed 50,000 men. But the return of Napoleon, which again awakened the war, was an event as totally unexpected in France as in Flanders, and, therefore, that nation was as much unprepared to make an attack as the allies to repel one. Thus it happened, that while Napoleon was exerting himself to collect a sufficient army by the means we have mentioned, the Duke of Wellington, who arrived at Brussels from Vienna in the beginning of April, had leisure to garrison and supply the strong places of Ostend, Antwerp, and Nieuport, which the French had not dismantled, and to fortify Ypres, Tournay, Mons, and Ath. He had also leisure to receive his reinforcements from England, and to collect the German, Dutch, and Belgian contingents.

Thus collected and reinforced, the Duke of Wellington's army might contain about thirty thousand English troops. They were not, however, those veteran soldiers who had served under him during the Peninsular war; the flower of which had been dispatched upon the American expedition. Most were second battalions, or regiments which had been lately filled up with new recruits. The foreigners were fifteen thousand Hanoverians, with the celebrated German Legion, eight thousand strong, which had so often distinguished itself in Spain; five thousand Brunswickers, under their gallant duke; and about seventeen thousand Belgians, Dutch, and Nassau troops, commanded by the Prince of Orange.

Great and just reliance was placed upon the Germans; but some apprehensions were entertained for

the steadiness of the Belgian troops. Discontents had prevailed among them, which, at one period, had broken out in open mutiny, and was not subdued without bloodshed. Most of them had served in the French ranks, and it was feared some of them might preserve predilections and correspondencies dangerous to the general cause. Bonaparte was under the same belief. He brought in his train several Belgian officers, believing there would be a movement in his favour so soon as he entered the Netherlands. But the Flemings are a people of sound sense and feeling. Whatever jealousies might have been instilled into them for their religion and privileges under the reign of a protestant and a Dutch sovereign, these were swallowed up in their apprehensions for the returning tyranny of Napoleon. Some of these troops behaved with distinguished valour; and most of them supported the ancient military character of the Walloons. The Dutch corps were in general enthusiastically attached to the Prince of Orange, and the cause of independence.

The Prussian army had been recruited to its highest war establishment, within an incredibly short space of time after Bonaparte's return had been made public, and was reinforced in a manner surprising to those who do not reflect, how much the resources of a state depend on the zeal of the inhabitants. Their enthusiastic hatred to France, founded partly on the recollection of former injuries, partly on that of recent success, was animated at once by feelings of triumph and of revenge, and they marched to this new war, as to a national crusade against an inveterate enemy, whom, when at their feet, they had treated with injudicious clemency. Blücher was, however, deprived of a valuable part of his army by the discontent of the Saxon troops. A mutiny had broken out among them, when the congress announced their intention of transferring part of the Saxon dominions to Prussia; much bloodshed had ensued, and it was judged most prudent that the troops of Saxony should remain in garrison in the German fortresses.

Prince Blücher arrived at Liège, with the Prussian army, which was concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse rivers, occupying Charleroi, Namur, Givet, and Liège. The Duke of Wellington covered Brussels, where he had fixed his headquarters, communicating by his left with the right of the Prussians. There was a general idea that Napoleon's threatened advance would take place on Namur, as he was likely to find least opposition at that dismantled city.

The Duke of Wellington's first corps, under the Prince of Orange, with two divisions of British, two of Hanoverians, and two of Belgians, occupied Engghien, Braine le Comte, and Nivelles, and served as a reserve to the Prussian division under Ziethen, which was at Charleroi. The second division, commanded by Lord Hill, included two British, two Hanoverian, and one Belgian, divisions. It was cantoned at Halle, Oudenarde, and Grammont. The reserve, under Picton, who, at Lord Wellington's special request, had accepted of the situation of second in command, consisted of the remaining two British divisions, with three of the Hano-

verians, and was stationed at Brussels and Ghent. The cavalry occupied Grammont and Nieve.

The Anglo-Belgic army was so disposed, therefore, as might enable the divisions to combine with each other, and with the Prussians, upon the earliest authentic intelligence of the enemy's being put in motion. At the same time, the various corps were necessarily, to a certain degree, detached, both for the purpose of being more easily maintained (especially the cavalry), and also because, from the impossibility of foreseeing in what direction the French Emperor might make his attack, it was necessary to maintain such an extensive line of defence as to be prepared for his arrival upon any given point. This is the necessary inconvenience attached to a defensive position, where, if the resisting general should concentrate his whole forces upon any one point of the line to be defended, the enemy would, of course, chuse to make their assault on some of the other points, which such concentration must necessarily leave comparatively open.

In the meantime, Napoleon in person advanced to Vervins on 12th June, with his Guard, who had marched from Paris. The other divisions of his selected grand army had been assembled on the frontier, and the whole, consisting of five divisions of infantry, and four of cavalry, were combined at Beaumont on the 14th of the same month, with a degree of secrecy and expedition which showed the usual genius of their commander. Napoleon reviewed the troops in person, reminded them that the day was the anniversary of the great victories of Marengo and Friedland, and called on them to remember that the enemies whom they had then defeated were the same which were now arrayed against them. "Are they and we," he asked, "no longer the same men?" The address produced the strongest effect on the minds of the French soldiery, always sensitively alive to military and national glory.

Upon the 15th June, the French army was in motion in every direction. Their advanced guard of light troops swept the western bank of the Sambre clear of all the allied corps of observation. They then advanced upon Charleroi, which was well defended by the Prussians under General Ziethen, who was at length compelled to retire on the large village of Gosselies. Here his retreat was cut off by the second division of the French army, and Ziethen was compelled to take the route of Fleurus, by which he united himself with the Prussian force, which lay about the villages of Ligny and St-Amand. The Prussian general had, however, obeyed his orders, by making such protracted resistance as gave time for the alarm being taken. In the attack and retreat, he lost four or five guns, and a considerable number in killed and wounded.

By this movement the plan of Napoleon was made manifest. It was at once most scientific and adventurous. His numbers were unequal to sustain a conflict with the armies of Blucher and Wellington united, but by forcing his way so as to separate the one enemy from the other, he would gain the advantage of acting against either individually with the gross of his forces, while he could spare enough of detached troops to keep the other in check. To accomplish this masterly manœuvre, it was necessary

to push onwards upon a part of the British advance, which occupied the position of Quatre-Bras, and the yet more advanced post of Frasnès, where some of the Nassau troops were stationed. But the extreme rapidity of Napoleon's forced marches had in some measure prevented the execution of his plan, by dispersing his forces so much, that, at a time when every hour was of consequence, he was compelled to remain at Charleroi until his wearied and over-marched army had collected.

In the meantime, Ney was detached against Frasnès and Quatre-Bras, but the troops of Nassau kept their post on the evening of the 15th. It is possible the French marshal might have succeeded had he attacked at Frasnès with his whole force; but hearing a cannonade in the direction of Fleurus (which was that of Ziethen's action), he detached a division to support the French in that quarter. For this exercise of his own judgment, instead of yielding precise obedience to his orders, Ney was reprimanded; a circumstance curiously contrasted with the case of Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon laid the whole blame of the defeat at Waterloo, because he *did* follow his orders precisely, and press the Prussians at Wavres, instead of being diverted from that object by the cannonade on the left.

The manœuvre meditated by Napoleon thus failed, though it had nearly been successful. He continued, however, to entertain the same purpose of dividing, if possible, the British army from the Prussians.

The British general received intelligence of the advance of the French, at Brussels, at six o'clock on the evening of the 15th, but it was not of sufficient certainty to enable him to put his army in motion, on an occasion when a false movement might have been irretrievable ruin. About eleven of the same night, the certain accounts reached Brussels that the advance of the French was upon the line of the Sambre. Reinforcements were hastily moved on Quatre-Bras, and the Duke of Wellington arrived there in person at an early hour on the 16th, and instantly rode from that position to Brie, where he had a meeting with Blucher. It appeared at this time that the whole French force was about to be directed against the Prussians.

Blucher was prepared to receive them. Three of his divisions, to the number of 80,000 men, had been got into position on a chain of gentle heights, running from Brie to Sombref; in front of their line lay the villages of the Greater and Lesser St-Amand, as also that of Ligny, all of which were strongly occupied. From the extremity of his right, Blucher could communicate with the British at Quatre-Bras, upon which the Duke of Wellington was, as fast as distance would permit, concentrating his army. The fourth Prussian division, being that of Bulow, stationed between Liege and Hainault, was at too great a distance to be brought up, though every effort was made for the purpose. Blucher undertook, however, notwithstanding the absence of Bulow, to receive a battle in this position, trusting to the support of the English army, who, by a flank movement to the left, were to march to his assistance.

Napoleon had, in the meantime, settled his own

plan of battle. He determined to leave Ney with a division of 45,000 men, with instructions to drive the English from Quatre-Bras, ere their army was concentrated and reinforced, and thus prevent their co-operating with Blücher, while he himself, with the main body of his army, attacked the Prussian position at Ligny. Ney being thus on the French left wing at Frasnès and Quatre-Bras, and Bonaparte on the right at Ligny, a division under d'Erlon, amounting to 10,000 men, served as a centre of the army, and was placed near Marchiennes, from which it might march laterally either to support Ney or Napoleon, whichever might require assistance. As two battles thus took place on the 16th June, it is necessary to take distinct notice of both.

That of Ligny was the principal action. The French Emperor was unable to concentrate his forces, so as to commence the attack upon the Prussians, until three o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour it began with uncommon fury all along the Prussian line. After a continued attack of two hours, the French had only obtained possession of a part of the village of St-Amand. The position of the Prussians, however, was thus far defective, that the main part of their army being drawn up on the heights, and the remainder occupying villages which lay at their foot, the reinforcements dispatched to the latter were necessarily exposed during their descent to the fire from the French artillery, placed on the meadows below. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, by which the Prussians suffered much, Napoleon thought the issue of the contest so doubtful, that he sent for d'Erlon's division, which, as we have mentioned, was stationed near Marchiennes, half-way betwixt Quatre-Bras and Ligny. In the meanwhile, observing that Blücher drew his reserves together on St-Amand, he changed his point of attack, and directed all his force against Ligny, of which, after a desperate resistance, he at length obtained possession. The French Guards, supported by their heavy cavalry, ascended the heights, and attacked the Prussian position in the rear of Ligny. The reserves of the Prussian infantry having been dispatched to St-Amand, Blücher had no means of repelling this attack, save by his cavalry. He placed himself at their head, and charged in the most determined manner, but without success. The cavalry of Blücher were forced back in disorder.

The Prince Marshal, as he directed the retreat, was involved in one of the charges of cavalry, his horse struck down by a cannon-shot, and he himself prostrated on the ground. His aide-de-camp threw himself beside the veteran, determined to share his fate, and had the precaution to fling a cloak over him to prevent his being recognized by the French. The enemy's cuirassiers passed over him, and it was not until they were repulsed, and in their turn pursued by the Prussian cavalry, that the gallant veteran was raised and remounted.—Blücher's death, or captivity, at that eventful moment, might have had most sinister effects on the event of the campaign, as it may be fairly doubted, whether anything short of his personal influence and exertion could, after this hard-fought and unfortunate day, have again brought the Prussian

army into action on the eventful 18th of June. When relieved, and again mounted, Blücher directed the retreat upon Tilly, and achieved it unmolested by the enemy, who did not continue their pursuit beyond the heights which the Prussians had been constrained to abandon.

Such was the battle of Ligny, in which the Prussians, as Blücher truly said, lost the field, but not their honour. The victory was attended with none of those decisive consequences which were wont to mark the successes of Bonaparte. There were no corps cut off or dispersed, no regiments which fled or flung down their arms, no line of defence forced, and no permanent advantage gained. Above all, there was not a man who lost heart or courage. The Prussians are believed to have lost in this bloody action at least 10,000 men; the *Moniteur* makes the number of the killed and wounded 15,000, and General Gourgaud, dissatisfied with this liberal allowance, rates them afterwards at no less than 25,000, while writing under Napoleon's dictation. The loss of the victors was, by the official accounts, estimated at 3000 men, which ought to have been more than tripled. Still, the French Emperor had struck a great blow—overpowered a stubborn and inveterate enemy, and opened the campaign with favourable auspices. The degree of advantage, however, which Napoleon might have derived from the Prussian retreat, was greatly limited by the indifferent success of Ney against the forces of Lord Wellington. Of this second action we have now to give some account.

Frasnès had been evacuated by the British, who, on the morning of the 16th, were in position at Quatre-Bras, a point of importance, as four roads diverge from it in different directions; so that the British general might communicate from his left with the Prussian right at St-Amand, besides having in his rear a causeway open for his retreat. On the left of the causeway; leading from Charleroi to Brussels, is a wood, called Bois de Bossus, which, during the early part of the day, was strongly contested by the sharpshooters on both sides, but at length carried by the French, and maintained for a time. About three o'clock in the afternoon, the main attack commenced, but was repulsed. The British infantry, however, and particularly the 42d Highlanders, suffered severely from an unexpected charge of lancers, whose approach was hid from them by the character of the ground, intersected with hedges, and covered with heavy crops of rye. Two companies of the Highlanders were cut off, not having time to form the square; the others succeeded in getting into order, and beating off the lancers. Ney then attempted a general charge of heavy cavalry. But they were received with such a galling fire from the British infantry, joined to a battery of two guns, that it could not be sustained; the whole causeway was strewn with men and horses, and the fugitives, who escaped to the rear, announced the loss of an action which was far from being decided, considering that the British had few infantry and artillery, though reinforcements of both were coming fast forward.

The French, as already noticed, had, about three o'clock, obtained possession of the Bois de Bossus,

and driven out the Belgians. They were in return themselves expelled by the British Guards, who successfully resisted every attempt made by the French to penetrate into the wood during the day.

As the English reinforcements arrived in succession, Marshal Ney became desirous of an addition of numbers, and sent to procure the assistance of d'Erlon's division, posted, as has been said, near Marchiennes. But these troops had been previously ordered to succour Bonaparte's own army. As the affair of Ligny was, however, over before they arrived, the division was again sent back towards Frasnes to assist Ney; but his battle was also by this time over, and thus d'Erlon's troops marched from one flank to the other, without firing a musket in the course of the day. The battle of Quatre-Bras terminated with the light. The British retained possession of the field, which they had maintained with so much obstinacy, because the Duke of Wellington conceived that Blücher would be able to make his ground good at Ligny, and was consequently desirous that the armies should retain the line of communication which they had occupied in the morning.

But the Prussians, evacuating all the villages which they held in the neighbourhood of Ligny, had concentrated their forces to retreat upon the river Dyle, in the vicinity of Wavres. By this retrograde movement, they were placed about six leagues to the rear of their former position, and had united themselves to Bulow's division, which had not been engaged in the affair at Ligny. Blücher had effected this retreat, not only without pursuit by the French, but without their knowing for some time in what direction he had gone.

This doubt respecting Blücher's movements occasioned an uncertainty and delay in those of the French, which were afterwards attended with the very worst consequences. Napoleon, or General Gourgaud in his name, does not hesitate to assert, that the cause of this delay rested with Marshal Grouchy, on whom was devolved the duty of following up the Prussian retreat. "If Marshal Grouchy," says the accusation, "had been at Wavres on the 17th, and in communication with *my* (Napoleon's) right, Blücher would not have dared to send any detachment of his army against me on the 18th; or if he had, I would have destroyed them." But the marshal appears to make a victorious defence. Grouchy says, that he sought out the emperor on the night of the 16th, so soon as the Prussian retreat commenced, but that he could not see him till he returned to Fleurus; nor did he obtain any answer to his request of obtaining some infantry to assist his cavalry in following Blücher and his retreating army, excepting an intimation that he would receive orders next day. He states that he went again to head-quarters in the morning of the 17th, aware of the full importance of following the Prussians closely up, but that he could not see Bonaparte till half-past seven, and then was obliged to follow him to the field of battle of the preceding day, previous to receiving his commands. Napoleon talked with various persons on different subjects, without giving Grouchy any orders until near noon, when he suddenly resolved to send the marshal with an army

of 32,000 men, not upon Wavres, for he did not know that the Prussians had taken that direction, but to follow Blücher wherever he might have gone. Lastly, Grouchy affirms that the troops of Gérard and Vandamme, who were placed under his command, were not ready to move until three o'clock. Thus, according to the marshal's very distinct narrative, the first orders for the pursuit were not given till about noon on the 17th, and the troops were not in a capacity to obey them until three hours after they were received. For this delay Grouchy blames Excelmans and Gérard, who commanded under him. His corps, at any rate, was not in motion until three o'clock upon the 17th.

Neither could his march, when begun, be directed with certainty on Wavres. The first traces of the Prussians which he could receive seemed to intimate, on the contrary, that they were retiring towards Namur, which induced Grouchy to push the pursuit in the latter direction, and occasioned the loss of some hours. From all these concurring reasons, the marshal shows distinctly that he could not have attained Wavres on the evening of the 17th June, because he had no orders to go there till noon, nor troops ready to march till three o'clock; nor had either Napoleon or his general any knowledge of the motions of Blücher, which might induce them to believe Wavres was the true point of his retreat. It was not till he found the English resolved to make a stand at Waterloo, and the Prussians determined to communicate with them, that Napoleon became aware of the plan arranged betwixt Wellington and Blücher, to concentrate the Prussian and English armies at Waterloo. This was the enigma on which his fate depended, and he failed to solve it. But it was more agreeable, and much more convenient, for Napoleon to blame Grouchy, than to acknowledge that he himself had been surprised by the circumstances in which he unexpectedly found himself on the 18th.

Meantime, having detached Grouchy to pursue the Prussians, Napoleon himself moved laterally towards Frasnes, and there united himself with the body commanded by Marshal Ney. His purpose was to attack the Duke of Wellington, whom he expected still to find in the position of Quatre-Bras.

But about seven in the morning, the duke, having received intelligence of the Prince Marshal Blücher's retreat to Wavres, commenced a retreat on his part towards Waterloo, in order to recover his communication with the Prussians, and resume the execution of the plan of co-operation, which had been in some degree disconcerted by the sudden irruption of the French, and the loss of the battle of Ligny by the Prussians. The retreat was conducted with the greatest regularity, though it was as usual unpleasant to the feelings of the soldier. The news of the battle of Ligny spread through the ranks, and even the most sanguine did not venture to hope that the Prussians would be soon able to renew the engagement. The weather was dreadful, as the rain fell in torrents; but this so far favoured the British, by rendering the ploughed fields impracticable for horses, so that their march was covered from the attacks of the French cavalry on the flanks, and the operations

of those by whom they were pursued were confined to the causeway.

At Genappe, however, a small town, where a narrow bridge over the river Dyle can only be approached by a confined street, there was an attack on the British rear, which the English light cavalry were unable to repel; but the heavy cavalry being brought up, repulsed the French, who gave the rear of the army no farther disturbance for the day.

At five in the evening, the Duke of Wellington arrived in the memorable field of Waterloo, which he had long before fixed as the position in which he had in certain events determined to make a stand for covering Brussels.

The scene of this celebrated action must be familiar to most readers, either from description or recollection. The English army occupied a chain of heights, extending from a ravine and village, termed Merke Braine, on the right, to a hamlet called Ter la Haye, on the left. Corresponding to this chain of heights there runs one somewhat parallel to them, on which the French were posted. A small valley winds between them of various breadth at different points, but not generally exceeding half a mile. The declivity on either side into the valley has a varied, but on the whole a gentle slope, diversified by a number of undulating irregularities of ground. The field is crossed by two high-roads, or causeways, both leading to Brussels,—one from Charleroi through Quatre-Bras and Genappe, by which the British army had just retreated, and another from Nivelles. These roads traverse the valley, and meet behind the village of Mont St-Jean, which was in the rear of the British army. The farm-house of Mont St-Jean, which must be carefully distinguished from the hamlet, was much closer to the rear of the British than the latter. On the Charleroi causeway, in front of the line, there is another farm-house, called La Haye Sainte, situated nearly at the foot of the declivity leading into the valley. On the opposite chain of eminences, a village called La Belle Alliance gives name to the range of heights. It exactly fronts Mont St-Jean, and these two points formed the respective centres of the French and English positions.

An old-fashioned Flemish villa, called Goumont, or Hougoumont, stood in the midst of the valley, surrounded with gardens, offices, and a wood, about two acres in extent, of tall beech-trees. Behind the heights of Mont St-Jean, the ground again sinks into a hollow which served to afford some sort of shelter to the second line of the British. In the rear of this second valley, is the great and extensive forest Soignies, through which runs the causeway to Brussels. On that road, two miles in the rear of the British army, is placed the small town of Waterloo.

CHAPTER CVII.

Napoleon's expectation that the alliance would be broken up in case of his defeating the English in Belgium.—The English army take up their ground on 17th June, and the French next morning.—Strength of the two armies.—Plans of their generals.—The Battle of Waterloo commenced on the forenoon of the 18th June.—French at-

tack directed against the British centre—shifted to their right—charges of the cuirassiers—and their reception.—Advance of the Prussians—Ney's charge at the head of the Guards—His repulse—and Napoleon's orders for retreat.—The victorious generals meet at La Belle Alliance.—Behaviour of Napoleon during the engagement.—Blücher's pursuit of the French.—Loss of the British—of the French.—Napoleon's subsequent attempts to undervalue the military skill of the Duke of Wellington answered.—His unjust censures of Grouchy.—The notion that the British were on the point of losing the battle when the Prussians came up shown to be erroneous.

THERE might be a difference of opinion, in a mere military question, whether the English general ought to have hazarded a battle for the defence of Brussels, or whether, falling back on the strong city of Antwerp, it might have been safer to wait the arrival of the reinforcements which were in expectation. But in a moral and political point of view, the protecting Brussels was of the last importance. Napoleon has declared, that, had he gained the battle of Waterloo, he had the means of revolutionizing Belgium; and although he was doubtless too sanguine in this declaration, yet unquestionably the French had many partisans in a country which they had so long possessed. The gaining of the battle of Ligny had no marked results, still less had the indecisive action at Quatre-Bras; but had these been followed by the retreat of the English army to Antwerp, and the capture of Brussels, the capital city of the Netherlands, they would then have attained the rank of great and decisive victories.

Napoleon, indeed, pretended to look to still more triumphant results from such a victory, and to expect nothing less than the dissolution of the European alliance as the reward of a decided defeat of the English in Belgium. So long as it was not mentioned by what means this was to be accomplished, those who had no less confidence in Napoleon's intrigues than his military talents, must have supposed that he had already in preparation among the foreign powers some deep scheme, tending to sap the foundation of their alliance, and ready to be carried into action when he should attain a certain point of success. But when it is explained that these extensive expectations rested on Napoleon's belief that a single defeat of the Duke of Wellington would occasion a total change of government in England; that the statesmen of the opposition would enter into office as a thing of course, and instantly conclude a peace with him; and that the coalition, thus deprived of subsidies, must therefore instantly withdraw the armies which were touching the French frontier on its whole northern and eastern line,—Napoleon's extravagant speculations can only serve to show how very little he must have known of the English nation, with which he had been fighting so long. The war with France had been prosecuted more than twenty years, and though many of these were years of bad success and defeat, the nation had persevered in a resistance which terminated at last in complete triumph. The national opinion of the great general who led the British troops was too strongly rooted to give way upon a single misfortune; and the event of the campaign of 1814, in which

Napoleon, repeatedly victorious, was at length totally defeated and dethroned, would have encouraged a more sly people than the English to continue the war notwithstanding a simple defeat, if such an event had unhappily occurred. The duke had the almost impregnable fortress and seaport of Antwerp in his rear, and might have waited there the reinforcements from America. Blücher had often shown how little he was disheartened by defeat; at worst, he would have fallen back on a Russian army of 200,000 men, who were advancing on the Rhine. The hopes, therefore, that the battle of Waterloo, if gained by the French, would have finished the war, must be abandoned as visionary, whether we regard the firm and manly character of the great personage at the head of the British monarchy, the state of parties in the House of Commons, where many distinguished members of the opposition had joined the ministry on the question of the war, or the general feeling of the country, who saw with resentment the new irruption of Napoleon. It cannot, however, be denied, that any success gained by Napoleon in this first campaign would have greatly added to his influence both in France and other countries, and might have endangered the possession of Flanders. The Duke of Wellington resolved, therefore, to protect Brussels, if possible, even by the risk of a general action.

By the march from Quatre-Bras to Waterloo, the duke had restored his communication with Blücher, which had been dislocated by the retreat of the Prussians to Wavres. When established there, Blücher was once more upon the same line with the British, the distance between the Prussian right flank, and the British left, being about five leagues, or five leagues and a half. The ground which lay between the two extreme points, called the heights of St-Lambert, was exceedingly rugged and wooded; and the cross-roads which traversed it, forming the sole means of communication between the English and Prussians, were dreadfully broken up by the late tempestuous weather.

The duke dispatched intelligence of his position in front of Waterloo to Prince Blücher, acquainting him at the same time with his resolution to give Napoleon the battle which he seemed to desire, providing the prince would afford him the support of two divisions of the Prussian army. The answer was worthy of the indefatigable and indomitable old man, who was never so much disconcerted by defeat as to prevent his being willing and ready for combat on the succeeding day. He sent for reply, that he would move to the Duke of Wellington's support, not with two divisions only, but with his whole army; and that he asked no time to prepare for the movement, longer than was necessary to supply food and serve out cartridges to his soldiers.

It was three o'clock on the afternoon of the 17th, when the British came on the field, and took up their bivouac for the night in the order of battle in which they were to fight the next day. It was much later before Napoleon reached the heights of La Belle Alliance in person, and his army did not come up in full force till the morning of the 18th. Great part of the French had passed the night in the little village of Genappe, and Napoleon's own

quarters had been at the farm-house called Caillou, about a mile in the rear of La Belle Alliance.

In the morning, when Napoleon had formed his line of battle, his brother Jérôme, to whom he ascribed the possession of very considerable military talents, commanded on the left—Counts Reille and d'Erlon on the centre—and Count de Lobau on the right. Marshals Soult and Ney acted as lieutenant-generals to the emperor. The French force on the field consisted probably of about 75,000. The English army did not exceed that number, at the highest computation. Each army was commanded by the chief, under whom they had offered to defy the world. So far the forces were equal. But the French had the very great advantage of being trained and experienced soldiers of the same nation, whereas the English, in the Duke of Wellington's army, did not exceed 35,000; and although the German Legion were veteran troops, the other soldiers under his command were those of the German contingents, lately levied, unaccustomed to act together, and in some instances suspected to be lukewarm to the cause in which they were engaged; so that it would have been imprudent to trust more to their assistance and co-operation than could not possibly be avoided. In Bonaparte's mode of calculating, allowing one Frenchman to stand as equal to one Englishman, and one Englishman or Frenchman against two of any other nation, the inequality of force on the Duke of Wellington's side was very considerable.

The British army thus composed, was divided into two lines. The right of the first line consisted of the second and fourth English divisions, the third and sixth Hanoverians, and the first corps of Belgians, under Lord Hill. The centre was composed of the corps of the Prince of Orange, with the Brunswickers and troops of Nassau, having the Guards, under General Cooke, on the right, and the division of General Alten on the left. The left wing consisted of the divisions of Picton, Lambert, and Kempt. The second line was in most instances formed of the troops deemed least worthy of confidence, or which had suffered too severely in the action of the 16th to be again exposed until extremity. It was placed behind the declivity of the heights to the rear, in order to be sheltered from the cannonade, but sustained much loss from shells during the action. The cavalry were stationed in the rear, distributed all along the line, but chiefly posted on the left of the centre, to the east of the Charleroi causeway. The farm-house of La Haye Sainte, in the front of the centre, was garrisoned, but there was not time to prepare it effectually for defence. The villa, gardens, and farm-yard of Hougomont, formed a strong advanced post towards the centre of the right. The whole British position formed a sort of curve, the centre of which was nearest to the enemy, and the extremities, particularly on their right, drawn considerably backward.

The plans of these two great generals were extremely simple. The object of the Duke of Wellington was to maintain his line of defence, until the Prussians, coming up, should give him a decided superiority of force. They were expected about eleven or twelve o'clock; but the extreme badness

of the roads, owing to the violence of the storm, detained them several hours later.

Napoleon's scheme was equally plain and decided. He trusted, by his usual rapidity of attack, to break and destroy the British army before the Prussians should arrive on the field; after which, he calculated to have an opportunity of destroying the Prussians, by attacking them on their march through the broken ground interposed betwixt them and the British. In these expectations he was the more confident, that he believed Grouchy's force, detached on the 17th in pursuit of Blücher, was sufficient to retard, if not altogether to check, the march of the Prussians. His grounds for entertaining this latter opinion were, as we shall afterwards show, too hastily adopted.

Commencing the action, according to his usual system, Napoleon kept his Guard in reserve, in order to take opportunity of charging with them, when repeated attacks of column after column, and squadron after squadron, should induce his wearied enemy to show some symptoms of irresolution. But Napoleon's movements were not very rapid. His army had suffered by the storm even more than the English, who were in bivouac at three in the afternoon of the 17th June; while the French were still under march, and could not get into line on the heights of La Belle Alliance until ten or eleven o'clock of the 18th. The English army had thus some leisure to take food, and to prepare their arms before the action; and Napoleon lost several hours ere he could commence the attack. Time was, indeed, inestimably precious for both parties, and hours, nay, minutes, were of importance. But of this Napoleon was less aware than was the Duke of Wellington.

The tempest, which had raged with tropical violence all night, abated in the morning; but the weather continued gusty and stormy during the whole day. Betwixt eleven and twelve, before noon, on the memorable 18th June, this dreadful and decisive action commenced, with a cannonade on the part of the French, instantly followed by an attack, commanded by Jérôme, on the advanced post of Hougoumont. The troops of Nassau, which occupied the wood around the château, were driven out by the French, but the utmost efforts of the assailants were unable to force the house, garden, and farm-offices, which a party of the Guards sustained with the most dauntless resolution. The French redoubled their efforts, and precipitated themselves in numbers on the exterior hedge, which screens the garden wall, not perhaps aware of the internal defence afforded by the latter. They fell in great numbers on this point by the fire of the defenders, to which they were exposed in every direction. The number of their troops, however, enabled them, by possession of the wood, to mask Hougoumont for a time, and to push on with their cavalry and artillery against the British right, which formed in squares to receive them. The fire was incessant, but without apparent advantage on either side. The attack was at length repelled so far, that the British again opened their communication with Hougoumont, and that important garrison was reinforced by Colonel Hepburn and a body of the Guards.

Meantime, the fire of artillery having become general along the line, the force of the French attack was transferred to the British centre. It was made with the most desperate fury, and received with the most stubborn resolution. The assault was here made upon the farm-house of St-Jean by four columns of infantry, and a large mass of cuirassiers, who took the advance. The cuirassiers came with the utmost intrepidity along the Genappe causeway, where they were encountered and charged by the English heavy cavalry; and a combat was maintained at the sword's-point, till the French were driven back on their own position, where they were protected by their artillery. The four columns of French infantry, engaged in the same attack, forced their way forward beyond the farm of La Haye Sainte, and, dispersing a Belgian regiment, were in the act of establishing themselves in the centre of the British position, when they were attacked by the brigade of General Pack, brought up from the second line by General Picton, while, at the same time, a brigade of British heavy cavalry wheeled round their own infantry, and attacked the French charging columns in flank, at the moment when they were checked by the fire of the musketry. The results were decisive. The French columns were broken with great slaughter, and two eagles, with more than 2000 men, were made prisoners. The latter were sent instantly off for Brussels.

The British cavalry, however, followed their success too far. They got involved amongst the French infantry, and some hostile cavalry which were detached to support them, and were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this part of the action, the gallant General Picton, so distinguished for enterprise and bravery, met his death, as did General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry.

About this period the French made themselves masters of the farm of La Haye Sainte, cutting to pieces about two hundred Hanoverian sharpshooters, by whom it was most gallantly defended. The French retained this post for some time, till they were at last driven out of it by shells.

Shortly after this event, the scene of conflict again shifted to the right, where a general attack of French cavalry was made on the squares, chiefly towards the centre of the British right, or between that and the causeway. They came up with the most dauntless resolution, in despite of the continued fire of thirty pieces of artillery, placed in front of the line, and compelled the artillerymen, by whom they were served, to retreat within the squares. The enemy had no means, however, to secure the guns, or even to spike them, and at every favourable moment the British artillerymen sallied from their place of refuge, again manœuvred their pieces, and fired on the assailants,—a manœuvre which seems peculiar to the British service.* The cuirassiers,

* Baron Muffling, speaking of this peculiarity, says,—“The English artillery have a rule not to remove their guns, when attacked by cavalry in a defensive position. The field-pieces are worked till the last moment, and the men then throw themselves into the nearest square, bearing off the implements they use for serving the guns. If the attack is repulsed, the artillerymen hurry back to their pieces, to fire on the retreating enemy. This is an ex-

however, continued their dreadful onset, and rode up to the squares in the full confidence, apparently, of sweeping them before the impetuosity of their charge. Their onset and reception was like a furious ocean pouring itself against a chain of insulated rocks. The British squares stood unmoved, and never gave fire until the cavalry were within ten yards, when men rolled one way, horses galloped another, and the cuirassiers were in every instance driven back.

The French authors have pretended, that squares were broken, and colours taken; but this assertion, upon the united testimony of every British officer present, is a positive untruth. This was not, however, the fault of the cuirassiers, who displayed an almost frantic valour. They rallied again and again, and returned to the onset, till the British could recognize even the faces of individuals among their enemies. Some rode close up to the bayonets, fired their pistols, and cut with their swords with reckless and useless valour. Some stood at gaze, and were destroyed by the musketry and artillery. Some squadrons, passing through the intervals of the first line, charged the squares of Belgians posted there, with as little success. At length the cuirassiers suffered so severely on every hand, that they were compelled to abandon the attempt, which they had made with such intrepid and desperate courage. In this unheard-of struggle, the greater part of the French heavy cavalry were absolutely destroyed. Bonaparte hints at it in his bulletin as an attempt made without orders, and continued only by the desperate courage of the soldiers and their officers. It is certain, that in the destruction of this noble body of cuirassiers, he lost the corps which might have been most effectual in covering his retreat. After the broken remains of this fine cavalry were drawn off, the French confined themselves for a time to a heavy cannonade, from which the British sheltered themselves in part by lying down on the ground, while the enemy prepared for an attack on another quarter, and to be conducted in a different manner.

It was now about six o'clock, and during this long succession of the most furious attacks, the French had gained no success, save occupying for a time the wood around Hougomont, from which they had been expelled, and the farm-house of La Haye Sainte, which had been also recovered. The British, on the other hand, had suffered very severely, but had not lost one inch of ground, save the two posts now regained. Ten thousand men were, however, killed and wounded; some of the foreign regiments had given way, though others had shown the most desperate valour. And the ranks were thinned, both by the actual fugitives, and by the absence of individuals, who left the bloody field for the purpose of carrying off the wounded, and some of whom might naturally be in no hurry to return to so fatal a scene.

But the French, besides losing about 15,000 men, together with a column of prisoners more than 2000 in number, began now to be disturbed by the ope-

remely laudable practice, if the infantry be properly arranged to correspond with it.*

rations of the Prussians on their right flank; and the secret of the Duke of Wellington was disclosing itself by its consequences. Blücher, faithful to his engagement, had, early in the morning, put in motion Bulow's division, which had not been engaged at Ligny, to communicate with the English army, and operate a diversion on the right flank and rear of the French. But although there were only about twelve or fourteen miles between Wavres and the field of Waterloo, yet the march was, by unavoidable circumstances, much delayed. The rugged face of the country, together with the state of the roads, so often referred to, offered the most serious obstacles to the progress of the Prussians, especially as they moved with an unusually large train of artillery. A fire, also, which broke out in Wavres, on the morning of the 18th, prevented Bulow's corps from marching through that town, and obliged them to pursue a circuitous and inconvenient route. After traversing, with great difficulty, the cross-roads by Chapelle Lambert, Bulow, with the 4th Prussian corps, who had been expected by the Duke of Wellington about 11 o'clock, announced his arrival by a distant fire, about half-past four. The first Prussian corps, following the same route with Bulow, was yet later in coming up. The second division made a lateral movement in the same direction as the fourth and first, but by the hamlet of Ohain, nearer to the English flank. The emperor instantly opposed to Bulow, who appeared long before the others, the 6th French corps, which he had kept in reserve for that service; and as only the advanced guard was come up, they succeeded in keeping the Prussians in check for the moment. The first and second Prussian corps appeared on the field still later than the fourth. The third corps had put themselves in motion to follow in the same direction, when they were furiously attacked by the French under Marshal Grouchy, who, as already stated, was detached to engage the attention of Blücher, whose whole force he believed he had before him.

Instead of being surprised, as an ordinary general might have been, with this attack upon his rear, Blücher contented himself with sending back orders to Thielmann, who commanded the third corps, to defend himself as well as he could upon the line of the Dyle. In the meantime, without weakening the army under his own command, by detaching any part of it to support Thielmann, the veteran rather hastened than suspended his march towards the field of battle, where he was aware that the war was likely to be decided in a manner so complete as would leave victory or defeat on every other point a matter of subordinate consideration.

At half-past six, or thereabouts, the second grand division of the Prussian army began to enter into communication with the British left, by the village of Ohain, while Bulow pressed forward from Chapelle Lambert on the French right and rear, by a hollow or valley called Frischmont. It became now evident that the Prussians were to enter seriously into the battle, and with great force. Napoleon had still the means of opposing them, and of achieving a retreat, at the certainty, however, of being attacked upon the ensuing day by the combined armies of Britain and Prussia. His celebrated

Guard had not yet taken any part in the conflict, and would now have been capable of affording him protection after a battle, which hitherto he had fought at disadvantage, but without being defeated. But the circumstances by which he was surrounded must have pressed on his mind at once. He had no succours to look for; a reunion with Grouchy was the only resource which could strengthen his forces; the Russians were advancing upon the Rhine with forced marches; the republicans at Paris were agitating schemes against his authority. It seemed as if all must be decided on that day, and on that field. Surrounded by these ill-omened circumstances, a desperate effort for victory, ere the Prussians could not effectually, might perhaps yet drive the English from their position; and he determined to venture on this daring experiment.

About seven o'clock, Napoleon's Guard were formed in two columns, under his own eye, near the bottom of the declivity of La Belle Alliance. They were put under command of the dauntless Ney. Bonaparte told the soldiers, and indeed imposed the same fiction on their commander, that the Prussians whom they saw on the right were retreating before Grouchy. Perhaps he might himself believe that this was true. The Guard answered for the last time, with shouts of *Vive l'empereur*, and moved resolutely forward, having for their support four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve, who stood prepared to protect the advance of their comrades. A gradual change had taken place in the English line of battle, in consequence of the repeated repulse of the French. Advancing by slow degrees, the right, which, at the beginning of the conflict, presented a segment of a convex circle, now resembled one that was concave, the extreme right, which had been thrown back, being now rather brought forward, so that their fire both of artillery and infantry fell upon the flank of the French, who had also to sustain that which was poured on their front from the heights. The British were arranged in a line of four men deep, to meet the advancing columns of the French Guard, and poured upon them a storm of musketry which never ceased an instant. The soldiers fired independently, as it is called; each man loading and discharging his piece as fast as he could. At length the British moved forward, as if to close round the heads of the columns, and at the same time continued to pour their shot upon the enemy's flanks. The French gallantly attempted to deploy, for the purpose of returning the discharge. But in their effort to do so, under so dreadful a fire, they stooped, staggered, became disordered, were blended into one mass, and at length gave way, retiring, or rather flying, in the utmost confusion. This was the last effort of the enemy, and Napoleon gave orders for the retreat; to protect which, he had now no troops left, save the last four battalions of the Old Guard, which had been stationed in the rear of the attacking columns. These threw themselves into squares, and stood firm. But at this moment the Duke of Wellington commanded the whole British line to advance, so that, whatever the bravery and skill of these gallant veterans, they also were thrown into disorder, and swept away in the general rout, in spite of the efforts of Ney, who,

having had his horse killed, fought sword in hand, and on foot, in the front of the battle, till the very last. That marshal, whose military virtues at least cannot be challenged, bore personal evidence against two circumstances, industriously circulated by the friends of Napoleon. One of these fictions occurs in his own bulletin, which charges the loss of the battle to a panic fear, brought about by the treachery of some unknown persons, who raised the cry of "*Sauve qui peut*." Another figment, greedily credited at Paris, bore, that four battalions of the Old Guard, the last who maintained the semblance of order, answered a summons to surrender, by the magnanimous reply, "The Guard can die, but cannot yield." And one edition of the story adds, that thereupon the battalions made a half wheel inwards, and discharged their muskets into each others' bosoms to save themselves from dying by the hands of the English. Neither the original reply, nor the pretended self-sacrifice of the Guard, have the slightest foundation. Camborne, in whose mouth the speech was placed, gave up his own sword, and remained prisoner; and the military conduct of the French Guard is better eulogised by the undisputed truth, that they fought to extremity, with the most unyielding constancy, than by imputing to them an act of regimental suicide upon the lost field of battle. Every attribute of brave men they have a just right to claim. It is no compliment to ascribe to them that of madmen. Whether the words were used by Camborne or no, the Guard well deserved to have them inscribed on their monument.

Whilst this decisive movement took place, Bulow, who had concentrated his troops, and was at length qualified to act in force, carried the village of Planchenois in the French rear, and was now firing so close on their right wing, that the cannonade annoyed the British who were in pursuit, and was suspended in consequence. Moving in oblique lines, the British and Prussian armies came into contact with each other on the heights so lately occupied by the French, and celebrated the victory with loud shouts of mutual congratulation.

The French army was now in total and inextricable confusion and rout; and when the victorious generals met at the farm-house of La Belle Alliance, it was agreed that the Prussians, who were fresh in comparison, should follow up the chase, a duty for which the British, exhausted by the fatigues of a battle of eight hours, were totally inadequate.

During the whole action, Napoleon maintained the utmost serenity. He remained on the heights of La Belle Alliance, keeping pretty near the centre, from which he had a full view of the field, which does not exceed a mile and a half in length. He expressed no solicitude on the fate of the battle for a long time, noticed the behaviour of particular regiments, and praised the English several times, always, however, talking of them as an assured prey. When forming his guard for the last fatal effort, he descended near them, half down the causeway from La Belle Alliance, to bestow upon them what proved his parting exhortation. He watched intently their progress with a spy-glass, and refused to listen to one or two aides-de-camp, who at that moment came from the right to inform him of the

appearance of the Prussians. At length, on seeing the attacking columns stagger and become confused, his countenance, said our informer, became pale as that of a corpse, and muttering to himself, "They are mingled together," he said to his attendants, "All is lost for the present," and rode off the field; not stopping or taking refreshment till he reached Charleroi, where he paused for a moment in a meadow, and occupied a tent which had been pitched for his accommodation.*

Meantime the pursuit of his discomfited army was followed up by Blücher, with the most determined perseverance. He accelerated the march of the Prussian advanced guard, and dispatched every man and horse of his cavalry upon the pursuit of the fugitive French. At Genappe they attempted something like defence, by barricading the bridge and streets; but the Prussians forced them in a moment, and although the French were sufficiently numerous for resistance, their disorder was so irremediable, and their moral courage was so absolutely quelled for the moment, that in many cases they were slaughtered like sheep. They were driven from bivouac to bivouac, without exhibiting even the shadow of their usual courage. One hundred and fifty guns were left in the hands of the English, and a like number taken by the Prussians in course of the pursuit. The latter obtained possession also of all Napoleon's baggage, and of his carriage, where, amongst many articles of curiosity, was found a proclamation intended to be made public at Brussels the next day.

The loss on the British side during this dreadful battle was, as the Duke of Wellington, no user of exaggerated expressions, truly termed it, *immense*. One hundred officers slain, five hundred wounded, many of them to death, fifteen thousand men killed and wounded (independent of the Prussian loss at Wavres), threw half Britain into mourning. Many officers of distinction fell. It required all the glory, and all the solid advantages of this immortal day, to reconcile the mind to the high price at which it was purchased. The commander-in-chief, compelled to be on every point of danger, was repeatedly in the greatest jeopardy. Only the duke himself, and one gentleman of his numerous staff, escaped unwounded in horse and person.

It would be difficult to form a guess at the extent of the French loss. Besides those who fell in the battle and flight, great numbers deserted. We do not believe, that of 75,000 men, the half were ever again collected under arms.

Having finished our account of this memorable action, we are led to notice the communications and criticisms of Napoleon himself on the subject, partly as illustrative of the narrative, but much more as indicating his own character.

The account of the battle of Waterloo, dictated

* Our informer on these points was Lacoste, a Flemish peasant, who was compelled to act as Bonaparte's guide, remained with him during the whole action, and accompanied him to Charleroi. He seemed a shrewd sensible man in his way, and told his story with the utmost simplicity. The author saw him, and heard his narrative very shortly after the action.

by Napoleon to Gourgaud, so severely exposed by General Grouchy, as a mere military romance, full of gratuitous suppositions, misrepresentations, and absolute falsehoods, accuses the subordinate generals who fought under Bonaparte of having greatly degenerated from their original character. Ney and Grouchy are particularly aimed at; the former by name, the latter by obvious implication. It is said they had lost that energy and enterprising genius by which they had formerly been distinguished, and to which France owed her triumphs. They had become timorous and circumspect in all their operations; and although their personal bravery remained, their greatest object was to compromise themselves as little as possible. This general remark, intended, of course, to pave the way for transferring from the emperor to his lieutenants the blame of the miscarriage of the campaign, is both unjust and ungrateful. Had they lost energy, who struggled to the very last in the field of Waterloo, long after the emperor had left the field? Was Grouchy undecided in his operations, who brought his own division safe to Paris, in spite of all the obstacles opposed to him by a victorious army, three times the amount of his own in numbers? Both these officers had given up, for the sake of Napoleon, the rank and appointments which they might have peacefully borne under the Bourbons. Did it indicate the reluctance to exonerate themselves, with which they are charged, that they ventured on the decided step of joining his desperate career, not only abandoning all regard to their interest and their safety, but compromising their character as men of loyalty in the face of all Europe, and exposing themselves to certain death, if the Bourbons should be successful? Those who fight with the cord around their neck, which was decidedly the case with Grouchy and Ney, must have headed the forlorn hope; and is it consistent with human nature, in such circumstances, to believe that they, whose fortune and safety depended on the victory, personally brave as they are admitted to be, should have loitered in the rear, when their fate was in the balance?

He who was unjust to his own followers can scarce be expected to be candid towards an enemy. The Duke of Wellington has, upon all occasions, been willing to render the military character of Napoleon that justice which a generous mind is scrupulously accurate in dispensing to an adversary, and has readily admitted that the conduct of Bonaparte and his army on this memorable occasion, was fully adequate to the support of their high reputation. It may be said, that the victor can afford to bestow praise on the vanquished, but that it requires a superior degree of candour in the vanquished to do justice to the conqueror. Napoleon, at any rate, does not seem to have attained, in this particular, to the pitch of a great or exalted mind, since both he and the various persons whom he employed as the means of circulating his statements, concur in a very futile attempt to excuse the defeat at Waterloo, by a set of apologies founded in a great degree upon misrepresentation. The reader will find these scientifically discussed in a valuable article in the Appendix.* But it may be necessary, at the risk of

* Vide (Appendix, No. 8) an account of the action of

some repetition, to take some notice of them here in a popular form. The allegations, which are designed to prove the incapacity of the British general, and to show that the battle of Waterloo was only lost by a combination of extraordinary fatalities, may be considered in their order.

The first, and most frequently repeated, is the charge, that the Duke of Wellington, on the 15th, was surprised in his cantonments, and could not collect his army fast enough at Quatre-Bras. In this his grace would have been doubtless highly censurable, if Napoleon had, by express information, or any distinct movement indicative of his purpose, shown upon which point he meant to advance. But the chivalrous practice of fixing a field of combat has been long out of date; and Napoleon, beyond all generals, possessed the art of masking his own movements, and misleading his enemy concerning the actual point on which he meditated an attack. The duke and Prince Blücher were, therefore, obliged to provide for the concentration of their forces upon different points, according as Bonaparte's selection should be manifested; and in order to be ready to assemble their forces upon any one position, they must, by spreading their cantonments, in some degree delay the movement upon all. The duke could not stir from Brussels, or concentrate his forces, until he had certain information of those of the enemy; and it is said that a French statesman, who had promised to send him a copy of the plan of Bonaparte's campaign, contrived by a trick of policy to evade keeping his word.* We do not mean to deny the talent and activity displayed by Bonaparte, who, if he could have brought forward his whole army upon the evening of the 15th of June, might probably have succeeded in preventing the meditated junction of Blücher and Wellington. But the celebrated prayer for annihilation of time and space would be as little reasonable in the mouth of a general as of a lover, and, fettered by the limitations against which that modest petition is directed, Bonaparte failed in bringing forward in due time a sufficient body of forces to carry all before him at Quatre-Bras; while, on the other hand, the Duke of Wellington, from the same obstacles of time and space, could not assemble a force sufficient to drive Ney before him, and enable him to ad-

vance to the support of Blücher during the action of Ligny.*

The choice of the field of Waterloo is also charged against the Duke of Wellington as an act of weak judgment; because, although possessed of all the requisites for maintaining battle or pursuing victory, and, above all, of the facilities for communicating with the Prussian army, it had not, according to the imperial critic, the means of affording security in case of a retreat, since there was only one communication to the rear—that by the causeway of Brussels, the rest of the position being screened by the forest of Soignies, in front of which the British army was formed, and through which, it is assumed, retreat was impossible.

Taking the principle of this criticism as accurate, it may be answered, that a general would never halt or fight at all, if he were to refuse combat on every other save a field of battle which possessed all the various excellencies which may be predicated of one in theory. The commander must consider whether the ground suits his present exigencies, without looking at other circumstances which may be less pressing at the time. Generals have been known to chuse by preference the ground from which there could be no retreating; like invaders who burn their ships, as a pledge that they will follow their enterprise to the last. And although provision for a safe retreat is certainly in most cases a desirable circumstance, yet it has been dispensed with by good generals, and by none more frequently than by Napoleon himself. Was not the battle of Essling fought without any possible mode of retreat save the frail bridges over the Danube?—Was not that of Wagram debated under similar circumstances?—And, to complete the whole, did not Napoleon, while censuring the Duke of Wellington for fighting in front of a forest, himself enter upon conflict with a defile in his rear, formed by the narrow streets and narrower bridge of Genappe, by which alone, if defeated, he could cross the Dyle?—It might, therefore, be presumed, that if the Duke of Wellington chose a position from which retreat was difficult, he must have considered the necessity of retreat as unlikely, and reckoned with confidence on being able to make good his stand until the Prussians should come up to join him.

Even this does not exhaust the question; for the English general-officers unite in considering the forest of Soignies as a very advantageous feature in the field; and, far from apprehending the least inconvenience from its existence, the Duke of

* Some people have been silly enough to consider the Duke of Wellington's being surprised as a thing indisputable, because the news of the French advance first reached him in a ball-room. It must be supposed that these good men's idea of war is, that a general should sit sentinel with his truncheon in his hand, like a statue in the midst of a city market-place, until the tidings come which call him to the field.

Free is his heart who for his country fights;
He on the eve of battle may resign
Himself to social pleasure—sweetest then,
When danger to the soldier's soul endears
The human joy that never may return.

Home's Douglas.

Waterloo, equally intelligible and scientific, drawn up by Captain Pringle of the artillery, which will amply supply the deficiencies of our narrative.

* This was Fouché, who seems to have been engaged in secret correspondence with all and sundry of the belligerent powers, while he was minister of police under Napoleon. In his Memoirs, he is made to boast that he contrived to keep his word to the Duke of Wellington, by sending the plan of Bonaparte's campaign by a female, a Flemish post-mistress, whom he laid wait for on the frontier, and caused to be arrested. Thus he

—kept the word of promise to the ear,
And broke it to the sense.

This story, we have some reason to believe, is true. One of the marvels of our times is how Fouché, after having been the mainspring of such a complication of plots and counterplots, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary intrigues, contrived after all to die in his bed.

Wellington regarded it as affording a position which, if his first and second line had been unhappily forced, he might have nevertheless made good against the whole French army. The hamlet of Mont St-Jean, in front, affords an excellent key to the position of an army compelled to occupy the forest. The wood itself is everywhere passable for men and horses, the trees being tall, and without either low boughs or underwood; and, singular as the discrepancy between the opinions of distinguished soldiers may seem, we have never met an English officer who did not look on the forest of Soignies as affording an admirable position for making a final stand. In support of their opinion, they refer to the defence of the Bois de Bossus, near Quatre-Bras, against the reiterated attacks of Marshal Ney. This impeachment of the Duke of Wellington may therefore be set aside, as inconsistent with the principles of British warfare. All that can be added is, that there are cases in which national habits and manners may render a position advantageous to soldiers of one country, which is perilous or destructive to those of another.

The next subject of invidious criticism is of a nature so singular, that, did it not originate with a great man, in peculiar circumstances of adversity, it might be almost termed ludicrous. Napoleon expresses himself as dissatisfied, because he was defeated in the common and vulgar proceeding of downright fighting, and by no special manoeuvres or peculiar display of military art on the part of the victor. But if it can afford any consolation to those who cherish his fame, it is easy to show, that Napoleon fell a victim to a scheme of tactics early conceived, and persevered in under circumstances which, in the case of ordinary men, would have occasioned its being abandoned; resumed, after events which seemed so adverse, that nothing save dauntless courage and unlimited confidence could have enabled the chiefs to proceed in their purpose; and carried into execution, without Napoleon's being able to penetrate the purpose of the allied generals, until it was impossible to prevent the annihilation of his army;—that he fell, in short, by a grand plan of *stratégie*, worthy of being compared to that of any of his own admirable campaigns.

To prove what we have said, it is only necessary to remark, that the natural bases and points of retreat of the Prussian and English armies were different; the former being directed on Maestricht, the other on Antwerp, where each expected their reinforcements. Regardless of this, and with full confidence in each other, the Prince Marshal Blücher, and the Duke of Wellington, agreed to act in conjunction against the French army. The union of their forces, for which both were prepared, was destined to have taken place at Ligny, where the duke designed to have supported the Prussians, and where Blücher hazarded an action in expectation of his ally's assistance. The active movements of Napoleon, and the impossibility of the English force being sufficiently concentrated at Quatre-Bras to afford the means of overpowering Ney and the force in their front,

prevented their making a lateral march to relieve Blücher at that critical period. Otherwise, the parts of the bloody drama, as afterwards acted, would have been reversed, and the British army would have moved to support the Prussians at Ligny, as the Prussians came to the aid of the British at Waterloo.

Napoleon had the merit of disconcerting this plan for the time; but he did not, and could not, discover that the allied generals retained, after the loss of the battle of Ligny, the same purpose which they had adopted on the commencement of the campaign. He imagined, as did all around him, that Blücher must retreat on Namur, or in such a direction as would effectually accomplish a separation betwixt him and the English, as it was natural to think a defeated army should approach towards its own resources, instead of attempting further offensive operations. At all events, Napoleon was in this respect so much mistaken, as to believe that if Blücher did retire on the same line with the English, the means which the Prussian retained for co-operating with his allies were so limited, and (perhaps he might think) the spirit of the general so subdued, that Marshal Grouchy, with 32,000 men, would be sufficient to keep the whole Prussian force in check. The marshal was accordingly, as we have seen, dispatched much too late, without any other instructions than to follow and engage the attention of the Prussians. Misled by the demonstration of Blücher, he at first took the road to Namur, and thus, without any fault on his part, lost time, which was inconceivably precious.

Bonaparte's subsequent accounts of this action blame Marshal Grouchy for not discovering Blücher's real direction, which he had no means of ascertaining, and for not obeying orders which were never given to him, and which could not be given, because Napoleon was as ignorant as the marshal, that Blücher had formed the determination at all events to unite himself with Wellington. This purpose of acting in co-operation, formed and persevered in, was to the French Emperor the riddle of the Sphinx, and he was destroyed because he could not discover it. Indeed he ridiculed even the idea of such an event. One of his officers, according to Baron Muffling, having hinted at the mere possibility of a junction between the Prussian army and that of Wellington, he smiled contemptuously at the thought. "The Prussian army," he said, "is defeated—it cannot rally for three days—I have 75,000 men, the English only 50,000. The town of Brussels awaits me with open arms. The English opposition waits but for my success to raise their heads. Then adieu subsidies, and farewell coalition!" In like manner, Napoleon frankly acknowledged, while on board the *Northumberland*, that he had no idea that the Duke of Wellington meant to fight, and therefore omitted to reconnoitre the ground with sufficient accuracy. It is well known, that when he observed them still in their position on the morning of the 18th, he exclaimed, "I have them, then, these English!"

It was half past eleven, just about the time that the battle of Waterloo commenced, that Grouchy, as already hinted, overtook the rear of the Prussians. A strong force, appearing to be the whole

of the Prussian army, lay before the French marshal, who, from the character of the ground, had no means of ascertaining their numbers, or of discovering the fact, that three divisions of Blücher's army were already on the march to their right, through the passes of St-Lambert; and that it was only Thielmann's division which remained upon the Dyle. Still less could he know, what could only be known to the duke and Blücher, that the English were determined to give battle in the position of Waterloo. He heard, indeed, a heavy cannonade in that direction, but that might have proceeded from an attack on the British rear-guard, the duke being, in the general opinion of the French army, in full retreat upon Antwerp. At any rate, the marshal's orders were to attack the enemy which he found before him. He could not but remember, that Ney had been reprimanded for detaching a part of his force on the 16th, in consequence of a distant cannonade; and he was naturally desirous to avoid censure for the self-same cause. Even if Napoleon was seriously engaged with the English, it seemed the business of Grouchy to occupy the large force which he observed at Wavres, and disposed along the Dyle, to prevent their attempting anything against Napoleon, if, contrary to probability, the emperor should be engaged in a general battle. Lastly, as Grouchy was to form his resolution under the idea of having the whole Prussian force before him, which was estimated at 80,000 men, it would have been impossible for him to detach from an army of 32,000 any considerable body, to the assistance of Napoleon; and in attacking with such inadequate numbers, he showed his devotion, at the risk of being totally destroyed.

He engaged, however, in battle without any hesitation, and attacked the line of the Prussians along the Dyle on every accessible point; to wit, at Wavres, at the mill of Bielge, and at the village of Limal. The points of attack were desperately defended by the Prussians under Thielmann, so that Grouchy could only occupy that part of Wavres, which was on his own side of the Dyle. About four o'clock, and consequently when the fate of the battle of Waterloo was nearly decided, Grouchy received from Marshal Soult the only order which reached him during the day, requiring him to manœuvre so as to unite himself to the right flank of the emperor, but at the same time acquainting him with the (false) intelligence, that the battle was gained upon the line of Waterloo. A postscript informed Grouchy, that Bulow was appearing upon Napoleon's right flank, and that if he could come up with speed, he would take the Prussian *flagrante delicto*.

These orders were quite intelligible. But two things were necessary to their being carried into execution. First, that Grouchy should get clear of Thielmann, the enemy with whom he was closely engaged, and who would not fail to pursue the French marshal if he retreated or moved to his left flank, without having repulsed him. Secondly, it was indispensable he should pass the small river Dyle, defended by Thielmann's division, since the road leading through the woods of Chapelle Lambert, was that by which he could best execute his march towards Waterloo. Grouchy redoubled his efforts to force the Dyle, but he could not succeed

till night, and then but partially; for the Prussians continued to hold the mill of Bielge, and remained in force within a cannon-shot of Grouchy's position.

In the morning, the marshal, anxious to learn with certainty the fate of Napoleon, though believing, according to Soult's letter, that he was victorious, sent out reconnoitring parties. When he learned the truth, he commenced a retreat, which he conducted with such talent, that, though closely pursued by the Prussians, then in all the animation of triumph, and though sustaining considerable loss, he was enabled to bring his corps unbroken under the walls of Paris. Weighing all these circumstances, it appears that Bonaparte had no right to count upon the assistance of Grouchy, far less to throw censure on that general for not coming to his assistance, since he scrupulously obeyed the orders he received; and when at four o'clock, that of attacking and pressing the Prussian rear was qualified by the directions of Soult, to close up to Bonaparte's right wing, Grouchy was engaged in an obstinate engagement with Thielmann, whom he must necessarily defeat before he could cross the Dyle, to accomplish the junction proposed.

The movement of Blücher, therefore, was a masterpiece of courage and judgment, since the prince marshal left one division of his army to maintain a doubtful onset against Grouchy, and involved himself with the other three in that flank movement through the woods of St-Lambert, by which he paid with interest the debt which he owed Napoleon for a similar movement, previous to the affairs of Champaubert and Montmirail, in 1814.

The same system which placed Blücher in motion, required that the Duke of Wellington should maintain his position, by confining himself to a strictly defensive contest. The British, as they were to keep their place at all risks, so on no temptation of partial success were they to be induced to advance. Every step which they might have driven the French backward, before the coming up of the Prussians, would have been a disadvantage as far as it went, since the object was not to beat the enemy by the efforts of the English only, which, in the state of the two armies, might only have amounted to a repulse, but to detain them in the position of La Belle Alliance, until the army of Blücher should come up. When Napoleon, therefore, objects to the conduct of the Duke of Wellington on the 18th, that he did not manœuvre in the time of action, he objects to the very circumstances which rendered the victory of the day so decisive. He was himself decoyed into, and detained in a position, until his destruction was rendered inevitable.

It has been a favourite assertion with almost all the French, and some English writers, that the English were on the point of being defeated, when the Prussian force came up. The contrary is the truth. The French had attacked, and the British had resisted, from past eleven until near seven o'clock; and though the battle was most bloody, the former had gained no advantage save at the wood of Hougoumont, and the farm-house of La Haye Sainte; both they gained, but speedily lost. Baron Muffling has given the most explicit testimony, "that the battle could have afforded no favourable result to

the enemy, even if the Prussians had never come up." He was an eye-witness, and an unquestionable judge, and willing, doubtless, to carry the immediate glory acquired by his countrymen on this memorable occasion, and in which he had a large personal stake, as high as truth and honour will permit. At the time when Napoleon made the last effort, Bulow's troops were indeed upon the field, but had not made any physical impression by their weapons, or excited any moral dread by their appearance. Napoleon announced to all his Guard, whom he collected and formed for that final exertion, that the Prussians whom they saw were closely pursued by the French of Grouchy's army. He himself, perhaps, had that persuasion; for the fire of Grouchy's artillery, supposed to be a league and a half, but in reality nearly three leagues distant, was distinctly heard; and some one of Napoleon's suite saw the smoke from the heights above Wavres. "The battle," he said, "is won; we must force the English position, and throw them upon the defiles.—*Allons! La Garde en avant!*"* Accordingly, they then made the attack in the evening, when they were totally repulsed, and chased back upon, and beyond, their own position. Thus, before the Prussians came into serious action, Napoleon had done his utmost, and had not a corps remaining in order, excepting four battalions of the Old Guard. It cannot be therefore said that our allies afforded the British army protection from an enemy that was totally disorganized; but that for which the Prussians do deserve the gratitude of Britain and of Europe, is the generous and courageous confidence with which they marched at so many risks to assist in the action, and the activity and zeal with which they completed the victory. It is universally acknowledged, that the British army, exhausted by so long a conflict, could not have availed themselves of the disorder of their enemy at its conclusion; while, on the contrary, nothing could exceed the dexterity and rapidity with which the Prussians conducted the pursuit. The laurels of Waterloo must be divided,†—the British won the battle, the Prussians achieved and rendered available the victory.

* He gave the same explanation when on board of the Northumberland. General Gourgaud had inaccurately stated that the emperor had mistaken the corps of Bulow for that of Grouchy. Napoleon explained that this was not the case, but that he had opposed a sufficient force to those Prussians whom he saw in the field, and concluded that Grouchy was closing up on their flank and rear.

† Baron Muffling's account of the British army must interest our readers:—"There is not, perhaps, in all Europe, an army superior to the English in the actual field of battle. That is to say, an army in which military instruction is entirely directed to that point, as its exclusive object. The English soldier is strongly formed and well-fed, and nature has endowed him with much courage and intrepidity. He is accustomed to severe discipline, and is very well armed. The infantry opposes with confidence the attack of cavalry, and shows more indifference than any other European army when attacked in the flank or rear. These qualities explain why the English have never been defeated in a pitched field since they were commanded by the Duke of Wellington.

* On the other hand, there are no troops in Europe less experienced than the English in the light service and in

CHAPTER CVIII.

Bonaparte's arrival at Paris.—The two Chambers assemble, and adopt resolutions, indicating a wish for Napoleon's abdication.—Bonaparte holds a general council.—Fouché presents to the representatives Napoleon's abdication, which stipulates that his son shall succeed him.—Carnot's exaggerated report to the Peers, of the means of defence—contradicted by Ney.—Stormy debate in the Peers on the abdication act.—Both Chambers evade formally recognizing Napoleon II.—Provisional Government appointed.—Napoleon required to retire to Malmaison.—His offer of his services in the defence of Paris rejected.—He is placed under the surveillance of General Becker.—Means provided at Rochefort for his departure to the United States.—He arrives at Rochefort on 3d July.—The Provisional Government attempt in vain to treat with the allies, or to excite the French to resistance.—The allies advance to Paris, and, an armistice being concluded, enter it on 7th July.—Chamber of Peers disperse, and the members of the other Chamber are excluded from the place of meeting.—Louis XVIII. re-enters Paris on 8th July.—Reflections upon this second restoration of the Bourbons.

IMMENSE as the direct and immediate consequences of the battle of Waterloo certainly were, being the total loss of the campaign, and the destruction of Napoleon's fine army, the more remote contingencies to which it gave rise were so much more important, that it may be doubted whether there was ever in the civilized world a great battle followed by so many and such extraordinary results.

That part of the French army which escaped from the battle of Waterloo, fled in the most terrible disorder towards the frontiers of France. Napoleon himself continued his flight from Charleroi, in the neighbourhood of which was his first place of hal-

skirmishes; accordingly, they do not practise that service themselves. The English army in Spain formed the standing force round which the Spaniards and Portuguese rallied. The Duke of Wellington acted wisely in reserving his English troops for regular battles, and in keeping up that idea in his army.

* If, on the one hand, a country is worthy of every which possesses an army consisting entirely of grenadiers, that army might, on the other hand, experience great disadvantage if forced to combat unassisted against an able general, who understands their peculiarities, and can avoid giving them battle excepting on advantageous ground. However, it is to be supposed that the English will seldom make war on the Continent without allies, and it appears their system is established on that principle. Besides, even an army as the English is most precious for those they may act with, as the most difficult task of the modern art of war is to form an army for pitched battles.* The Duke adds in a note upon the last sentence,—"The people who inhabit other quarters of the world, and are not come to the same state of civilization with us, afford a proof of this. Most of them know better than Europeans how to fight man to man, but can never attain the point of gaining a battle over us. Discipline, in the full extent of the word, is the fruit of moral and religious instruction."—*Histoire de la Campagne de l'Armée Anglaise, etc., sous les ordres du Duc de Wellington, et de l'Armée Prussienne sous les ordres du Prince Blücher de Wahlstadt*, Bâle, 1815, p. 6 de 10. Stuttgart et Tubingue, 1817.

ing, and hurried on to Philippeville. From this point he designed, it was said, to have marched to place himself at the head of Grouchy's army. But no troops of any kind having been rallied, and Charleroi having been almost instantly occupied by the Prussian pursuers, a report became current that the division was destroyed, and Grouchy himself made prisoner. Napoleon, therefore, pursued his own retreat, leaving orders, which were not attended to, that the relics of the army should be rallied at Avesnes. Soult could only succeed in gathering together a few thousands, as far within the French territory as Laon. Meanwhile Bonaparte, traveling post, had reached Paris, and brought thither the news of his own defeat.

On the 19th of June the public ear of the capital had been stunned by the report of a hundred pieces of cannon, which announced the victory at Ligny, and the public prints had contained the most gasconading accounts of that action; of the forcing the passage of the Sambre, the action at Charleroi, and the battle of Quatre-Bras. The imperialists were in the highest state of exultation, the republicans doubtful, and the royalists dejected. On the morning of the 21st, the third day after the fatal action, it was at first whispered, and then openly said, that Napoleon had returned alone from the army on the preceding night, and was now in the palace of Élysée Bourbon. The fatal truth was not long in transpiring—he had lost a dreadful and decisive pitched battle, and the French army, which had left the capital so confident, so full of hope, pride, and determination, was totally destroyed.

Many reasons have been given for Napoleon's not remaining with his army on this occasion, and endeavouring at least to bring it into a state of reorganization; but the secret seems to be explained by his apprehension of the faction of republicans and constitutionalists in Paris. He must have remembered that Fouché, and others of that party, had advised him to end the distresses of France by his abdication of the crown, even before he placed himself at the head of his army. He was aware, that what they had ventured to suggest in his moment of strength, they would not hesitate to demand and extort from him in the hour of his weakness, and that the Chamber of Representatives would endeavour to obtain peace for themselves by sacrificing him. "He is known," says an author already quoted, friendly to his fame, "to have said, after the disasters of the Russian campaign, that he would confound the Parisians by his presence, and fall among them like a thunderbolt. But there are things which succeed only because they have never been done before, and for that reason ought never to be attempted again. His fifth flight from his army occasioned the entire abandonment of himself and his cause by all who might have forgiven him his misfortune, but required that he should be the first to arise from the blow."^{*}

It was a curious indication of public spirit in Paris, that, upon the news of this appalling misfortune, the national funds rose, immediately after the

first shock of the tidings was past; so soon, that is, as men had time to consider the probable consequence of the success of the allies. It seemed as if public credit revived upon any intelligence, however disastrous otherwise, which promised to abridge the reign of Bonaparte.

The anticipations of Napoleon did not deceive him. It was plain, that, whatever deference the jacobins had for him in his hour of strength, they had no compassion for his period of weakness. They felt the opportunity favourable to get rid of him, and did not disguise their purpose to do so.

The two Chambers hastily assembled. La Fayette addressed that of the Representatives in the character of an old friend of liberty, spoke of the sinister reports that were spread abroad, and invited the members to rally under the three-coloured banner of liberty, equality, and public order, by adopting five resolutions. The first declared that the independence of the nation was menaced. The second declared the sittings of the Chambers permanent, and denounced the pains of treason against whosoever should attempt to dissolve them. The third announced that the troops had deserved well of their country. The fourth called out the National Guard. The fifth invited the ministers to repair to the assembly.

These propositions intimated the apprehensions of the Chamber of Representatives, that they might be a second time dissolved by an armed force, and, at the same time, announced their purpose to place themselves at the head of affairs, without further respect to the emperor. They were adopted, all but the fourth concerning the National Guard, which was considered as premature. Regnault de St Jean d'Angely attempted to read a bulletin, giving an imperfect and inconsistent account of what had passed on the frontiers; but the Representatives became clamorous, and demanded the attendance of the ministers. At length, after a delay of three or four hours, Carnot, Caulaincourt, Davoust, and Fouché, entered the hall with Lucien Bonaparte.

The Chamber formed itself into a secret committee, before which the ministers laid the full extent of the disaster, and announced that the emperor had named Caulaincourt, Fouché, and Carnot, as commissioners to treat of peace with the allies. The ministers were bluntly reminded by the republican members, and particularly by Henry Lacoste, that they had no basis for any negotiations which could be proposed in the emperor's name, since the allied powers had declared war against Napoleon, who was now in plain terms pronounced, by more than one member, the sole obstacle betwixt the nation and peace. Universal applause followed from all parts of the hall, and left Lucien no longer in doubt that the Representatives intended to separate their cause from that of his brother. He omitted no art of conciliation or entreaty, and,—more eloquent probably in prose than in poetry,—appealed to their love of glory, their generosity, their fidelity, and the oaths which they had so lately sworn. "We have been faithful," replied La Fayette; "we have followed your brother to the sands of Egypt—to the snows of Russia. The bones of Frenchmen, scattered in every region, attest our fidelity." All

^{*} *Letters from Paris, written during the Last Reign of Napoleon.*

seemed to unite in one sentiment, that the abdication of Bonaparte was a measure absolutely necessary. Davoust, the minister at war, arose, and disclaimed, with protestations, any intention of acting against the freedom or independence of the Chamber. This was, in fact, to espouse their cause. A committee of five members was appointed to concert measures with ministers. Even the latter official persons, though named by the emperor, were not supposed to be warmly attached to him. Carnot and Fouché were the natural leaders of the popular party, and Caulaincourt was supposed to be on indifferent terms with Napoleon, whose ministers, therefore, seemed to adopt the interest of the Chamber in preference to his. Lucien saw that his brother's authority was ended, unless it could be maintained by violence. The Chamber of Peers might have been more friendly to the imperial cause, but their constitution gave them as little confidence in themselves as weight with the public. They adopted the three first resolutions of the lower Chamber, and named a committee of public safety.

The line of conduct which the Representatives meant to pursue was now obvious; they had spoken out, and named the sacrifice which they exacted from Bonaparte, being nothing less than abdication. It remained to be known whether the emperor would adopt measures of resistance, or submit to this encroachment. If there could be a point of right, where both were so far wrong, it certainly lay with Napoleon. These very representatives were, by voluntary consent, as far as oaths and engagements can bind men, his subjects, convoked in his name, and having no political existence excepting as a part of his new constitutional government. However great his faults to the people of France, he had committed none towards these accomplices of his usurpation, nor were they legislators otherwise than as he was their emperor. Their right to discard and trample upon him in his adversity consisted only in their having the power to do so; and the readiness which they showed to exercise that power spoke as little for their faith as for their generosity. At the same time, our commiseration for fallen greatness is lost in our sense of that justice, which makes the associates and tools of a usurper the readiest implement of his ruin.

When Bonaparte returned to Paris, his first interview was with Carnot, of whom he demanded, in his usual tone of authority, an instant supply of treasure, and a levy of 300,000 men. The minister replied, that he could have neither the one nor the other. Napoleon then summoned Maret, Duke of Bassano, and other confidential persons of his court. But when his civil counsellors talked of defence, the word vung from him the bitter ejaculation, "Ah, my Old Guard, could they but defend themselves like you?" A sad confession that the military truncheon, his best emblem of command, was broken in his gripe. Lucien urged his brother to maintain his authority and dissolve the Chambers by force; but Napoleon, aware that the National Guard might take the part of the Representatives, declined an action so full of hazard. Davoust was, however, sounded concerning his willingness to act against the Chambers, but he positively refused to do so.

Some idea was held out by Fouché to Napoleon, of his being admitted to the powers of a dictator; but this could be only thrown out as a proposal for the purpose of amusing him. In the meantime arrived the news of the result of the meeting of the representatives in secret committee.

The gauntlet was now thrown down, and it was necessary that Napoleon should resist or yield, declare himself absolute, and dissolve the Chambers by violence, or abdicate the authority he had so lately resumed. Lucien, finding him still undetermined, hesitated not to say that the smoke of the battle of Mont St-Jean had turned his brain. In fact, his conduct at this crisis was not that of a great man. He dared neither venture on the desperate measures which might, for a short time, have preserved his power, nor could he bring himself to the dignified measure of an apparently voluntary resignation. He clung to what could no longer avail him, like the distracted criminal, who, wanting resolution to meet his fate by a voluntary effort, must be pushed from the scaffold by the hand of the executioner.

Bonaparte held, upon the night of the 21st, a sort of general council, comprehending the ministers of every description, the president and four members of the Chamber of Peers, the president and four vice-presidents of the Representatives, with other official persons and counsellors of state. The emperor laid before this assembly the state of the nation, and required their advice. Regnault (who was the imperial orator in ordinary) seconded the statement with a proposal, that measures be taken to recruit with heroes the heroic army, and best succours to what, by a happily selected phrase, he termed the "astonished eagle." He opined, therefore, that the Chambers should make an appeal to French valour, while the emperor was treating of peace in the most steady and dignified manner. La Fayette stated, that resistance would but aggravate the calamities of France. The allies thus pledged to demand a particular sacrifice when they first engaged in the war; they were not likely to recede from it after this decisive victory. One measure alone he saw betwixt the country and a bloody and ruinous conflict, and he referred to the great and generous spirit of the emperor to discover its nature. Maret, Duke of Bassano, long Bonaparte's most confidential friend, and fatally so, because (more a courtier than a statesman) he attended rather to sooth his humour than to guide his councils, took fire at this suggestion. He called for severe measures against the royalists and disaffected; a revolutionary police, and revolutionary punishments. "He said," he said, "been earlier resorted to, a person (meaning probably Fouché) who now hears us would not be now smiling at the misfortunes of his country, and Wellington would not be marching upon Paris." This speech was received with a burst of disapprobation, which even the presence of the emperor, in whose cause Maret was thus vehement, proved unable to restrain; hisses and clamours drowned the voice of the speaker. Carnot, who had juster views of the military strength, or rather weakness, of France at the moment, was desirous, as a democrat as he was, to retain the advantage of Napoleon's talents. He is said to have wept when the

abdication was insisted upon. Lanjuinais and Benjamin Constant supported the sentiments of La Fayette. But the emperor appeared gloomy, dissatisfied, and uncertain, and the council broke up without coming to any determination.

For another anxious night the determination of Bonaparte was suspended. Had the nation, or even the ministers, been unanimous in a resolution to defend themselves, unquestionably France might have been exposed to the final chance of war, with some prospect of a struggle on Napoleon's part; though, when it is considered within how short a time the allies introduced, within the limits of France, an armed force amounting to 800,000 effective men, it does not appear how his resistance could have eventually proved successful. It would be injustice to deny Napoleon a natural feeling of the evils which must have been endured by the nation in such a protracted contest, and we readily suppose him unwilling to have effected a brief continuation of his reign, by becoming the cause of total destruction to the fine country which he had so long ruled. Like most men in difficulties, he received much more advice than offers of assistance. The best counsel was, perhaps, that of an American gentleman, who advised him instantly to retreat to the North American States, where he could not indeed enjoy the royal privileges and ceremonial, to which he was more attached than philosophy warrants, but where that general respect would have been paid to him, which his splendid talents, and wonderful career of adventure, were so well calculated to enforce. But now, as at Moscow, he lingered too long in forming a decided opinion; for, though the importunity of friends and opponents wrung from him the resignation which was demanded at all hands, yet it was clogged by conditions which could only be made in the hope of retaining a predominant interest in the government by which his own was to be succeeded.

On the morning of the 22d June, only four days after the defeat at Waterloo, the Chamber of Representatives assembled at nine in the morning, and expressed the utmost impatience to receive the act of abdication. A motion was made by Duchesne, that it should be peremptorily demanded from the emperor, when this degree of violence was rendered unnecessary by his compliance. It was presented by Fouché, whose intrigues were thus far crowned with success, and was couched in the following terms:

"Frenchmen!—In commencing war for maintaining the national independence, I relied on the union of all efforts, of all wills, and the concurrence of all the national authorities. I had reason to hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of the powers against me.

"Circumstances appear to me changed. I offer myself as a sacrifice to the hatred of the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in their declarations, and have really directed them only against my power! My political life is terminated, and I proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., Emperor of the French.

"The present ministers will provisionally form

the council of the government. The interest which I take in my son induces me to invite the Chambers to form, without delay, the regency by a law.

"Unite all for the public safety, in order to remain an independent nation.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

The republican party having thus obtained a victory, proposed instantly several new models for settling the form of a constitution, in the room of that, which, exactly three weeks before, they had sworn to in the Champ-de-Mai. This was judged something premature; and they resolved for the present to content themselves with nominating a provisional government, vesting the executive powers of the state in five persons—two to be chosen from Bonaparte's House of Peers, and three from that of the representatives.

In the meanwhile, to preserve the decency due to the late emperor, the Chamber named a committee to wait on him with an address of thanks, in which they carefully avoided all mention and recognition of his son. Napoleon, for the last time, received the committee delegated to present the address, in the imperial habit, and surrounded by his state officers and guards. He seemed pale and pensive, but firm and collected, and heard with a steady indifference the praises which they bestowed on his patriotic sacrifice. His answer recommended unanimity, and the speedy preparation of means of defence; but at the conclusion he reminded them, that his abdication was conditional, and comprehended the interests of his son.

Lanjuinais, President of the Chamber, replied, with profound respect, that the Chamber had given him no directions respecting the subject which Napoleon pressed upon. "I told you," said he, turning to his brother Lucien, "they would not, could not do it.—Tell the assembly," he said, again addressing the president, "that I recommend my son to their protection. It is in his favour I have abdicated."

Thus the succession of Napoleon II. came to be now the point of debate between the abdicated emperor and the legislative bodies. It is certain, the appointment could not have been rendered acceptable to the allies; and the influence which Bonaparte and his friends were likely to have in a regency were strong arguments for all in France who had opposed him in the struggle, uniting to set aside his family and dynasty.

Upon the same 22d June, a strange scene took place in the Chamber of Peers. The government had received intelligence that Marshal Grouchy, whom we left on the banks of the Dyle, near Wavres, and who continued his action with Thielmann, to whom he was opposed till deep in the night, had, on hearing the loss of the battle at Waterloo, effected a most able retreat through Namur, defended himself against several attacks, and finally made his way to Laon. This good news encouraged Carnot to render a brilliant account to the Chamber, of Grouchy being at the head of an untouched army of upwards of 60,000 men (Grouchy's whole force at Wavres having been only 32,000); of Soult collecting 20,000 of the Old Guard

at Mezières; of 10,000 new levies dispatched from the interior to join the rallied forces, with 200 pieces of cannon. Ney, half frantic at hearing these exaggerated statements, and his mind galloped with the sense of Napoleon's injustice towards him, as expressed in the bulletins, started up, and spoke like a possessed person under the power of the exorcist. There was a reckless desperation in the manner of his contradicting the minister. It seemed as if he wished the state of the world undone in his own undoing. "The report," he said, "was false—false in every respect. Dare they tell eye-witnesses of the disastrous day of the 18th, that we have yet sixty thousand soldiers embodied? Grouchy cannot have under him twenty, or five and twenty thousand soldiers, at the utmost. Had he possessed a greater force, he might have covered the retreat, and the emperor would have been still in command of an army on the frontiers. Not a man of the Guard," he said, "will ever rally more. I myself commanded them—I myself witnessed their total extermination, ere I left the field of battle—They are annihilated—The enemy are at Nivelles with 80,000 men; they may, if they please, be at Paris in six days—There is no safety for France, but in instant propositions of peace." On being contradicted by General Flahaut, Ney resumed his sinister statement with even more vehemence; and at length striking at once into the topic which all felt, but none had ventured yet to name, he said in a low, but distinct voice,—“Yes! I repeat it—your only course is by negotiation—you must recal the Bourbons; and for me, I will retire to the United States.”

The most bitter reproaches were heaped on Ney for this last expression. Lavalette and Carnot especially appeared incensed against him. Ney replied, with sullen contempt, to those who blamed his conduct, “I am not one of those to whom their interest is everything; what should I gain by the restoration of Louis, except being shot for desertion? but I must speak the truth, for the sake of the country.”

This strange scene sunk deep into the minds of thinking men, who were in future induced to view the subsequent sounding resolutions, and bustling debates of the Chambers, as empty noise, unsupported by the state of the national resources.

After this debate on the state of the means of defence, there followed one scarce less stormy, in the Chamber of Peers, upon the reading of the act of abdication. Lucien Bonaparte took up the question of the succession, and insisted upon the instant recognition of his nephew, according to the rules of the constitution. The Count de Pontecoulant interrupted the orator, demanding by what right Lucien, an Italian prince, and an alien, presumed to name a sovereign to the French empire, where he himself had not even the privileges of a denizen? To this objection,—a strange one, certainly, coming from lips which had sworn faith but twenty-two days before to a constitution, recognizing Lucien not only as a denizen, but as one of the blood-royal of France,—the prince answered that he was a Frenchman by his sentiments, and by virtue of the laws. Pontecoulant then objected to accept as sovereign a child

residing in a different kingdom; and Labédoyère, observing the hesitation of the assembly, started up, and, demeaning himself with fury, exhibited the same blind and devoted attachment to Napoleon which had prompted him to show the example of defection at Grenoble.

“The emperor,” he said, “had abdicated solely in behalf of his son. His resignation was null, if his son was not instantly proclaimed. And who were they who opposed this generous resolution? Those whose voices had been always at the sovereign's devotion while in prosperity; who had fled from him in adversity, and who were already hastening to receive the yoke of foreigners. Yes,” continued this impetuous young man, aiding his speech with the most violent gestures, and overpowering, by the loudness of his tone, the murmurs of the assembly, “if you refuse to acknowledge the imperial prince, I declare that Napoleon must again draw his sword—again shed blood. At the head of the brave Frenchmen who have bled in his cause, we will rally around him; and woe to the base generals who are perhaps even now meditating new treasons! I demand that they be impeached, and punished as deserters of the national standard—that their names be given to infamy, their houses razed, their families proscribed and exiled. We will endure no traitors among us. Napoleon, in resigning his power to the nation, has done his duty to himself, but the nation is not worthy of him, since she has a second time compelled him to abdicate; she who would abide by him in prosperity and reverse.” The ravings of this daring enthusiast, who was, in fact, giving language to the feelings of a great part of the French army, were at length drowned in a general cry of order. “You forget yourself,” exclaimed Masséna. “You believe yourself still in the *corps de garde*,” said Lameth. Labédoyère strove to go on, but was silenced by the general clamour, which at length put an end to this scandalous scene.

The Peers, like the deputies of the Lower Chamber, having eluded the express recognition of Napoleon II., the two Chambers proceeded to name the members of the Provisional Government. These were Carnot, Fouché, Caulaincourt, Grenier, and Quinette. In their proclamation, they stated that Napoleon had resigned, and that his son had been proclaimed (which, by the way, was not true), calling on the nation for exertions, sacrifices, and unanimity, and promising, if not an actually new constitution, as had been usual on such occasions, yet such a complete revision and repair of that which was now three weeks old, as should make it in every respect as good as new.

This address had little effect either on the troops or the federates, who, like Labédoyère, were of opinion that Napoleon's abdication could only be received on his own terms. These men assembled in armed parties, and paraded under Bonaparte's windows, at the palace of Élysée Bourbon. Mugs and liquor were delivered to them, which increased their cries of *Vive Napoléon! Vive l'empereur!* They insulted the National Guards, and seemed disposed to attack the residence of Fouché. On the other hand, the National Guards were 30,000 men in number, disposed in general to support order.

and many of them leaning to the side of Louis XVIII. A moment of internal convulsion seemed inevitable; for it was said, that if Napoleon II. was not instantly acknowledged, Bonaparte would come down and dissolve the Chamber with an armed force.

On the meeting of the 24th June, the important question of succession was decided, or rather evaded, as follows:—Mannet, generally understood to be the organ of Fouché in the House of Representatives, made a long speech to show that there was no occasion for a formal recognition of the succession of Napoleon II., since he was, by the terms of the constitution, already in possession of the throne. When the orator had given this deep reason that their sovereign should neither be acknowledged nor proclaimed, purely because he *was* their sovereign, all arose and shouted, *Vive Napoleon II.* But when there was a proposal to swear allegiance to the new emperor, there was a general cry of "No oaths! No oaths!" as if there existed a consciousness in the Chamber of having been too lavish of these ill-redeemed pledges, and a general disgust at commencing a new course of perjury.

The Chamber of Representatives thus silenced, if they did not satisfy, the imperialist party, by a sort of incidental and ostensible acknowledgment of the young Napoleon's right to the crown; while at the same time, by declaring the Provisional Government to be a necessary guarantee for the liberties of the subject, they prevented the interference either of Napoleon himself, or any of his friends, in the administration of the country. Yet, notwithstanding the simulated nature of their compliance with the especial condition of Napoleon's resignation, the Chambers and Provisional Government were as strict in exacting from the abdicated sovereign the terms of his bargain, as if they had paid him the stipulated value in current, instead of counterfeit coin. Thus they exacted from him a proclamation, addressed in his own name to the soldiers, in order to confirm the fact of his abdication, which the troops were unwilling to believe on any authority inferior to his own. In this address, there are, however, expressions, which show his sense of the compulsion with which he was treated. After an exhortation to the soldiers to continue in their career of honour, and an assurance of the interest which he should always take in their exploits, follows this passage:—"Both you and I have been calumniated. Men, very unfit to appreciate our labours, have seen in the marks of attachment which you have given me, a zeal of which I was the sole object. Let your future successes tell them, that it was the country, above all things, which you served in obeying me; and that, if I had any share in your affections, I owed it to my ardent love for France, our common mother."

These expressions were highly disagreeable to the Chamber of Representatives, who at the same time regarded the presence of Napoleon in the capital as dangerous to their own power, and to the public tranquillity. The suburbs, with their fierce inmates, continued to be agitated, and soldiers, the stragglers of the field of Waterloo, were daily gathering under the walls of Paris, furious at their recent defeat, and calling on their emperor to lead

them to vengeance. There seems to have been little to prevent Napoleon from still placing himself at the head of a small but formidable army. To remove him from this temptation the Provisional Government required him to retire to the palace of Malmaison, near St-Germain, so long the favourite abode of the discarded Joséphine. Napoleon had not been within its walls a single day, before, surrounded by Fouché's police, he found that he, who, not a month since, had disposed of the fate of myriads, was no longer the free master of his own actions. He was watched and controlled, though without the use of actual force, and now, for the first time, felt what it was to lose that free agency, of which his despotism had for so many years deprived so large a portion of mankind. Yet he seemed to submit to his fate with indifference, or only expressed impatience when beset by his personal creditors, who, understanding that he was not likely to remain long in France, attempted to extort from him a settlement of their claims. This petty persecution was given way to by the government, as one of several expedients to abridge his residence in France; and they had the means of using force, if all should fail.

Short as was the time he lingered at Malmaison, incredible as it may be thought, Napoleon was almost forgotten in Paris. "No one," says a well-informed author, living in that city during the crisis, "except the immediate friends of government, pretends to know whether he is still at Malmaison, or seems to think it a question of importance to ask. On Saturday last, Count M—saw him there: he was tranquil, but quite lost. His friends now pretend, that, since his return from Elba, he has never been quite the man he was."* There was, however, a reason for his protracting his residence at Malmaison, more honourable than mere human reluctance to submit to inevitable calamity.

The English and Prussian forces were now approaching Paris by rapid marches; every town falling before them which could have been reckoned upon as a bar to their progress. When Paris was again to be girt round with hostile armies, honourable as well as political feelings might lead Napoleon to hope that the Representatives might be inclined to waive all personal animosity, and having recourse to his extraordinary talents and his influence over the minds of the army and federates, by which alone the capital could be defended, might permit him once more to assume the sword for protection of Paris. He offered to command the army as general in chief, in behalf of his son. He offered to take share in the defence, as an ordinary citizen. But the internal discord had gone too far. The popular party which then prevailed saw more danger in the success of Napoleon, than in the superiority of the allies. The latter they hoped to conciliate by treaty. They doubted, with good reason, the power of resisting them by force; and if such resistance was or could be maintained by Napoleon, they feared his supremacy, in a military command, at least as much as the predominance of the allies. His services were therefore declined by them.

* Substance of Letters written by an Englishman resident at Paris, etc., vol. II.

Like skilful anglers, the Provisional Government had been gradually drawing their nets around Napoleon, and it was now time, as they thought, to drag him upon the shallows. They proceeded to place him under a sort of arrest, by directing General Becker, an officer with whom Napoleon had been on indifferent terms, to watch over, and, if necessary, to restrain his movements in such a manner, that it should be impossible for him to make his escape, and to use measures to induce him to leave Malmaison for Rochefort, where the means were provided for his departure out of France. Orders were at the same time given for two frigates to transport him to the United States of America; and the surveillance of General Becker and the police was to continue until the late emperor was on board the vessels. This order was qualified by directions that all possible care should be taken to insure the safety of Napoleon's person. A corresponding order was transmitted by Davoust, who, giving way to one of those equivocal bursts of feeling, by which men compromise a conflict between their sentiments and their duty or their interest, refused to sign it himself, but ordered his secretary to do so, which, as he observed, would be quite the same.*

Napoleon submitted to his destiny with resignation and dignity. He received General Becker with ease, and even cheerfulness; and the latter, with feelings which did him honour, felt the task committed to him the more painful, that he had experienced the personal enmity of the individual who was now intrusted to his custody. About forty persons, of different ranks and degrees, honourably dedicated their services to the adversity of the emperor, whom they had served in prosperity.

Yet, amid all these preparations for departure, a long hope remained that his exile might be dispensed with. He heard the distant cannonade as the war-horse hears the trumpet. Again he offered his services to march against Blücher as a simple volunteer, undertaking that, when he had repulsed the invaders, he would then proceed on his journey of expatriation. He had such hopes of his request being granted, as to have his horses brought out and in readiness to join the army. But the Provisional Government anew declined an offer, the acceptance of which would indeed have ruined all hopes of treating with the allies. Fouché, on hearing Napoleon's proposal, is said to have exclaimed, "Is he laughing at us!" Indeed his joining the troops would have soon made him master of the destiny of the Provisional Government, whatever might have been the final result.

On the 29th of June, Napoleon departed from Malmaison; on the 3d of July he arrived at Rochefort. General Becker accompanied him, nor does his journey seem to have been marked by any circumstances worthy of remark. Wherever he came, the troops received him with acclamation; the citizens respected the misfortunes of one who had been well nigh master of

the world, and were silent where they could not applaud.

Thus, the reign of the Emperor Napoleon was completely ended. But, before adverting to his future fate, we must complete, in few words, the consequences of his abdication, and offer some remarks on the circumstances by which it was tortured and enforced.

The Provisional Government had sent commissioners to the Duke of Wellington, to request passports for Napoleon to the States of America. The duke had no instructions from his government to grant them. The Prussian and English generals alike declined all overtures made for the establishment, or acknowledgment, either of the provisional administration, or any plan which it endeavoured to suggest, short of the restoration of the Bourbons to the seat of government. The provisional commissioners endeavoured, with as little success, to awaken the spirit of national defence. They had lost the road to the soldiers' hearts. The thoughts of patriotism had in the army become dissolubly united with the person and the qualities of Napoleon. It was in vain that deputies, with words and proclamations of public right, and invocations of the ancient watchwords of the Revolution, endeavoured to awaken the spirit of 1794. The soldiers and federates answered sullenly, "Why should we fight any more? we have no longer an emperor!"

Meanwhile, the royalist party assumed courage and showed themselves in arms in several of the departments, directed the public opinion in many others, and gained great accessions from the constitutionalists. Indeed, if any of the latter still continued to dread the restoration of the Bourbons, it was partly from the fear of reaction and retaliation on the side of the successful royalists, and partly because it was apprehended that the late emperor might have made on the mind of Louis an impression unfavourable to constitutional limitations, a disgust to those by whom they were recommended and supported, and a propensity to resume the arbitrary measures by which his ancestors had governed their kingdom. Those who nourished those apprehensions could not but allow, that they were founded in the fickleness and ingratitude of the people themselves who had shown themselves unworthy of, and easily induced to conspire against, the mild and easy rule of a limited monarchy. But they involved, nevertheless, tremendous consequences, if the king should be disposed to act upon rigorous and vindictive principles; and it was such an apprehension on the part of some, joined to the fears of others for personal consequences, the sullen shame of a lost party, and the hatred of the army to the princes whom they had betrayed, which procured for the Provisional Government a show of obedience.

It was thus that the Chambers continued their resistance to receiving their legitimate monarch, though unable to excite any enthusiasm save the expressed in the momentary explosions discharged within their own place of meeting, which gratified no ears, and heated no brains but their own. In the meanwhile, the armies of Soult and Grouchy were driven under the walls of Paris, where they were speedily followed by the English and the Prussians.

* *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. I, p. 40.—Note.

The natural gallantry of the French then dictated a resistance, which was honourable to their arms, though totally unsuccessful. The allies, instead of renewing the doubtful attack on Montmartre, crossed the Seine, and attacked Paris on the undefended side. There was not, as in 1814, a hostile army to endanger the communications on their rear. The French, however, showed great bravery, both by an attempt to defend Versailles, and in a *coup-de-main* of General Exelmans, by which he attempted to recover that town. But at length, in consequence of the result of a council of war held in Paris, on the night betwixt the 2d and 3d of July, an armistice was concluded, by which the capital was surrendered to the allies, and the French army was drawn off behind the Loire.

The allies suspended their operations until the French troops should be brought to submit to their destined movement in retreat, against which they struggled with vain enthusiasm. Permitting their violence to subside, they delayed their own occupation of Paris until the 7th of July, when it had been completely evacuated. The British and Prussians then took military possession in a manner strictly regular, but arguing a different state of feelings on both parts, from the joyous procession of the allies along the Boulevards in 1814. The Provisional Government continued their sittings, though Fouché, the chief among them, had been long intriguing (and, ever since the battle of Waterloo, with apparent sincerity) for the second restoration of the Bourbon family, on such terms as should secure the liberties of France. They received on the 6th of July the final resolution of the allied sovereigns, that they considered all authority emanating from the usurped power of Napoleon Bonaparte as null, and of no effect; and that Louis XVIII., who was presently at Saint-Denis, would on the next day, or day after at farthest, enter his capital, and resume his regal authority.

On the 7th of July, the Provisional Commission dissolved itself. The Chamber of Peers, when they heard the act of surrender, dispersed in silence; but that of the Representatives continued to sit, vote, and debate, for several hours. The president then prorogued the meeting till eight the next morning, in defiance of the cries of several members, who called on him to maintain the literal permanence of the sitting. The next morning, the members who attended found the hall sentinelled by the National Guard, who refused them admittance, and heard the exclamations and complaints of the deputies with great disregard. Nay, the disappointed and indignant legislators were subjected to the ridicule of the idle spectators, who accompanied the arrival and retreat of each individual with laughter and acclamation, loud in proportion to the apparent excess of his mortification.

On the 8th of July, Louis re-entered his capital, attended by a very large body of the National Guards and Royal Volunteers, as well as by his household troops. In the rear of these soldiers came a numerous *état-major*, among whom were distinguished the Marshals Victor, Marmont, Macdonald, Oudinot, Gouvion St-Cyr, Mooney, and Lefebvre. An immense concourse of citizens received, with

acclamations, the legitimate monarch; and the females were observed to be particularly eager in their expressions of joy. Thus was Louis again installed in the palace of his ancestors, over which the white banner once more floated. Here, therefore, ended that short space, filled with so much that is wonderful, that period of a Hundred Days, in which the events of a century seem to be contained. Before we proceed with the narrative, which must in future be the history of an individual, it may not be improper to cast a look back upon the events comprised within that period, and offer a few remarks on their political nature and tendency.

It is unnecessary to remind the reader, that Napoleon's elevation to the throne was the combined work of two factions. One comprehended the army, who desired the recovery of their own honour, sullied by recent defeats, and the restoration of the emperor to their head, that he might save them from being disbanded, and lead them to new victories. The other party was that which not only desired that the kingdom should possess a large share of practical freedom, but felt interested that the doctrines of the Revolution should be recognized, and particularly that which was held to entitle the people, or those who might contrive to assume the right of representing them, to alter the constitution of the government at pleasure, and to be, as was said of the great Earl of Warwick, the setter up and puller down of kings. This party, availing themselves of some real errors of the reigning family, imagining more, and exciting a cloud of dark suspicions, had instigated a general feeling of dissatisfaction against the Bourbons. But though they probably might have had recourse to violence, nothing appears less probable than their success in totally overturning royalty, had they been unsupported by the soldiers. The army, which rose so readily at Bonaparte's summons, had no community of feeling with the jacobins, as they were called; and, but for his arrival upon the scene, would have acted, there can be little doubt, at the command of the marshals, who were almost all attached to the royal family. It was, therefore, the attachment of the army to their ancient commander which gave success to the joint enterprise, which the jacobinical party alone would have attempted in vain.

The republican, or jacobin party, closed with their powerful ally; their leaders accepted titles at his hands; undertook offices, and became members of a Chamber of Peers and of Representatives, summoned by his authority. They acknowledged him as their emperor; received as his boon a new constitution; and swore in the face of all France the oath of fealty to it, and to him as their sovereign. On such terms the emperor and his legislative body parted on the 7th of June. Suspicion there existed between them certainly, but, in all outward appearance, he departed a contented prince from a contented people. Eleven days brought the battle of Waterloo, with all its consequences. Policy of a sound and rational sort should have induced the Chambers to stand by the emperor whom they had made, to arm him with the power which the occasion required, and avail themselves of his extraordinary military talent, to try some chance of arrest-

ing the invaders in their progress. Even shame might have prevented them from lending their shoulders, to overthrow the tottering throne before which they had so lately kneeled. They determined otherwise. The instant he became unfortunate, Napoleon ceased to be their emperor, the source of their power and authority. They could see nothing in him but the hurt deer, who is to be butted from the herd; the Jonas in the vessel, who is to be flung overboard. When Napoleon, therefore, talked to them of men and arms, they answered him, with "equality and the rights of man;" every chance of redeeming the consequences of Waterloo was lost, and the emperor of their choice, if not ostensibly, was in effect at least arrested, and sent to the sea-coast, like a felon for deportation. Their conduct, however, went clearly to show, that Napoleon was not the free choice of the French people, and especially that he was not the choice of those who termed themselves exclusively the friends of freedom.

Having thus shown how easily they could get rid of the monarch who had called them into political existence, the Chambers applied to the allies, inviting them to give their concurrence to the election of another sovereign, and assist them to build another throne on the quicksand which had just swallowed that of Napoleon. In one respect they were not unreasonably tenacious. They cared little who the sovereign should be, whether Orleans or Orange, the Englishman Wellington or the Cossack Platoff, providing only he should derive no right from any one but themselves; and that they should be at liberty to recal that right when it might please them to do so. And there can be little doubt, that any new sovereign and constitution which could have been made by the assistance of such men, would have again occasioned the commencement of the wild dance of revolution, till, like so many mad dervises, dizzy with the whirl, the French nation would once more have sunk to rest under the iron sway of despotism.

The allied sovereigns viewed these proposals with an evil eye, both in respect to their nature, and to those by whom they were proposed. Of the authorities, the most prudent was the Duke of Otranto, and he had been Fouché of Nantes. Carnot's name was to be found at all the bloody rescripts of Robespierre, in which the conscience of the old decemvir and young count had never found anything to boggle at. There were many others, distinguished in the revolutionary days. The language which they held was already assuming the cant of democracy, and though there was among them a large proportion of good and able men, it was not to be forgotten how many of such existed in the first assembly, for no purpose but to seal the moderation and rationality of their political opinions with their blood. It was a matter of imperious necessity to avoid whatever might give occasion to renew those scenes of shameful recollections, and the sovereigns saw a guarantee against their return, in insisting that Louis XVIII. should remount the throne as its legitimate owner.

The right of legitimacy, or the right of succession, a regulation adopted into the common law of most

monarchical constitutions, is borrowed from the analogy of private life, where the eldest son becomes naturally the head and protector of the family upon the decease of the father. While states, indeed, are small, before laws are settled, and when much depends on the personal ability and talents of the monarch, the power, which, for aught we know, may exist among the abstract rights of man, of choosing each chief magistrate after the death of his predecessor, or perhaps more frequently, may be exercised without much inconvenience. But as states become extended, and their constitutions circumscribed and bounded by laws, which leave less scope and less necessity for the exercise of the sovereign's magisterial functions, men become glad to exchange the licentious privilege of a Tartarian council, or a Polish diet, for the principle of legitimacy; because the chance of a hereditary successor's proving adequate to the duties of his situation is at least equal to that of a popular election lighting upon a worthy candidate; and because, in the former case, the nation is spared the convulsions occasioned by previous competition and solicitation, and succeeding heart-burnings, factions, civil war, and ruin, uniformly found at last to attend elective monarchies.

The doctrine of legitimacy is peculiarly valuable in a limited monarchy, because it affords a degree of stability otherwise unattainable. The principle of hereditary monarchy, joined to that which declares that the king can do no wrong, provides in the permanence of the executive government, and represses that ambition which would animate so many bosoms, were there a prospect of the supreme sway becoming vacant or subject to election from time to time. The king's ministers, on the other hand, being responsible for his actions, remain a check, for their own sakes, upon the exercise of his power; and thus provision is made for the correction of all ordinary evils of administration, since, to use an expressive though vulgar simile, it is better to rectify any occasional deviation from the regular course by changing the driver, than by overturning the carriage.

Such is the principle of legitimacy, which was invoked by Louis XVIII., and recognized by the allied sovereigns. But it must not be confounded with the slavish doctrine, that the right thus vested is by divine origin indefeasible. The heir-at-law in private life may dissipate by his folly, or forfeit by his crimes, the patrimony which the law conveys to him; and the legitimate monarch may most unquestionably, by departing from the principles of the constitution under which he is called to reign, forfeit for himself, and for his heirs, if the legislature shall judge it proper, that crown which the principle of legitimacy bestowed on him as his birth-right. The penalty of forfeiture is an extreme case, provided, not in virtue of the constitution, which recognizes no possible delinquency in the sovereign, but because the constitution has been attacked and infringed upon by the monarch, and therefore can no longer be permitted to afford him shelter. The crimes by which this high punishment is justly incurred must therefore be of an extraordinary nature, and beyond the reach of those correctives for which the constitution provides, by the punishment of mi-

ministers and counsellors. The constitutional buckler of impeccability covers the monarch (personally) for all blameworthy use of his power, providing it is exercised within the limits of the constitution; it is when he stirs beyond it, and not sooner, that it affords no defence for the bosom of a tyrant. A King of Britain, for example, may wage a rash war, or make a disgraceful peace, in the lawful though injudicious and blameworthy, exercise of the power vested in him by the constitution. His advisers, not he himself, shall be called, in such a case, to their responsibility. But if, like James II., the sovereign infringes upon, or endeavours to destroy, the constitution itself, it is then that resistance becomes lawful and honourable, and the king is justly held to have forfeited the right which descended to him from his forefathers, by his attempt to encroach on the rights of the subject.

The principles of hereditary monarchy, of the inviolability of the person of the king, and of the responsibility of ministers, were recognized by the constitutional charter of France. Louis XVIII. was, therefore, during the year previous to Bonaparte's return, the lawful sovereign of France, and it remains to be shown by what act of treason to the constitution he had forfeited his right of legitimacy. If the reader will turn back to Chapter CI. (and we are not conscious of having spared the conduct of the Bourbons), he will probably be of opinion with us, that the errors of the restored king's government were not only fewer than might have been expected in circumstances so new and difficult, but were of such a nature as an honest, well-meaning, and upright opposition would soon have checked; he will find that not one of them could be personally attributed to Louis XVIII., and that, far from having incurred the forfeiture of his legitimate rights, he had, during these few months, laid a strong claim to the love, veneration, and gratitude of his subjects. He had fallen a sacrifice, in some degree, to the humours and rashness of persons connected with his family and household—still more to causeless jealousies and unproved doubts, the water-colours which insurrection never lacks to paint her cause with; to the fickleness of the French people, who became tired of his simple, orderly, and peaceful government; but, above all, to the dissatisfaction of a licentious and licensed soldiery, and of clubs of moody handitti, panting for a time of pell-mell havoc and confusion. The forcible expulsion of Louis XVIII., arising from such motives, could not break the solemn compact entered into by France with all Europe, when she received her legitimate monarch from the hand of her clement conquerors, and with him, and for his sake, obtained such conditions of peace as she was in no condition to demand, and would never otherwise have been granted. The king's misfortune, as it arose from no fault of his own, could infer no forfeiture of his vested right. Europe, the virtual guarantee of the treaty of Paris, had also a title, leading back the lawful king in her armed and victorious hand, to require of France his re-instatement in his rights; and the termination which she thus offered to the war was as just and equitable, as the conduct of the sovereigns during this brief campaign had been honourable and successful.

To these arguments, an unprejudiced eye could scarcely see any answer; yet the popular party endeavoured to found a pleading against the second restoration of Louis, upon the declaration of the allies. This manifesto had announced, they said, that the purpose of the war was directed against Bonaparte personally, and that it was the purpose of the allied sovereigns, when he should be dethroned, to leave the French the free exercise of choice respecting their own internal government. The Prince Regent's declaration, in particular, was referred to, as announcing that the treaty of Vienna, which resolved on the dethronement of Napoleon, should not bind the British government to insist upon the restoration of the Bourbon family as an indispensable condition of peace. Those who urged this objection did not, or would not, consider the nature of the treaty which this explanatory clause referred to. That treaty of Vienna had for its express object the restoration of Louis XVIII., and the Prince Regent adhered to it with the same purpose of making every exertion for bringing about that event. The restrictive clause was only introduced, because his royal highness did not intend to bind himself to make that restoration *alone* the cause of continuing the war to extremity. Many things might have happened to render an absolute engagement of this nature highly inexpedient; but since none of these did happen, and since the re-establishment of the throne of the Bourbons was, in consequence of the victory of Waterloo, a measure which could be easily accomplished, it necessarily followed that it *was* to be accomplished according to the tenor of the treaty of Vienna.

But, even had the sovereigns positively announced in their manifestoes, that the will of the French people should be consulted exclusively, what right had the legislative body, assembled by Bonaparte, to assume the character of the French people? They had neither weight nor influence with any party in the state, except by the momentary possession of an authority, which was hardly acknowledged on any side. The fact, that Napoleon's power had ceased to exist, did not legitimate them. On the contrary, flowing from his commission, it must be held as having fallen with his authority. They were either the Chambers summoned by Napoleon, and bound to him as far as oaths and professions could bind them, or they were a body without any pretension whatever to a political character.

La Fayette, indeed, contended that the present representatives of France stood in the same situation as the Convention Parliaments of England, and the army encamped on Hounslow-heath, at the time of the English Revolution. To have rendered this parallel apt, it required all the peculiar circumstances of justice which attended the great event of 1688. The French should have been able to vindicate the reason of their proceedings by the aggressions of their exiled monarch, and by the will of the nation generally, nay, almost unanimously, expressed in consequence thereof. But the English history *did* afford one example of an assembly, exactly resembling their own, in absence of right and exuberance of pretension; and that precedent existed when the Rump Parliament contrived to shuffle the cards

out of the hands of Richard Cromwell, as the provisional commissioners at Paris were endeavouring by legation to convey the authority from Napoleon II. This Rump Parliament also sat for a little time as a government, and endeavoured to settle the constitution upon their own plan; in despite of the whole people of England, who were longing for the restoration of their lawful monarch; as speedily was shown to be the case, when Monk, with an armed force, appeared to protect them in the declaration of their real sentiments. This was the most exact parallel afforded by English history to the situation of the provisional commissioners of France; and both they and the Rump Parliament, being equally intrusive occupants of the supreme authority, were alike deprived of it by the return of the legitimate monarch.

While the allied powers were thus desirous that the king of France should obtain possession of a throne which he had never forfeited, they, and England in particular, saw at once the justice and the policy of securing to France every accession of well-regulated freedom, which she had obtained by and through the Revolution, as well as such additional improvements upon her constitution as experience had shown to be desirable. These were pointed out and stipulated for by the celebrated Fouché, who, on this occasion, did much service to his country. Yet he struggled hard, that while the king acknowledged, which he was ready to do, the several advantages, both in point of public feeling and public advantage, which France had derived from the Revolution, the sovereign should make some steps to acknowledge the Revolution itself. He contended for the three-coloured banners being adopted, as a matter of the last importance;—in that somewhat resembling the arch-fiend in the legends of necromancy, who, when the unhappy persons with whom he deals decline to make over their souls and bodies according to his first request, is humble enough to ask and accept the most petty sacrifices—the paring of the nails, or a single lock of hair, providing it is offered in symbol of homage and devotion. But Louis XVIII. was not thus to be drawn into an incidental and equivocal homologation, as civilians term it, of all the wild work of a period so horrible, which must have been by implication a species of ratification even of the death of his innocent and murdered brother. To preserve and cherish the good which had flowed from the Revolution, was a very different thing from a ratification of the Revolution itself. A tempest may cast rich treasures upon the beach, a tornado may clear the air; but while these benefits are suitably prized and enjoyed, it is surely not requisite that, like ignorant Indians, we should worship the wild surge, and erect altars to the howling of the wind.

The King of France having steadily refused all proposals which went to assign to the government an authority founded on the Revolution, the constitution of France is to be recognized as that of a hereditary monarchy, limited by the royal charter, and by the principles of freedom. It thus affords to the other existing monarchies of Europe a guarantee against sudden and dangerous commotion; while in favour of the subject, it extends all the necessary

checks against arbitrary sway, and all the suitable provisions for ameliorating and extending the advantages of liberal institutions, as opportunity shall offer, and the expanding light of information shall recommend.

The allies, though their treaty with France was not made in the same humour of romantic generosity which dictated that of 1814, insisted upon no articles which could be considered as dishonourable to that nation. The disjoining from her empire three or four border fortresses was stipulated, in order to render a rapid and favourable invasion of Germany or the Netherlands more difficult in future. Large sums of money were also exacted in recompense of the heavy expenses of the allies; but they were not beyond what the wealth of France could readily discharge. A part of her fortresses were also detained by the allies as a species of pledge for the peaceable behaviour of the kingdom; but these were to be restored after a season, and the armies of Europe, which for a time remained within the French territories, were at the same period to be withdrawn. Finally, that splendid Museum, which the right of conquest had collected by the stripping of so many states, was transferred by the same right of conquest, not to those of the allies who had great armies in the field, but to the poor and small states, who had resigned their property to the French under the influence of terror, and received it back from the confederates with wonder and gratitude.

These circumstances were indeed galling to France for the moment; but they were the necessary consequence of the position in which, perhaps rather passively than actively, she had been placed by the Revolution of the Hundred Days. All the prophecies which had been circulated to animate the people against the allies, of their seeking selfish and vindictive objects, or endeavouring to destroy the high national rank which that fair kingdom ought to hold in Europe, were proved to be utterly fallacious. The conquered provinces, as they are called, the acquisitions of Louis XIV., were not rent from the French empire—their colonies were left as at the peace of Paris. The English did not impose on them an unfavourable treaty of commerce, which Napoleon affirmed was their design, and the omission to insist on which he afterwards considered as a culpable neglect of British interests by the English ministers. France was left, as she ought to be, altogether independent, and splendidly powerful.

Neither were the predictions concerning the probability of the new royal government less false than had been the vaticinations respecting the purposes of the allies. Numbers prophesied the downfall of the Bourbon dynasty. It was with difficulty that the political augurs would allow that it might last as long as the life of Louis XVIII. He now sleeps with his fathers: and his successor, generally beloved for his courteous manners, and respected for his integrity and honour, reigns over a free and flourishing people. Time, that grand pacificator, is daily abating the rancour of party, and removing from the scene those of all sides who, unaccustomed to the general and impartial exercise of the laws, were ready to improve every

advantage, and debate every political question, sword in hand, or, as they themselves express it, *par voie de fait*. The guarantee for the permanence of their freedom is the only subject on which reasonable Frenchmen of the present day are anxious. We trust there is no occasion for their solicitude. Fatal indeed would be the advice which should induce the French government to give the slightest subject for just complaints. The ultra royalist, the jacobin *enragé*, are gradually cooled by age, or fate has removed them from the scene. Those who succeed, having never seen the sword drawn, will be less apt to hurry into civil strife; and the able and well-intentioned on either side, while they find room in the Chambers for expressing their difference of opinion, will acquire the habit of enduring contradiction with candour and good humour, and be led to entertain the wholesome doubt, whether, in the imperfect state of the human intellect, it is possible for one class of statesmen to be absolutely and uniformly right, and their opponents, in all instances, decidedly wrong. The French will learn that it is from freedom of debate—from an appeal not to the arms, but to the understandings of the people—by the collision of intellect, not the strife of brutal violence, that the political institutions of this ingenious people are in future to be improved.

The aspirations of France after glory in the field had been indulged, during the period of which we have treated, dreadfully for other countries, and the requital to herself was sufficiently fearful. A sentiment friendly to peace and good order has of late years distinguished even those two nations, which, by a rash and wicked expression, have been sometimes termed natural enemies. The enlarged ideas of commerce, as they spread wider, and become better understood, will afford, perhaps, the strongest and most irresistible motive for amicable intercourse,—that, namely, which arises from mutual advantage; for commerce keeps pace with civilization, and a nation, as it becomes wealthy from its own industry, acquires more and more a taste for the conveniences and luxuries, which are the produce of the soil, or of the industry, of other countries. Britain, of whom all that was selfish was expected and predicated by Napoleon and his friends—Britain, who was said to meditate enchaining France by a commercial treaty (which would have ruined her own manufactures), has, by opening her ports to the manufactures of her neighbour, had the honour to lead the way in a new and more honourable species of traffic, which has in some degree the property ascribed by the poet to Mercy,—

It bleaseth him who gives, and him who takes.

To the eye of a stranger, the number of new buildings established in Paris, and indeed throughout France, are indications of capital and enterprise, of a nature much more satisfactory than the splendid but half-finished public edifices, which Napoleon so hastily undertook, and so often left in an incomplete state. The general improvement of ideas may be also distinctly remarked, on comparing the French people of 1815 and 1826, and observing the gradual extinction of long-cherished prejudices, and the no less gradual improvement and enlargement of ideas.

This state of advancement cannot, indeed, be regular—it must have its ebbs and flows. But on the whole, there seems more reason than at any former period of the world, for hoping that there will be a general peace of some lengthened endurance; and that Britain and France, in particular, will satisfy themselves with enjoying in recollection the laurels each country has won in the field, and be contented to struggle for the palm of national superiority by the arts of peaceful and civilized industry.

CHAPTER CIX.

Disposition of the British fleet along the western coast of France, in order to prevent Bonaparte's escape.—The Bellerophon appointed to the station of Rochefort.—Orders under which Captain Maitland acted.—Plans agitated for Napoleon's escape.—Circumstances which show that his surrender, if made, could not be a matter of choice.—Savary and Las Cases open a negotiation with Captain Maitland.—Captain Maitland's Account of what passed at their interviews.—Las Cases' account.—The two statements compared, and preference given to Captain Maitland's.—Napoleon's letter to the Prince Regent.—He surrenders himself on board the Bellerophon, on 15th July.—His behaviour during the passage.—His arrival off Torbay—off Plymouth.—Great curiosity prevails among the English people to see him.—All approach to the ship prohibited.—Final determination of the English government that Bonaparte shall be sent to St Helena, communicated to him.—His protest and remonstrances against it.

OUR history returns to its principal object. Bonaparte arrived at Rochefort upon the 3d July; so short had been the space between the bloody cast of the die at Waterloo, and his finding himself an exile. Yet even this brief space of fifteen days had undo his retreat difficult, if not impracticable. Means, indeed, were provided for his transportation. The two French frigates, the Saale and the Medusa, together with the Bayadère, a corvette, and the Epervier, a large brig, waited Bonaparte's presence, and orders to sail for America from their station under the Isle d'Aix. But, as Napoleon himself said shortly afterwards, wherever there was water to swim a ship, there he was sure to find the British flag.

The news of the defeat at Waterloo had been the signal to the admiralty to cover the western coast of France with cruisers, in order to prevent the possibility of Napoleon's escaping by sea from any of the ports in that direction. Admiral Lord Keith, an officer of great experience and activity, then commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet, had made a most judicious disposition of the fleet under his command, by stationing an inner line of cruisers, of various descriptions, off the principal ports between Brest and Bayonne, with an exterior line, necessarily more widely extended, betwixt Ushant and Cape Finisterre. The commanders of these vessels had the strictest orders to suffer no vessel to pass unexamined. No less than thirty ships of different descriptions maintained this blockade. According to this arrangement, the British line-of-battle ship, the Bellerophon, cruized off Rochefort, with the occasional assistance of the *Slauey*, the *Phœbe*, and

other small vessels, sometimes present, and sometimes detached, as the service might require. Captain Maitland, who commanded the *Bellerophon*, is a man of high character in his profession, of birth, of firmness of mind, and of the most indisputable honour. It is necessary to mention these circumstances, because the national character of England herself is deeply concerned and identified with that of Captain Maitland, in the narrative which follows.

The several orders under which this officer acted, expressed the utmost anxiety about intercepting Bonaparte's flight, and canvassed the different probabilities concerning its direction. His attention was at a later date particularly directed to the frigates in Aix Roads, and the report concerning their destination. Admiral Hotham writes to Captain Maitland, 8th July, 1815, the following order:—

"The lords commissioners of the admiralty having every reason to believe that Napoleon Bonaparte meditates his escape, with his family, from France to America, you are hereby required and directed, in pursuance of orders from their lordships, signified to me by Admiral the Right Honourable Viscount Keith, to keep the most vigilant look-out, for the purpose of intercepting him; and to make the strictest search of any vessel you may fall in with; and if you should be so fortunate as to intercept him, you are to transfer him and his family to the ship you command, and there keeping him in careful custody, return to the nearest port in England (going into Torbay in preference to Plymouth), with all possible expedition; and, on your arrival, you are not to permit any communication whatever with the shore, except as hereinafter directed; and you will be held responsible for keeping the whole transaction a profound secret, until you receive their lordships' further orders.

"In case you should arrive at a port where there is a flag-officer, you are to send to acquaint him with the circumstances, strictly charging the officer, sent on shore with your letter, not to divulge its contents; and if there should be no flag-officer at the port where you arrive, you are to send one letter express to the secretary of the admiralty, and another to Admiral Lord Keith, with strict injunctions of secrecy to each officer who may be the bearer of them."

We give these orders at full length, to show that they left Captain Maitland no authority to make conditions or stipulations of surrender, or to treat Napoleon otherwise than as an ordinary prisoner of war.

Captain Maitland proceeded to exercise all the vigilance which an occasion so interesting demanded; and it was soon evident, that the presence of the *Bellerophon* was an absolute bar to Napoleon's escape by means of the frigates, unless it should be attempted by open force. In this latter case, the British officer had formed his plan of bearing down upon and disabling the one vessel, and throwing on board of her a hundred men selected for the purpose, while the *Bellerophon* set sail with all speed in pursuit of her consort, and thus made sure of both. He had also two small vessels, the *Slaney* and *Phœbe*, which he could attach to the pursuit of the frigate, so as at least to keep her in view. This plan

might have failed by accident, but it was so judiciously laid as to have every chance of being successful; and it seems that Napoleon received no encouragement from the commanders of the frigates to try the event of a forcible escape.

The scheme of a secret flight was next meditated. A *chasse-marée*, a peculiar species of vessel, used only in the coasting trade, was to be fitted up and manned with young probationers of the navy, equivalent to our midshipmen. This, it was thought, might elude the vigilance of such British cruisers as were in shore; but then it must have been a suspicious object at sea, and the possibility of its being able to make the voyage to America, was considered as precarious. A Danish corvette was next purchased, and as, in leaving the harbour, it was certain she would be brought to and examined by the English, a place of concealment was contrived, being a cask supplied with air-tubes, to be stowed in the hold of the vessel, in which it was intended Napoleon should lie concealed. But the extreme rigour with which the search was likely to be prosecuted, and the compulsion of Bonaparte, which would not permit him to remain long in a close or constrained position, made them lay aside this as well as other hopeless contrivances.

There were undoubtedly at this time many proposals made to the ex-emperor by the army, who, compelled to retreat behind the Loire, were still animated by a thirst of revenge, and a sense of injured honour. There is no doubt that they would have received Napoleon with acclamation; but if he could not, or would not, pursue a course so desperate in 1814, when he had still a considerable army, and a respectable extent of territory remaining, it must have seemed much more ineligible in 1815, when his numbers were so much more disproportioned than they had formerly been, and when his best generals had embraced the cause of the Bourbons, or fled out of France. Napoleon's condition, had he embraced this alternative, would have been that of the chief of a roving tribe of warriors struggling for existence, with equal misery to themselves and the countries through which they wandered, until at length broken down and destroyed by superior force.

Rejecting this expedient, the only alternative which remained was to surrender his person, either to the allied powers as a body, or to any one of them in particular. The former course would have been difficult, unless Napoleon had adopted the idea of resorting to it earlier, which, in the view of his escape by sea, he had omitted to do. Neither had he time to negotiate with any of the allied sovereigns, or of traveling back to Paris for the purpose, with any chance of personal safety, for the royalists were now everywhere holding the ascendancy, and more than one of his generals had been attacked and killed by them.

He was cooped up, therefore, in Rochefort, although the white flag was already about to be hoisted there, and the commandant respectfully hinted the necessity of his departure. It must have been anticipated by Napoleon, that he might be soon deprived of the cover of the batteries of the Isle d'Aix. The fact is (though we believe not generally known).

that on the 13th July, Lord Castlereagh wrote to Admiral Sir Henry Hotham, commanding off Cape Finisterre, suggesting to him the propriety of attacking, with a part of his force, the two frigates in the roads of the Isle d'Aix, having first informed the commandant that they did so in the capacity of allies of the King of France, and placing it upon his responsibility if he fired on them from the batteries. Napoleon could not indeed know for certain that such a plan was actually in existence, and about to be attempted, but yet must have been aware of its probability, when the royalist party were becoming everywhere superior, and their emblems were assumed in the neighbouring town of La Rochelle. It is, therefore, in vain to state Bonaparte's subsequent conduct, as a voluntary confidence reposed by him in the honour of England. He was precisely in the condition of the commandant of a besieged town, who has the choice of surrendering, or encountering the risks of a storm. Neither was it open for him to contend, that he selected the British, out of all the other allied powers, with whom to treat upon this occasion. Like the commandant in the case above supposed, he was under the necessity of surrendering to those who were the immediate besiegers, and therefore he was compelled to apply for terms of safety to him who alone possessed the direct power of granting it, that is, to Captain Frederick Maitland, of the *Bellerophon*.

Napoleon opened a communication with this officer on the 10th July, by two of his attendants, General Savary and Count Las Cases, under pretence of inquiring about a safe-conduct; a passport which Napoleon pretended to expect from England, and which, he said, had been promised to him, without stating by whom. Under this round assertion, for which there was not the slightest grounds, Messrs Savary and Las Cases desired to know, whether Captain Maitland would permit the frigates to sail with him uninterrupted, or at least give him leave to proceed in a neutral vessel. Captain Maitland, without hesitation, declared that he would not permit any armed vessel to put to sea from the port of Rochefort. "It was equally out of his power," he stated, "to allow the emperor to proceed in a neutral vessel, without the sanction of Admiral Hotham, his commanding officer." He offered to write to that officer, however, and the French gentlemen having assented, he wrote, in their presence, to the admiral, announcing the communication he had received, and requesting orders for his guidance. This was all but a prelude to the real subject of negotiation. The Duke of Rovigo (Savary) and Count Las Cases remained two or three hours on board, and said all they could to impress Captain Maitland with the idea, that Napoleon's retirement was a matter of choice, not of compulsion, and that it was the interest of Britain to consent to his going to America; a measure, they said, which was solely dictated to him by humanity, and a desire to save human blood. Captain Maitland asked the natural question, which we give in his own words:

"Supposing the British government should be induced to grant a passport for Bonaparte's going to America, what pledge could he give that he would not return, and put England, as well as all Europe,

to the same expense of blood and treasure that has just been incurred?"

"General Savary made the following reply:— 'When the emperor first abdicated the throne of France, his removal was brought about by a faction, at the head of which was Talleyrand, and the sense of the nation was not consulted: but in the present instance he has voluntarily resigned the power. The influence he once had over the French people is past; a very considerable change has taken place in their sentiments towards him, since he went to Elba; and he could never regain the power he had over their minds; therefore, he would prefer retiring into obscurity, where he might end his days in peace and tranquillity; and were he solicited to ascend the throne again, he would decline it.'

"If that is the case," said Captain Maitland, 'why not ask an asylum in England?' Savary answered, 'There are many reasons for his not wishing to reside in England; the climate is too damp and cold; it is too near France; he would be, as it were, in the centre of every change and revolution that might take place there, and would be subject to suspicion; he has been accustomed to consider the English as his most inveterate enemies, and they have been induced to look upon him as a monster, without one of the virtues of a human being.'

Captain Knight of the *Falmouth* was present during the whole of this conversation, from which Captain Maitland, like an able diplomatist, drew a conclusion respecting the affairs of Napoleon, exactly opposite from that which they endeavoured to impress upon him, and concluded that he must be in extremity.

On the 14th July, Count Las Cases again came on board the *Bellerophon*, now attended by General Count Lallemand. The pretext of the visit was, to learn whether Captain Maitland had received any answer from the admiral. Captain Maitland observed, the visit on that account was unnecessary, as he would have forwarded the answer so soon as received; and added, he did not approve of frequent communication by flags of truce; thus repelling rather than inviting them. The conference was resumed after breakfast, Captain Maitland having, in the meantime, sent for Captain Sartorius of the *Slaney*, to be witness of what passed. In this most important conference, we hold it unjust to Captain Maitland to use any other words than his own, copied from his journal, the original of which we have ourselves had the advantage of seeing:

"When breakfast was over, we retired to the after-cabin. Count Las Cases then said, 'The emperor is so anxious to spare the further effusion of human blood, that he will proceed to America in any way the British government chooses to sanction, either in a French ship of war, a vessel armed en flûte, a merchant vessel, or even in a British ship of war.' To this I answered, 'I have no authority to agree to any arrangement of that sort, nor do I believe my government would consent to it; but I think I may venture to receive him into this ship, and convey him to England: if, however,' I added, 'he adopts that plan, I cannot enter into any promise, as to the reception he may meet with, as, even in the case I have mentioned, I shall be

acting on my own responsibility, and cannot be sure that it would meet with the approbation of the British government.'

"There was a great deal of conversation on this subject, in the course of which Lucien Bonaparte's name was mentioned, and the manner in which he had lived in England alluded to, but I invariably assured Las Cases most explicitly, that I had no authority to make conditions of any sort, as to Napoleon's reception in England. In fact, I could not have done otherwise, since, with the exception of the order [inserted at page 738], I had no instructions for my guidance, and was, of course, in total ignorance of the intention of his majesty's ministers as to his future disposal. One of the last observations Las Cases made, before quitting the ship, was, 'Under all circumstances, I have little doubt that you will see the emperor on board the Bellerophon;' and, in fact, Bonaparte must have determined on that step before Las Cases came on board, as his letter to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent is dated 13th July, the day before this conversation."

The Count Las Cases gives nearly a similar detail of circumstances, with a colouring which is exaggerated, and an arrangement of dates which is certainly inaccurate. It must also be noticed that Count Las Cases dissimbled his acquaintance with the English language; and therefore, if any mistake had occurred betwixt him and Captain Maitland, who spoke French with difficulty, he had himself so far to blame for it. Of the visit on board the Bellerophon on the 10th, after giving the same statement as Captain Maitland, concerning the application for the passports, the count states, "It was suggested to us to go to England, and we were assured we had no room to fear any bad treatment." *

On the 14th, being the date of his second visit, he states that there was a repetition of the invitation to England, and the terms on which it was recommended. "Captain Maitland," he says, "told him, that if the emperor chose immediately to embark, he had authority to receive him on board, and conduct him to England." This is so expressed, as to lead the reader to believe that Captain Maitland spoke to the count of some new directions or orders which he had received, or pretended to have received, concerning Bonaparte. Such an inference would be entirely erroneous; no new or extended authority was received by Captain Maitland, nor was he capable of insinuating the existence of such. His sole instructions were contained in the orders of Admiral Hotham, quoted at p. 738, directing him, should he be so fortunate as to intercept Bonaparte, to transfer him to the ship he commanded, to make sail for a British port, and, when arrived there, to communicate instantly with the port-admiral, or with the admiralty.

Count Las Cases makes Captain Maitland proceed to assure him and Savary, that, "in his own private opinion, Napoleon would find in England all the respect and good treatment to which he could make any pretension; that there, the princes and ministers did not exercise the absolute autho-

riety used on the Continent, and that the English people had a liberality of opinion, and generosity of sentiment, superior to that entertained by sovereigns." Count Las Cases states himself to have replied to the panegyric on England, by an oration in praise of Bonaparte, in which he described him as retiring from a contest which he had yet the means of supporting, in order that his name and rights might not serve as a pretext to prolong civil war. The count, according to his own narrative, concluded by saying, that, "under all the circumstances, he thought the emperor might come on board the Bellerophon, and go to England with Captain Maitland, for the purpose of receiving passports for America." Captain Maitland desired it should be understood, that he by no means warranted that such would be granted.

"At the bottom of my heart," says Las Cases, "I never supposed the passports would be granted to us; but as the emperor had resolved to remain in future a personal stranger to political events, we saw, without alarm, the probability that we might be prevented from leaving England; but to that point all our fears and suppositions were limited. Such, too, was doubtless the belief of Maitland. I do him, as well as the other officers, the justice to believe, that he was sincere, and of good faith, in the painting they drew us of the sentiments of the English nation."

The envoys returned to Napoleon, who held, according to Las Cases, a sort of council, in which they considered all the chances. The plan of the Danish vessel, and that of the *chasse-marée*, were given up as too perilous; the British cruiser was pronounced too strong to be attacked; there remained only the alternative of Napoleon's joining the troops, and renewing the war, or accepting Captain Maitland's offer by going on board the Bellerophon. The former was rejected; the latter plan adopted, and "THEN," says M. Las Cases, "*Napoleon wrote to the Prince Regent.*" * The letter follows, but it is remarkable that the date is omitted. This is probably the reason why Count Las Cases did not discover that his memory was betraying him, since that date must have reminded him that the letter was written *before*, not *after*, the conference of the 14th July.

From this narrative two things are plain; 1. That no terms of capitulation were made with Captain Maitland. 2. That it is the object of Count Las Cases to insinuate the belief, that it was in consequence of the arguments used by Captain Maitland, supported by the British officers present, that Las Cases was induced to recommend, and Napoleon to adopt, the step of surrendering himself on board the Bellerophon. But this whole inference is disproved by two small ciphers; the date, namely, of 13th of July on the letter addressed to the Prince Regent, which, therefore, could not, in the nature of things, have been written in consequence of a conference betwixt Las Cases and Captain Maitland; and a consultation betwixt Napoleon and his followers, which conference and consultation did

* "Il nous fut suggéré de nous rendre en Angleterre, et affirmé qu'on ne pouvait y craindre aucun mauvais traitement." *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. I, p. 65.

* "Alors Napoléon écrivit au Prince Régent." *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. I, p. 66.

not take place till the 14th of July. The resolution was taken, and the letter written, the day before all those glowing descriptions of the English people put into the mouth of Captain Maitland; and the faith of Napoleon was grounded upon the impersonal suggestion to go to England,* made to Las Cases and Savary on their first visit to the *Bellerophon*. The visit of the 14th, doubtless, confirmed the resolution which had been adopted the preceding day.

No delay now intervened. On the same 14th of July, General Baron Gourgaud was sent off with the letter, so often mentioned, addressed to the Prince Regent, which was in these well-known terms :

Rochefort, July 13th, 1815.

"YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS,

"A victim to the factions which distract my country, and to the enmity of the greatest powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself upon the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws, which I claim from your royal highness, as the most powerful, the most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.

"NAPOLEON."

Captain Maitland informed Count Las Cases, that he would dispatch General Gourgaud to England, by the *Slaney*, and prepare to receive Napoleon and his suite. General Gourgaud proposed to write to Count Bertrand instantly, when, in presence and hearing of his brother officers, Captains Sartorius and Gambier, Captain Maitland gave another instance of his anxiety not to be misunderstood on this important occasion.

"When General Gourgaud was about to write the letter, to prevent any future misunderstanding, I said, 'Monsieur Las Cases, you will recollect that I am not authorized to stipulate as to the reception of Bonaparte in England, but that he must consider himself entirely at the disposal of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.' He answered, 'I am perfectly aware of that, and have already acquainted the emperor with what you said on the subject.'"

Captain Maitland subjoins the following natural and just remark :—

"It might, perhaps, have been better if this declaration had been given in an official written form; and could I have foreseen the discussions which afterwards took place, and which will appear in the sequel, I undoubtedly should have done so; but as I repeatedly made it in the presence of witnesses, it did not occur to me as being necessary; and how could a stronger proof be adduced, that no stipulations were agreed to respecting the reception of Bonaparte in England, than the fact of their not being reduced to writing? which certainly would have been the case had any favourable terms been demanded on the part of Monsieur Las Cases, and agreed to by me."

To conclude the evidence on this subject, we add Captain Maitland's letter, addressed to the secretary of the admiralty on 14th July :

* See, above, p. 740, where Las Cases says, "It was suggested to us to go to England."

"For the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, I have to acquaint you that the Count Las Cases and General Lallemand this day came on board his majesty's ship under my command, with a proposal from Count Bertrand for me to receive on board Napoleon Bonaparte, for the purpose of throwing himself on the generosity of the Prince Regent. Conceiving myself authorized by their lordships' secret order, I have acceded to the proposal, and he is to embark on board this ship to-morrow morning. That no misunderstanding might arise, I have explicitly and clearly explained to Count Las Cases, that I have no authority whatever for granting terms of any sort, but that all I can do is to carry him and his suite to England, to be received in such manner as his royal highness may deem expedient."

Is it in human nature to suppose, that a British officer, with two others of the same rank as witnesses of the whole negotiation, would have expressed himself otherwise than as truth warranted, in a case which was sure to be so strictly inquired into?

On the 15th July, 1815, Napoleon finally left France, to the history of which he had added so much of victory and so much of defeat; the country which his rise had saved from civil discord and foreign invasion, and which his fall consigned to both; in a word, that fair land to which he had been so long as a deity, and was in future to be of less import than the meanest peasant on the soil. He was accompanied by four of his generals—Bertrand, Savary, Lallemand, and Montholon, and by Count Las Cases, repeatedly mentioned as counsellor of state. Of these, Bertrand and Montholon had their ladies on board, with three children belonging to Count Bertrand, and one of Count Montholon's. The son of Las Cases accompanied the emperor as a page. There were nine officers of inferior rank, and thirty-nine domestics. The principal persons were received on board the *Bellerophon*, the others in the corvette.

Bonaparte came out of Aix Roads on board of the *Épervier*. Wind and tide being against the brig, Captain Maitland sent the barge of the *Bellerophon* to transport him to that ship. Most of the officers and crew of the *Épervier* had tears in their eyes, and they continued to cheer the emperor while their voices could be heard. He was received on board the *Bellerophon* respectfully, but without any salute or distinguished honours. As Captain Maitland advanced to meet him on the quarter-deck, Napoleon pulled off his hat, and, addressing him in a firm tone of voice, said, "I come to place myself under the protection of your prince and laws." His manner was uncommonly pleasing, and he displayed much address in seizing upon opportunities of saying things flattering to the hearers whom he wished to conciliate.

As when formerly on board Captain Usher's vessel, Bonaparte showed great curiosity concerning the discipline of the ship, and expressed considerable surprise that the British vessels should so easily defeat the French ships, which were heavier, larger, and better manned than they. Captain Maitland accounted for this by the greater experience of the men and officers. The ex-emperor examined the

marines also, and, pleased with their appearance, said to Bertrand, "How much might be done with a hundred thousand such men!" In the management of the vessel, he particularly admired the silence and good order of the crew while going through their manœuvres, in comparison to a French vessel, "where every one," he said, "talks and gives orders at once." When about to quit the *Bellerophon*, he adverted to the same subject, saying, there had been less noise on board that vessel, with six hundred men, in the whole passage from Rochefort, than the crew of the *Epervier*, with only one hundred, had contrived to make between the *Isle d'Aix* and *Basque Roads*.

He spoke, too, of the British army in an equal style of praise, and was joined by his officers in doing so. One of the French officers observing that the English cavalry were superb, Captain Maitland observed, that in England, they had a higher opinion of the infantry. "You are right," said the French gentleman; "there is none such in the world; there is no making an impression on them; you might as well attempt to charge through a wall, and their fire is tremendous." Bertrand reported to Captain Maitland that Napoleon had communicated to him his opinion of the Duke of Wellington in the following words;—"The Duke of Wellington, in the management of an army, is fully equal to myself, with the advantage of possessing more prudence." This we conceive to be the genuine unbiassed opinion of one great soldier concerning another. It is a pity that Napoleon could on other occasions express himself in a strain of depreciation, which could only lower him who used it, towards a rival in the art of war.

During the whole passage, notwithstanding his situation, and the painful uncertainty under which he laboured, Napoleon seemed always tranquil, and in good temper; at times, he even approached to cheerfulness. He spoke with tenderness of his wife and family, complained of being separated from them, and had the tears in his eyes when he showed their portraits to Captain Maitland. His health seemed perfectly good; but he was occasionally subject to somnolency, proceeding, perhaps, from the exhaustion of a constitution which had gone through such severe service.

On 23d July, they passed Ushant. Napoleon remained long on deck, and cast many a melancholy look to the coast of France, but made no observations. At day-break on 24th, the *Bellerophon* was off Dartmouth; and Bonaparte was struck, first with the boldness of the coast, and then, as he entered Torbay, with the well-known beauty of the scenery. "It reminded him," he said, "of Porto Ferrajo, in Elba;" an association which must at the moment have awakened strange remembrances in the mind of the deposed emperor.

The *Bellerophon* had hardly anchored, when orders came from the admiral, Lord Keith, which were soon after seconded by others from the admiral, enjoining that no one, of whatever rank or station, should be permitted to come on board the *Bellerophon*, excepting the officers and men belonging to the ship. On the 28th, the vessel received orders to move round to Plymouth Sound.

In the meantime, the newspapers which were brought on board tended to impress anxiety and consternation among the unhappy fugitives. The report was generally circulated by these periodical publications, that Bonaparte would not be permitted to land, but would be presently sent off to St Helena, as the safest place for detaining him, as a prisoner of war. Napoleon himself became alarmed, and anxiously desirous of seeing Lord Keith, who had expressed himself sensible of some kindness which his nephew, Captain Elphinstone of the 7th Hussars, had received from the emperor, when wounded and made prisoner at Waterloo. Such an interview accordingly took place betwixt the noble admiral and the late emperor, upon the 28th July, but without any results of importance, as Lord Keith was not then possessed of the decision of the British government.

That frenzy of popular curiosity, which, predominating in all free states, seems to be carried to the utmost excess by the English nation, caused such numbers of boats to surround the *Bellerophon*, that, notwithstanding the peremptory orders of the admiral, and in spite of the efforts of the man-of-war's boats, which maintained constant guard round the vessel, it was almost impossible to keep them at the prescribed distance of a cable's length from the ship. They incurred the risk of being run down,—of being as they might apprehend, shot (for muskets were discharged for the purpose of intimidation), of all the dangers of a naval combat, rather than lose the opportunity of seeing the emperor whom they had heard so much of. When he appeared he was greeted with huzzas, which he returned with bows, but could not help expressing his wonder at the eagerness of popular curiosity, which he was not accustomed to see in such a pitch of excitation.

On the evening of the 30th of July, Major-general Sir Henry Bunbury, one of the under secretaries of state, arrived, bringing with him the final intentions of the British government, for the disposal of Bonaparte and his suite. Upon the 31st, Lord Keith and Sir Henry waited upon the ex-emperor, on board of the *Bellerophon*, to communicate to him the displeasing tidings. They were accompanied by Mr Meike, the secretary of Lord Keith, whose presence was deemed necessary as a witness to what passed. Napoleon received the admiral and under secretary of state with becoming dignity and calmness. The letter of Lord Melville (first lord of the admiralty) was read to the ex-emperor, announcing his intended destination. It stated, that "it would be inconsistent with the duty of the British ministers to their sovereign and his allies, to leave General Bonaparte the means or opportunity of again disturbing the peace of Europe—announced that the island of St Helena was selected for his future residence, and selected as such, because its local situation would permit his enjoying more freedom than could be compatible with adequate security elsewhere—that, with the exception of Generals Savary and Lallemand, the general might select three officers, together with his surgeon, to attend him to St Helena—that twelve domestics would also be allowed." The same document stated, "that the persons who might attend upon him would be liable to a certain degree

of restraint, and could not be permitted to leave the island without the sanction of the British government. Lastly, it was announced that Rear-admiral Sir George Cockburn, appointed to the chief command of the Cape of Good Hope, would be presently ready to sail for the purpose of conveying General Bonaparte to St Helena, and therefore it was desirable that he should without delay make choice of the persons who were to form his suite.*

The letter was read in French to Bonaparte by Sir Henry Bunbury. He listened without impatience, interruption, or emotion of any kind. When he was requested to state if he had any reply, he began, with great calmness of manner and mildness of countenance, to declare that he solemnly protested against the orders which had been read—that the British ministry had no right to dispose of him in the way proposed—that he appealed to the British people and the laws—and asked what was the tribunal which he ought to appeal to. "I am come," he continued, "voluntarily to throw myself on the hospitality of your nation—I am not a prisoner of war, and if I was, have a right to be treated according to the law of nations. But I am come to this country a passenger on board one of your vessels, after a previous negotiation with the commander. If he had told me I was to be a prisoner, I would not have come. I asked him if he was willing to receive me on board, and convey me to England. Admiral Maitland said he was, having received, or telling me had received special orders of government concerning me. It was a snare then that had been spread for me. I came on board a British vessel as I would have entered one of their towns—a vessel, a village, it is the same thing. As for the island of St Helena, it would be my sentence of death. I demand to be received as an English citizen. How many years entitle me to be domiciliated?"

Sir Henry Bunbury answered, that he believed four were necessary. "Well, then," continued Napoleon, "let the Prince Regent during that time place me under any superintendence he thinks proper—let me be placed in a country-house in the centre of the island, thirty leagues from every seaport—place a commissioned officer about me, to examine my correspondence and superintend my actions; or, if the Prince Regent should require my word of honour, perhaps I might give it. I might then enjoy a certain degree of personal liberty, and I should have the freedom of literature. In St Helena I could not live three months; to my habits and constitution it would be death. I am used to ride twenty miles a-day,—what am I to do on that little rock at the end of the world? No! Botany Bay is better than St Helena—I prefer death to St Helena.—And what good is my death to do you? I am no longer a sovereign. What danger could result from my living as a private person in the heart of England, and restricted in any way which the government should think proper?"

He referred repeatedly to the manner of his coming on board the *Bellerophon*, insisting upon his being perfectly free in his choice, and that he had preferred confiding to the hospitality and generosity of the British nation.

"Otherwise," he said, "why should I not have

gone to my father-in-law, or to the Emperor Alexander, who is my personal friend? We have become enemies, because he wanted to annex Poland to his dominions, and my popularity among the Poles was in his way. But otherwise he was my friend, and he would not have treated me in this way. If your government act thus, it will disgrace you in the eyes of Europe. Even your own people will blame it. Besides, you do not know the feeling that my death will create both in France and Italy. There is, at present, a high opinion of England in these countries. If you kill me it will be lost, and the lives of many English will be sacrificed. What was there to force me to the step I took? The tricoloured flag was still flying at Bordeaux, Nantes, and Rochefort.* The army has not even yet submitted. Or, if I had chosen to remain in France, what was there to prevent me from remaining concealed for years amongst a people so much attached to me?"

He then returned to his negotiation with Captain Maitland, and dwelt on the honours and attentions shown to him personally by that officer and Admiral Hotham. "And, after all, it was only a snare for me!"† He again enlarged on the disgrace to England which was impending. "I hold out to the Prince Regent," he said, "the brightest page in his history, in placing myself at his discretion. I have made war upon you for twenty years, and I give you the highest proof of confidence by voluntarily giving myself into the hands of my most inveterate and constant enemies. Remember," he continued, "what I have been, and how I stood among the sovereigns of Europe. This courted my protection—that gave me his daughter—all sought for my friendship. I was emperor, acknowledged by all the powers in Europe, except Great Britain, and she had acknowledged me as chief consul. Your government has no right to term me *General Bonaparte*," he added, pointing with his finger to the offensive epithet in Lord Melville's letter. "I am prince, or consul, and ought to be treated as such, if treated with at all. When I was at Elba,

* The white flag was flying at La Rochelle and the Isle of Oleron. It was hoisted on the 12th, hauled down afterwards, and again hoisted on the 13th July, to the final exclusion of the three-coloured ensign.

† Admiral Hotham and Captain Maitland had no particular orders how this uncommon person was to be treated, and were naturally desirous of showing respect under misfortunes to one who had been so great. Their civilities went no farther than manning the yards when he entered the *Superb* on a breakfast visit, and when he returned to the *Bellerophon* on the same occasion. Captain Maitland also permitted Napoleon to lead the way into the dining cabin, and seat himself in the centre of the table; an honour which it would have been both ungracious and uncalled for to have disputed. Even these civilities could not have been a portion of the snare of which Napoleon complains, or have had the least effect in inducing him to take his resolution of surrendering to the English, as the argument in the text infers; for that resolution had been taken, and the surrender made, before the attentions Napoleon found upon could have been offered and received. This tends to confirm the opinion of Nelson, that the French, when treated with ceremonial politeness, are apt to form pretensions upon the concessions made to them in ordinary courtesy.

I was at least as much a sovereign in that island as Louis on the throne of France. We had both our respective flags, our ships, our troops—Mine, to be sure," he said, with a smile, "were rather on a small scale—I had six hundred soldiers, and he had two hundred thousand. At length, I made war upon him, defeated him, and dethroned him. But there was nothing in this to deprive me of my rank as one of the sovereigns of Europe."

During this interesting scene, Napoleon spoke with little interruption from Lord Keith and Sir Henry Bunbury, who declined replying to his remonstrances, stating themselves to be unauthorized to enter into discussions, as their only duty was to convey the intentions of government to Napoleon, and transmit his answer, if he charged them with any. He repeated again and again his determination not to go to St Helena, and his desire to be suffered to remain in Great Britain.

Sir Henry Bunbury then said, he was certain that St Helena had been selected as the place of his residence, because its local situation allowed freer scope for exercise and indulgence, than could have been permitted in any part of Great Britain.

"No, no," repeated Bonaparte, with animation, "I will not go there—You would not go there, sir, were it your own case—nor, my lord, would you." Lord Keith bowed and answered,—"He had been already at St Helena four times." Napoleon went on reiterating his protestations against being imprisoned, or sent to St Helena. "I will not go thither," he repeated; "I am not a Hercules (with a smile), but you shall not conduct me to St Helena. I prefer death in this place. You found me free, send me back again; replace me in the condition in which I was, or permit me to go to America."

He dwelt much on his resolution to die rather than to go to St Helena; he had no great reason, he said, to wish for life. He urged the admiral to take no farther steps to remove him into the Northumberland, before government should have been informed of what he had said, and have signified their final decision. He conjured Sir Henry Bunbury to use no delay in communicating his answer to government, and referred himself to Sir Henry to put it into form. After some cursory questions and pauses, he again returned to the pressing subject, and urged the same arguments as before. "He had expected," he said, "to have had liberty to land, and settle himself in the country, some commissioner being named to attend him, who would be of great use for a year or two to teach him what he had to do. You could chuse," he said, "some respectable man, for the English service must have officers distinguished for probity and honour; and do not put about me an intriguing person, who would only play the spy, and make cabals." He declared again his determination not to go to St Helena; and this interesting interview was concluded.

After the admiral and Sir Henry Bunbury had left the cabin, Napoleon recalled Lord Keith, whom, in respect of his former attention to his lordship's relative, Captain Elphinstone, he might consider as more favourable to his person.

Napoleon opened the conversation, by asking Lord Keith's advice how to conduct himself. Lord Keith replied, that he was an officer, and had discharged his duty, and left with him the heads of his instructions. If he considered it necessary to renew the discussion, Sir Henry Bunbury must be called in. Bonaparte said that was unnecessary. "Can you," said he, "after what is passed, detain me until I hear from London?" Lord Keith replied, that must depend on the instructions brought by the other admiral, with which he was unacquainted. "Was there any tribunal," he asked, "to which he could apply?" Lord Keith answered, that he was no civilian, but believed that there was none whatever. He added, that he was satisfied there was every disposition on the part of the British government to render his situation as comfortable as prudence would permit. "How so?" said Napoleon, lifting the paper from the table, and speaking with animation. Upon Lord Keith's observing, "that it was surely preferable to being confined to a smaller space in England, or being sent to France, or perhaps to Russia,"—"Russia," exclaimed Bonaparte, "God preserve me from it!"

During this remarkable scene, Napoleon's manner was perfectly calm and collected, his voice equal and firm, his tones very pleasing. Once or twice only he spoke more rapidly, and in a harsher key. He used little gesticulation, and his attitudes were ungraceful; but the action of the head was dignified, and the countenance remarkably soft and placid, without any marks of severity. He seemed to have made up his mind, anticipating what was to be announced, and perfectly prepared to reply. In expressing his positive determination not to go to St Helena, he left it to his hearers to infer, whether he meant to prevent his removal by suicide, or to resist it by force.†

CHAPTER CX.

Napoleon's real view of the measure of sending him to St Helena.—Allegation that Captain Maitland made towards him—disproved—Probability that the insinuation arose with Las Cases, who was disappointed that a negotiation which he had conducted was not successful—Scheme of removing Napoleon from the Bellefleur, by citing him as witness in a case of libel—Threats of self-destruction by Napoleon—by his followers that they would put him to death—only made to intimidate the government.—Napoleon goes on board the Northumberland, which sails for St Helena.—His behaviour on the voyage.—Manner in which he was treated by George Cockburn.—He arrives at St Helena, and lands on 16th October.

THE interest attaching to the foregoing interview betwixt Napoleon and the gentlemen sent to announce his doom loses much, when we regard it in a present

* "Russie—Dieu m'en garde!"

† Having had the inestimable advantage of comparing Sir Henry Bunbury's minutes of this striking transaction with those of Mr Melke, who accompanied Lord Keith in the capacity of secretary, the author has been enabled to lay before the public the most ample and exact account of the interview of 31st July, which has yet appeared.

measure as an empty personification of feeling, a well-painted passion which was not in reality felt. Napoleon, as will presently appear, was not serious in averring that he had any encouragement from Captain Maitland to come on board his ship, save in the character of a prisoner, to be placed at the Prince Regent's discretion. Neither had he the most distant idea of preventing his removal to the Northumberland, either by violence to himself, or any one else. Both topics of declamation were only used for show,—the one to alarm the sense of honour entertained by the Prince Regent and the people of England, and the other to work upon their humanity.

There is little doubt that Napoleon saw the probability of the St Helena voyage, so soon as he surrendered himself to the captain of the *Bellerophon*. He had affirmed, that there was a purpose of transferring him to St Helena or Lucie, even before he left Elba; and if he thought the English capable of sending him to such banishment while he was under the protection of the treaty of Fontainebleau, he could hardly suppose that they would scruple to execute such a purpose, after his own conduct had deprived him of all the immunities with which that treaty had invested him.

Nevertheless, while aware that his experiment might possibly thus terminate, Napoleon may have hoped a better issue, and conceived himself capable of cajoling the Prince Regent and his administration into hazarding the safety and the peace of Europe, in order to display a quixotic generosity towards an individual, whose only plea for deserving it was, that he had been for twenty years their mortal enemy. Such hopes he may have entertained; for it cannot be expected that he was to acknowledge even to himself the personal disqualifications which rendered him, in the eyes of all Europe, unworthy of trust or confidence. His expectation of a favourable reception did not go so far, in all likelihood, as those of the individual among his followers, who expected that Napoleon would receive the Order of the Garter from the Prince Regent; but he might have hoped to be permitted to reside in Britain on the same terms as his brother Lucien.

Doubtless he calculated upon, and perhaps overrated, all these more favourable chances. Yet, if the worst should arrive, he saw even in that worst, that Island of St Helena itself, the certainty of personal safety, which he could not be assured of in any despotic country, where, as he himself must have known pretty well, an obnoxious prisoner, or *détenu*, may lose his life *par négligence*, without any hostile or alarm being excited upon the occasion. Upon the 16th August, while on his passage to St Helena, he frankly acknowledged, that though he had been deceived in the reception he had expected from the English, still, harshly and unfairly as he thought himself treated, he found comfort from knowing that he was under the protection of British laws, which he could not have enjoyed had he gone to another country, where his fate would have depended upon the caprice of an individual. This we believe to be the real secret of his rendition to England, in preference to his father-in-law of Austria, or his friend

in Russia. He might, in the first-named country, be kept in custody, more or less severe; but he would be at least secure from perishing of some political disease. Even while at St Helena, he allowed, in an interval of good-tempered candour, that, comparing one place of exile to another, St Helena was entitled to the preference. In higher latitudes, he observed, they would have suffered from cold, and in any other tropical island they would have been burned to death. At St Helena the country was wild and savage, the climate monotonous, and unfavourable to health, but the temperature was mild and pleasing.*

The allegation on which Napoleon had insisted so much, namely, that Captain Maitland had pledged himself for his good reception in England, and received him on board his vessel, not as a prisoner, but as a guest, became now an important subject of investigation. All the while Napoleon had been on board the *Bellerophon*, he had expressed the greatest respect for Captain Maitland, and a sense of his civilities totally inconsistent with the idea, that he conceived himself betrayed by him. He had even sounded that officer, by the means of Madame Bertrand, to know whether he would accept a present of his portrait set with diamonds, which Captain Maitland requested might not be offered, as he was determined to decline it.

On the 6th of August, Count Las Cases, for the first time, hinted to Captain Maitland, that he had understood him to have given an assurance, that Napoleon should be well received in England. Captain Maitland replied, it was impossible the count could mistake him so far, since he had expressly stated he could make no promises; but that he thought his orders would bear him out in receiving Napoleon on board, and conveying him to England. He reminded the count, that he had questioned him (Captain Maitland) repeatedly, as to his private opinion, to which he could only answer, that he had no reason to think Napoleon would be ill received. Las Cases had nothing to offer in reply. Upon the same 6th August, Napoleon himself spoke upon the subject, and, it will be observed, how very different his language was to Captain Maitland, from that which he held in his absence. "They say," he remarked, "that I made no conditions. *Certainly I made no conditions.* How could an individual enter into terms with a nation? I wanted nothing of them but hospitality, or, as the ancients would express it, air and water. As for you, captain, I have no cause of complaint; your conduct has been that of a man of honour."

The investigation of this matter did not end here, for the ungrounded assertion that Captain Maitland had granted some conditions, expressed or implied, was no sooner repelled than it again revived.

On the 7th, Count Las Cases, having a parting interview with Lord Keith, for the purpose of delivering to him a protest on the part of Bonaparte, "I was in the act of telling him," said the count, "that Captain Maitland had said he was authorized to carry us to London, without letting us suspect that we were to be regarded as prisoners of war;

* *Mémoires de St-Hélène*, vol. II, p. 303.

and that the captain could not deny that we came freely and in good faith; that the letter from the emperor to the Prince of Wales, of the existence of which I had given Captain Maitland information, must necessarily have created tacit conditions, since he had made no observation on it." Here the admiral's impatience, nay, anger, broke forth. He said to him sharply, that in that case Captain Maitland was a fool, since his instructions contained not a word to such a purpose; and this he should surely know, since it was he, Lord Keith, who issued them. Count Las Cases still persevered, stating that his lordship spoke with a hasty severity, for which he might be himself responsible; since the other officers, as well as Rear-admiral Hotham, had expressed themselves to the same effect, which could not have been the case had the letter of instructions been so clearly expressed, and so positive, as his lordship seemed to think.*

Lord Keith, upon this statement of Count Las Cases, called upon Captain Maitland for the most ample account he could give of the communications which he had had with the count, previous to Napoleon's coming on board the *Bellerophon*. Captain Maitland of course obeyed, and stated at full length the manner in which the French frigates lay blockaded, the great improbability of their effecting an escape, and the considerable risk they would have run in attempting it; the application to him, first by Savary and Las Cases, afterwards by Las Cases and Gourgaud; his objecting to the frequent flags of truce; his refusal to allow Bonaparte to pass to sea, either in French ships of war or in a neutral vessel; his consenting to carry to England the late emperor and his suite, to be at the disposal of the Prince Regent, with his cautions to them, again and again renewed, in the presence of Captain Sartorius and Captain Gambier, that he could grant no stipulations or conditions whatsoever. These officers gave full evidence to the same effect, by their written attestations. If, therefore, the insinuation of Count Las Cases, for it amounts to no more, is to be placed against the express and explicit averment of Captain Maitland, the latter must preponderate, were it but by aid of the direct testimony of two other British officers. Finally, Captain Maitland mentioned Napoleon's acknowledgment, and that of his suite, that though their expectations had been disappointed, they imputed no blame to him, which he could not have escaped, had he used any unwarranted and fallacious proposals to entice them on board his vessel. As the last piece of evidence, he mentioned his taking farewell of Montholon, who again reverted to Napoleon's wish to make him a present, and expressed the emperor's sense of his civilities, and his high and honourable deportment through the whole transaction.

Captain Maitland, to use his own words, then said, "I feel much hurt that Count Las Cases should have stated to Lord Keith, that I had promised

Bonaparte should be well received in England, or indeed made promises of any sort. I have endeavoured to conduct myself with integrity and honour throughout the whole of this transaction, and therefore cannot allow such an assertion to go uncontradicted." "Oh!" said Count Montholon, "Las Cases negotiated this business; it has turned out very differently from what he and all of us expected. He attributes the emperor's situation to himself, and is therefore desirous of giving it the best countenance he can; but I assure you, the emperor is convinced your conduct has been most honourable;" then taking my hand, he pressed it, and added, "and that is my opinion also."

Lord Keith was, of course, perfectly convinced that the charge against Captain Maitland was not only totally unsupported by testimony, but that it was disproved by the evidence of impartial witnesses, as well as by the conduct and public expression of sentiments of those who had the best right to complain of that officer's conduct, had it been really deserving of censure. The reason why Count Las Cases should persist in grounding hopes and wishes of his own framing, upon supposed expressions of encouragement from Captain Maitland, has been probably rightly treated by Count Montholon. Napoleon's conduct, in loading Captain Maitland with the charge of "laying snares for him," while his own conscience so far acquitted that brave officer, that he pressed upon him thanks, and yet more substantial evidence of his favourable opinion, can, we are afraid, only be imputed to a predominant sense of his own interest, to which he was not unwilling to have sacrificed the professional character and honourable name of an officer, to whom, on other occasions, he acknowledged himself obliged. As Captain Maitland's modest and manly narrative is now published, the figment, that Napoleon came on board the *Bellerophon* in any other character than as a prisoner of war, must be considered as silenced for ever.

Having prosecuted this interesting subject to a conclusion, we return to the train of circumstances attending Napoleon's departure from England, so far as they seem to contain historical interest.

The inconvenient resort of immense numbers, sometimes not less than a thousand boats, scarce to be kept off by absolute force by those who *rowed* guard within the prescribed distance of 300 yards from the *Bellerophon*, was rendered a greater annoyance, when Napoleon's repeated expressions, that he would never go to St Helena, occasioned some suspicions that he meant to attempt his escape. Two frigates were therefore appointed to lie as guards on the *Bellerophon*, and sentinels were doubled and trebled, both by day and night.

An odd incident, of a kind which could only have happened in England (for though as many bizarre whims may arise in the minds of foreigners, they are much more seldom ripened into action), added to the cares of those who were to watch this important prisoner. Some newspaper, which was not possessed of a legal adviser to keep them right in point of form, had suggested (in tenderness, we suppose, to public curiosity), that the person of Napoleon Bonaparte should be removed to shore by agency of a

* The reader may judge for himself, by turning to p. 738, where the instructions are printed, acting under which no man but a fool, as the admiral truly said, could have entered into such a treaty, as Count Las Cases pretends Captain Maitland to have engaged in.

writ of Habeas Corpus. This magical rescript of the Old Bailey, as Smollet terms it, loses its influence over an alien and prisoner of war, and therefore such an absurd proposal was not acted upon. But an individual, prosecuted for a libel upon a naval officer, conceived the idea of citing Napoleon as an evidence in a court of justice, to prove, as he pretended, the state of the French navy, which was necessary to his defence. The writ was to have been served on Lord Keith; but he disappointed the litigant, by keeping his boat off the ship while he was on board, and afterwards by the speed of his twelve-oared barge, which the attorney's panting rowers toiled after in vain. Although this was a mere absurdity, and only worthy of the laughter, with which the anecdote of the attorney's pursuit and the admiral's flight was generally received, yet it might have given rise to inconvenience, by suggesting to Napoleon, that he was, by some process or other, entitled to redress by the common law of England, and might have encouraged him in resisting attempts to remove him from the *Bellerophon*. On the 4th of August, to end such inconvenient occurrences, the *Bellerophon* was appointed to put to sea and remain cruising off the Start, where she was to be joined by the squadron destined for St Helena, when Napoleon was, with his immediate attendants, to be removed on board of the *Northumberland*.

His spirit for some time seemed wound up to some desperate resolve, and though he gave no hint of suicide before Captain Maitland, otherwise than by expressing a dogged resolution not to go to St Helena, yet to Las Cases, he spoke in undisguised terms of a Roman death. We own we are not afraid of such resolutions being executed by sane persons, when they take the precaution of consulting an intelligent friend. It is quite astonishing how slight a backing will support the natural love of life, in minds the most courageous, and circumstances the most desperate. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that the philosophic arguments of Las Cases determined Napoleon to survive and write his history. Had he consulted his military attendants, he would have received other counsels, and assistance to execute them if necessary. Lallemand, Muntholon, and Gourgaud, assured Captain Maitland, that the emperor would sooner kill himself than go to St Helena, and that even were he to consent, they three were determined themselves to put him to death, rather than he should so far degrade himself. Captain Maitland, in reply, gave some hints indicative of the gallows, in case such a scheme were prosecuted.

Savary and Lallemand were, it must be owned, under circumstances peculiarly painful. They had been among the list of persons excluded from the amnesty by the royal government of France, and now they were prohibited by the British ministry from accompanying Napoleon to St Helena. They entertained, not unnaturally, the greatest anxiety about their fate, apprehensive, though entirely without reason, that they might be delivered up to the French government. They resolved upon personal resistance to prevent their being separated from their emperor, but fortunately were no considerate

amid their wrath, as to take the opinion of the late distinguished lawyer and statesman, Sir Samuel Romilly. As the most effectual mode of serving these unfortunate gentlemen, Sir Samuel, by personal application to the lord chancellor, learned that there were no thoughts of delivering up his clients to the French government, and thus became able to put their hearts at ease upon that score. On the subject of the resistance, as to the legality of which they questioned him, Sir Samuel Romilly acquainted them, that life taken in an affray of the kind, would be construed into murder by the law of England. No greater danger, indeed, was to be expected from an assault, legalized upon the opinion of an eminent lawyer, than from a suicide adjusted with the advice of a counsellor of state; and we suppose neither Napoleon nor his followers were more serious in the violent projects which they announced, than they might think necessary to shake the purpose of the English ministry. In this they were totally unsuccessful, and their intemperate threats only occasioned their being deprived of arms, excepting Napoleon, who was left in possession of his sword. Napoleon and his followers were greatly hurt at this marked expression of want of confidence, which must also have been painful to the English officers who executed the order, though it was explained to the French gentlemen, that the measure was only one of precaution, and that their weapons were to be carefully preserved and restored to them. During his last day on board the *Bellerophon*, Napoleon was employed in composing a protest, which, as it contains nothing more than his address to Lord Keith and Sir Henry Bonbury, we have thrown into the Appendix.* He also wrote a second letter to the Prince Regent.

On the 4th of August, the *Bellerophon* set sail, and next morning fell in with the *Northumberland*, and the squadron destined for St Helena, as also with the *Tonnant*, on board of which Lord Keith's flag was hoisted.

It was now that Napoleon gave Captain Maitland the first intimation of his purpose to submit to his exile, by requesting that Mr O'Meara, surgeon of the *Bellerophon*, might be permitted to attend him to St Helena, instead of his own surgeon, whose health could not stand the voyage. This made it clear that no resistance was designed, and, indeed so soon as Napoleon observed that his threats had produced no effect, he submitted with his usual equanimity. He also gave orders to deliver up his arms. His luggage was likewise subjected to a form of search, but without unpacking or disturbing any article. The treasure of Bonaparte, amounting only to 4000 gold Napoleons, was taken into custody, to abridge him of that powerful means of effecting his escape. Full receipts, of course, were given, rendering the British government accountable for the same; and Marchand, the favourite valet-de-chambre of the emperor, was permitted to take whatever money he thought might be immediately necessary.

About eleven o'clock on the morning of the 7th August, Lord Keith came in his barge to transfer

* See Appendix, No. 9.—* Bonaparte's protest.*

Napoleon from the Bellerophon to the Northumberland. About one o'clock, when Bonaparte had announced that he was in full readiness, a captain's guard was turned out; Lord Keith's barge was prepared; and as Napoleon crossed the quarter-deck, the soldiers presented arms under three ruffles of the drum, being the salute paid to a general officer. His step was firm and steady; his farewell to Captain Maitland polite and friendly. That officer had no doubt something to forgive to Napoleon, who had endeavoured to fix on him the stigma of having laid a snare for him; yet the candid and manly avowal of the feelings which remained on his mind at parting with him ought not to be suppressed. They add credit, were that required, to his plain, honest, unvarnished narrative.

"It may appear surprising, that a possibility could exist of a British officer being prejudiced in favour of one who had caused so many calamities to his country; but to such an extent did he possess the power of pleasing, that there are few people who could have sat at the same table with him for nearly a month, as I did, without feeling a sensation of pity, allied perhaps to regret, that a man possessed of so many fascinating qualities, and who had held so high a station in life, should be reduced to the situation in which I saw him."

Napoleon was received on board of the Northumberland with the same honours paid at leaving the Bellerophon. Sir George Cockburn, the British admiral to whose charge the late emperor was now committed, was in every respect a person highly qualified to discharge the task with delicacy towards Napoleon, yet with fidelity to the instructions he had received. Of good birth, accustomed to the first society, a handsome person, and an agreeable address, he had yet so much of the firmness of his profession as to be able to do unpleasing things when necessary. In every particular within the circle of his orders, he was kind, gentle, and accommodating; beyond them, he was inflexible. This mixture of courtesy and firmness was particularly necessary, since Napoleon, and still more his attendants on his behalf, were desirous upon several occasions to arrogate a degree of royal rank for the prisoner, which Sir George Cockburn's instructions, for reasons to be hereafter noticed, positively forbade him to concede. All that he could give, he gave with a readiness which showed kindness as well as courtesy; but aware that, beyond the fixed limit, each admitted claim would only form the foundation for another, he made his French guests sensible that ill-humour or anger could have no effect upon his conduct.

The consequence was, that though Napoleon, when transferred to the Northumberland, was, by the orders of the admiralty, deprived of certain marks of deference which he received on board of the Bellerophon (where Captain Maitland had no precise orders on the subject, and the withholding of which in him would have been a gratuitous infliction of humiliation), yet no positive quarrel, far less any rooted ill-will, took place betwixt Napoleon and the admiral. The latter remained at the principal place of his own table, was covered when on the quarter-deck, after the first salutations had

passed, and disregarded other particulars of etiquette observed towards crowned heads; yet such circumstances only occasioned a little temporary coldness, which, as the admiral paid no attention to his guests' displeasure, soon gave way to a Frenchman's natural love of society; and Sir George Cockburn (ceasing to be the *Requin*, as Las Cases says the French termed him when they were in the pet) became that mixture of the obliging gentleman and strict officer for which Napoleon held him whenever he spoke candidly on the subject.

It may be mentioned as no bad instance of fine line of conduct, and its effects, that, upon the Northumberland crossing the line, the emperor desiring to exhibit his munificence to the seamen, by presenting them with a hundred louis-d'or, under pretext of paying the ordinary fine, Sir George Cockburn considering this tribute to Neptune as too excessive in amount, would not permit the donative to exceed a tenth part of the sum; and Napoleon, offended by the restriction, paid nothing at all. Upon another occasion, early in the voyage, a difference in national manners gave rise to one of those slight misunderstandings which we have noticed. Napoleon was accustomed, like all Frenchmen, to leave the table immediately after dinner, and Sir George Cockburn, with the English officers, remained at him at table; for, in permitting his French guests their liberty, the admiral did not chuse to admit the right of Napoleon to break up the party at his, or George's, own table. This gave some discontent. Notwithstanding these trifling subjects of dissension, Las Cases informs us that the admiral, when he took to be prepossessed against them at first, became every day more amicable. The emperor used to take his arm every evening on the quarter-deck, and hold long conversations with him upon maritime subjects, as well as past events in general.†

While on board the Northumberland, the late emperor spent his mornings in reading or writing, his evenings in his exercise upon deck, and at cards. The game was generally *vingt-un*. But when the play became rather deep, he discouraged that amusement, and substituted chess. Great tactician as he was, Napoleon did not play well at that military game, and it was with difficulty that his antagonist, Monthonlon, could avoid the solicitude of beating the emperor.

During this voyage, Napoleon's *jour de fête* occurred, which was also his birth-day. It was the 15th August; a day for which the pope had expressly canonized a St Napoleon to be the emperor's patron. And now, strange revolution, it was celebrated by him on board of an English man-of-war.

* Las Cases, *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. I. p. 125, gives somewhat a different account of this trifling matter, which appears to have been a misunderstanding. Las Cases supposes the admiral to have been offended at Napoleon's rising, whereas Sir George Cockburn was only desirous to show that he did not conceive himself obliged to break up the party because his French guests withdrew. It seems, however, to have dwelt on Napoleon's mind, and was always quoted when he desired to express dissatisfaction with the admiral.

† *Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. I. p. 192.

war, which was conducting him to his place of imprisonment, and, as it proved, his tomb. Yet Napoleon seemed cheerful and contented during the whole day, and was even pleased with being fortunate at play, which he received as a good omen.

Upon the 15th of October, 1815, the Northumberland reached St Helena, which presents but an unpromising aspect to those who design it for a residence, though it may be a welcome sight to the sea-worn mariner. Its destined inhabitant, from the deck of the Northumberland, surveyed it with his spy-glass. St James' Town, an inconsiderable village, was before him, encased, as it were, in a valley, amid arid and scarped rocks of immense height; every platform, every opening, every gorge, was bristled with cannon. Las Cases, who stood by him, could not perceive the slightest alteration of his countenance. The orders of government had been, that Napoleon should remain on board till a residence could be prepared suitable for the line of life he was to lead in future. But as this was likely to be a work of time, Sir George Cockburn readily undertook, on his own responsibility, to put his passengers on shore, and provide in some way for the security of Napoleon's person, until the necessary habitation should be fitted up. He was accordingly transferred to land upon the 16th October; and thus the Emperor of France, nay well nigh of Europe, sunk into the Recluse of St Helena.

CHAPTER CXI.

Causes which justify the English government in the measure of Napoleon's banishment.—He was a prisoner of war, and had already shown, by breach of the treaty of Fontainebleau, that no confidence could be reposed in him.—The government was even censured for not taking stronger precautions to prevent his escape from Elba.—Napoleon's wish to retire to England, in order that being near France, he might again interfere in her affairs.—Reasons for withholding from him the title of emperor.—Advantages of St Helena, as a place of banishment.—Sir George Cockburn's instructions for the treatment of Napoleon.—Longwood fixed on as the place of residence of the ex-emperor.—Temporary accommodation prepared for him at Briars.—He removes to Longwood.—Precautions taken for the safe custody of the prisoner.—Regulations concerning the vessels permitted to enter the harbour.

WE are now to touch upon the arguments which seem to justify the administration of England in the strict course which they adopted towards Napoleon Bonaparte, in restraining his person, and abating the privileges of rank which he tenaciously claimed. And here we are led to observe the change produced in men's feelings within the space of only twelve years. In 1816, when the present author, however inadequate to the task, attempted to treat of the same subject, there existed a considerable party in Britain who were of opinion that the British government would best have discharged their duty to France and Europe, by delivering up Napoleon to Louis XVIII.'s government, to be treated as he himself had treated the Duke d'Enghien. It would be at this time of day needless to throw away argument upon this subject, or to show that Napoleon was at

least entitled to security of life, by his surrender to the British flag.

As needless would it be to go over the frequently repeated ground, which proves so clearly that in other respects the transaction with Captain Maitland amounted to an unconditional surrender. Napoleon had considered every plan of escape by force or address, and none had seemed to him to present such chance of a favourable result, as that which upon full consideration he adopted. A surrender to England insured his life, and gave him the hope of taking further advantages from the generosity of the British nation; for an unconditional surrender, as it secures nothing, so it excludes nothing. General Bertrand, when on board the Northumberland, said that Napoleon had been much influenced in taking the step he had done by the Abbé Siéyes, who had strongly advised him to proceed at once to England, in preference to taking any other course, which proves that his resolution must of course have been formed long before he ever saw Captain Maitland. Even Monsieur Las Cases, when closely examined, comes to the same result; for he admits that he never hoped that Napoleon would be considered as a free man, or receive passports for America; but only that he would be kept in custody under milder restrictions than were inflicted upon him. But as he made no stipulation of any kind concerning the nature of these restrictions, they must of course have been left to the option of the conquering party. The question, therefore, betwixt Napoleon and the British nation, was not one of justice, which has a right to its due, though the consequence should be destruction to the party by which it is to be rendered, but one of generosity and clemency, feelings which can only be wisely indulged with reference to the safety of those who act upon them.

Napoleon being thus a prisoner, surrendered at discretion, became subjected to the common laws of war, which authorize belligerent powers to shut up prisoners of war in places of confinement, from which it is only usual to except such whose honour may be accounted as a sufficient guarantee for their good faith, or whose power of doing injury is so small that it might be accounted contemptible. But Bonaparte was neither in the one situation nor the other. His power was great, the temptation to use it powerful, and the confidence to be placed in his resolution or promise to resist such temptation, very slight indeed.

There is an unauthorized report that Lord Castlereagh, at the time of the treaty of Fontainebleau, asked Caulaincourt, why Napoleon did not chuse to ask refuge in England, rather than accept the almost ridiculous title of Emperor of Elba. We doubt much if Lord Castlereagh said so. But if, either upon such a hint, or upon his own free motion, Napoleon had chosen, in 1814, to repose his confidence in the British nation, or even had he fallen into our hands by chance of war, England ought certainly, on so extraordinary an occasion, to have behaved with magnanimity; and perhaps ought either to have permitted Napoleon to reside as an individual within her dominions, or suffered him to have departed to America. It might then have been urged (though cautious persons might even then hesitate), that the pledged word of a soldier, who had been so lately a

sovereign, ought to be received as a guarantee for his observance of treaty. Nay, it might then have been held, that the talents and activity of a single individual, supposing them as great as human powers can be carried, would not have enabled him, however desirous, to have again disturbed the peace of Europe. There would have been a natural desire, therefore, to grant so remarkable a person that liberty, which a generous nation might have been willing to conceive would not, and could not, be abused. But the experiment of Elba gave too ample proof at once how little reliance was to be placed in Napoleon's engagement, and how much danger was to be apprehended from him, even when his fortunes were apparently at the lowest ebb. His breach of the treaty of Fontainebleau altered entirely his relations with England and with Europe; and placed him in the condition of one whose word could not be trusted, and whose personal freedom was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe. The experiment of trusting to his parole had been tried and failed. The wise may be deceived once; only fools are twice cheated in the same manner.

It may be pleaded and admitted for Napoleon, that he had, to instigate his returning from Elba, as strong a temptation as earth could hold out to an ambitious spirit like his own,—the prospect of an extraordinary enterprise, with the imperial throne for its reward. It may be also allowed, that the Bourbons, delaying to pay his stipulated revenue, afforded him, so far as they were concerned, a certain degree of provocation. But all this would argue against his being again trusted within the reach of such temptation. While France was in a state of such turmoil and vexation, with the remains of a disaffected army fermenting amid a fickle population, while the king (in order to make good his stipulated payments to the allies) was obliged to impose heavy taxes, and to raise them with some severity, many opportunities might arise, in which Napoleon, either complaining of some petty injuries of his own, or invited by the discontented state of the French nation, might renew his memorable attempt of 28th February. It was the business of the British ministry to prevent all hazard of this. It was but on the 20th April before, that they were called upon by the opposition to account to the House of Commons for not taking proper precautions to prevent Bonaparte's escape from Elba. For what then would they have rendered themselves responsible, had they placed him in circumstances which admitted of a second escape?—at least for the full extent of all the confusion and bloodshed to which such an event must necessarily have given rise. The justice, as well as the necessity of the case, warranted the abridgment of Bonaparte's liberty, the extent of which had been made, by his surrender, dependent upon the will of Britain.

In deducing this conclusion, we have avoided having any recourse to the argument *ad hominem*. We have not mentioned the dungeon of Toussaint, on the frontier of the Alps, or the detention of Ferdinand, a confiding and circumvented ally, in the Château of Valency. We have not adverted to the instances of honours and appointments bestowed on officers who had broken their parole of honour,

by escaping from England, yet were received in the Tuileries with favour and preferments. Neither have we alluded to the great state maxim, which erected political necessity, or expediency, into a power superior to moral law. Were Britain to vindicate her actions by such instances as the above, it would be reversing the blessed rule, acting towards our enemy, not according as we would have desired he should have done, but as he actually had done in regard to us, and observing a crooked and criminal line of policy, because our adversary had set us the example.

But Bonaparte's former actions must necessarily have been considered, so far as to ascertain what confidence was to be reposed in his personal character; and if that was found marked by gross instances of breach of faith to others, ministers would surely have been inexcusable had they placed him in a situation where his fidelity was what the nation had principally to depend on for tranquility. The fact seems to be admitted by Las Cases, that while he proposed to retire to England, it was with the hope of again meddling in French affairs.* The example of Sir Niel Campbell had shown how little restraint the mere presence of a commissioner would have had over this extraordinary man; and his resurrection after leaving Elba, had distinctly demonstrated that nothing was to be trusted to the second political death which he proposed to submit to as a recluse in England.

It has, however, been urged, that if the character of the times and his own rendered it an act of necessity to take from Napoleon his personal freedom, his captivity ought to have been at least accompanied with all marks of honourable distinction, and that it was unnecessarily cruel to hurt the feelings of his followers and his own, by refusing him the imperial title and personal observances which he had enjoyed in his prosperity, and of which he was tenacious in adversity.

It will be agreed on all hands, that if anything

* This, to be sure, according to Las Cases, was only in order to carry through those great schemes of establishing the peace, the honour, and the union of the country. He had hoped to the last, it seems, in the critical moment. "That, at the sight of the public danger, the eyes of the people of France would be opened; that they would return to him, and enable him to save the country of France. It was this which made him prolong the time at Malmaison—it was this which induced him to tarry yet longer at Rochefort. If he is now at St Helena, he owes it to the sentiment. It is a train of thought from which he could never be separated. Yet more lately, when there was no other resource than to accept the hospitality of the British, perhaps it was not without a species of satisfaction that he found himself irresistibly drawn on by the course of events towards England, since being there was being near France. He knew well that he would not be free, but he hoped to make his opinion heard; and then how many chances would open themselves to the new direction which he wished to inspire."—*Mémoires de Ste-Hélène*, vol. III. pp. 444-5. We cannot understand the meaning of this, unless it implies that Napoleon, while retiring into England, on condition of abstaining from politics, entertained hopes of regaining his ascendancy in French affairs, by exerting through the influence which he expected to exercise over those of Britain.

could have been done consistent with the main exigencies of the case, to save Napoleon, in his unfortunate situation, a single pang, that measure should have been resorted to. But there could be no reason why Britain, in compassionate courtesy, should give to her prisoner a title which she had refused to him *de jure*, even while he wielded the empire of France *de facto*; and there were arguments, to be hereafter stated, which weighed powerfully against granting such an indulgence.

The place of Napoleon's confinement, also, has been the subject of severe censure; but the question is entirely dependent upon the right of confining him at all. If that is denied, there needs no further argument; for a place of confinement, to be effectual, must connect several circumstances of safety and seclusion, each in its degree aggravating the sufferings of the person confined, and inflicting pain which ought only to be the portion of a legal prisoner. But if it be granted, that a person so formidable as Napoleon should be debarred from the power of making a second avatar on the earth, there is perhaps no place in the world where so ample a degree of security could have been reconciled with the same degree of personal freedom to the captive, as St Helena.

The healthfulness of the climate of that island will be best proved by the contents of a report annexed to a return made on 20th March, 1820, by Dr Thomas Shortt, physician to the forces; from which it appears, that among the troops then stationed in St Helena, constantly employed in ordinary or on fatigue duty, and always exposed to the atmosphere, the proportion of sick was only as one man to thirty, even including casualties, and those sent to the hospital after punishment. This extraordinary degree of health, superior to that of most places in the world, Dr Shortt imputes to the circumstance of the island being placed in the way of the trade winds, where the continued steady breeze carries off the superfluous heat, and with it such effluvia noxious to the human constitution, as it may have generated. The same cause, bringing with it a succession of vapours from the ocean, affords a cloudy curtain to intercept the sun's rays, and prevents the occurrence of those violent and rapid forms of disease, which present themselves throughout the tropics in general. Checked perspiration is noticed as an occasional cause of disease, but which, if properly treated, is only fatal to those whose constitutions have been previously exhausted by long residence in a hot climate. It should also be observed, that the climate of the island is remarkably steady, not varying upon an average more than nine or ten degrees in the course of the year; which equality of temperature is another great cause of the general healthfulness.* The atmosphere is warm, indeed; but as Napoleon was himself born in a hot climate, and was stated to be afraid of the cold even of Britain, that could hardly in his case be considered as a disadvantageous circumstance.

In respect to Napoleon's personal treatment, Sir

* See Appendix, No. 10.—“State of thermometer, as taken at Deadwood, Island of St Helena, during 12 calendar months, viz. from 1st Sept., 1820, to 31st Aug., 1821, inclusive.”

George Cockburn proceeded on his arrival to arrange this upon the system recommended by his final instructions, which run thus:

“In committing so important a trust to British officers, the Prince Regent is sensible that it is not necessary to impress upon them his anxious desire that no greater measure of severity with respect to confinement or restriction be imposed, than what is deemed necessary for the faithful discharge of that duty, which the admiral, as well as the Governor of St Helena, must ever keep in mind,—the perfect security of General Bonaparte's person. Whatever, consistent with this great object, can be allowed in the shape of indulgence, his royal highness is confident will be willingly shown to the general; and he relies on Sir George Cockburn's known zeal and energy of character, that he will not allow himself to be betrayed into any imprudent relaxation of his duty.”*

It was in the spirit of these instructions that Sir George Cockburn acted, in selecting a place of residence for his important prisoner, while, at the same time, he consulted Napoleon's wishes as much as the case could possibly admit.

The accommodation upon the island was by no means such as could be desired in the circumstances. There were only three houses of a public character, which were in any degree adapted for such a guest. Two, the town residences of the governor and lieutenant-governor of the island, were unfit for the habitation of Napoleon, because they were within James Town, a situation which, for obvious reasons, was not advisable. The third was Plantation House, a villa in the country, belonging to the governor, which was the best dwelling in the island. The British administration had prohibited the selection of this house for the residence of the late imperial captive. We differ from their opinion in this particular, because the very best accommodation was due to fallen greatness; and, in his circumstances, Napoleon, with every respect to the authority of the governor, ought to have been the last person on the island subjected to inconvenience. We have little doubt that it would have been so arranged, but for the disposition of the late French emperor and his followers to use every point of deference, or complaisance, exercised towards them, as an argument for pushing their pretensions farther. Thus, the civility shown by Admiral Hotham and Captain Maitland, in manning the yards as Napoleon passed from one vessel to the other, was pleaded upon as a proof that his free and regal condition was acknowledged by these officers; and, no doubt, the assigning for his use the best house in the island might, according to the same mode of logic, have been assumed to imply that Napoleon had no superior in St Helena. Still there were means of repelling this spirit of encroachment, if it had shown itself; and we think it would have been better to risk the consequences indicated, and to have assigned Plantation House for his residence, as that which was at least the best accommodation which the island afforded.

* Extract of a dispatch from Earl Bathurst, addressed to the lords commissioners of the admiralty, dated 30th July, 1815.

Some circumstances about the locality, it is believed, had excited doubts whether the house could be completely guarded. But this, at any rate, was a question which had been considered at home, where, perhaps, the actual state of the island was less perfectly understood; and Sir George Cockburn, fettered by his instructions, had no choice in the matter.

Besides Plantation House, there was another residence situated in the country, and occupied by the lieutenant-governor, called Longwood, which, after all the different estates and residences in the island had been examined, was chosen by Sir George Cockburn as the future residence of Napoleon. It lies detached from the generally-inhabited places of the island, consequently none were likely to frequent its neighbourhood, unless those who came there on business. It was also distant from those points which were most accessible to boats, which, until they should be sufficiently defended, it was not desirable to expose to the observation of Napoleon or his military companions. At Longwood, too, there was an extent of level ground, capable of being observed and secured by sentinels, presenting a space adapted for exercise, whether on horseback or in a carriage; and the situation, being high, was more cool than the confined valleys of the neighbourhood. The house itself was equal in accommodation (though that is not saying much) to any on the island, Plantation House excepted.

To conclude, it was approved of by Napoleon, who visited it personally, and expressed himself so much satisfied, that it was difficult to prevail on him to leave the place. Immediate preparations were therefore made, for making such additions as should render the residence, if not such a one as could be wished, at least as commodious as the circumstances admitted. Indeed it was hoped, by assistance of artificers and frames to be sent from England, to improve it to any extent required. In the meanwhile, until the repairs immediately necessary could be made at Longwood, General Bertrand, and the rest of Napoleon's suite, were quartered in a furnished house in James' Town, while he himself, at his own request, took up his abode at Briars, a small house, or cottage, romantically situated, a little way from the town, in which he could only have one spare room for his own accommodation. Sir George Cockburn would have persuaded him rather to take up his temporary abode in the town, where the best house in the place was provided for him. Napoleon declined this proposal, pleading his natural aversion to expose himself to the public gaze. Besides the solitude, the pleasing landscape, agreeable especially to those whose persons have been lately confined to a ship, and whose eyes have long wandered over the waste of ocean, determined the ex-emperor in favour of Briars.

Whilst dwelling at Briars, Napoleon limited himself more than was necessary; for, taking exception at the sentinels, who were visible from the windows of the house, and objecting more reasonably to the resort of visitors, he sequestered himself in a small pavilion, consisting of one good room, and two small attic apartments, which stood about twenty yards

from the house. Of course, his freedom, unless when accompanied by a British field-officer, was limited to the small garden of the cottage, the rest of the precincts being watched by sentinels. Sir George Cockburn felt for the situation of his prisoner, and endeavoured to hurry forward the improvements at Longwood, in order that Napoleon might remove thither. He employed for this purpose the ship-carpenters of the squadron, and all the artificers the island could afford; "and Longwood," says Dr O'Meara, "for nearly two months, exhibited as busy a scene as had ever been witnessed during the war in any of his majesty's dock-yards, whilst a fleet was fitting out under the personal direction of some of our best naval commanders. The admiral, indefatigable in his exertions, was frequently seen to arrive at Longwood shortly after sunrise, stimulating by his presence the St Helena workmen, who, in general lazy and indolent, beheld with astonishment the dispatch and activity of a man-of-war succeed to the characteristic idleness, which until then they had been accustomed both to witness and practise."

During the ex-emperor's residence at Briars, he remained much secluded from society, spent his mornings in the garden, and in the evening played at whist for sugar-plums, with Mr Balcombe, the proprietor, and the members of his family. The Count Las Cases, who seems, among those of his retinue, to have possessed the most various and extensive information, was naturally selected as the chief, if not the only companion of his studies and recreations in the morning. On such occasions he was usually gentle, accessible, and captivating in his manners.

The exertions of Sir George Cockburn, struggling with every difficulty which want of building-materials, means of transport, and everything which facilitates such operations, could possibly interpose, at length enabled him to accomplish the transmutation of Longwood into such a dwelling-house, as, though it was far below the former dignity of its possessor, might sufficiently accommodate a captive of the rank at which Napoleon was rated by the British government.*

On the 9th December, Longwood received Napoleon and part of his household; † the Count and Countess of Montholon and their children; the Count Las Cases and his son. General Gourgaud, Doctor O'Meara, who had been received as his medical attendant, and such other of Napoleon's attendants as could not be lodged within the house, were, for the time, accommodated with tents; and the Count and Countess Bertrand were lodged in a small cottage at a place called Hut's-gate, just on the verge of what might be called the privileged grounds of Longwood, whilst a new house was

* The suite of apartments destined for his own peculiar use consisted of a saloon, an eating-room, a library, a small study, and a sleeping apartment. This was a strange contrast with the palaces which Napoleon had lately inhabited; but it was preferable, in the same proportion, to the Tower of the Temple, and the dungeon of Vincennes.

† See Appendix, No. 11.—"Memorandum of the Establishment at Longwood."

building for their reception. Upon the whole, as it is scarcely denied, on the one hand, that every effort was made to render Longwood House as commodious for the prisoner as time and means could possibly permit; so, on the other, it must in fairness be considered, that the delay, however inevitable, must have been painfully felt by the emperor, confined to his hut at Briars; and that the house at Longwood, when finished as well as it could be in the circumstances, was far inferior in accommodation to that which every Englishman would have desired that the distinguished prisoner should have enjoyed whilst in English custody.

It had been proposed to remedy the deficiencies of Longwood by constructing a habitation of wood upon a suitable scale, and sending it out in pieces from England, to be put together on the spot; the only mode, as the island can scarce be said to afford any building materials, by which the desired object of Napoleon's fitting accommodation could, it was thought, be duly attained. Circumstances, however, prevented this plan from being attempted to be carried into execution for several months; and a series of unhappy disputes betwixt the governor and his prisoner added years of delay; which leads us again to express our regret that Plantation House had not been at once assigned to Napoleon for his residence.

We have already said, that around the house of Longwood lay the largest extent of open ground in the neighbourhood, fit for exercise either on foot or upon horseback. A space of twelve miles in circumference was traced off, within which Napoleon might take exercise without being attended by any one. A chain of sentinels surrounded this domain to prevent his passing, unless accompanied by a British officer. If he inclined to extend his excursions, he might go to any part of the island, providing the officer was in attendance, and near enough to observe his motions. Such an orderly officer was always in readiness to attend him when required. Within the limited space already mentioned, there were two camps, that of the 53d regiment at Deadwood, about a mile from Longwood; another at Hut's-gate, where an officer's guard was mounted, that being the principal access to Longwood.

We are now to consider the means resorted to for the safe custody of this important prisoner. The old poet has said, that "every island is a prison;" but, in point of difficulty of escape, there is none which can compare with St Helena; which was no doubt the chief reason for its being selected as the place of Napoleon's detention.

Dr O'Meara, no friendly witness, informs us that the guards, with attention at once to Napoleon's feelings, and the security of his person, were posted in the following manner:—

"A subaltern's guard was posted at the entrance of Longwood, about six hundred paces from the house, and a cordon of sentinels and pickets was placed round the limits. At nine o'clock the sentinels were drawn in and stationed in communication with each other, surrounding the house in such positions, that no person could come in or go out without being seen and scrutinized by them. At

the entrance of the house double sentinels were placed, and patrols were continually passing backward and forward. After nine, Napoleon was not at liberty to leave the house, unless in company with a field-officer; and no person whatever was allowed to pass without the counter-sign. This state of affairs continued until day-light in the morning. Every landing-place in the island, and, indeed, every place which presented the semblance of one, was furnished with a picket, and sentinels were even placed upon every goat-path leading to the sea; though in truth the obstacles presented by nature, in almost all the paths in that direction, would, of themselves, have proved insurmountable to so unwieldy a person as Napoleon."

The precautions taken by Sir George Cockburn, to avail himself of the natural character and peculiarities of the island, and to prevent the possibility of its new inhabitant making his escape by sea, were so strict, as, even without the assistance of a more immediate guard upon his person, seemed to exclude the possibility, not only of an escape, but even an attempt to communicate with the prisoners from the sea-coast.

"From the various signal-posts on the island," continues the account of Dr O'Meara, "ships are frequently discovered at twenty-four leagues' distance, and always long before they can approach the shore. Two ships of war continually cruized, one to windward, and the other to leeward, to whom signals were made as soon as a vessel was discovered from the posts on shore. Every ship, except a British man-of-war, was accompanied down to the road by one of the cruisers, who remained with her until she was either permitted to anchor, or was sent away. No foreign vessels were allowed to anchor, unless under circumstances of great distress; in which case, no person from them was permitted to land, and an officer and party from one of the ships of war was sent on board to take charge of them as long as they remained, as well as in order to prevent any improper communication. Every fishing-boat belonging to the island was numbered, and anchored every evening at sunset, under the superintendence of a lieutenant in the navy. No boats, excepting guard-boats from the ships of war, which pulled about the island all night, were allowed to be down after sunset. The orderly officer was also instructed to ascertain the actual presence of Napoleon, twice in the twenty-four hours, which was done with as much delicacy as possible. In fact, every human precaution to prevent escape, short of actually incarcerating or enchaining him, was adopted by Sir George Cockburn."

CHAPTER CXII.

Bonaparte's alleged grievances considered.—Right of Great Britain to restrict his liberty.—Propriety of withholding the title of emperor.—The right of inspecting his correspondence might have been dispensed with.—Regulation that a British orderly officer should see Napoleon at certain times in the day—its importance.—Limits allowed Napoleon for his walks and rides.—Complaints urged by Las Cases against Sir George Cockburn.—Measures adopted by the European powers

to secure Napoleon's safe custody.—Sir Hudson Lowe appointed Governor of St Helena—His qualifications for the office considered.—Information given by General Gourgaud to government.—Agitation of various plans for Bonaparte's escape.—Writers on the subject of Napoleon's residence at St Helena.—Napoleon's irritating treatment of Sir Hudson Lowe.—Interviews between them.

HITHERTO, as we have prosecuted our task, each year has been a history which we have found it difficult to contain within the limits we had prescribed to ourselves; remaining besides conscious, that, in the necessary compression, we have been obliged to do injustice to the importance of our theme. But the years of imprisonment which pass so much more slowly to the captive, occupy, with their melancholy monotony, only a small portion of the page of history; and the tale of five years of St Helena might, so far as events are concerned, be sooner told than the history of a single campaign, the shortest which was fought under Bonaparte's auspices. Yet these years were painfully marked, and indeed embittered, by a train of irritating disputes betwixt the prisoner and the officer to whom was committed the important, and yet most delicate, task of restraining his liberty, and cutting off all prospect of escape, and whose duty it was, at the same time, to mix the necessary degree of vigilance with as much courtesy, and, we will add, kindness, as Napoleon could be prevailed on to accept.

We have had considerable opportunity to collect information on this subject, the correspondence of Sir Hudson Lowe with his majesty's government having been opened to our researches by the liberality of Lord Bathurst, late secretary of state for the colonial department. This communication has enabled us to speak with confidence respecting the general principles by which the British government were guided in their instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe, and the tenor of these instructions themselves. We therefore propose to discuss, in the first place, the alleged grievances of Napoleon, as they arose out of the instructions of the British government; reserving, as a second subject of discussion, the farther complaints of the aggravated mode in which these instructions are alleged to have been executed by the Governor of St Helena. On the latter subject our information is less perfect, from the distance of Sir Hudson Lowe from Europe precluding personal inquiry, and the impossibility of producing impartial evidence on the subject of a long train of minute and petty incidents, each of which necessarily demands investigation, and is the subject of inculpation and defence. We have, however, the means of saying something upon this subject also.

We have already discussed the circumstances of Napoleon's surrender to the British without reserve, qualification, or condition of any kind; and we have seen, that if he sustained any disappointment in being detained a prisoner, instead of being considered as a guest, or free inmate of Britain, it arose from the failure of hopes which he had adopted on his own calculation, without the slightest encouragement from Captain Maitland. We doubt greatly, indeed, if his most sanguine expectations ever se-

riously anticipated a reception very different from what he experienced; at least he testified little or no surprise when informed of his destiny. But, at any rate, he was a prisoner of war, having acquired by his surrender no right save to claim safety of life and limb. If the English nation had inveigled Napoleon into a capitulation, under conditions which they had subsequently broken, he would have been in the condition of Toussaint, whom, nevertheless, he immured in a dungeon. Or, if he had been invited to visit the Prince Regent of England in the character of an ally, had been at first received with courteous hospitality, and then committed to confinement as a prisoner, his case would have approached that of Prince Ferdinand of Spain, trepanned to Bayonne. But we should be ashamed to vindicate our country by quoting the evil example of our enemy. Truth and Falsehood remain immutable and irreconcilable; and the worst criminal ought not to be proceeded against according to his own example, but according to the general rules of justice. Nevertheless, it greatly diminishes our interest in a complaint, if he who prefers it has himself been in the habit of meting to others with the same undue weight and measure, which he complains of when used towards himself.

Napoleon, therefore, being a prisoner of war, and to be disposed of as such (a point which admits of no dispute), we have, we conceive, further proved that his residence within the territories of Great Britain was what could hardly take place consistently with the safety of Europe. To have delivered him up to any of the other allied powers, whose government was of a character similar to his own, would certainly have been highly objectionable: since in doing so Britain would have so far broken faith with him, as to part with the power of protecting his personal safety, to which extent the country to which he surrendered himself stood undeniably pledged. It only remained to keep this important prisoner in such a state of restraint, as to insure him not having the means of making a second escape, and again involving France and Europe in a bloody and doubtful war. St Helena was selected as the place of his detention, and, we think, with much propriety; since the nature of that sequestered island afforded the means for the greatest certainty of security, with the least restriction on the personal liberty of the distinguished prisoner. Waves and rocks around its shores afforded the security of walls, ditches, bars, and bolts, in a citadel; and his hours of exercise might be safely extended over a space of many miles, instead of being restrained within the narrow and guarded limits of a fortress.

The right of imprisoning Napoleon being conceded, or at least proved, and the selection of St Helena, as his place of residence, being vindicated, we have no hesitation in avowing the principle, that everything possible ought to have been done to alleviate the painful feelings, to which, in every point of view, a person so distinguished as Napoleon must have been subjected, by so heavy a change of fortune. We would not, at that moment, have remembered the lives lost, fortunes destroyed, and hopes blighted, of so many hundreds of our country-

men, civilians traveling in France, and detained there against every rule of civilized war; nor have thought ourselves entitled to avenge upon Napoleon, in his misfortunes, the cruel inflictions, which his policy, if not his inclination, prompted him to award against others. We would not have made his dungeon so wretched, as that of the unhappy Negro chief, starved to death amidst the Alpine snows. We would not have surrounded him, while a prisoner, with spies, as in the case of the Earl of Elgin; or, as in that of Prince Ferdinand, have spread a trap for him by means of an emissary like the false Baron Kolli, who, in proffering to assist his escape, should have had it for an object to obtain a pretence for treating him more harshly. These things we would not then have remembered; or, if we could not banish them from our recollection, in considering how far fraud and ignoble violence can debase genius, and render power odious, we would have remembered them as examples, not to be followed, but shunned. To prevent the prisoner from resuming a power which he had used so fatally, we would have regarded as a duty not to Britain alone, but to Europe and to the world. To accompany his detention with every alleviation which attention to his safe custody would permit, was a debt due, if not to his personal deserts, at least to our own nobleness. With such feelings upon the subject in general, we proceed to consider the most prominent subjects of complaint, which Bonaparte and his advocates have brought against the administration of Great Britain, for their treatment of the distinguished exile.

The first loud subject of complaint has been already touched upon, that the imperial title was not given to Napoleon, and that he was only addressed and treated with the respect due to a general officer of the highest rank. On this subject Napoleon was particularly tenacious. He was not of the number of those persons mentioned by the Latin poet, who, in poverty and exile, snited their titles and their language to their condition.* On the contrary, he contended with great obstinacy, from the time he came to Portsmouth, on his right to be treated as a crowned head; nor was there, as we have noticed, a more fertile source of discord betwixt him and the gentlemen of his suite on one side, and the Governor of St Helena on the other, than the pertinacious claim, on Napoleon's part, for honours and forms of address, which the orders of the British government had prohibited the governor from granting, and which, therefore, Napoleon's knowledge of a soldier's duty should have prevented his exacting. But, independently of the governor's instructions, Bonaparte's claim to the peculiar distinction of a sovereign prince was liable to question, both in respect of the party by whom it was insisted on,

and in relation to the government from whom it was claimed.

Napoleon, it cannot be denied, had been not only an emperor, but perhaps the most powerful that has ever existed; and he had been acknowledged as such by all the continental sovereigns. But he had been compelled, in 1814, to lay aside and abdicate the empire of France, and to receive in exchange the title of Emperor of Elba. His breach of the treaty of Paris was in essence a renunciation of the empire of Elba; and the re-assumption of that of France was so far from being admitted by the allies, that he was declared an outlaw by the congress at Vienna. Indeed, if this second occupation of the French throne were even to be admitted, as in any respect re-establishing his forfeited claim to the imperial dignity, it must be remembered that he himself a second time abdicated, and formally renounced a second time the dignity he had in an unhappy hour reassumed. But if Napoleon had no just pretension to the imperial title or honours after his second abdication, even from those who had before acknowledged him as Emperor of France, still less had he any right to a title which he had laid down, from a nation who had never acquiesced in his taking it up. At no time had Great Britain recognized him as Emperor of France; and Lord Castlereagh had expressly declined to accede to the treaty of Paris, by which he was acknowledged as Emperor of Elba. Napoleon, indeed, founded, or attempted to found, an argument upon the treaty of Amiens having been concluded with him, when he held the capacity of First Consul of France. But he had himself destroyed the consular government, of which he then constituted the head, and his having been once first consul gave him no more title to the dignity of emperor, than the directorship of Barras invested him with the same title. On no occasion whatsoever, whether directly or by implication, had Great Britain recognized the title of her prisoner to be considered as a sovereign prince; and it was surely too late to expect acquiescence in claims in his present situation, which had not been admitted when he was actually master of half the world.

But it may be urged that, admitting that Napoleon's claim to be treated with royal ceremonial was in itself groundless, yet, since he had actually enjoyed the throne for so many years, the British ministers ought to have allowed to him that rank which he had certainly possessed *de facto*, though not *de jure*. The trifling points of rank and ceremonial ought, it may be thought, according to the principles which we have endeavoured to express, to have been conceded to eclipsed sovereignty and down-fallen greatness.

To this it may be replied, that if the concession recommended could have had no further consequences than to mitigate the repinings of Napoleon—if he could have found comfort in the empty sound of titles, or if the observance of formal etiquette could have reconciled his feelings to his melancholy and dethroned condition, without altering the relative state of the question in other respects—such concession ought not to have been refused to him.

* Et tragicus plerumque dolet sermone pedestri
Telesphus et Pelcus, cum pauper et exul uterque,
Proicit ampullas et sesquipedalia verba.

Hor. *Art. Poetica*.

Princes will sometimes mourn their lot in prose.

Pelcus and Telesphus, broke down by woes,
In indigence and exile forced to roam,

Leave sounding phrase, and long-tail'd words, at home.

But the real cause of his desiring to have, and of the British government's persisting in refusing to him, the name and honours of a sovereign, lay a great deal deeper. It is true, that it was a foible of Bonaparte, incident, perhaps, to his situation as a *parvenu* amongst the crowned heads of Europe, to be at all times peculiarly and anxiously solicitous that the most strict etiquette and form should be observed about his person and court. But granting that his vanity, as well as his policy, was concerned in insisting upon such rigid ceremonial as is frequently dispensed with by sovereigns of ancient descent, and whose title is unquestionable, it will not follow that a person of his sense and capacity could have been gratified, even if indulged in all the marks of external influence paid to the Great Mogul, on condition that, like the later descendants of Timur, he was still to remain a close prisoner. His purpose in tenaciously claiming the name of a sovereign, was to establish his claim to the immunities belonging to that title. He had already experienced at Elba the use to be derived from erecting a barrier of etiquette betwixt his person and any inconvenient visitor. Once acknowledged as emperor, it followed, of course, that he was to be treated as such in every particular; and thus it would have become impossible to enforce such regulations as were absolutely demanded for his safe custody. Such a *status*, once granted, would have furnished Napoleon with a general argument against every precaution which might be taken to prevent his escape. Who ever heard of an emperor restricted in his promenades, or subjected, in certain cases, to the surveillance of an officer, and the restraint of sentinels? Or how could those precautions against escape have been taken, without irreverence to the person of a crowned head, which, in the circumstances of Napoleon Bonaparte, were indispensably necessary? Those readers, therefore, who may be of opinion that it was necessary that Napoleon should be restrained of his liberty, must also allow that the British government would have acted imprudently if they had gratuitously invested him with a character which they had hitherto refused him, and that at the very moment, when their doing so was to add to the difficulties attending his safe custody.

The question, however, does not terminate even here; for not only was Great Britain at full liberty to refuse to Bonaparte a title which she had never recognized as his due—not only would her granting it have been attended with great practical inconvenience, but farther, she could not have complied with his wishes, without affording the most serious cause of complaint to her ally the King of France. If Napoleon was called emperor, his title could apply to France alone; and if he was acknowledged as Emperor of France, of what country was Louis XVIII. king? Many wars have arisen from no other cause than that the government of one country has given the title and ceremonial due to a sovereign to a person pretending to the throne of the other, and it is a ground of quarrel recognized by the law of nations. It is true, circumstances might have prevented Louis from resenting the supposed recognition of a royal character in his rival, as severely as Britain did the acknowledgment of the exiled

Stuarts by Louis XIV., yet it must have been the subject of serious complaint; the rather that a conduct tending to indicate England's acquiescence in the imperial title claimed by Napoleon, could not but keep alive dangerous recollections, and encourage a dangerous faction in the bosom of France.

Yet, notwithstanding all we have said, we feel there was an awkwardness in approaching the individual who had been so pre-eminently powerful, with the familiarity applicable to one who had never stood more high above others than he would have done merely as General Bonaparte. A compromise was offered by Sir Hudson Lowe, in proposing to make use of the word *Napoleon*, as a more disguised style of addressing his prisoner. But an easy and respectable alternative was in the prisoner's own power. Napoleon had but to imitate other sovereigns, who, either when upon foreign travel, or when other circumstances require it, usually adopt a conventional appellation, while their doing so waves no part of their own claim of right to royal honours, in equally far from a concession of that right on the part of those who may have occasion to transact with them. Louis XVIII. was not the less the legitimate King of France, that he was for many years, and in various countries, only known by the name of the Count of Lille. The expediency of the idea had struck Napoleon himself; for at one time, when talking of the conditions of his residence in England, he said he would have no objection to assume the name of Muiron, an aide-de-camp who had died by his side at the battle of Arcola. But it seems that Napoleon more tenacious of form than a prince who had been cradled in it, considered this vailing of his dignity as too great a concession on his part to be granted to the Governor of St Helena. Sir Hudson Lowe, at one time, desirous to compromise this silly subject of dispute, would have been contented to render Napoleon the title of excellency, as due to a field marshal, but neither did this meet with acceptance. Napoleon was determined either to be acknowledged by the governor as emperor, or to retain his grievance in its full extent. No modifications could be devised by which it could be rendered palatable.

Whether this pertinacity in claiming a title which was rendered ridiculous by his situation, was the result of some feelings which led him to doubt his own title to greatness, when his ears were no longer flattered by the language of humility, or whether the political considerations just alluded to, rendered him obstinate to refuse all epithets, except one who might find him in claims to those indecisions and privileges with which so high a title is intimate, we from which it may be said to be inseparable, it is impossible for us to say; vanity and policy may combine in recommending to him perseverance in his claim. But the strife should certainly, for his own sake, have been abandoned, when the point remained at issue between the governor and him only, since even if the former had wished to comply with the prisoner's desires, his instructions forbade him to do so. To continue an unavailing struggle was only to invite the mortification of defeat and repulse. Yet Napoleon and his followers retained so much sensibility on this subject, that though they

must have been aware that Sir Hudson Lowe only used the language prescribed by his government, and indeed dared use no other, this unfortunate phrase of *General Bonaparte* occurring so often in their correspondence, seemed to render every attempt at conciliation a species of derogation and insult, and made such overtures resemble a coarse cloth tied over a raw wound, which it frets and injures more than it protects.

Whatever might be the merits of the case, as between Napoleon and the British ministry, it was clear that Sir George Cockburn and Sir Hudson Lowe were left by their instructions no option in the matter at issue. These instructions bore that Napoleon, their prisoner, was to receive the style and treatment due to General Bonaparte, a prisoner of war; and it was at their peril if they gave him a higher title, or a different style of attention from what that title implied. No one could know better than Napoleon how strictly a soldier is bound by his *consigne*; and to upbraid Sir Hudson Lowe as ungenerous, unmanly, and so forth, because he did not disobey the instructions of his government, was as unreasonable as to hope that his remonstrances could have any effect save those of irritation and annoyance. He ought to have been aware that persisting to resent, in rough and insulting terms, the deprivation of his title on the part of an officer who was prohibited from using it, might indeed fret and provoke one with whom it would have been best to keep upon civil terms, but could not bring him one inch nearer to the point which he so anxiously desired to attain.

In fact, this trivial but unhappy subject of dispute was of a character so subtle, that it penetrated into the whole correspondence between the emperor and the governor, and tended to mix with gall and vinegar all attempts made by the latter to cultivate something like civil intercourse. This unlucky barrier of etiquette started up and poisoned the whole effect of any intended politeness. While Sir George Cockburn remained on the island, for example, he gave more than one ball, to which *General Bonaparte* and his suite were regularly invited. In similar circumstances, Henry IV. or Charles II. would have attended the ball, and to a certainty would have danced with the prettiest young woman present, without dreaming that, by so doing, they derogated from pretensions derived from a long line of royal ancestors. Bonaparte and Las Cases, on the contrary, took offence at the familiarity, and wrote it down as a wilful and flagrant affront on the part of the admiral. These were not the feelings of a man of conscious dignity of mind, but of an upstart, who conceives the honour of preferment not to consist in having enjoyed, or in still possessing, a high situation, gained by superiority of talent, so much as in wearing the robes, or listening to the sounding titles, which are attached to it.

A subject, upon which we are called upon to express much more sympathy with the condition of Napoleon, than moves us upon the consideration of his abrogated title, is, the screen which was drawn betwixt him, and, it may be said, the living world, through which he was not permitted to penetrate, by letter, even to his dearest friends and relatives, un-

less such had been previously communicated to and read by the governor of the island.

It is no doubt true, that this is an inconvenience to which prisoners of war are, in all cases, subjected; nor do we know any country in which their parole is held so sacred as to induce the government to dispense with the right of inspecting their letters. Yet the high place so lately occupied by the fallen monarch might, we think, have claimed for him some dispensation from a restriction so humiliating. If a third person, cold-blooded at best, perhaps inclined to hold up to scorn the expressions of our grief or our affection, is permitted to have the review of the effusions of our heart towards a wife, a sister, a brother, or a bosom-friend, the correspondence loses half its value; and, forced as we are to keep it within the bounds of the most discreet caution, it becomes to us rather a new source of mortification, than the opening of a communion with those absent persons, whose friendship and attachment we hold to be the dearest possession of our lives. We rather think that some exercise of this privilege might have been left to Napoleon, without any risk of endangering the safe custody of his person; because we are pretty well convinced that all efforts strictly to enforce this regulation did, and must have proved, ineffectual, and that in some cases by means of money, and at other times by the mere influence of compassion, he and his followers would always acquire the means of transmitting private letters from the island without regard to the restriction. Whatever, therefore, was to be apprehended of danger in this species of intercourse by letter, was much more likely to occur in a clandestine correspondence, than in one carried on even by sealed letters, openly and by permission of the government. We cannot help expressing our opinion, that, considering the accurate attention of the police, which would naturally have been turned in foreign countries towards letters from St Helena, there was little danger of the public post being made use of for any dangerous machinations. Supposing, therefore, that the exile had been permitted to use it, it would have been too dangerous to have risked any proposal for his escape through that medium. A secret correspondence must have been resorted to for that purpose, and that under circumstances which would have put every well-meaning person, at least, upon his guard against being aiding in it; since, if the ordinary channels of communication were open to the prisoner, there could have been no justifiable reason for his resorting to private means of forwarding letters from the island. At the same time, while such is our opinion, it is founded upon reasoning totally unconnected with the claim of right urged by Napoleon; as his situation, considering him as a prisoner of war, and a most important one, unquestionably entitled the government of Britain to lay him under all the restrictions incident to persons in that situation.

Another special subject of complaint pleaded upon by Napoleon and his advocates, arose from a regulation, which, we apprehend, was so essential to his safe custody, that we are rather surprised to find it was dispensed with upon any occasion, or to any extent; as, if fully and regularly complied with,

it would have afforded the means of relaxing a considerable proportion of other restrictions of a harassing and irritating character, liable to be changed, from time to time, and to be removed and replaced in some cases, without any very adequate or intelligible motive. The regulation which we allude to is that which required that Bonaparte should be visible twice, or at least once, in the day, to the British orderly officer. If this regulation had been submitted to with equanimity by the ex-emperor, it would have given the strongest possible guarantee against the possibility of his attempting an escape. From the hour at which he had been seen by the officer, until that at which he should again become visible, no vessel would have been permitted to leave the island; and supposing that he was missed by the officer at the regular hour, the alarm would have been general, and, whether conceded in the town, or on board any of the vessels in the roadstead, he must necessarily have been discovered. Indeed, the risk was too great to induce him to have tried an effort so dangerous. It might easily have been arranged, that the orderly officer should have the opportunity to execute his duty with every possible respect to Napoleon's privacy and convenience, and the latter might himself have chosen the time and manner of exhibiting himself for an instant. In this case, and considering how many other precautions were taken to prevent escape—that every accessible path to the beach was closely guarded—and that the island was very much in the situation of a citadel, of which soldiers are the principal inhabitants—the chance of Napoleon's attempting to fly, even if permitted the unlimited range of St Helena, was highly improbable, and the chance of his effecting his purpose next to an impossibility. But this security depended upon his submitting to see a British officer at a fixed hour; and, resolute in his plan of yielding nothing to circumstances, Napoleon resisted, in every possible manner, the necessity of complying with this very important regulation. Indeed Sir Hudson Lowe, on his part, was on many occasions contented to wink at its being altogether neglected, when the orderly officer could not find the means of seeing Napoleon by stealth while engaged in a walk, or in a ride, or, as it sometimes happened, through the casement. This was not the way in which this important regulation ought to have been acted upon and enforced, and the governor did not reap a great harvest of gratitude from his conduct in dispensing with this act of superintendence upon his own responsibility.

We have seen that a circuit of twelve miles and upwards was laid off for Bonaparte's private exercise. No strangers entered these precincts without a pass from Bertrand; and the emperor had uninterrupted freedom to walk or ride within them, unaccompanied by any one save those in his own family. Beyond these privileged bounds, he was not permitted to move, without the attendance of a British officer; but under the escort of such a person he was at liberty to visit every part of the island. To this arrangement Napoleon was more averse, if possible, than to that which appointed that a British officer should see him once a-day.

Other subjects of complaint there were, but as

they chiefly arose out of private discussions with Sir Hudson Lowe—out of by-laws enacted by that officer—and restrictions of a more petty description, we limit ourselves for the present to those of a general character, which, however inconvenient and distressing, were, it is to be observed, such as naturally attached to the condition of a prisoner; and which, like the fetters of a person actually in chains, are less annoying when submitted to with fortitude and equanimity, than when the captive struggles in vain to wrench himself out of their gripe. We are far, nevertheless, from saying, that the weight of the fetters in the one case, and the hardship of the personal restrictions in the other, are in themselves evils which can be easily endured by those who sustain them. We feel especially how painful the loss of liberty must have been to one who had not only enjoyed the freedom of his own actions, but the uncontrolled right of directing those of others. Impatience, however, in this, as in other instances, has only the prerogative of injuring its master. In the many hours of meditation which were afforded to Bonaparte by his residence in St Helena, we can never perceive any traces of the reflection, that he owed his present unhappy situation less to the immediate influence of those who were agents in his defeat and imprisonment, than to the course of ambition, which, sparing neither the liberties of France, nor the independence of Europe, had at length rendered his personal freedom inconsistent with the rights of the world in general. He felt the distresses of his situation, but he did not, or could not, reason on their origin. It is impossible to reflect upon him without the idea being excited of a noble lion, imprisoned within a narrow and gloomy den, and venting the wrath which once made the forest tremble, upon the petty bolts and bars, which, insignificant as they are, defy his lordly strength, and detain him captive.

The situation was in every respect a painful one: nor is it possible to refuse our sympathy, not only to the prisoner, but to the person whose painful duty it became to be his superintendent. His duty of detaining Napoleon's person was to be done most strictly, and required a man of that extraordinary firmness of mind, who should never yield for one instant his judgment to his feelings, and should be able at once to detect and reply to all such false arguments, as might be used to deter him from the downright and manful discharge of his office. But, then, there ought to have been combined with those rare qualities a calmness of temper almost equally rare, and a generosity of mind which, confident in its own honour and integrity, could look with serenity and compassion upon the daily and hourly effects of the maddening causes, which tortured into a state of constant and unendurable irritability the extraordinary being subjected to their influence. Bonaparte, indeed, and the followers who reflected his passions, were to be regarded on all occasions as men acting and speaking under the feverish and delirious influence of things long past, and altogether destitute of the power of cool or clear reasoning, on any grounds that exclusively referred to things present. The emperor could not forget his empire, the husband could not forget his wife, the father his child, the hero his triumphs, the legislator his power. It was

scarce in nature, that a brain agitated by such recollections should remain composed under a change so fearful, or be able to reflect calmly on what he now was, when agitated by the extraordinary contrast of his present situation with what he had been. To have soothed him would have been a vain attempt; but the honour of England required that he should have no cause of irritation, beyond those which severely enough attached to his condition as a captive.

From the character we have given of Sir George Cockburn, it may be supposed that he was attentive, as far as his power extended, and his duty permitted, to do all that could render Napoleon's situation more easy. The various authors, Dr O'Meara, Las Cases, Santini, and others, who have written with much violence concerning Sir Hudson Lowe's conduct, have mentioned that of Sir George as fair, honourable, and conciliatory. No doubt there were many occasions, as the actual inconveniences of the place were experienced, and as the rays of undefined hope vanished from their eyes, when Napoleon and his followers became unreasonably captious in their discussions with the admiral. On such occasions he pursued with professional bluntness the straightforward path of duty, leaving it to the French gentlemen to be sullen as long as they would, and entering into communication again with them whenever they appeared to desire it. It was probably this equanimity, which, notwithstanding various acknowledgments of his good and honourable conduct towards them, seemed to have drawn upon Sir George Cockburn the censure of Monsieur Las Cases, and something that was meant as a species of insult from Napoleon himself. As Sir George Cockburn is acknowledged on the whole to have discharged his duty towards them with mildness and temper, we are the rather tempted to enter into their grounds of complaint against him, because they tend to show the exasperated and ulcerated state of mind with which these unfortunate gentlemen regarded those, who, in their present office, had no alternative but to discharge the duty which their sovereign and country had imposed upon them.

At the risk of being thought trifling with our reader's patience, we shall recapitulate the grievances complained of by Las Cases, who frankly admits, that the bad humour, arising out of his situation, may have in some degree influenced his mind in judging of Sir George Cockburn's conduct, and shall subjoin to each charge the answer which seems to correspond to it.

1st, The admiral is accused of having called the Emperor Napoleon, *General Bonaparte*; and to have pronounced the words with an air of self-satisfaction, which showed the expression gratified him. It is replied, that Sir George Cockburn's instructions were to address Napoleon by that epithet; and the commentary on the looks or tone with which he did so is hypercritical.—2d, Napoleon was quartered in Briars for two months, while the admiral himself resided in Plantation House. Answered, that the instructions of government were, that Napoleon should remain on board till his abode was prepared; but finding that would occupy so much more time than was expected, Sir George Cockburn, on his own responsibility, placed him on shore, and at

Briars, as being the residence which he himself preferred.—3d, The admiral placed sentinels under Napoleon's windows. Replied, it is the usual practice when prisoners of importance are to be secured, especially if they do not even offer their parole that they will make no attempt to escape.—4th, Sir George did not permit any one to visit Napoleon without his permission. Replied, it seemed a necessary consequence of his situation, until Sir George should be able to distinguish those visitors, who might be with propriety admitted to an unlimited privilege of visiting the important prisoner.—5th, He invited Napoleon to a ball, by the title of General Bonaparte. The subject of the title has been already discussed; and it does not appear how its being used in sending an invitation to a convivial party, could render the name by which the admiral was instructed to address his prisoner more offensive than on other occasions.—6th, Sir George Cockburn, pressed by Bertrand's notes, in which he qualified the prisoner as an emperor, replied sarcastically, that he knew of no emperor, at St Helena, nor had heard that any European emperor was at present traveling abroad. Replied, by referring to the admiral's instructions, and by the fact, that if an emperor can abdicate his quality, certainly Napoleon was no longer one.—7th, Sir George Cockburn is said to have influenced the opinions of others upon this subject, and punished with arrest some subordinate persons, who used the phrase of emperor. Answered as before, he had orders from his government not to suffer Bonaparte to be addressed as emperor, and it was his duty to cause them to be obeyed. He could not, however, have been very rigorous, since Monsieur Las Cases informs us that the officers of the 53d used the *mezzo-terme* Napoleon, apparently without censure from the governor.—Lastly, There remains only to be added the complaint, that there was an orderly officer appointed to attend Napoleon when he went beyond certain limits, a point of precaution, which must be very useful, if not indispensable, where vigilant custody is required.

From this summary of offences, it must be plain to the reader, that the resentment of Las Cases and his master was not so much against Sir George Cockburn personally, as against his office; and that the admiral would have been very acceptable, if he could have reconciled it to his duty to treat Napoleon as an emperor and a free man, suffered himself, like Sir Niel Campbell, to be admitted or excluded from his presence, as the etiquette of an imperial court might dictate, and ran the risk of being rewarded for his complaisance by learning, when he least looked for it, that Napoleon had sailed for America, or perhaps for France. The question, how far Britain, or rather Europe, had a right to keep Napoleon prisoner, has already been discussed. If they had no such right, and if a second insurrection in France, a second field of Waterloo, should be hazarded, rather than that Napoleon Bonaparte should suffer diminution of dignity, or restraint of freedom, then Napoleon had a right to complain of the ministry, but not of the officer, to whom his instructions were to be at once the guide and vindication of his conduct.

While these things passed at St Helena, the ministry of Great Britain were employed in placing the detention of the ex-emperor under the regulation of an Act of Parliament, which interdicted all intercourse and commerce with St Helena, excepting by the East India Company's regular chartered vessels. Ships not so chartered, attempting to trade or touch at St Helena, or hovering within eight leagues of the island, were declared subject to seizure and confiscation. The crews of the vessels who came on shore, or other persons visiting the island, were liable to be sent on board, at the governor's pleasure; and those who might attempt to conceal themselves on shore were declared subject to punishment. Ships were permitted to approach upon stress of weather, but it was incumbent on them to prove the indispensable necessity, and, while they remained at St Helena, they were watched in the closest manner. A clause of indemnity protected the governor and commissioners from any act transgressing the letter of the law, which they might already have committed, while detaining Napoleon in custody. Such was the act, 56 George III. ch. 23, which legalized the confinement of Napoleon at St Helena.

Another convention betwixt the principal powers of Europe, at Paris, 20th August, 1815, had been also entered into upon the subject of Napoleon, and the custody of his person. It set forth, 1. That, in order to render impossible any farther attempt on the part of Napoleon Bonaparte against the repose of the world, he should be considered as prisoner to the high contracting powers, the King of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia. 2. That the custody of his person was committed to the British government, and it was remitted to them to chuse the most secure place and mode of detaining him in security. 3. That the courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, were to name commissioners who were to inhabit the same place which should be assigned for Napoleon Bonaparte's residence, and who, without being responsible for his detention, should certify themselves that he was actually present. His most Christian Majesty was also invited to send a commissioner. 4. The King of Great Britain engaged faithfully to comply with the conditions assigned to him by this convention.

Of these powers, only three availed themselves of the power, or privilege, of sending commissioners to St Helena. These were, Count Balmain, on the part of Russia, Baron Stürmer for Austria, and an old emigrant nobleman, the Marquis de Montebenu, for France. Prussia seems to have thought the expense of a resident commissioner at St Helena unnecessary. Indeed, it does not appear that any of these gentlemen had an important part to play while at St Helena, but yet their presence was necessary to place what should pass there under the vigilance of accredited representatives of the high powers who had engaged in the Convention of Paris. The imprisonment of Napoleon was now not the work of England alone, but of Europe, adopted by her most powerful states, as a measure indispensable for public tranquillity.

Several months before the arrival of the commissioners, Sir George Cockburn was superseded in his anxious and painful office by Sir Hudson Lowe, who remained Governor of St Helena, and had the charge of Napoleon's person, until the death of that remarkable person. The conduct of this officer has been censured, in several of the writings which have treated of Napoleon's confinement, with such extremity of bitterness as in some measure defeats its own end, and leads us to doubt the truth of charges which are evidently brought forward under strong feelings of personal animosity to the late Governor of St Helena. On the other hand, it would require a strong defence on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe himself, refuting or explaining many things which as yet have neither received contradiction nor commentary, to induce us to consider him as the very rare and highly exalted species of character, to whom, as we have already stated, this important charge ought to have been intrusted.

Sir Hudson Lowe had risen to rank in the army while serving chiefly in the Mediterranean, in a foreign corps, in the pay of England. In this situation he became master of the French and Italian languages, circumstances which highly qualified him for the situation to which he was appointed. In the campaign of 1814, he had been attached to the army of the allies, and carried on a correspondence with the English government, describing the events of the campaign, part of which was published, and estimates spirit and talent in the writer. Sir Hudson Lowe received from several of the allied sovereigns and generals the most honourable testimonies of his services that could be rendered. He had thus the opportunity and habit of mixing with persons of distinction in the discussion of affairs of importance: and his character as a gentleman and a man of honour was carefully inquired into, and highly vouched, ere his nomination was made out. These were points on which precise inquiries could be made, and distinct answers received, and they were all in favour of Sir Hudson Lowe.

But there were other qualifications, and those not less important, his possession of which could only be known by putting him upon trial. The indispensable attribute, for example, of an imperturbable temper, was scarce to be ascertained, until his proceedings in the office intrusted to him should show whether he possessed or wanted it. The same must be said of that firmness and decision, which dictate to an official person the exact line of his duty—prevent all hesitation or wavering in the exercise of his purpose—render him, when it is discharged, boldly and firmly confident that he has done exactly that which he ought—and enable him fearlessly to resist all importunity which can be used to induce him to change his conduct, and condemn all misrepresentations and obloquy which may arise from his adhering to it.

Knowing nothing of Sir Hudson Lowe personally, and allowing him to possess the qualities of an honourable, and the accomplishments of a well-informed man, we are inclined, from a review of his conduct, divesting it so far as we can of the exaggerations of his personal enemies, to think there remain traces of a warm and irritable temper, which

seems sometimes to have overborne his discretion, and induced him to forget that his prisoner was in a situation where he ought not, even when his conduct seemed most unreasonable and most provoking, to be considered as an object of resentment, or as being subject, like other men, to retort and retaliation. Napoleon's situation precluded the possibility of his inflicting an insult, and therefore the temper of the person to whom such was offered, ought, if possible, to have remained cool and unruffled. It does not seem to us that this was uniformly the case.

In like manner, Sir Hudson Lowe appears to have been agitated by an oppressive sense of the importance and the difficulties of his situation, to a nervous and irritating degree. This over-anxiety led to frequent changes of his regulations, and to the adoption of measures which were afterwards abandoned, and perhaps again resumed. All this uncertainty occasioned just subject of complaint to his prisoner; for, though a captive may become gradually accustomed to the fetters which he wears daily in the same manner, he must be driven to impatience if the mode of adjusting them be altered from day to day.

It is probable that the warm temper of Sir Hudson Lowe was in some degree convenient to Napoleon, as it afforded him the means of reprisals upon the immediate instrument of his confinement, by making the governor feel a part of the annoyance which he himself experienced. Sir George Cockburn had been in *seipso totus teres, atque rotundus*. He did what his duty directed, and cared little what Napoleon thought or said upon the subject. The new governor was vulnerable; he could be rendered angry, and might therefore be taken at advantage. Thus Napoleon might enjoy the vindictive pleasure, too natural to the human bosom, of giving pain to the person who was the agent, though not the author, in the restrictions to which he himself was subjected. But Napoleon's interest in provoking the governor did not rest upon the mere gratification of spleen. His views went far deeper, and were connected with the prospect of obtaining his liberty, and with the mode by which he hoped to accomplish it. And this leads us to inquire upon what these hopes were rested, and to place before our readers evidence of the most indisputable credit, concerning the line of policy adopted in the council of Longwood.

It must be premised that the military gentlemen, who, so much to the honour of their own fidelity, had attended on Bonaparte, to soften his calamity by their society and sympathy, were connected by no other link than their mutual respect for the same unhappy master. Being unattached to each other by any ties of friendship, or community of feelings or pursuits, it is no wonder that these officers, given up to ennui, and feeling the acidity of temper which such a situation is sure to cause, should have had misunderstandings, nay, positive quarrels, not with the governor only, but with each other. In these circumstances, the conduct of General Gourgand distinguished him from the rest. After the peace of Paris, this officer had been aide-de-camp to the Duke de Berri, a situation which he aban-

doned on Napoleon's return at the period of the Hundred Days. As he was in attendance upon the ex-emperor at the moment of his fall, he felt it his duty to accompany him to St Helena. While upon that island, he took less share in Napoleon's complaints and quarrels with the governor, than either Generals Bertrand or Montholon, or Count Las Cases, avoided all appearance of intrigue with the inhabitants, and was regarded by Sir Hudson Lowe as a brave and loyal soldier, who followed his emperor in adversity, without taking any part in those proceedings which the governor considered as prejudicial to his own authority. As such, he is characterized uniformly in Sir Hudson's dispatches to his government.

This officer had left in France a mother and sister, to whom he was tenderly devoted, and who loved him with the fondest affection. From attachment to these beloved relatives, and their affecting desire that he should rejoin them, General Gourgand became desirous of revisiting his native country; and his resolution was the stronger, that considerable jealousies and misunderstandings arose betwixt him and Count Bertrand. In these circumstances, he applied for and obtained permission from the governor to return to London direct. Before leaving St Helena, he was very communicative both to Sir Hudson Lowe and Baron Stürmer, the Austrian commissioner, respecting the secret hopes and plans which were carrying on at Longwood. When he arrived in Britain in the spring, 1818, he was no less frank and open with the British government, informing them of the various proposals for escape which had been laid before Napoleon; the facilities and difficulties which attended them, and the reasons why he preferred remaining on the island, to making the attempt. At this period, it was supposed that General Gourgand was desirous of making his peace with the King of France; but whatever might be his private views, the minutes of the information which he afforded to Sir Hudson Lowe and Baron Stürmer at St Helena, and afterwards at London to the under secretary at war, are still preserved in the records of the Foreign Office. They agree entirely with each other, and their authenticity cannot be questioned. The communications are studiously made, with considerable reserve as to proper names, in order that no individual should be called in question for anything which is there stated; and in general they bear, as was to be expected, an air of the utmost simplicity and veracity. We shall often have occasion to allude to these documents, that the reader may be enabled to place the real purposes of Napoleon in opposition to the language which he made use of for accomplishing them; but we have not thought it proper to quote the minutes at length, unless as far as Napoleon is concerned. We understand that General Gourgand, on his return to the Continent, has resumed that tenderness to Napoleon's memory, which may induce him to regret having communicated the secrets of the prison-house to less friendly ears. But this change of sentiments can neither diminish the truth of his evidence, nor affect our right to bring forward what we find recorded as communicated by him.

Having thus given an account of the evidence we mean to use, we resume the subject of Napoleon's quarrels with Sir Hudson Lowe.

It was not, according to General Gourgaud, for want of means of escape, that Napoleon continued to remain at St Helena. There was one plan for carrying him out in a trunk with dirty linen; and so general was the opinion of the extreme stupidity of the English sentinels, that there was another by which it was proposed he should slip through the camp in disguise of a servant carrying a dish. When the Baron Sturmer represented the impossibility of such wild plans being in agitation, Gourgaud answered, "there was no impossibility to those who had millions at their command. Yes, I repeat it," he continued, "he can escape from hence and go to America whenever he has a mind." *—"Why, then, should he remain here?" said Baron Sturmer. Gourgaud replied, "that all his followers had urged him to make the experiment of escape; but he preferred continuing on the island. He has a secret pride in the consequence attached to the custody of his person, and the interest generally taken in his fate. He has said repeatedly, 'I can no longer live as a private person. I would rather be a prisoner on this rock, than a free but undistinguished individual in the United States.'"[†]

General Gourgaud said, therefore, that the event to which Napoleon trusted for liberty, was some change of politics in the court of Great Britain, which should bring into administration the party who were now in opposition, and who, he rather too rashly perhaps conceived, would at once restore to him his liberty. The British ministers received the same assurances from General Gourgaud with those given at St Helena. These last are thus expressed in the original:

"Upon the subject of General Bonaparte's escape, Monsieur Gourgaud stated confidently, that although Longwood was from his situation capable of being well protected by sentries, yet he was certain that there would be no difficulty in eluding at any time the vigilance of the sentries posted round the house and grounds; and, in short, that escape from the island appeared to him in no degree impracticable. The subject, he confessed, had been discussed at Longwood amongst the individuals of the establishment, who were separately desired to give their plans for effecting it. But he expressed his belief to be, that General Bonaparte was so fully impressed with the opinion, that he would be permitted to leave St Helena, either upon a change of ministry in England, or by the unwillingness of the English to bear the expense of detaining him, that he would not at present run the hazard to which an attempt to escape might expose him. It appeared, however, from the statement of General Gourgaud, and from other circumstances stated by him, that Bonaparte had always looked to the period of the removal of the allied armies from France, as that most favour-

able for his return; and the probability of such an event, and the consequences which would flow from it, were urged by him as an argument to dissuade General Gourgaud from quitting him until after that period."[‡]

General Gourgaud's communications further bear, what indeed can be collected from many other circumstances, that as Napoleon hoped to obtain his liberty from the impression to be made on the minds of the English nation, he was careful not to suffer his condition to be forgotten, and most anxious that the public mind should be carefully kept alive to it, by a succession of publications coming out one after another, modified according to the different tempers and information of the various authors, but bearing all of them the stamp of having issued in whole or in part from the interior of Longwood. Accordingly, the various works of Warder, O'Meara, Santini, the Letter of Montholon, and other publications upon St Helena, appeared one after another, to keep the subject awake, which, although seemingly discharged by various hands, bear the strong peculiarity of being directed at ideologically the same mark, and of being arrows from the same quiver. Gourgaud mentioned this species of file-firing, and its purpose. Even the *Manuel de Ste. Helène*, a tract, in which dates and facts were misplaced and confounded, was also, according to General Gourgaud, the work of Bonaparte, and composed to puzzle and mystify the British public. He told Sir Hudson Lowe that he was not to consider the abuse in these various pamphlets leveled against him personally, but as written upon political calculation, with the view of exciting some relaxation of vigilance by the reiteration of complaints. The celebrated Letter of Montholon was, according to the same authority, written in a great measure by Napoleon; and the same was the case with Santini's, though so grossly over-coloured that he himself afterwards disowned it. Other papers, he said, would appear under the names of captains of merchantmen and the like, for Napoleon was possessed by a mania for scribbling, which had no interruption. It becomes the historian, therefore, to receive with caution the narratives of those who have thus taken a determined partial part in the controversy, and concocted their statements from the details afforded by the party principally concerned. If what General Gourgaud has said be accurate, it is Napoleon who is pleading his own cause under a borrowed name, in the pages of O'Meara, Santini, Montholon, &c. Even when the facts mentioned in these works, therefore, are undeniable, still it is necessary to strip them of exaggeration, and place them in a fair and just light before pronouncing on them.

The evidence of O'Meara, as contained in *A Voice from St Helena*, is that of a disappointed man, bitterly incensed against Sir Hudson Lowe, as the cause of his disappointment. He had no need to kindle the flame of his own resentment, at that of Bonaparte. But it may be granted that their vindictive feelings must have strengthened each other. The quarrel was the more irreconcilable, as it appears that Dr O'Meara was originally on great habits of intimacy with Sir Hudson Lowe, and in, the

* "Je le répète, il peut s'évader seul, et aller en Amérique quand il le voudra." Taken from a report of Baron Sturmer to Prince Metternich, giving an account of General Gourgaud's communications, dated 14th March, 1818.

† "Je ne puis plus vivre en particulier. J'aime mieux être prisonnier ici, que libre aux Etats-Unis."

custom of repeating at Plantation House the gossip which he had heard at Longwood. Some proofs of this were laid before the public, in the *Quarterly Review*; and Sir Hudson Lowe's correspondence with government contains various allusions to Mr O'Meara's authority,* down to the period when their mutual confidence was terminated by a violent quarrel.

Count Las Cases is not, in point of impartiality, to be ranked much above Dr O'Meara. He was originally a French emigrant, a worshiper by profession of royalty, and therefore only changed his idol, not his religion, when he substituted the idol Napoleon for the idol Bourbon. He embraces with passive obedience the interests of his chief, real or supposed, and can see nothing wrong which Napoleon is disposed to think right. He was also the personal enemy of Sir Hudson Lowe. We have no idea that he would falsify the truth; but we cannot but suspect the accuracy of his recollection, when we find he inserts many expressions and incidents in his *Journal*, long after the period at which it was originally written, and it is to be presumed from memory. Sir Hudson Lowe had the original manuscript for some time in his possession, and we have at present before us a printed copy, in which Sir Hudson has, with his own hand, marked those additions which had been made to the *Journal* since he saw it in its primitive state. It is remarkable that all, or almost all, the additions which are made to the *Journal*, consist of passages highly injurious to Sir Hudson Lowe, which had no existence in the original manuscript. These additions must therefore have been made under the influence of recollection, sharpened by angry passions, since they did not at first seem important enough to be preserved. When memory is put on the rack by passion and prejudice, she will recollect strange things; and, like witnesses under the actual torture, sometimes avow what never took place.

Of Dr Antommarchi it is not necessary to say much; he was a legatee of Bonaparte, and an annuitant of his widow, besides being anxious to preserve the countenance of his very wealthy family. He never speaks of Sir Hudson Lowe without rancour. Sir Hudson's first offence against him was inquiring for clandestine correspondence; his last was, preventing the crowd at Napoleon's funeral from pulling to pieces the willow-trees by which the grave was sheltered, besides placing a guard over the place of sepulture. What truth is there, then, to be reposed in an author, who can thus misrepre-

sent two circumstances,—the one imposed on Sir Hudson Lowe by his instructions; the other being what decency and propriety, and respect to the deceased, imperatively demanded?

The mass of evidence shows, that to have remained upon good, or even on decent terms with the governor, would not have squared with the politics of one who desired to have grievances to complain of; and who, far from having the usual motives which may lead a captive and his keeper to a tolerable understanding, by a system of mutual accommodation, wished to provoke the governor, if possible, beyond the extent of human patience, even at the risk of subjecting himself to some new infliction, which might swell the list of wrongs which he was accumulating to lay before the public.

What we have stated above is exemplified by Napoleon's reception of Sir Hudson Lowe, against whom he appears to have adopted the most violent prejudices at the very first interview, and before the governor could have afforded him the slightest disrespect. We quote it, because it shows that the mind of the prisoner was made up to provoke and insult Sir Hudson, without waiting for any provocation on his part.

The governor's first aggression (so represented) was his requiring permission of *General Bonaparte* to call together his domestics, with a view to their taking the declaration required by the British government, binding themselves to abide by the rules laid down for the custody of Bonaparte's person. This permission was refused in very haughty terms. If Napoleon had been at the Tuileries, such a request could not have been more highly resented. The servants, however, appeared, and took the necessary declaration. But the affront was not canceled; "Sir Hudson Lowe had put his finger betwixt Napoleon and his valet-de-chambre." This was on 27th July, 1816.

Upon the 30th, the governor again paid his respects at Longwood, and was received with one of those calculated bursts of furious passion with which Napoleon was wont to try the courage, and shake the nerves, of those over whom he desired to acquire influence. He spoke of protesting against the convention of Paris, and demanded what right the sovereigns therein allied had to dispose of their equal always, and often their superior. He called upon the governor for death or liberty,—as if it had been in Sir Hudson Lowe's power to give him either the one or the other. Sir Hudson enlarged on the conveniences of the building which was to be sent from England, to supply the present want of accommodation. Bonaparte repelled the proposed consolation with fury. It was not a house that he wanted, it was an executioner and a line. These he would esteem a favour; all the rest was but irony and insult. Sir Hudson Lowe could in reply only hope that he had given no personal offence, and was reminded of his review of the domestics; which reproach he listened to in silence.

Presently afterwards, Napoleon fell on a new and cutting method of exercising Sir Hudson's patience. A book on the campaign of 1814 lay on the table. Napoleon turned up some of the English bulletins, and asked, with a tone which was perfectly intel-

* Sir Hudson Lowe writes, for example, to Lord Bathurst, 13th May, 1816:—"Having found Dr O'Meara, who was attached to Bonaparte's family on the removal of his French physician, very useful in giving information in many instances, and as, if removed, it might be difficult to find another person who might be equally agreeable to General Bonaparte, I have deemed it advisable to suffer him to remain in the family on the same footing as before my arrival." On the 29th of March, 1817, Sir Hudson writes:—"Dr O'Meara had informed me of the conversations that had occurred, and, with that readiness which he always manifests upon such occasions, immediately wrote them down for me."

ligible, whether the governor had not been the writer of these letters. Being answered in the affirmative, Napoleon, according to Dr O'Meara, told Sir Hudson they were full of folly and falsehood; to which the governor, with more patience than most men could have commanded on such an occasion, replied, "I believe I saw what I have stated;" an answer certainly as temperate as could be returned to so gratuitous an insult. After Sir Hudson had left the room in which he had been received with so much unprovoked incivility, Napoleon is described as having harangued upon the sinister expression of his countenance, abused him in the coarsest manner, and even caused his valet-de-chambre throw a cup of coffee out of the window, because it had stood a moment on the table beside the governor.

Every attempt at conciliation on the part of the governor seemed always to furnish new subjects of irritation. He sent fowling-pieces to Longwood, and Napoleon returned for answer, it was an insult to give fowling-pieces where there is no game; though Santini, by the way, pretended to support the family in a great measure by his gun. Sir Hudson sent a variety of clothes and other articles from England, which it might be supposed the exiles were in want of. The thanks returned were, that the governor treated them like paupers, and that the articles ought, in due respect, to have been left at the store or governor's house, while a list was sent to the emperor's household, that such things were at their command if they had any occasion for them. On a third occasion, Sir Hudson resolved to be cautious. He had determined to give a ball; but he consulted Dr O'Meara whether Napoleon would take it well to be invited. The doctor foresaw that the fatal address, *General Bonaparte*, would make shipwreck of the invitation. The governor proposed to avoid this stumbling-block, by asking Napoleon verbally and in person. But with no name which his civility could devise for the invitation, could it be rendered acceptable. A governor of St Helena, as Napoleon himself observed, had need to be a person of great politeness, and at the same time of great firmness.

At length, on 18th August, a decisive quarrel took place. Sir Hudson Lowe was admitted to an audience, at which was present Sir Pulteney Malcolm, the admiral who now commanded on the station. Dr O'Meara has preserved the following account of the interview, as it was detailed by Napoleon to his suite, the day after it took place.

"That governor," said Napoleon, "came here yesterday to annoy me. He saw me walking in the garden, and, in consequence, I could not refuse to see him. He wanted to enter into some details with me about reducing the expenses of the establishment. He had the audacity to tell me that things were as he found them, and that he came up to justify himself; that he had come up two or three times before to do so, but that I was in a bath." I replied, "No, sir, I was not in a bath; but I ordered one on purpose not to see you. In endeavouring to justify yourself you make matters worse." He said, that I did not know him; that, if I knew him, I should change my opinion. "Know you, sir!" I answered; "how could I know you? People make themselves known by their actions—

by commanding in battles. You have never commanded in battle. You have never commanded any but vagabond Corsican deserters, Piedmontese, and Neapolitan brigands. I know the name of every English general who has distinguished himself; but I never heard of you, except as a *scrivanno* to Blucher, or as a commandant of brigands. You have never commanded, or been accustomed to men of honour." He said, that he had not sought for his present situation. I told him that such employments were not asked for; that they were given by governments to people who had dishonoured themselves. He said, that he only did his duty, and that I ought not to blame him, as he only acted according to his orders. I replied, "So does the hangman; he acts according to his orders. But when he puts a rope about my neck to finish me, is that a reason that I should like that hangman, because he acts according to his orders? Besides, I do not believe that any government could be so mean as to give such orders as you cause to be executed." I told him that, if he pleased, he need not send up anything to eat; that I would go over and dine at the table of the brave officers of the 58th; that I was sure there was not one of them who would not be happy to give a plate at the table to an old soldier; that there was not a soldier in the regiment who had not more heart than he had; that is the iniquitous bill of parliament, they had decreed that I was to be treated as a prisoner; but that I was treated me worse than a condemned criminal at a galley slave, as they were permitted to receive newspapers and printed books, of which he deprived me. I said, "You have power over my body, but none over my soul. That soul is as proud, fierce, and determined at the present moment, as when I commanded Europe." I told him that he was a *sbirro Siciliano* (Sicilian thief-taker), and not an Englishman; and desired him not to let me see him again until he came with orders to dispatch me, when he would find all the doors thrown open to admit him."

It is not surprising that this extreme violence met with some return on Sir Hudson's part. He told Napoleon that his language was uncivil and ungentlemanlike, and that he would not remain to listen to it. Accordingly, he left Longwood without even the usual salutation.

Upon these occasions, we think it is evident that Napoleon was the wilful and intentional aggressor, and that his conduct proceeded either from the stings of injured pride, or a calculated scheme which made him prefer being on bad rather than good terms with Sir Hudson Lowe. On the other hand, we could wish that the governor had avoided entering upon the subject of the expenses of his detention with Napoleon in person. The subject was ill-chosen, and could produce no favourable result.

They never afterwards met in friendship, or even on terms of decent civility; and having given this account of their final quarrel, it only remains for us to classify, in a general manner, the various subjects of angry discussion which took place betwixt them, placed in such uncomfortable relative circumstances.

• Clerk.

and each determined not to give way to the other's arguments, or accommodate himself to the other's wishes or convenience.

CHAPTER CXIII.

Instructions to Sir Hudson Lowe for his treatment of Napoleon.—Sum allowed by the British government for the ex-emperor's expenses.—The allegations that his table was not sufficiently supplied, considered.—Napoleon's proposal to defray his own expenses.—Sale of his plate—made in order to produce a false impression of the state to which he was reduced.—The fact, that he had at that time a large sum of money in his strong-box, stated.—Wooden house constructed in London for Bonaparte, and transported to St Helena.—Interview between Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon on its arrival.—Delays in the erection of it.—When finished, Bonaparte's ill-health prevented his being removed to it.—The regulation that a British officer should attend Napoleon in his rides, a subject of much displeasure to him.—Free communication with Europe carried on by the inmates of Longwood, without the knowledge of the governor.—Regulation respecting Napoleon's intercourse with the inhabitants of St Helena.—General reflections on the disputes between him and Sir Hudson Lowe.

BEFORE entering upon such brief inquiry as our bounds will permit, upon the conduct of the new governor towards Napoleon, it may be necessary to show what were his, Sir Hudson Lowe's, instructions from the English government on the subject of the custody of the ex-emperor:

"Downing Street, 12th September, 1816.

"You will observe that the desire of his majesty's government is, to allow every indulgence to General Bonaparte which may be compatible with the entire security of his person. That he should not by any means escape, or hold communication with any person whatsoever, excepting through your agency, must be your unremitted care; and those points being made sure, every resource and amusement, which may serve to reconcile Bonaparte to his confinement, may be permitted."

A few weeks later, the secretary of state wrote to Sir Hudson Lowe a letter to the same purpose with the former, 26th October, 1816:

"With respect to General Bonaparte himself, I deem it unnecessary to give you any farther instructions. I am confident that your own disposition will prompt you to anticipate the wishes of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and make every allowance for the effect which so sudden a change of situation cannot fail to produce on a person of his irritable temper. You will, however, not permit your forbearance or generosity towards him to interfere with any regulations which may have been established for preventing his escape, or which you may hereafter consider necessary for the better security of his person."

The just and honourable principle avowed by government is obvious. But it was an extraordinary and most delicate tax upon Sir Hudson Lowe, which enjoined him to keep fast prisoner an individual,

who, of all others, was likely to be most impatient of restraint, and, at the same time, to treat him with such delicacy as might disguise his situation from himself, if it could not reconcile him to it. If Sir Hudson failed in doing so, he may be allowed to plead, that it was in a case in which few could have succeeded. Accordingly, Napoleon's complaints against the governor were bitter and clamorous.

The first point of complaint on the part of the family at Longwood respected the allowance assigned by the British government for their support, which they alleged to be insufficient to their wants. This was not a point on which Napoleon thought it proper to express his feelings in his own person. His attention was apparently fixed upon obtaining concessions in certain points of etiquette, which might take him from under the condition in which he was most unwilling to allow himself to be placed, in the rank, namely, of a prisoner at war. The theme, of the inadequacy of the allowance, was not, however, left untouched, as those concerned were well aware that there was no subject of grievance which would come more home to the people of England than one which turned upon a deficiency either in the quantity or quality of the food supplied to the exiles. Montholon's letter was clamant on the subject; and Santini intimated that the emperor must sometimes have gone without a meal altogether, had he (Santini) not been successful with his gun.

The true state of the case was this. The British government had determined that Napoleon's table should be provided for at the rate of a general of the first rank, together with his military family. The expense of such an establishment was, by the regulations furnished to Sir Hudson Lowe, dated 15th April, and 22d November, 1816, supposed to reach to £8000 a-year, with permission, however, to extend it as far as £12,000, should he think it necessary. The expenses could not, in Sir Hudson Lowe's opinion, be kept within £8000; and indeed they were instantly extended by him to £12,000, paid in monthly instalments to the purveyor, Mr Balcombe, by whom it was expended in support of the establishment at Longwood. If, however, even £12,000, the sum fixed as a probable ultimatum, should, in the governor's opinion, be found, from dearth, high price of provisions, or otherwise, practically insufficient to meet and answer the expense of a general's family, calculated on a liberal scale, Sir Hudson Lowe had liberty from government to extend the purveyor's allowance without limitation. But if, on the other hand, the French should desire to add to their housekeeping anything which the governor should think superfluous, in reference to the rank assigned to the principal person, they were themselves to be at the charge of such extraordinary expenditure.

It is apprehended that the British government could not be expected to do more for Napoleon's liberal maintenance, than to give the governor an unlimited order to provide for it, upon the scale applicable to the rank of a general officer of the first rate. But yet the result, as the matter was managed, was not so honourable to Great Britain, as the intentions of the government really designed. The

fact is, that virtues as well as vices have their day of fashion in England; and at the conclusion of the peace, when the nation were cloyed with victory, men began, like epicures after a feast, to wrangle about the reckoning. Every one felt the influence of the *Quart d'heure de Rabelais*. It ascended into the Houses of Parliament, and economy was the general theme of the day. There can be no doubt that a judicious restriction upon expenditure is the only permanent source of national wealth; but, like all other virtues, parsimony may be carried to an extreme, and there are situations in which it has all the meanness of avarice. The waste of a few pounds of meat, of a hundred billets of wood, of a few bottles of wine, ought not to have been made the shadow of a question between Britain and Napoleon; and it would have been better to have winked at and given way to the prodigality of a family, which had no motives of economy on their own part, than to be called upon to discuss such petty domestic details in the great council of the nation, sitting as judges betwixt England and her prisoner. A brief answer to those who might in that case have charged the government with prodigality might have been found in referring the censors to the immense sums saved by the detention of Napoleon in St Helena. It is something of a different scale of expense, which is requisite to maintain a score of persons even in the most extravagant manner, and to support an army of three hundred thousand men.

But although such disputes arose, we think, from the governor mistaking the meaning of the British ministers, and descending, if he really did so, to details about the quality of salt or sugar to be used in the kitchen at Longwood, there is no reason to entertain the belief that the prisoners had any actual restriction to complain of, though it might not always happen that articles of the first quality could be procured at St Helena so easily as at Paris. The East India Company sent out the supplies to the purveyor, and they consisted of every luxury which could be imagined; so that delicacies very unusual in St Helena could, during Napoleon's residence, be obtained there for any one who chose to be at the expense. The wine was (generally speaking) excellent in quality, and of the first price;* and although there was rather too much said and thought about the quantity consumed, yet it was furnished, as we shall hereafter see, in a quantity far beyond the limits of ordinary conviviality. Indeed, although the French officers, while hunting for grievances, made complaints of their treatment at table, and circulated, in such books as that of Santini, the grossest scandal on that subject, yet when called on as men of honour to give their opinion, they did justice to the governor in this respect.

In a letter of General Bertrand to the governor, he expresses himself thus:—"Be assured that we are well persuaded of the good intentions of the governor to supply us with everything necessary,

* The claret, for example, was that of Carbonell, at £6 per dozen without duty. Each domestic of superior rank was allowed a bottle of this wine, which is as choice, as dear certainly, as could be brought to the table of sovereigns. The labourers and soldiers had each, daily, a bottle of Teneriffe wine of excellent quality.

and that as to provisions there will never be any complaints, or, if there are, they will be made against the government, not against the governor, upon whom the matter does not depend." He adds, "that such were the sentiments of the emperor. That indeed they had been under some difficulties when the plate was broken up, but that ever since then they had been well supplied, and had no complaint whatever to make." Such is the evidence of Count Bertrand, when deliberately writing to the governor through his military secretary.

But we have also the opinion of the ex-emperor himself, transmitted by Dr O'Meara, who was at that time, as already noticed, in the habit of sending to the governor such scraps of information as he heard in conversation at Longwood:

* 5th June, 1817.

"He (Bonaparte) observed that Santini's was a foolish production, exaggerated, full of cogitations, and some lies: truths there were in it, but exaggerated. That there never had existed that actual want described by him; that there had been enough to eat supplied, but not enough to keep a proper table; that there had been enough of wine for them; that there certainly had been sometimes a deficiency of necessary articles, but that this might be accounted for by accidents; that he believed frequent purchases had been made, at the camp, of bread and other provisions, which might also have occasionally arisen from the same cause. He added, he was convinced some Englishman had written it, and not Santini."

There is something to the same purpose in Dr O'Meara's printed book, but not so particular. What makes Napoleon's confutation of Santini's work the more amusing is, that, according to General Gourgaud's communication to the British government, Napoleon was himself the author of the whole, or greater part, of the work in question. The difference between the prisoner and governor, so far as it really existed, may have had its rise in the original dispute; for a table, which suited the rank of a general must have been considerably inferior to one kept for an emperor; and while the former was what the governor was directed to maintain, the latter was what Napoleon conceived himself entitled to expect.

The permission given to Bonaparte, and which indeed could not be well refused, to purchase from his own funds what additional articles he desired beyond those supplied by the British government, afforded peculiar facilities to the French, which they did not fail to make use of. Napoleon's money had been temporarily taken into custody when he left the Bellerophon, with a view to prevent his having the means of facilitating his escape by bribery. The permitting him to draw upon the Continent for money, was in a great measure restoring to him the golden key, before which prison-gates give way, and also tended to afford him the means of secret correspondence with those friends abroad, who might aid him to arrange a scheme of flight.

Indeed, the advantages of this species of corre-

spondence were of such evident importance, that Napoleon, through General Montholon, made the following proposal, which was sent to Lord Bathurst by the governor, 8th September, 1816.—“The emperor,” he said, “was desirous to enter into arrangements for paying the *wholes* of his expenses, providing any house here, or in England, or on the continent of Europe, to be fixed on with the governor’s consent, or even at his own choice; were appointed to transact his money matters; under assurance from him, General Bonaparte, that all letters sent through his hands would be solely on pecuniary affairs. But provided always, that such letters should pass *sealed and unopened* to their direction.”

It is probable that Napoleon concluded, from the ferment which was at that time taking place in parliament on the subject of economy, that the English nation was on the point of bankruptcy, and did not doubt that an offer, which promised to relieve them of £12,000 a-year, would be eagerly caught at by Sir Hudson Lowe, or the British ministry. But the governor saw the peril of a measure, which, in its immediate and direct tendency, went to place funds to any amount at the command of the ex-emperor, and might, more indirectly, lead the way to private correspondence of every kind. Napoleon, indeed, had offered to plight his word that the communication should not be used for any other than pecuniary purposes, but Sir Hudson liked not the security. On his part, the governor tendered a proposal that the letters to the bankers should be visible only to himself, and to Lord Bathurst, the secretary for the colonial department, and pledged his word that they would observe the most inviolable secrecy on the subject of the contents; but this arrangement did not answer Napoleon’s purposes, and the arrangement was altogether dropped.

It was about the same time that Sir Hudson Lowe was desirous to keep the expense of the establishment within £12,000. A conference on this subject was held betwixt General Montholon, who took charge of the department of the household, and Major Gorrequer, belonging to Sir Hudson’s staff, who acted on the part of the governor. It appears that Sir Hudson had either misapprehended the instructions of the government, and deemed himself rigidly bound to limit the expenses of Longwood within £12,000 yearly, not adverting that he had an option to extend it beyond that sum; or else that he considered the surplus above £1000 per month, to consist of such articles of extra expenditure as the French might, in a free interpretation of his instructions, be required to pay for themselves, as being beyond the limits of a general officer’s table, provided upon the most liberal plan. General Montholon stated, that the family could not be provided, even after many reductions, at a cheaper rate than £15,194, and that this was the *minimum of minimums*, the least possible sum. He offered that the emperor would draw for the sum wanted, providing he was permitted to send a sealed letter to the banking-house. ‘This, Major Gorrequer said, could not be allowed. Count Montholon then declared, that as the emperor was not permitted by the British

government to have access to his funds in Europe, he had no other means left than to dispose of his property here; and that if the emperor was obliged to defray those expenses of the establishment, which went beyond the allowance made by Britain, he must dispose of his plate.

This proposal was too rashly assented to by Sir Hudson Lowe, whose instructions of 22d November empowered him to have prevented a circumstance so glaringly calculated to accredit all that had ever been said or written respecting the mean and sordid manner in which the late Emperor of France was treated. Napoleon had an opportunity, at the sacrifice of a parcel of old silver plate, to amuse his own moments of languor, by laughing at and turning into ridicule the inconsistent qualities of the English nation,—at one time sending him a house and furniture to the value of £60,000, or £70,000; at another obliging him to sell his plate, and discharge his servants, and all for the sake of a few bottles of wine, or pounds of meat. Sir Hudson Lowe ought not to have exposed his country to such a charge; and even if his instructions seemed inexplicit on the subject, he ought, on his own interpretation of them, to have paid the extra expense, without giving room to such general scandal as was sure to arise from Napoleon’s disposing of his plate.

But if the governor took too narrow a view of his duty upon this occasion, what are we to say of the poor conduct of Napoleon, who, while he had specie in his strong-box to have defrayed three times the sum wanted to defray the alleged balance, yet preferred making the paltry sale alluded to, that he might appear before Europe in *forma pauperis*, and set up a claim to compassion as a man driven to such extremity, as to be obliged to part with the plate from his table, in order to be enabled to cover it with the necessary food! He was well aware that little compassion would have been paid to him, had he been thought possessed of ready money sufficient to supply any deficiencies in the tolerably ample allowance paid by England; and that it was only the idea of his poverty, proved, as it seemed, by a step, which even private individuals only take in a case of necessity, which made his case appear strong and clamant. The feeling of compassion must have given place to one of a very different kind, had the actual circumstances of the case been fully and fairly known.

The communications of General Gourgaud, upon parting with Sir Hudson Lowe, put the governor in possession of the curious fact, that the breaking up of the plate was a mere trick, resorted to on account of the impression it was calculated to produce in England and Europe; for that at the time they had at Longwood plenty of money. Sir Hudson Lowe conjectured, that General Gourgaud alluded to the sale of some stock belonging to Las Cases, the value of which that devoted adherent had placed at Napoleon’s disposal; but General Gourgaud replied, “No, no; before that transaction they had received 240,000 fr., chiefly in Spanish doubloons.” He further said, that it was Prince Eugène who lodged the money in the hands of the bankers. In London General Gourgaud made the same communication.

We copy the words in which it is reported to Lord Bathurst:

"General Gourgaud stated himself to have been aware of General Bonaparte having received a considerable sum of money in Spanish doubloons, viz. £10,000, at the very time he disposed of his plate; but, on being pressed by me as to the persons privy to that transaction, he contented himself with assuring me, that the mode of its transmission was one purely accidental; that it could never again occur; and that, such being the case, he trusted that I should not press a discovery, which, while it betrayed its author, could have no effect, either as it regarded the punishment of the offenders, or the prevention of a similar act in future. The actual possession of money was, moreover, not likely, in his view of the subject, to afford any additional means of corrupting the fidelity of those whom it might be advisable to seduce; as it was well known, that any draught, whatever might be its amount, drawn by General Bonaparte on Prince Eugène, or on certain other members of his family, would be scrupulously honoured." He further stated, that it was Napoleon's policy to make a *moyen*, a fund for execution of his plans, by placing sums of money at his, General Gourgaud's, command; and that he had sustained ill-treatment on the part of Napoleon, and much importunity on that of Bertrand, because he declined lending himself to facilitate secret correspondence.

Whatever sympathy Bonaparte may claim for his other distresses at St Helena, it was made plain, from this important disclosure, that want of funds could be none of them; and it is no less so, that the trick of selling the plate can now prove nothing, excepting that Napoleon's system was a deceptive one; and that evidence of any sort, arising either from his word or actions, is to be received with caution, when there is an apparent point to be carried by it.

When Sir Hudson Lowe's report reached England, that the excess of the expenditure at Longwood, above twelve thousand pounds, had been defrayed by Napoleon himself, it did not meet the approbation of the ministry; who again laid before the governor the distinction which he was to draw betwixt expenses necessary to maintain the table and household of a general officer, and such as might be of a nature different from, and exceeding, those attendant on the household of a person of that rank; which last, and those alone, the French might be called on to defray. The order is dated 24th Oct., 1817:

"As I observe from the statement contained in your dispatch, No. 84, that the expense of General Bonaparte's establishment exceeds £12,000 per annum, and that the excess beyond that sum has, up to the date of that dispatch, been defrayed from his own funds, I deem it necessary again to call your attention to that part of my dispatch, No. 15, of the 22d November last, in which, in limiting the expense to £12,000 a-year, I still left you at liberty to incur a farther expenditure, should you consider it to be necessary for the comfort of General Bonaparte; and to repeat, that, *if you should consider the sum of £12,000 a-year not to be adequate to maintain such an establishment as would be re-*

quisite for a general officer of distinction, you will have no difficulty in making what you deem to be a requisite addition. But, on the other hand, if the expenses which General Bonaparte has himself defrayed are beyond what, on a liberal construction, might be proper for a general officer of distinction, you will permit them, as heretofore, to be defrayed from his own funds."

These positive and reiterated instructions serve to show, that there was never a wish on the part of Britain to deal harshly, or even closely, with Napoleon; as the avowals of General Gourgaud prove on the other hand, that if the governor was too rigid on the subject of expense, the prisoner possessed means sufficient to have saved him from any possible consequences of self-denial, which might have accrued from being compelled to live at so low a rate as twelve thousand pounds a-year.

The subject of the RESIDENCE of Napoleon continued to furnish great subjects of complaint and commotion. We have recorded our opinion, that from the beginning, Plantation House, as the residence in the island, ought to have been set apart for his use. If, however, this was objected to, the building a new house from the foundations, even with the indifferent means which the island affords, would have been far more respectable, and perhaps as economical, as constructing a new wooden frame in London, and transporting it to St Helena, where it arrived, with the furniture destined for it, in May, 1816. It was not, however, a complete *parapluie* house, as such structures have been called, but only the materials for constructing such a one; capable of being erected separately, or, at Napoleon's choice, of being employed for making large and commodious additions to the mansion which he already occupied. It became a matter of courtesy to inquire whether it would be the best answer Napoleon's idea of convenience that an entirely new edifice should be constructed, or whether that end would be better attained by suffering the former building to remain, and constructing the new one in the form of an addition to it. We have recounted an interview betwixt Napoleon and the governor, in the words of the former, delivered to O'Meara. The present we give as furnished by Sir Hudson in a dispatch to Lord Bathurst, dated 17th May, 1816:

"It becoming necessary to come to some decision in respect to the house and furniture which he is sent from England for the accommodation of General Bonaparte and his followers, I resolved on waiting upon him, communicating to him the views of the various materials, and asking his sentiments with respect to their appropriation, before I made any disposition of them. I previously called on General Bertrand, to ask if he thought General Bonaparte would be at leisure to receive me; and on his reply, which was in the affirmative, I proceeded to Longwood House, where, having met Colonel Lisle Cases, I begged he would be the bearer of my message to the general, acquainting him with my business there, if his convenience admitted of being visited by me. I received a reply, saying, 'The emperor would see me.'

"I passed through his outer dining-room into his drawing-room. He was alone, standing with his hat under his arm, in the manner in which he usually presents himself when he assumes his imperial dignity. He remained silent, expecting I would address him. Finding him not disposed to commence, I began in the following words:—'Sir, you will probably have seen by our English newspapers, as well, perhaps, as heard through other channels, of the intention of the British government to send out hither for your accommodation the materials for the construction of a house, with every necessary furniture. These articles have now for the first time arrived. In the meantime, government has received information of the building prepared for your reception at this place, and I have instructions for appropriating the articles as may seem best, whether for making a new building, or adding to the conveniences of your present one. Before making any disposition on the subject, I waited to know whether you had any desires to communicate to me regarding it.' He stood as before, and made no reply.

"Observing his silence continue, I again commenced by saying, 'I have conceived, sir, that possibly the addition of two or three good rooms—(*deux ou trois salons*)—to your present house, with other improvements to it, might add to your convenience in less time than by constructing a new building.' He then commenced, but spoke with such rapidity, such intemperance, and so much warmth, that it is difficult to repeat every word he used. Without apparently having lent an ear to what I said, he began—'I do not at all understand the conduct of your government towards me. Do they desire to kill me? And do you come here to be my executioner, as well as my gaoler?—Posterity will judge of the manner in which I have been treated. The misfortunes which I suffer will recoil upon your nation. No, sir; never will I suffer any person to enter into the interior of my house, or penetrate into my bed-chamber, as you have given orders. When I heard of your arrival in this island, I believed that, as being an officer of the army, you would be possessed of a more polite character than the admiral, who is a navy-officer, and might have more harsh manners. I have no reason to complain of his heart. But, you, sir—in what manner do you treat me? It is an insult to invite me to dinner by the name of General Bonaparte. I am not General Bonaparte—I am the Emperor Napoleon. I ask you again,—have you come hither to be my gaoler—my hangman?' Whilst speaking in this manner, his right arm moved backward and forward; his person stood fixed; his eyes and countenance exhibiting everything which could be supposed in a person who meant to intimidate or irritate.

"I suffered him to proceed throughout, not without a strong feeling of restraint on myself, until he was really out of breath, when, on his stopping, I said, 'Sir, I am not come here to be insulted, but to treat of an affair which regards you more than me. If you are not disposed to talk upon the subject—'

"'I have no intention to insult you, sir,' he replied; 'but in what sort of manner have you treated me? is it in a soldier-like fashion?'

"I answered, 'Sir, I am a soldier according to the fashion of my own country, to do my duty to her accordingly, and not according to the fashion of foreigners. Besides, if you conceive you have any reason to complain of me, you have only to put your accusation upon paper, and I will send it to England by the first opportunity.'

"'To what good purpose?' he said; 'my complaints will not be more public there than here.'

"'I will cause them be published,' I answered, 'in all the gazettes of the Continent, if you desire it. I do my duty, and everything else is indifferent to me.' Then, adverting for the first time to the matter which had brought me to him, he said, 'Your government has made me no official communication of the arrival of this house. Is it to be constructed where I please, or where you may fix it to be?'

"'I am now come, sir, for the express purpose of announcing it to you. I have no difficulty in replying to the other point. If there is any particular spot, which you might have thought of to erect it upon, I will examine it, and have it erected there, if I see no objection to it. If I see any objection to it, I will acquaint you with it. It was to combine this matter in some degree of concert with you that I am now come.'

"'Then you had better speak to the grand marshal about it, and settle it with him.'

"'I prefer, sir, addressing you upon it. I find so many *mésintelligence*s happen, when I adopt the medium of other persons (particularly as in the instance of the orders which you mention I had given for forcing an entrance into your private apartments), that I find it more satisfactory to address yourself.'

"He made no particular reply to this, walked about for a moment, and then working himself up apparently to say something which he thought would appal me with extraordinary surprise or dread, he said,—'Do you wish me, sir, to tell you the truth? Yes, sir, I ask you if you desire me to tell you the truth? I believe that you have received orders to kill me—yes, to kill me—yes, sir, I believe that you have received orders to stick at nothing—nothing.' He then looked at me, as if expecting a reply. My answer was—'You were pleased to remark, sir, in our last interview, that you had miscalculated the spirit of the English people. Give me leave to say, you at present calculate as erroneously the spirit of an English soldier.'

"Our interview here terminated; and, as if neither of us had anything more to say, we mutually separated."

Sir Hudson received a letter in reply to his account of this strange and violent scene, in which his forbearance and firmness are approved of. But we quote it, chiefly because it marks the intention of the British government with respect to Bonaparte, and shows the consideration which they had for his peculiar condition, and the extent of forbearance which it was their desire should be extended towards him by the Governor of St Helena:

"There is a wide distinction between the conduct which you ought to hold towards General Bonaparte, and towards those who have chosen to follow his

fortunes, by accompanying him to St Helena.

"It would be a want of generosity not to make great allowance for the intemperate language into which the former may at times be betrayed. The height from whence he has been precipitated, and all the circumstances which have attended his fall, are sufficient to overset a mind less irritable than his; and it is to be apprehended that he can find little consolation in his reflections, either in the means by which he obtained his power, or his manner of exercising it. So long, therefore, as his violence is confined to words, it must be borne with—always understanding, and giving him to understand, that any wilful transgression, on his part, of the rules which you may think it necessary to prescribe for the security of his person, will place you under the necessity of adopting a system of restraint, which it will be most painful to you to inflict.

"With respect to his followers, they stand in a very different situation; they cannot be too frequently reminded, that their continuance in the island is an act of indulgence on the part of the British government; and you will inform them that you have received strict instructions to remove them from the person of General Bonaparte, and to transport them out of the island, if they shall not conduct themselves with that respect which your situation demands, and with that strict attention to your regulations which is the indispensable condition on which their residence in the island is permitted."

The stormy dispute which took place on the 17th May, 1816, left everything unsettled with respect to the house; and indeed it may be conjectured, without injustice, that Napoleon preferred the old and inconvenient mansion, with the right to complain of it as a grievance, to the new and commodious one, the possession of which must have shewn his lips upon one fertile subject of misrepresentation. Repeated and equally nugatory discussions on the subject took place during the course of two or three years, all which time Napoleon complained of the want of the promised house, and the governor, on his side, alleged, there was no getting Napoleon to express a fixed opinion on the situation or the plan, or to say whether he would prefer a thorough repair of the old house, occupying Monsieur Bertrand's apartments in the meanwhile, until the work should be accomplished. Sometimes Napoleon spoke of changing the situation of the house, but he never, according to Sir Hudson Lowe's averment, intimated any specific wish upon that subject, nor would condescend to say distinctly in what place it should be erected. Napoleon on his part maintained, that he was confined for three years in an unhealthy barn, during which time the governor was perpetually talking about a house which had never been commenced. While the blame is thus reciprocally retorted, the impartial historian can only say, that had Sir Hudson Lowe delayed willingly the building of the house, he must have exposed himself to severe censure from his government in consequence, since his dispatches were daily urging the task. There was nothing which the governor could place against this serious risk, except the malicious purpose of distressing Napoleon. On the other hand, in sub-

mitting to indifferent accommodation, rather than communicate with a man whom he seemed to hold in abhorrence, Napoleon only acted upon his general system, of which this was a part, and sacrificed his convenience, as he afterwards did his health, rather than bend his mind to comply with the regulations of his place of captivity. Mr Ellis, an unprejudiced witness, declares that the original house seemed to him commodious and well furnished.

The fate of the new house was singular enough. It was at last erected, and is said to be a large and comfortable building. But it happened, that the plan directed the building to be surrounded, as is common in England, with something like a moat ditch, surrounded by cast-iron railing of an ornamental character. No sooner had Napoleon seen these preparations, than the idea of a fortification and a dungeon entered into his head; nor was it possible to convince him that the rails and such fence were not intended as additional means of securing his person. When Sir Hudson Lowe learned the objection which had been started, he ordered the ground to be leveled, and the palisade removed. But before this was accomplished, Napoleon's health was too much broken to permit of his being removed, so that he died under the same roof which received him after his temporary residence at Blenheim.

Another subject of complaint, which Napoleon greatly insisted upon, was, that the Governor of St Helena had not been placed there merely as a ministerial person, to see duly executed the instructions which he should receive from Britain, but as a legislator, himself possessing and exercising the power to alter the regulations under which his prisoners were to be confined, to recal them, to suspend them, and finally, to replace them. To this it must be answered, that in such a situation, where the governor holds so important a charge was at so great a distance from the original source of his power, some discretionary authority must necessarily be lodged in him, since cases must occur where he was to act on the event as it arose, and it was indispensable that he should possess the power to do so. It must also be remembered, that different constructions might possibly be given to the instructions from the secretary of state; and it would, in that case, have been equally anomalous and inconvenient, should the governor not have had it in his power to adopt that explanation, which circumstances demanded, and not less so if he had been obliged to litigate the point with his prisoner, and, as a mere ministerial person, must have done, wait till a commentary on the dispute article should arrive from England.

It is a different question, and on which we are far from having so clear an opinion, whether Sir Hudson Lowe, in every case, exercised this high privilege with sound discretion. It would be unjust to condemn him unheard, who has never fairly been put upon his defence, and the evidence against whom is, we must again say, of a very suspicious nature. Still it appears, that alterations of the existing regulations were, as far as we have information, more frequent than necessity, the best if not the only apology for varying the manner of such proceedings seems to have authorized.

For example, one of the heaviest of Napoleon's

complaints is made against the restriction of the limits within which he might take exercise without the company of a British officer, which, instead of extending to twelve miles in circumference, were contracted to two-thirds of that space. Everything in this world is relative, and we can conceive the loss of one-third of his exercising ground to have been, at this moment, a more sincere subject of distress to Napoleon, than the loss of a kingdom while he yet governed Europe. The apology alleged for this was the disposition which Napoleon seemed to show, to cultivate the acquaintance of the inhabitants of St Helena more than it was advisable that he should have the opportunity of doing. We can easily conceive this to be true; for not only might Napoleon be disposed, from policy, to make friends among the better classes by his irresistible conciliation of manners, and of the lower class by familiarity and largesses; but he must also be supposed, with the feelings natural to humanity in distress, to seek some little variety from the monotony of existence, some little resumption of connexion with the human race, from which, his few followers excepted, he was in a manner excluded. But this aptitude to mingle with such society as chance threw within his reach, in his very limited range, might perhaps have been indulged without the possibility of his making any bad use of it, especially since no one could enter these grounds without passes and orders. The limits were shortly after restored by Sir Hudson Lowe to their original extent, Napoleon having declared that unless this were the case, he would not consent to take exercise, or observe the usual means of keeping himself in health.

The injunction requiring that Bonaparte should daily be seen by an orderly officer was, under Sir Hudson Lowe's authority, as it had been under that of Sir George Cockburn, the subject of Bonaparte's most violent opposition. He affected to apprehend that it was to be enforced by positive violence, and carried this so far as to load fire-arms, with the idea of resisting by force any attempt of an orderly officer to insist upon performing this part of his duty. He alludes resentfully to the circumstance in his angry interview with Sir Hudson Lowe upon the 17th May, 1816. Yet, of all unpleasant regulations to which a prisoner is subjected by his captivity, that appears the least objectionable, which, assuring us from space to space that the person of the prisoner is secure, enables us, in the interval, to leave him a much greater share of personal freedom than otherwise could be permitted, because the shortness of each interval does not allow him time to use it in escape. Nevertheless, Sir Hudson Lowe, as already hinted, was content in this case to yield to the violent threats of Napoleon, and rather suffer the duty to be exercised imperfectly and by chance, than run the risk of his prisoner perishing in the fray which his obstinacy threatened. Perhaps the governor may be in this case rather censured as having given up a point impressed upon him by his original instructions, than blamed for executing them too strictly against the remarkable person who was his prisoner. We cannot but repeat the opinion we have been led to form, that, could Bonaparte's bodily presence have been exactly ascertained from

time to time, his rambles through the whole of the island might have been permitted, even without the presence of a military officer.

This regulation was another circumstance, of which Napoleon most heavily complained. He regarded the company of such attendant as a mark of his defeat and imprisonment, and resolved, therefore, rather to submit to remain within the limits of the grounds of Longwood, narrow as they were, than, by stirring without them, to expose himself to the necessity of admitting the company of this odious guardian. It may be thought, that in thus judging, Napoleon did not adopt the most philosophical or even the wisest opinion. Misfortune in war is no disgrace; and to be prisoner, has been the lot before now both of kings and emperors. The orderly officers, also, who were ready to accompany Napoleon in his ride, might be often men of information and accomplishment; and their society and conversation could not but have added some variety to days so little diversified as those spent by Napoleon.

The prisoner, however, was incapable of deriving amusement from any such source. It might be as well expected that the occupant of a dungeon should amuse himself with botanizing in the ditches which most it round. Napoleon could not forget what he had been and what he was, and plainly confessed by his conduct that he was contented rather to die, than to appear in public, wearing the badge of his fate, like one who was sitting down resigned to it.

While so averse to this regulation, Napoleon had not taken the proper mode of escaping from its influence. Sir George Cockburn, upon his remonstrance after his first arrival, had granted to him a dispensation from the attendance of an orderly officer, at least in his immediate company or vicinity. This privilege was suddenly withdrawn while the admiral was yet upon the island, and both Napoleon and the various St Helena authors, Las Cases in particular, make the most bitter complaints on the tantalizing conduct of Sir George Cockburn, who gave an indulgence, as it would seem, only with the cruel view of recalling it the next morning. The truth is here told, but not the whole truth. Napoleon had engaged to the admiral, that in consideration of this indulgence, he would not enter into any intercourse with any of the inhabitants whom he might meet during the time of his excursion. He chose to break through his promise the very first time that he rode out alone, or only with his suite; and hence Sir George Cockburn, considering faith as broken with him, recalled the permission altogether. It was not, therefore, with a good grace, that Napoleon complained of the want of inclination, on the part of the governor, to restore an indulgence to him, which he had almost instantly made a use of that was contrary to his express engagement. The truth is, that the ex-emperor had his own peculiar manner of viewing his own case. He considered every degree of leniency, which was at any time exercised, as a restoration of some small portion of that liberty, of which he conceived himself to be deprived illegally and tyrannically; and scrupled no more to employ what he got in endeavouring to attain a farther degree of freedom, than the pri-

soner whose hand is extricated from fetters would hesitate to employ it in freeing his feet. There can be no doubt, that if by means of such a privilege as riding without the attendance of an officer, he could have arranged or facilitated any mode of final escape, he would not have hesitated to use it to that effect.

But on the other hand, such being his way of thinking, and hardly disguised, it put the governor strongly on his guard against granting any relaxation of the vigilance necessary for effectually confining him. Indulgences of this nature are, so far as they go, a species of confidence reposed in the captive by the humanity of his keeper, and cannot, in perfect good faith, be used to purposes, which must lead to the disgrace, or perhaps the ruin, of the party who grants them. If, therefore, Napoleon showed himself determined to hold a closer and more frequent intercourse with the natives of St Helena, and the strangers who visited the island, than Sir Hudson Lowe approved, it only remained for the latter to take care that such interviews should not occur without a witness, by adhering to the restrictions, which required that a British officer should attend upon the more distant excursions of the hard-ruled captive.

It is to be remarked, that this intercourse with the inhabitants, and others who visited St Helena, was no imaginary danger, but actually existed to a considerable extent, and for purposes calculated to alarm Sir Hudson Lowe's watchfulness, and to transgress in a most material respect his instructions from government. The disclosures of General Gourgaud are on these points decisive. That officer "had no difficulty in avowing, that there has always existed a free and uninterrupted communication betwixt the inhabitants of Longwood and the country, without the knowledge or intervention of the governor; and that this has been made use of, not only for the purpose of receiving and transmitting letters, but for that of transmitting pamphlets, money, and other articles, of which the party in Longwood might from time to time have been in want; and that the correspondence was for the most part carried on direct with Great Britain. That the persons employed in it were those Englishmen who from time to time visit St Helena, to all of whom the attendants and servants of Bonaparte have free access, and who, generally speaking, are willing, many of them without reward, and others for very small pecuniary considerations, to convey to Europe any letter or packet intrusted to their charge. It would appear also, that the captains and others on board the merchant ships touching at the island, whether belonging to the East India Company, or to other persons, are considered at Longwood as being peculiarly open to the seduction of Bonaparte's talents; so much so, that the inhabitants of Longwood have regarded it as a matter of small difficulty to procure a passage on board one of these ships for General Bonaparte, if escape should at any time be his object."

In corroboration of what is above stated, of the free communication betwixt St Helena and Europe, occurs the whimsical story told by Dr Antommarchi, of a number of copies of Dr O'Meara's book being

smuggled ashore at St Helena, under the disguise of tracts distributed by a religious society. Another instance is mentioned by Count Las Cases, who, when removed from Longwood, and debarred from personally communicating with his master, felt considerable difficulty in discovering a mode of conveying to him a diamond necklace of great value, which had been intrusted to his keeping, and which Napoleon might want after his departure. He addressed at hazard the first decent-looking person he saw going to Longwood, and conjured him, in the most pathetic manner, to take charge of the packet. The stranger slackened his pace without speaking, and pointed to his coat-pocket. Las Cases dropt in the packet; and the jewels, thus consigned to the faith of an unknown person, reached their owner in safety.

It is honourable to humanity, that distress of almost any kind, but especially that which affects the imagination by exciting the memory of former greatness, should find assistants even among those who were enemies to that greatness when in prosperity. But it was the duty of the governor to take heed, that neither overstrained notions of romantic compassion and generosity, nor the temptation of worse motives, should lead to any combination which might frustrate his diligence; and Napoleon, having at once avarice and the excess of generosity to solicit in his favour, the governor naturally secluded him as much as he could from those individuals, who might be liable to be given over to his interest by such powerful seductions.

Upon the 7th January, 1818, the government of Britain intimated their approbation of the enlargement of Napoleon's bounds of exercise to the ordinary limits, which had been for a time restricted; and, in order to preserve for him the opportunity of keeping up society with such of the people of the island as he might desire to receive on business, or as visitors, the following regulation was adopted:—

"Respecting the intercourse with the inhabitants. I see no material objection to the placing it upon the footing recently suggested by Count Bertrand, as it is one which he represents would be more consonant to General Bonaparte's wishes. The count's proposition is, that a list of a given number of persons, resident in the island, should be made out, who shall be at once admitted to Longwood on the general's own invitation, without a previous application being made to your excellency on each invitation. You will, therefore, consider yourself at liberty to accede to the suggestions of Count Bertrand; and you will for this purpose direct him to present to you, for your approbation, a list of persons, not exceeding fifty in number, resident in the island, who may be admitted to Longwood at reasonable hours, without any other pass than the invitation of General Bonaparte, it being understood that they are on each occasion to deliver in the invitation as a voucher, with their names, at the barrier. In giving your approbation to the list, you will, as far as is consistent with your duty, consult the wishes of General Bonaparte; but you will let it be clearly understood, that you reserve to yourself a discretionary power of erasing from the list, at

any time, any of those individuals, to whom you may have found it inexpedient to continue such extraordinary facility of access; and you will take special care, that a report be always made to you by the orderly officer, of the several persons admitted to Longwood upon General Bonaparte's invitation."

We have touched upon these various subjects of grievance, not as being the only causes of dispute, or rather of violent discord, which existed betwixt the Ex-Emperor of France and the Governor of St Helena, for there were many others. It is not in our purpose, however, nor even in our power, to give a detailed or exact history of these particular quarrels, but merely to mark,—as our duty, in this a very painful one, demands,—what was the character and general scope of the debate which was so violently conducted on both sides. Of course it follows, that a species of open war having been declared betwixt the parties, every one of the various points of discussion which must necessarily have arisen betwixt Sir Hudson Lowe and Napoleon, or through their respective attendants and followers, was turned into matter of offence on the one side or the other, and as such warmly contested. It is thus, that, when two armies approach each other, the most peaceful situations and positions lose their ordinary character, and become the subjects of attack and defence. Every circumstance, whether of business or of etiquette, which occurred at St Helena, was certain to occasion some dispute betwixt Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe, the progress and termination of which seldom passed without an aggravation of mutual hostilities. It is beneath the dignity of history to trace these *tracasseries*; and beyond possibility, unless for one present on the spot, and possessed of all the minute information attending each subject of quarrel, to judge which had the right or the wrong.

It would be, indeed, easy for us, standing aloof and remote from these agitating struggles, to pass a sweeping condemnation on the one party or the other, or perhaps upon each of them; and to show that reason and temper on either side would have led to a very different proceeding on both, had it been permitted by those human infirmities to which, unhappily, those who have power or pretensions are more liable than the common class, who never possessed the one, and make no claim to the other.

Neither would it be difficult for us to conceive a Governor of St Helena, in the abstract, who, treating the reviling and reproaches with which he was on all occasions loaded by Bonaparte, as the idle chidings of a storm, which must howl around whatever it meets in its course, would, with patience and equanimity, have suffered the tempest to expend its rage, and die away in weakness, the sooner that it found itself unresisted. We can conceive such a person wrapping himself up in his own virtue, and, while he discharged to his country the duty she had intrusted to him, striving, at the same time, by such acts of indulgence as might be the more gratifying because the less expected, or perhaps merited, to melt down the sullenness which the hardship of his situation naturally imposed on the prisoner. We can even conceive that a man of such rare temper

might have found means, in some happy moment, of re-establishing a tolerable and ostensible good understanding, if not a heartfelt cordiality, which, could it have existed, would so much have lessened the vexations and troubles, both of the captive and of the governor. All this is very easily conceived. But in order to form the idea of such a man, we must suppose him, in the case in question, stoically impassive to insults of the grossest kind, insults poured on him before he had done anything which could deserve them, and expressed in a manner which plainly intimated the determination of Napoleon to place himself at once on the most hostile terms with him. This must have required the most uncommon share of calmness and candour. It is more natural that such a functionary as the Governor of St Helena, feeling the impulse of ill-usage from a quarter where no regular satisfaction could be had, if he did not use the power which he held for the time, to the actual annoyance and vexation of the party by whom he had been deliberately insulted, would be apt at least to become indifferent how much, or how little, his prisoner was affected by the measures which he adopted, and to go forward with the necessary means of confining the person, without being so solicitous as he might otherwise have been to spare the feelings. An officer, termed to his face, a liar, a brigand, an assassin, a robber, a hangman, has few terms to keep with him by whom he has been loaded with such unworthy epithets; and who, in using them, may be considered as having declared mutual war, and disclaimed the courtesy, while he defied the power, of the person to whom he addressed them.

In the same manner, judging with the coolness of a third party, we should be inclined to say, that the immediate attendants and followers of Napoleon might have here served their master more effectually, by endeavouring to accommodate the subjects of dispute with Sir Hudson Lowe, than by aggravating and carrying them still farther by their own subordinate discussions with the governor and his aides-de-camp, and thus heating their master's passions by their own. But while that was the line of conduct to be desired, it is impossible to deny that another was more naturally to be expected. Generals Bertrand, Montholon, and Gourgand, were all soldiers of high reputation, who, rising to fame under Napoleon's eye, had seen their own laurels flourish along with his. In the hour of adversity, they had most laudably and honourably followed him, and were now sharing with him the years of solitude and exile. It was not, therefore, to be wondered at, that they, wearied of their own restrained and solitary condition, enraged, too, at everything which appeared to add to the calamitous condition of their fallen master, should be more disposed to increase the angry spirit which manifested itself on both sides, than, by interposing their mediation, to endeavour to compose jars which might well render Napoleon's state more irritable and uncomfortable, but could not, in any point of view, tend to his comfort, peace, or even respectability.

But perhaps we might have been best entitled to hope, from the high part which Napoleon had played in the world, from the extent of his genius, and the

natural pride arising from the consciousness of talent, some indifference towards objects of mere form and ceremony, some confidence in the genuine character of his own natural elevation, and a noble contempt of the change which fortune could make on circumstances around him. We might have hoped that one whose mental superiority over the rest of his species was so undeniable, would have been the last to seek with eagerness to retain the frippery and feathers of which the wind of adverse fortune had stripped him, or to be tenacious of that etiquette, which now, if yielded to him at all, could only have been given by compassion. We might have thought the conqueror in so many bloody conflicts would, even upon provocation, have thought it beneath him to enter on a war of words with the governor of an islet in the Atlantic, where foul language could be the only weapon on either side, and held it a yet greater derogation, so far to lay aside his high character, as to be the first to engage in so ignoble a conflict. It might, we should have supposed, have been anticipated by such a person, not only that calm and patient endurance of inevitable misfortunes is the noblest means of surmounting them, but that, even with a view to his liberty, such conduct would have been most advisable, because most politic. The people of Europe, and especially of Britain, would have been much sooner apt to unite in the wish to see him removed from confinement, had he borne himself with philosophical calmness, than seeing him, as they did, still evincing within his narrow sphere the restless and intriguing temper which had so long disturbed the world, and which now showed itself so engrained in his constitution, as to lead him on to the unworthy species of warfare which we have just described. But the loftiest and proudest beings of mere humanity are like the image which the Assyrian monarch beheld in his dream,—blended of various metals, uniting that which is vile with those which are most precious; that which is frail, weak, and unsubstantial, with what is most perdurable and strong. Napoleon, like many an emperor and hero before him, sunk under his own passions after having vanquished nations, and became in his exile the prey of petty spleen, which racked him almost to frenzy, and induced him to hazard his health, or perhaps even to throw away his life, rather than submit with dignified patience to that which his misfortunes had rendered unavoidable.

CHAPTER CXIV.

Napoleon's domestic habits.—Manner in which he spent the day.—his dress.—Nature of the fragments of Memoirs he dictated to Messrs Gourgaud and Montholon.—His particular taste in belles lettres led him to admire Ossian.—His attachment to the drama—prefers Racine and Corneille to Voltaire.—Dislike of Tacitus.—His vindication of the character of Cæsar.—His behaviour towards the persons of his household—amusements and exercises.—His character of Sir Pulteney Malcolm.—Degree of his intercourse with the islanders, and with visitors to the island.—Interview with Captain Basil Hall—with Lord Amherst and the gentlemen attached to the Chinese embassy.

THE unpleasant and discreditable disputes of which we have given some account in the last chap-

ter, form, unhappily, the most marked events of Napoleon's latter life. For the five years and seven months that he remained in the island of St Helena, few circumstances occurred to vary the melancholy tenor of his life, excepting those which affected his temper or his health. Of the general causes influencing the former we have given some account; the latter we shall hereafter allude to. Our present object is a short and general view of his personal and domestic habits, while in this melancholy and secluded habitation.

Napoleon's life, until his health began to give way, was of the most regular and monotonous character. Having become a very indifferent sleeper, perhaps from his custom of assigning during the active part of his life no precise time for repose, his hours of rising were uncertain, depending upon the rest which he had enjoyed during the earlier part of the night. It followed from this irregularity, that during the day-time he occasionally fell asleep, for a few minutes, upon his couch or arm-chair. At times his favourite *valet-de-chambre*, Marchand, read to him while in bed until he was composed to rest, the best remedy, perhaps, for that course of "thick-coming fancies," which must so oft have disturbed the repose of one in circumstances so singular and so melancholy. So soon as Napoleon arose from bed, he either began to dictate to one of his generals (Montholon or Gourgaud generally) and placed upon record such passages of his remarkable life as he desired to preserve; or, if the weather and his inclination suited, he went out for an hour or two on horseback. He sometimes breakfasted in his own apartment, sometimes with his suite, generally about ten o'clock, and almost always *à la fourchette*. The fore part of the day he was usually devoted to reading, or dictating to one or other of his suite, and about two or three o'clock received such visitors as had permission to wait upon him. An airing in the carriage or on horseback usually succeeded to this species of leisure, at which occasions he was attended by all his suite. Their horses, supplied from the Cape of Good Hope, were of a good race and handsome appearance. On returning from his airings, he again resumed the book, or caused his amanuensis to take up the pen until dinner time, which was about eight o'clock at night. He preferred plain food, and eat plentifully, and with an apparent appetite. A very few glasses of claret, scarce amounting to an English pint in all, and chiefly drank during the time of dinner, completed his meal. Sometimes he drank champagne; but his constitutional sobriety was such, that a large glass of that more generous wine immediately brought a degree of colour to his cheek. No man appears to have been in a less degree than Napoleon subject to the influence of those appetites which man has in common with the lower range of nature. He never took more than two meals a-day, and concluded each with a small cup of coffee. After dinner, chess, cards, a volume of light literature, read aloud for the benefit of his suite, or general conversation, in which the ladies of his suite occasionally joined, served to consume the evening till ten or eleven, about which time he retired to his apartment, and went immediately to bed.

We may add to this brief account of Napoleon's domestic habits, that he was very attentive to the duties of the toilet. He usually appeared in the morning in a white night-gown, with loose trousers and stockings joined in one, a chequered red Madras handkerchief round his head, and his shirt collar open. When dressed, he wore a green uniform, very plainly made, and without ornament, similar to that which by its simplicity used to mark the sovereign among the splendid dresses of the Tuileries, white waistcoat, and white or nankeen breeches, with milk stockings, and shoes with gold buckles, a black stock, a triangular cocked hat, of the kind to be seen in all the caricatures, with a very small tri-coloured cockade. He usually wore, when in full dress, the ribbon and grand cross of the Legion of Honour.

Such were the personal habits of Napoleon, on which there is little for the imagination to dwell, after it has once received the general idea. The circumstance of the large portion of his time employed in dictation alone interests our curiosity, and makes us anxious to know with what he could have found means to occupy so many pages, and so many hours. The fragments upon military subjects, dictated from time to time to Generals Gourgaud and Montholon, are not voluminous enough to account for the leisure expended in this manner; and even when we add to them the number of pamphlets and works issuing from St Helena, we shall still find room to suppose, either that manuscripts remain which have not yet seen the light, or that Napoleon was a slow composer, and fastidious in the choice of his language. The last conjecture seems most probable, as the French are particularly scrupulous in the punctilios of composition, and Napoleon, emperor as he had been, must have known that he would receive no mercy from the critics upon that particular.

The avowed works themselves, fragments as they are, are extremely interesting in a military point of view; and those in which the campaigns of Italy are described contain many most invaluable lessons on the art of war. Their political value is by no means so considerable. Gourgaud seems to have formed a true estimation of them, when, in answer to Baron Sturmer's inquiries whether Napoleon was writing his history, he expressed himself thus: "He writes disjointed fragments, which he will never finish. When asked why he will not put history in possession of the exact fact, he answers, it is better to leave something to be guessed than to tell too much. It would also seem, that not considering his extraordinary destinies as entirely accomplished, he is unwilling to detail plans which have not been executed, and which he may one day resume with more success." To these reasons for leaving blanks and imperfections in his proposed history, should be added the danger which a faithful and unreserved narrative must have entailed upon many of the actors in the scenes from which he was lifting the veil. It is no doubt true, that Napoleon seems systematically to have painted his enemies, more especially such as had been once his adherents, in the most odious colours, and particularly in such as seemed likely to render them most obnoxious to the

ruling powers; but the same principle induced him to spare his friends, and to afford no handle against them for their past efforts in his favour, and no motive for taking from them the power of rendering him farther service, if they should be in a capacity to do so.

These considerations operated as a check upon the pen of the historian; and it may be truly said, that no man who has written so much of his own life, and that consisting of such singular and important events, has told so little of himself which was not known before from other sources. But the present is not the less valuable; for there is sometimes as much information derived from the silence as from the assertions of him who aspires to be his own biographer; and an apology for, or vindication of, the course of a remarkable life, however partially written, perhaps conveys the most information to the reader, next to that candid confession of faults and errors, which is so very seldom to be obtained in autobiography.

Napoleon's Memoirs, together with the labour apparently bestowed upon his controversial pamphlets written against Sir Hudson Lowe, seem to have furnished the most important part of his occupation whilst at St Helena, and probably also of his amusement. It was not to be expected that in sickness and calamity he could apply himself to study, even if his youth had furnished him with more stores to work upon. It must be remembered that his whole education had been received at the Military School of Brienne, where indeed he displayed a strong taste for the sciences. But the studies of mathematics and algebra were so early connected and carried on with a view to the military purposes in which he employed them, that it may be questioned whether he retained any relish for prosecuting his scientific pursuits in the character of an inquirer into abstract truths. The practical results had been so long his motive, so long his object, that he ceased to enjoy the use of the theoretical means, when there was no siege to be formed, no complicated manoeuvres to be arranged, no great military purpose to be gained by the display of his skill,—but when all was to begin and end with the discussion of a problem.

That Napoleon had a natural turn for belles lettres is unquestionable; but his leisure never permitted him to cultivate it, or to refine his taste or judgment on such subjects. The recommendation, which, in 1783, described him as fit to be sent to the Military School at Paris, observes, that he is tolerably acquainted with history and geography, but rather deficient in polite accomplishments, and in the Latin language. At seventeen years of age he joined the regiment of La Fère, and thus ended all the opportunities afforded him of regular education. He read, however, very extensively, but, like all young persons, with little discrimination, and more to amuse himself than for the purpose of instruction. Before he had arrived at that more advanced period when youth of such talent as his, and especially when gifted with such a powerful memory, usually think of arranging and classifying the information which they have collected during their earlier course of miscellaneous reading, the tumults of Corsica, and subsequently the siege

of Toulon, carried him into those scenes of war and business which were his element during the rest of his life, and down to the period we now speak of.

The want of information which we have noticed, he supplied, as most able men do, by the assistance derived from conversing with persons possessing knowledge, and capable of communicating it. No one was ever more dexterous than Napoleon at extracting from individuals the kind of information which each was best qualified to impart; and in many cases, while in the act of doing so, he contrived to conceal his own ignorance, even of that which he was anxiously wishing to know. But although in this manner he might acquire facts and results, it was impossible to make himself master, on such easy terms, of general principles, and the connexion betwixt them and the conclusions which they lead to.

It was no less certain, that though in this manner Napoleon could obtain by discoursing with others the insulated portions of information which he was desirous of acquiring, and though the knowledge so acquired served his immediate purpose in public life, these were not habits which could induce him to resume those lighter subjects of study so interesting and delightful in youth, but which an advanced age is unwilling to undertake, and slow to profit by. He had, therefore, never corrected his taste in the belles lettres, but retained his admiration for Ossian, and other books which had fascinated his early attention. The declamatory tone, redundancy of expression, and exaggerated character, of the poetry ascribed to the Celtic bard, suit the taste of very young persons; but Napoleon continued to retain his relish for them to the end of his life; and, in some of his proclamations and bulletins, we can trace the hyperbolical and bombastic expressions which pass upon us in youth for the sublime, but are rejected as taste and reason become refined and improved. There was indeed this apology for Napoleon's lingering fondness for Ossian, that the Italian translation, by Cæsarotti, is said to be one of the most beautiful specimens of the Tuscan language. The work was almost constantly beside him.

Historical, philosophical, or moral works, seem more rarely to have been resorted to for the amusements of Longwood. We have, indeed, been informed, that the only books of this description for which Napoleon showed a decided partiality, were those of Machiavel and Montesquieu, which he did not perhaps consider as fit themes of public recitation; Tacitus, who holds the mirror so close to the features of sovereigns, he is said always to have held in aversion, and seldom to have mentioned without terms of censure or dislike. Thus will the patient sometimes loath the sight of the most wholesome medicine. The French novels of the day were sometimes tried as a resource; but the habits of order and decency which Napoleon observed rendered their levities and indelicacies unfitted for such society.

There remained another department of literature, from which the party at Longwood derived frequent resources. The drama occupied a considerable part of those readings with which Napoleon used to

while away the tedious hours of his imprisonment. This was an indication that he still retained the national taste of France, where few neglect to attend the spectacle, in one form or another, during the space betwixt dinner and the reunion of society in the evening. Next to seeing his ancient favourite Talma, was to Napoleon the reading some of those chefs-d'œuvre to which he had seen and heard him give life and personification. He is himself said to have read with taste and effect, which agrees with the traditions that represent him as having been early attached to theatrical representations. It was in the discussions following these readings, which Las Cases has preserved with so much zeal, that Bonaparte displayed his powers of conversation, and expressed his peculiar habits and opinions.

Corneille and Racine stood much higher in his estimation than Voltaire. There seems a good reason for this. They wrote their immortal works for the meridian of a court, and at the command of the most monarchical of monarchs, Louis XIV. Their productions, therefore, contain nothing that could wound the ear of the most sensitive sovereign. In the King of Denmark's phrase, they "have no fence in them."

With Voltaire it is different. The strong and searching spirit, which afterwards caused the French Revolution, was abroad at his time, and thus aware of the extent to which it might lead, the philosopher of Ferney was not the less its proponent. There were many passages, therefore, in his works, which could not but be instantly applied to the changes and convulsions of the period during which Napoleon had lived, to the despotic character of his government, and to the plans of freedom which had sunk under the influence of his sword. On this account Voltaire, whose composition recalled painful comparisons and recollections, was no favourite with Napoleon. The *Mahomet* of that author he particularly disliked, avowing, at the same time, his respect for the Oriental impostor, whom he accused, the poet of traducing and misrepresenting. Perhaps he secretly acknowledged a certain degree of resemblance between his own career and that of the youthful camel-driver, who, rising from a mean origin in his native tribe, became at once the conqueror and the legislator of so many nations. Perhaps, too, he remembered his own proclamation while in Egypt, in the assumed character of a muleman, which he was wont to term by the true phrase of *charlatanerie*, but adding that it was characteristic of a high and elevated character.

The character of Cæsar was another which Napoleon always strove to vindicate. The French general could not be indifferent to the Roman hero who, like himself, having at first risen into notice by his victories over the enemies of the republic, had also like himself, ended the struggles between patricians and plebeians of ancient Rome, by reducing both parties equally under his own absolute dominion; who would have proclaimed himself their sovereign even by the proscribed title of *dictator*, had he not been prevented by conspiracy; and who when he had conquered his country, thought of nothing so much as extending an empire, already much too large, over the distant regions of Scythia.

Parthia. The points of personal difference, indeed, were considerable; for neither did Napoleon indulge in the gross debauchery and sensuality imputed to Cæsar, nor can we attribute to him the Roman's powers as an author, or the gentle and forgiving character which distinguished him as a man.

Yet, although Napoleon had something vindictive in his temper, which he sometimes indulged when Cæsar would have scorned to do so, his intercourse with his familiar friends was of a character the most amiable. It is true, indeed, that determined, as he expressed himself, to be emperor within Longwood and its little demesne, he exacted from his followers the same marks of severe etiquette which distinguished the Court of the Tuileries; yet in other respects, he permitted them to carry their freedom in disputing his sentiments, or replying to his arguments, almost beyond the bounds of ordinary decorum. He seemed to make a distinction between their duty towards him as subjects, and their privileges as friends. All remained uncovered and standing in his presence, and even the person who played at chess with him sometimes continued for hours without sitting down. But their verbal intercourse of language and sentiments was that of free men, conversing with a superior indeed, but not with a despot. Captain Maitland mentions a dispute betwixt Napoleon and General Bertrand. The latter had adopted a ridiculous idea that £30,000 a-year, or some such extravagant sum, was spent in maintaining the grounds and establishment at Blenheim. Napoleon's turn for calculation easily detected the improbability. Bertrand insisted upon his assertion, on which Bonaparte said, with quickness, "*Bah! c'est impossible.*"—"Oh!" said Bertrand, much offended, "if you are to reply in that manner, there is an end of all argument;" and for some time would not converse with him. Bonaparte, so far from taking umbrage, did all he could to soothe him and restore him to good humour, which was not very difficult to effect.

But although Napoleon tolerated freedoms of this kind to a considerable extent, yet he still kept in his own hands the royal privilege of starting the topic of conversation, and conducting it as he should think proper; so that, in some respects, it seemed that, having lost all the substantial enjoyment of power, he had become more attached than ever to the observance of its monotonous, wearisome, unprofitable ceremonial. Yet there might be a reason for this, besides the gratification of his own peevish temper. The gentlemen who inhabited Longwood had followed him from the purest motives, and there was no reason to suppose that their purpose would waver, or their respect diminish. Still their mutual situation compelled the deposed sovereign, and his late subjects, into such close familiarity, as might perhaps beget, if not contempt, at least an inconvenient degree of freedom betwixt the parties, the very possibility of which it might be as well to exclude by a strict barrier of etiquette.

We return to Napoleon's habits of amusement. Music was not one of the number. Though born an Italian, and possessing something of a musical ear, so far, at least, as was necessary to enable him to hum a song, it was probably entirely without culti-

vation. He appears to have had none of the fanaticism for music which characterizes the Italians; and it is well known that in Italy he put a stop to the cruel methods which had been used in that country to complete their concerts.

Neither was Napoleon, as we have heard Denon reluctantly admit, a judge or an admirer of painting. He had some pretence to understand sculpture; and there was one painting in the Museum, before which he used to pause, terming it his own; nor would he permit it to be ransomed for a very large sum by its proprietor the Duke of Modena.* But he valued it, not on account of its merit, though a master-piece of art, but because he had himself been the means of securing it to the Museum at a great sacrifice. The other paintings in that immense collection, however great their excellence, he seldom paid much attention to. He also shocked admirers of painting by the contempt he showed for the durability of the art. Being informed that a first-rate picture would not last above five or six hundred years, he exclaimed, "*Bah! a fine immortality!*" Yet by using Denon's advice, and that of other savans, Napoleon sustained a high reputation as an encourager of the arts. His medals have been particularly and deservedly admired.

In respect of personal exercise at St Helena, he walked occasionally, and, while strong, did not shun steep, rough, and dangerous paths. But although there is some game on the island, he did not avail himself of the pleasure of shooting. It does not indeed appear that he was ever much attached to field sports, although, when emperor, he replaced the hunting establishment upon a scale still more magnificent, as well as better regulated, than formerly. It is supposed he partook of this princely pastime, as it has been called, rather out of a love of magnificent display than any real attachment to the sport. We may here mention, in his own words, the danger in which he was once placed at a boar-hunt. The picture will remind the amateur of the pieces of Rubens and Schneider.

"Upon one occasion at Marly," said the emperor, "at a boar-hunt, I kept my ground with Soult and Berthier against three enormous wild-boars, who charged us up to the bayonet's point. All the hunting party fled: 'twas a complete military rout. We killed the three animals dead; but I had a scratch from mine, and had nigh lost my finger" (on which a deep scar was still visible). "But the jest was to see the numbers of men, surrounded with their dogs, concealing themselves behind the three heroes, and crying at top of their throats—'to the emperor's assistance! save the emperor! help the emperor!'—and so forth; but not one coming forward."

While on the subject of Napoleon's exercises, we may mention another danger which he incurred by following an amusement more common in England than in France. He chose at one time to undertake the task of driving a carriage, which he overturned, and had a severe and dangerous fall. Joséphine and others were in the vehicle. The English reader cannot fail to recollect that a similar accident happened to Cromwell, who, because, as the historian

* See p. 193.

says, he could manage three nations, took upon him to suppose that he could drive six fiery horses, of which he had just received a present; and, being as unsuccessful as Napoleon in later days, overturned the carriage, to the great damage of the Secretary Thurlow, whom he had placed inside, and to his own double risk, both from the fall, and from the explosion of a pistol, which he carried privately about his person. Bonaparte's sole observation was, "I believe every man should confine himself to his own trade."

The chief resource of Napoleon at St Helena was society and conversation, and those held chiefly with the gentlemen of his own suite. This need not have been the case, had he been able in the present instance to command that temper which had not failed him under great misfortunes, but seemed now to give way under a series of petty quarrels and mortifications.

The governor and the staff belonging to him were of course excluded from the society of Longwood, by the terms on which Napoleon stood with Sir Hudson Lowe. The officers of the regiments which lay in the island might most probably have afforded some well-informed men, who, having been engaged in the recent war, would have occasionally supplied amusing society to the emperor and his suite. But they did not in general frequent Longwood. Dr O'Meara observes that the governor had exerted his influence to prevent the officers from cultivating the acquaintance of the French; which Sir Hudson Lowe repels as a calumny, confuted by the declarations of the officers of the 53d themselves. But admitting that no intimations were used of set purpose to keep asunder the British officers from the French prisoners, such estrangement naturally followed from the unwillingness of military men to go where they were sure to hear not only their commanding officer for the time, but also their country and its ministers, treated with the grossest expressions of disrespect, while there was no mode of calling the person who used them either to account or to explanation.

The rank and character of Sir Pulteney Malcolm, who commanded the squadron upon the station, set him above the feelings which might influence inferior officers, whether of the army or navy. He visited Napoleon frequently, and was eulogized by him in a description, which (though we, who have the advantage of seeing in the features of Sir Pulteney those of an honoured friend, can vouch for its being just) may have been painted the more willingly, because it gave the artist an opportunity of discharging his spleen, while contrasting the appearance of the admiral with that of the governor, in a manner most unfavourable to the latter. Nevertheless we transcribe it, to prove that Bonaparte could occasionally do justice, and see desert, even in a Briton.

"He said he had seen the new admiral. 'Ah! there is a man with a countenance really pleasing, open, frank, and sincere. There is the face of an Englishman. His countenance bespeaks his heart, and I am sure he is a good man: I never yet beheld a man of whom I so immediately formed a good opinion, as of that fine soldier-like old man. He carries his head erect, and speaks out openly

and boldly what he thinks, without being afraid to look you in the face at the time. His physiognomy would make every person desirous of a further acquaintance, and render the most suspicious confident in him."

Sir Pulteney Malcolm was also much recommended to Napoleon's favourable judgment by the circumstance of having nothing to do with the restraints imposed upon his person, and possessing the power neither of altering or abating any of the restrictions he complained of. He was fortunate, too, in being able, by the calmness of his temper, to turn aside the violent language of Bonaparte, without either granting the justice of his complaints, or giving him displeasure by direct contradiction. "Does your government mean," said Napoleon one day to the English admiral, "to detain me upon this rock until my death's day?"—"I am sorry to say, sir," answered Sir Pulteney, "that such I apprehend is their purpose."—"Then the term of my life will soon arrive," said Napoleon. "I hope not, sir," answered the admiral; "I hope you will survive to record your great actions, which are so numerous that the task will insure you a term of his life." Napoleon bowed, and was gratified, probably both as a hero and as an author. Nevertheless before Sir Pulteney Malcolm left the island, as while he was endeavouring to justify the governor against some of the harsh and extravagant charges in which Napoleon was wont to indulge, the latter began to appeal from his judgment as being too much of an Englishman to be an impartial judge. They parted, however, on the best terms, and Napoleon often afterwards expressed the pleasure which he had received from the society of Sir Pulteney Malcolm.

The colonists of St Helena did not, it may be well supposed, furnish many individuals, sufficiently qualified, by rank and education, to be admitted into the society of the exile. They too, lay under the same awkward circumstances, which prevented the British officers from holding intercourse with Longwood and its inhabitants. The governor, should he be displeased at the too frequent attentions of any individual, or should he conceive any suspicion arising out of such an intercourse, might the power, and in the opinion of the colonists, might not want the inclination, to make his resentment severely felt. Mr Balcombe, however, who held the situation of purveyor, with one or two other inhabitants of the island, sometimes visited at Longwood. The general intercourse between the French prisoners and the colonists was carried on by means of the French domestics, who had the privilege of visiting James Town as often as they pleased, and whose doings could infer no disadvantageous suspicions. But the society of Longwood gained no advantage by its intercourse with James Town, although unquestionably the facility of foreign communication was considerably increased to the exiles. Their correspondence was chiefly maintained by the way of Russia, and it is certain they succeeded in sending many letters to Europe, although they are believed to have been less fortunate in receiving answers.

It was to be expected, that some accession to the society of Longwood might have accrued, from the

residence of three gentlemen of rank, two of them, we believe, having ladies and a family, the commissioners of Austria, Russia, and France. But here also ceremonial interposed one of those bars, which are effectual, or otherwise, according to the opinion of those betwixt whom they are erected. The commissioners of the allied powers had requested to be presented to Napoleon. On their wish being announced, he peremptorily declined to receive them in their official capacity, disclaiming the right which the princes of Europe had to interfere with and countenance the custody of his person. On the other hand, the commissioners, finding their public function disowned, refused to hold any communication with Longwood in their private capacity; and thus there were excluded from this solitary spot three persons, whose manners and habits, as foreigners, might have assorted tolerably with those of the exile and his attendants.

The society of St Helena receives a great temporary increase at the seasons when vessels touch there on their way to India, or on their return to Europe. Of course, every officer and every passenger on such occasions was desirous to see a person so celebrated as Napoleon; and there might sometimes occur individuals among them whom he too might have pleasure in receiving. The regulation of these visits to Longwood seems to have been one of the few parts of the general system of which Napoleon made no complaints. He had a natural reluctance to gratify the idle curiosity of strangers, and the regulations protected him effectually against their intrusion. Such persons as desired to wait upon Napoleon were obliged to apply, in the first place, to the governor, by whom their names were transmitted to General Bertrand, as grand marshal of the household, who communicated Napoleon's reply, if favourable, and assigned an hour at which he was to receive their visit.

Upon such occasions, Napoleon was particularly anxious that the etiquette of an imperial court should be observed, while the visitors, on the contrary, were strictly enjoined by the governor not to go beyond the civilities due to a general of rank. If, therefore, as sometimes happened, the introduction took place in the open air, the French part of the company attendant on Bonaparte remained uncovered, while the English replaced their hats after the first salutation. Napoleon saw the incongruity of this, and laid his orders on his attendants to imitate the English in this particular point. It is said, that they did not obey without scruples and murmurs.

Those visitors who were admitted to pay their respects at Longwood were chiefly either persons of distinguished birth, officers of rank in the army and navy, persons of philosophical inquiry (to whom he was very partial), or travelers from foreign regions, who could repay, by some information, the pleasure which they received from being admitted to the presence of a man so distinguished. Of these interviews, some who enjoyed the benefit of them have published an account; and the memoranda of others we have seen in manuscript. All agree in extolling the extreme good grace, propriety, and appearance of benevolence, with which Napoleon

clothed himself whilst holding these levees; and which scarce left the spectators permission to believe that, when surprised by a fit of passion, or when chusing to assume one for the purpose of effect, he could appear the rude, abrupt, and savage despot, which other accounts described him. His questions were uniformly introduced with great tact, so as to put the person interrogated at his ease, by leading to some subject with which he was acquainted, while, at the same time, they induced him to produce any stock of new or curious information which he possessed.

The Journal of Captain Basil Hall of the Royal Navy, well-known by his character both in his profession and in literature, affords a pleasing example of what we have been endeavouring to express, and displays at the same time the powerful extent of Bonaparte's memory. He recognized the name of Captain Hall instantly, from having seen his father, Sir James Hall, Bart., when he was at the military academy of Brienne, to which visit Sir James had been led by the love of science, by which he was always distinguished. Bonaparte explained the cause of his recollecting a private individual, after the intervention of such momentous events as he had himself been concerned in. "It is not," he said, "surprising. Your father was the first Englishman that I ever saw; and I have recollected him all my life on that account." He was afterwards minute in his inquiries respecting the Royal Society of Edinburgh, of which Sir James Hall was long president. He then came to the very interesting subject of the newly-discovered island of Loo-Choo; and Captain Hall gives an account of the nature of the interrogations which he underwent, which we will not risk spoiling by an attempt at condensing.

"Having settled where the island lay, he cross-questioned me about the inhabitants with a closeness—I may call it a severity of investigation—which far exceeds every thing I have met with in any other instance. His questions were not by any means put at random, but each one had some definite reference to that which preceded it, or was about to follow. I felt in a short time so completely exposed to his view, that it would have been impossible to have concealed or qualified the smallest particular. Such, indeed, was the rapidity of his apprehension of the subjects which interested him, and the astonishing ease with which he arranged and generalized the few points of information I gave him, that he sometimes outstripped my narrative, saw the conclusion I was coming to before I spoke it, and fairly robbed me of my story.

"Several circumstances, however, respecting the Loo-Choo people surprised even him a good deal; and I had the satisfaction of seeing him more than once completely perplexed, and unable to account for the phenomena which I related. Nothing struck him so much as their having no arms. '*Point d'armes!*' he exclaimed. '*c'est-à-dire point de canons—ils ont des fusils?*' Not even muskets, I replied. '*Eh bien donc—des lances, ou, au moins, des arcs et des flèches?*' I told him they had neither one nor other. '*Ni poignards?*' cried he, with increasing vehemence. 'No, none. '*Mais!*' said Bonaparte, clenching his fist, and raising his voice

to a loud pitch, '*Mais! sans armes, comment se bat-on?*'

"I could only reply, that, as far as we had been able to discover, they had never had any wars, but remained in a state of internal and external peace. 'No wars!' cried he, with a scornful and incredulous expression, as if the existence of any people under the sun without wars was a monstrous anomaly.

"In like manner, but without being so much moved, he seemed to discredit the account I gave him of their having no money, and of their setting no value upon our silver or gold coins. After hearing these facts stated, he mused for some time, muttering to himself, in a low tone, 'Not know the use of money—are careless about gold and silver.' Then looking up, he asked, sharply, 'How then did you contrive to pay these stragglers of all people for the bullocks and other good things which they seem to have sent on board in such quantities?' When I informed him that we could not prevail upon the people of Loo-Choo to receive payment of any kind, he expressed great surprise at their liberality, and made me repeat to him twice the list of things with which we were supplied by these hospitable islanders."

The conversation proceeded with equal spirit, in which it is singular to remark the acuteness of Napoleon, in seizing upon the most remarkable and interesting facts, notwithstanding the hurry of a casual conversation. The low state of the priesthood in Loo-Choo was a subject which he dwelt on without coming to any satisfactory explanation. Captain Hall illustrated the ignorance of the people of Loo-Choo with respect to all the world, save Japan and China, by saying they knew nothing of Europe at all—knew nothing of France and England—and never had even heard of his majesty; at which last proof of their absolute seclusion from the world, Napoleon laughed heartily. During the whole interview, Napoleon waited with the utmost patience until his questions were replied to, inquired with earnestness into every subject of interest, and made naturally a most favourable impression on his visitor.

"Bonaparte," says the acute traveler, "struck me as differing considerably from the pictures and busts I had seen of him. His face and figure looked much broader and more square, larger, indeed, in every way, than any representation I had met with. His corpulency, at this time universally reported to be excessive, was by no means remarkable. His flesh looked, on the contrary, firm and muscular. There was not the least trace of colour in his cheeks; in fact, his skin was more like marble than ordinary flesh. Not the smallest trace of a wrinkle was discernible on his brow, nor an approach to a furrow on any part of his countenance. His health and spirits, judging from appearances, were excellent; though at this period it was generally believed in England, that he was fast sinking under a complication of diseases, and that his spirits were entirely gone. His manner of speaking was rather slow than otherwise, and perfectly distinct: he waited with great patience and kindness for my answers to his questions, and a reference to Count Bertrand was necessary only once during the whole

conversation. The brilliant and sometimes dazzling expression of his eye could not be overlooked. It was not, however, a permanent lustre, for it was only remarkable when he was excited by some point of particular interest. It is impossible to imagine an expression of more entire mildness, I may almost call it of benignity and kindness, than that which played over his features during the whole interview. If, therefore, he were at this time out of health and in low spirits, his power of self-command must have been even more extraordinary than is generally supposed; for his whole deportment, his conversation, and the expression of his countenance, indicated a frame in perfect health, and a mind at ease."

The date of this meeting was 13th August, 1817.

In the above interview, Bonaparte played a natural part. Upon another remarkable occasion, 1st July, 1817, when he received Lord Amherst and the gentlemen composing and attached to the embassy, then returning from China, his behaviour and conversation were of a much more studied, restrained, and empirical character. He had obviously a part to play, a statement to make, and propositions to announce, not certainly with the view that the seed which he sowed might fall into barren ground; but that it might be retained, gathered up, and carried back to Britain, there to take root in public credulity, and bear fruit seven-fold. He rushed once into a tide of politics, declaring that the Russian ascendancy was to be the destruction of Europe; yet, in the same moment, proclaimed the French and English to be the only effective troops deserving notice for their discipline and moral qualities. Presently after, he struck the English out of the field on account of the smallness of the army, and insisted that, by trusting to our military forces, we were endangering our naval ascendancy. He then entered upon a favourite topic—the extreme negligence of Lord Castlereagh in failing to stipulate, or rather extort, a commercial treaty from France, and to wring out of Portugal reimbursement of our expenses. He seemed to consider this as sacrificing the interests and welfare of his country, and stated it as such, with a confidence which was calculated to impress upon the hearers that he was completely serious in the extravagant doctrines which he announced.

He failed, of course, to make any impression on Lord Amherst, or on Mr Henry Ellis, third commissioner of the embassy, to whom a large portion of this violent tirade was addressed, and who he permitted us to have the perusal of his private journal, which is much more full on the subject of this interview than the account given in the periodical narrative of the embassy which appeared in 1817.

Having stated Lord Castlereagh's supposed errors towards the state, Napoleon was not silent upon his own injuries. It was chiefly in his conversation with Lord Amherst that he dwelt with great bitterness on Sir Hudson Lowe's conduct to him in various respects; but totally failed in producing the conviction which he aimed at. It seemed, on the contrary,

* See Appendix, No. 12, for one of the best and most authentic accounts of Napoleon's conversation and mode of reasoning.

to the ambassador and his attendants, that there never, perhaps, was a prisoner of importance upon whose personal liberty fewer actual restraints had been imposed, than on that of the late sovereign of France. Mr Ellis, after personal inspection, was induced to regard his complaints concerning provisions and wine as totally undeserving of consideration, and to regret that real or pretended anger should have induced so great a man to countenance such petty misrepresentations. The house at Longwood, considered as a residence for a sovereign, Mr Ellis allowed to be small and inadequate; but, on the other hand, regarded as the residence of a person of rank living in retirement, being the view taken in England of the prisoner's condition, it was, in his opinion, both convenient and respectable. Reviewing, also, the extent of his limits, Mr Ellis observes that greater personal liberty, consistent with any pretension to security, could not be granted to an individual supposed to be under any restraint at all. His intercourse with others, he observes, was certainly under immediate surveillance, no one being permitted to enter Longwood, or its domains, without a pass from the governor; but this pass, he affirms, was readily granted, and had never formed any check upon such visitors as Napoleon desired to see. The restraint upon his correspondence is admitted as disagreeable and distressing to his feelings, but is considered as a "necessary consequence of that which he now is, and had formerly been." "Two motives," said Mr Ellis, "may, I think, be assigned for Bonaparte's unreasonable complaints. The first, and principal, is to keep alive public interest in Europe, but chiefly in England, where he flatters himself that he has a party; and the second, I think, may be traced to the personal character and habits of Bonaparte, who finds an occupation in the petty intrigues by which these complaints are brought forward, and an unworthy gratification in the *tracasseries* and annoyance which they produce on the spot."

The sagacity of Mr Ellis was not deceived; for General Gourgaud, among other points of information, mentions the interest which Bonaparte had taken in the interview with the embassy which returned to Britain from China, and conceived that his arguments had made a strong impression upon them. The publication of Mr Ellis's account of the embassy dispelled that dream, and gave rise to proportional disappointment at St Helena.

Having now given some account of the general circumstances attending Bonaparte's residence in St Helena, while he enjoyed a considerable portion of health, of his mode of living, his studies, and amusements, and having quoted two remarkable instances of his intercourse with strangers of observation and intelligence, we have to resume, in the next chapter, the melancholy particulars of his decline of health, and the few and unimportant incidents which occurred betwixt the commencement of his sickness and its final termination.

CHAPTER CXV.

Napoleon's illness—viz. Cancer in the stomach.—Dr Arnott's opinion that it was not the effect of climate,

but had been growing upon him since 1817.—The disposition which might have obtained a relaxation of the restrictions by which Napoleon was guarded, not manifested by him.—Removal of Las Cases from his household.—Montholon's various complaints brought forward by Lord Holland in the House of Lords, and replied to by Lord Bathurst.—Effect of the failure of Lord Holland's motion upon Bonaparte.—Symptoms of his illness increase—his refusal to take exercise or medicine.—Removal of Dr O'Meara from his attendance on Bonaparte—who refuses to permit the visits of any other English physician.—Two Roman Catholic priests sent to St Helena at his desire.—Napoleon's opinions on the subject of religion.—Dr Antommarchi arrives to supply the place of O'Meara.—Continued disputes between Napoleon and Sir Hudson Lowe.—Plans for effecting Bonaparte's escape.—Scheme of Johnstone, a daring smuggler, to approach St Helena in a submarine vessel, and receive the prisoner on board—frustrated by the seizure of the vessel.—The disturbed state of Italy and other causes render fresh vigilance in the custody of Napoleon's person necessary.—His disease increases.—Letter expressing his majesty's interest in the illness of Napoleon.—Consent of the latter to admit the visits of Dr Arnott.—Napoleon employs himself in making his will—and gives other directions connected with his decease.—Extreme unction administered to him.—His Death, on 5th May, 1821.—Anatomization of the body.—His funeral.

REPORTS had been long current concerning the decline of Bonaparte's health, even before the battle of Waterloo; and many were disposed to impute his failure in that decisive campaign, less to the superiority of his enemies than to the decrease of his own habits of activity. There seems no room for such a conclusion: the rapid manner in which he concentrated his army upon Charleroi ought to have silenced such a report for ever. He was subject occasionally to slight fits of sleepiness, such as are incident to most men, especially after the age of forty, who sleep ill, rise early, and work hard. When he landed at St Helena, so far did he seem from showing any appearance of declining health, that one of the British grenadiers, who saw him, exclaimed, with his national oath, "They told us he was growing old;—he has forty good campaigns in his belly yet, d—n him!" A speech which the French gentlemen envied, as it ought, they said, to have belonged to one of the Old Guard. We have mentioned Captain Hall's account of his apparent state of health in summer, 1817; that of Mr Ellis, about the same period, is similar, and he expresses his belief that Bonaparte was never more able to undergo the fatigues of a campaign than at the moment he saw him. Yet at this time, viz. July, 1817, Napoleon was alleging the decline of his health as a reason for obtaining more indulgence, while, on the other hand, he refused to take the exercise judged necessary to preserve his constitution, unless a relaxation of superintendence should be granted to him. It is probable, however, that he himself felt, even at that period, the symptoms of that internal malady which consumed his life. It is now well known to have been the cruel complaint of which his father died, a cancer, namely, in the stomach, of which he had repeatedly expressed his apprehensions, both in Russia and elsewhere. The

progress of this disease, however, is slow and insidious, if indeed it had actually commenced so early as 1817. Gourgaud, at a much later period, avowed himself a complete disbeliever in his illness. He allowed, indeed, that he was in low spirits to such an extent as to talk of destroying himself and his attached followers, by shutting himself and them up in a small apartment with burning charcoal—an easy death, which Berthollet the chemist had, it seems, recommended. Nevertheless, "on the subject of General Bonaparte's health, General Gourgaud stated that the English were much imposed upon; for that he was not, as far as bodily health was concerned, in any degree materially altered, and that the representations upon this subject had little, if any, truth in them. Dr O'Meara was certainly the dupe of that influence which General Bonaparte always exercises over those with whom he has frequent intercourse, and though he (General Gourgaud) individually had only reason *de se louer de M. O'Meara*, yet his intimate knowledge of General Bonaparte enabled him confidently to assert that his state of health was not at all worse than it had been for some time previous to his arrival at St Helena."

Yet, as before hinted, notwithstanding the disbelief of friends and foes, it seems probable that the dreadful disease of which Napoleon died was already seizing upon the vitals, though its character was not decisively announced by external symptoms. Dr Arnott, surgeon to the 20th regiment, who attended on Napoleon's death-bed, has made the following observations upon this important subject:

"We are given to understand, from great authority,* that this affection of the stomach cannot be produced without a considerable predisposition of the parts to disease. I will not venture an opinion; but it is somewhat remarkable, that he often said that his father died of scirrhus of the pylorus; that the body was examined after death, and the fact ascertained. His faithful followers, Count and Countess Bertrand, and Count Montholon, have repeatedly declared the same to me.

"If, then, it should be admitted that a previous disposition of the parts to this disease did exist, might not the depressing passions of the mind act as an exciting cause? It is more than probable that Napoleon Bonaparte's mental sufferings in St Helena were very poignant. By a man of such unbounded ambition, and who once aimed at universal dominion, captivity must have been severely felt.

"The climate of St Helena I consider healthy; the air is pure and temperate, and Europeans enjoy their health, and retain the vigour of their constitution, as in their native country."

Dr Arnott proceeds to state, that notwithstanding this general assertion, dysentery, and other acute diseases of the abdominal viscera, prevailed among the troops. This he imputes to the carelessness and intemperance of the English soldiers, and the fatigue of the working parties; as the officers, who had little night duty, retained their health and strength as in

Europe. "I can therefore safely assert," continues the physician, "that any one of temperate habits, who is not exposed to much bodily exertion, night air, and atmospherical changes, as a soldier must be, may have as much immunity from disease in St Helena as in Europe; and I may therefore further assert, that the disease of which Napoleon Bonaparte died was *not* the effect of climate."

In support of Dr Arnott's statement, it may be observed, that of Napoleon's numerous family of nearly fifty persons, English servants included, only one died during all their five years' residence on the island; and that person (Cypriani, the major-domo) had contracted the illness which carried him off being a species of consumption, before he left Europe.

Dr Arnott, to whose opinion we are induced to give great weight, both from the excellence of his character and his having the best opportunities of information, states that the scirrhus, or cancer of the stomach, is an obscure disease, the symptoms which announce it being common to, and characteristic of other diseases, in the same region; yet he early conceived that some morbid alteration of the structure of the stomach had taken place, especially after he learned that his patient's father had died of scirrhus of the pylorus. He believed, as already hinted, that the disease was in its incipient state even so far back as the end of the year 1817, when the patient was affected with pain in the stomach, nausea, and vomiting, especially after taking food, which symptoms never left him from that period, but increased progressively till the day of his death.

From this period, therefore, Napoleon was in a situation which, considering his great actions, and the height of his former fortunes, deserved the compassion of his most bitter enemies, and the sympathy of all who were disposed to take a moral lesson from the most extraordinary vicissitude of human affairs which history has ever presented. Nor can we doubt that such reflections might have eventually led to much relaxation in the severity with which the prisoner was watched, and, it may be, at length to his entire emancipation. But to attain this end, it would have been necessary that Napoleon's conduct, while under restrictions, should have been of a very different character from that which he thought it most politic, or felt it most natural, to adopt. First, to obtain the sympathy and privileges due to an invalid, he ought to have permitted the visits of some medical person, whose report might be held as completely impartial. This could not be the case with that of Dr O'Meara, engaged as he was in the prisoner's intimate and even secret service and on the worst terms with the governor; and Napoleon's positive rejection of all other assistance seemed to countenance the belief, however unjust, that he was either feigning indisposition, or making use of some slight symptoms of it to obtain a relaxation of his governor's vigilance. Nor was it to be supposed that Dr Antommarchi's evidence, being that of an individual entirely dependent on Napoleon, could be considered as more authentic, till corroborated by some indifferent, and, at the same time, competent medical authority.

Secondly, It is to be remembered that the fun

* * See Dr Baillie's inestimable book on Morbid Anatomy, pp. 141, 142."

damental reason on which Napoleon's confinement was vindicated, was, that his liberty was inconsistent with the tranquillity of Europe. To prove the contrary, it would have been necessary that the ex-emperor should have evinced a desire to retreat from political disputes, and shown symptoms of having laid aside or forgotten those ambitious projects which had so long convulsed Europe. Compassion, and the admiration of great talents, might then have led the states of Europe to confide in the resigned dispositions of one, whom age, infirmities, and sufferings, appeared to incline to dedicate the remainder of his days to ease and retirement, and in whom they might seem a sure guarantee for his pacific intentions. But so far were such feelings from being exhibited, that everything which emanated from St Helena showed that the ex-emperor nourished all his former plans, and vindicated all his former actions. He was not satisfied that the world should adopt the opinion that his ambition was allayed, and his pretensions to empire relinquished. On the contrary, his efforts, and those of the works into which he breathed his spirit, went to prove, if they proved anything, that he never entertained ambition of a culpable character—that his claims of sovereignty were grounded upon national law and justice—that he had a right to entertain them formerly, and that he was disposed and entitled to assert them still. He was at pains to let the world know that he was not altered in the slightest degree, was neither ashamed of his projects, nor had renounced them; but, if restored to Europe, that he would be in all respects the same person, with the same claims, and little diminished activity, as when he landed at Cannes to recover the empire of France.

This mode of pleading his cause had the inevitable consequence, of confirming all those who had deemed restrictions on his freedom to be necessary in the outset (and these were the great majority of Europe), in the belief that the same reasons existed for continuing the restraint, which had originally caused it to be imposed. We are unwilling to revert again to the hackneyed simile of the imprisoned lion; but certainly, if the royal animal which Don Quixote desired to set at liberty had, instead of demeaning himself peaceably and with urbanity, been roaring, ramping, and tearing the bars of his cage, it may be questioned whether the Great Redresser of Wrongs himself would have advocated his freedom.

In November, 1816, Napoleon sustained a loss to which he must have been not a little sensible, in the removal of Count Las Cases from his society. The devoted attachment of the count to his person could not be doubted, and his age, and situation as a civilian, made him less apt to enter into those feuds and quarrels, which sometimes, notwithstanding their general attachment to Napoleon, seemed to have arisen among the military officers of the household of Longwood. He was of a literary turn, and qualified to converse upon general topics, both of history and science. He had been an emigrant, and, understanding all the manoeuvres and intrigues of the ancient noblesse, had many narrations which Napoleon was not unwilling to listen to. Above all, he received and recorded everything which was said by Napoleon, with undoubting faith and

unwearied assiduity. And, like the author of one of the most entertaining books in the English language (Boswell's *Life of Johnson*), Count Las Cases thought nothing trivial that could illustrate his subject. Like Boswell, too, his veneration for his principal was so deep, that he seems to have lost, in some cases, the exact perception of right and wrong, in his determination to consider Napoleon as always in the right. But his attachment, if to a certain degree tending to blind his judgment, came warm from his heart. The count gave a substantial mark, also, of his sincerity, in dedicating to his master's service a sum of £4000, or thereabout, his whole private fortune, which was vested in the English funds.

For our misfortune, as also for his own, since he must have considered his separation from Bonaparte as such, Count Las Cases had been tempted into a line of conduct inconsistent with the engagement he had come under with the other attendants of the ex-emperor, not to hold secret communication beyond the verge of the island. The opportunity of a servant of his own returning to England, induced him to confide to the domestic's charge a letter, written upon a piece of white silk, that it might be the more readily concealed, which was stitched into the lad's clothes. It was addressed to Prince Lucien Bonaparte. As this was a direct transgression, in a most material point, of the conditions which Count Las Cases had promised to observe, he was dismissed from the island, and sent to the Cape of Good Hope, and from thence to Europe. His Journal remained for some time in the hands of Sir Hudson Lowe; but, as we had formerly occasion to mention, alterations and additions were afterwards made, which, in general, are more vituperative of the governor, than the manuscript as it originally stood when the count left St Helena. The abridgment of the count's stay at the island was much to be regretted, as his Journal forms the best record, not only of Napoleon's real thoughts, but of the opinions which he desired should be received as such. Unquestionably, the separation from this devoted follower added greatly to the disconsolate situation of the Exile of Longwood; but it is impossible to suppress the remark, that, when a gentleman attached to Napoleon's suite found himself at liberty thus to break through a plighted engagement in his chief's behalf, it sufficiently vindicated Sir Hudson Lowe for putting little faith in the professions made to him, and declining to relax any reasonable degree of vigilance which the safe custody of his prisoner seemed to demand.

The complaints of Napoleon and his followers produced, as they ought to have done, an inquiry into the personal treatment of the ex-emperor, in the British Parliament; when the general reasoning which we have hinted at, joined to the exposure which ministers afforded of the exaggerated representations that had been made in the statements which had come from St Helena, were found greatly to preponderate over the arguments of Napoleon's compassionate and accomplished advocate, Lord Holland.

The question came before the House of Lords, on 18th March, 1817. Lord Holland, in a speech of great good sense and moderation, disowned all

attempts at persuading the House, that the general line of policy adopted with respect to Napoleon should be changed. It had been adopted in contradiction to his (Lord Holland's) sentiments, but it had been confirmed by Parliament, and he did not hope to obtain a reversal of their judgment. But, if the confining Napoleon was, as had been alleged, a measure of necessity, it followed that necessity must limit what necessity had created, and of course that the prisoner should be treated with no unnecessary harshness. His lordship did not presume to state the reports which had reached him as absolute matters of fact, but only as rumours which demanded an inquiry, where the honour of the country was so nearly concerned. Most of the allegations on which Lord Holland grounded his motion were contained in a paper of complaints sent by General Montholon. The particulars noticed in this remonstrance were circumstances which have been already adverted to, but may be here briefly noticed, as well as the answers by the British government.

First, the restrictions upon the exercising ground formerly allowed to Napoleon were alleged as a grievance. The climate of St Helena, Lord Holland admitted, was good, but his lordship complained that the upper part of the island, where Longwood was situated, was damp and unhealthy. The inconvenience of the house was also complained of.

Lord Bathurst, the colonial secretary of state, replied to this charge, that the general accounts of Longwood described it as healthy. It had been the usual country residence of the lieutenant-governor, which went far to show that the site could not be ineligible. The situation had been preferred by Napoleon himself, who was so impatient to take possession of it, that he even wished to have pitched a tent there till the house could be cleared for his reception. The restriction of the bounds of exercise, he explained to have been caused by Napoleon's evincing some disposition to tamper with the inhabitants. He still had a circuit of eight miles, within which he might range unattended and uncontrolled. If he wished to go farther, he was at liberty to traverse the island, upon permitting an orderly officer to join his suite. His refusal to take exercise on such terms was not the fault of the British government; and if Napoleon's health suffered in consequence, it was the result not of the regulations, which were reasonable and indispensable, but of his own wilfulness in refusing to comply with them.

The second class of exceptions taken by Lord Holland was against what he considered as the harsh and iniquitous restrictions upon the exile's communication with Europe. He was not, his lordship stated, permitted to obtain books, or to subscribe for journals and newspapers. All intercourse by letter was interdicted to the distinguished prisoner, even with his wife, his child, and his nearest and dearest relatives. He was not allowed to write under seal to the Prince Regent.

Upon these several topics Lord Bathurst answered, that a list of books, the value of which amounted to £1400 or £1500 (which General Montholon termed a few books), had been sent by Napoleon to Britain; that the commissioners put this

list into the hands of an eminent French bookseller, who had supplied as many as could be obtained in London and Paris, but several of them, chiefly works on military matters, could not be procured. The volumes which could be procured, had been sent with an apology for the omission of those which were not to be gotten; but the residents of Longwood had not admitted the excuse. Respecting the permission of a free subscription by Napoleon to journals, Lord Bathurst deemed it his duty to place some restriction upon that species of indulgence, attempts having been detected to establish correspondence with Napoleon through the medium of newspapers. On the subject of intercourse with Europe by letter, Lord Bathurst stated that it was not interdicted, unless by the condition that Sir Hudson Lowe should previously be permitted to read the letter, whether of business or otherwise. This right, Lord Bathurst stated, had been exercised only by the governor in person, and with strict delicacy and feeling; and he repelled, with the most flat contradiction, the assertions of Montholon that the Governor of St Helena had broken open and detained letters, under pretence that they did not come through the channel of the English minister. Lord Bathurst said, that General Montholon had been challenged by Sir Hudson Lowe to produce a single instance of such tyranny having been permitted, but that the French general had remained silent, the assertion being absolutely false. All the letters which the relatives of Napoleon were disposed to send through his, Lord Bathurst's office, he said, should be instantly forwarded, but was a necessary preliminary that such should be written. Now, a letter from his brother Joseph, which was received in October last, and instantly forwarded, was the only one from any of his family or relatives which had reached the office. His lordship then adverted to the regulation which enacted that even a letter to the Prince Regent must pass through the Governor of St Helena's hands in its open state. Lord Bathurst explained that the regulation gave the governor no authority or option as to transmitting the letter, which he was directed to forward instantly. The rule only required that Sir Hudson Lowe should be privy to the contents, in order that, if it should contain any impeachment of his conduct, his defence or apology might reach London as soon as the accusation. This, his lordship remarked, was necessary, in order that no time might be lost in redressing a complaint of a grave character, or repelling any frivolous and unsubstantial charge. He added, that should any such letter be addressed to the Prince Regent by Napoleon, he, Lord Bathurst, would have no hesitation to open it, if the governor had not previously done so. He should conceive it to be his duty to forward it instantly as addressed whenever he was acquainted with the contents; but being in his department responsible for the acts of the sovereign, he would feel it his duty to make himself previously acquainted with the nature of the communication.

Thirdly, Lord Holland touched on the inadequacy of the sum allowed for the maintenance of Napoleon, and on the unworthiness of making that pension contribute to bear his own charges. The

ministers, his lordship stated, having placed him in a situation where great expense was necessary, turned round upon him, and insisted that he should himself be in a great measure at the charge of supporting it.

Lord Bathurst replied by stating the facts with which the reader is already acquainted. He mentioned, that the sum of £8000 had been fixed upon as adequate, after the heavy expenses of the first year; and that it was increased to £12,000 on the remonstrance of Sir Hudson Lowe. This allowance, he said, was the same given to the governor, who had to bear the cost of frequent entertainments. It did not appear to government, that the family of Napoleon, which was to be maintained on the footing of that becoming a general officer of distinction, ought to cost more than that of Sir Hudson Lowe, who actually held that condition, with the necessity of discharging the expenses of his staff, and all other incumbent disbursements. He gave some details on the subject of the provisions and the cellar, from which it appeared, that, besides the inferior species of wine, the table of Napoleon was supplied at the rate of two bottles daily of a superior quality for each individual.

Lord Holland concluded with stating, that, although Queen Mary could be no otherwise regarded than as the bitterest enemy of the illustrious Elizabeth, yet the greatest stain upon the memory of the latter sovereign was not the unjust, for *unjust* it was not, but the harsh and ungenerous treatment of Mary. He reminded the House, that it would not be considered by posterity, whether Bonaparte had been justly punished for his crimes, but whether Great Britain had acted in that generous manner which became a great country. He then moved for the production of such papers and correspondence betwixt St Helena and the British government, as should seem best fitted to throw light on the personal treatment of Napoleon.

It may be observed, that in the candid and liberal manner in which Lord Holland stated the case, he was led into a comparison unfavourable to his own argument. To have rendered the case of Mary (the justice of which his lordship admitted, in questioning its generosity) parallel to that of Napoleon, two remarkable circumstances were wanting. First, Mary, far from being at war with Queen Elizabeth, was ostensibly on the most friendly terms with that sovereign when she took refuge in England; secondly, the British ministry testified no design to finish Napoleon's confinement by cutting off his head.

Lord Darnley, who had concurred with Lord Holland in desiring an inquiry, now considered the reports alluded to as totally refuted by the candid and able statement of Lord Bathurst, and was not of opinion that Lord Holland should press the motion farther. The Marquis of Buckingham's opinion was founded on the broad ground of Napoleon's delinquencies towards Europe, and England in particular. He was of opinion, that every degree of restraint necessary to prevent his escape, should be imposed and enforced. The severe and close duration to which General Bonaparte was subjected was not, his lordship said, dictated by motives of

revenge, but of security. It was a piece of political justice which we owed to Europe, and the defeat of which would never be forgotten in this or in any other state of the civilized world.

The motion of Lord Holland does not appear to have been seconded, and was negatived without a division.

There can be no doubt, that the failure of this effort in the British Senate had a deep effect on Napoleon's spirits, and may, perhaps, have aggravated that tendency to disease in the stomach, which was suspected to have already taken place. Nothing is better known, though perhaps few things are more difficult to be satisfactorily explained, than the mysterious connexion betwixt distress of mind and the action of the digestive powers. Violent sickness is produced on many persons by extreme and sudden affliction, and almost every one feels the stomach more or less affected by that which powerfully and painfully occupies the mind. And here we may add, that Lord Holland's kindness and compassion for so great a man, under such severe circumstances, were shown by a variety of delicate attentions on his part and that of his lady, and that the supplies of books and other articles sent by them through the Foreign Office, where every facility was afforded for the conveyance, continued from time to time to give Napoleon assurance of their sympathy. But though he gratefully felt their attentions, his distress of body, and perhaps of mind, assumed a character incapable of receiving consolation.

This unhappy state was kept up and prolonged by the extent to which Bonaparte indulged in determined opposition to the various regulations respecting the custody of his person; on which subject, everything which occurred occasioned a struggle against the authority of Sir Hudson Lowe, or a new effort to obtain the imperial distinctions which he considered as due to his rank.

The last point seems to have been carried to the length of childish extravagance. It was necessary, for example, that Dr O'Meara should report to the governor of the island the state of the prisoner's health, which began to give room for serious apprehension. Napoleon insisted, that when this bulletin was rendered in writing, O'Meara, whom he considered as in his own service, should give him the title of emperor. It was in vain that the doctor remonstrated, pleading that the instructions of government, as well as the orders of Lieutenant-general Lowe, prohibited him from using this forbidden epithet; and it was with difficulty that he at last prevailed that the word *personage* or *patient* might be substituted for the offensive phrase of *General Bonaparte*. Had this ingenious device not been resorted to, there could have been no communication with the government on the subject of Napoleon's health.

The physician of Napoleon had till now enjoyed an easy office. His health was naturally sound, and, like many persons who enjoy the same inestimable advantage, the ex-emperor doubted of the healing powers of medicines which he never needed to use. Abstinence was his chief resource against stomach complaints, when these began to assail

him, and the bath was frequently resorted to when the pangs became more acute. He also held it expedient to change the character of his way of living, when he felt affected with illness. If it had been sedentary, he rode hard and took violent exercise; and if, on the contrary, he had been taking more exercise than usual, he was accustomed to lay it aside for prolonged repose. But more recently he had not the wish to mount on horseback, or take exercise at all.

About the 25th of September, 1818, Napoleon's health seems to have been seriously affected. He complained much of nausea, his legs swelled, and there were other unfavourable symptoms, which induced his physician to tell him that he was of a temperament which required much activity; that constant exertion of mind and body was indispensable; and that without exercise he must soon lose his health. He immediately declared, that, while exposed to the challenge of sentinels, he never would take exercise, however necessary. Dr O'Meara proposed calling in the assistance of Dr Baxter, a medical gentleman of eminence on Sir Hudson Lowe's staff. "He could but say the same as you do," said Napoleon, "and recommend my riding abroad; nevertheless, as long as the present system continues, I will never stir out." At another time he expressed the same resolution, and his determination to take no medicines. Dr O'Meara replied, that, if the disease should not be encountered by remedies in due time, it would terminate fatally. His answer was remarkable:—"I will have at least the consolation that my death will be an eternal dishonour to the English nation, who sent me to this climate to die under the hands of ****." The physician again represented, that by neglecting to take medicine, he would accelerate his own death. "That which is written is written," said Napoleon, looking up. "Our days are reckoned."

This deplorable and desperate course seems to have been adopted partly to spite Sir Hudson Lowe, partly in the reckless feelings of despondency inspired by his situation, and in some degree, perhaps, was the effect of the disease itself, which must necessarily have disinclined him to motion. Napoleon might also hope, that, by thus threatening to injure his health by forbearing exercise, he might extort the governor's acquiescence in some points which were disputed betwixt them. When the governor sent to offer him some extension of his riding ground, and Dr O'Meara wished him to profit by the permission, he replied, that he should be insulted by the challenge of the sentinels, and that he did not chuse to submit to the caprice of the governor, who, granting an indulgence one day, might recal it the next. On such grounds as these,—which, after all, amounted just to this, that being a prisoner, and one of great importance, he was placed under a system of vigilance, rendered more necessary by the constant intrigues carried on for his escape,—did he feel himself at liberty to neglect those precautions of exercise and medicine, which were necessary for the preservation of his health. His conduct on such occasions can scarce be termed worthy of his powerful mind; it resembled too

much that of the froward child, who refuses to eat food, or its physic, because it is contradicted.

The removal of Dr O'Meara from Napoleon's person, which was considered by him as a great injury, was the next important incident in the monotony of his life. It seems, from quotations given elsewhere in this volume, that Dr O'Meara had been for some time a confidant of Sir Hudson Lowe, and was recommended by him to ministers as a person by whose means he could learn what passed in the family of Napoleon. But in process of time, Dr O'Meara, growing perhaps more intimate with the prisoner, became unwilling to supply the governor with the information of which he had been formerly profuse, and a quarrel took place betwixt him and Sir Hudson Lowe. In describing the scenes which passed between him and the governor, we have already said that Dr O'Meara writes with a degree of personal animosity, which is unfavourable to his own credit. But his departure from St Helena was occasioned by a warmer mark of the interest which he took in Napoleon's fortunes, than could be inferred from his merely refusing to inform Sir Hudson of what was said at Longwood.

Dr O'Meara seems not only to have taken the part of Napoleon in his controversies with the governor, but also to have engaged deeply in forwarding a secret correspondence with a Mr Holmes, the ex-emperor's agent in London. This appears to have been clearly proved by a letter received from the agent, relating to large remittances of money to St Helena, by the connivance of the physicians. Under such suspicions Dr O'Meara was withdrawn by the governor's mandate from attending on the person of Napoleon, and sent back to England. Napoleon had never obeyed his medical injunctions, but he complained severely when he was recalled from his household; expressing his belief that depriving him of the medical attendant whose prescriptions he had never followed, was a direct and bold step in the plan contrived for murdering him. It is probable, however, he regretted Dr O'Meara's secret services more than those which were professional.

Sir Hudson Lowe again offered the assistance of Dr Baxter, but this was construed at Longwood into an additional offence. It was even treated as an offer big with suspicion. The governor tried, it was said, to palm his own private physician upon the emperor, doubtless that he might bide his time more effectually in his power. On the other hand the British ministers were anxious that everything should be done which could prevent complaints on this head. "You cannot better fulfil the wishes of his majesty's government (says one of Lord Bathurst's dispatches to the governor), than by giving effect to any measure which you may consider calculated to prevent any just ground of dissatisfaction on the part of General Bonaparte, on account of any real or supposed inadequacy of medical attendance."

* The letter alluded to is quoted at full length in the *Quarterly Review*, vol. XXVIII, p. 294, to p. 296. It was received after Dr O'Meara's dismissal, which therefore must have been occasioned only by the suspicion of what was afterwards proved.

Dr Stokoe, surgeon on board the *Conqueror*, was next called in to visit at Longwood. But differences arose betwixt him and the governor, and after a few visits his attendance on Napoleon was discharged.

After this period, the prisoner expressed his determination, whatever might be the extremity of his case, not to permit the visits of an English physician; and a commission was sent to Italy to obtain a medical man of reputation from some of the seminaries in that country. At the same time, Napoleon signified a desire to have the company of a catholic priest. The proposition for this purpose came through his uncle, Cardinal Fesch, to the papal government, and readily received the assent of the British ministry. It would appear that this mission had been thought by his holiness to resemble, in some degree, those sent into foreign and misbelieving countries; for two churchmen were dispatched to St Helena instead of one.

The senior priest, Father Bonavita, was an elderly man, subject to the infirmities belonging to his period of life, and broken by a residence of twenty-six years in Mexico. His speech had been affected by a paralytic stroke. His recommendation to the office which he now undertook, was his having been father confessor to Napoleon's mother. His companion was a young abbé called Vignali. Both were pious, good men, well qualified, doubtless, to give Napoleon the comfort which their church holds out to those who receive its tenets, but not so much so to reclaim wanderers, or confirm those who might doubt the doctrines of the church.

Argument or controversy, however, were not necessary. Napoleon had declared his resolution to die in the faith of his fathers. He was neither an infidel, he said, nor a philosopher. If we doubt whether a person who had conducted himself towards the pope in the way which history records of Napoleon, and who had at one time been excommunicated (if, indeed, the ban was yet removed), could be sincere in his general professions of catholicism, we must at least acquit the exile of the charge of deliberate atheism. On various occasions, he expressed, with deep feelings of devotion, his conviction of the existence of the deity, the great truth upon which the whole system of religion rests; and this at a time when the detestable doctrines of atheism and materialism were generally current in France. Immediately after his elevation to the dignity of first consul, he meditated the restoration of religion; and thus, in a mixture of feeling and of policy, expressed himself upon the subject to Thibaudeau, then a counsellor of state. Having combated for a long time the systems of modern philosophers upon different kinds of worship, upon deism, natural religion, and so forth, he proceeded. "Last Sunday evening, in the general silence of nature, I was walking in these grounds (of Malmaison). The sound of the church-bell of Rueil fell upon my ear, and renewed all the impressions of my youth. I was profoundly affected, such is the power of early habit and associations; and I considered, if such was the case with me, what must not be the effect of such recollections upon the more simple and credulous vulgar? Let your philosophers answer that. The people must have a

religion." He went on to state the terms on which he would negotiate with the pope, and added, "They will say I am papist—I am no such thing. I was a mahomedan in Egypt—I will be a catholic here, for the good of the people. I do not believe in forms of religion, but in the existence of a God!" He extended his hands towards heaven—"Who is it that has created all above and around us?" * This sublime passage proves that Napoleon (unfortunate in having proceeded no farther towards the christian shrine) had at least crossed the threshold of the temple, and believed in and worshiped the Great Father of the Universe.

The missionaries were received at St Helena with civility, and the rites of mass were occasionally performed at Longwood. Both the clergymen were quiet, unobtrusive characters, confining themselves to their religious duties, and showing neither the abilities nor the active and intriguing spirit which protestants are apt to impute to the catholic priesthood.

The same vessel which arrived at St Helena on the 18th September, in 1819, with these physicians for the mind, brought with them Dr F. Antommarchi, anatomic prosector (that is, assistant to a professor of anatomy) to the hospital of Saint Marie Neuve at Florence, attached to the University of Pisa, who was designed to supply the place about the prisoner's person, occupied by Dr O'Meara, and after him provisionally by Dr Stokoe. He continued to hold the office till Napoleon's death, and his Account of his Last Moments, a work in two volumes, though less interesting, and showing far less acuteness than that of Las Cases, or of O'Meara, is yet useful and entertaining, as relating to the last days of so extraordinary a person. Dr Antommarchi seems to have been acceptable to Napoleon, and the rather that he was a native of Corsica. He brought also news from his family. The Princess Pauline Borghese had offered to come to attend him. "Let her remain where she is," said Napoleon; "I would not have her witness the degrading state which I am reduced to, and the insults to which I am subjected."

It is needless to resume the subject of these alleged insults. They consisted in the precautions which Sir Hudson Lowe deemed himself obliged to take for the security of his prisoner; particularly in requiring that a British officer should be regularly made assured of his being at Longwood, and that an officer, not under the rank of captain, should attend him on the excursions which he proposed to make through the island. On these subjects, Napoleon had made his mind up to a species of passive resistance; and had, as we have seen, already expressed himself determined to take no exercise, however indispensable to his health, unless the regulations of his confinement were entirely dispensed with, or modified according to his own pleasure. This was an argument *ad misericordiam*, which must have given the governor great distress and uneasiness, since, if the health of the prisoner should fail, even though it was through his own wilfulness, Sir Hudson could not expect that his conduct would escape censure. At the same time, if he yielded to

* *Mémoires sur le Consulat, 1799 à 1804, par un ancien Conseiller d'État*, pp. 151-3: 1 vol. 8vo, Paris, 1827.

this species of compulsory argument, it might be carried to an extent altogether inconsistent with the safe custody of the captive. His vigilance was also sharpened by constant reports of plots for the liberation of Napoleon; and the sums of money which he and his family had at their command, rendered it dangerous to trust to the natural securities of the island. It is remarkable, too, that in demanding, as a matter of right, freedom from the restrictions of which he complained, Napoleon never proposed any concessions on his part, by offer of his parole or otherwise, which might tend to give any additional moral assurance, in place of those limitations which he desired to have removed. Yet, to accommodate himself in some degree to his prisoner's obstinacy, Sir Hudson Lowe was content that the British officer whose duty it was to report on the presence of Napoleon at Longwood, should only be required to satisfy himself of it by such indirect opportunities as his walking in the garden, or appearing at the window, permitted him to enjoy, and on such occasions he was enjoined to keep his own person concealed. In this way there were days which passed without any regular report on this most important point, for which Sir Hudson Lowe would have been highly responsible if an escape had been effected. We beg to refer to Dr Antommarchi's work for instances of the peculiar and grossly infelicitous opportunities, which, to compound between the necessity of the case and the obstinacy of Napoleon, his attendants took to make his person visible when he was not aware of it.

Schemes for Napoleon's escape were not wanting. A Colonel Latapie, distinguished as a partisan officer, was said to be at the head of an attempt to carry him off from St Helena, which was to be undertaken by a band of desperadoes from America, but Napoleon said, he knew too well the character of such adventurers to hope to profit by them. Government had other information of attempts to be made from America, but none of them seem to have proceeded to any serious length.

It was different with the undertaking of Johnstone, a smuggler of an uncommonly resolute character, and whose life had been a tissue of desperate risks. He had made a memorable escape from Newgate, and had afterwards piloted Lord Nelson's vessel to the attack of Copenhagen, when the ordinary masters of the fleet, and pilots, declined the task. Johnstone was also said to have meditated a bold attempt to carry off Bonaparte on a former occasion, when he trusted himself on the water for the purpose of visiting Flushing.* And now he cer-

* Such at least was the report. The attempt was to have been made by Johnstone and his desperate associates in a boat, which they were to row across the Scheldt towards Flushing, just when Napoleon was proceeding thither. They were to board the imperial barge, throw every one save Napoleon into the sea, and removing him to their own light row boat, were to pull out and deliver him up to the British squadron, then cruising off the island. It is added, that Napoleon took the alarm from seeing a boat rowing very swiftly towards him, and, ordering his crew to pull harder, or give way, as it is called, the smuggler, instead of running athwart the barge, fell astern, and the opportunity was lost. We do not know that there is any good authority for the story.

tainly engaged in a plot to deliver Napoleon from St Helena, of a very singular kind. A submarine vessel, that is, a ship capable of being sunk under water for a certain time, and of being raised again at pleasure by disengaging certain weights, was to be the means of effecting this enterprise. It was thought that, by sinking the vessel during the day-time, she might escape the notice of the British cruisers, and, being raised at night, might approach the guarded rock without discovery. The vessel was actually begun in one of the building-yards upon the Thames; but the peculiarity of her construction having occasioned suspicion, she was seized by the British government.

These, and others which we could name, were very perilous and wild attempts, yet calculated to keep vigilance alive; for in every case in which great natural difficulties have been surmounted by such enterprises, it has been because these difficulties have been too much relied upon. But while such precarious means of escape were presented from time to time, the chance upon which Napoleon secretly relied for release from his present situation was vanishing from his eyes.

His case was mentioned in the House of Commons, but incidentally only, on the 12th July, 1818. The subject was introduced into a debate on finance when Mr C. H. Hutchinson pointed out the yearly expense of detaining Napoleon at St Helena, which he stated to amount to half-a-million sterling, an useless expenditure of public money. In this statement he received no countenance from any one except Mr Joseph Hume. It was answered by the chancellor of the exchequer; and the expense was declared not to exceed a fifth part of the sum alleged. The leading members of opposition seemed to take no interest in the question; and it was believed at St Helena, that Napoleon's disappointment in the hopes which he had entertained of their strength and overpowering interposition in his behalf, had led to his mental depression and total abandonment of hope.

The complexion of the times, indeed, had become such as to strengthen every reason which existed for detaining him in captivity. The state of England, owing to the discontent and sufferings of the manufacturing districts,—and more especially that of Italy, convulsed by the short-lived revolutions of Naples and Savoy,—rendered the safe custody of Napoleon a matter of more deep import than it had been at any time since his fall. What the effect of his name might have produced in that moment of general commotion cannot be estimated, but the consequences of his escape must have been formidable.

The British ministry, aware of the power of such a spirit to work among the troubled elements, anxiously enjoined additional vigilance to the Governor of St Helena:

"The overthrow of the Neapolitan government, the revolutionary spirit which more or less prevails over all Italy, and the doubtful state of France itself, must excite his attention, and clearly show that a crisis is fast approaching, if not already arrived, when his escape would be productive of important consequences. That his partisans are active cannot

be doubted; and if he be ever willing to hazard the attempt, he will never allow such an opportunity to escape. You will, therefore, exert all your attention in watching his proceedings, and call upon the admiral to use his utmost vigilance, as upon the navy so much must ultimately depend.*

The alarm was natural, but there was no real cause for apprehension. Politics and war were never more to know the powerful influence of Napoleon Bonaparte. His lost hopes aggravating the progress of the cruel disease, which had its source in the stomach, it now affected the whole frame, and undermined the strength of the constitution. Death was now finally to terminate the fretful and degrading discussions, by which he inflicted, and from which he received, so much pain, and to open the gates of a prison, for which Hope herself could scarce present another key. The symptoms of disorganization in the digestive powers became more and more apparent, and his reluctance to take any medicine, as if from an instinctive persuasion that the power of physic was in vain, continued as obstinate as ever. On one of the many disputes which he maintained on this subject, he answered Antommarchi's reasoning thus:—"Doctor, no physicking. We are, as I already told you, a machine made to live. We are organized for that purpose, and such is our nature. Do not counteract the living principle. Let it alone—leave it the liberty of defending itself—it will do better than your drugs. Our body is a watch, that is intended to go for a given time. The watchmaker cannot open it; and must, on handling it, grope his way blind-folded and at random. For once that he assists and relieves it by dint of tormenting it with his crooked instruments, he injures it ten times, and at last destroys it." This was on the 14th of October, 1820.

As the ex-emperor's health grew weaker, it cannot be thought extraordinary that his mind became more and more depressed. In lack of other means of amusing himself, he had been somewhat interested in the construction of a pond and fountain in the garden of Longwood, which was stocked with small fishes. A mixture of copperas in the mastic employed in cementing the basin, had affected the water. The creatures, which had been in a good measure the object of Napoleon's attention, began to sicken and to die. He was deeply affected by this circumstance, and, in language strongly resembling the beautiful verses of Moore, expressed his sense of the fatality which seemed to attach itself to him. "Everything I love—everything that belongs to me," he exclaimed, "is immediately struck. Heaven and mankind unite to afflict me."† At other times he lamented his decay of energy. The bed, he said, was now a place of luxury, which he would not exchange for all the thrones in the universe. The eyes, which formerly were so vigilant, could now scarcely be opened. He recollected that he used to dictate to four or

five secretaries at once. "But then," he said, "I was Napoleon—now I am no longer anything—my strength, my faculties, forsake me—I no longer live, I only exist." Often he remained silent for many hours, suffering, as may be supposed, much pain, and immersed in profound melancholy.

About the 23d January, 1821, Napoleon appeared to resume some energy, and to make some attempt to conquer his disease by exercise. He mounted his horse, and galloped, for the last time, five or six miles around the limits of Longwood, but nature was overcome by the effort. He complained that his strength was sinking under him rapidly.

The governor had already transmitted to Britain accounts of Napoleon's decay of health, without having it, however, in his power to ascertain how far it was real, or how far the appearances were assumed. The patient would neither receive the visit of any English surgeon or physician, nor would he authorize the communication of Dr Antommarchi with Sir Hudson Lowe. The governor was obliged to state accounts of the prisoner's declining health as reports, the reality of which he had no means of ascertaining. The generous feelings of the great personage at the head of the British government were naturally deeply interested in the fate of the prisoner, and prompted him, by every means in his power, and especially by expressions of his own sympathy, to extend such hope and comfort to Napoleon as he could be supposed to receive, under the necessity of his continued captivity. The following is Lord Bathurst's dispatch to Sir Hudson Lowe on this interesting subject, dated 16th February, 1821:

"I am aware how difficult it is to make any communication to the general which will not be liable to misrepresentation; and yet, if he be really ill, he may derive some consolation by knowing, that the repeated accounts which have of late been transmitted of his declining health have not been received with indifference. You will, therefore, communicate to General Bonaparte the great interest which his majesty has taken in the recent accounts of his indisposition, and the anxiety which his majesty feels to afford him every relief of which his situation admits. You will assure General Bonaparte that there is no alleviation which can be derived from additional medical assistance, nor any arrangement consistent with the safe custody of his person at St Helena (and his majesty cannot now hold out any expectation of his removal), which his majesty is not most ready and desirous to afford. You will not only repeat the offer which has already been more than once made, of such further medical assistance as the island of St Helena affords, but you will give him the option of procuring the attendance of any of the medical gentlemen who are at the Cape, where there is one, at least, of considerable eminence in his profession; and in case of any wish being expressed by the general to receive such assistance, you will consider yourself authorized to make a communication to the Cape, and take such other measures as may be necessary to secure the immediate attendance of the person whom the general may name."

* Dispatch to Sir Hudson Lowe, 30th September, 1820.

† Oh! ever thus—from childhood's hour,
I've seen my fondest hopes decay;
I never loved a tree or flower,
But 't was the first to fade away.

Napoleon had not the satisfaction to know the interest which his majesty took in his illness, which would probably have afforded him some gleam of consolation. The tenor of the letter might, perhaps, have induced him to think, that his own system of pertinacious content with the authorities under whose charge he was placed, had been so far injudicious, as to lead to doubts of the reality of the disorder under which he was dying; and had therefore been one great cause of intercepting the sympathy, and perhaps the relief, which must otherwise have extended itself to a situation so well deserving of commiseration.

Towards the end of February the disease assumed a character still more formidable, and Dr Antommarchi became desirous of obtaining a consultation with some of the English medical men. The emperor's aversion to their assistance had been increased by a well-meant offer of the governor, announcing that a physician of eminence had arrived at the island, whom he therefore placed at General Bonaparte's devotion.* This proposal, like every other advance on the part of Sir Hudson Lowe, had been received as meditated injury; "He wants to deceive Enrope by false bulletins," said Napoleon; "I will not see any one who is in communication with him." To refuse seeing every physician but his own, was certainly an option which ought to have been left in Napoleon's choice, and it was so left accordingly. But in thus obstinately declining to see an impartial medical man, whose report must have been conclusive respecting his state of health, Napoleon unquestionably strengthened the belief, that his case was not so desperate as it proved to be.

At length the ex-emperor consented that Dr Antommarchi should consult with Dr Arnott, surgeon of the 20th regiment. But the united opinion of the medical gentlemen could not overcome the aversion of Napoleon to medicine, or shake the belief which he reposed in the gloomy doctrines of fatalism. "*Quod scriptum scriptum*," he replied in the language of a moslem, "All that is to happen is written down. Our hour is marked, and it is not in our power to claim a moment longer of life than Fate has predestined for us."

Dr Antommarchi finally prevailed in obtaining admittance for Dr Arnott into the apartment and presence of the patient, who complained chiefly of his stomach, of the disposition to vomit, and deficiency of the digestive powers. He saw him for the first time on 1st April, 1821, and continued his visits regularly. Napoleon expressed his opinion that his liver was affected. Dr Arnott's observations led him to think, that though the action of the liver might be imperfect, the seat of the disease was to be looked for elsewhere. And here it is to be remarked, that Napoleon, when Dr Antommarchi expressed doubts on the state of his stomach, had repelled them with sharpness, though his own private belief was, that he was afflicted with the disease of his father. Thus, with a capricious inconsistency,

natural enough to a sick-bed, he communicated to some of his retinue his sense of what disease afflicted him, though, afraid perhaps of some course of medicine being proposed, he did not desire that his surgeon should know his suspicions.* From the 15th to the 25th of April, Napoleon was engaged from time to time in making his testamentary bequests, of which we shall have occasion to make some mention hereafter, as illustrative of his peculiar character and sentiments. On the day last mentioned, he was greatly exhausted by the fatigue of writing, and showed symptoms of over-excitation. Among these may be safely included, a plan which he spoke of for reconciling all religious dissensions in France, which he said he had designed to carry into effect.

As the strength of the patient gradually sunk, the symptoms of his disease became less equivocal, until, on the 27th April, the ejection of a dark-coloured fluid gave farther insight into the nature of the malady. Dr Antommarchi persevered in attributing it to climate, which was flattering the wish of the patient, who desired to lay his death upon his confinement at St Helena; while Dr Arnott expressed his belief that the disease was the same which cut off his father in the pure air of Montpellier. Dr Antommarchi, as usually happens to the reporter of a debate, silenced his antagonist in the argument, although Dr Arnott had by this time obtained the patient's own authority for the assertion. Upon the 28th of April, Napoleon gave instructions to Antommarchi, that after his death his body should be opened, but that no English medical man should touch him, unless in the case of assistance being absolutely necessary, in which case he gave Antommarchi leave to call in that of Dr Arnott. He directed that his heart should be conveyed to Parma, to Maria Louisa; and requested anxiously that his stomach should be particularly examined, and the report transmitted to his son. "The vomitings," he said, "which succeed one another without interruption, lead me to suppose that the stomach is, of all my organs, the most diseased; and I am inclined to believe that it is attacked with the same disorder which killed my father,—I mean a scirrhus in the pylorus." On the 2d May, the patient returned to the same interesting subject, reminding Antommarchi of his anxiety that the stomach should be carefully examined. "The physicians of Montpellier had announced that the scirrhus in the pylorus would be hereditary in my family. Their report is, I believe, in the hands of Louis. Ask for it, and compare it with your own observations, that I may save my son from the sufferings I now experience."

During the 3d May, it was seen that the life of Napoleon was drawing evidently to a close; and his followers, and particularly his physician, became desirous to call in more medical assistance;—that of Dr Shortt, physician to the forces, and of Dr Mitchell, surgeon of the flag-ship, was referred to. Dr Shortt, however, thought it proper to assert the dignity belonging to his profession, and refused to

* Dr Shortt, physician to the forces; who, at this time, replaced Dr Baxter as principal medical officer at St Helena, and to whom we have been obliged for much valuable information.

* Madame Bertrand mentioned to Dr Shortt, that Napoleon conceived himself dying of cancer in the stomach, which she considered as a mere whim.

ve an opinion on a case of so much importance in self, and attended with so much obscurity, unless we were permitted to see and examine the patient. The officers of Napoleon's household excused themselves, by professing that the emperor's strict commands had been laid on them, that no English physician, Dr Arnott excepted, should approach his lying bed. They said, that even when he was speechless they would be unable to brook his eye, could he turn it upon them in reproof for their disobedience.

About two o'clock of the same day, the priest Viali administered the sacrament of extreme unction. Some days before, Napoleon had explained to him the manner in which he desired his body should be laid out in state, in an apartment lighted by torches, or what catholics call *une chambre ardente*. "I am neither," he said, in the same phrase which we have formerly quoted, "a philosopher nor a physician. I believe in God, and am of the religion of my father. It is not every body who can be an atheist. I was born a catholic, and will fulfil all the duties of the catholic church, and receive the assistance which it administers." He then turned to Dr Antommarchi, whom he seems to have suspected of heterodoxy, which the doctor, however, disowned. "How can you carry it so far?" he said. "Can you not believe in God, whose existence everything proclaims, and in whom the greatest minds have believed?"

As if to mark a closing point of resemblance between Cromwell and Napoleon, a dreadful tempest arose on the 4th May, which preceded the day that was to close the mortal existence of this extraordinary man. A willow, which had been the exile's favourite, and under which he had often enjoyed the fresh breeze, was torn up by the hurricane; and almost all the trees about Longwood shared the same fate.

The 5th of May came amid wind and rain. Napoleon's passing spirit was deliciously engaged in a strife more terrible than that of the elements around. The words "*tête d'armée*," the last which escaped his lips, intimated that his thoughts were watching the current of a heady fight. About eleven minutes before six in the evening, Napoleon, after a struggle which indicated the original strength of his constitution, breathed his last.

THE officers of Napoleon's household were disposed to have the body anatomized in secret. But Sir Hudson Lowe had too deep a sense of the responsibility under which he and his country stood, to permit this to take place. He declared, that even if he were reduced to make use of force, he would insure the presence of English physicians at the dissection.

Generals Bertrand and Montholon, with Marchand, the valet-de-chambre of the deceased, were present at the operation, which took place on the 6th of May. It was also witnessed by Sir Thomas Reade, and some British staff-officers. Drs Thomas Shortt, Archibald Arnott, Charles Mitchell, Matthew Livingston, and Francis Burton, all of them medical men, were also present. The cause of death was

sufficiently evident. A large ulcer occupied almost the whole of the stomach. It was only the strong adhesion of the diseased parts of that organ to the concave surface of the lobe of the liver, which, being over the ulcer, had prolonged the patient's life by preventing the escape of the contents of the stomach into the cavity of the abdomen. All the other parts of the viscera were found in a tolerably healthy state. The report was signed by the British medical gentlemen present. Dr Antommarchi was about to add his attestation, when, according to information which we consider as correct, General Bertrand interdicted his doing so, because the report was drawn up as relating to the body of *General Bonaparte*. Dr Antommarchi's own account does not, we believe, greatly differ from that of the British professional persons, though he has drawn conclusions from it which are apparently inconsistent with the patient's own conviction, and the ghastly evidence of the anatomical operation. He continued to insist that his late patron had not died of the cancer which we have described, or, in medical language, of scirrhus of the pylorus, but of a *chronic gastro-hepatitis*, a disease he stated to be endemic in the island of St Helena; although we do not observe it asserted or proved that the hospital of the island, at any time, produced a single case like that of the deceased captive.

The gentlemen of Napoleon's suite were desirous that his heart should be preserved and given to their custody. But Sir Hudson Lowe did not feel himself at liberty to permit this upon his own authority. He agreed, however, that the heart should be placed in a silver vase, filled with spirits, and interred along with the body; so that in case his instructions from home should so permit, it might be afterwards disintombed and sent to Europe.

The place of interment became the next subject of discussion. On this subject Napoleon had been inconsistent. His testamentary disposition expressed a wish that his remains should be deposited on the banks of the Seine; a request which he could not for an instant suppose would be complied with, and which appears to have been made solely for the sake of producing effect. The reflection of an instant would have been sufficient to call to recollection, that he would not, while in power, have allowed Louis XVIII. a grave in the land of his fathers; nor did he permit the remains of the Duke d'Enghien any other interment than that assigned to the poorest outcast, who is huddled to earth on the spot on which he dies. But neither did the agitated state of the public mind, now general through Italy, recommend the measure.

A grave for the Emperor of France, within the limits of the rocky island to which his last years were limited, was the alternative that remained; and sensible that this was likely to be the case, he had himself indicated the spot where he wished to lie. It was a small secluded recess, called *Slane's* or *Haines' Valley*, where a fountain arose, at which his Chinese domestics used to fill the silver pitchers which they carried to Longwood for Napoleon's use. The spot had more of verdure and shade than any in the neighbourhood; and the illustrious exile was often accustomed to repose under the beautiful

weeping willows which overhung the spring. The body, after lying in state in his small bed-room, during which time it was visited by every person of condition in the island, was on the 8th of May carried to the place of interment. The pall which covered the coffin was the military cloak which Napoleon had worn at the battle of Marengo. The members of his late household attended as mourners, and were followed by the governor, the admiral, and all the civil and military authorities of the island. All the troops were under arms upon the solemn occasion. As the road did not permit a near approach of the hearse to the place of sepulture, a party of British grenadiers had the honour to bear the coffin to the grave. The prayers were recited by the priest, Abbé Vignali. Minute guns were fired from the admiral's ship. The coffin was then let down into the grave, under a discharge of three successive volleys of artillery, fifteen pieces of cannon firing fifteen guns each. A large stone was then lowered down on the grave, and covered the moderate space now sufficient for the man for whom Europe was once too little.

CONCLUSION.

ARRIVED at the conclusion of this momentous narrative, the reader may be disposed to pause a moment to reflect on the character of that wonderful person, on whom Fortune showered so many favours in the beginning and through the middle of his career, to overwhelm it close with such deep and unwonted afflictions.

The external appearance of Napoleon was not imposing at the first glance, his stature being only five feet six inches English. His person, thin in youth, and somewhat corpulent in age, was rather delicate than robust in outward appearance, but cast in the mould most capable of enduring privation and fatigue. He rode ungracefully, and without the command of his horse which distinguishes a perfect cavalier; so that he showed to disadvantage when riding beside such a horseman as Murat. But he was fearless, sat firm in his seat, rode with rapidity, and was capable of enduring the exercise for a longer time than most men. We have already mentioned his indifference to the quality of his food, and his power of enduring abstinence. A morsel of food, and a flask of wine hung at his saddle-bow, used, in his earlier campaigns, to support him for days. In his latter wars, he more frequently used a carriage; not, as has been surmised, from any particular illness, but from feeling in a frame so constantly in exercise the premature effects of age.

The countenance of Napoleon is familiar to almost every one from description, and the portraits which are found everywhere. The dark-brown hair bore little marks of the attentions of the toilet. The shape of the countenance approached more than is usual in the human race to a square. His eyes were grey, and full of expression, the pupils rather large, and the eye-brows not very strongly marked. The brow and upper part of the countenance was rather of a stern character. His

nose and mouth were beautifully formed. The upper lip was very short. The teeth were indifferent, but were little shown in speaking.* His smile possessed uncommon sweetness, and is stated to have been irresistible. The complexion was a clear olive, otherwise in general colourless. The prevailing character of his countenance was grave, even to melancholy, but without any signs of severity or violence. After death, the placidity and dignity of expression which continued to occupy the features, rendered them eminently beautiful, and the admiration of all who looked on them.

Such was Napoleon's exterior. His personal and private character was decidedly amiable, excepting in one particular. His temper, when he received, or thought he received, provocation, especially if of a personal character, was warm and vindictive. He was, however, placable in the case even of his enemies, providing that they submitted to his mercy; but he had not that species of generosity which respects the sincerity of a manly and fair opponent. On the other hand, no one was a more liberal rewarder of the attachment of his friends. He was an excellent husband, a kind relation, and, unless when state policy intervened, a most affectionate brother. General Gouraud, whose communications were not in every case to Napoleon's advantage, states him to have been the best of masters, labouring to assist all his domestics wherever it lay in his power, giving them the highest credit for such talents as they actually possessed, and imputing, in some instances, good qualities to such as had them not.

There was gentleness, and even softness, in his character. He was affected when he rode over the fields of battle, which his ambition had strewn with the dead and the dying, and seemed not only desirous to relieve the victims,—issuing for that purpose directions, which too often were not, and could not be, obeyed,—but showed himself subject to the influence of that more acute and imaginative species of sympathy which is termed sensibility. He mentions a circumstance which indicates a deep sense of feeling. As he passed over a field of battle in Italy, with some of his generals, he saw a houseless dog lying on the body of his slain master. The creature came towards them, then returned to the dead body, moaned over it pitifully, and seemed to ask their assistance. "Whether it were the feeling of the moment," continued Napoleon, "the scene, the hour, or the circumstance itself, I was never so deeply affected by anything which I have seen upon a field of battle. That man, I thought, has perhaps had a house, friends, comrades, and here he lies deserted by every one but his dog. How mysterious are the impressions to which we are subject! I was in the habit, without emotion, of ordering battles which must decide the fate of a campaign, and could look with a dry eye on the execution of manoeuvres which must be attended with much loss; and here I was moved—nay, painfully affected—by the cross and the grief of a dog. It is certain that at that moment I should have been more accessible to a

* When at St Helena, he was much troubled with tooth-ache and scurvy in the gums.

pliant enemy, and could better understand the conduct of Achilles in restoring the body of Hector to the tears of Priam.* The anecdote at once shows that Napoleon possessed a heart amenable to humane feelings, and that they were usually in total abjection to the stern precepts of military stoicism. It was his common and expressive phrase, that the heart of a politician should be in his head; but his feelings sometimes surprised him in a gentler mood. A calculator by nature and by habit, Napoleon was fond of order, and a friend to that moral conduct which order is best exemplified. The libels of the day have made some scandalous averments to the contrary, but without adequate foundation. Napoleon respected himself too much, and understood the value of public opinion too well, to have plunged into general or vague debauchery.

Considering his natural disposition, then, it may be assumed that if Napoleon had continued in the state of private life, and no strong temptation of passion or revenge had crossed his path, he must have been generally regarded as one whose friendship was every way desirable, and whose enmity it was not safe to incur.

But the opportunity afforded by the times, and the elasticity of his own great talents, both military and political, raised him with unexampled celerity to a sphere of great power, and at least equal temptation. Ere we consider the use which he made of his ascendancy, let us briefly review the causes by which it was accomplished.

The consequences of the Revolution, however fatal to private families, were the means of filling the camps of the nation with armies of a description which Europe had never seen before, and, it is to be hoped, will never witness again. There was neither safety, honour, nor almost subsistence, in any other profession than the military; and accordingly it became the refuge of the best and bravest of the youth of France, until the army ceased to consist, as in most nations, of the miserable and disorderly class of the community, but was levied in the body and bosom of the state, and composed of the flower of France, whether as regarded health, moral qualities, or elevation of mind. With such men, the generals of the Republic achieved many and great victories, but without being able to insure corresponding advantages. This may have been in a great measure occasioned by the dependence in which these leaders were held by the various administrators of the Republic at home—a dependence accounted for by the necessity of having recourse to those in power at Paris for the means of paying and supporting their armies. From the time that Napoleon passed the Alps, he inverted this state of things; and made the newly conquered countries not only maintain the army by means of contributions and confiscations, but even contribute to support the government. Thus war, which had hitherto been a burden to the Republic, became in his hands a source of public revenue; while the youthful general, contributing to the income of the state, on which his predecessors had been dependent, was enabled to assert the freedom at which he speedily aimed, and correspond with the

Directory upon a footing approaching to equality. His talents as a soldier, and situation as a victorious general, soon raised him from equality to pre-eminence.

These talents applied not less to the general arrangements of the campaign, than to the dispositions for actual battle. In each of these great departments of war, Napoleon was not merely a pupil of the most approved masters of the art,—he was an improver, an innovator, and an inventor.

In strategy, he applied upon a gigantic scale the principles upon which Frederick of Prussia had acted, and gained a capital or a kingdom, when Frederick would have won a town or a province. His system was, of course, that of assembling the greatest possible force of his own upon the vulnerable point of the enemy's position, paralyzing, perhaps, two fourths of their army, while he cut the third to pieces, and then following up his position by destroying the remainder in detail. For this purpose, he taught generals to divide their armies upon the march, with a view to celerity of movement and facility of supply, and to unite them at the moment of contest, where an attack would be most feebly resisted, because least expected. For this, also, he first threw aside all species of baggage which could possibly be dispensed with—supplied the want of magazines by the contributions exacted from the country, or collected from individuals by a regular system of marauding—discontinued the use of tents, and trusted to bivouacking with his soldiers, where hamlets could not be found, and there was no time to erect huts. His system was ruinous in point of lives, for even the military hospitals were often dispensed with; but although Moreau termed Napoleon a conqueror at the rate of ten thousand men a-day, yet the sacrifice for a length of time uniformly attained the object for which it was designed. The enemy who had remained in their extensive cantonments, distracted by the reports of various columns moving in different directions, were surprised and defeated by the united force of the French, which had formed a junction where and when it was least expected. It was not till they had acquired the art of withdrawing from his attack so soon as made, that the allies learned to defeat the efforts of his moveable columns.

Napoleon was not less original as a tactician than as a strategist. His manœuvres on the field of battle had the promptness and decision of the thunderbolt. In the actual shock of conflict, as in the preparations which he had made for bringing it on, his object was to amuse the enemy upon many points, while he oppressed one by an unexpected force of numbers. The breaking through the line, the turning of a flank, which had been his object from the commencement of the fight, lay usually disguised under a great number of previous demonstrations, and was not attempted until both the moral and physical force of the enemy was impaired by the length of the combat. It was at this period that he brought up his guards, who, impatient of inactivity, had been held in readiness for hours, and now, springing forward like wolf-dogs from the leash, had the glorious task, in which they rarely failed, of deciding the long-sustained contest. It

* *Mémoires de St-Hélène*, vol. II, pp. 36-7.

may be added, as further characteristic of his tactics, that he preferred employing the order of the column to that of the line; perhaps on account of the faith which he might rest in the extreme valour of the French officers by whom the column was headed.

The interest which Napoleon preserved in the French soldier's affection by a frequent distribution of prizes and distinctions, as well as by his familiar notice of their persons, and attention to their wants, joined to his possession of absolute and independent command, rendered it no difficult matter for him to secure their support in the revolution of the eighteenth Brumaire, and in placing him at the head of affairs. Most part of the nation were heartily tired by this time of the continually unsettled state of the government, and the various changes which it had experienced, from the visionary speculations of the girondists, the brutal and bloody ferocity of the jacobins, and the sordid and undecided versatility and imbecility of the Directory; and the people in general desired a settled form of government, which, if less free, should be more stable in duration, and better calculated to assure to individuals the protection of property and of personal freedom, than those which had followed the downfall of the monarchy. A successful general, of a character more timid, or conscience more tender, than that of Napoleon, might have attempted the restoration of the Bourbons. But Napoleon foresaw the difficulties which would occur by an attempt to reconcile the recal of the emigrants to the assurance of the national sales, and aptly concluded, that the parties which tore France to pieces would be most readily amalgamated together under the authority of one, who was in a great measure a stranger to them all.

Arrived at the possession of supreme power, a height that dazzles and confounds so many, Napoleon seemed only to occupy the station for which he was born, to which his peculiar powers adapted him, and his brilliant career of success gave him, under all circumstances, an irresistible claim. He continued, therefore, with a calm mind and enlightened wisdom, to consider the means of rendering his power stable, of destroying the republican impulse, and establishing a monarchy, of which he destined himself to be the monarch. To most men the attempt to revive, in favour of a military adventurer, a form of government, which had been rejected by what seemed the voice of the nation with universal acclaim, would have seemed an act of desperation. The partisans of the Republic were able statesmen, and men of superior talent, accustomed also to rule the fierce democracy, and organize those intrigues which had overthrown crown and altar; and it was hardly to be supposed that such men would, were it but for shame's sake, have seen their ten years' labour at once swept away by the sword of a young though successful general.

But Napoleon knew himself and them; and felt the confidence, that those who had been associates in the power acquired by former revolutions, must be now content to sink into the instruments of his advancement, and the subordinate agents of his authority, contented with such a share of spoil as that with which the lion rewards the jackal.

To the kingdom at large, upon every new stride

towards power, he showed the certificate of superior efficacy guaranteed by the most signal success; and he assumed the empire of France under the proud title, *Detur dignissimo*. Neither did actions up to this point encourage any one to challenge the defects or flaws of his title. In practice, his government was brilliant abroad, and, with few exceptions, liberal and moderate at home. The abominable murder of the Duke d'Enghien showed the vindictive spirit of a savage; but, in general, the public actions of Napoleon, at the commencement of his career, were highly laudable. The battle of Marengo, with its consequences,—the softening of civil discord, the reconciliation with the Church of Rome, the recal of the great body of the emigrants, and the revivification of national jurisprudence,—were all events calculated to flatter the imagination, and even gain the affections, of the people.

But, with a dexterity peculiar to himself, Napoleon proceeded, while abolishing the Republic, to press into his service those very democratical principles which had given rise to the Revolution, and encouraged the attempt to found a commonwealth. His sagacity had not failed to observe, that the popular objections to the ancient government were founded less upon any objection to the royal authority in itself, than a dislike, amounting to detestation, of the privileges which it allotted to the nobles and to the clergy, who held, from birth and office, the right to fill the superior ranks in every profession, and barred the competition of all others, however above them in merit. When, therefore, Napoleon constructed his new forms of monarchical government, he wisely considered that he was not, like hereditary monarchs, tied down to any particular rules arising out of ancient usage, but, being himself creator of the power which he wielded, he was at liberty to model it according to his own pleasure. He had been raised also so easily to the throne, by the general acknowledgment of his merits, that he had not needed the assistance of a party of his own; consequently, being unlimited by previous engagements, and by the necessity of gratifying old partisans, or acquiring new ones, his conduct was in a very unusual degree free and unlimited.

Having, therefore, attained the summit of human power, he proceeded, advisedly and deliberately, to lay the foundation of his throne on that democratic principle which had opened his own career, and which was the throwing open to merit, though without further title, the road to success in every department of the state. This was the secret key of Napoleon's policy; and he was so well aided in the use of it, by acute perception of character, as well as by good nature and good feeling (both of which, in his cooler moments, he possessed), that he never, through all his vicissitudes, lost an opportunity of conciliating and pleasing the multitude by evincing a well-timed attention to distinguish and reward talent. To this his conversation perpetually alluded; and for this he claims, and is entitled to, the highest praise. We have little hesitation in repeating, that it was this opening a full career to talent of every kind, which was the key-stone of his reputation, and the main foundation of his power. Unhappily, his love of merit, and disposition to reward it, were not

founded exclusively upon a patriotic attention to the public welfare, far less on a purely benevolent desire to reward what was praiseworthy; but upon a principle of selfish policy, to which must be ascribed a great part of his success, no small portion of his misfortunes, and almost all his political crimes.

We have quoted elsewhere the description given of the emperor by his brother Lucien, in a moment probably of spleen, but which has been nevertheless confirmed by almost all the persons habitually conversant with Napoleon, at whom we have had an opportunity of making inquiries. "His conduct," said his brother, "is entirely regulated by his policy, and his policy is altogether founded upon egotism." No man, perhaps, ever possessed (under the restrictions to be presently mentioned) so intense a proportion of that selfish principle which is so common to humanity. It was planted by nature in his heart, and nourished by the half monastic, half military education, which so early separated him from social ties; it was encouraged by the consciousness of possessing talents which rendered him no mate for the ordinary men among whom his lot seemed cast; and became a confirmed habit, by the desolate condition in which he stood at his first onset in life, without friend, protector, or patron. The praise, the promotion he received, were given to his genius, not to his person; and he who was conscious of having forced his own way, had little to bind him in gratitude or kindness to those, who only made room for him because they durst not oppose him. His ambition was a modification of selfishness, sublime indeed in its effects and consequences, but yet, when strictly analyzed, leaving little but egotism in the crucible.

Our readers are not, however, to suppose, that the selfishness of Napoleon was of that ordinary and odious character, which makes men miserly, oppressive, and fraudulent in private life; or which, under milder features, limits their exertions to such enterprises as may contribute to their own individual profit, and closes the heart against feelings of patriotism, or of social benevolence. Napoleon's egotism and love of self was of a far nobler and more elevated kind, though founded on similar motives;—just as the wings of the eagle, who soars into the regions of the sun, move on the same principles with those which cannot bear the dunghill fowl over the palea of the poultry-yard.

To explain our meaning, we may add, that Napoleon loved France, for France was his own. He studied to confer benefits upon her, for the profit redounded to her emperor, whether she received amended institutions, or enlarged territories. He represented, as he boasted, the people as well as the sovereign of France; he engrossed in his own person her immunities, her greatness, her glory, and was bound to conduct himself so as to exalt at the same time the emperor and the empire. Still, however, the sovereign and the state might be, and at length actually were, separated; and the egotistical character of Bonaparte could, after that separation, find amusement and interest in the petty scale of Elba, to which his exertions were then limited.* Like

the magic tent in the Arabian Tales, his faculties could expand to inclose half a world, with all its cares and destinies, or could accommodate themselves to the concerns of a petty rock in the Mediterranean, and his own conveniences when he retreated to its precincts. We believe that while France acknowledged Napoleon as emperor, he would cheerfully have laid down his life for her benefit; but we greatly doubt, if, by merely raising his finger, he could have made her happy under the Bourbons, whether (unless the merit of the action had redounded to his own personal fame) that finger would have been lifted. In a word, his feelings of self-interest were the central point of a circle, the circumference of which may be extended or contracted at pleasure, but the centre itself remains fixed and unchanged.

It is needless to inquire how far this solicitous, and we must add, enlightened attention to his own interest, facilitated Bonaparte's ascent to the supreme power. We daily witness individuals, possessed of a very moderate proportion of parts, who, by intently applying themselves to the prosecution of some particular object, without being drawn aside by the calls of pleasure, the seductions of indolence, or other interruptions, succeed ultimately in attaining the object of their wishes. When, therefore, we conceive the powerful mind of Napoleon, animated by an unbounded vivacity of imagination, and an unconquerable tenacity of purpose, moving forward, without deviation or repose, to the accomplishment of its purpose, which was nothing less than to acquire the dominion of the whole world, we cannot be surprised at the immense height to which he raised himself.

But the egotism which governed his actions—subject always to the exercise of his excellent sense, and the cultivation of his interest in the public opinion,—if in a great measure it favoured the success of his various enterprises, did him in the end much more evil than good; as it instigated his most desperate enterprises, and was the source of his most inexcusable actions.

Moderate politicians will agree that after the imperial system was substituted for the republican, the chief magistrate ought to have assumed and exerted a considerable strength of authority, in order to maintain that re-establishment of civil order, that protection of the existing state of things, which was necessary to terminate the wild and changeful recurrence of perpetual revolutions. Had Napoleon stopped here, his conduct would have been unblameable, and unblamed, unless by the more devoted followers of the house of Bourbon, against whom Providence appeared to most men to have closed the gate of restoration. But his principles of egotism would not be satisfied until he had totally destroyed every vestige of those free institutions, which had been acquired by the perils, the blood, the tears of the Revolution, and reduced France, save for the influence of public opinion, to the condition of Constantinople or of Algiers. It was a merit to raise up the throne, it was natural that he who did so should himself occupy it; since in ceding it to the Bourbons, he must have betrayed those at whose hands he accepted power; but to plunder the nation of their privileges as free-born men, was the act of a par-

* See pp. 664, 672.

ricide. The nation lost under his successive encroachments, what liberty the ancient government had left them, and all those rights which had been acquired by the Revolution. Political franchises, individual interests, the property of municipalities, the progress of education, of science, of mind and sentiment, all were usurped by the government. France was one immense army, under the absolute authority of a military commander, subject to no control nor responsibility. In that nation, so lately agitated by the nightly assembly of thousands of political clubs, no class of citizens, under any supposable circumstances, had the right of uniting in the expression of their opinions. Neither in the manners nor in the laws, did there remain any popular means of resisting the errors or abuses of the administration. France resembled the political carcase of Constantinople, without the insubordination of the pachas, the underhand resistance of the elemats, and the frequent and clamorous mutinies of the janizaries.*

Whilst Napoleon destroyed successively every barrier of public liberty—while he built new state prisons, and established a high police, which filled France with spies and jailers—while he took the charge of the press so exclusively into his own hand—his policy at once, and his egotism, led him to undertake those immense public works, of greater or less utility or ornament as the chance might be, but which were sure to be set down as monuments of the emperor's splendour. The name given him by the working classes, of the General Undertaker, was by no means ill bestowed; but in what an incalculably greater degree do such works succeed, when raised by the skill and industry of those who propose to improve their capital by the adventure, than when double the expense is employed at the arbitrary will of a despotic sovereign! Yet it had been well if bridges, roads, harbours, and public works, had been the only compensation which Napoleon offered to the people of France for the liberties he took from them. But he poured out to them, and shared with them, to drown all painful and degrading recollections, the intoxicating and fatal draught of military glory and universal domination. To lay the whole universe prostrate at the foot of France, while France, the Nation of Camps, should herself have no higher rank than the first of her own emperor's slaves, was the gigantic project at which he laboured with such tenacious assiduity. It was the Sisyphean stone, which he rolled so high up the hill, that at length he was crushed under its precipitate recoil.

The main objects of that immense enterprise were such as had been undertaken while his spirit of ambition was at its height; and no one dared, even in his councils, to interfere with the resolutions which he adopted. Had these been less eminently successful, it is possible he might have paused, and perhaps might have preferred the tranquil pursuit of a course which might have rendered one kingdom free and happy, to the subjugation of all Europe. But Napoleon's career of constant and uninterrupted

success under the most disadvantageous circumstances, together with his implied belief in his Destiny, conspired, with the extravagant sense of his own importance, to impress him with an idea, that he was not "in the roll of common men," and induced him to venture on the most desperate undertakings, as if animated less by the result of reason than by an internal assurance of success. After great miscarriages, he is said sometimes to have shown a corresponding depression; and thence he resigned four times the charge of his army when he found his situation embarrassing, as if no longer feeling confidence in his own mind, or conceiving he was deserted for the moment by his guardian genius. There were similar alternations, too, according to General Gourgaud's account, in his conversation. At times, he would speak like a deity, at others, in the style of a very ordinary person.

To the egotism of Napoleon, we may also trace the general train of deception which marked his public policy, and, when speaking upon subjects in which his own character was implicated, his private conversation.

In his public capacity, he had so completely prostituted the liberty of the press, that France could know nothing whatever but through Napoleon's own bulletins. The battle of Traisgur was not hinted at till several months after it had been fought, and then it was totally misrepresented; and so deep and dark was the mantle which covered the events in which the people were most interested, that, on the very evening when the battle of Marmonte was fought, the *Moniteur*, the chief organ of public intelligence, was occupied in a commentary on *nosographie*, and a criticism on a drama on the subject of the chaste Susannah. The hiding the truth is only one step to the invention of falsehood, and, as a periodical publisher of news, Napoleon became so eminent for both, that, to "be like a bulletin," became an adopted expression, not likely soon to lose ground in the French language, and the more disgraceful to Napoleon, that he is well known to have written those official documents in most instances himself.

Even this deceptive system, this plan of alternately keeping the nation in ignorance, or abusing it by falsehood, intimated a sense of respect for public opinion. Men love darkness, because their deeds are evil. Napoleon dared not have submitted to the public an undisguised statement of his perfidious and treacherous attacks upon Spain, thus which a more gross breach of general good faith and existing treaties could scarce have been conceived. Nor would he have chosen to plead at the public bar, the policy of his continental system, adopted in total ignorance of the maxims of political economy, and the consequences of which were, first, to cause general distress, and then to encourage universal resistance against the French yoke throughout the whole continent of Europe. Nor is it more likely that, could the public have had the power of forming a previous judgment upon the probable event of the Russian campaign, that rash enterprise would ever have had an existence. In silencing the voice of the wise and good, the

* *Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule*, par le Général Foy.

able and patriotic, and communicating only with such counsellors as were the echoes of his own inclinations, Napoleon, like Lear,

Kill'd his physician, and the foe bestow'd
Upon the foul disease.

This was the more injurious, as Napoleon's knowledge of the politics, interest, and character of foreign courts was, excepting in the case of Italy, exceedingly imperfect. The peace of Amiens might have remained uninterrupted, and the essential good understanding betwixt France and Sweden need never have been broken, if Napoleon could, or would have understood the free constitution of England, which permits every man to print or publish what he may chuse; or if he could have been convinced that the institutions of Sweden did not permit their government to place their fleets and armies at the disposal of a foreign power, or to sink the ancient kingdom of the Goths into a secondary and vassal government.

Self-love, so sensitive as that of Napoleon, shunned especially the touch of ridicule. The gibes of the English papers, the caricatures of the London print-shops, were the petty stings which instigated, in a great measure, the breach of the peace of Amiens. The laughter-loving Frenchmen were interdicted the use of satire, which, all-licensed during the times of the Republic, had, even under the monarchy, been only punished with a short and easy confinement in the Bastille. During the time of the consulate, Napoleon was informed that a comic opera, something on the plan of the English farce of *High Life Below Stairs*, had been composed by Monsieur Dupaty, and brought forward on the stage, and that, in this audacious performance, three valets mimicked the manners, and even the dress, of the three consuls, and especially his own. He ordered that the actors should be exposed at the Grève, in the dresses they had dared to assume, which should be there stripped from their backs by the executioner; and he commanded that the author should be sent to St Domingo, and placed, as a person under requisition, at the disposal of the commander-in-chief. The sentence was not executed, for the offence had not existed, at least to the extent alleged;* but the intention shows Napoleon's ideas of the liberty of the stage, and intimates what would have been the fate of the author of the *Beggar's Opera*, had he written for the French Opéra Comique.

But no light, which reason or information could supply, was able to guide the intensity of a selfish ambition, which made Napoleon desire that the whole administration of the whole world should not only remotely, but even directly and immediately, depend on his own pleasure. When he distributed kingdoms to his brothers, it was under the express understanding that they were to follow in everything the course of politics which he should dictate; and after all, he seemed only to create dependent states for the purpose of resuming them. He dethroned his brother Louis, for refusing to countenance the oppressions which, in the name of France, he imposed

on Holland; and he had thoughts of removing Joseph from Spain, when he saw of what a fair and goodly realm he had pronounced him king. In his wild and insatiable extravagance of administering in person the government of every realm which he conquered, he brought his powerful mind to the level of that of the spoiled child, who will not be satisfied without holding in its own hand whatever has caught its eye. The system, grounded on ambition so inordinate, carried with it in its excess the principles of its own ruin. The runner who will never stop for repose must at last fall down with fatigue. Had Napoleon succeeded both in Spain and Russia, he would not have rested, until he had found elsewhere the disasters of Baylen and of Moscow.

The consequences of the unjustifiable aggressions of the French Emperor were an unlimited extent of slaughter, fire, and human misery, all arising from the ambition of one man, who, never giving the least sign of having repented the unbounded mischief, seemed, on the contrary, to justify and take pride in the ravage which he had occasioned. This ambition, equally insatiable and incurable, justified Europe in securing his person, as if it had been that of a lunatic, whose misguided rage was not directed against an individual, but against the civilized world; which, well nigh overcome by him, and escaping with difficulty, had a natural right to be guaranteed against repetition of the frantic exploits of a being who seemed guided by more than human passion, and capable of employing in execution of his purpose more than human strength.

The same egotism, the same spirit of self-deception, which marked Napoleon during his long and awful career of success, followed him into adversity. He framed apologies for the use of his little company of followers, as he had formerly manufactured bulletins for the Great Nation. Those to whom these excuses were addressed, Las Cases and the other gentlemen of Napoleon's suite, being too much devoted to him, and too generous to dispute, after his fall, doctrines which it would have been dangerous to controvert during his power, received whatever he said as truths delivered by a prophet, and set down doubtless to the score of inspiration what could by no effort be reconciled to truth. The horrid evils which afflicted Europe during the years of his success were represented to others, and perhaps to his own mind, as consequences which the emperor neither wished nor contemplated, but which were necessarily and unalterably attached to the execution of the great plans which the Man of Destiny had been called upon earth to perform, resembling in so far the lurid and fear-inspiring train pursuing the rapid course of a brilliant comet, which the laws of the universe have projected through the pathless firmament.

Some crimes he committed of a different character, which seem to have sprung, not like the general evils of war, from the execution of great and calculated plans of a political or military kind, but must have had their source in a temper naturally passionate and vindictive. The Duke d'Enghien's murder was at the head of this list; a gratuitous act of treachery and cruelty, which, being undeniable, led Napoleon to be believed capable of other crimes

* *Mémoires sur le Consulat, 1799 à 1804, p. 148, 150.*

of a secret and bloody character,—of the murder of Pichegru and of Wright,—of the spiriting away of Mr Windham, who was never afterwards heard of,—and of other actions of similar atrocity. We pause before charging him with any of those which have not been distinctly proved. For, while it is certain that he had a love of personal vengeance, proper, it is said, to his country, it is equally evident, that, vehement by temperament, he was lenient and calm by policy; and that, if he had indulged the former disposition, the security with which he might have done so, together with the ready agency of his fatal police, would have made his rage resemble that of one of the Roman emperors. He was made sensible, too late, of the general odium drawn upon him by the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, and does not seem to have been disposed to incur farther risks of popular hatred in prosecution of his individual resentment. The records of his police, however, and the persecutions experienced by those whom Napoleon considered as his personal enemies, show that, by starts at least, nature resumed her bent, and that he, upon whom there was no restraint, save his respect for public opinion, gave way occasionally to the temptation of avenging his private injuries. He remarked it as a weakness in the character of his favourite Cæsar, that he suffered his enemies to remain in possession of the power to injure him; and Antommarchi, the reporter of the observation, admitted, that when he looked on the person before him, he could not but acknowledge that he was unlikely to fall into such an error.

When Napoleon laid aside reserve, and spoke what were probably his true sentiments, he endeavoured to justify those acts of his government which transgressed the rules of justice and morality, by political necessity, and reasons of state; or, in other words, by the pressure of his own interest. This, however, was a plea, the full benefit of which he reserved, to vindicate his own actions, never permitting it to be used by any other sovereign. He considered himself privileged in transgressing the law of nations, when his interests required it; but pleaded as warmly upon the validity of public law, when alleging it had been infringed by other states, as if he himself had in all instances respected its doctrines as inviolable.

But although Napoleon thus at times referred to state necessity as the ultimate source of actions otherwise unjustifiable, he more frequently endeavoured to disguise his errors by denial, or excuse them by apologies which had no foundation. His habits of concealing truth, and inventing falsehood, had become so strong, that his very last will and testament bears the grossest marks of his deceptive system. He avers, in his will,* that, by the confession of the Duke d'Enghien, the Count d'Artois maintained sixty assassins against his life; and that for this reason the Duke d'Enghien was tried, convicted, and put to death. The examination of the duke bears no such confession, but, on the contrary, an express denial of the whole of the alleged system; nor was the slightest attempt made to contra-

dict him by other testimony. He bequeathed, in like manner, a legacy to a villain who had attempted the assassination of the Duke of Wellington; the assassin, according to his strange argument, having as good a right to kill his rival and victor, as the English had to detain him prisoner at St Helena. This clause in the last will of a dying man, is not striking from its atrocity merely, but from the inaccuracy of the moral reasoning which it exhibits. Napoleon has drawn a parallel betwixt two cases, which must be therefore both right, or both wrong. If both were wrong, why reward the ruffian with a legacy? but if both were right, why complain of the British government for detaining him at St Helena?

But, indeed, the whole character of Napoleon's autobiography marks his desire to divide mankind into two classes,—his friends and his enemies; the former of whom are to be praised and vindicated; the latter to be vilified, censured, and condemned, without any regard to truth, justice, or consistency. To take a gross example, he stoutly affirmed, that the treasures which were removed from Paris, in April, 1814, and carried to Orleans, were seized and divided by the ministers of the allied powers,—Talleyrand, Metternich, Hardenberg, and Castlereagh; and that the money thus seized included the marriage-portion of the Empress Maria Louisa. Had this story been true, it would have presented Napoleon with a very simple means of avenging himself upon Lord Castlereagh, by putting the British public in possession of the secret.

It is no less remarkable, that Napoleon, though himself a soldier and a distinguished one, could never allow a tribute of candid praise to the troops and generals by whom he was successively opposed. In mentioning his victories, he frequently bestows commendations upon the valour and conduct of the vanquished. This was an additional and more delicate mode of praising himself and his own troops, by whom these enemies were overthrown. But he never allows any merit to those by whom he was defeated in turn. He professes never to have seen the Prussian troops behave well save at Jena, or the Russians but at Austerlitz. Those armies of the same nations, which he both saw and felt in the campaigns of 1812 and 1813, and before whom he made such disastrous retreats as those of Moscow and Leipsic, were, according to his expressions, mere canaille.

In the same manner, when he details an action in which he triumphed, he is sure to boast, like the old Grecian (very justly perhaps), that in this Fortune had no share; while his defeats are entirely and exclusively attributed to the rage of the elements, the combination of some most extraordinary and unexpected circumstances, the failure of some of his lieutenants or marshals, or, finally, the obstinacy of the general opposed, who, by mere dint of stupidity, blundered into success through circumstances which should have insured his ruin.

* See Dr O'Meara's *Voice from St Helena*, who seems himself to have been startled at the enormity of the action. What makes it yet more extravagant is, that Napoleon's will disposes of a part of that very treasure, as if it were still in the hands of Maria Louisa.

* See Appendix, No. 13.—* Bonaparte's last will and testament.*

In a word, from one end of Napoleon's works to the other, he has scarcely allowed himself to be guilty of a single fault or a single folly, excepting of that kind, which, arising from an over-confidence and generosity, men secretly claim as merits, while they affect to give them up as matters of censure. If we credit his own word, we must believe him to have been a faultless and impeccable being. If we do not, we must set him down as one that, where his own reputation was concerned, told his story with a total disregard to candour and truth.

Perhaps it was a consequence of the same indifference to truth, which induced Napoleon to receive into his favour those French officers who broke their parole by escape from England. This, he alleged, he did by way of retaliation, the British government having, as he pretended, followed a similar line of conduct. The defence is false, in point of fact; but if it were true, it forms no apology for a sovereign and a general countenancing a breach of honour in a gentleman and a soldier. The French officers who liberated themselves by such means were not the less dishonoured men, and unfit to bear command in the army of France, though they could have pointed with truth to similar examples of infamy in England.

But the most extraordinary instance of Napoleon's deceptive system, and of his determination, at all events, to place himself under the most favourable light to the beholders, is his attempt to represent himself as the friend and protector of liberal and free principles. He had destroyed every vestige of liberty in France—he had persecuted as ideologists all who cherished its memory—he had boasted himself the restorer of monarchical government—the war between the constitutionalists and him, covered, after the return from Elba, by a hollow truce, had been renewed, and the liberalists had expelled him from the capital—he had left in his testament, the appellation of *traitor* with La Fayette, one of their earliest, most devoted, and most sincere chiefs—yet, notwithstanding all this constant opposition to the party which professes most to be guided by them, he has ventured to represent himself as a friend of liberal ideas! He has done so, and he has been believed.

There is but one explanation of this. The friends of revolution are upon principle the enemies of ancient and established governments—Napoleon became the opponent of the established powers from circumstances; not because he disputed the character of their government, but because they would not admit him into their circle; and though there was not, and could not be, any real connexion betwixt his system and that of the liberalists, yet both had the same opponents, and each loved in the other the enemy of their enemies. It was the business of Napoleon in his latter days to procure, if professions could gain it, the sympathy and good opinion of any or every class of politicians; while, on the contrary, it could not be indifferent to that to which he made advances, to number among their disciples, even in the twelfth

hour, the name of Napoleon. It resembled what sometimes happens in the catholic church, when a wealthy and powerful sinner on his death-bed receives the absolution of the church on easy terms, and dies after a life spent in licentious courses, wrapt up in the mantle, and girded with the cord, of some order of unusual strictness. Napoleon, living a despot and a conqueror, has had his memory consecrated and held up to admiration by men, who term themselves emphatically the friends of freedom.

The faults of Bonaparte, we conclude as we commenced, were rather those of the sovereign and politician, than of the individual. Wisely is it written, that if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. It was the inordinate force of ambition which made him the scourge of Europe; it was his efforts to disguise that selfish principle, that made him combine fraud with force, and establish a regular system for deceiving those whom he could not subdue. Had his natural disposition been coldly cruel, like that of Octavius, or had he given way to the warmth of his temper, like other despots, his private history, as well as that of his campaigns, must have been written in letters of blood. If, instead of asserting that he never committed a crime, he had limited his self-eulogy to asserting, that in attaining and wielding supreme power, he had resisted the temptation to commit many, he could not have been contradicted. And this is no small praise.

His system of government was false in the extreme. It comprehended the slavery of France, and aimed at the subjugation of the world. But to the former he did much to requite them for the jewel of which he robbed them. He gave them a regular government, schools, institutions, courts of justice, and a code of laws. In Italy, his rule was equally splendid and beneficial. The good effects which arose to other countries from his reign and character, begin also to be felt, though unquestionably they are not of the kind which he intended to produce. His invasions, tending to reconcile the discords which existed in many states between the governors and governed, by teaching them to unite together against a common enemy, have tended to loosen the feudal yoke, to enlighten the mind both of prince and people, and have led to many admirable results, which will not be the less durably advantageous, that they have arisen, and are arising, slowly, and without contest.

In closing the Life of NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, we are called upon to observe, that he was a man tried in the two extremities, of the most exalted power and the most ineffable calamity; and if he occasionally appeared presumptuous when supported by the armed force of half a world, or unreasonably querulous when imprisoned within the narrow limits of St Helena, it is scarce within the capacity of those whose steps have never led them beyond the middle path of life, to estimate either the strength of the temptations to which he yielded, or the force of mind which he opposed to those which he was able to resist.

Appendix.

No. 1.

ADDITIONAL NOTICES ON NAPOLEON'S EARLY CAREER.

Page 167.

It may be added to the meagre account given in the text, that Napoleon, though only a youth of twenty-four, was, on his return to Corsica in 1793, deeply involved in the politics of that island. For some time he held the same course with his venerated relative, Paoli, who, struck with his early talents and mode of expression, pronounced him to belong to those characters whom Plutarch records. About the same time, another remarkable person, the well-known statesman Count Pozzo di Borgo, was distinguished as a rising character in the same island. He was the relation, and originally the friend and companion, of Napoleon, and enjoyed, like him, great consideration among his countrymen. But when civil dissensions arose, the friendship between the two relatives was broken off. Pozzo di Borgo, who already held an important situation in the community of Corsica, adhered to Paoli. Napoleon embraced that side which espoused the cause of the French republican party. He was at this time lieutenant-colonel of a regiment of the National Guard. The colonel of the same regiment entertained different political sentiments from his young assistant; and upon one occasion, Napoleon drew up a part of the regiment which adhered to him, and fired upon his commanding-officer and the rest. After this skirmish, he was engaged in others, until, the party of Paoli becoming superior, Napoleon was solemnly banished from his native island.

He always blamed Pozzo di Borgo for having been active in procuring his exile; and with the strong love of revenge which is said to mark his country, never, amongst so many important affairs as afterwards required his attention, forgot his feud with his early rival. Wherever France obtained an ascendancy, an abode there became dangerous to the object of Napoleon's hatred; to avoid which, Pozzo di Borgo was compelled to retreat from one kingdom to another, until at last he could only find shelter in England. But the fate of these two early acquaintances seemed strongly connected and interwoven. As Napoleon began to lose ground, the fortunes of his relative appeared to advance, and honours and advantages dropped upon him, in proportion to Napoleon's descent from eminence. It was even his remarkable destiny to have, from his influence in the Russian councils, no small share in deciding upon the destiny of his powerful persecutor. When the councils of the allies were wavering respecting the march to Paris, it was the arguments of Count Pozzo di Borgo which supported the Emperor of Russia in his resolution to adopt that decisive measure.

In page 168, mention is made of a "small jacobin publication (by Bonaparte), called *le Souper de Beaucaire*, a political dialogue between Marat and

a federalist (or girondist), in which the latter is overwhelmed and silenced by the arguments and eloquence of the friend of the people." This is an inaccurate account of the *Souper de Beaucaire*, of which the editor had not been able to find a copy. It has been since republished, and is of a tenor considerably different from what is above described. Marat, for example, is not a personage in the dialogue. The scene is laid at the period when the federalists were making head against the jacobin government in several of the towns of France, and particularly in Lyons and Marseilles. The date is 29th July, 1793. The plan of the work is as follows:—

A miscellaneous party is supposed to meet at a table-d'hôte at Beaucaire, during the last day of the great fair held at that place. The company consists of a military man, being the author himself, two merchants of Marseilles, a native of Nismes, and an artisan of Montpellier. They fall naturally into a train of conversation concerning the probable issue of the civil war. The Marseillais, who have just learned the bad success of their countrymen's attack upon Avignon, from which they had been driven by the jacobins, after holding it for a short time (see p. 131), are inquisitive to know the state of the army of the democrats, under Cartaux; and the information which they receive from the young soldier, is of a nature to strike them with apprehension.

The Soldier. "The army of Cartaux was four thousand men strong when it assaulted Avignon (then occupied by the Marseillaise army); it now amounts to six thousand, and within four days will reach ten thousand men. It has never been repulsed from Avignon, since it never made a formal attack; the troops only manoeuvred about the place, in order to ascertain where an attempt to force the gates, by means of petards, might be made to advantage; a few cannon were fired, to try the courage of the garrison, and it was then necessary to draw back to the camp, to combine the attack for the next morning. The Marseillais were three thousand six hundred men; they had a heavier and more numerous artillery, and yet they have been obliged to recross the Durance. That surprises you, but it is only veteran troops who can endure the uncertain events of a siege. We were masters of the Rhône, of Villeneuve, and of the open country; we had intercepted all their communications. They were under the necessity of evacuating the town (Avignon), were pursued by the cavalry, and lost many prisoners, and two guns."

The Marseillais endeavour to contrast these bad news with what they had to expect from the proposed exertions of their city, in recruiting their army with new levies and with heavy cannon. But the young officer proceeds in a professional manner to show the inferiority of 18 and 24 pounders to field artillery, when armies were to engage in the field, the superior skill of regular artillerymen in serving the guns, the advantages possessed by the disciplined soldiers of Cartaux, over the raw recruits which

Marseilles might call into the field, and the want of means of subsistence in the city in case of a close siege.

The Marseillais, in reply, plays the part usually ascribed to the interlocutor, in this species of dialogue, who combats the opinions favoured by the author. He proposes various schemes of defence, one after another, the weakness of which is easily exposed by his victorious antagonist. He points out to them, that there was the utmost folly in the extremity of resistance, and that the Marseillais possessed no means which could ultimately lead to success. "Your army," he said, "will be composed of all the wealthy and well-educated of your city, for the sans-culottes will readily turn against you. Thus, you will expose the flower of your youth, accustomed to hold the commercial balance of the Mediterranean, and to enrich their country by mercantile speculations, by confronting them with veteran soldiers, who have been dyed a hundred times in the blood of the furious aristocrat and ferocious Prussian. Let poor countries fight to the last extremity. The native of Vivarais, of the Cevennes, of Corsica, may expose himself without fear to the event of battle. If he gain the fight, he has attained his purpose—if he loses, he is in no worse situation than before for making peace. But you—if you lose a battle, the fruit of a thousand years of fatigue, of labour, of fragility, of good fortune, become the prey of the soldier."

In this tone the discussion proceeds, until the Marseillais merchants, driven out of the field of dispute, are compelled to acknowledge, that submission is the best chance they have of escaping destruction. They agree to recommend it to their countrymen, and treat the young soldier with a few bottles of champagne, in grateful acknowledgment, that he had been at the trouble to clear up their ideas on the subject.

From this analysis the reader will perceive that nothing can be more inaccurate than to term the *Souper de Beaucaire* a jacobin pamphlet, although it is unquestionably written to urge the federalists to submit to their inevitable fate, and avert extremity by doing so in time. The work is entirely free from all the exaggerated and cant language of the day. There is no mention of liberty, equality, or fraternity of the rights of man—no abstract discussion of political principles. The whole merits of the dispute betwixt Paris and the departments are hurried over with little or no argument. Bonaparte urges the Marseillais to submission, not because the principles which dictated their insurrection were erroneous, but because they had not means to maintain successful resistance; not because they had been confuted by the jacobins in argument; but because they were unequal to the task of contending with them by force. Notwithstanding, therefore, what is said in the text, from erroneous information of the nature of this publication, there is nothing in it inconsistent with Napoleon's own account of the origin of the work, that it was written under the assumed character of a jacobin, with the friendly intention of convincing the girondists that they were chusing an unfit time for insurrection, and attempting it in a hopeless manner (see above, p. 168). Ne-

vertheless, even the colour of his vizard disgusted the author on recollection. He called in and destroyed every copy of the *Souper de Beaucaire* which could be found, so that only one remained, from which the reprint of Monsieur Panconcke has been executed.

The *Souper de Beaucaire* is written in a dry, dispassionate, and constrained style; but there is another and earlier work of Napoleon's youth, which is much more worthy of commemoration, as indicative of the temper of the man. This was his Letter to M. Matteo Buttafoco, one of the deputies for Corsica to the National Assembly. The history of the work is given by M. J. B. Joly, printer at Dôle, by whom one copy has been carefully preserved, corrected by the author in two places, and bearing to be his gift. Bonaparte caused a hundred and fifty copies to be thrown off and sent to Corsica. At the same time, Napoleon meditated other literary labours. He was then a lieutenant of artillery, quartered at Auxonne, and had composed a work, which might form two volumes, on the political, civil, and military history of Corsica. He invited Monsieur Joly to visit him at Auxonne, with a view to print and publish this work. He came, and found the future emperor in a naked barrack room, the sole furniture of which consisted of a wretched bed without curtains, a table placed in the embrasure of a window, loaded with books and papers, and two chairs. His brother Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretched mattress, in an adjoining closet. Monsieur Joly and the author agreed on the price of the impression of the book, but Napoleon was at the time in uncertainty whether he was to remain at Auxonne or not. Shortly after, he was ordered to Toulon, where his extraordinary career first commenced. The work on Corsica was never printed, nor has a trace of it been discovered. Monsieur Joly, naturally desirous of preserving every recollection of this interview with the future conqueror of nations, in the character and condition of a Grub-street author, mentions that the clerical dress and ornaments of the chaplain of the regiment, whose office had been just suppressed, were deposited with Napoleon by the other officers. He showed them to his visitor, and spoke of the ceremonies of religion without indecency, yet also without respect. "If you have not heard mass to-day, I can say it to you," was his expression to Monsieur Joly.

The Letter to Buttafoco is a diatribe against Corsican noblemen, who had been, during the wars with France, the friend of the latter nation, and the opponent of the liberties of his country. He had been, of course, the enemy of the family of Paoli, to which Napoleon at this time (winter 1790) was warmly attached. We have preserved the composition entire, because, though the matter be uninteresting, the rough and vivid style of invective is singularly characteristic of the fiery youth, whose bosom one of his teachers compared to a volcano surcharged with molten granite, which it poured forth in torrents, whenever his passions were excited.

Letter of Napoleon Bonaparte to M. Matteo Buttafoco, Deputy from Corsica to the National Assembly.

SIR,

From Bonifacio to Cape Corso, from Ajaccio to Bastia there is one chorus of imprecations against you. Your friends keep out of sight, your relations disown you, and even the man of reflection, who does not allow himself to be swayed by popular opinion, is, for once, led away by the general effervescence.

But what have you done? What are the crimes to justify such universal indignation, such complete desertion? This, sir, is what I wish to inquire into, in the course of a little discussion with you.

The history of your life, since the time, at least, when you appeared on the stage of public affairs, is well known. Its principal features are drawn in letters of blood. Still, however, there are details comparatively unknown. In these I may be mistaken; but I reckon upon your indulgence, and hope for information from you.

After having entered the service of France, you returned to see your relations; you found the tyrants vanquished, the national government established, and the Corsicans, entirely governed by noble sentiments, vying with each other in daily sacrifices for the prosperity of the state. You did not allow yourself to be seduced by the general enthusiasm; far from that, you looked with nothing but pity on the nonsensical stuff about country, liberty, independence, and constitution, which had got into the heads of our meanest peasants. Deep reflection had taught you to set a proper value on those artificial sentiments, the maintenance of which is a general evil. In fact, the peasant must be taught to mind his work, and not play the hero, if it is wished that he should not starve, that he should bring up his family, and pay respect to authority. As to those who are called, by their rank and fortune, to occupy stations of power, they cannot long remain such dupes as to sacrifice their comforts and consideration in society for a mere chimera, or stoop to pay court to a cobbler, that they may at last play the part of Brutus. Still, as it was necessary for your designs that you should gain the favour of Paoli, you had to dissemble;—M. Paoli being the centre of all the movements of the political body. We shall admit that he had talent—even a certain degree of genius; he had, in a short time, placed the affairs of the island on a good footing; he had founded a university, in which, for the first time, perhaps, since the creation, the sciences which are useful for the development of reason were taught among our mountains. He had established a foundry for cannon, powder-mills, and fortifications, which increased the means of defence; he had formed harbours, which, while they encouraged commerce, improved agriculture; he had created a navy, which protected our communication with other countries, while it injured our enemies. All these establishments, in their infancy, were a mere presage of what he one day might have done. Union, peace, and liberty, seemed the precursors of national prosper-

ity, had not a government, ill organized, and placed on an unsound basis, afforded still surer indications of the misfortunes which were to happen, and of the total ruin into which everything was to fall.

M. Paoli had dreamed of being a Solon, but had been unsuccessful in his imitation. He had placed everything in the hands of the people or their representatives, so that it was impossible even to exist without pleasing them. A strange error! which places under the control of a brutal and mercenary plebeian, the man who alone, by his education, his illustrious birth, and his fortune, is formed for governing. In the long run, so palpable a dereliction of reason cannot fail to bring on the ruin and dissolution of the body-politic, after having exposed it to every species of suffering.

You succeeded to your wish. M. Paoli, constantly surrounded by enthusiastic and hot-headed persons, never imagined that there could be any other passion than the devotion to liberty and independence. Finding that you had some knowledge of France, he did not trouble himself to do more than take your own word for your moral principles. He got you appointed to treat at Versailles respecting the accommodation which was negotiating under the mediation of that cabinet. M. de Choiseul saw you, and knew you; minds of a certain stamp are speedily appreciated. In a short time, in place of being the representative of a free people, you transformed yourself into the clerk of a minister; you communicated to him the instructions, the plans, the secrets of the cabinet of Corsica.

This conduct, which is considered here as base and atrocious, appears to me quite natural; but this is because, in all sorts of affairs, we should understand one another, and reason with coolness.

The prude censures the coquette, and is laughed at by her in return;—this, in a few words, is your history. The man of principle judges you harshly, but you do not believe that there is a man of principle. The common people, who are always led away by virtuous demagogues, cannot be appreciated by you, who do not believe in virtue. You cannot be condemned but by your own principles, like a criminal by the laws; but those who know the refinement of your principles, find nothing in your conduct but what is very simple. This brings us back, then, to what we have already said, that, in all sorts of affairs, the first thing requisite is to understand one another, and then argue coolly. You are also protected by a sort of sub-defence, not less effectual, for you do not aspire to the reputation of a Cato or a Catinat. It is sufficient for you to resemble a certain class; and among this certain class, it is agreed that he who may get money, and does not profit by the opportunity, is a ninny; for money procures all the pleasures of sense, and the pleasures of sense are the only pleasures. Now, M. de Choiseul, who was very liberal, made it impossible for you to resist him—particularly as your ridiculous country paid you for your services, according to her laughable custom, by the honour of serving her.

The treaty of Compiègne being concluded, M. de Chauvelin and twenty-four battalions landed on our shores. M. de Choiseul, to whom the celerity of the expedition was most important, had uneasiness

on the subject, which in his confidential communications, he could not disguise from you. You suggested that he should send you there with a few millions. As Philip took cities with his Mule, you promised to make everything yield to him without opposition. No sooner said than done,—and there you are, recrossing the sea, throwing off the mask, and, with money and your commission in your hand, opening negotiations with those who you thought would be most easily gained over.

Never imagining that a Corsican could prefer himself to his country, the cabinet of Corsica had intrusted you with her interest. Never dreaming, for your part, that any man would not prefer money and himself to his country, you sold yourself and hoped to buy every body. Profound moralist as you were, you knew how much the enthusiasm of each individual was worth; some pounds of gold, more or less, formed, in your eyes, all the shades which diversify characters.

You were mistaken, however:—the weak-minded were certainly shaken, but they were terrified by the horrible idea of mangling the bosom of their country. They thought they saw their fathers, their brothers, their friends, who perished in defending her, raise their heads from the tomb to load them with curses. These ridiculous prejudices were strong enough to stop you in your career; you lamented having to do with a people so childish in its notions. But, sir, this refinement of sentiment is not heaviest on the multitude; and, therefore, they live in poverty and wretchedness; while a man who has got proper notions, if circumstances favour him ever so little, knows the way to rise very speedily. This is pretty exactly the moral of your story.

When you made your report of the obstacles which prevented you from realising your promises, you proposed that the Royal Corsican regiment should be bought. You hoped that its example would enlighten our too simple and honest peasants, and accustom them to things to which they felt so much repugnance. But what happened? Did not Rossi, Marengo, and some other madmen, inflame the minds of the regiment to such a pitch, that the officers in a body protested, by an authentic writing, that they would throw up their commissions, sooner than violate their oaths, or their duties, which were still more sacred?

You thus found yourself reduced to stand alone as an example to others. Without being disconcerted, at the head of a few friends and a French detachment, you threw yourself into Vescovato; but the terrible Clement * unknelt you from thence. You

* Clement Paoli, elder brother of the general, a good soldier, an excellent citizen, a real philosopher. At the beginning of an action he could not bring himself to engage in personal combat; he gave his orders with the *sang-froid* which characterises the good officer. But he no sooner saw his men begin to fall, than he seized his arms with a convulsive movement of indignation, and made use of them, exclaiming—“Unjust men! why break down the barriers of nature? why must you be enemies of your country?”

Austere in his manners, simple in his habits, he has always lived retired. It was only in great emergencies that he came forward to give his opinion, which was very seldom departed from.

retired upon Bastia with your companions in adventure and their families. This little affair was not much to your credit; your house, and those of your associates, were burnt. But, in a place of safety, you laughed at these impotent efforts.

People here charge you with having endeavoured to arm the Royal Corsicans against their brethren. They also wish to impeach your courage, for the small resistance you made at Vescovato. There is little foundation for these accusations; for the first was an immediate consequence of your projects, indeed one of your means of executing them; and, as we have already proved that your conduct was perfectly simple and natural, this incidental charge goes for nothing. As to your want of courage, I do not see how this is settled by the action of Vescovato: You did not go there with the serious purpose of fighting, but for the sake of encouraging, by your example, those who were wavering in the opposite party. And after all, what right has any one to require that you should have run the risk of losing the fruits of two years' good conduct, by being shot like a common soldier? But you must have felt a good deal, say some folks, on seeing your own house, and those of your friends, become a prey to the flames. Good God! when will narrow-minded people give over trying to judge of everything? Your letting your house be burnt put M. de Choiseul under the necessity of indemnifying you. Experience proved the accuracy of your calculations; you received much more than the value of what you lost. To be sure you are accused of having kept all to yourself, and of having given nothing but a trifle to the poor creatures whom you had seduced. In order to justify your having acted in this way, it is only necessary to inquire if you could do it with perfect safety. Now, the poor people who were so dependent on your protection were neither in a condition to demand restitution, nor even to understand very clearly the injustice which was done them. They could not become malcontents, and rebel against your authority; being held in detestation by their countrymen, their return to their former sentiments could no longer be held as sincere. It was then very natural that, when a few thousand crowns thus came in your way, you should not let them out of your hands;—to have done so would have been cheating yourself.

The French, beaten in spite of their gold, their commissions, the discipline of their numerous battalions, the activity of their squadrons, the skill of their artillerymen,—defeated at La Penta, Vescovato, Loretto, San-Nicolas, Borgo Barbaggio, Oletta,—entrenched themselves, excessively disheartened. Winter, the time of their repose, was for you, sir, a period of the greatest labour; and if you could not triumph over the obstinacy of prejudices so deeply rooted in the minds of the people, you found means to seduce some of their chiefs, whom you succeeded, though with some difficulty, in bringing to a right way of thinking. This, along with the thirty battalions whom M. de Vaux brought with him the following spring, forced Corsica to yield to the yoke, and drove Paoli and the greatest fanatics into banishment.

One portion of the patriots had died in the defence of their independence, another had fled from a land

of proscription, and which, from that time, was a hideous den of tyrants. But a great number could neither die nor take flight; they became the objects of persecution. Minds, whom it had been found impossible to corrupt, were of such a stamp, that the empire of the French could only be established on their total destruction. Alas! this plan was but too punctually executed. Some perished, victims of crimes unjustly imputed to them; others, betrayed by their own hospitality, and by their own confidence, expiated on the scaffold the sighs and tears into which they had been surprised by dissimulation. A great number, crowded by Narbonne Frizelar into the town of Toulon, poisoned by unwholesome food, tortured by their chains, and sinking under the most barbarous treatment, lived a short time in their misery, merely to see death slowly approaching. —O God, witness of their innocence, why didst thou not become their avenger!

In the midst of this general calamity, in the midst of the groans and lamentations of this unfortunate people, you, however, began to enjoy the fruit of your labours—honours, dignities, pensions, all were showered upon you. Your prosperity would have advanced still more rapidly, had not Du Barri overthrown M. de Choiseul, and deprived you of a protector, who duly appreciated your services. This blow did not discourage you; you turned your attention to the *bureaux*; you merely felt the necessity of greater assiduity. This flattered the persons in office, your services were so notorious. All your wishes were granted. Not content with the Lake of Bignlia, you demanded a part of the lands of many communities. Why, it is said, did you wish to deprive them of these lands? I ask, in my turn, what regard ought you to have for a nation, by whom you knew yourself to be detested?

Your favourite project was, to divide the island among ten barons. How! not satisfied with having assisted in forging the chains with which your country was bound, you wished still further to subject her to the absurd feudal government? But I commend you for having done as much harm to the Corsicans as you possibly could. You were at war with them; and, in war, to do evil for one's own advantage, is a first principle.

But let us pass over all these paltry matters—let us come to the present moment, and conclude a letter, which, from its frightful length, cannot fail to fatigue you.

The state of affairs in France prognosticated extraordinary events. You became alarmed for the effect of them in Corsica. The same madness with which we were possessed before the war, began, to your great scandal, to infect that amiable people. You comprehended the consequences; for, if noble sentiments were to gain an ascendancy in public opinion, you would become no better than a traitor, instead of being a man of prudence and good sense. What was still worse, if ever noble sentiments were again to stir the blood of our ardent countrymen, and if ever a national government were to be the result of such sentiments, what would become of you? Your own conscience then began to terrify you. Restless, however, and unhappy as you were, you did not yield to your conscience. You resolved

to risk everything for everything—but you played your game skillfully. You married, to strengthen your interest. A respectable man, who, relying on your word, had given his sister to your nephew, found himself abused. Your nephew, whose patrimony you had swallowed up in order to increase an inheritance which was to have been his own, was reduced to poverty, with a numerous family.

Having arranged your domestic affairs, you cast your eyes over the country. You saw it smoking with the blood of its martyrs, heaped with numerous victims, and, at every step, inspiring only ideas of vengeance. But you saw the ruffian soldier, the insolent pettifogger, the greedy tax-gatherer, lord it without contradiction; and the Corsican, groaning under the weight of triple chains, neither daring to think of what he was, nor to reflect on what he still might be. You said to yourself, in the joy of your heart, "Things go on well, and the only thing is to keep them so." And straightway you leagued yourself with the soldier, the pettifogger, and the tax-gatherer. The only point now to be attended to was, to procure deputies who should be animated by congenial sentiments; for, as to yourself, you could never suppose that a nation which was your enemy would chuse you for her representative. But you necessarily changed your opinion, when the letters of convocation, by an absurdity which was perhaps the result of design, determined that the deputy from the nobility should be appointed by an assembly composed of only twenty-two persons. All that was necessary was to obtain twelve votes. Your associates in the higher council laboured with activity. Threats, promises, caresses, money, all were put in action. You succeeded. Your friends were not so successful among the commons. The first president failed; and two men of exalted ideas—the one the son, the brother, the nephew, of the most zealous defenders of the common cause—the other a person who had seen Siouville and Narbonne, and whose mind was full of the horrid actions he had seen, while he lamented his own want of power to oppose them;—these two men were proclaimed deputies, and their appointment satisfied the wishes of the nation. The secret chagrin, the suppressed rage, which were everywhere caused by your appointment, form the best eulogy on the skill of your manoeuvres, and the influence of your league.

When you arrived, at Versailles, you were a zealous royalist. When you now arrived at Paris, you must have seen with much concern, that the government, which it was wished to organize upon so many ruins, was the same with that which, in our country, had been drowned in so much blood.

The efforts of the unprincipled were powerless: the new constitution being admired by all Europe, and having become an object of interest to every thinking being, there remained for you but one resource. This was, to make it be believed that this constitution was not adapted to our island; although it was exactly the same with that which had produced such good effects, and which it cost so much blood to deprive us of.

All the delegates of the former administration, who naturally entered into your cabal, served you with the zeal arising from personal interest. Mr.

morials were written, the object of which was to prove how advantageous for us was the existing government, and to demonstrate that any change would be contrary to the wish of the nation. At this time the city of Ajaccio obtained some knowledge of what was going on. This city roused herself, formed her national guard, organized her committee. This unexpected incident alarmed you—the fermentation spread in all directions. You persuaded the ministers, over whom you had gained some ascendancy in relation to the affairs of Corsica, that it was of importance to send thither your father-in-law, M. Gaffory, with a command; and immediately we saw M. Gaffory, a worthy precursor of M. Narbonne, endeavouring, at the head of his troops, to maintain by force that tyranny which his late father, of glorious memory, had resisted and confounded by his genius. Innumerable blunders left no room for concealing your father-in-law's mediocrity of talent; he possessed no other art but that of making himself enemies. The people rallied against him on every side. In this imminent danger you lifted up your eyes, and saw Narbonne! Narbonne, profiting by a moment of favour, had laid the plan of establishing firmly, in an island which he had wasted with unheard-of cruelty, the despotism which oppressed it. You laid your beads together; the plan was determined on; five thousand men received orders; commissions for increasing by a battalion the provincial regiment were prepared; Narbonne set out. This poor nation, unarmed and disheartened, without hope and without resource, is delivered into the hands of her executioner.

O unhappy countrymen! Of what odious treachery were you to be the victims! You would not perceive it till it was too late. How were you, without arms, to resist ten thousand men? You would yourself have signed the act of your degradation; hope would have been extinguished; and days of uninterrupted misfortune would have succeeded. Emancipated France would have looked upon you with contempt; afflicted Italy with indignation; and Europe, astonished at this unexampled degree of degradation, would have effaced from her annals the traits which do honour to your character. But your deputies from the Commons penetrated the design, and informed you of it in time. A king, whose only wish was the happiness of his people, being well informed on the subject by M. La Fayette, that steady friend of liberty, dissipated the intrigues of a perfidious minister, who was certainly impelled by the desire of vengeance to do you injury. Ajaccio showed resolution in her address, in which was described with such energy the miserable state to which you were reduced by the most oppressive of governments. Bastia, till then stupified as it were, awoke at the sound of danger, and took up arms with that resolution for which she has been always distinguished. Aréna came from Paris to Balagne, full of those sentiments which lead men to the boldest enterprises. With arms in one hand, and the decrees of the National Assembly in the other, he made the public enemies tremble. Achilles Meunati, the conqueror of Capraia, who had carried desolation

as far as Genoa, and who, to be a Turenne, wanted nothing but opportunity and a more extensive field, reminded his companions in glory, that this was the time to acquire additional fame,—that their country in danger had need, not of intrigues, which he knew nothing about, but of fire and sword. At the sound of so general an explosion, Gaffory returned to the insignificance from which he had been brought, so *mal-à-propos*, by intrigues;—he trembled in the fortress of Corte. Narbonne fled from Lyons, to hide in Rome his shame, and his infernal projects. A few days afterwards Corsica is united to France, Paoli recalled; and in an instant the prospect changes, and opens to your view a course of events which you could not have dared to hope for.

I beg your pardon, sir; I took up my pen to defend you; but my heart revolts against so uniform a system of treason and atrocity. What! did you, a son of the same country, never feel anything for her? What! did your heart experience no emotion at the sight of the rocks, the trees, the houses, the spots which were the scenes of your infant amusements? When you came into the world, your country nourished you with her fruits; when you came to the years of reason, she placed her hopes in you; she honoured you with her confidence; she said to you, "My son, you see the wretched state to which I am reduced by the injustice of men;—through my native vigour, I am recovering a degree of strength which promises me a speedy and infallible recovery; but I am again threatened! Fly, my son, hasten to Versailles; inform the great king of everything, dissipate his suspicions, request his friendship."

Well! a little gold made you betray her confidence; and forthwith, for a little gold, you were seen, like a parricide, tearing open her bosom. Ah, sir, I am far from wishing you ill; but there is an avenging conscience! Your countrymen, to whom you are an object of horror, will enlighten France as to your character. The wealth, the pensions, the fruits of your treasons, will be taken from you. In the decrepitude of old age and poverty, in the frightful solitude of wickedness, you will live long enough to become a prey to the torments of conscience. The father will point you out to his son, the master to his pupil, saying, "Young people, learn to respect your country, virtue, fidelity, and humanity."

And you, respectable and unhappy woman, whose youth, beauty, and innocence were vilely prostituted, does your pure and chaste heart beat under a hand so criminal? In those moments in which nature gives the alarm to love, when, withdrawn from the chimeras of life, unmingled pleasures succeed each other with rapidity, when the mind, expanded by the fire of sentiment, enjoys only the pleasure of causing enjoyment, and feels only the pleasure of exciting feeling,—in those moments you press to your heart, you become identified with that cold and selfish man, who has never deviated from his character, and who, in the course of sixty years, has never known anything but the care of his own interest, an instinctive love of destruction, the most infamous avarice, the base pleasures of sense! By and by, the glare of honours, the trappings of riches, will disappear; you will be loaded with general

contempt. Will you seek, in the bosom of him who is the author of your woes, a consolation indispensable to your gentle and affectionate mind? Will you endeavour to find in his eyes tears to mingle with yours? Will your failing hand, placed on his bosom, seek to find an agitation like that in your own? Alas, if you surprise him in tears they will be those of remorse; if his bosom heave, it will be with the convulsions of the wretch, who dies abhorring nature, himself, and the hand that guides him.

O Lameth! O Robespierre! O Pétion! O Volney! O Mirabeau! O Barnave! O Bailly! O La Fayette! this is the man who dares to seat himself by your side! Dropping with the blood of his brethren, stained by every sort of vice, he presents himself with confidence in the dress of a general, the reward of his crimes! He dares to call himself the representative of the nation—he who sold her—and you suffer it! He dares to raise his eyes, and listen to your discourse, and you suffer it! Is it the voice of the people that seat him? He never had more than the voice of twelve nobles. Ajaccio, Bastia, and most of the districts, have done that to his effigy which they would have been very glad to do to his person.

But you, who are induced, by the error of the moment, or perhaps temporary abuses, to oppose any fresh changes, will you tolerate a traitor? a man who, under the cool exterior of a man of sense, conceals the avidity of a lacquey? I cannot imagine it. You will be the first to drive him away with ignominy, as soon as you are aware of the string of atrocities of which he has been the author.

I have the honour, etc.

BONAPARTE.

From my closet at Millel,
January, Year 2.

No. 2.

DESCENT OF THE FRENCH IN SOUTH WALES, UNDER COLONEL TATE.

Page 245.

WE have found some curious particulars respecting Tate's descent in the *Memoirs of Theobald Wolfe Tone*, one of the unfortunate and misguided Irish gentlemen who were engaged in the Rebellion, 1796, and who, being taken on his return to Ireland with a French expedition, was condemned to be executed, but died in prison, after an unsuccessful attempt at suicide. The author, for whom we entertain much compassion, seems to have been a gallant light-hearted Irishman, his head full of scraps of plays, and his heart in a high fever on account of the supposed wrongs which his country had sustained at the hands of Great Britain. His hatred, indeed, had arisen to a pitch which seems to have surprised himself, as appears from the conclusion of the following extracts, which prove that nothing less than the total destruction of Bristol was expected from Tate and his merry men, who had been industriously picked out as the greatest reprobates of the French army.

We have that sort of opinion of Citizen Wolfe Tone, which leads us to think he would have wept heartily had he been to witness the havoc of which he seems ambitious to be an instrument. The violence of his expressions only shows how civil war and political fury can deform and warp the moral feelings. But we should have liked to have seen Pat's countenance when he learned that the *Bande Noire* had laid down their arms to a handful of Welsh militia, backed by the appearance of a body of market women, with red cloaks (such was the fact), whom they took for the head of a supporting column. Even those attempts at pillage, in which they were supposed so dexterous, were foiled by the exertions of the sons of Owen Glendower. The only blood spilt was that of a French straggler, surprised by a Welch farmer in the act of storming his hen-roost. The bold Briton knocked the assassin on the head with his flail, and, not knowing whom he had slain, buried him in the dunghill, until he learned by the report of the country that he had slain a French invader, when he was much astonished and delighted with his own valour. Such was the event of the invasion; Mr Tone will tell us what was expected.

* Nov. 1st and 2d, 1796 (Brest).

Colonel Shee tells me that General Quatrecas has been dispatched from Flushing with 2000 of the greatest reprobates in the French army, to land in England; and do as much mischief as possible, and that we have 3000 of the same stamp, whom we are also to disgorge on the English coast. . . .

Nov. 24th and 25th.

Colonel Tate, an American officer, has offered his services, and the general has given him the rank of chef-de-brigade, and 1050 men of the *Légion Noire*, in order to go on a buccaneering party into England. Excepting some little errors in the locality, which, after all, may seem errors to me from my own ignorance, the instructions are incomparably well drawn; they are done, or at least corrected, by the general himself; and if Tate be a dashing fellow, with military talents, he may play the devil in England before he is caught. His object is Liverpool; and I have some reason to think the scheme has resulted from a conversation I had a few days since with Colonel Shee, wherein I told him that, if we were once settled in Ireland, I thought we might make a piratical visit in that quarter; and, in fact, I wish it was we that should have the credit and profit of it. I should like, for example, to pay a visit to Liverpool myself, with some of the gentlemen from Ormond Quay, though I must say to citizens of the *Légion Noire* are very little beloved by my countrymen either in appearance or morals, which last has been prodigiously cultivated by three or four campaigns in Bretagne and La Vendée. A thousand of these desperadoes, in their black jackets, will edify John Bull exceedingly, if they get safe into Lancashire.

Nov. 26th.

To-day, by the general's orders, I have made a fair copy of Colonel Tate's instructions with some

alterations from the rough draught of yesterday, particularly with regard to his first destination, which is now fixed to be Bristol. If he arrives safe, it will be very possible to carry it by a *coup de main*, in which case he is to burn it to the ground. I cannot but observe here that I transcribed, with the greatest sang-froid, the orders to reduce to ashes the third city of the British dominions, in which there is, perhaps, property to the amount of £5,000,000.

No. 3.

HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE 18th BRUMAIRE.

Page 278.

THE following facts, which have never been made public, but with which we have been favoured from an authentic channel, throw particular light on the troubled period during which Napoleon assumed the supreme power, the risks which he ran of being anticipated in his aim, or of altogether missing it.

In the end of July, 1799, when all those discontented were fermenting, which afterwards led to the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire, General Augereau, with one of the most celebrated veterans of the republican army, attended by a deputation of six persons, amongst whom were Salicetti and other members of Convention, came on a mission to General Bernadotte, then minister at war, at an early hour in the morning.

Their object was to call the minister's attention to a general report, which announced that there was to be a speedy alteration of the constitution and existing order of things. They accused Barras, Siéyes, and Fouché, as being the authors of these intrigues. It was generally believed, they said, that one of the Directors (Barras) was for restoring the Bourbons; another (Siéyes is probably meant) was for electing the Duke of Brunswick. The deputation made Bernadotte acquainted with their purpose of fulminating a decree of arrest against the two official persons. Having first inquired what proofs they could produce in support of their allegations, and being informed that they had no positive proof to offer, the minister informed them that he would not participate in the proposed act of illegal violence. "I require your word of honour," he said, "that you will desist from this project. It is the only mode to insure my silence on the subject." One of the deputation, whom the minister had reason to regard as a man of the most exemplary loyalty, and with whom he had had connexions in military service, replied to him, "Our intention was to have placed you in possession of great power, being well persuaded that you would not abuse it. Since you do not see the matter as we do, the affair is at an end. We give up our scheme. Let the affair be buried in complete oblivion." In less than two months afterwards, Bonaparte's arrival gave a new turn to the state of affairs.

He landed, as is well known, at Fréjus, after having abandoned his army and broke the quarantine laws. When this intelligence reached Bernadotte, he intimated to the Directory, that there was not an

instant to lose in having him brought before a council of war. General Debel was instructed to make this communication to a member of the Directory, who was one of his friends. Colonel St-Martin, of the artillery, spoke to this Director to the same purpose. His answer was, "We are not strong enough." On its being said that Bernadotte was of opinion that Bonaparte should be proceeded against according to the principles of military discipline, and that the opportunity which occurred should be laid hold of, the Director replied, "Let us wait."

Bonaparte arrived at Paris. All the generals went to visit him. A public dinner to him was proposed, and a list for that purpose handed about: When it was presented to Bernadotte by two members of the Council of Five Hundred, he said to them, "I would advise you to put off this dinner till he account satisfactorily for having abandoned his army."*

More than twelve days had elapsed before Bernadotte saw Bonaparte. At the request of Joseph, his brother-in-law, and of Madame Leclerc, Bonaparte's sister, Bernadotte at length went to visit him. The conversation turned upon Egypt. Bonaparte having begun to talk of public affairs, Bernadotte allowed him to enlarge on the necessity of a change in the government; and at last, perceiving that Bonaparte, aware of the awkwardness of his situation, was exaggerating the unfavourable circumstances in the situation of France,—“But, general,” said Bernadotte, “the Russians are beaten in Switzerland, and have retired into Bohemia; a line of defence is maintained between the Alps and the Ligurian Apennines; we are in possession of Genoa; Holland is saved—the Russian army that was there is destroyed, and the English army has retired to England:—15,000 insurgents have just been dispersed in the department of the Upper Garonne, and constrained to take refuge in Spain;—at this moment we are busied in raising two hundred auxiliary battalions of 1000 men each, and 40,000 cavalry; and in three months at most, we shall not know what to do with this multitude of men, unless we make them rush into Germany and Italy like torrents. Indeed, if you had been able to bring the army of Egypt with you, the veterans who compose it would have been very useful in forming our new corps. Though we should look upon this army as lost, unless it return by virtue of a treaty, I do not despair of the safety of the Republic, and I am convinced she will withstand her enemies both at home and abroad.” While pronouncing the words *enemies at home*, Bernadotte unintentionally looked in the face of Bonaparte, whose confusion was evident. Madame Bonaparte changed the conversation, and Bernadotte soon after took leave.

Some days afterwards, M. R—, formerly chief secretary to the minister of war, begged General

* When Bernadotte came into the ministry, it became a question whether Bonaparte should not be sent for from Egypt.—“It is the army you mean,” said the minister,—“for as to the general, you know he has an eye to the dictatorship; and sending vessels to bring him to France would just be giving it to him.”

A French fleet was at that time cruising in the Mediterranean,—the minister insisted that it should be ordered into Toulon.

Bernadotte to introduce him to Bonaparte. The general carried him along with him. After the usual compliments, they began to talk of the situation of France. Bonaparte spoke much of the great excitement of feeling among the republicans, and particularly in the "*club du manège*." Bernadotte said, in answer, "When an impulse is once given, it is not easily stopped. This you have often experienced. After having impressed on the army of Italy a movement of patriotic enthusiasm, you could not repress this feeling when you judged it proper to do so. The same thing happens now. A number of individuals, and your own brothers principally, have formed the club you speak of. I have never belonged to it. I was too busy, and had too many duties to perform as minister, to be able to attend it. You have alleged that I have favoured these meetings. This is not correct. I have indeed supported many respectable persons who belonged to this club, because their views were honest, and they hoped to give prevalence to a spirit of moderation and prudence, which is generally thrown aside by ambitious men. Salicetti, a particular friend and secret confidant of your brothers, was one of the directors of that meeting. It has been believed by observers, and is believed still, that the state of excitement which you complain of has originated in the instructions received by Salicetti."

Here Bonaparte lost temper, and declared that he would rather live in the woods, than continue to exist in the midst of a society which gave him no security.

"What security do you want?" answered General Bernadotte. Madame Bonaparte, fearing that the conversation would become too warm, changed the subject, addressing herself to M R——, who was known to her. General Bernadotte did not persist in his questions, and, after some general conversation, he withdrew.

A few days afterwards, Joseph had a large party at Morfontaine. Bonaparte, meeting General Bernadotte coming out of the Théâtre Français, inquired if he was to be of the party on the following day. Being answered in the affirmative—"Will you," said he, "give me my coffee to-morrow morning? I have occasion to pass near your house, and shall be very glad to stop with you for a few moments." Next morning, Bonaparte and his wife arrived; Louis followed them a moment afterwards. Bonaparte made himself very agreeable.* In the evening there was some conversation between Regault de St-Jean d'Angely, Joseph, and Lucien. Bonaparte conversed with Bernadotte, who saw, from his embarrassed air, and frequent fits of absence, that his mind was deeply occupied. He had no longer any doubt that it was Bonaparte's determined purpose to save himself, by the overthrow of the constitution, from the danger with which he was threatened in consequence of his leaving Egypt, abandoning his army, and violating the quarantine laws. He resolved to oppose it by every means in

his power. On his return to Paris, he happened, accidentally, to be in a house belonging to a fellow countryman and friend of Moreau's. That general having inquired if he had been at the party at Morfontaine, and if he had spoken with Bonaparte, and Bernadotte having told him he had, Moreau said, "That is the man who has done the greatest harm to the Republic."—"And," added Bernadotte, "who is preparing the greatest."—"We shall prevent him" replied Moreau. The two generals shook hands, and promised to stand by each other in resisting the deserter from Egypt. So they called him in presence of a number of persons, among whom was the ex-minister, Petiet.

The Directory, it is true, did not enjoy the public esteem. Siéyes stood first in reputation among the five members, but he was looked upon as being timid and vindictive. He was believed to be disposed to call the Duke of Brunswick to the throne of France. Barras was suspected by some persons of being in treaty with the Count de Lille. Gohier, Moulins, and Roger Ducos, were very respectable men, but considered to be unfit for the government of a great nation. Gohier, however, was known to be one of the first lawyers of that period, to be of incorruptible integrity, and an ardent lover of his country.

When Siéyes obtained a place in the Directory, he had desired to have General Bernadotte for war-minister. Some confidential relations between them, and a certain degree of deference which Bernadotte paid to Siéyes, in consequence of his great celebrity, had flattered his self-love. Bonaparte's two brothers, Joseph and Lucien, thinking they should find in Bernadotte a ready instrument for the execution of the plans of their brother, whom they believed to be on the point of landing in France, agreed with Siéyes in bringing Bernadotte into the ministry. Gohier, Moulins, and Roger Ducos joined the Bonapartes and Siéyes; Barras alone inclined towards Dubois Crancé; but he yielded with a good grace to the opinion of his colleagues.

The proposal was made to Bernadotte at a dinner at Joseph's, in the Rue du Rocher. Joubert, one of the party, who had recently formed an intimacy with the candidate for the place of minister, was chosen by the Bonapartes to propose it to him. The proposal was refused, and the remonstrances of Joubert had no effect on the resolution of Bernadotte, which at that time appeared immovable. The Bonapartes, who were the prime movers of all the changes which took place, and enjoyed the distribution of all the great posts, were astonished when they heard General Joubert's report. They got several members of the council to endeavour to induce Bernadotte to accept. Their attempts were vain. Every solicitation was followed by a most obstinate refusal. But what could not be done by Bernadotte's friends and partisans, duped by the apparent friendship of the Bonapartes for him, was accomplished by his wife and sister-in-law. After many days spent in entreaties, Bernadotte yielded, and received the *porte-feuille* from the hands of General Millet-Mureau, who then had the charge of that department. The Bonapartes were not slow in showing a desire to exercise a direct influence

* It was by no means from friendship that Bonaparte went to Bernadotte's on this occasion; but really to render the Directory and the friends of the Republic suspicious as to that general's intentions.

in the war-department. Many of their creatures were raised, by the new minister, to higher situations; but the number of fresh applications continually made to him, convinced him that they considered him as holding his place merely to serve their purposes, and prepare the way for their elevation.

The minister, who went regularly at five o'clock in the morning to the office of the war-department, where he had to repair heavy disasters, recruit the army, put a stop to dilapidations, organize two hundred battalions of a thousand men each, bring back to their corps 80,000 men, who had, in the course of a few years, absented themselves without permission, and accomplish an extraordinary levy of 40,000 horse, did not return to his house, in the Rue Cisalpine, till between five and six in the evening. Joseph and his wife were almost always there. Joseph sometimes turned the conversation on the incapacity of the Directory, the difficulty of things remaining as they were, and the necessity of new-modeling the administration.

Bernadotte, on the contrary, thought that if the five Directors were reduced to three, one of whom should go out of office every three years, the constitution would go on very well. He found in that form of government the creation of a patrician order exclusively charged with the government of the state. The Roman republic was his model, and he saw in the constitution of the year III. a great analogy to the consular privileges and the rights of senators. By the 135th article of that constitution, no one could aspire to become a Director, without having been first a member of one of the two councils, a minister of state, etc. As that condition was already fulfilled in his case, it was natural that he should incline towards the preservation of a form of government which placed him on an equality with kings, and gave him the hopes of seeing many kings tributary to, or at least protected by, the Republic. These discussions sometimes became rather unreserved; and it was at such a time that Joseph intimated to Bernadotte, in a sort of half-confidence, the possibility of his brother's speedy return. The minister had sufficient presence of mind to conceal his indignation; but his surprise was so visible that Joseph was alarmed by it. He endeavoured to diminish the impression which his communication had produced. He said, "That what he had advanced was merely a simple conjecture on his part, which might become a probability—perhaps, even (added he) a reality; for he has conquered Egypt—his business is at an end—he has nothing more to do in that quarter."—"Conquered!" replied Bernadotte—"Say rather, *invaded*. This conquest, if you will call it so, is far from being secure. It has given new life to the coalition which was extinct; it has given us all Europe for our enemies; and rendered the very existence of the Republic doubtful. Besides, your brother has no authority to quit the army. He knows the military laws, and I do not think that he would be inclined, or would dare, to render himself liable to punishment under them. Such a desertion would be too serious a matter; and he is too well aware of its consequences."

Joseph went away a few moments afterwards; and this conversation having proved to him that Bernadotte did not concur in his opinions, it became an object to produce a breach between him (Bernadotte) and Siéyès.

Bernadotte retired from the ministry, and Bonaparte arrived about three weeks afterwards. Not being able to doubt that the Directors themselves were either dupes of Bonaparte's ambition, or his accomplices, and that they were meditating with him the overthrow of the established order of things, General Bernadotte persevered in offering his counsels and services to those members of the government, or of the legislative body, who might have opposed those designs. But the factions and the intriguing went on at a more rapid pace; and every day Bonaparte increased his party by the accession of some distinguished personage.

On the 16th Brumaire, at five o'clock, Bernadotte went to General Bonaparte's, where he was invited to dinner. General Jourdan was of the party. He arrived after they had sat down to table. The conversation was entirely on military subjects; and Bernadotte undertook to refute the maxims which Bonaparte was laying down relative to the system of war by invasion. Bernadotte concluded nearly in these words:—"There is more trouble in preserving than in invading;" alluding to the conquest of Egypt. The company rose and went to the drawing-room. Immediately afterwards there arrived several very distinguished members of the Council, and a good many men of letters; Volney and Talleyrand were of the number. The conversation was general, and turned on the affairs of the west of France. Bonaparte, raising his voice a little, and addressing somebody near him, said—"Ah! you see a Chouan in General Bernadotte." The general, in answering him, could not refrain from smiling. "Don't contradict yourself," said he; "it was but the other day that you complained of my favouring the inconvenient enthusiasm of the friends of the Republic, and now you tell me that I protect the Chouans. This is very inconsistent." The company continued to increase every minute; and the apartments not being very spacious, Bernadotte went away.

Many persons have thought that the answers given by Bernadotte to Bonaparte on this occasion had retarded for twenty-four hours the movement which had been prepared. Others, on the contrary, have alleged that, the 17th being a Friday, Bonaparte, naturally superstitious, had deferred the execution of the project till the 18th.

On the 17th Brumaire, between eleven and twelve at night, Joseph Bonaparte, returning to his house in the Rue du Rocher by the way of the Rue Cisalpine, called at the house of Bernadotte. He, being in bed, sent to request Joseph to return next day. He did so before seven o'clock on the morning of the 18th. He told Bernadotte that his brother desired to speak with him; that the measures to be taken had been discussed the evening before, and that they wished to inform him of them. They both went immediately to Bonaparte's house in the Rue de la Victoire. The court, the vestibule, and the apartments, were filled with generals and

officers of rank. Many of the officers had the air of persons in a state of excitation from wine. Bernadotte was shown into a small room; Joseph did not go in. Bonaparte was sitting at breakfast with one of his aides-de-camp, who, as far as can be remembered, was Lemarrois. General Lefebvre, afterwards Duke of Dantzig, then commanding the 17th military division, of which Paris was the headquarters, was standing. Bernadotte, seeing him in that attitude, did not doubt that he was detained a prisoner. He immediately took a chair, sat down, and made a sign to Lefebvre to do the same. Lefebvre hesitated, but a glance from Bonaparte reassured him. He sat down respectfully, looking at Bonaparte. The latter, addressing himself to Bernadotte, said, with embarrassment,—"Why, you are not in uniform!" On Bernadotte answering—"I am not on duty," Bonaparte replied—"You shall be immediately." "I do not think so," said Bernadotte. Bonaparte rose, took Bernadotte by the hand, and carried him into an adjoining room. "This Directory governs ill," said he; "it would destroy the Republic if we did not take care. The Council of Ancients has named me commandant of Paris, of the National Guard, and of all the troops in the division. Go and put on your uniform, and join me at the Tuileries, where I am now going."

Bernadotte having declined doing this, Bonaparte said,—"I see you think you can count upon Moreau, Beaumontville, and other generals. You will see them all come to me,—Moreau himself;" and, speaking very fast, he named about thirty members of the Council of the Ancients, whom Bernadotte had believed to be the greatest friends of the constitution of the year III. "You don't know mankind," added he; "they promise much, and perform little."

Bernadotte having declared that he did not chuse to be involved in a rebellion of this kind, nor to overturn a constitution which had cost the lives of a million of men,—"Well," said Bonaparte, "you will stay till I receive the decree of the Council of Ancients; for till then I am nothing." Bernadotte, raising his voice, said—"I am a man whom you may put to death, but whom you shall not detain against his will." "Well, then!" said Bonaparte, softening his voice, "give me your word that you will do nothing against me." "Yes, as a citizen; but if I am called upon by the Directory, or if the legislative body gives me the command of its guard, I shall oppose you, and you shall not have the upper hand." "What do you mean by *as a citizen*?" "I will not go to the barracks, nor places of public resort, to inflame the minds of the soldiers and the people."

"I am quite easy," answered Bonaparte; "I have taken my measures; you will receive no appointment; they are more afraid of your ambition than of mine. I wish merely to save the Republic; I want nothing for myself; I shall retire to Malmaison, after having brought about me a circle of friends. If you wish to be of the number, you shall be made very welcome." Bernadotte said in reply, as he was going away—"As to your being a good friend, that may be; but I am convinced that you will always be the worst of masters."

Bernadotte left the room; Bonaparte followed him into the lobby, and said to Joseph, with an agitated voice,—"Follow him." Bernadotte passed through a crowd of generals, officers of rank, and soldiers, who filled the court of the house, and a part of the street, making some impression upon them by his looks, which expressed his disapprobation of their conduct. Joseph followed Bernadotte, and came up to him in the court of the house. He asked him to go to his house, in the Rue du Rocher, where he had assembled several members of the legislative body. When he arrived at Joseph's he found a dozen of persons, among whom were several deputies devoted to Bonaparte, and particularly Siccardi. Breakfast was served. During the few moments they remained at table, they spoke of the resolutions which would be taken, and Joseph repeated, that his brother wished for nothing but the consolidation of freedom, that he might then have it in his power to live like a philosopher at Malmaison.

Bernadotte went to the garden of the Tuileries, and passed along the front of the 79th demi-brigade. The officers having recognized him, though not in uniform, came up to him, and asked him for information as to what was going to happen. Bernadotte answered in general terms, expressing his wish that the public tranquillity might not be endangered by the movement about to take place. The soldiers, having in their turn recognized the general, who had commanded them at the siege and taking of Maastricht, loudly expressed their astonishment at his not being along with the generals, who, said they, were then deciding, in the palace, the fate of France.

Bernadotte having observed what he might expect, in case of need, from this corps, and from some detachments before whom he had presented himself on the Boulevard and on the Pont de la Révolution, went to General Jourdan's, presuming that the Directory would send for him to take care of the safety of the government. He found at Jourdan's a good many members of the Council of Five Hundred, among others Augereau, afterwards Duke of Castiglione. He had scarcely arrived, when a great number of the members came to announce the communications of the decree of the Council of Ancients, which, in virtue of the 102d article of the Constitution, transferred the sitting of the Legislative Body to St-Cloud.

Bernadotte, on his return home, learned from his wife that the Adjutant-general Rappatel, attached to General Moreau's staff, had just been there, and that he had been sent by Bonaparte and Moreau, to persuade him to join them at the Tuileries. Bonaparte had said to him—"You have served under General Bernadotte. I know that he has confidence in you. Tell him that all his friends are assembled at the Tuileries, and that they are desirous of seeing him among them; add that they love their country as much as he, and that they strongly wish to see him appear among the number of those to whom she this day owes her safety."

Siéyes and Roger Ducos had already joined Bonaparte at the Tuileries. The three directors, Gohier the president, Molins and Barras, remained at the Luxembourg. The secretary-general, La garde, was still faithful to the majority of the Di-

rectory. As General Bernadotte had foreseen, that majority cast their eyes on him for the ministry of war, and the general command of the troops, and of the National Guards of the 17th division. The resignation of Barras, and the defection of the secretary-general, put a stop to this nomination. Bonaparte, having no longer anything to fear, made a new division of the different commands, and assigned to Moreau, with a hundred horse, that of the Luxembourg, where Gohier and Moulins were detained.

Moreau, dissatisfied with the indifference with which he had been treated by Bonaparte, and acquainted with his intentions and projects, was already thinking of forsaking his cause, which he regarded as unjust and traitorous to the nation. He again desired Rappatel to go, towards evening, to Bernadotte's, to invite him, on the part of Moreau, to go to the Luxembourg, that they might consult together as to the measures to be taken for preventing Bonaparte from seizing the dictatorship. Bernadotte's answer to these overtures was, that he was bound by the word of honour which he had given, not to undertake anything as a citizen; but that he was free to act if called on or summoned to do so by a public man; that if Moreau would march out of the Luxembourg, at the head of the detachment which he commanded, present himself at his door, and summon him, in the name of the public good, to make common cause with him in the defence of liberty and of the constitution which had been sworn to, he, Bernadotte, would mount his horse with his aides-de-camp, put himself under Moreau's command, address the troops, and cause Bonaparte to be immediately arrested and tried as a deserter from the army of Egypt, and as having violated the constitution, by accepting a command given him by a mere fraction of the legislative body. Moreau, bound down by the duty of military discipline, according to which he was under the orders of General Bonaparte, did not agree to Bernadotte's proposal; and the latter, therefore, did not think himself at liberty to go to the Luxembourg.

Bernadotte, from seven o'clock till ten, had conferences with Salicetti, Augereau, Jourdan, Gareau, and a dozen of the most influential members of the Council of Five Hundred. It was decided, that, next morning, Bernadotte should be named commandant of the guard of the legislative body, and of all the troops in the capital, and they separated. Salicetti ran to the Tuileries to tell Bonaparte what had happened, and he, who dreaded so courageous an adversary as Bernadotte, charged Salicetti to be present next morning at five o'clock, at the preparatory meeting which was to take place before going to St. Cloud, and to tell every one of the deputies, that he, Bonaparte, had made the greatest efforts to prevent a decree of deportation being issued against the deputies who had formed the design of giving to Bernadotte the command of the armed force.

On the 19th, at seven o'clock in the morning, generals Jourdan and Augereau, followed by eight or ten deputies of the Council of Five Hundred (among whom were Gareau and Talot), went to General Bernadotte's, in the Rue Cisalpine. They

informed him that Salicetti had made them aware, on the part of Bonaparte, that Siéyès had proposed to arrest a number of deputies of the two Councils, in order to prevent their appearing at St. Cloud. They asked Bernadotte what he thought of the events of the day. He saw nothing in the communication of Salicetti, but the desire of rendering these deputies favourable to Bonaparte. Some of these legislators seemed to feel grateful for the service which Bonaparte had done them the evening before. Bernadotte did not appreciate this act of generosity as they did; but he agreed in their opinion as to the conciliatory measures which they seemed to wish to adopt, and, entering into their views, he explained himself in these terms:—"Let one of you mount the tribune; let him describe succinctly the internal situation of France, and her successes abroad; let him say, that the departure of an army for Egypt, while it has involved us in war, has deprived us of an army of more than 30,000 veterans, and a great many experienced generals; that, nevertheless, the Republic is triumphant; that the coalition is broken up, since Suwarrow is returned to Russia; that the English, with a prince of the blood at their head, have left the Batavian republic, and retired to England; that the line of defence is maintained between the Alps and the Ligurian Apennines; that 200,000 conscripts are hastening to arrange themselves into battalions to reinforce the armies, and 40,000 cavalry are raising; that the insurrection of the west is reduced to a few scattered bands, and that a royalist army in the Upper Garonne has been destroyed or dispersed; that, to obtain a peace quite as honourable as that of Campo Formio, it is only necessary for France to maintain this formidable attitude; that, in order to maintain it, union and mutual confidence are indispensable; that, although the Council of Ancients have violated the constitution, in naming Bonaparte general-in-chief of the 17th division, and in giving him the command of the National Guard, and the Guard of the Directory, the Council of Five Hundred is not now engaged in deliberating on this violation of the constitution, but rather on the means of giving security to the French people, the two Councils, and the government of the state; that, for this purpose, the Council of Five Hundred names General Bernadotte colleague to General Bonaparte; that these two generals shall understand each other in regard to the employment of the armed force, and the distribution of commands, in case of this force being employed; but that the tranquillity which prevails in Paris and the vicinity, renders it certain that there will be no occasion for this force being put in motion. Send me this decree; in twenty minutes after receiving it I shall be in the midst of you with my aides-de-camp; I shall take the command of the corps that I shall find on my way, and we shall see what is to be done. If it is necessary to declare Bonaparte an outlaw, you will always have on your side a general, and a great proportion at least of the troops."

The deputies immediately set off for St. Cloud. The unhappy custom of delivering set speeches from the tribune produced the loss of precious time. The debate became warm; and the taking individually

the oath to the constitution caused a useless loss of more than an hour and a half. No other resolution was taken. Bonaparte made his appearance, and the events which then happened at St-Cloud are well known.

After having been repulsed from the Council of Five Hundred, Bonaparte, stammering with agitation, addressed the soldiers. "Are you for me?"—"We are for the Republic," said they.—(It was at this time that Lucien, President of the Council, harangued the troops). What would have become of him had Bernadotte been there! Bonaparte felt this himself; for he said, at this period,—"I am not afraid of Bernadotte's consenting to my being assassinated; but he will harangue the troops, and that is what I have to fear."

Bonaparte was made aware, the same evening, of the language which Bernadotte had used to the deputies at his house in the Rue Cisalpine. The expressions he had really made use of, though they must have been disagreeable enough to Bonaparte, particularly in so far as related to his escape from Egypt, and his ulterior designs against the liberty of France, were exaggerated, and represented to Bonaparte so as to indicate personal hatred.

Bonaparte, though he never found an opportunity of taking open revenge against Bernadotte, let slip no opportunity of injuring him, by placing him, as a general, in difficult situations, and leaving him, in the most perilous and delicate circumstances, without instructions or orders. The following occurrence, which took place soon afterwards, will give a correct idea of this conduct on the part of Bonaparte.

The measures for restoring tranquillity in the west of France, in the month of January, 1800, had never been entirely completed; for, at the same moment that they were taken, several departments were put out of the pale of the constitution. The Chouans of these departments were organized as militia, and as guerillas, who plundered the diligences, and murdered the persons who became proprietors of the national domains. They were regularly paid, and had communications with the enemies of the Republic, by means of the English fleets which threatened the coasts. At this critical moment, Bernadotte was invested with the civil and military command of these departments. By his firm and prudent conduct, he repressed the seditious movements, and re-established good order and obedience to the laws. Many free corps, numbers of individuals belonging to which, for want of being properly employed, were in the pay of the Chouan chiefs, were organized as regular troops; and by this measure he furnished government with the means of drawing from these departments troops for the army of Italy. But when these troops were to begin their march to Dijon, a serious insurrection broke out at Vannes, on the 28th Fructidor, year VIII (4th September, 1800). The 52d demi brigade refused to march till they should receive their arrears of pay. The commandant and officers, who wished to restore order among them, were maltreated. Bernadotte being informed of this transaction, hastened to Vannes to quell the insurrection; but the corps had left the place. He gave orders to General Liebert, commanding the 22d military division, to

assemble the 52d demi-brigade on its way to Tours; to come before it followed by his staff and the council of war; to make the military penal code be read; to order the colonels to point out one or two men in each company, who had made themselves most remarkable in the revolt of the 28th; to deliver these men to the council of war, and to have them tried on the spot, etc., etc.

Bernadotte's orders were executed on the 4th Vendémiaire (25th September), when the 52d demi-brigade was drawn up on the parade at Tours, and the ringleaders of the revolt arrested in presence of a great number of spectators, without the smallest disturbance taking place.

Bernadotte made a report of this event to the first consul, and to Carnot, the minister of war; but as the result of the measures he had taken was not yet known, the consul put on the margin of the report,—“General Bernadotte has not done well in taking such severe measures against the 52d demi-brigade, not having sufficient means to bring them to order in the heart of a town where the garrison is not strong enough to repress mutiny.”

The result was different. The soldiers returned to their duty, and themselves denounced the authors of the insurrection. The demi-brigade continued its route to Italy; and two days afterwards the consul was profuse in his encomiums on the prudence, foresight, and firmness of the general whose conduct he had been so hasty in disapproving.—The letter which he wrote to Bernadotte on this subject, was in these terms:—

“Paris, 10th Vendémiaire, year IX.

“I have read with interest, citizen-general, the account of what you have done to restore order in the 52d, and also the report of general Liebert of the 5th Vendémiaire. Give this officer the assurance of the satisfaction of government with his conduct. Your promotion of the colonel of brigade to the rank of general of brigade, is confirmed. I desire that this brave officer may come to Paris. He has given an example of firmness and energy most honourable to a military man.

“I salute you,
“BONAPARTE.”

All men, doubtless, are liable to err; but the eagerness of the consul to attach blame to the conduct of a military and political commander, charged with the maintenance of discipline and obedience to the laws, appears evidently to have proceeded more from private hatred than from any duty which the government had to perform; for there was no occasion to give his judgment so precipitately, and he might have waited the final result of the measures he censured, more especially as the scene had taken place in a district agitated by faction and civil war. Bernadotte's friends, who were still in the ministry of war, and even frequented the saloons of the consul, were anxious to make him acquainted with Bonaparte's evil intentions towards him. Every dispatch which he received informed him that the police was forming secret intrigues and conspiracies; that agents were scattered among the army of the West and the army of the Rhine, to endeavour to

make the staffs of those armies commit themselves, in order to have a pretext for disgracing the generals who commanded them. Reports were circulated among the members of these staffs; one day the consul was dying; next day the population of Paris had risen, and the constitution of the year III. was re-established with the necessary modifications. The persons employed in raising these reports watched the looks of the generals, and reported their slightest expressions. These snares roused the indignation of General Bernadotte, and the army he commanded; and it is not going too far to say, that it was in the army of the West and the army of the Rhine, that plans for the preservation and security of constitutional freedom originated. Men, who were obliged by profession and duty, to yield to the force of military discipline, and who neither had, nor wished to have, anything to do with the intricacies of civil policy, were all at once inspired with a new spirit, and tacitly formed an association guided by their opinions; so much so, that, during the course of the year 1801, the consul perceived, from the reserve and behaviour of many of the generals towards him, that a change had taken place in the confidence entertained as to his intentions on the subject of public liberty and individual security.

This reserve, the cause of which he penetrated, determined him to make a set of new creatures, and bring around him men from whom he was sure, as he said, to meet with no contradiction. His having laid down this principle of action, and his well-known system of degrading everything, were the cause of the entry of foreign armies into France, and the fall of his dynasty.

No. 4.

INSTRUCTIONS BY NAPOLEON TO TALLEYRAND,
PRINCE OF BENEVENTUM.

Page 327.

THIS very singular memorandum contains the instructions given by Napoleon to Talleyrand, concerning the manner in which he wished him to receive Lord Whitworth, then about to quit Paris, under the immediate prospect of the war again breaking out. He did not trust, it seems, to that accomplished statesman the slightest circumstance of the conference; "although," as Talleyrand himself observed, as he gave to the Duke of Wellington the interesting document, in Napoleon's own handwriting, "if I could be trusted with anything, it must have been the mode of receiving and negotiating with an ambassador." From the style of the note, it seems that the warmth, or rather violence, which the first consul had thrown into the discussion at the levee, did not actually flow from Napoleon's irritated feelings, but was a calculated burst of passion, designed to confound and overwhelm the English nobleman, who proved by no means the kind of person to be shaken with the utmost vehemence. It may be also remarked, that Napoleon, while he was desirous to try the effect of a cold, stern, and indifferent mode of conduct towards the English minister, was yet desirous, if that should not shake Lord

Whitworth's firmness, that Talleyrand, by reference to the pleasure of the first consul, should take care to keep open the door for reconciliation.

The various errors in orthography, as *sait* for *fait* or *faites*, *dit* for *dis* or *dites*, are taken from the original.

St-Cloud, à 4 heures et demie.

"Je reçois votre lettre qui m'a été remise à la Malmaison. Je désire que la conférence ne se tourne pas en parlage. Montrez-vous y froid, altier, et même un peu fier.

"Si la note contient le mot *ultimatum*, fait* lui sentir que ce mot renferme celui de guerre, que cette manière de négocier et d'un supérieur à un inférieur. Si la note ne contient pas ce mot, fait† qu'il le mette, en lui observant qu'il faut enfin savoir à quoi nous en tenir—que nous sommes las de cet état d'anxiété—que jamais on n'obtiendra de nous ce que l'on a obtenu des dernières années des Bourbons,—que nous ne sommes plus ce peuple qui recevra un Commissaire à Dunkerque; que, l'ultimatum remis, tout deviendra rompu.

"Effrayez le sur les suites de cette remise. S'il est inébranlable, accompagnez le dans votre salon.** de vous quitter, dit†† lui, mais le Cap et l'île de Gorée, sont ils évacués?—radoucissez un peu la fin de la conférence, et invitez le à revenir avant d'écrire à sa cour, enfin que vous puissiez lui dire l'impression qu'elle a fait sur moi, qu'elle pourrait être diminué par les mesures de ces évacuations du Cap et de l'île de Gorée."

Translation.

St-Cloud, half past four.

I received your letter, which was brought to me at Malmaison. I request that the conference do not go into dialogue. Show yourself cold, lofty, even a little haughty.

If his note contains the word *ultimatum*, make him sensible that that word imports war, since such a manner of negotiating only takes place betwixt a superior and an inferior. If the note does not contain that word, contrive to make him insert it, by observing to him that it is necessary at length we should know upon what footing we are to stand with respect to each other; that we are weary of this state of anxiety; that they will never obtain from us those advantages which they extorted, during the latter part of the reign of the Bourbons; that we are no longer the same people who received an English Commissary at Dunkirk; that the *ultimatum* being rejected, all treaty will be broken off.

Alarm him upon the consequences of that rejection. If he remains still immovable, accompany him into your saloon. and at the moment of his departure, ask him incidentally, "By the way, the Cape and the Island of Gorée, are they evacuated?" Soften your tone a little towards the end of the conference, and invite him to return before writing to his court. At last, you may hint that the unfavourable impression he has made on me may possibly be diminished by the evacuation of the Cape and the Isle of Gorée.

* Faites. † Faites. ** Illegible. †† Dites.

No. 5.

FURTHER PARTICULARS CONCERNING THE ARREST,
TRIAL, AND DEATH OF THE DUKE D'ENGHIEN.

Page 341.

THIS most melancholy history appears to deserve further notice than we had it in our power to bestow, without too long interrupting the course of our narrative. It has been, and must for ever remain, the most marked and indelible blot upon the character of Napoleon Bonaparte. "A young prince," says the author of a well-reasoned dissertation on this subject, "in the flower of his age, treacherously seized in a neutral country, where he reposed under the protection of the law of nations, dragged into France, brought before judges, who had no pretension to assume that character, accused of supposed crimes, deprived of the assistance of a legal advocate or defender, put to death by night in the ditches of a state-prison;—so many virtues misconstrued, so many fond hopes crushed in the bud, will always render that catastrophe one of the most revolting acts which absolute power has been tempted to consummate."

The Duke d'Enghien was one of the most active and determined of the exiled princes of the house of Bourbon, to whom the emigrants and the royalists who remained within France were alike devotedly attached. He was master of many of their secrets; and in July, 1799, when the affairs of the Republic were in a very perilous state, and the royalists were adjusting a general rising through all the south of France, his name was used upon the following extraordinary occasion.

A former member of the representation, known as much by his character as a royalist, as by his worth and probity, requested a private interview with General Bernadotte, then minister at war. The audience being granted by the minister, with whom he had some connexion, the representative entered into a long argument to prove what could not be denied—the disastrous and dangerous state of France, and then proceeded thus: "The republican system being no longer able to support itself, a general movement is about to take place for the restoration of the king, and is so well organized, that it can scarce fail to be successful. The Duke d'Enghien, lieutenant-general of the royal army, is at Paris at this very moment while I speak to you, and I am deputed by one of his most faithful adherents, to make known these circumstances to General Bernadotte. The prince esteems you, confides his safety to your loyalty, reckons on your assistance, and is ready to grant any conditions which you may attach to your services." Bernadotte replied to this unexpected communication, "That the Duke d'Enghien should have no reason to repent the confidence which he had reposed in him: but that the loyalty which the duke had ascribed to him prevented his complying with the prince's wishes and request." He proceeded to state, that his own fame and personal interest were alike interested in his adherence to a government sprung from the will of the people; and that he was in-

capable of violating his oath of fidelity, or overthrowing the constitution to which he had sworn. "Make haste," he continued, "to convey my sentiments to him who sent you; tell him they are sincere and inalterable. But let him know, that for three days I will keep the secret which I have just learned, most profoundly. During that time he must find means of placing himself in security, by repossessing the frontiers: but on the fourth morning, the secret will be mine no longer. This very morning, the term of three days will commence; make haste—and remember that the least imprudence on your part will be attended with fatal consequences."

It was afterwards ascertained that the deputy was mistaken, when he averred that the Duke d'Enghien was in Paris. It was pretty certain that he had never crossed the Rhine, and only waited the favourable reply of the minister at war to make the attempt. But in the light in which the case was presented to Bernadotte, his generous and firm conduct does not the less honour that eminent person, especially when contrasted with that of Napoleon. There might have been a strong temptation, and even a show of right, to have seized on the unfortunate prince, supposing him to be in Paris, negotiating plans against the existing government, and tempting the fidelity of their principal ministers;—there could be none to kidnap him in foreign parts, when, however it might be suspected, it could not be shown by proof, that the unfortunate duke was concerned in any of the political intrigues which were laid to his charge. The tottering state of public affairs requiring so much vigilance and vigour on the part of the government, might also have been pleaded in excuse of Bernadotte, had he delivered up the Duke d'Enghien to a dungeon or scaffold, while Napoleon, on the contrary, took the unhappy prince's life at a moment when his own power was so firmly established, as rather to incur danger than to acquire safety by the indulgence of a cruel revenge. The above anecdote, not, we believe, generally known, may be relied upon as authentic.

Napoleon, four years later, adopted towards the unfortunate prince that line of severity with which the world is acquainted. His broad vindication uniformly was stated to be, that the duke had offended against the laws of the country, and that, to put a stop to conspiracies, he had, from the beginning, determined to let the law take its course against him. He alleged, as we shall hereafter notice, various pleas in palliation or excuse; but his chief defence uniformly consisted in an appeal to the laws; and it is therefore just to the memory of Napoleon and his victim, that we should examine whether, in a legal sense, the procedure against the Duke d'Enghien is vindicated in whole or in part. The labours of Monsieur Dupin, the learned author of a pamphlet already quoted, has furnished us with an excellent work on this subject.

The case of the unfortunate duke must always be admitted to be a hard one. This is not denied by Bonaparte himself; and, on that account, it is the more necessary to the vindication of those upon whom his fate depended, to bring their procedure within the pale of the law. We are not now talking of reconciling the tragedy to the general rules of

justice, generosity, or humanity; but, in resigning the arguments which these afford, we are the more entitled to expect that the procedure which we impugn should, however harsh or cruel, be at least in strict conformity with the existing laws of France at the time, and such as could be carried on and vindicated by day-light, and in an open court. This is surely limiting our inquiry to the narrowest possible ground; and we shall prosecute the subject by examining the process in detail.

Arrest of the Duke d'Enghien.

Every arrest, to be legal, must be so in three points of view: 1. as to the place where it is made; 2. concerning the person whom it regards; 3. in respect of the grounds on which it proceeds.

The duke was residing in the territories of the Elector of Baden, a sovereign prince who had not ventured to afford him that refuge without consulting the French governor on the subject, and who was authorized to believe that his affording hospitality to the unfortunate prince would afford no cause of rupture with his powerful neighbour. The acquiescence of the French government affords too much reason to suppose, that the measure afterwards adopted had been for some time premeditated; and that there was a secret design of detaining the victim within reach of the blow which they had already resolved to strike, when they should see convenient. Whether this was the case or no, the Duke d'Enghien was residing under protection of the law of nations, which proclaims the inviolability of the territories of one state by the soldiers of another, unless in case of war openly declared. It would be wasting arguments to show that the irruption of the French troops into the territory of Baden, and the seizure of the prince and his retinue, were directly contrary to public law, and could only be compared to an incursion of Algerines or robbers. Thus the place of arrest was highly and evidently illegal.

The charge on which the arrest was granted did not improve its legality. The only laws which could be referred to as applicable to the occasion, are those of 28th March, 1793, and of 25 Brumaire, an III. tit 5, sect. i. art. 7. By these, it is provided that *emigrants*, who have carried arms against France, shall be arrested, *whether in France, or in any hostile or conquered country*, and judged within twenty-four hours, by a commission of five members, to be named by the chief of the état-major of the division of the army quartered in the district where they are found. A third law extended this order to all emigrants of every description, *arrested within the territory of the Republic*; but provided that the court should consist of seven persons, instead of five, to be named by the general commanding the division in which the arrest was made. These ferocious laws had in practice been so far modified, that it was laid down in the law books, that although, speaking strictly, they continued to exist, yet "the government always limited to deportation the sentence of such emigrants as were arrested within the French territory."* Before re-

viving them in their utmost severity against a single individual, it was therefore doubly incumbent to show that the party arraigned fell within these charges.

By no force of construction could the Duke d'Enghien be brought under the influence of these laws. He was not, properly speaking, an emigrant, nor did he possess the qualities of such. He was a prince of France,—as such declared an alien, and banished for ever from France. But, what is much more to the purpose, the Duke d'Enghien was neither found within France, nor in the precincts of any hostile or conquered country; but brought by force from a territory neutral to and friendly in its relations with France; and that without legal warrant, and by main force. Bonaparte took credit to himself for having prevented the execution of those laws against emigrants who had been forced on the shore of France by tempest, and had thereby come under the letter, though not the spirit of the law. How much more ought the Duke d'Enghien's case to have been excepted, who was only within France by the force exercised on his person, and, instead of being arrested within the territory, as the law required, was arrested in a neutral country, and brought into France against his will? The arrest was therefore, so far as respected the person on whom it was used, an act of illegal violence; and not less so considering the grounds on which it proceeded, since there was no charge founded on any existing law.

Incompetency of the court.

A military commission was assembled at Paris, to take under trial the Duke d'Enghien, accused of having borne arms against the Republic—of having been, and of still being, in the pay of England—and, lastly, of having taken part in the conspiracies against the safety of the Republic, both external and internal.

Mons. Dupin, by the most decisive arguments and authorities, shows, that although the military commission might possibly be competent judges in the case of bearing arms against France, or receiving pay from England, yet the trial of a criminal accused of political conspiracy was totally beyond the power of a court-martial, and could only be taken cognizance of by the regular tribunals. He quotes decisions of the minister of justice upon this point of jurisprudence, and concludes by applying to the military commission the well-known brocard of law, *Nullus major defectus, quam potestatis*.

Irregularities in the procedure.

1. The procedure took place at the dead of night, contrary to the laws of France and every civilized country. The worn-out and exhausted criminal was roused at midnight from the first sleep he had been permitted to enjoy for three nights, and called in to place himself on defence for his life, whilst, through fatigue of body and mind, he could scarcely keep himself awake.

He answered to their interrogatories in a manly and simple manner; and, by the French order of process, his answers ought to have been read over to him, and he should have been called upon for his re-

* *Nouveau Répertoire de Jurisprudence*, under the head *Commission*.

marks upon the exactitude with which they had been taken down; but nothing of this kind was proposed to the Duke d'Enghien.

2. The French law enjoins, that after closing the interrogatory, the reporter should require of the accused person to make choice of a friend for the purpose of conducting his defence. The accused, it further declares, shall have the selection amongst all the persons present, and failing his making such a choice, the reporter shall select a defender to act on his behalf. No such choice was allowed to the Duke d'Enghien; and, indeed, it would have been to little purpose; nor was any legal assistant assigned to him in terms of the law. The law presumes an open court at a legal hour, and held in broad daylight. It would have been but an additional insult to have required the duke to select a friend or a defender among the gendarmes, who alone were bystanders in the Castle of Vincennes, or at the hour of midnight. Contrary, therefore, to the privilege of accused persons by the existing law of France, the accused had no benefit either of legal defence or friendly assistance.

Defects of the sentence.

The trial itself, though it deserves not the name, took place on the day after the interrogatory, or more properly on the night of that day, being what was then called the 30th Ventose;—like the previous interrogation, at the hour of midnight. The whole Castle of Vincennes was filled with gendarmes, and Savary was in the actual command. He has published that he was led there by curiosity, though the hour was midnight, and the place so strictly guarded against every person, saving those who were to be officially concerned, that even one of the officers, who had been summoned, had considerable difficulty in procuring admission. We shall presently see if his presence and conduct indicated the part of a mere by-stander; for the vindication which he was pleased to publish, drew forth that of General Hulín, president of the military commission, who has informed us of several important circumstances which had escaped the memory of the Duke of Rovigo, but which bear, nevertheless, very much on the point at issue.

The court being constituted duly, the warrant was read, which contained the charge against the prisoner. It accused him, 1. Of having fought against France; 2. Of being in the pay of England; 3. Of plotting with the latter power against the internal and external safety of the Republic. Of the two first counts, as they may be termed, of the indictment, we have already shown that they could not be rendered cognizable under any law then existing in France, unless qualified by the additional circumstance, that the emigrant accused had been found either within France, or in a country hostile to, or which had been subdued by France, which could not be stated to be the case of the Duke d'Enghien. Respecting the third count, the military commission were not legally competent to try it; the courts ordinary of France alone had the alleged crime within their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in mockery of the form, as well as the essence of law, the court proceeded upon the trial upon two points of accusation,

which were irrelevant, and upon a third which was incompetent.

The mock trial, when brought on, was a mere repetition of the interrogatory which the duke had been previously subjected to. We are now to give an abstract of both interrogatories, only premising that within their limits must be found the whole head and front of the offences charged. The guilt of the accused must either be proved from thence, or his innocence must be acknowledged; the sole evidence produced or attempted to be brought forward on the trial being the answers of the duke.

Upon the first examination, the following admissions were made by the accused. The duke avowed his name, birth, and quality; his exile from France, and the campaigns which he had made with the emigrant army under his grandfather, the Prince of Condé. He stated the various countries which he had inhabited since the army of Condé was disbanded, and that he had resided at Ettenheim for two years and a half, by permission of the elector. Interrogated if he had ever been in England, or if that government made him any allowance; he answered he had never been in that country, but that England did allow him an annuity, which was his only means of support. Interrogated, what were his reasons for residing at Ettenheim; he answered that he had thoughts of settling at Fribourg in the Brisgau, as a pleasant place of residence, and had only removed at Ettenheim on account of the elector's indulging him with full liberty of hunting, to which amusement he was very partial. Interrogated, if he kept up any correspondence with the French princes of his family who were at London, and if he had seen them lately, he replied, that he naturally kept up a correspondence with his grandfather ever since he had left him at Vienna, after the disbanding of his army; but had not seen him since that period;—that he also corresponded with his father (Duke of Bourbon), but had not seen him since 1794 or 1795. Interrogated, what rank he occupied in the army of Condé; he answered, commandant of the *van-guard*, and that when the army was received into Prussia, and divided into two corps, he was made colonel of one of them. These admissions might have been deduced or presumed from the simple fact, that the individual before them was the Duke d'Enghien, whose history and military services were sufficiently known.

The subsequent part of the examination consisted in an attempt to implicate the accused in the conspiracy of Georges, Pichegru, and Moreau. The reader will see how far his answers make the charge good.

Interrogated, if he knew General Pichegru, and if he had any connexion or intercourse with him;—Replied, "I do not know him; I have never, I believe, seen him; I have had no conversation with him; I am glad I have not been acquainted with him, if the story told be true, respecting the *réunion* means which he proposed making use of."

Interrogated, if he knew General Dumourier, or had any connexion with him;—Answered, "that he knew him no more than the other—he had never seen him."

Interrogated, if, after the peace, he had not kept

up a correspondence in the interior of the Republic;—Replied, "I have written to some friends that are still attached to me, who had fought along with me, both on their affairs and my own. These correspondences were not of the character which I conceive to be alluded to."

The report further bears, that when the *procès-verbal* was closed, he expressed himself thus: "Before signing the *procès-verbal*, I make with urgency the request, to have a private audience of the first consul. My name, my rank, my manner of thinking, and the horror of my situation, make me hope he will not refuse my desire."

In the second interrogatory, in presence of the military commission, the duke adhered to what he had said in his preceding examination, with the sole additional circumstance, that he was ready to renew the war, and to take service in the approaching hostilities betwixt England and France.

The commission, as appears from record of their proceedings, received no other evidence of any kind whatever, whether written or oral, and undertook the task which they knew was expected from them, of extracting reasons for awarding a capital punishment out of a confession from which nothing could be drawn by any ordinary process of reasoning, save that the accused person had been in arms against France, and was willing to be so again,—but in open warfare, and in the hope of recovering what he considered as the rights of his family: a case which could not be brought under the penalty of death, except under the laws of 28th March, 1793, and of 25 Brumaire, an III.; where the capital punishment is limited, as we have repeatedly said, to emigrants taken within the limits of France, or of countries hostile to her, or subjected by her arms. The avowal that the duke had a pension from England did not infer that he was in her military pay; nor, indeed, did he in fact hold that allowance on any other conditions than as an alimentary provision allowed by the generous compassion of the British nation. Neither could he be found guilty upon his candid avowal that he was willing, or even desirous, to enter into the English service; for, supposing the actually doing so were a crime, the mere intention to do so could not be construed into one, since men are in this world responsible only for their actions, not for their thoughts, or the unexecuted purposes of their mind. No other evidence was adduced excepting the report of an officer of police, or state spy, sent to watch the Duke d'Enghien's movements, who declared that the Duke d'Enghien received many emigrants at his table, and that he was frequently absent for several days without his (the spy's) being able to discover where he went; but which suspicious facts were sufficiently explained, by his having the means of giving some assistance to his distressed companions, and his long hunting-parties in the Black Forest, in which he was wont to pass many days at a time. A report from Sbee, the Prefect of the Lower Rhine, was also read, but neither Savary nor Hulín mention its import, nor how it was converted into evidence, or bore upon the question of the Duke d'Enghien's guilt or innocence. Hulín also mentions a long report from the

councillor of state, Réal, where the affair, with all its ramifications, was rendered so interesting, that it seemed the safety of the state, and the existence of the government, depended on the judgment which should be returned. Such a report could only argue the thirst of the government for the poor young man's blood, and exhibits that open tampering with the court, which they were not ashamed to have recourse to, but certainly could not constitute evidence in the case.

But both Savary and Hulín are disposed to rest the reason of the condemnation upon the frank and noble avowal of the prisoner, which, in their opinion, made it imperative on the court to condemn him. He uniformly maintained, that "he had only sustained the right of his family, and that a Condé could never enter France save with arms in his hands. My birth," he said, "my opinions, must ever render me inflexible on this point." The firmness of his answers reduced the judges," continues Hulín, "to despair. Ten times we gave him an opening to retract his declarations, but he still persisted in them immovably. 'I see,' he said, 'the honourable intention of the members of the commission, but I cannot resort to the means of safety which they indicate.' And being acquainted that the military commissioners judged without appeal; 'I know it,' he replied, 'and I do not disguise from myself the danger which I incur. My only request is to have an interview with the first consul.' It is sufficiently plain that the gallant bearing of the prince, so honourable to himself, brought him under no law by which he was not previously affected. But it did much worse for him in a practical sense: it avowed him the open enemy of Bonaparte, and placed each judge under the influence of such reasoning as encouraged Sir Piers Exton to the murder of a deposed prince at the hint of a usurper."

The doom of the prisoner had been fixed from the moment he crossed the draw-bridge of that gloomy state prison. But it required no small degree of dexterity to accommodate the evidence to the law, so as to make out an ostensible case of guilt which should not carry absurdity and contradiction on its very front. This was the more difficult, as it is an express legal form in French courts-martial, that it shall express upon its record the exact fact for which death is to be inflicted, and the precise article of the law under which the sentence is awarded. The military commission had much more trouble in placing the record upon a plausible footing, than they found in going through the brief forms of such a trial as they were pleased to afford the accused. They experienced the truth of the observation, that it is much more easy to commit a crime than to justify it.

* Didst thou not mark the king, what words he spoke—
Have I no friend will rid me of this fear—
Have I no friend? quoth he—he spoke it twice,
And speaking it, looked wistfully on me,
As who should say, I would thou wert the man
That would divorce this terror from my breast—
Meaning the king at Pomfret—Let us go;
I am the king's friend, and will rid his foe.

Verdict.

The first difficulty which occurred, was to apply the verdict to the indictment, to which it ought to be the precise answer, since it would be monstrous to find a man guilty of a crime different from that of which he stood accused; as for example, to find a man guilty of theft, when he had been charged with murder, or *vice versa*. The judges of this military commission had, at the same time, the additional difficulty of reconciling the verdict with the evidence which had been adduced, as well as with the accusations laid. If the reader will take the trouble to peruse the following copy of the record, with our observations, which we have marked by Italics, they will see how far the Military Court of Vincennes had been able to reconcile their verdict with the act of accusation, and with the sentence.

The verdict bears: The voices being collected on each of the underwritten questions, beginning with the younger, and ending with the president; the court declares Louis Antoine de Bourbon, Duke d'Enghien,—

1. Unanimously guilty of having borne arms against the French Republic.—*This is in conformity with the act of accusation, and the evidence; therefore, so far regular.*

2. Unanimously guilty of having offered his services to the English government, the enemy of the French Republic.—*This is not in conformity to the charge. The duke only said he was willing to join the English in the new war, not that his services had been either offered or accepted. The former was a matter of intention, the latter would have been a point of fact.*

3. Unanimously guilty of having received and accredited agents of the said English government, of having procured the means of intelligence in France, and of having conspired with them against the internal and external safety of the Republic.—*The facts alluded to in this clause of the verdict may be considered as contained by implication in the general charge in the accusation, that the duke plotted with England. But certainly they are not there stated in the precise and articulate manner in which a charge which a man must answer with his life ought to be brought against him. As to evidence, there is not, in the examination of the duke, the slightest word to justify the finding him guilty of such an offence. Not a question was put, or an answer received, respecting the plots with England, or the duke's accession to and encouragement of them.*

4. Unanimously guilty of having placed himself at the head of a large collection of French emigrants, and others, forced in the frontiers of France, in the county of Fribourg and Baden, paid by England.—*There is not a word of such a charge in the accusation or indictment, nor was the slightest evidence of its existence brought forward before the court, or inquired into upon the duke's examination.*

5. Unanimously guilty of having had communications with the town of Strasburg, tending to excite insurrection in the neighbouring departments, for the purpose of a diversion in favour of England.—

There is no mention of this charge in the accusation—there is no mention of it in the evidence.

6. Unanimously guilty of being one of the favourers and accomplices of the conspiracy carried on by the English against the life of the first consul; and intending, in the event of such conspiracy, to enter France.—*There is no mention of this charge in the act of accusation or indictment. The evidence on the subject goes distinctly to disprove the charge. The Duke d'Enghien said he did not know Pichegru, and had no connexion with him; and added, that he rejoiced at the circumstance, if it was true that the general aimed at success by means so horrible.*

The result of the whole is, that this most liberal commission, in answer to the three charges, brought in a verdict upon six points of indictment; and that, on applying the evidence to the verdict, not one of the returns is found supported by evidence, the first excepted; of the other five, of which three at least are gratuitously introduced into the charge, four are altogether unsupported by the evidence, and the sixth is not only unsupported, but disproved, being in direct contradiction to the only testimony laid before the commissioners.

Sentence.

Having drawn up their verdict, or answer to the act of accusation, with so little regard either to the essence or forms of justice, this unconscientious court proceeded to the sentence, which, according to the regular form, ought to bear an express reference to the law by which it was authorized. But to discover such a law, must be inevitably a work of some difficulty; and in the meantime, the devoted victim still lived. The record of the court-martial bore the date, *two in the morning*; * so that *two hours* had already elapsed upon the trial and subsequent proceedings, and it was destined the sun should not rise on the devoted head of the young Bourbon. It was, therefore, necessary that he should be immediately found guilty and executed, as all that was considered the direct object for which the court was convened. It would be time enough to consider after he was no more, under what law he had suffered, and to fill up the blanks in the sentence accordingly. One would have thought such a tragedy could never have taken place in a civilized age and country, seven French officers, claiming to be esteemed men of honour by profession, being the slavish agents. It must, one would say, have occurred at Tripoli or Fex, or rather among the Galla and Shanggalla, the Agows, or the Lasta of Abyssinia. But here is the sentence to speak for itself:—

"The prisoner having withdrawn, the court being cleared, deliberating with closed doors, the president collected the votes of the members; beginning with the *junior*, and voting himself the last, the prisoner was unanimously found Guilty; and in pursuance of the—*blank*—article of the law of—*blank*—to the following effect—[two or three lines left blank for inserting the law which

* A sense of shame caused these words to be erased, but the operation has left them still legible. The attempt at concealment shows the sense of guilt, without hiding the crime.

should be found applicable]—condemned to suffer the punishment of death. *Ordered that the judge-advocate should see the present sentence executed IMMEDIATELY.*"

Most laws allow at least a few days of intervention betwixt sentence and execution. Such an interval is due to religion and to humanity; but in France it was also allowed for the purpose of appeal. The laws 25 Brumaire, an VI., and 27 Ventose, an VIII., permitted appeals from the judgments of courts-martial. The decree of the 17 Messidor, an XII., permitting no appeal from military sentences, was not then in existence; but if it had, even that severe and despotic enactment allowed prisoners some brief space of time betwixt this world and the next, and did not send a human being to execution until the tumult of spirits, incidental to a trial for life and death, had subsided, and his heart had ceased to throb betwixt hope and fear. Twenty-four hours were permitted betwixt the court of justice and the scaffold,—a small space in ordinary life, but an age when the foot is on the brink of the grave. But the Duke d'Enghien was ordered for instant execution.

Besides the blanks in the sentence of this court, as originally drawn up, which made it a mockery of all judicial form, there lay this fatal error to the sentence, that it was not signed by the greffier, or clerk of court.

We do the judges the credit to believe that they felt for the accused, and for themselves; saw with pity the doom inflicted, and experienced shame and horror at becoming his murderers. A final attempt was made by General Hulín to induce the court to transfer to Bonaparte the request of the prisoner. He was checked by Savary, "It will be *inopportune*," said that officer, who, leaning on the back of the president's chair, seems to have watched and controlled the decisions of the court. The hint was understood, and nothing more was said.

We have given one copy of the sentence of the court-martial. It was not the only one. "Many draughts of this sentence were tried," says Hulín, "among the rest, the one in question; but after we had signed it, we doubted (*and with good reason*) whether it were regular, and, therefore, caused the clerk make out a new draught, grounded chiefly on a report of the privy-councillor Réal, and the answers of the prince. This second draught was the true one, and ought alone to have been preserved."

This second draught has been preserved, and affords a curious specimen of the cobbling and trumping up which the procedure underwent, in hopes it might be rendered fit for public inspection. Notwithstanding what the president says was intended, the new draught contains no reference to the report of Shee, or the arguments of Réal, neither of which could be brought into evidence against the duke. The only evidence against him, was his owning the character of a prince of the blood, an enemy by birth, and upon principle, to the present government of France. His sole actual crime, as is allowed by Monsieur Savary himself, consisted in his being the Duke d'Enghien; the sole proof was his own avowal, without which it was pretended the commissioners would not have found him guilty.

To return to the new draught of this sentence. It agrees with the original draught, in so far as it finds the duke guilty of six criminal acts upon a charge which only accused him of *three*. But there is a wide distinction in other respects. The new draught, though designed to rest (according to Hulín's account) upon the report of the privy-councillor Réal, and the answers of the prince, takes no notice of either. It does make an attempt, however, to fill up the blanks of the first copy, by combining the sentence with the existing laws; but how far applicable to the case under consideration, the reader shall be enabled to judge.

Article I. 1st Brumaire, an V. Every individual, of whatever rank, quality, or profession, convicted of being a spy for the enemy, shall be punished with death.—*The Duke d'Enghien had neither been accused nor convicted of being a spy for the enemy.*

Article II. Every plot against the Republic shall be punished with death.—*There was no evidence that the duke was engaged in any plot; he positively denied it on his examination.*

Article III. All conspiracies or plots tending to disturb the state, by a civil war—to arm the citizens against each other, or against lawful authority, shall be punished with death.—*Here the same want of evidence applies.*

Upon the whole, it appears that the law could neither be so moulded as to apply to the evidence, nor the evidence so twisted as to come under the law,—the judges were obliged to suppress the one or the other, or to send their sentence forth with a manifest contradiction on the face of it.

But this second draught of the sentence was so far conforming to the law, that it was signed by the greffier or clerk of court, which was not the case with the former. It was also more indulgent towards the accused; for the order for immediate execution was omitted, and its place supplied by the following details.

"It is enjoined to the capitaine rapporteur instantly to read the present judgment to the condemned person in presence of the guard assembled under arms.

"Ordered that the president and the reporter see their diligence according to the legal forms, in dispatching copies of this procedure to the minister at war, the grand judge, minister of justice, and to the general in chief, governor of Paris."

By the interposition of these legal forms, the commissioners unquestionably desired to gain some time, to make interest with Bonaparte that he might not carry his cruel purpose into execution. This has been explained by the president of the court-martial, General Hulín himself, who, blind, aged, and retired from the world, found himself obliged, on the appearance of Savary's vindication of his share in the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, to come forward, not to vindicate his conduct, but, while expressing his remorse for the share he really had in the tragedy, to transfer the principal charge to the superior officer, who was present during the whole trial, to overawe, it would seem, and to control the court. His account is in these words:—

"Scarcely was it (the sentence) signed, when I began a letter to Napoleon, in which I conveyed to

him, in obedience to the unanimous wish of the court, the desire expressed by the prince of an interview with the first consul; and farther, to con-
 jure the first consul to remit the punishment, which the severity of our situation did not permit us to elude. It was at this moment that a man interfered (Savary), who had persisted in remaining in the court-room, and whom I should name without hesitation, if I did not recollect that, even in attempting a defence for myself, it does not become me to accuse another.—'What are you doing there?' said this person, coming up to me. 'I am,' I replied, 'writing to the first consul, to convey to him the wish of the prisoner, and the recommendation of the court.' 'You have done your business,' said he, taking the pen out of my hand, 'and what follows is mine.' I confess that I thought at the moment, and so did several of my colleagues, that he meant to say, that the conveying of these sentiments to the first consul was his business. His answer, thus understood, left us still the hope that the recommendation would reach the first consul. I only recollect, that I even at the moment felt a kind of vexation at seeing thus taken out of my hands, the only agreeable circumstance of the painful situation in which I was placed. Indeed, how could we imagine, that a person had been placed about us with an order to violate all the provisions of the law? I was in the hall, outside the council-room, conversing about what had just occurred. Several knots of persons had got into private conversation. I was waiting for my carriage, which not being permitted (any more than those of the other members) to come into the inner court of the castle, delayed my departure and theirs. We were ourselves shut in, and could not communicate with those without, when an explosion took place—a terrible sound, which struck us to the hearts, and froze them with terror and fright. Yes, I swear, in the name of myself and my colleagues, that this execution was not authorized by us; our sentence directed that copies of the sentence should be sent to the minister of war, the grand judge, and the general, governor of Paris. The latter alone could, according to law, direct the execution; the copies were not yet made; they would occupy a considerable portion of the day. On my return to Paris, I should have waited on the governor—on the first consul; who knows what might have happened?—but all of a sudden, this terrific explosion informed us that the prince was no more. We know not whether he (Savary) who thus hurried on this dreadful execution, had orders for doing so. If he had not, he alone is responsible; if he had, the court, which knew nothing of these orders, which itself was kept in confinement—the court, whose last resolution was in favour of the prince, could neither foresee nor prevent the catastrophe."

Execution.

The gallant young prince, therefore, was cut off in the flower of his age, and, so far as we can see, on no evidence whatever, excepting that he was a son of the house of Bourbon, the enemy, by his birth, of the temporary governor of France, but his public and declared enemy, who had never owed duty

to him, and who had not been taken engaged in any active proceedings against him. The descendant of the great Condé was condemned to a bloody death by a court, the judges of which were themselves prisoners, at the hour when thieves and murderers deal with their victims, upon an unproved accusation tried by incompetent judges.

The research of the lawyer must go beyond the prince's nameless and bloody tomb to inquire into the warrant by which he was consigned to it. Was it by virtue of the first or of the second draught of that sentence, which the military erudition found so much difficulty in cobbling up into the form of a legal sentence? We suppose it must have been in virtue of the first draught, because that commands instant execution. If this conjecture is allowed, the Duke d'Enghien was executed in virtue of a document totally deficient in solemnity, since that first remains blank in its most essential parts and is not signed by the greffier or clerk of court—a formality expressly enjoined by law.

If, again, we suppose, that the second, not the first copy of the sentence, was the warrant made use of, the proceeding to execution will be found not less illegal. For that second draught, though it exhibits no blanks, and is signed by the greffier, and is so far more formal than the first, gives no authority for instant execution of the sentence. On the contrary, it enjoins the usual legal delays, until the copies should be made out and sent to the various officers of state mentioned in the warrant itself. The effect of this delay might have probably been the saving of the unfortunate prince's life; for if Paris had not heard of his death at the same time with his arrestment, it is not likely that Bonaparte would have braved public opinion, by venturing on concluding his nocturnal tragedy by a day-light catastrophe. But, laying that consideration aside, it is enough for a lawyer to pronounce, that such sentence, executed in a manner disconforming from its warrant, is neither more nor less than a *MEURTRE*: for as such are construed in the laws of every civilized country, those cases in which the prompt will of the executioner anticipates the warrant of the judge.

General view of the procedure.

Looking over this whole procedure, with the eyes of one accustomed to juridical reasoning, it is impossible to resist the conviction, that a train of more gross inconsistencies, practised with a more barefaced audacity, or for a worse purpose, does not stain and disgrace the page of history. The arrest was against the law of nations; the constitution of the court was against the military law; the mode of conducting the trial was against the law of France; the sentence was contrary to the forms of every civilized nation; the execution was a contravention of the laws of God and man. It would be absurd to term the slaughter of the Duke d'Enghien a murder committed by the sword of justice, unless we understand Hogarth's parody of that allegorical figure, with one eye open, one scale depressed with a bribe, and a butcher's knife in her hand instead of the ever-swayed sword.

Having endeavoured to trace this bloody and cruel proceeding in a legal point of view, we must, before leaving the subject, consider what apologies have been set up against the black charge which arises out of the details.

The first of these screens would have been doubly convenient, providing it could have been rendered plausible. It amounted to the transference of the more active part of the guilt from Napoleon himself to Talleyrand, whom it would have been delicious revenge to have overwhelmed with the odium of a crime which must have made an impassable gulf between the ex-imperial minister and the restored royal family. Napoleon therefore repeatedly hinted and expressed, that the measure of the Duke d'Enghien's death had been thrust upon him by the advice of Talleyrand, and that without giving the matter due consideration, he had adopted the course recommended to him. It was afterwards still more broadly avowed, that Talleyrand had intercepted a letter written by the prince from Strasburg, begging his life, and offering in grateful return to serve Napoleon in his armies. This boon Napoleon intimates he might have granted if Talleyrand had delivered the letter; but by intercepting it, that statesman became the actual murderer of the unfortunate prince.

There are two modes of considering every allegation, that is, according to the presumptive, or the positive and direct evidence brought in support of it. If we look at the former, we cannot discern the shadow of a motive why Talleyrand, however unprincipled we may suppose him, should have led his master into the commission of a great and odious crime, of which he was likely to have the whole unpopularity thrown upon himself, so soon as it should be found too heavy for his principal. Talleyrand was a politician; but so far as we have ever heard, possessed of no blood-thirsty disposition, and, being himself descended from a noble family, was unlikely, to say the least, to urge the catastrophe of a young prince, against whom, or his family, he is never believed to have had any especial enmity. On the other hand, if we suppose him guided to the step by foolish and misguided zeal for Bonaparte's own interest, we traduce Talleyrand's mental capacity as much in the one case, as we should do his natural disposition in the other. No man knew better than the Prince of Beneventum, that power is, in enlightened nations, dependent on public opinion, and that the blood of an innocent and high-spirited enemy might indeed stain his master's throne, but could not cement its basis.—Again, if we regard the spirit displayed by the Duke d'Enghien upon his mock trial, when he declared he would not recal his avowed enmity to the French, in conformity to the hints thrown out by the court-martial, how is it possible that the same individual can be supposed capable of having, two days before, crouched to Bonaparte for his life; or how are we to reconcile his having offered to accept service under the first consul, with his declaration that it did not become a Condé to enter France save with arms in his hands? We must suppose him a madman, if, having endeavored to creep to Bonaparte's favour by the means of submission, he

should have assumed an air of contumacy and defiance towards the judges who were to report his conduct on his trial to the first consul. The existence of the letter, and the fact of its being intercepted by Talleyrand, is, therefore, disproved as far as it can be, both by the character of the alleged writer, and of the minister for foreign affairs.

But, farther, it is disproved not only by reasoning *a priori*, but directly and from the state of facts, as far as negative evidence possibly can go. The whole proceedings against the Duke d'Enghien took place under the councillor of state, Réal, and were managed entirely by the police; those safe, silent agents, who acted by immediate directions from the supreme head of the government, like the mutes of the seraglio, and were not liable to the control of any subordinate minister. Talleyrand never interfered, nor indeed had an opportunity of interfering in it.

It was an officer of the police who was sent to inquire into the state of things at Ettenheim; and his report was made, *not* to Talleyrand, not even to his proper chief, Réal,—but to Bonaparte himself. This is proved by Savary's own narrative, who says expressly, that “the first inspector of the gendarmerie received the report from the officer, and carried it himself to the first consul, instead of giving it to M. Réal.” The troops employed in the act of seizing the Duke d'Enghien were also gendarmes, that is policemen; and had a letter been written by their prisoner at Strasburg, or anywhere else, it would certainly have gone, like the report above-mentioned, to the first consul, and not to Talleyrand to the foreign department. *2dly*; There is a sad but minute memorial of his imprisonment, kept by the duke as a sort of diary. In this record is no mention of his having written such a letter. *3dly*, As the Baron de St Jacques, secretary to the unfortunate prince, was with his master constantly until the duke was taken from Strasburg, he was in a situation to offer a formal testimony against the very allegation of such a letter having been written, since he must have become acquainted with it, if it had any real existence. *4thly*, The gendarmes who collected the duke's few papers, and made an inventory of them, would not have failed to secure such a document, if, as we said before, there had been such a document to secure.

For all these reasons, the story of the suppressed letter must be considered, from beginning to end, as an absolute fiction, invented to absolve Napoleon of what he felt was generally considered as a great crime, and to transfer the odium to Talleyrand, whose active offices in behalf of the royal family his former master could neither forget nor forgive.

But the story of the letter was not the only one to which Napoleon had recourse to qualify the public indignation, which was so generally directed against him as the author of this unhappy deed.

In the examination of the persons who were arrested on account of accession to the conspiracy of Pichegru and Georges, it appeared, according to a very apocryphal statement by Napoleon, that a person occasionally appeared among the conspirators, of noble mien and distinguished manners, to whom

the principal conspirators showed such symptoms of homage and deference as are paid only to princes. "He appeared," says Savary, "36 years of age, his hair was fair, his forehead open, of a middle stature and size. When he entered the apartment, all present, even Messrs de Polignac and de Rivière, rose and remained standing in his presence." The police considered who this mysterious personage could be, and agreed it must be the Duke d'Enghien. To the impression this supposed discovery made on the mind of the first consul, was to be imputed, according to his own account and General Savary's, the mission of the police officer to Strasburg, as already mentioned. The report of the spy concerning the frequent absences of the Duke d'Enghien from Ettenheim, was held sufficient to identify him with the mysterious stranger at Paris—the resolution to kidnap him was formed and executed; and although no circumstances occurred to show that he had been in Paris, or to identify him with the incognito above alluded to, and although they were not even at the trouble of confronting the duke with the persons who described that individual, to see if they could recognize them to be one and the same; yet he was put to death, we are called upon to believe, upon the conviction that he was the visitor and friend of Georges Cadoudal and the person in whose presence all the world testified such profound respect. Hardly, however, had the duke been huddled into his bloody grave than we are told it was discovered that the mysterious personage so often alluded to, was no other than Pichegru; and the blame of keeping up the mistake in the first consul's mind is imputed to Talleyrand, who is destined to be the scapegoat in every version of the story which comes from Napoleon or his favourites.

We submit that no author of a novel or romance, when compelled, at the conclusion of his tale, to assign a reason for the various incidents which he has placed before the reader, ever pressed into his service a string of such improbable and inconsistent circumstances. Was it credible that a prince of the blood, supposing him to have ventured to Paris during the consulate, and mingled with a band of conspirators, would have insisted upon, or would have permitted, the honours of his rank, and thus have betrayed his character to those who did not profess to know more of him than from that circumstance only? The very mention of a line of conduct so improbable, ought to have made the legend suspected at the very outset. Secondly, How could a mistake possibly occur betwixt the person of the Duke d'Enghien and that of General Pichegru? The former was fair, with light-coloured hair; the latter was dark, with a high coloured complexion, and dark hair. The duke was slight and elegant in his form; Pichegru was stout-made, robust, and athletic. The prince was but just turned of thirty; Pichegru was forty years of age and upwards. There was scarcely a point of similarity between them. Thirdly, How was it possible for those circumstances to have occurred which occasioned the pretended mistake? Under what imaginable character was Pichegru to have commanded the respects paid to a prince of the blood, and that not only from the Choann Georges, but from the Messieurs de Poli-

gnac and de Rivière, who, it is pretended, remained uncovered in his presence? Lastly, On the voluminous trial of Georges, which was published in the *Moniteur*, though several of his band were brought to bear witness against him, there was no evidence whatever of royal honours being rendered either to him or any one else. So that the whole legend seems to have been invented, *ex post facto*, as a screen, and a very frail one, behind which Napoleon might shelter himself. It is evident, indeed, even by his own most improbable account, that if the Duke d'Enghien died in consequence of a blunder, it was one which a moment's consideration must have led every one to doubt, and which a moment's inquiry would have explained, and that Napoleon's credulity can only be imputed to his determination to be deceived. How Talleyrand could have contributed to it, is not intimated; but General Savary informs us that the consul exclaimed—"Ah! wretched Talleyrand, what hast thou made me do!" This apostrophe, if made at all, must have been intended to support a future charge against his minister; for as to being led by the nose by Talleyrand, in a matter where his own passions were so deeply interested, it is totally inconsistent with all that is recorded of Napoleon, as well as with the character, and even the private interest, of his minister.

After this tedious dissertation, the reader may perhaps desire to know the real cause of the extraordinary outrage. Napoleon's interest seemed no way, or very slightly concerned, as the sufferer was, of all the Bourbon family, the farthest removed from the succession to the throne. The odium which the deed was to occasion, without any corresponding advantage, was, it might have seemed, to the politic and calculating spirit which Napoleon usually evinced, a sufficient reason for averting an unnecessary outrage; nor was his temper by any means of that ferocious quality which takes delight in causing misery, or in shedding blood.

All these things admitted, we must remind our readers, that, as Napoleon was calm and moderate by policy, he was also by temperament fierce and ardent, and had in his blood a strain of the wild and revengeful disposition, for which his native Corsica has been famous since the days of the ancients. The temptation was strong on the present occasion. He felt himself exposed to the danger of assassination, to which his nerves seem to have been peculiarly sensible; he knew that the blow would be aimed by the partisans of the royal family; and he suspected that they were encouraged by the exiled princes. In such a case, what is the principle of the savage state, or that which approaches next to it? A North American Indian injured by one white trader who escapes his vengeance, retaliates on the first European who falls within his power. A Scotch Highlander, wronged by an individual of another clan, took vengeance on the first of the sept whom he happened to meet. The Corsicans are not less ruthless and indiscriminate in their feuds, which go from father to son, and affect the whole family without the resentment being confined to the particular persons who have done the wrong. Upon this principle the first consul seems to have acted, when, conceiving his life aimed at by the friends of the

Bourbons, he sprang like a tiger at the only one of the family who was within his reach and his power. The law of nations and those of society were alike forgotten in the thirst of revenge; and, to gratify an immediate feeling of vengeance, he stained his history with a crime of which no time can wash away the infamy.

The tendency to violence, arising out of a fierce and semi-barbaric resentment and love of revenge, might perhaps have shown itself in more instances than actually occurred, had it not been for Napoleon's policy, and his respect for public opinion, which would not have borne many such acts of vindictive cruelty. But though he was able in general to subdue this peculiar temper, he could not disguise it from those by whom he was closely observed. When some one, in the presence of Mounier, pronounced a eulogium upon Napoleon, and concluded by defying any of the listeners to produce a parallel character—"I think I could find something like him," said Mounier, "*among the Montenegrins.*"

No. 6.

REFLECTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF NAPOLEON TOWARDS THE PRINCE ROYAL OF SWEDEN.

Pages 504, 519.

(Translated from the original French.)

It was Napoleon himself, who, by his insupportable pretensions, forced Sweden to take a part in opposition to him. From the period of the election of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, the only discussions the prince had with the emperor consisted in refusals, on the prince's part, to enter into engagements hostile to the interests of the nation who had chosen him to be her ruler.

When the first overtures respecting his election in Sweden were made to him by a Swedish nobleman, and by General Count de Wrede, he went immediately to St-Cloud, to inform the emperor, who said to him:—

"I cannot be of any use to you—let things take their course," etc.

The prince went to Plombières. At his return, he paid his respects to the emperor, who, addressing him in presence of a good many persons, asked if he had lately had any news from Sweden?

"Yes, sire."

"What do they say?" replied the emperor.

"That your majesty's chargé d'affaires at Stockholm opposes my election, and says publicly, that your majesty prefers the King of Denmark."

The emperor answered with surprise, "It is not possible;" and changed the subject.

It was, however, in consequence of secret instructions given to M. Désaguiers, that he had presented a note in favour of the King of Denmark; but Napoleon, in order not to commit himself in an affair of such delicacy, and in which a check would have been a proof of the decline of his political ascendancy, disavowed the conduct of M. Désaguiers.

When this agent was recalled a short time afterwards, the Duke de Cadore frankly confessed to M.

de Lagerbjelke, the Swedish minister at Paris, "*that they had sacrificed an innocent person.*"

The emperor had expressed himself in the most friendly manner to King Charles XIII., as well as to the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, consenting that the prince should accept the succession to the throne of Sweden. The act of election had been published in the *Moniteur*, and ten days had elapsed without the emperor's having said anything about the Prince Royal's departure. Having finished the preparations for his journey, and seeing that the emperor still remained silent on the subject, the prince determined to apply to him for letters-patent, emancipating him (the prince) from his allegiance.

To this formal application, the emperor replied, that the expediting of these letters had been retarded only by the proposal made by a member of the privy-council, of a preliminary condition—"What is it?" said the prince.—"It is, that you are to come under an engagement never to bear arms against me." The Prince Royal, greatly surprised, answered, that his election by the Diet of Sweden, and the consent to it already given by the emperor, both to himself and to King Charles XIII., had already made him a Swedish subject; and that, in that quality, he could not subscribe this engagement. *—"Your majesty tells me," added he, "that this is the proposal of a member of the council. I am very sure it never could have come from yourself, sire; it must have come from the arch-chancellor, or the grand judge, who were not aware to what a height this proposal would raise me."—"What do you mean?"—"If you prevent me from accepting a crown, unless I come under an engagement never to fight against you, sire,—is not this, in fact, placing me in your line as a general?"

The emperor, after a moment's reflection, said to him in a suppressed voice, and with a gesture which betrayed his agitation:—

"Well, go;—our destinies are about to be accomplished."

"I beg your pardon, sire, I did not hear you rightly."

"Go;—our destinies are about to be accomplished," repeated the emperor, in a more distinct, but equally agitated voice.

When the report first became current that there was an intention in Sweden to elect the Prince of Ponte-Corvo Prince Royal, Marshal Davoust, thinking to please his master, said, in the emperor's chamber:—"The Prince of Ponte-Corvo suspects nothing." This piece of irony made Napoleon smile. He answered in a low voice,—"He is not yet elected."

The prince, who till then had been very undecided, intimated, that if the King and the States of Sweden fixed their choice on him, he should accept.

During this interval, Napoleon, constantly wishing to prevent him from becoming heir to the throne of Sweden, said to him one day:—"You will probably be called to Sweden. I had formed the design of giving you Arragon and Catalonia; for Spain is too great a country for my brother's strength of capacity."

* Here the emperor frowned, and appeared embarrassed.

The prince made no reply. For a considerable time back, not wishing to be an object of iniquitude to government, he had been considering what means he should use to gain Napoleon's confidence. The greatness of France, the victories gained by her armies, and the éclat which they reflected upon the commander, imposed on the prince the duty of not endeavouring to emulate the power of the emperor.

In his conversations with Napoleon, he endeavoured to do away the impressions which the emperor entertained against him. For this purpose he took general views, spoke of the interests of great states—of the fortunes of men who had astonished the world by their successes, of the difficulties and obstacles which these men had had to surmount; and finally, of the public tranquillity and happiness which had been the result of these circumstances, from the moment that secondary interests had been satisfied.

The emperor listened attentively, and seemed almost always to applaud the principles of stability and preservation which the prince enlarged upon. At times, when the latter reminded the emperor of the immensity of the means of recompense which he had at his disposal, Napoleon, struck by what he said, held out his hand to him affectionately, when they separated, and seemed, by his manner, to say to him,—“Reckon always upon my friendship and support.”

The prince used to return from these conversations, thinking himself no longer an object of suspicion to the emperor. He expressed this belief to the members of Napoleon's family, in order that they, in their turn, might assure the emperor, that as the prince went entirely into his system, both from duty and from interest, any mistrust of him should be laid aside.

There were individuals of Napoleon's family, on those occasions, who smiled at the prince's simplicity, and told him what the emperor had said the evening before, immediately after the conversation the prince and he had had together; and all that the emperor said bore marks of the greatest insincerity, and of an ill-will constantly founded on his ideas of the extravagant ambition of the prince. This ill-will seemed to be mitigated, when the time came for the prince's departure for Sweden. One of his friends was in high favour with Napoleon. On the very day the prince departed, Napoleon, seeing this friend come in, went up to him and said:—“Well! does not the prince regret France?”—“Yes, undoubtedly.”—“And I, for my part, should have been very glad if he had not accepted the invitation; but there is no help for it.”—And then, checking himself,—“Besides, he does not love me.”

On its being answered, that Napoleon was mistaken, and that the prince had chosen his party, and had been frankly and cordially attached to him for a long time past, the emperor replied,—

“We have not understood each other: now it is too late: he has his own interests, his own policy, and I have mine.”

Napoleon had acquiesced in the reasons given him by the prince, for his refusal to engage not to take arms against him. He saw very well that he ought

to have expected such a refusal, and that he ought not to have exposed himself to it. He had even endeavoured to efface any painful impression which his proposal had made on the prince, by making him the most friendly promises of an indemnity of two millions for the cession of his principality of Ponte-Corvo, and his possessions in Poland, and leaving him all the others in property.* He had, besides, permitted him to take with him all his aides-de-camp.

The prince knew not what was at the bottom of the emperor's thoughts, but when he left him he was full of confidence in him; and Napoleon had no just motive for imputing to him any designs hostile to his interest, and still less to the interest of France. This illusion, on the part of the prince, was of short duration. The reception he met with in all the places he passed through, and particularly when he arrived in Sweden,—the speeches addressed to him, and the answers he made,—all contributed to displease the emperor. It seemed to him as if the prince attracted some share of that general attention which should have been fixed on him alone. The patriotic sentiments expressed by the speakers of the four orders were no more to his taste than those of the prince in his answers. He and the Swedes were equally the objects of the emperor's sarcasms, and even of his insults: he treated them as jacobins, as anarchists; and it was chiefly against the prince that these attacks were leveled. To show the prince his displeasure, he annulled all the promises he had made him; and took from him all the lands with which he had endowed him, and which he re-united to his own domains. He recalled all the Prince Royal's French aides-de-camp. It was in vain that the prince, in his correspondence, tried to appease him, by writing, among others, the following letter:—

“At the moment when I was going to address my thanks to your majesty, for your goodness in extending for a year the leave granted to the French officers who have accompanied me to Sweden, I was informed that your majesty has retracted that favour. This unexpected disappointment, and, indeed, everything that reaches me from Paris, makes me sensible that your majesty is not well disposed towards me. What have I done, sire, to deserve this treatment? I suppose that calumny alone has been the cause of it. In the new situation in which fortune has placed me, I should doubtless be more exposed to it than ever, were I not fortunate enough to find a defender in your majesty's own heart. Whatever may be said to you, sire, I beseech you to believe that I have nothing to reproach myself with, and that I am entirely devoted to your person, not merely through the strength of my old associations, but from a sentiment that is unalterable. If things are not conducted in Sweden entirely according to your majesty's wish, this is solely owing to the constitution. To infringe this constitution is not in the power of the king, and still less in mine. There are still here many particular interests to be

* The prince never received more than one million of the two which had been promised him.

melted down in the great national crucible,—four orders of the state to be tied up in one bundle,—and it is only by means of very prudent and measured conduct, that I can hope to sit one day on the throne of Sweden. As M. Gentil de St-Alphonse, my aide-de-camp, returns to France in conformity to your majesty's orders, I make him the bearer of this letter. Your majesty may question him; he has seen everything; let him tell your majesty the truth. You will see in what a situation I am placed, and how many measures I have to keep. He will tell your majesty whether or not I am anxious to please you, and if I am not here in a state of continual torment between the pain of displeasing you and my new duties.

"Sire, your majesty has grieved me by withdrawing from me the officers whom you had granted me for a year. Since you command it, I send them back to France. Perhaps your majesty will be inclined to alter your decision; in which case, I beg that you yourself will fix the number that you may think proper to send me. I shall receive them from you with gratitude. If, on the contrary, your majesty retains them in France, I recommend them to your goodness. They have always served with distinction, and have had no share in the rewards which were distributed after the last campaign."

Napoleon's ill humour against the prince changed to positive resentment. He repented that he had agreed to his going, and he made no secret of it; for he went the length of saying, before his courtiers,—"That he had a mind to make him finish his course of the Swedish language at Vincennes."

While the prince refused to believe the information, which he had received from the Tuileries, of such a threat as this, Napoleon was actually thinking of putting it in execution, and of repeating, upon him, the capture of the Duke d'Enghien. The prince at last was convinced of the truth of what he had heard, by the discovery of a plot formed by Napoleon's agents, for seizing him in the neighbourhood of Haga, and carrying him on board a vessel which they had in readiness. The attempt failed through a mere accident. The conspirators, all foreigners but one, thought themselves discovered: they instantly embarked, and sailed in the night.*

This conduct, odious as it was, made no change in the disposition of the prince towards Napoleon.

* M. de Salazar, formerly aide-de-camp to the Duke of Ragusa, who had quitted the service, and retired into England, was one of those who gave information respecting a plan formed in France to carry off the Prince Royal. He made a full communication on this subject to an illustrious personage in England, and to Baron de Rehausen, the Swedish Minister at London, who immediately informed Count d'Engestrom of what had been revealed by M. de Salazar, as to the plots which Napoleon was laying against the personal safety of the prince. In order to facilitate these communications, Baron de Rehausen was instructed to furnish M. de Salazar with money to enable him to go to Sweden. He arrived at Orebro during the Diet of 1812, and was admitted to some private audiences, in which he repeated to the prince the declarations which he had previously made to Baron de Rehausen and Count d'Engestrom.

He looked upon it as the effect of intrigues formed by the personal enemies of both, and by enemies of France. He saw nothing in it, besides, but a degree of personal animosity which might pass away, and which ought to have no influence on the political determinations of Sweden. But Napoleon listening to nothing but his hatred, knowing that the prince, being aware of his designs, would now be on his guard, and having no longer any hope of surprising him, desired to place the prince in open hostility to him. He took the surest method to accomplish this object by seizing Pomerania, because he thought that this insulting violation of public faith would force the Prince Royal to revenge the affront put upon Sweden, but at bottom directed against the prince personally. In order to leave no room for doubt on this subject, the emperor had given orders that the invasion should take place on the 26th of January, the Prince Royal's birth-day; but this refinement, so much in character, was thrown away; for the invasion could not be carried into effect till the morning of the 27th.*

The news of this invasion did not reach Stockholm till the 11th of February. The prince immediately wrote the emperor the following letter:—

"The accounts, which have just arrived, inform me that a division of the army under the orders of the Prince of Eckmuhl, has invaded the territory of Swedish Pomerania, in the night between the 23th and 27th of January; that his division has continued its march, entered the capital of the duchy, and taken possession of the island of Rugen. The king expects that your majesty will explain the reasons which have led you to act in a manner so diametrically opposite to the faith of existing treaties. My former connexion with your majesty authorizes me to beseech you to explain your motives without delay, in order that I may be enabled to give the king my opinion as to the future policy which ought to be adopted by Sweden. This gratuitous outrage committed against Sweden is deeply felt by the people, and doubly so, sire, by me, who am intrusted with the honour of defending them. If I have contributed to the triumphs of France; if I have uniformly wished to see her respected and happy, it never could enter into my thoughts to sacrifice the interests, the honour, and the national independence of the country which has adopted me. Your majesty, so good a judge of what is right in the case which has happened, has already penetrated my resolution. Though not jealous of the glory and power by which you are surrounded, sire, I am extremely sensible to the disgrace of being looked upon as a vassal. Your majesty rules the greater part of Europe; but your dominion does not extend to the country to whose government I have been called. My ambition is limited to her defence; which I look upon as the lot assigned me by Providence. The effect produced on the people by the invasion which I now complain of, may have incalculable conse-

* It was from a similar motive that the Prince Royal opened the ports of Sweden to all nations on the 15th August, 1812, Napoleon's birth-day, and that the peace with England was signed at the same time.

quences; and though I am not a Coriolanus, nor command Volscians, I have a good enough opinion of the Swedes to assure you, sire, that they are capable of daring and undertaking everything, to revenge affronts which they have not provoked, and to preserve rights to which they are probably as much attached as to their existence."

When the emperor received this letter, it was observed that he foamed with rage, and cried, "Submit to your degradation, or die with arms in your hands!"

This, indeed, was the only alternative which he wished to leave the prince; knowing very well what part would be taken by a man whom he himself had called, "A French head, with the heart of a Roman."

There was no receding. The prince declared to the King of England and the Emperor of Russia, that he was at war with Napoleon; and wrote the Emperor Alexander the following letter, dated from Stockholm, the 7th of March, 1812:

"The occupation of Swedish Pomerania by the French troops, induces the king to dispatch Count de Lowenhjelm, his aide-de-camp, to your imperial majesty. This officer, who enjoys the entire confidence of his sovereign, has it in charge to acquaint your majesty with the motives which have served as a pretext for an invasion so diametrically in opposition to the subsisting treaties.

"The successive annexation of the coasts of the Mediterranean, of Holland, and of the Baltic, and the subjugation of the interior of Germany, must have pointed out, even to the least clear-sighted princes, that the laws of nations being thrown aside, were giving way to a system, which, destroying every kind of equilibrium, would unite a number of nations under the government of a single chief;—the tributary monarchs, terrified at this constantly increasing dominion, are waiting in consternation for the development of this vast plan.

"In the midst of this universal depression, men's eyes are turned towards your majesty; they are already raised to you, sire, with confidence and hope; but suffer me to observe to your majesty, that, in all the successes of life, there is nothing like the magical effect of the first instant;—so long as its influence lasts, everything depends on him who chooses to act. Minds struck with astonishment are incapable of reflection; and everything yields to the impulse of the charm which they fear, or by which they are attracted.

"Be pleased, sire, to receive with favour the expression of my gratitude for the sentiments which your majesty has testified towards me. If I have still any wish to form, it is for the continuation of a happiness, of which I shall always be worthy, in consequence of the value which I attach to it."

It was not, then, the Emperor of Russia who prevailed upon Sweden to take up arms against Napoleon.—It was himself—himself alone,—who irresistibly compelled the prince to throw himself among his enemies. In doing so, the prince merely did what Napoleon desired; and the latter wished it, because,

Sweden having given him no motive for directly attacking her, he saw no other way of regaining the mastery of the prince's fortunes, but by placing him among the number of his enemies, whom he looked upon as already conquered, without suspecting that he was going to force them at last to conquer himself.

Meanwhile, still wishing to deceive the prince, he made proposals to him. The prince answered this by the following letter, the bearer of which was M. Signeul:

"Notes have just reached me; and I cannot refrain from expressing myself on the subject of them to your imperial majesty, with all the frankness which belongs to my character.

"When the wishes of the Swedish people called me to succeed to the throne, I hoped, in leaving France, that I should always be able to reconcile my personal affections with the interests of my country. My heart cherished the hope that it might identify itself with the sentiments of this people, at the same time preserving the remembrance of its first attachments, and never losing sight of the glory of France, nor its sincere attachment to your majesty—an attachment founded on a brotherhood in arms, which had been distinguished by so many great actions.

"It was with this hope that I arrived in Sweden—I found a nation generally attached to France; but still more to its own liberty and laws:—jealous of your friendship, sire, but not desirous of ever maintaining it at the expense of its honour and its independence.—Your majesty's minister chose to disregard this national feeling, and ruined everything by his arrogance:—his communications bore marks of that respect which crowned heads owe each other.—While fulfilling, according to the dictates of his own passions, the intentions of your majesty, Baron Agguier spoke like a Roman consul, without recollecting that he was not addressing himself to slaves.

"This minister, then, was the first cause of the distrust which Sweden began to show as to your majesty's intentions with regard to her; subsequent events were calculated to give it new weight."

"I had already had the honour, sire, by my letters of the 19th November and 8th December, 1811, to make your majesty acquainted with the situation of Sweden, and the desire which she felt, to find in your majesty a protector. She could attribute your majesty's silence to nothing but unmerited indifference; and it became incumbent on her to take precautions against the storm that was ready to burst on the Continent.

"Sire, mankind has already suffered but too much. For twenty years the earth has been deluged with human blood; and to put a period to these sufferings is the only thing wanting to complete your majesty's glory.

"If your majesty desires that the king should intimate to his majesty the Emperor Alexander the possibility of an accommodation, I augur success from the magnanimity of that monarch, to venture to assure you, that he will give a willing ear to every

* The invasion of Pomerania.

tures equitable at the same time for your empire and for the north. If an event, so unexpected, and so universally wished for, could take place, with what blessings would the nations of the Continent hail your majesty! Then gratitude would be increased in proportion to the terror they now feel for the return of a scourge which has already been so heavy upon them, and the ravages of which have left such cruel marks.

"Sire, one of the happiest moments which I have experienced since leaving France was that in which I became assured that your majesty had not altogether forgotten me. You have judged rightly as to my feelings. You have been aware how deeply they must have been wounded by the painful prospect of either seeing the interests of Sweden on the eve of being separated from those of France, or of being constrained to sacrifice the interests of a country by which I have been adopted with boundless confidence.

"Sire, though a Swede by honour, by duty, and by religion, I still identify myself by my wishes, with that beautiful France, in which I was born, and which I have served faithfully ever since my childhood. Every step I take in Sweden, the homage I receive, revives in my mind those bright recollections of glory which were the principal cause of my elevation; nor do I disguise from myself, that Sweden, in chusing me, wished to pay a tribute of esteem to the French people."

Napoleon blames all the world for his reverses. When he has no longer any one to blame, he accuses his destiny. But it is himself only whom he should blame; and the more so, because the very desertion on the part of his allies, which hastened his fall, could have had no other cause but the deep wounds he had inflicted by his despotic pride, and his acts of injustice. He was himself the original author of his misfortunes, by outraging those who had contributed to his elevation. It was his own hands that consummated his ruin; he was, in all the strictness of the term, a political suicide, and so much the more guilty, that he did not dispose of himself alone, but of France at the same time.

No. 7.

EXTRACT FROM MANUSCRIPT OBSERVATIONS ON
NAPOLEON'S RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN, BY AN ENGLISH
OFFICER OF RANK.

Page 535.

HAVING examined into the probabilities of Ségur's allegation, that Bonaparte entertained thoughts of taking up his winter quarters at Vitepsk, the military commentator proceeds as follows:—

"The Russian army at Smolensk, seeing the manner in which the French army was dispersed in cantonments between the rivers Dwina and Dnieper, moved, on the 7th of August, towards Rudnein, in order to beat up their quarters. They succeeded in surprising those of Sébastiani, and did him a good deal of mischief in an attack upon Inkowo. In the meantime, Barclay de Tolly was alarmed by a

movement made by the viceroy about Souraj, on the Dwina; and he countermanded the original plan of operations, with a view to extend his right flank; and for some days afterwards, the Russian army made various false movements, and was in a considerable degree of confusion. Whether Napoleon's plan was founded upon the march of the Russian army from Smolensk, as supposed by Ségur, or upon their position at Smolensk in the first days of August, he carried it into execution, notwithstanding that march.

"Accordingly, he broke up his cantonments upon the Dwina on the 10th of August, and marched his army by different columns by corps across the front of the Russian army, from these cantonments to Rasassina, upon the Dnieper. The false movements made by the Russian army from the 7th to the 12th of August prevented their obtaining early knowledge of this march, and they were not in a situation to be able to take advantage of it. On the other hand, Napoleon could have had no knowledge of the miscalculated movements made by the Russian army.

"Being arrived at Rasassina, where he was joined by Davoust, with three divisions of the first corps, he crossed the Dnieper on the 14th. The corps of Poniatowski and Junot were at the same time moving upon Smolensk direct from Mohiloff.

"Napoleon moved forward upon Smolensk."

"The garrison of that place, a division of infantry under General Newerowski, had come out as far as Krasnoi, to observe the movements of the French troops on the left of the Dnieper, supposed to be advancing along the Dnieper from Orssa. Murat attacked this body of troops with all his cavalry; but they made good their retreat to Smolensk, although repeatedly charged in their retreat. These charges were of little avail, however; and this operation affords another instance of the security with which good infantry can stand the attack of cavalry. This division of about 6000 infantry had no artificial defence, excepting two rows of trees on each side of the road, of which they certainly availed themselves. But the use made even of this defence shows how small an obstacle will impede and check the operations of the cavalry.

"It would probably have been more advisable if Murat, knowing of the movement of Poniatowski and Junot directed from Mohiloff upon Smolensk, had not pushed this body of troops too hard. They must have been induced to delay on their retreat, in order effectually to reconnoitre their enemy. The fort would undoubtedly in that case have fallen into the hands of Poniatowski.

"On the 17th of August, Napoleon assembled the whole of the operating army before Smolensk, on the left of the Dnieper. It consisted as follows:—

The cavalry, under Murat, ...	40,000
Guards, ...	47,000
First Corps, ...	72,000
Second Corps, ...	30,000
Third Corps, ...	45,000
Fourth Corps, ...	36,000
Fifth Corps, ...	18,000
Sixth Corps, ...	

258,000.

"These corps had, about six weeks before, entered the country with the numbers above stated; they had had no military affair to occasion loss, yet Ségur says, they were now reckoned at 185,000. The returns of the 3d August are stated to have given the last numbers only.

"The town had been attacked on the 16th, first, by a battalion,—secondly, by a division of the third corps—which troops were repulsed. In the meantime, Bagration moved upon Katani, upon the Dnieper, having heard of Napoleon's movement from the Dwina; and Barclay de Tolly having authorized the resumption of the plan of operations in pursuance of which the Russian army had broken up from Smolensk on the 17th. He moved thence on the 16th, along the right of the Dnieper, back upon Smolensk, and immediately reinforced the garrison. He was followed that night by Barclay de Tolly, who relieved the troops under the command of Bagration, which were in the town; and the whole Russian army was collected at Smolensk, on the right of the Dnieper.

"Bagration moved during the same night with his army on the road to Moscow. Barclay de Tolly remained in support of the troops in Smolensk.

"Napoleon, after waiting till two o'clock, in expectation that Barclay would cross the Dnieper, and move out of Smolensk, to fight a general battle, attacked the town on the 17th with his whole army, and was repulsed with loss; and in the evening, the Russian troops recovered possession of all the outposts. Barclay de Tolly, however, withdrew the garrison in the night of the 17th, and destroyed the bridges of communication between the French and the town. The enemy crossed the Dnieper by fords, and obtained for a moment possession of the faubourg called Petersburg, on the right of that river, but were driven back. The Russian army, after remaining all day on the right of the river opposite Smolensk, retired on the night of the 18th; and the French that night repaired the bridges on the Dnieper.

"Before I proceed farther with the narrative, it is necessary to consider a little this movement of Napoleon, which is greatly admired by all the writers on the subject.

"When this movement was undertaken, the communication of the army was necessarily removed altogether from the Dwina. Instead of proceeding from Wilna upon Vitepsk, it proceeded from Wilna upon Minsk, where a great magazine was formed, and thence across the Beresina, upon Orsha on the Dnieper, and thence upon Smolensk. The consequences of this alteration will appear presently, when we come to consider of the retreat.

"It is obvious, that the position of the great magazine at Minsk threw the communications of the army necessarily upon the Beresina, and eventually within the influence of the operations of the Russian armies from the southward. Napoleon's objects by the movement might have been three:—First, to force the Russians to a general battle; secondly, to obtain possession of Smolensk, without the loss or the delay of a siege; thirdly, to endeavor again to obtain a position in rear of the Rus-

sian army, upon their communications with Moscow, and with the southern provinces of the Russian empire. This movement is much admired, and extolled by the Russian as well as the French writers upon this war; yet if it is tried by the only tests of and military movement—its objects compared with its risks and difficulties, and its success compared with the same risks and difficulties, and with the probable hazards and the probably successful result of other movements to attain the same objects,—it will be found to have failed completely.

"The risk has been stated to consist, first, in the march of the different corps from their cantonnements on the Dwina, to Rzasassina, on the Dnieper, across the front of the Russian army, without the protection of a body of troops formed for that purpose; and next, in the hazard incurred in removing the communication of the army from Vitepsk to Minsk. This will be discussed presently.

"In respect of the first object,—that of bringing the Russian army to a general battle,—it must be obvious to every body, that the fort of Smolensk and the river Dnieper were between Napoleon and the Russian army when his movement was completed. Although, therefore, the armies were not only in sight, but within musket-shot of each other, it was impossible for Napoleon to bring the enemy to action on that ground without his consent; and as the ground would not have been advantageous to the Russian army, and an unsuccessful, or even a doubtful result, could not have saved Smolensk, and there was no object sufficiently important to induce the Russian general to incur the risk of an unsuccessful result of a general action, it was not very probable he would move into the trap which Ségur describes as laid for him.

"Neither was it likely that Napoleon would take Smolensk by any assault which this movement might enable him to make upon that place. He had no heavy artillery, and he tried in vain to take the place by storm, first, by a battalion, then, by a division, and lastly, by the whole army. He obtained possession of Smolensk at last, only because the Russian general had made no previous arrangements for occupying the place; and because Barclay de Tolly knew that, if he left a garrison there unprovided, it must fall into Napoleon's hands a few days sooner or later. The Russian general then thought proper to evacuate the place; and notwithstanding the position of Napoleon on the left of the Dnieper, and his attempts to take the place by storm, the Russian general would have kept the possession, if he could have either maintained the position of his own army in the neighbourhood, or could have supplied the place adequately before he retired from it.

"The possession of the place depended, then, on the position of the Russian army; and what follows will show, that other measures and movements than those adopted were better calculated to dislodge the Russian army from Smolensk.

"There can be no doubt that, upon Napoleon's arrival at Smolensk, he had gained six marches upon his enemy. If Napoleon, when he crossed the Dnieper at Rzasassina, had masked Smolensk, and marched direct upon any point of the Dnieper above that

place, he could have posted himself with his whole army upon the communications of his enemy with Moscow; and his enemy could scarcely have attempted to pass across his front, to seek the road by Kalouga. Barclay de Tolly must have gone to the northward, evacuating or leaving Smolensk to its fate, and Napoleon might have continued his march upon Moscow, keeping his position constantly between his enemy and his communications with that city, and with the southern provinces. The fate of Smolensk could not have been doubtful.

"Here, then, a different mode, even upon the same plan of manœuvring, would have produced two of the three objects which Napoleon is supposed to have had in view by these movements. But these were not the only movements in his power, at that time. The viceroy is stated to have been at Souraj and Velij. If, instead of moving by his right, Napoleon had moved by his left, and brought the first, fifth, and eighth corps from the Dnieper to form the reserve; and had marched from Souraj upon any point of the Upper Dnieper, he would equally have put himself in the rear of his enemy, and in a position to act upon his communications. He would have effected this object with greater certainty, if he had ventured to move the first, and the fifth and eighth corps through the country on the left of the Dnieper. And in this last movement there would have been no great risk, first, because Napoleon's manœuvres upon the Dwina would have attracted all the enemy's attention; secondly, because these corps would all have passed Smolensk, before the Russian generals could have known of their movement, in like manner as Napoleon passed the Dnieper and arrived at Smolensk without their knowledge. By either of these modes of proceeding, Napoleon would have cut off his enemy from their communications, would have obliged them to fight a battle to regain these communications, and in all probability Smolensk would have fallen into his hands without loss, with its buildings entire—an object of the last consequence in the event of the campaign.

"Either of these last modes of effecting the object would have been shorter by two marches than the movement of the whole army upon Rasassina."

No. 8.

REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815;

By Capt. John W. Pringle, of the Royal Engineers.

Page 722.

THE following observations were hastily made, at a time when much public interest was excited by the various accounts of the campaign of 1815, edited by several individuals, all claiming the peculiar distinction of having been dictated by Napoleon, or written under his immediate direction. With some slight exceptions, and occasional anecdotes, they nearly correspond, as far as relates to the military details.* The 9th volume of the Memoirs of Napoleon,

* Liv. ix, *Mémoires Historiques de Napoléon*: Sir R. Phillips, London, 1820.—*Monthon, Mémoires de Napoléon*: Colburn, London, 1823.—*Las Cases*: London, 2 vols.—Gour-

published by O'Meara, is perhaps the original from which the greatest part of the other productions are derived. It is now generally acknowledged to have been, to a certain extent, composed by Bonaparte.

These works have had one particular object,—the defence of an unfortunate and a great man. The individual, however, is always held up to view; the actions are softened or strengthened to suit this purpose, and in the extension of this design, the reputation of his own officers, and a strict adherence to facts, are occasionally sacrificed. The military features of the campaign have remained unanswered; whilst the wounded honour and fame of his generals have called for some counter-statements, which throw curious light on the whole campaign, and on the machinery of a system which so long alarmed the world. These last are little known in Britain.

Whoever has perused the mass of military works by French officers, most of them ably written, and many artfully composed, must feel how much they tend to encourage a peculiar feeling of national superiority in young minds, in a country where only their own military works are read. In these works they never find a French army beaten in the field, without some plausible reason; or, as Las Cases terms it, "a concurrence of unheard-of fatalities," to account for it. Upon the minds of young soldiers, this has an effect of the most powerful description.

Great care appears to have been taken in these various works, to meet the accusations of military men respecting the disposition and employment of the French army. Where a fault is admitted, the error is at least transferred from Bonaparte to the incapacity or remissness of his generals. The talents and honour of the British commanders are rated at a low state; their success attributed more to chance than to military skill, and the important result of the battle, less to the courage of the British troops, than to the opportune arrival of the Prussians, whom they allege to have saved the British army from destruction. What are now termed liberal ideas, seem to have made it a fashion to assert, and give credence to these accounts; and it is no uncommon occurrence to meet with Englishmen who doubt the glory and success of their countrymen on that eventful day. A wounded spirit of faction has contributed to this feeling, and in the indulgence of its own gratification, and under the mask of patriotism, endeavoured to throw a doubt over the military achievements of our countrymen, eagerly laid hold of any faults or failures,

gaud. War of 1815: London, 1824.—Many passages in these works will be found quite parallel; for instance, Monthon, vol. ii, p. 272—280, with liv. ix, p. 43. Grouchy, page 4, designates these works from St Helena, as containing, "des instructions et des ordres supposés; des mouvements imaginaires," etc.; also, "des assertions erronées, des hypothèses faites après coup;" see also p. 26. P. 22, he says, with justice, of these authors: "Des individus qui se persuadaient que l'auréole de gloire d'un grand homme, en les éclairant un moment, les a transformés en d'irréversibles autorités, et ne voyant pas qu'un éclat d'emprunt qui ne se réfléchit sur aucun fait d'armes connus, sur aucuns services éminens, ne sert qu'à mieux faire ressortir la présumption impérieuse des jugemens qu'ils prononcent."

* Vol. II, p. 15.

palliating, at the same time, those of their enemies, and often giving that implicit belief to the garbled accounts of the French, which they deny to the simple and manly dispatch of a British general.

There does appear in this a decoy of that national feeling, and jealousy of our country's honour, the main spring of all great actions, which other nations, our rivals, cling to with renewed ardour. No man could persuade a Frenchman that it was British valour which has conquered in almost every battle, from Cressy down to Waterloo; and it is impossible to forget that national pride, so honourable to the French name, which could make their unfortunate emigrants even forget for a while their own distresses, in the glory which crowned the arms of the republicans at that Revolution, which drove them from their homes.

The British works on the campaign, with one exception,* are incomplete productions, written by persons unacquainted with military affairs, and hastily composed of rude materials, collected from imperfect sources.†

Whoever has endeavoured to analyse the accounts of modern actions, and to separate in them what can be proved to be facts, from what is affirmed to be so, or to compare the private accounts (too often indiscreetly published) with the official documents, and the information procured from proper sources, will not be surprised to find in these home-made accounts of this campaign, fulsome praises lavished on individuals and regiments; ** tales of charges, which one would imagine must have annihilated whole corps, and yet find not more than fifty or sixty men killed and wounded in a whole regiment.††

Our officers, whatever their corps may be, should be above the idea of vain boasting or exaggeration. It is much that we can claim, during a long period of eight years, the praise of having successfully contended with troops of the first military power in Europe; while our soldiers have disputed the palm of valour; and our officers, with less trumpeted claims than their boasted marshals, have shown as great military skill; and our armies, in the moment of victory, a spirit of humanity and moderation, not frequently evinced by their antagonists.

In the following observations, it is not pretended that any new matter can be given on a subject already so much discussed; still some facts and con-

* Batty.

† The best account of the campaign is by an anonymous author, C. de W., published at Stutgard, 1817, and is attributed to Baron Muffling. It does honour to its illustrious author, from its candour and manliness, though he naturally wishes to give more effect to the Prussian attack on the 18th, than was actually the case; that is, he brings them into action, with their whole force, considerably too early in the day.

** It is well remarked, in liv. ix, p. 150,—"Ces détails en appartiennent plus à l'histoire de chaque régiment qu'à l'histoire générale de la bataille."

†† Rogiat, p. 147, speaking of charges, says,—"S'ils marchent à la baïonnette, ce n'est qu'un simulacre d'attaque; ils ne la croisent jamais avec celles d'un ennemi qu'ils craignent d'aborder, parce qu'ils se contentent sans défense contre ses coups, et l'un des deux partis prend la fuite avant d'en venir aux mains."—Such is the case in all charges.

siderations are treated of, which have not been perhaps fully or fairly appreciated. Many charges of blame have been brought forward against the generals of the allied forces; and superior talent in profiting by their mistakes has been attributed to their opponents, which might well be accounted for, as arising from the situations in which they were relatively placed. In order to judge, for instance, of the credit given to Napoleon, of having surprised their armies in their cantonments, it is necessary to be aware of the state of both countries (France and Belgium), and the objects, besides the mere watching of the frontiers, to which the attention of the allied commanders was necessarily directed previous to the commencement of the war, and whilst it may be supposed as still in some measure doubtful.

France, as is well known, is, on the Belgian frontier, studded with fortresses. Belgium, on the contrary, is now defenceless. The numerous fortresses in the Low Countries, so celebrated in our former wars, had been dismantled in the reign of the Emperor Joseph; and their destruction completed by the French, when they got possession of the country at the battle of Fleurus, 1794, with the exception of Antwerp, Ostend, and Nieuport, which they had kept up on account of their marine importance. These circumstances placed the two parties in very different situations, both for security and for facility of preparing and carrying into execution the measures either for attack or defence.

The French had maintained their own celebrated triple line of fortresses; extending, on that part of the frontier, from Dunkirk to Philippeville, and which had been put into a state of defence during the war in the preceding year*—these gave every facility for the concentration and formation of troops—for affording a supply of artillery, and every requisite for taking the field, and for concealing their movements—particularly from the French organization of their National Guards, which enabled the latter immediately to take the garrison duties, or relieve and occupy the outposts along the frontiers—such was the relative situation of the frontier at the period of Napoleon's return from Elba.

The necessity of re-establishing the principal fortresses on the Belgian frontier, which commanded the sluices and inundation of the country, had indeed already been evident, and decided upon whilst Napoleon was yet in Elba. A committee of British engineers had been employed in examining the country for that purpose, but only the general plans and reports had been prepared, when Bonaparte's sudden return and rapid advance upon Paris, and the probability of a speedy renewal of the war, called for expeditions and immediate means of defence. The declaration of the Congress of Vienna, of the 13th March, reached Paris on the same day he arrived there, which must have convinced him he would not be allowed quietly to repossess his throne.

It may be well supposed, that the general impression in Belgium was, that he would lose no time to endeavour to regain a country which he considered as almost part of France; important to him from the resources it would have afforded, and perhaps still

* Liv. ix, p. 36.

more so, as it would deprive his enemies of so convenient a base of operations, for the preparation of the means for attacking France. The discontent in Belgium, and the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, also amongst the Saxon troops who had served in his army, were known.* The mutinous spirit of these troops appeared to be in concert with the movements of the French forces on the frontiers; so much so, that they were disarmed and sent to the rear.† In the former, the discontent was particularly favoured by the number of French officers and soldiers, who had been discharged as aliens from the French army, in which they had served, nearly since the Revolution, and now gave themselves little care to conceal their real sentiments and attachments. The flight of Louis from Lille, through Flanders, added to this feeling in Belgium—such appeared to be the prevailing spirit. The force the British had to keep it in check, and resist an invasion, amounted only to 6 or 7000 men, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, consisting chiefly of second battalions, hastily collected, a great portion of our best troops not having yet returned from America. There were also in Belgium the German Legion, together with 8 to 10,000 men of the new Hanoverian levies. The organization of the Belgian troops had been just commenced, so that the force of the Prince of Orange might amount to about 20,000 men.

The Prussian general, Kleist, who commanded on the Rhine and Meuse, had 30,000 men, afterwards augmented to 50,000, which, however, included the Saxons.**

These generals had immediately agreed to act in concert; but from what we have mentioned, had Napoleon concentrated 36,000 men at Lille on the 1st April, which he says was possible for him to have done,‡ and advanced into Belgium, it is certainly probable he might have obtained the most important results; for the Prince of Orange, who had united his troops at Ath, Mons, and Tournay, was not strong enough to have covered Brussels, and must have either fallen back on Antwerp, or formed a junction with the Prussian general, Kleist. The intelligence of Napoleon having landed at Cannes on the 1st March reached Brussels on the 9th. Preparations were immediately made for the defence of the country. The British troops under General Clinton concentrated, with their allies, near Ath, Mons, and Tournay; and these places, with Ypres, Ghent, and Oudenarde, were ordered to be put in a state of defence consistently with the exigence of the moment. To effect this, every use was made of what remained of the old fortifications. New works were added, and by taking advantage of the great system of defence in that country, which is generally under the level of some canal, or the sea, and consequently capable of being inundated. The sluices which commanded the inundations were covered by strong redoubts.

The inundation of the country near the sea, admits of being made in two ways. The canals or rivers

are drains for the fresh water of the country to the sea. The sluice-gates are opened for its egress at low water, and shut to prevent the ingress of the salt water at the return of the tide. It is evident, therefore, that we could have laid the country under water, and so covered their fortresses on two or three sides, which would prevent the necessity of their having large garrisons to defend them.* But salt-water inundation ruins the soil for several years, and it was determined only to employ it as a last resource; and in the meantime the sluice-gates were merely kept shut to prevent the egress of the fresh-water, which in that wet season soon accumulated; and the fresh-water inundation only destroyed the crops of one season.

About 20,000 labourers, called in by requisitions on the country, were daily employed on the works, in addition to the working parties furnished by the troops. The necessary artillery and stores were supplied from England and Holland. Troops arrived daily and were immediately moved to the frontiers, where, from the movements that were constantly taking place, it is probable that exaggerated accounts were transmitted to the enemy. By these vigorous and prompt measures, confidence became restored—the panic amongst the people of Belgium was removed—they saw that their country was not to be given up without a severe struggle.—It fixed the wavering, and silenced the disaffected. In less than a month, most of the frontier places were safe from a coup-de-main.

The Duke of Wellington had arrived at Brussels from Vienna, early in April, and immediately inspected the frontier and the fortresses; after which, he agreed on a plan of operations with the Prussians, by which they concentrated their troops along the Sambre and Meuse, occupying Charleroi, Namur, and Liège, so as to be in communication with his left. The Prussians had repaired the works round Cologne, which assured their communications with Prussia, and gave them a tête-de-pont on the Rhine. The small fortress of Juliers afforded them the command of the Roer on the same line, and they held Maestricht on the Lower Meuse. It was important to occupy Liège and Namur, though their fortifications had been destroyed. They afforded a facility to act rapidly on either side of the Meuse, and a choice of the strong positions along the banks of that river. The disaffection in the provinces on the Rhine, which had been recently added to Prussia, was considered even greater than in Belgium. The fortress of Luxembourg was the great key which Prussia possessed for their preservation; and her interest would have led her to make that her dépôt and base of operations, for the invasion of France: but besides being so far distant from Brussels, that armies occupying such distant points could not act in concert, the roads in that part of the country, between the Meuse and the Moselle, were in a state almost impracticable for artillery, and for the general communication of an army. On the other hand, the roads and communi-

* The salt-water inundation could be raised at Ghent, so as to place the Great Square five feet under water.

* Liv. ix, pp. 58—61.

† *Muffling*, p. 5.

** *Ibid.* pp. 1—3.

†† *Montholon*, vol. ii, p. 281. Liv. ix, p. 53.

cations to cross the Rhine at Cologne are good, the town itself could be put in a state of defence, and have become the best and safest line of communication. Reference to the map will elucidate these observations, and show that the cantonments of the Prussians, along the Sambre and Meuse, enabled them to act in concert with our army; to cover their line of communication with Prussia; and to move rapidly into the provinces of the Moselle, in the event of the enemy advancing from Mentz.*

The Russians were to have come into the line at Mentz, but they did not reach the Rhine until June, and then only the first corps; so that, for the present, a gap existed from the Prussian left at Dinant, to the Austro-Bavarian right at Mannheim.

It was an important object to cover Brussels; and it is to be considered, that this city forms, as it were, a centre to a large portion of the French frontier, extending about seventy miles from the Lys to the Meuse, viz. from Menin to Philippeville or Givet; that it is about fifty miles distant from these extreme points; and that it was necessary to guard the entry from France by Tournay, Mons, and Charleroi; and also to prevent Ghent, a very important place, from being attacked from Lille. The protection of all these distant points, with the difficulty of subsisting troops, particularly cavalry and artillery, are sufficient causes to explain why the armies were not more united in their cantonments.† Bonaparte appears to have attached much importance to the occupation of Brussels, as appears by the bulletins, found ready printed in his baggage, which was captured. It was therefore of much importance in every point of view, to prevent even a temporary occupation of this city, and this could only be done by risking an action in front of it. The Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher had also separate views in preserving their lines of operation,—the one by Cologne, with Prussia; the other with England, by Brussels, which neither were disposed willingly to abandon. This probably may have been the cause why Quatre-Bras and Ligny were chosen as positions covering both.

It is evident, that an army placed in cantonments, so as to meet all these objects, could only be concentrated in a position covering the city, by the

* Such, however, could only be a desultory attack, for the chaussée by Charleroi and Givet was the nearest entry from France on this side. The country from this to Mentz was then nearly impracticable for large armies. Good roads have since been made through it.

† Bonaparte blames the allied generals for not having formed a camp in front of Brussels, as he alleges might have been done in the beginning of May. The wet season, and difficulty of subsisting so large a body of troops, is some reason against it. Besides which, Bonaparte might have made demonstrations in front, and sent 20,000 men from his garrisons to ravage Ghent and the country beyond the Scheldt, and cut off our communications with Ostend. In 1814, when the Prussians were concentrated near Brussels, this had been done with effect from Lille. Though little advantage might have resulted to the enemy from such a measure, much blame would have been attached for not taking precautions against it. To cover Brussels, the capital of the country, was certainly of great importance; and had that been the only object, a camp in its front would have certainly been the best means of effecting it.

troops in advance being able to keep the enemy in check, so as to afford time for that concentration, which was certainly accomplished. The positions on the different roads of approach from the French frontier had been attentively reconnoitred; that of Mont St-Jean, or Waterloo, very particularly; and no precaution appears to have been omitted, by which an offensive movement of the enemy was to be encountered.

Some movements were observed on the French frontier, between Lille and Bergue, as if preparing for offensive operations, about the end of March, at which period the troops, cantoned near Menin, had orders, after making due resistance, and destroying the bridge on the Lys, to fall back on Courtrai, their point of assembling; and then, after such a resistance as would not compromise their safety in retreat, to endeavour to ascertain the object of the enemy's movements, and give time for the troops to assemble. They were to retire on Oudenarde and Ghent, opening the sluices, and extending the inundation. About the beginning of May similar movements were also observed, but less was then to be apprehended, since, by the advanced state of the works at Tournay, and the tête de pont at Oudenarde and Ghent, we then commanded the Scheldt, and could have assumed the offensive.

Great credit is undoubtedly due to Napoleon, for the mode in which he concealed his movements, and the rapidity with which he concentrated his army. The forced marches he was obliged to make, appear, however, to have paralysed his subsequent movements, from the fatigue his troops underwent. The numerous French fortresses favoured his plans in a very great degree, by affording him the means of employing the garrison and National Guards to occupy the advanced posts along the frontier,* and opportunity afterwards to make demonstrations across the frontiers near Lille, whilst he assembled his army on the Sambre. They were also somewhat favoured by the circumstance, that hostilities were not actually commenced, which prevented our advanced posts (even if they suspected a change in the troops opposed to them) from obliging the enemy to show himself, or, by bringing on a skirmish, to obtain from prisoners intelligence of their movements. He had another advantage of powerful consequence. The army he commanded were mostly old soldiers of the same nation, under a single chief. The allied armies were composed of different nations, a great portion young levies, and under two generals, each of such reputation, as not likely to yield great deference to the other.†

On the night of the 14th June, the French army bivouacked in three divisions, as near the frontier as possible, without being observed by the Prussians: the left at Ham-sur-Heure, the centre at Beaumont, where the head-quarters were established, and the right at Philippeville.**

At three o'clock, A. M., on the 15th June, the

* Liv. ix., pp. 68—85. *Montholon*, vol. ii., p. 122.

† Bonaparte himself has remarked,—“L'unité de commandement est la chose la plus importante de la guerre.”

** Bonaparte, *liv. ix.*, p. 69, rates his forces at 122,400 men, and 350 guns.—*Muffling*, p. 17, at 130,000. Other accounts make it smaller, and Batty, 127,400, with 350 guns.

French army crossed the frontier in three columns, directed on Marchiennes, Charleroi, and Châtelet. The Prussian outposts were quickly driven in; they, however, maintained their ground obstinately at three points, until eleven o'clock, when General Ziethen took up a position at Gilly and Gosselies, in order to check the advance of the enemy, and then retired slowly on Fleurus, agreeably to the orders of Marshal Blücher, to allow time for the concentration of his army.* The bridge at Charleroi, not having been completely destroyed, was quickly repaired by the enemy. Upon Ziethen's abandoning the chaussée, which leads to Brussels through Quatre-Bras, Marshal Ney, who commanded the left of the French army, was ordered to advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes part of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops, under the command of Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, after some skirmishing, maintained his position.† The French army was formed on the night of the 15th, in three columns, the left at Gosselies, the centre near Gilly, and the right at Châtelet. Two corps of the Prussian army occupied the position at Sombref on the same night, where they were joined by the 1st corps, and occupied St-Amand, Brie, and Ligny; so that, notwithstanding all the exertions of the French, at a moment where time was of such importance, they had only been able to advance about fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of day-light.** The corps of Ziethen had suffered considerably, but he had effected his orders; so that Marshal Blücher was enabled to assemble three corps of his army, 80,000 men, in position early on the 15th, and his 4th corps was on its march to join him that evening.

The Duke of Wellington seems to have expected an attack by the Mons chaussée,†† and, on his first receiving information of the enemy's movements, merely ordered his troops to hold themselves in readiness; this was on the evening of the 15th of June, at six o'clock. Having obtained farther intelligence about eleven o'clock, which confirmed the real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately given for the troops to march upon Quatre-Bras; a false movement of the

English general to his right, at that period, could not have been easily remedied in time to have fought in front of Brussels, and to have effected his junction with the Prussians; and in such a case, as Marshal Blücher only fought at Ligny, on the expectation of being supported by the Duke of Wellington, it is probable that that action would not have taken place. He had, however, a safe retreat on Bulow's corps and Maestricht, as had the Duke of Wellington on Ghent and Antwerp, or else the plan afterwards adopted of concentrating at Waterloo and Wavres could not have been easily executed. It is, indeed, a matter of surprise, that Bonaparte did not make a more important demonstration on the side of Lille and Mons. The duke, in deciding on these movements, was under the necessity of acting on the intelligence given by spies or deserters, which can only be so far depended on, as it is confirmed by reports from the outposts, who may be themselves deceived.* What was true at their departure, may be entirely changed at their arrival with the information; and, whatever may have been the case formerly, few or no instances occur at present of a person in the confidence of the cabinet, particularly of a military officer, betraying the confidence placed in him.

The Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre-Bras on the 16th, at an early hour, and immediately proceeded to Brie, to concert measures with Marshal Blücher, for arranging the most efficient plan of support. It appeared at that time, that the whole French attack would be directed against the Prussians, as considerable masses of the enemy were in movement in their front. Blücher was at this time at the windmill of Brie, about five English miles from Quatre-Bras.† The duke proposed to advance upon Frasnes and Gosselies, which would have been a decided movement, as acting on the French communications, and immediately in rear of their left flank; but as the troops could not be ready to advance from Quatre-Bras before four o'clock, the attack must have been too late, and in the meantime the Prussians would have to sustain the attack of nearly the whole French army. Marshal Blücher, therefore, judged it more desirable, that the duke should form a junction with the Prussian right, by marching direct by the chaussée from Quatre-Bras to Brie.**

The object of the enemy on the 16th, as may be seen by the general orders of Napoleon, communicated by Soult to Ney and Grouchy, was to turn the Prussian right, by driving the British from Quatre-Bras, and then to march down the chaussée upon Brie, and thus separate the two armies.†† For this pur-

* Grouchy, p. 59, speaks of the rapidity with which Blücher assembled his army. It is also adverted to by several French military writers.

† Ney might probably have driven back these troops, and occupied the important position at Quatre-Bras; but hearing a heavy cannonade on his right flank, where Ziethen had taken up his position, he thought it necessary to halt, and detach a division in the direction of Fleurus. This brings forward a remarkable case, as he was severely censured by Napoleon, for not having literally followed his orders, and pushed on to Quatre-Bras. This was done in the presence of Marshal Grouchy—(see Grouchy's *Observations sur la 'Relation de la Campagne de 1815, par le Général Gourgaud'*, published at Philadelphia 1818), who gives it as a reason (pp. 32, 33, 61), for acting in the manner he did on the 18th, and not moving to his left to support Napoleon at Waterloo.

** Rogniat, p. 311, says that a great portion of the French army only reached Charleroi late on the 15th, and Fleurus at 11 A. M. on the 16th—See Grouchy, p. 36.

†† Official Dispatch.—Muffling, pp. 8, 10, 18.

* Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Bonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.

† Muffling, p. 10.

** Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as a rising from having two armies, and two chiefs with different objects in view.

†† See orders in the Appendix to *Batty*, ix to xiii; pp. 120 to 133.

pose Ney was detached with 43,000 men.* On reference to the above orders, it appears that not much resistance was expected in getting possession both of Sombref and Quatre-Bras.† Ney has been accused of delaying to attack, but reference to those orders will show, that Ney had not been commanded to attack ** until two o'clock, M. P., in consequence of the allies having assembled in force at Quatre-Bras. The plan was excellent, and if Ney had been successful, would have led to important results. After obtaining possession of Quatre-Bras, he was to have detached part of his forces to attack the Prussian right flank in rear of St-Amand, whilst Bonaparte was making the chief attack on that village, the strongest in the position, and at the same time keeping the whole Prussian line engaged. Half of Ney's force was left in reserve near Frasnès, to be in readiness either to support the attacks on Quatre-Bras or St-Amand, and in the event of both succeeding, to turn the Prussian right by marching direct on Wagnele or Brie. ††

The village of St-Amand was well defended; it formed the strength of the Prussian right, and, from the intersection of several gardens and hedges, was very capable of defence; although so much in advance of the rest of the Prussian position. The face of the country in front of this position possesses no remarkable features; the slopes towards the stream are gentle, and of easy access. After a continued attack for two hours, the enemy had only obtained possession of half the village of St-Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, which was taken and retaken several times.*** At this time Bonaparte sent for the corps of reserve left by Ney at Frasnès; before, however, it reached St-Amand, in consequence of the check they had sustained at Quatre-Bras, it was countermarched, and from this circumstance became of little use either to Bonaparte or Ney. Bonaparte having observed the masses of troops which Blücher had brought up behind St-Amand (and probably in consequence of the corps above mentioned being necessary at Quatre-Bras†††), appears to have changed the disposition of his reserves, who were marching upon St-Amand, and moved them towards the right to attack the Prussian centre at Ligny, which they succeeded in forcing, and so obtained possession of

that village.* A large body of French cavalry, and another of infantry, then pushed forward to the height between Brie and Sombref, immediately in the rear of Ligny, and quite in the heart of the Prussian position, where they were attacked by Blücher at the head of his cavalry; this attempt to re-establish the action failed, and the Prussian cavalry were driven back upon the infantry.† It was now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the French from advancing farther, and they contented themselves with the occupation of Ligny. The Prussians did not evacuate Brie before three o'clock A. M. on the 17th.** In the course of the night the Prussians fell back on Tilly and Gembloux. The loss of the Prussians, according to their own account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces of artillery; the French official account in the *Mémorial*, raises it to 15,000.†† The French acknowledge to have lost 7000. It is evident that Bonaparte, in changing the point of attack from the Prussian right at St-Amand, to the centre at Ligny, in a manner forced the Prussians, if defeated, to retreat upon the British army, and give up their own line of operations; but still, at that hour in the evening, when the situation of the armies is considered, the change of attack appears to be the only hope he had of obtaining even a partial success; under such circumstances it was perhaps the best course he could pursue.***

It is not easy to conceive that a defeat, in our case, would have been such as to prevent the junction, since each army had such considerable reinforcements moving up, and close upon them; but even in an extreme case, they could each have retired on their fortresses, and formed entrenched camps of perfect security, with every means of repairing the losses they sustained.†††

* Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was: "*La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers neuf heures du soir; seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été commencée.*"

† Here it was that Blücher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.

** Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on the 17th, he supposed the Prussians had retired upon Namur, so they were they followed; the light cavalry of General Pajol pursuing them in this direction on the 17th, captured the guns, which, with some stragglers, as are found in Liège, was his whole success.

†† The St Helena productions raise the amount to 28,000 men, 40 guns, standards, &c. See Grouchy on this subject in answer to Gourgaud, pp. 48, 49.—Menthon says they lost 60,000.—Liv. x. p. 158, says that the Prussian army was reduced to 40,000 men by the loss they had sustained, 9,000 men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, who had disbanded, and ravaged the banks of the Meuse, and by the detachments sent to cover their retreat, and that of the baggage, in the direction of Namur.

*** The intention of the allied marshals to remain together, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Wellington had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been abandoned to their own strength, and had the events of the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and group Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both armies would have retired.

††† Had earlier or more positive information of the enemy's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the

* Liv. ix. p. 103, Official Papers.

† See Grouchy, p. 47. Gourgaud, Liv. ix. p. 102.

** It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's hold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his troops in readiness, but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Bonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.

†† The French did not attack until 3 P. M., the different corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour.—Grouchy, p. 36. Rogiat, p. 311.

*** Ney's letter to the Duke d'Ortante: Paris, 1815.—*Muffling*, p. 14.

††† *Muffling*, pp. 15-14.—Blücher had employed his reserves to support his right at St-Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. *Muffling*, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St-Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.

The force of the enemy, at the time the Duke of Wellington left Quatre-Bras to communicate with Blücher, appeared to be so weak, that no serious attack was at that time to be apprehended; but on his return to that position, about three o'clock, he found they had assembled a large force at Frasnès, and were preparing for an attack, which was made about half past three o'clock by two columns of infantry, and nearly all their cavalry, supported by a heavy fire of artillery. The force at that time under his orders was 17,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, of which about 4500 were British infantry, the rest Hanoverians, and Belgians, and Nassau troops.* They at first obtained some success, driving back the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry; their cavalry penetrated amongst our infantry before they had quite time to form squares, and forced a part to retire into the adjoining wood; they were, however, repulsed. At this period of the action, the third British division, under General Alten, arrived about four o'clock, soon after the action had commenced. They consisted of about 6300 men, and were composed of British, King's German Legion, and Hanoverians. They had some difficulty in maintaining their ground, and one regiment lost a colour.† They succeeded, however, in repelling the enemy from the advanced points he had gained at the farm of Gemincourt and village of Pierrefont.

Ney still, however, occupied part of the wood of Bossus, which extends from Quatre-Bras, on the right of the road towards Frasnès, to the distance of about a mile. This favoured an attack on the right of our position, which he accordingly made, after having been repulsed on the left. At this moment the division of General Cooke (Guards), 4000 strong, arrived from Enghien, and materially assisted to repel this attack, which, after considerable exertions, was done, and the enemy driven back upon Frasnès, in much confusion. This affair was severely contested, and though the enemy were repulsed, the loss on each side was nearly equal, owing to the superiority of the French in artillery. The loss, however, inflicted on the French by the fire of musketry, which their attacking columns were exposed to, was very considerable, and counterbalanced the advantage they derived from their ar-

troops put in movement on the evening of the 15th, the combinations of the two allied chiefs would have been perfect. Nothing more is necessary to show how well their plans had been laid, but which were not carried into full effect, by one of those accidental occurrences which no human foresight can prevent.

* Liv. ix. p. 163, Bonaparte says, that Ney attacked with 16,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 44 guns, leaving 16,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 64 guns, in reserve at Frasnès.

† This belonged to the 69th regiment, not to the 42d, as Liv. ix. p. 164, states, and was almost the only one captured during the whole war. It may here be remarked, that if the French had carried one quarter the number of eagles with their regiments that we have of colours, a much larger proportion would now be found at Whitehall. A weak imitation of English infantry always carries two large colours, very heavy and inconvenient, whilst a French eagle, about the size of a blackbird, was only given to a regiment composed of several battalions, which was easily secured in case of defeat.

tillery. It required great exertions to maintain the important post of Quatre-Bras, in the present relative situations of the two armies. It is certain that, if Ney had advanced as rapidly as Bonaparte says he might have done, he would have obtained his object. Ney, however, in his letter, contradicts the possibility of his having done so, which seems to be confirmed by Soult's letter to him, dated at 2 o'clock P. M., where he tells him that Grouchy is to attack Briè with the 3d and 4th corps, at half past 2 P. M.,* that he is to attack the corps in his front, and afterwards to assist Grouchy; but that if he (Ney) defeats the troops in his front first, Grouchy would be ordered to assist his operations. It is most probable that the corps left at Frasnès, which Ney complains was taken away without his knowledge, was destined to assist either attack as might be found necessary.

Even had Ney got possession of Quatre-Bras at an early hour, he would scarcely have been able to detach any sufficient force against the Prussians, seeing, as he must have done, or at least ought to have calculated, that the British forces were arriving rapidly on the point which we suppose him to have occupied. The British could have still retreated on Waterloo, and been concentrated on the 17th at that position; and there was nothing to prevent the Prussians retreating on Wavres, as they afterwards did. Though Bonaparte says,† that on the 15th everything had succeeded as he wished, and that the Duke of Wellington had manoeuvred as he would have wished him to do; yet one corps of the Prussian army had so far kept him in check, that he was not able to reach Fleurus; and on the 16th, could not commence the attack until three hours after mid-day. He did not gain possession of Quatre-Bras until the forenoon of the 17th. He had sustained a severe check with one part of his army, and gained an indecisive action with the other; the loss of the allies not exceeding his own, whilst they had the advantage of retiring leisurely on their resources and reinforcements, and by the retreat, gave up no place or position now of consequence to the pursuing enemy. The result of the operations of the 16th produced no important consequences to the French. The celebrated engineer, General Rogiat, does not hesitate to term it an indecisive action. The success of the British in repelling the attack of Quatre-Bras, tended to make them meet the renewed attack at Waterloo with more confidence, and probably had a contrary effect on the enemy; whilst the manner in which the Prussian corps of Thielmann received the attack of Grouchy on the 18th, who had superior forces, showed how little the confidence of the Prussians had been shaken by the action at Ligny. It may be observed, that the forces engaged at Ligny were nearly equal, even deducting d'Erlon's corps, which was left at Frasnès, as not engaged. The French passed the frontiers with about 125,000 men—Blücher had 80,000—and at the close of the day Lord Wellington had 30,000.** The com-

* See Official Papers in the Appendix to *Batty*.

† Liv. ix. p. 209.

** Liv. ix. p. 60, Bonaparte remarks that the numbers of the allied army must not be rated at their numerical force.

* *Parce que l'armée des alliés était composée de troupes*

maunders of the allied armies appear not to have overrated what was to be expected from their troops, which was not exactly the case with their opponents.

The outline of the operations, and the stratégie on the part of Napoleon to separate the two armies, was no doubt finely conceived, and, as we have seen, was nearly successful; yet it is presumed, that, had it been so, even to the extent Bonaparte could hope or expect, the allies had still a safe retreat, and sufficient resources. On all sides, it was a calculation of hours. It is hardly possible to know the point an enterprising enemy means to attack, especially on so extended a line; and here the assailant has the advantage. Fault has been found with the Duke of Wellington for having no artillery and very few cavalry upon the 16th. No portion of either were with the reserve at Brussels, which is remarkable, particularly as regards the artillery.*

The spirited manner in which the allied marshals adhered to their plans of defence previously agreed on, and extricated themselves from the difficulties which they found themselves placed in, by the sudden and vigorous attack they had to sustain, and which their distinct commands tended rather to increase, most command admiration; and since war is only a great game, where the movements are influenced by many events which occur during their execution and progress—events which human calculation cannot foresee—it becomes easy to criticise when the operations are passed, when all the data on which they rested, or might have rested, are known; but to form a good plan of attack, or a campaign—to act with decision and firmness, and with a “coup d’œil,” so as immediately to profit by the changes which incessantly take place, can be said of very few men of the many who have ever arrived at the command of an army.

On the morning of the 17th, the British troops remained in possession of Quatre-Bras, where the rest of the army had joined the Duke of Wellington, who was prepared to maintain that position against the French army, had the Prussians remained in the position of Ligny, so as to give him support.

Marshal Blücher had sent an aide-de-camp to inform the duke of his retreat, who was unfortunately killed; and it was not until seven o’clock on the 17th, that Lord Wellington learned the direction which the Prussians had taken. A patrol, sent at day-light to communicate with the Prussians, advanced beyond Brie and Sombref, which confirmed

plus ou moins bonnes. Un Anglais pourrait être compté pour un Français; et deux Hollandais, Prussiens, ou hommes de la confédération, pour un Français. Les armées ennemies étaient cantonnées sous le commandement de deux généraux différens, et formées de deux nations divisées d’intérêts et de sentimens.† His army, on the contrary, was under one chief, the idol of his soldiers, who were of the best description—veterans who had fought in the brilliant campaign of 1813–14, and draughts from the numerous garrisons who had since entered France from Antwerp, Mamburg, Magdeburg, Dantzic, Mentz, Alexandria, Mantua, etc., with the numerous prisoners from England. Liv. ix, p. 201.

* Three brigades of iron eighteen-pounders were preparing at Brussels, but not in a state of forwardness to be sent to Waterloo.

how little of the Prussian position had been occupied by the French. The Prussians had fallen back very leisurely on Wavres, their rear-guard occupying Brie, which they did not evacuate before three o’clock on the morning of the 17th. Bonaparte, in deceiving the French people, by the accounts he gave of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, seems almost to have deceived himself. He must have known that the action was not a decisive one—and that the enemy had retired in excellent order—that he had not been able to pursue them—and that his own loss must have considerably weakened his army, whilst the Prussians were falling back upon their reinforcements—and, above all, that Marshal Blücher commanded them. The Prussian army was concentrated at Wavres at an early hour, and communication took place between the Duke of Wellington and Blücher, by which a junction of the army was arranged for the succeeding day at Waterloo.† The retrograde movement of the Prussians rendered a corresponding one necessary on the part of the British, which was performed in the most leisurely manner, the duke allowing the men time to finish their cooking. About ten o’clock, the whole army retired in three columns, by Genappe and Nivelles, towards a position at Waterloo—a rear-guard was left to occupy the ground, so as to conceal the movement from the enemy, who, about mid-day, deployed their troops in columns of attack, as if expecting to find the English army in position there. They immediately followed up the retreat with cavalry and light artillery. An affair of cavalry occurred at Genappe, where the 7th hussars attacked a French regiment of lancers without success, upon which the heavy cavalry were brought up by the Marquis of Anglesea, who checked the enemy’s advance by a vigorous and decisive charge.

As the troops arrived in position in front of Mont St-Jean, they took up the ground they were to maintain, which was effected early in the evening. The weather began to be very severe at this period. The whole French army, under Bonaparte, with the exception of two corps under Grouchy (20,000 men, and 108 guns), took up a position immediately in front; and, after some cannonading, both armies remained opposite to each other during the night, the rain falling in torrents. The duke had already communicated with Marshal Blücher, who promised to come to his support with the whole of his army, on the morning of the 18th. It was consequently decided upon to cover Brussels (the preservation of which was of such importance, in every point of view, to the King of the Netherlands), by maintaining the position of Mont St-Jean. The intention of the allied chiefs, if they were not attacked on the 18th, was to have attacked the enemy on the 19th.

Since we are now arrived at the position of Mont St-Jean, it may be necessary to offer a few remarks as regards the position itself, which has been considered as a bad one by some writers;‡ and also

* Muffling, p. 20, says, “that Blücher only asked for time to distribute food and cartridges to his men.”

† Montholon, vii, p. 134. Liv. ix, pp. 123–25. Gougeon, p. 131.

loose allusions to its defects thrown out; but more particularly fixing upon its not affording a secure retreat, in the event of the enemy's attack having proved successful. Previous, however, to entering into any disquisition as to the merits of the position of Mont St-Jean, it may be well to consider a few of the conditions that are judged essential in a greater or less degree, for every position taken up by an army. The first requisite is, that the ground in front, within cannon-shot, should be well seen; and every point of approach with musket-shot, well discovered.—2d, That the ground which is occupied should admit of a free communication for troops and guns, from right to left, and from front to rear, in order to move supports wherever they may be wanted; also that, by the sinuosities of the ground, or other cover, such movements may be made unseen by the enemy.—3d, That your flanks rest on some support, secure from being turned.—And, lastly, that your retreat be insured, in the event of your position being forced or turned.

The site of the position of Mont St-Jean, and the features of the ground round it, have been so often and well described, that we may conclude it to be familiar to most people; and hence the possession of these necessary conditions will be already evident. The easy slope from our front into the valley, from whence it rises in an ascent equally gentle and regular, to the opposite heights, on which the enemy were posted at the distance of about a mile, or a mile and a half, gave it, in an eminent degree, the condition stated in the first remark. The two chaussées, running nearly perpendicular to our line,—the valley immediately in rear of our first line, and parallel to it, with two country roads passing in the same direction; also the openness of the country,—gave the position the requisites mentioned in the second. The same valley afforded cover for the support of the first line; also for its artillery, and spare ammunition-waggons; whilst the second line and reserves, placed on and behind the next ridge, and about 500 or 600 yards in rear of the first, were unseen from the enemy's position, although certainly so far exposed, that many of his shot and shells, which passed over the first line, ricoched into the second, and amongst the reserves. The third requisite, as far as regards the security of the flanks, was completely obtained, by the occupation of the village of Braine la Leud on its right, which would have been entrenched, but for an accidental misunderstanding of orders; and La Haye and Ohain on the left; also by both flanks being thrown back on the forest of Soignies.

That our retreat, in case of a reverse, was sufficiently provided for, we trust, notwithstanding the criticism above noticed, to establish in a satisfactory manner. Our position was sufficiently in advance of the entrance of the chaussée into the forest, to give a free approach from every part of the field to that point; which the uninclosed state of the country afforded the troops every means of profiting by. Had our first position been forced, the village of Mont St-Jean, at the junction of the two chaussées, afforded an excellent centre of support for a second, which the enemy would have had equal difficulty in carrying;—besides which there

is another farm-house and wood immediately behind Mont St-Jean, and in front of the entrance of the forest; which would have enabled us to keep open that entrance. By occupying these points, we might have at any time effected a retreat; and with sufficient leisure to have allowed all the guns, that were in a state to be moved, to file off into the forest. Undoubtedly, had our centre been broken by the last attack of the enemy,* a considerable part of our artillery must have been left behind, a number of guns disabled, and many men and horses killed and wounded; these must have fallen into the enemy's hands; also the brigades at the points attacked, which were placed rather in front of the infantry, and remained until the last, firing grape-shot into the enemy's columns. The men and horses would have saved themselves with the infantry, and soon found a fresh equipment in the fortresses. The troops at Hongoumont would have been cut off had that attack succeeded, but their retreat was open, either upon the corps of 16,000 men left at Halle to cover Brussels, or upon Braine la Leud, which was occupied by a brigade of infantry, who had strengthened their post; between which and our right flank a brigade of cavalry kept a communication open. From Braine la Leud there is a very good road through the forest by Alembert to Brussels, by which the troops and artillery of our right flank could have effected their retreat. If we now suppose that the enemy, instead of our right centre, had broken our left centre by the great attack he made on it at three o'clock, Ohain afforded nearly the same advantage to the left of our army, that Braine la Leud would have done on the right. A road leads from it through the forest to Brussels; or that wing might have retired on the Prussians at Wavres: so that, had either of these two grand attacks succeeded, the retreat into the defiles of the forest need not have been precipitated. It is no fault of our troops to take alarm and lose confidence because they find themselves turned or partially beaten. Of this many instances might be given. The best proof, however, is, that the enemy can scarcely claim having made a few hundred prisoners during the whole of the last war. No success on the part of the enemy, which they had a right to calculate on, could have then precipitated us into the forest in total disorder. The attacks we sustained to the last on the 18th were as determined and severe as can be conceived. Still, to the last, a part of the reserve and the cavalry had not suffered much; whereas the French cavalry (heavy) had all been engaged before five o'clock, and were not in a state, from the severe losses they had sustained, to take advantage of a victory.†

* About half past seven.

† See liv. ix, p. 196. "*Ainsi à cinq heures après midi, l'armée se trouva sans avoir une réserve de cavalerie. Si, à huit heures et demi, cette réserve eût existé,*" etc., etc.

It is singular how great soldiers, in reporting military actions, will contradict each other. Napoleon ascribes the loss of the battle in great measure to his cavalry being so soon and generally engaged, that he had not a reserve left to protect his retreat. General Foy, on the contrary, affirms, that it was not the French, but the British cavalry, which was annihilated at Waterloo.—*Guerre de la Péninsule*, p. 116, Note.

But suppose we had been driven into the wood in a state of *déroute*, similar to what the French were, the forest did not keep us hermetically sealed up, as an impenetrable marsh did the defeated troops at Austerlitz. The remains of our shattered battalions would have gained the forest and found themselves in security. It consists of tall trees without underwood, passable almost anywhere for men and horses. The troops could, therefore, have gained the *chaussée* through it, and when we at last came to confine ourselves to the defence of the entrance to the forest, every person, the least experienced in war, knows the extreme difficulty in forcing infantry from a wood which cannot be turned. A few regiments, with or without artillery, would have kept the whole French army in check, even if they had been as fresh as the day they crossed the frontiers.* Indeed, the forest in our rear gave us so evident an advantage, that it is difficult to believe that an observation to the contrary was made by Napoleon. Could he quite forget his own retreat? It little availed him to have two fine *chaussées*, and an open country in his rear; his matériel was all abandoned, and not even a single battalion kept together.

The two farms in front of the position of Mont St-Jean gave it its principal strength. That of Hougoumont, with its gardens and inclosures, could contain a force sufficient to make it a most important post. La Haye Sainte was too small for that purpose; otherwise its situation on the *Genappe* *chaussée*, in the centre of the position, rendered it better adapted for that purpose. These farms lay on the slope of the valley, about 1500 yards apart, in front of our line; so that no column of the enemy could pass between them, without being exposed to a flank fire. Indeed without these posts, the ground gave us little advantage over our enemy, except the loss he must be necessarily exposed to in advancing in column upon a line already fixed.

From these observations it will appear that our retreat was well secured, and that the advantages of the position for a field of battle were very considerable; so that there was little risk but that it would have been successfully defended, even if the Prussians had by "some fatality" been prevented from forming a junction. The difficulties of the roads, from the severe rains, detained them from joining us, at least double the time that was calculated upon. We had therefore to sustain the attack of a superior army so much longer; yet they were not able to make any impression. Every attack had been most successfully repulsed; and we may safely infer that, even if the Prussians had not joined in time, we would still have been able to maintain our position, and repulse the enemy, but might have been perhaps unable, as was the case at Talavera, to profit by this advantage, or to follow up our success.†

* On the 16th, at Quatre-Bras, the 33d regiment (British), and afterwards two battalions of the Guards, when obliged to give way to an attack of the enemy, and pursued by the French cavalry, saved themselves in the wood of Bossus, formed along the skirts of it, and repelled the enemy, with severe loss.

† The armies were now placed under their favourite commanders, as the military of both nations had long wished;

The morning of the 18th, and part of the forenoon, were passed by the enemy in a state of *inaction*, for which it was difficult to account. The rain had certainly retarded his movements, more particularly that of bringing his artillery into position; yet it was observed, that this had been accomplished at an early hour. In Grouchy's publication, we find a reason which may have caused this delay; namely, that Napoleon's ammunition had been so much exhausted in the preceding actions, that there was only a sufficiency with the army for an action of eight hours. Bonaparte states* that it was necessary to wait until the ground was sufficiently dried, to enable the cavalry and artillery to manoeuvre; however, in such a soil, a few hours could make very little difference, particularly as a drizzling rain continued all the morning, and indeed after the action had commenced. The heavy fall of rain on the night of the 17th to 18th, was no doubt more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the troops under Lord Wellington; the latter were in position, and had few movements to make; whilst the enemy's columns, and particularly his cavalry, were much fatigued and impeded by the state of the ground, which, with the trampled corn, caused them to advance more slowly, and kept them longer under fire. On the other hand, the same causes delayed the Prussians in their junction, which they had promised to effect at eleven o'clock; and obliged Lord Wellington to maintain the position alone, nearly eight hours longer than had been calculated upon.

About twelve o'clock, the enemy commenced the action by an attack upon Hougoumont, with several columns, preceded by numerous light troops, who, after severe skirmishing, drove the Nassau troops from the wood in its front, and established themselves in it. This attack was supported by the constant fire of a numerous artillery. A battalion of the Guards occupied the house and gardens, with the other inclosures, which afforded great facilities for defence; and after a severe contest, and immense loss, the enemy were repulsed, and a great part of the wood regained.**

and on an arena which may be considered as fair a one as could well have offered in the chances of war. The British troops, however, were not composed of our best regiments, at least our infantry, nor equal to that army which had been in the preceding year in the south of France. Many of the most efficient regiments had been sent to America; sent a brigade from Bordeaux to Washington; another to Canada; and afterwards a force from Portsmouth to New Orleans. None of these returned in time for Waterloo, though they were on their way.—Liv. ix, p. 208. It has been shown how the French army was composed.

* Liv. ix.

† Montolieu, liv. ii, p. 136.

** Bonaparte, liv. ix, p. 142, says, that he saw with pleasure that the English Guards were placed on our right, as they were our best troops, which rendered his premeditated attack on our left more easy. Our Guards are not, as is the case in other armies, the élite of our army; they are not selected, as in other services, from the best soldiers in other regiments, but are recruited exactly as troops of the line, except that they are required to be somewhat taller. It may be here remarked, the great superiority in appearance, that the French and other troops possessed over ours at the close of the war. The mode of recruiting accounts

During the early part of the day, the action was almost entirely confined to this part of the line, except a galling fire of artillery along the centre, which was vigorously returned by our guns. This fire gradually extended towards the left, and some demonstrations of an attack of cavalry were made by the enemy. As the troops were drawn up on the slope of the hill, they suffered most severely from the enemy's artillery. In order to remedy this, Lord Wellington moved them back about 150 or 200 yards, to the reverse slope of the hill, to shelter them from the direct fire of the guns; our artillery in consequence remained in advance, that they might see into the valley. This movement was made between one and two o'clock by the duke in person; it was general along the front or centre of the position, on the height to the right of La Haye Sainte.

It is by no means improbable, that the enemy considered this movement as the commencement of a retreat, since a considerable portion of our troops were withdrawn from his sight, and determined in consequence to attack our left centre, in order to get possession of the buildings, called Ferme de Mont St-Jean, or of the village itself, which commanded the point of junction of the two chaussées. The attacking columns advanced on the Genappe chaussée, and by the side of it; they consisted of four columns of infantry (d'Erlon's corps, which was not engaged on the 16th), thirty pieces of artillery, and a large body of cuirassiers (Milhaud's). On the left of this attack, the French cavalry took the lead of the infantry, and had advanced considerably, when the Duke of Wellington ordered the heavy cavalry (Life Guards) to charge them as they ascended the position near La Haye Sainte. They were driven back on their own position, where the chaussée, being cut into the rising ground, leaves steep banks on either side. In this confined space they fought at sword's length for some minutes, until the enemy brought down some light artillery from the heights, when the British cavalry retired to their own position. The loss of the cuirassiers did not appear great. They seemed immediately to reform their ranks, and soon after advanced to attack our infantry, who were formed into squares to receive them, being then unsupported by cavalry. The columns of infantry, in the meantime, pushed forward on our left of the Genappe chaussée, beyond La Haye Sainte, which they did not attempt in this attack to take. A Belgian brigade of infantry, formed in front, gave way, and these columns crowned the position. When Sir Thomas Picton moved up the brigade of General Pack from the second line (the 92d regiment in front), which opened a fire on the column just as it gained the height, and advanced upon it, when within thirty yards, the column began to hesitate; at this moment a brigade of heavy

cavalry (the 1st and 2d dragoons) wheeled round the 92d regiment, and took the column in flank; a total rout ensued; the French, throwing down their arms, ran into our position to save themselves from being cut down by the cavalry; many were killed, and two eagles, with 2000 prisoners, taken. But the cavalry pursued their success too far, and being fired upon by one of the other columns, and at the same time, when in confusion, being attacked by some French cavalry, who had been sent to support the attack, the British were obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this attack the enemy had brought forward several pieces of artillery, which were captured by our cavalry; the horses in the guns were killed, and we were obliged to abandon the guns. General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, was killed. The gallant Sir Thomas Picton also fell, leading on his division to repel this attack.* The number of occurrences which crowded on the attention rendered it impossible for any individual to see the whole action, and in the midst of noise, bustle, and personal danger, it is difficult to note the exact time in which the event happens.†

It is only afterwards, in discussing the chances and merits of each, that such questions become of interest, which may in some measure account for the discrepancy of the statements of officers present, as to the time and circumstances of some of the principal events. From this period, half past two, until the end of the action, the British cavalry were scarcely engaged, but remained in readiness in the second line.** After the French cuirassiers had reformed, and were strongly reinforced,†† they again advanced upon our position, and made several desperate attacks upon our infantry, who immediately formed into squares, and maintained themselves with the most determined courage and coolness. Some time previous to this, about three o'clock, an attack was made upon La Haye Sainte, which is merely a small farm-house; it was occupied by two companies of the German Legion. The enemy had advanced beyond it, so that the communication was cut off for some time, and it could not be reinforced. The troops having expended their ammunition, the post was carried. A continued fire was kept up at this point, and the enemy was soon afterwards obliged to abandon it, without being able to avail himself of it as a point of support for his attacking columns. The house was too small for a sufficient number of troops to maintain themselves so close to our position, under such a heavy fire.

The French cavalry, in the attack on the centre of our line, above mentioned, were not supported by

* Rogniat, p. 231, blames both generals for the too early employment of their cavalry. In the case here mentioned, he says, the success was "*contre toute probabilité*," as the cavalry charged unbroken infantry. The head of the attacking columns had, however, been already shaken by the charge of the 92d regiment, which took place nearly at the moment the cavalry charged.

† Muffling, p. 26, observes, "*La fumée était si épaisse que personne ne voyait l'ensemble de l'action.*"

** Liv. ix, p. 202, Bonaparte says, "*L'infanterie Anglaise a été ferme et solide. La cavalerie pouvait mieux faire.*"

†† Rogniat, p. 231, says, they amounted to 12,000, including other heavy cavalry.

for this. Even our militia were much superior in this point of view to the troops of the line, and most of the best men were obtained from them. Our recruits were in general composed of the population of large cities, or of manufacturing towns, certainly not the best specimens of our population; the military service is not in any estimation amongst our peasantry, whilst the French army was composed of the picked men of thirty millions, and other nations in proportion.

infantry. They came on, however, with the greatest courage, close to the squares of our infantry; the artillery, which was somewhat in advance, kept up a well-directed fire upon them as they advanced, but on their nearer approach, the gunners were obliged to retire into the squares, so that the guns were actually in possession of the enemy's cavalry, who could not, however keep possession of them, or even spike them, if they had the means, in consequence of the heavy fire of musketry to which they were exposed. The French accounts say, that several squares were broken, and standards taken, which is decidedly false; on the contrary, the small squares constantly repulsed the cavalry, whom they generally allowed to advance close to their bayonets before they fired. They were driven back with loss on all points, and the artillerymen immediately resumed their guns in the most prompt manner, and opened a severe and destructive fire of grape-shot on them as they retired.*

After the failure of the first attack, the French had little or no chance of success by renewing it; but the officers, perhaps ashamed of the failure of such boasted troops, endeavoured repeatedly to bring them back to charge the squares; but they could only be brought to pass between them, and round them; they even penetrated to our second line, where they cut down some stragglers and artillery-drivers, who were with the limbers and ammunition-waggons. They charged the Belgian squares in the second line, with no better success, and upon some heavy Dutch cavalry showing themselves, they soon retired.*

If the enemy supposed us in retreat, then such an attack of cavalry might have led to the most important results; but by remaining so uselessly in our position, and passing and repassing our squares of infantry, they suffered severely by their fire; so much so, that, before the end of the action, when they might have been of great use, either in the attack, or in covering the retreat, they were nearly destroyed.† The only advantage which appeared

* The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back as if expecting our fire: they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles; on the approach of the cavalry two files fired, the others reserving their fire, the cavalry then turned, and it is not easy to believe how few fell,—only one officer and two men; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.

† It has been said, that if the enemy had brought up infantry and light artillery, our squares must have given way. This would no doubt have been preferable; but then our reserve and cavalry would have been moved forward to check the cavalry, and the squares would have probably repelled the attack of the infantry. The enemy had tried to bring guns with the attacking columns, on our left, early in the day; the consequence was, that the horses were killed before they had advanced far, so that they could not follow the movements of the infantry, and were left behind. A similar attempt was made in the south of France, in the

to result from their remaining in our position, was preventing the fire of our guns on the columns which afterwards formed near La Belle Alliance, in order to debouche for a new attack. The galling fire of the infantry, however, forcing the French cavalry at length to retire into the hollow ground, to cover themselves, the artillerymen were again at their guns, and, being in advance of the squares, saw completely into the valley, and, by their well-directed fire, seemed to make gaps in them as they re-formed to repeat this useless expenditure of lives. Had Bonaparte been nearer the front, he surely would have prevented this useless sacrifice of his best troops. Indeed, the attack of cavalry at this period, is only to be accounted for by supposing the British army to be in retreat; he had had no time to avail himself of his powerful artillery to make an impression on that part of the line he meant to attack, as had always been his custom, otherwise it was not availing himself of the superiority he possessed; and it was treating his enemy with a contempt, which from what he had experienced at Quatre-Bras, could not be justified.* He allows, in liv. ix, p. 156, that this charge was made too soon;† but that it was necessary to support it, and that the Cuirassiers of Kellermann, 3000 in number, were consequently ordered forward to maintain the position. And at pp. 196 and 157, liv. ix, he allows that the Grenadiers-à-cheval, and Dragoons of the Guard, which were in reserve, advanced without orders; that he sent to recal them, but, as they were already engaged, any retrograde movement would then have been dangerous. Thus, every attack of the enemy had been repulsed, and a severe loss inflicted. The influence this must have had on the "morale" of each army, was much in favour of the British, and the probability of success on the part of the enemy was consequently diminished from that period.

The enemy now seemed to concentrate their artillery, particularly on the left of the Genappe chaussée, in front of La Belle Alliance, and commenced a heavy fire (a large proportion of his guns were 12-pounders) on that part of our line extending from behind La Haye Sainte towards Hougomont. Our infantry sheltered themselves, by lying down behind the ridge of the rising ground, and bore it with the most heroic patience. Several of our guns had been disabled, and many artillerymen killed and wounded, so that this fire was scarcely returned; but when the new point of attack was no longer doubtful, two brigades were brought from Lord Hill's corps on the right, and were of most essential service.

It may here be proper to consider the situation of the Prussian army, and the assistance they had rendered up to this time, about six o'clock.

attack of Lord Hill's corps on the Nive: the guns were harnessed, so as to allow them to fire as they advanced, but the horses were soon killed or disabled, and the guns were abandoned when the attack was repulsed.

* This was what Marmont had done at the Arriples, at the battle of Salamanca, and for which he suffered so severely.

† Muffling, p. 27, says, after this attack, which he states to be at four o'clock, "*La bataille avait été très-sanglante, mais il n'y avait point de danger pour l'armée Anglaise.*" He says it was then five o'clock.

The British army had sustained several severe attacks, which had been all repulsed, and no advantage of any consequence had been gained by the enemy. They had possessed part of the wood and garden of Hougoumont, and La Haye Sainte, which latter they were unable to occupy. Not a square had been broken, shaken, or obliged to retire. Our infantry continued to display the same obstinacy, the same cool, calculating confidence in themselves, in their commander, and in their officers, which had covered them with glory in the long and arduous war in the Peninsula. From the limited extent of the field of battle, and the tremendous fire their columns were exposed to, the loss of the enemy could not have been less than 15,000 killed and wounded. Two eagles, and 2000 prisoners, had been taken, and their cavalry nearly destroyed. We still occupied nearly the same position as we did in the morning, but our loss had been severe, perhaps not less than 10,000 killed and wounded. Our ranks were further thinned by the numbers of men who carried off the wounded, part of whom never returned to the field; the number of Belgian and Hanoverian troops, many of whom were young levies, that crowded to the rear, was very considerable, besides the number of our own dismounted dragoons, together with a proportion of our infantry, some of whom, as will always be found in the best armies, were glad to escape from the field. These thronged the road leading to Brussels, in a manner that none but an eye-witness could have believed,* so that perhaps the actual force under the Duke of Wellington at this time, half past six, did not amount to more than 34,000 men. We had at an early hour been in communication with some patrols of Prussian cavalry on our extreme left. A Prussian corps, under Bulow, had marched from Wavres at an early hour to manoeuvre on the right and rear of the French army, but a large proportion of the Prussian army were still on the heights above Wavres, after the action had commenced at Waterloo.† The state of the roads, and the immense train of artillery they carried, detained Bulow's corps for a remarkably long time; they had not more than twelve or fourteen miles to march. At one o'clock,** the advanced guard of this corps was discovered by the French; about two o'clock the patrols of Bulow's corps were discovered from part of our position. The French detached some light cavalry to observe them, which was the only diversion that had taken place up to this time. At half-past four, Blücher had joined in person Bulow's corps, at which time two brigades of infantry and some cavalry were detached to act on the right

of the French.* He was so far from the right of the French, that his fire of artillery was too distant to produce any effect, and was chiefly intended to give us notice of his arrival.† It was certainly past five o'clock before the fire of the Prussian artillery** was observed from our position; and it soon seemed to cease altogether. It appears they had advanced, and obtained some success, but were afterwards driven back to a considerable distance by the French, who sent a corps under General Lobau to keep them in check.†† About half past six, the 1st Prussian corps came into communication with our extreme left near Ohain.

The effective state of the several armies may be considered to be as follows:—

The army under the Duke of Wellington amounted, at the commencement of the campaign, to 75,000 men, including every description of force,*** of which nearly 40,000 were English, or the King's German Legion. Our loss at Quatre-Bras amounted to 4500 killed and wounded, which reduced the army to 70,500 men; of these about 54,000 were actually engaged at Waterloo; about 32,000 were composed of British troops, or the King's German Legion, including cavalry, infantry, and artillery; the remainder, under Prince Frederick, took no part in the action, but covered the approach to Brussels from Nivelles, and were stationed in the neighbourhood of Halle. The French force has been variously stated, and it is not easy to form a very accurate statement of their strength. Batty gives it at 127,000; that is the number which crossed the frontier. Liv. ix, p. 69, it is given at 122,000. Gourgaud reduces it to 115,000; of these, 21,000 were cavalry, and they had 350 guns. Let us, however, take the statement in liv. ix, and say,

122,000	
5,300	Deduct left at Charleroi. Liv. ix, p. 92.††
116,700	
10,350	{ Loss at Quatre-Bras and Ligny. Liv. ix, p. 100, and 106.
106,350	
3,200	{ Left at Ligny. (Grouchy, p. 8). Liv. ix, p. 103, this is stated at 3,000.
103,150	
32,000	With Grouchy. (Grouchy, p. 8).
71,150	Engaged at Waterloo.

This number, however, is certainly underrated; and there is little doubt but Bonaparte had upwards of 75,000 men under his immediate command on the 18th June.****

Bonaparte, liv. ix, pp. 117, 102, states the Prussian

* See Muffling, p. 32, who makes the number amount to 10,000, and there is little doubt but that he is correct. A regiment of allied cavalry, whose uniform resembled the French, having fled to Brussels, an alarm spread that the enemy were at the gates. Numbers of those who had quitted the field of battle, and,—let the truth be spoken,—Englishmen too, fled from the town, and never halted until they reached Antwerp. This fact is too well attested to be doubted.

† Muffling, p. 29. At four o'clock, he says, "Il n'avait pas encore paru un homme de cette armée."

** See Soult's letter to Grouchy, dated from the field of battle at half past one o'clock.

* See Muffling, pp. 30, 31, near Frischemont.

† Ibid. p. 31.

** Bulow's corps.

†† Liv. ix, p. 155, Bonaparte says it was seven o'clock when Lobau repulsed them.

*** Of these about 12,700 were cavalry.

††† Liv. ix, p. 193, this force is stated "à 45,000 hommes."

**** Muffling, p. 58, mentions, that Bonaparte stated to some general officer on the morning of the 5th, that he had 75,000 men, and the English only 50,000. Liv. ix, p. 193, by taking Bonaparte's own account in this part of the book, upon calculation it will be seen that he there allows that he had upwards of 74,000.

force concentrated at Wavres to be 75,000 men. Grouchy, p. 9, makes it 95,000. It is, however, generally understood that they had not above 70,000 with the army at Wavres.

It may be necessary here to refer to the operations of the corps under Grouchy, who were detached in pursuit of the Prussians. It appears, that at twelve o'clock on the 17th, Bonaparte was ignorant of the direction the Prussian army had taken.* It was generally supposed that it was towards Namur. At that hour, Bonaparte ordered Grouchy,† with 32,000 men, to follow them. As the troops were much scattered, it was three o'clock before they were in movement, and they did not arrive at Gembloux before the night of the 17th, when Grouchy informed Bonaparte of the direction the Prussian army had taken. He discovered the rear-guard of the Prussians near Wavres about twelve o'clock on the 18th, and at two o'clock he attacked Wavres, which was obstinately defended by General Thielmann, and succeeded in obtaining possession of a part of the village. By the gallant defence of this post by General Thielmann, Grouchy was induced to believe that the whole Prussian army was before him. Blücher, however, had detached Bulow's corps (4th) at an early hour upon Chapelle Lambert, to act on the rear of the French army. The movement of this corps was, however, much delayed by a fire which happened at Wavres, and by the bad state of the roads; so that they had great difficulty in bringing up the numerous artillery they carried with this corps, which prevented them from attacking the enemy before half-past four o'clock.**

The 2d Prussian corps marched upon Chapelle Lambert and Lasne; and at a later period of the day, †† the 1st corps moved in the direction of Ohain. The 3d corps was also to have supported the 4th and 2d corps. Blücher was not aware of the large force under Grouchy who attacked the 3d corps, as it was preparing to leave Wavres; and obliged it to take up a position on the Dyle, between Limale and Wavres, where he afterwards ordered it to maintain itself as well as it could.

The British army, at this eventful period of the day, amounted to about 34,000 men (allowing 10,000 killed and wounded, and 10,000 more who had left the field);*** 18,000 of whom were English. The enemy may have had about 45,000 immediately opposed to us, allowing 20,000 killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; and 10,000 men detached to act against the Prussians.

The assistance of the Prussians had been expected at an early hour,††† which had induced Lord Wellington to accept a battle; so that the British army had to bear the whole brunt of the action for

a much longer period than was calculated. Lord Wellington, however, showed no anxiety as to the result. The corps of Lord Hill, several Belgian battalions, and a considerable portion of the cavalry, had been little engaged. He knew the troops he had under his command, and seemed confident to be able to maintain his position, even if the Prussians did not arrive before night. The army was not aware of their approach, nor did he think it necessary to animate their exertions by this intelligence. Bonaparte, on the contrary, thought proper to revive the drooping spirits of his troops, even of his Guards, who had not yet been engaged, by sending his aide-de-camp Labédoyère to inform them, as they were about to advance,* that Grouchy had joined their right flank, and even deceived Ney himself by this false intelligence.

The above detail has been entered into for the purpose of showing the state of the armies towards the close of the day. Bonaparte was now aware of the powerful diversion the Prussians were about to make, but at the same time seems to have imagined that Grouchy would be able to paralyse their movements. He therefore resolved to make a last desperate effort to break the centre of the British army, and carry their position before the attack of the Prussians could take effect.

The Imperial Guard had been kept in reserve, and had been for some time formed on the heights extending from La Belle Alliance, towards Hougoumont, which supported their left flank. They had not yet been engaged.

About seven o'clock they advanced in two columns,† leaving four battalions in reserve. They were commanded by Ney, who led them on. At the same time, they pushed on some light troops in the direction of La Haye. The advance of these columns of the Guards was supported by a heavy fire of artillery. Our infantry, who had been posted on the reverse of the hill, to be sheltered from the fire of the guns, were instantly moved forward by Lord Wellington. General Maitland's brigade of Guards, and General Adam's brigade (52d and 71st regiments, and 95th rifles), met this formidable attack. They were flanked by two brigades of artillery, who kept up a destructive fire on the advancing columns. Our troops waited for their approach with their characteristic coolness, until they were within a short distance of our line, when they opened a well-directed fire upon them. The line was formed four deep. The men fired independently, retiring a few paces to load, and then advanced and fired, so that their fire never ceased for a moment. The French, headed by their gallant leader, still advanced, notwithstanding the severe loss they sustained by this fire, which apparently seemed to check their movement. They were now within about fifty yards of our line, when they attempted to deploy, in order to return the fire. Our line appeared to be closing round them. They could not, however, deploy under such a fire; and from the moment they ceased to advance, their chance of success was over. They now

* Grouchy, p. 13.

† Grouchy.

** See Muffling, pp. 22, 31, 62. Gourgaud, pp. 98 and 99, says it was half past four when General Dumont informed Bonaparte of their arrival.

†† Liv. ix, pp. 168, 169, Bonaparte makes Bulow's attack after sunset.

*** See Muffling, p. 32.

††† Muffling, p. 62, says it was hoped the Prussian army could have attacked at two o'clock, but that it was half past four before a cannon was fired by them.

* Liv. ix, p. 167. Ney's letter.

† See Lord Wellington's dispatches.

formed a confused mass, and at last gave way, retiring in the utmost confusion. They were immediately pursued by the light troops of General Adam's brigade. This decided the battle. The enemy had now exhausted his means of attack. He had still, however, the four battalions of the Old Guard in reserve. Lord Wellington immediately ordered the whole line to advance to attack their position. The enemy were already attempting a retreat. These battalions formed a square to cover the retreat of the flying columns, flanked by a few guns, and supported by some light cavalry (red lancers).

The first Prussian corps had now joined our extreme left. They had obtained possession of the village of La Haye, driving out the French light troops who occupied it. Bulow, with the fourth corps, had some time previous to this made an unsuccessful attack upon the village of Planchenoit, in the rear of the enemy's right wing, and being joined by the second corps (Pirch's), was again advancing to attack it.* In the meantime, the square of the Old Guard maintained itself, the guns on its flank firing upon our light cavalry, who now advanced, and threatened to turn their flank. Our light troops were close on their front, and our whole line advancing, when this body, the "élite," and now the only hope of the enemy to cover their retreat, and save their army, gave way, and mixed in the general confusion and rout, abandoning their cannon and all their matériel. It was now nearly dark. Bulow, upon being joined by Pirch's corps, again attacked Planchenoit, which he turned; and then the enemy abandoned it. He immediately advanced towards the Genappe chaussée, and closed round the right of the French,† driving the enemy before him, and augmenting their confusion. His troops came into the high-road, or chaussée, near Maison du Roi, and Blücher and Wellington having met about the same time near La Belle Alliance, it was resolved to pursue the enemy, and give him no time to rally. The loss of the Prussians on the 18th did not exceed 800 men. The brunt of the action was chiefly sustained by the troops of the British and King's German Legion, as their loss will show. In stating this, it must be allowed, that much support was afforded by the other contingents, but they were chiefly raw levies, newly raised, who could not be depended upon in a situation of importance. Some behaved ill, as is publicly known. None were in the first line, except the Nassau troops at Hougoumont, and some on our extreme left. They were placed in the second line, and in the valley behind the first line, and on the right, at Braine la Leud. They had generally been formed with the British brigades of the different divisions (in the manner Lord Wellington found so advantageous with the Portuguese troops); but these arrangements had just been made. The different brigades in a division had not any knowledge of, or confidence in each other. Many battalions, particularly some Belgian troops, in the rear of the first line, stood with firmness against the French ca-

valry, and drove them back. They suffered more severely, perhaps, than the first line, from the fire of the enemy's artillery, and, at the close of the action, advanced in support of the first line with great steadiness and regularity.

The Prussians, who had made only a short march during the day, pursued the enemy with such vigour, that they were unable to rally a single battalion. The British army halted on the field of battle. They once attempted to make a show of resistance at Genappe, where, perhaps, if they had had a chief to direct them, they might have maintained themselves until day-light, the situation of the village being strong; this might have given them the means of saving at least the semblance of an army. The second Prussian corps was afterwards detached to intercept Grouchy, who was not aware of the result of the battle until twelve o'clock next day. He had succeeded in obtaining some advantage over General Thielmann, and got possession of Wavres. He immediately retreated towards Namur, where his rear-guard maintained themselves against all the efforts of the Prussians, who suffered severely in their attempt to take the place. This served to cover his retreat, which he executed with great ability, keeping in a parallel line to Blücher, and, having rallied many of the fugitives, he brought his army without loss to Paris. He had been considered as lost, and his army made prisoners; this belief was a great cause of the resignation of Bonaparte; otherwise, with this army, he could have mustered 70 or 80,000 men; with the fortifications and resources of Paris, which was sufficiently secure against a coup-de-main, it is not likely he would have so easily submitted without another struggle, after the brilliant defensive campaign he had made the preceding year. The great central dépôts of Paris and Lyons gave him great advantages, as is well shown in the introductory chap. liv. ix, and p. 181. There are always some turns of fortune in the events of war; he might at least have made terms. The southern and eastern parts of France were certainly in his favour; he and his army had been well received there only a few weeks before. That army, and a great part of the population, would still have been glad to make sacrifices to endeavour to re-establish the sullied lustre of his arms. At least, the honour of falling sword in hand was in his power.

The time of the arrival and co-operation of the Prussians, has been variously stated.* The above account is perhaps as near the truth as can be. The French writers make it at an early hour, to account more satisfactorily for their defeat. The Prussians also make it somewhat earlier than was actually the case, in order to participate more largely in the honours of the day. Their powerful assistance has been acknowledged to its full extent. They completed the destruction of the French army, after they had failed in all their attacks against the Bri-

* Gneissau says, it was half past seven o'clock before Pirch's corps arrived.—See Blücher's dispatches.

† Liv. ix, p. 169.

* Liv. ix, says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy, dated half past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, completely contradicts this. Liv. ix.

tish, which continued upwards of seven hours, after their cavalry had been destroyed, their Imperial Guards driven back, and eagles and prisoners taken, and when their means of further attack may be considered as exhausted. The British army had suffered severely, and was not in a state to have taken great advantage of the retreat of the French. But its safety was never for a moment compromised, and no calculation could justify the idea, that we would have been so easily defeated and driven from our position, but that the enemy would have been so much crippled, that he could not have taken much advantage of our reverses. Even in such a case, the arrival of the Prussians must have obliged him to have retired. Muffling has observed, that the bold movement of Blücher on the 18th has not been sufficiently appreciated.* It was bold and masterly. Even when he was told that Grouchy was in his rear with a large force, his plans were not shaken, though this might have somewhat retarded his movements. The skilful veteran knew that it was on the field of Waterloo where the fate of the day was to be decided, and if even Grouchy had attacked Bulow's corps, there was nothing to prevent the first and second corps from joining the British army by Ohain. Grouchy could only, at farthest, have checked the third and fourth corps. There cannot be a moment's doubt of the anxiety and exertions of the Prussians to assist on the 18th. The cordiality and friendship of the Prussians have been felt and acknowledged by every officer who has had occasion to visit Prussia subsequently; this has been particularly the case with the military.

This short campaign of "Hours" was a joint operation. The honours must be shared. On the 16th, the Prussians fought at Ligny under the promise of our co-operation, which could not, however, be given to the extent it was wished or hoped. On the 18th, Lord Wellington fought at Waterloo, on the promise of the early assistance of the Prussians, which, though unavoidably delayed, was at last given with an effect, which perhaps had never before been witnessed. The finest army France ever saw, commanded by the greatest and ablest of her chiefs, ceased to exist, and in a moment the destiny of Europe was changed.

No. 9.

BONAPARTE'S PROTEST.

Page 747.

"Je proteste solennellement ici, à la face du Ciel et des hommes, contre la violence qui m'est faite, contre la violation de mes droits les plus sacrés, en disposant par la force de ma personne et de ma liberté.

"Je suis venu librement à bord du Bellerophon; je ne suis point prisonnier; je suis l'hôte de l'Angleterre. J'y suis venu à l'instigation même du

* Muffling, p. 61. "Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un général ordinaire aurait fait; mais une nouvelle de cette nature aurait pu entraîner le général le plus distingué à prendre des précautions, ou la résolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple démonstration."

capitaine, qui a dit avoir des ordres du gouvernement de me recevoir, et de me conduire en Angleterre, avec ma suite, si cela m'était agréable. Je me suis présenté de bonne foi pour venir me mettre sous la protection des lois d'Angleterre. Aussitôt assis à bord du Bellerophon, je fus sur le foyer du peuple Britannique. Si le gouvernement, en donnant des ordres au capitaine du Bellerophon de me recevoir, ainsi que ma suite, n'a voulu que tendre une embûche, il a forfait à l'honneur et sétré son pavillon. Si cet acte se consommait, ce serait en vain que les Anglais voudraient parler à l'Europe de leur loyauté, de leurs lois et de leur liberté. La foi Britannique se trouvera perdue dans l'hospitalité du Bellerophon. J'en appelle à l'histoire; elle dira qu'un ennemi, qui fit vingt ans la guerre au peuple Anglais, vint librement, dans son infortune, chercher un asile sous ses lois. Quelle plus éclatante preuve pouvait-il lui donner de son estime et de sa confiance! Mais comment répondit-on en Angleterre à une telle magnanimité?—On feignit de tendre une main hospitalière à cet ennemi; et quand il se fut livré de bonne foi, on l'immola.

(Signé) "NAPOLEON.

"A bord du Bellerophon,
4 Août, 1815."

. Translation.

"I hereby solemnly protest, in the face of Heaven and of men, against the violence done me, and against the violation of my most sacred rights, in forcibly disposing of my person and my liberty.

"I came voluntarily on board of the Bellerophon: I am not a prisoner—I am the guest of England. I came on board even at the instigation of the captain, who told me he had orders from the government to receive me and my suite, and conduct me to England, if agreeable to me. I presented myself with good faith, to put myself under the protection of the English laws. As soon as I was on board the Bellerophon, I was under shelter of the British people. If the government, in giving orders to the captain of the Bellerophon to receive me as well as my suite, only intended to lay a snare for me, it has forfeited its honour, and disgraced its flag. If this act be consummated, the English will in vain boast to Europe their integrity, their laws and their liberty. British good faith will be lost in the hospitality of the Bellerophon. I appeal to history; it will say that an enemy, who for twenty years waged war against the English people, came voluntarily, in his misfortunes, to seek an asylum under their laws. What more brilliant proof could he give of his esteem and his confidence? But what return did England make for so much magnanimity?—They feigned to stretch forth a friendly hand to that enemy; and when he delivered himself up in good faith, they sacrificed him.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON.

"On board the Bellerophon,
4th August, 1815."

We have already, in the text, completely refuted the pretence that Bonaparte was ensnared on board the Bellerophon. Every expression of Captain

Maitland went to disown any authority to treat with Napoleon, or grant him conditions of any kind; nor could he say more when his private opinion was demanded, than that he had no reason to suppose that Napoleon would be ill received in England. This was in presence of Captain Sartorius and Captain Gambier, both of whom Captain Maitland appealed to in support of his statement. We do not, however, feel it too much, on the present occasion, to copy the letters which passed betwixt Lord Keith, on the one hand, and Captain Maitland, Captain Sartorius, and Captain Gambier, on the other.

* Tonnant, at anchor under Berryhead,
7th August, 1815.

"Sir,

"Count Las Cases having this morning stated to me, that he understood from you, when he was on board the Bellerophon in Basque Roads, on a mission from General Bonaparte, that you were authorized to receive the general and his suite on board the ship you command, for conveyance to England; and that you assured him, at the same time, that both the general and his suite would be well received there; you are to report for my information such observations as you may consider it necessary to make upon these assertions.

"I am, Sir,

"Your most obedient humble servant,

"KEITH, Admiral.

* Captain Maitland,
Bellerophon."

* H. M. S. Bellerophon,
Plymouth Sound, 8th August, 1815.

"MY LORD,

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter of yesterday's date, informing me that Count Las Cases had stated to you, that he had understood from me, when he was on board the Bellerophon in Basque Roads, on a mission from General Bonaparte, that I was authorized to receive the general and his suite on board the ship I command, for a conveyance to England; and that I assured him, at the same time, that both the general and his suite would be well received there; and directing me to report, for your lordship's information, such observations as I may consider it necessary to make upon these assertions. I shall, in consequence, state, to the best of my recollection, the whole of the transaction that took place between Count Las Cases and me, on the 14th of July, respecting the embarkation of Napoleon Bonaparte, for the veracity of which I beg to refer your lordship to Captain Sartorius as to what was said in the morning, and to that officer and Captain Gambier (the Myrmidon having joined me in the afternoon) as to what passed in the evening.

"Your lordship being informed already of the flag of truce that came out to me on the 10th of July, as well as of everything that occurred on that occasion, I shall confine myself to the transactions of the 14th of the same month.

"Early in the morning of that day, the officer of the watch informed me, a schooner, bearing a flag of truce, was approaching: on her joining the ship,

about seven A. M., the Count Las Cases and General Lallemant came on board, when, on being shown into the cabin, Las Cases asked me if any answer had been returned to the letter sent by me to Sir Henry Hotham, respecting Napoleon Bonaparte being allowed to pass for America, either in the frigates or in a neutral vessel. I informed him no answer had been returned, though I hourly expected, in consequence of those dispatches, Sir Henry Hotham would arrive; and, as I had told Monsieur Las Cases when last on board, that I should send my boat in when the answer came, it was quite unnecessary to have sent out a flag of truce on that account:—there, for the time, the conversation terminated. On their coming on board, I had made the signal for the Captain of the Slaney, being desirous of having a witness to all that might pass.

"After breakfast (during which Captain Sartorius came on board) we retired to the after cabin, when Monsieur Las Cases began on the same subject, and said, 'The emperor was so anxious to stop the further effusion of blood, that he would go to America in any way the English government would sanction, either in a neutral, a disarmed frigate, or an English ship of war.' To which I replied, 'I have no authority to permit any of those measures; but if he chuses to come on board the ship I command, I think, under the orders I am acting with, I may venture to receive him, and carry him to England; but if I do so, I can in no way be answerable for the reception he may meet with:' (this I repeated several times): when Las Cases said, 'I have little doubt, under those circumstances, that you will see the emperor on board the Bellerophon.' After some more general conversation, and the above being frequently repeated, Monsieur Las Cases and General Lallemant took their leave; and I assure your lordship, that I never in any way entered into conditions with respect to the reception General Bonaparte was to meet with; nor was it at that time finally arranged that he was to come on board the Bellerophon. In the course of conversation, Las Cases asked me, whether I thought Bonaparte would be well received in England? to which I gave the only answer I could do in my situation—'That I did not at all know what was the intention of the British government; but I had no reason to suppose he would not be well received.' It is here worthy of remark, that when Las Cases came on board, he assured me that Bonaparte was then at Rochefort, and that it would be necessary for him to go there to report the conversation that had passed between us (this I can prove by the testimony of Captain Sartorius, and the first lieutenant of this ship, to whom I spoke of it at the time), which statement was not fact; Bonaparte never having quitted Isle d'Aix, or the frigates, after the 3d.

"I was therefore much surprised at seeing Monsieur Las Cases on board again before seven o'clock the same evening; and one of the first questions I put to him was, whether he had been at Rochefort? He answered, that, on returning to Isle d'Aix, he found that Napoleon had arrived there.

"Monsieur Las Cases then presented to me the letter Count Bertrand wrote concerning Bonaparte's intention to come on board the ship (a copy of which

has been transmitted to your lordship by Sir Henry Hotham; and it was not till then agreed upon that I should receive him; when either Monsieur Las Cases, or General Gourgaud (I am not positive which, as I was employed writing my own dispatches), wrote to Bertrand to inform him of it. While paper was preparing to write the letter, I said again to Monsieur Las Cases, 'You will recollect I have no authority for making conditions of any sort.' Nor has Monsieur Las Cases ever started such an idea till the day before yesterday. That it was not the feeling of Bonaparte, or the rest of his people, I will give strong proof, drawn from the conversations they have held with me.

"As I never heard the subject mentioned till two days ago, I shall not detail every conversation that has passed, but confine myself to that period.

"The night that the squadron anchored at the back of Berryhead, Bonaparte sent for me about ten, P. M., and said he was informed by Bertrand, that I had received orders to remove him to the Northumberland, and wished to know if that was the case; on being told that it was, he requested that I would write a letter to Bertrand, stating I had such orders, that it might not appear he went of his own accord, but that he had been forced to do so. I told him I could have no objection, and wrote a letter to that effect, which your lordship afterwards sanctioned, and desired me, if he required it, to give him a copy of the order.

"After having arranged that matter, I was going to withdraw, when he requested me to remain, as he had something more to say: he then began complaining of his treatment in being forced to go to St Helena: among other things he observed, 'They say I made no conditions; certainly I made no conditions: how could a private man (*un particulier*) make conditions with a nation? I wanted nothing from them but hospitality, or (as the ancients would express it) air and water. I threw myself on the generosity of the English nation: I claimed a place *sur leurs foyers*, and my only wish was to purchase a small estate, and end my life in tranquillity.' After more of the same sort of conversation, I left him for the night.

"On the morning he removed from the Bellerophon to the Northumberland, he sent for me again, and said, 'I have sent for you to express my gratitude for your conduct to me, while I have been on board the ship you command. My reception in England has been very different from what I expected; but you throughout have behaved like a man of honour; and I request you will accept my thanks, as well as convey them to the officers and ship's company of the Bellerophon.'

"Soon afterwards, Montholon came to me from Bonaparte; but, to understand what passed between him and me, I must revert to a conversation that I had with Madame Bertrand on the passage from Rochefort.

"It is not necessary to state how the conversation commenced, as it does not apply to the present transaction; but she informed me that it was Bonaparte's intention to present me with a box containing his picture set with diamonds. I answered, 'I hope not, for I cannot receive it.'—Then you will offend

him very much,' she said. 'If that is the case,' I replied, 'I request you will take measures to prevent its being offered, as it is absolutely impossible I can accept of it; and I wish to spare him the mortification, and myself the pain, of a refusal.' There the matter dropt, and I heard no more of it, till about half an hour before Bonaparte quitted the Bellerophon, when Montholon came to me, and said he was desired by Bonaparte to express the high sense he entertained of my conduct throughout the whole of the transaction: that it had been his intention to present me with a box containing his portrait, but that he understood I was determined not to accept it. I said, 'Placed as I was, I felt it impossible to receive a present from him, though I was highly flattered at the testimony he had borne to the uprightness of my conduct throughout.' Montholon added, 'One of the greatest causes of chagrin he feels in not being admitted to an interview with the Prince Regent, is, that he had determined to ask as a favour, your being promoted to the rank of rear-admiral.' To which I replied, 'That would have been quite impossible, but I do not the less feel the kindness of the intention.' I then said, 'I am hurt that Las Cases should say I held forth any assurances as to the reception Bonaparte was to meet with in England.'—'Oh!' said he, 'Las Cases is disappointed in his expectations: and as he negotiated the affair, he attributes the emperor's situation to himself: but I can assure you, that he (Bonaparte) feels convinced you have acted like a man of honour throughout.'

"As your lordship overheard part of a conversation which took place between Las Cases and me on the quarter-deck of the Bellerophon, I shall not detail it; but on that occasion, I positively denied having promised anything as to the reception of Bonaparte and his suite; and I believe your lordship was of opinion he could not make out the statement to you. It is extremely unpleasant for me to be under the necessity of entering into a detail of this sort; but the unhandsome representation Las Cases has made to your lordship of my conduct has obliged me to produce proofs of the light in which the transaction was viewed by Bonaparte as well as his attendants.

"I again repeat, that Captain Gambier and Sartorius can verify the principal part of what I have stated, as far as concerns the charge made against me by Count Las Cases.

"I have the honour to be your lordship's

"Most obedient humble servant,

"FREDERICK L. MAITLAND

"To the Right Hon.
Viscount Keith, G. C. B.
etc., etc., etc."

"Slaney, in Plymouth Sound.
15th August, 1814.

"MY LORD,

"I have read Captain Maitland's letter to your lordship, of the 8th instant, containing his observations upon the assertions made on the preceding day by Count Las Cases; and I most fully attest the correctness of the statement he has made, so far as

relates to the conversations that took place in my presence.

"I have the honour to be your lordship's

"Most obedient humble servant,

"G. R. SARTORIUS,

"Capt. of H. M. S. Slaney.

"To the Right Hon.

Viscount Keith, G. C. B.
etc., etc., etc."

It happened that Captain Gambier's attestation to the above statement was not in Captain Maitland's possession; but, having obtained a copy of it from the kindness of Mr Meike, secretary to Lord Keith, we can supply this additional piece of evidence to a proof already so distinct in itself.

"I have read the preceding letter (that of Captain Maitland), and most fully attest the correctness of what Captain Maitland has said, so far as relates to the what occurred in my presence on the evening of the 14th of July.

(Signed) "ROBERT GAMBIER,
"Captain of H. M. Ship Myrmidon."

No. 10.

Page 751.

STATES OF THERMOMETER, as taken at Deadwood, Island of St Helena, during 12 calendar months, viz. from 1st Sept. 1820, to 31st Aug. 1821, inclusive.

THIS condensed view of the different states of the thermometer was kept at Deadwood, which is just one short mile from Longwood, and therefore expresses the exact temperature of the climate in which he lived,—milder, and more equable, certainly, than most in the known world. In point of moisture, Dr Shortt is not of opinion that St Helena differs materially from any other tropical island of the same extent. His account of the general state of health among the troops has been already referred to.

MONTHS.	Thermom.			REMARKS.
	Maximum.	Medium.	Minimum.	
Sept. 1820.	66	61	62	Wind blowing from S. E.
Oct. do.	68	62	61	Do. Do.
Nov. do.	72	66	61	Generally S. E. 6 days from N. W.
Dec. do.	72	66	61	Wind from S. E.
Jan. 1821	76	70	68	Do. Do.
Feb. do.	76	70	67	Do. Do.
Mar. do.	76	71	67	Do. Do.
April do.	74	70	66	Do. Do.
May do.	72	68	61	Do. Do.
June do.	70	66	57	Generally S. E. 1 day westerly.
July do.	71	66	57	Do. Do.
Aug. do.	68	64	62	Wind from S. E.

(Certified by) THOMAS SHORTT,
Physician to H. M. Forces, and
Principal Medical Officer at St Helena.

No. 11.

MEMORANDUM OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AT LONGWOOD.

Page 752.

GENERAL BONAPARTE 1

Followers.

General and Madame Bertrand 2
Children of ditto 3
General and Madame Montholon 2
Children of ditto 2
General Gourgaud 1
Count Las Cases 1
Monsieur Las Cases, his son 1
Captain Piontowski 1

Foreign Servants to General Bonaparte. 12

Marchand,	Noverraz,
Santini,	Pierron,
Lepage,	Archambault, 1.
St-Denis, or Aly,	Archambault, 2.
Cypriani,	Gentilini,
Rousseau,	1 female cook.

Bernard, wife, and son, foreign servants to General Bertrand 3
1 French female servant to General Montholon 1

English Attendants.

1 English gardener 1
English soldiers (servants) 12
1 boy, a soldier's son 1
1 English maid-servant to General Bertrand 1
2 English female servants to General Montholon 2
Black servants 3
50

British Officers attached to the establishment.

Captain Poppleton, captain of the guard 1
Dr O'Meara, surgeon 1
Servants 3

Total 55

29th August, 1816.

Of these persons, General Gourgaud, Madame Montholon and her children, Count Las Cases and his son, Piontowski and Santini, returned to Europe at different periods.

Cypriani, the maitre-d'hôtel, died on the island.

The abbé Bonavita, surgeon Antommarchi, the priest Vignali, and two cooks, were sent out to St Helena in 1819.

The abbé returned to Europe in 1821, having left St Helena in the month of March of that year.

Something happened to three of the servants, Pierron, Aly, and Archambault, which cannot be now precisely ascertained. It is thought, however, that Pierron was sent away in consequence of some quarrel about a female servant—Aly (probably) died, and one of the Archambaults went to America.

General Bertrand's family in France, and the re-

lations of his wife in England (the Jerninghams), were employed to send them out several servants, whose names cannot be ascertained.

Extract from *Mémorial de Ste-Hélène*, par le Comte de Las Cases, vol. II, pp. 72-4 : 8 vols., Svo, Paris, 1823-4.

"*Déc. 1815.*—La maison domestique de l'empereur, au départ de Plymouth, se trouva composée encore de onze personnes. Je me fais un plaisir de consacrer ici leurs noms ; je le dois à leur dévouement.

"Quelque nombreuse que se trouvât cette maison, on pourrait dire cependant que, depuis notre départ d'Angleterre, durant notre traversée, et depuis notre débarquement à Ste-Hélène, elle avait cessé d'exister pour lui.

Personnes composant le service de l'empereur :—
Chambre.

Marchand (*Parisien*), premier valet-de-chambre, St-Denis (*de Versailles*), valet-de-chambre, Noverraz (*Suisse*), idem, Santini (*Corse*), huissier.

Bouche.

Cypriani (*Corse*), maître-d'hôtel, Pierron (*Parisien*), officier, Lepage, cuisinier, Rousseau (*de Fontainebleau*), argentier.

Livrée.

Archambault, aîné (*de Fontainebleau*), piqueur, Archambault, cadet (*idem*), idem, Gentilini (*Elbois*), valet-de-pied.

"Dès que nous nous trouvâmes tous réunis à Longwood, l'empereur voulut régulariser tout ce qui était autour de lui, et chercha à employer chacun de nous suivant la pente de son esprit. Conservant au grand maréchal le commandement et la surveillance du tout en grand, il confia à M. de Montholon tous les détails domestiques ; il donna au Général Gouraud la direction de l'écurie, et me réserva le détail des meubles, avec l'administration intérieure de ce qui nous serait fourni. Cette dernière partie me semblait tellement en contact avec les détails domestiques, et je trouvais que l'unité sur ce point devait être si avantageuse au bien commun, que je me prêtai le plus que je pus à m'en faire dépouiller ; ce qui ne fut ni difficile ni long."

No. 12.

INTERVIEW BETWEEN NAPOLEON BONAPARTE AND HENRY ELLIS, ESQ., THIRD COMMISSIONER OF LORD AMHERST'S EMBASSY TO CHINA.

Page 780.

ALTHOUGH, like others, I was familiar with the details of Bonaparte's present situation, and might, therefore, be supposed to have become saturated with those sentiments of surprise, which such an extraordinary reverse of fortune was calculated to excite,—I must confess that I could boast but little

self-possession on entering the presence of a man, who had been at once the terror and wonder of the civilized world. "The absence of attendants, and the other circumstances of high station, did not seem to me to have affected his individual greatness ; however elevated his rank had been, his actions had been still beyond it. Even the mighty weapons which he had wielded were light to his gigantic strength ; the splendour of a court, the pomp, discipline, and number of his armies, sufficient to have constituted the personal greatness of an hereditary monarch, scarcely added to the effect produced by the tremendous, but fortunately ill-directed, energies of his mind. Their absence, therefore, did not diminish the influence of his individuality. I do not know that I ever before felt myself in the presence of a mind differing from mine, not in degree, but in nature ; and could have had but little disposition to gratify curiosity by inquiries into the motives which had guided his conduct in the eventful transactions of his life. I came prepared to listen and recollect, not to question or speculate. Lord Amherst having presented me, Napoleon began by saying, that my name was not unknown to him ; that he understood I had been at Constantinople, and had a faint recollection of some person of my name having been employed in Russia. I, in reply, said that I had been at Constantinople in my way to Persia. "Yes," says he, "it was I who showed you the way to that country. *Eh bien, comment se porte mon ami le Shah ?* What have the Russians been doing lately in that quarter ?" On my informing him that the result of the last war had been the cession of all the territory in the military occupation of their troops,—he said, "Yes, Russia is the power now most to be dreaded ; Alexander may have whatever army he pleases. Unlike the French and English, the subjects of the Russian empire improve their condition by becoming soldiers. If I called on a Frenchman to quit his country, I required him to abandon his happiness. The Russian, on the contrary, is a slave while a peasant, and becomes free and respectable when a soldier. A Frenchman, leaving his country, always changes for the worse, while Germany, France, and Italy, are all superior to the native country of the Russians. Their immense bodies of Cossacks are also formidable ; their mode of travelling resembles the Bedouins of the desert. They advance with confidence into the most unknown regions." He then related the following instance of the extraordinary powers of vision possessed by the Arabs. When in Egypt, he took up his glass to examine an Arab, who was still at some distance. Before Bonaparte had, with the assistance of the instrument, ascertained his appearance, a Bedouin standing near him, had so completely made him out, as to distinguish the dress of the tribe to which he belonged. "Russia," continued he, "has still her designs upon Constantinople. To obtain my consent to his projects upon Turkey, was the great wish of the Emperor Alexander, but in vain ; I told him I never would allow the Greek cross to be added to the crown of the czars. Austria would unite with Russia against Turkey, on condition of being allowed to retain the provinces contiguous to her frontier. France and England are the only powers interested in

opposing their schemes; I always felt this, and always supported the Turks, although I hated them as barbarians. If Russia," he added, "organizes Poland, she will be irresistible." Napoleon here took a rapid view of the military character of the nations of Europe, and without reference to what he had just said respecting the Russians, declared the French and English were the only troops deserving notice for their discipline and moral qualities. "The Austrian and Prussian," he said, "were much inferior: in fact, real strength and efficiency were confined to the English and French." The remainder of his harangue (for his habit of not waiting for, or indeed listening to replies, renders conversation an inapplicable term), was employed upon the present state of England, which he considered was most calamitous, and as produced by the impolicy of mixing with continental affairs. The dominion of the seas, and the maintenance of a monopoly of commerce, he considered as the only true foundation of our national prosperity. "Whatever might be the bravery of our troops, their limited number would for ever prevent us from becoming a great military power. *Vous avez toujours votre bravoure des siècles; mais, avec quarante-cinq mille, vous ne serez jamais puissance militaire.*—In sacrificing maritime affairs, we were acting like Francis I. at the battle of Pavia, whose general had made an excellent disposition of his army, and had placed forty-five pieces of cannon (an unheard-of battery at that time) in a situation that must have secured the victory: Francis, however, his grand sabre à la main, placed himself at the head of his gendarmerie and household troops, between the battery and the enemy, and thereby lost the advantage his superiority of artillery gave him; thus," said he, "seduced by a temporary success, you are masking the only battery you possess, your naval pre-eminence. While that remains, you may blockade all Europe. I well know the effect of blockade. With two small wooden machines, you distress a line of coast, and place a country in the situation of a body rubbed over with oil, and thus deprived of the natural perspiration. I," says he, "am now suffering in my face from this obstruction to perspiration, and blockade has the same effect upon a nation. What have you gained by the war? you have gained possession of my person, and had an opportunity of exhibiting an example of ungenerousness. By placing the Bourbons on the throne, you have disturbed the legitimacy of kings, for I am the natural sovereign of France. You conceived that none but Napoleon could shut the ports of Europe against you, but now every petty sovereign insults you with prohibitory regulations upon your commerce.—*L'Angleterre est déchue depuis qu'elle s'est mêlée des affaires du continent.*—You should have been aware of the advance I had made towards the improvement of manufacture throughout my empire, and secured the repayment of your expenses during the war, by a forced extension of your trade. Who placed the King of Portugal on his throne? Was it not England? Had you not, therefore, a right to be reimbursed, and that reimbursement might have been found in the exclusive trade to the Bra-

zils for five years. This demand was reasonable, and could not, therefore, have been refused." I observed that such a proceeding would not have been consonant with our political system, and that the King of Portugal, aware of this, would have resisted, the more especially as, when placed on the throne, he no longer wanted our assistance. "The demand should have been made in the first instance," said he, "when you might have asked anything; but it is now too late; and you have only to blame your ministers, who have totally neglected the interests of England. Russia, Austria, Prussia, have all been gainers; England alone has been a loser. You have even neglected that poor kingdom of Hanover. Why not have added three or four millions to its population? Lord Castlereagh, got among the monarchs, became a courtier, and thought more of their aggrandizement, than the claims of his country. Your good fortunes, *et mes fautes, mes imprudences*, have brought about a state of things which even Pitt never dared to dream of; and what is the result? your people are starving, and your country is convulsed with riots. The situation of England is most curious. She has gained all, and yet she is ruined. Believe the opinion of a man accustomed to consider political subjects: England should look wholly to commerce and naval affairs; she never can be a continental power, and in the attempt must be ruined. Maintain the empire of the seas, and you may send your ambassadors to the courts of Europe and ask what you please. The sovereigns are aware of your present distressed situation, and insult you." He repeated, "Forty-five thousand men will never make you a military power; it is not in the genius of your nation. None but the very dregs of the nation enlist in your army; the profession is not liked." He would not listen to an observation respecting the great channel of supply from the militia to the line, which he seemed to confound with the volunteers.

Napoleon continued his observations by saying, "The suspension of the Habeas Corpus would not prove a remedy for the riots; people must have food; the stagnation of commerce diminishes your exports, and your manufacturers are starving. It is absurd to describe the evils as temporary. Wellesley is right in that, the distress is general, and must be lasting. Stopping the evils by suspending the Habeas Corpus, is applying topical remedies when the disease is in the system: topical remedies will only remove topical eruption; the complaint extends over the whole body.—There is not a man of ability in the cabinet. Lord Chatham understood the true interests of England when he said, 'If we are just for twenty-four hours, we must be ruined.' Immense extension of commerce, combined with reductions and reforms, could alone have prevented the present crisis in England. For his part, he wished that all was tranquil and settled, as that was his only chance of being released." "A large army," he remarked, "was moreover inconsistent with our free constitution, to which we were, with reason, so much attached." I remarked, that the superior importance to England of maritime concerns was fully acknowledged by our ministers, and

that they would heartily rejoice in being enabled to withdraw the British contingent in France (to which he seemed to have alluded); that the actual distress in England arose from the system of public credit; by which the war had been supported, and the consequences of which were in their nature lasting; that these consequences had been anticipated, and were not, it was to be hoped, irremediable. "Yes," said Napoleon, "your resources are great: but your ruin, from persisting in your present policy, is certain. Your ministers have affected generosity, and have ruined the country. In this generosity you have departed from the system of your ancestors, who never concluded a peace without gaining, or attempting to gain, some advantage; they were steady merchants who filled their purses, but you have set up for gentlemen, and are ruined. Although the peace, on the termination of the American war, was honourable to France, for she compelled England to acknowledge the independence of America, the treaty in 1783 was fatal to French commerce; and how do you suppose that came to be concluded? The French ministers were fully aware of its injurious consequences, but England threatened war, and they had no money to defray the expenses." I understood Bonaparte to say that this account was supported by *Memoirs in the Bureau des Affaires Étrangères*.

During the conversation, which, notwithstanding the variety of topics started, if not discussed, did not occupy more than half an hour, there were frequent repetitions of particular expressions; such as "*L'Angleterre est déchue; avec 45,000 hommes, vous ne serez jamais puissance continentale.*" Bonaparte never listened to any reply naturally arising from his observations, but continued his own view of the subject he was discussing; he seemed little studious in arrangement, but poured out his ideas with a rapidity of language almost equal to the rapidity of their succession in the mind. His style upon political subjects is so epigrammatic and tranchant, that in a man whose actions had not been correspondent, it would look like charlatanerie. Bonaparte must be allowed to be eloquent, and possesses that species of oratory well adapted for a popular assembly, or for influencing persons already prepared to look up to him. Upon the former, his point would produce impression; and a sort of oracular confidence, in which he abounds, would command the conviction of the latter. His manner, on the whole, was pleasing, and had a mixture of simplicity and conscious superiority which I never before witnessed. The expression of his countenance is more intellectual than commanding: and his person, so far from being overgrown with corpulence, seems fully equal to the endurance of the greatest exertion. I should say that he was as fit as ever to go through a campaign, and that, considering his age, he was not unusually corpulent. I have omitted to mention an illustration made use of by Bonaparte, in speaking of the conduct of the English ministers at the congress. "You were," said he, "like the dog in the fable, who dropt the piece of meat in the water, while looking at his own image. You had the commerce of the world, and you took no precautions to retain it. Nothing but a great

extension of commerce could have enabled you to bear your immense taxes, and you made no effort to obtain it." Bonaparte miscalls English names and words more than any foreigner I ever before heard, who had pretensions to a knowledge of the language; and notwithstanding his reading, and the attention he has probably paid to the subject, he seems little acquainted with the nature of our domestic policy. His plans, like his practice, are all despotic, and are formed without adverting to constitutional restrictions.

In his conversation with Lord Amherst, he dwelt much upon his present situation; and expressed himself with great and unjustifiable bitterness respecting Sir H. Lowe. Lord Bathurst's speech had evidently annoyed him, and he expressed disappointment at the countenance such language and treatment received from Lords Sidmouth and Liverpool, with whom he affected to consider himself as having been formerly on terms of amicable intercourse. He said such a man as Lord Cornwallis ought to have been placed in Sir H. Lowe's situation. It is difficult to conceive any complaints more unreasonable, than those made by Bonaparte of Sir H. Lowe's conduct. There perhaps never was a prisoner so much requiring to be watched and guarded, to whom so much liberty and range for exercise was allowed. With an officer he may go over any part of the island; wholly unobserved, his limits extend four miles—partially observed, eight—and overlooked, twelve. At night, the sentinels certainly close round Longwood itself. The house is small, but well furnished; and altogether as commodious as the circumstances under which it was procured would admit. I can only account for his petulance and unfounded complaints, from one of two motives—either he wishes by their means to keep alive interest in Europe, and more especially in England, where he flatters himself he has a party; or his troubled mind finds an occupation in the tracasseries which his present conduct gives to the governor. If the latter be the case, it is in vain for any governor to unite being on good terms with him, to the performance of his duty. Bonaparte in concluding the observations which he thought proper to address to me, made a motion with his hand to Lord Amherst for the introduction of Captain Maxwell and the gentlemen of the embassy. They entered, accompanied by Generals Bertrand, Montholon, and Gouraud. A circle under the direction of the grand marshal was formed, and Lord Amherst, having presented Captain Maxwell, Bonaparte said, "I have heard of you before—you took one of our frigates, the *Pauline*; *vous êtes un méchant*; well, your government can say nothing about your losing the ship, for you have taken one for them before." He observed of Lord Amherst's son, that he must resemble his mother, and good-humouredly asked him what he had brought from China, whether a bonnet or a mandarin. He inquired of Mr M'Leod, the surgeon of the *Alceste*, how long he had served, and if he had been wounded; repeating the question in English. On Mr Abel being introduced as naturalist, he inquired if he knew Sir Joseph Banks, saying that his name had always been a passport, and that, even during the war, his requests had

always been attended to. He wished to know if Mr Abel was a member of the Royal Society, or was a candidate for that honour. Bonaparte appeared to be under some erroneous impression respecting a son of Sir J. Banks having gone on an expedition to the coast of Africa. Mr Cook's name led him naturally to inquire whether he was a descendant of the celebrated Cook, the navigator, adding, "he was indeed a great man." Dr Lynn having been presented as a physician, was asked at what university he had studied: "At Edinburgh," being the reply; "Ah! are you a Brunonian in practice, and do you bleed and give as much mercury as our St Helena doctors?" To Mr Griffiths, the chaplain (whom he called *aumônier*), he put some questions respecting the state of religion in China: he was answered a kind of Polytheism. Not seeming to understand this word spoken in English, Bertrand explained, *Pluralité de Dieux*. "Ah, *Pluralité de Dieux*! Do they believe," he resumed, "in the immortality of the soul?" "They seem to have some idea of a future state," was the reply. He then asked to what university he belonged; and jokingly said to Lord Amberst, you must get him a good living when you go home; adding, "I wish you may be a prebendary." He then inquired of Mr Hayne, how and where he had been educated? On being told that he had been educated at home by his father, he immediately turned away; and having now said something to each, he dismissed us.

No. 13.

BONAPARTE'S LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT.

Page 798.

This 15th April, 1821, at Longwood, Island of St Helena.
This is my Testament, or Act of my last Will.

NAPOLEON.

I.

1. I DIE in the apostolical Roman religion, in the bosom of which I was born, more than fifty years since.

2. It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people, whom I have loved so well.

3. I have always had reason to be pleased with my dearest wife, Maria Louisa. I retain for her, to my last moment, the most tender sentiments.—I beseech her to watch, in order to preserve my son from the snares which yet environ his infancy.

4. I recommend to my son, never to forget that he was born a French prince, and never to allow himself to become an instrument in the hands of the triumvirs who oppress the nations of Europe; he ought never to fight against France, or to injure her in any manner; he ought to adopt my motto—"*Everything for the French people.*"

5. I die prematurely, assassinated by the English oligarchy and its ***. The English nation will not be slow in avenging me.

6. The two unfortunate results of the invasions of France, when she had still so many resources, are

to be attributed to the treason of Marmont, Angereau, Talleyrand, and La Fayette.

I forgive them—may the posterity of France forgive them like me!

7. I thank my good and most excellent mother, the cardinal, my brothers Joseph, Lucien, Jérôme, Pauline, Caroline, Julie, Hortense, Catarine, Eugène, for the interest which they have continued to feel for me. I pardon Louis for the libel which he published in 1820: it is replete with false assertions and falsified documents.

8. I disavow the *Manuscript of St Helena*, and other works, under the title of Maxims, Sayings, etc., which persons have been pleased to publish for the last six years. These are not the rules which have guided my life. I caused the Duke d'Anguien to be arrested and tried, because that step was essential to the safety, interest, and honour of the French people, when the Count d'Artois was maintaining, by his confession, sixty assassins at Paris. Under similar circumstances, I would act in the same way.

II.

1. I bequeath to my son, the boxes, orders, and other articles; such as my plate, field-bed, saddles, spurs, chapel plate, books, linen, which I have been accustomed to wear and use, according to the list annexed (A). It is my wish that this slight bequest may be dear to him, as recalling the memory of a father, of whom the universe will discourse to him.

2. I bequeath to Lady Holland the antique Cameo which Pope Pius VI. gave me at Tolentino.

3. I bequeath to Count Montholon two millions of francs, as a proof of my satisfaction with the filial attentions which he has paid to me during six years, and as an indemnity for the losses which his residence at St Helena has occasioned.

4. I bequeath to Count Bertrand five hundred thousand francs.

5. I bequeath to Marchand, my first valet-de-chambre, four hundred thousand francs. The services which he has rendered to me are those of a friend; it is my wish that he should marry the widow, sister, or daughter of an officer of my Old Guard.

6. Item. To St-Denis, one hundred thousand francs.

7. Item. To Noverraz, one hundred thousand francs.

8. Item. To Pierron, one hundred thousand francs.

9. Item. To Archambault, fifty thousand francs.

10. Item. To Cursor, twenty-five thousand francs.

11. Item. To Chandellier, idem.

12. To the Abbé Vignali one hundred thousand francs. It is my wish that he should build his house near the Ponte Novo di Rostino.

13. Item. To Count Las Cases one hundred thousand francs.

14. Item. To Count Lavalette one hundred thousand francs.

15. Item. To Larrey, surgeon-in-chief, one hundred thousand francs.—He is the most virtuous man I have known.

16. Item. To General Brayer, one hundred thousand francs.

17. Item. To General Lefebvre Desnouettes, one hundred thousand francs.

18. Item. To General Drouot, one hundred thousand francs.

19. Item. To General Cambrone, one hundred thousand francs.

20. Item. To the children of General Mouton Dornet, one hundred thousand francs.

21. Item. To the children of the brave Labédoyère, one hundred thousand francs.

22. Item. To the children of General Girard, killed at Ligury, one hundred thousand francs.

23. Item. To the children of General Chartrand, one hundred thousand francs.

24. Item. To the children of the virtuous General Travost, one hundred thousand francs.

25. Item. To General Lallemand the elder, one hundred thousand francs.

26. Item. To Count Réal, one hundred thousand francs.

27. Item. To Costa di Basilica, in Corsica, one hundred thousand francs,

28. Item. To General Clausel, one hundred thousand francs.

29. Item. To Baron de Menneval, one hundred thousand francs.

30. Item. To Arnault, the author of *Marios*, one hundred thousand francs.

31. Item. To Colonel Marbot, one hundred thousand francs. I engage him to continue to write in defence of the glory of the French armies, and to confound their calumniators and apostates.

32. Item. To Baron Bignon, one hundred thousand francs. I engage him to write the history of French diplomacy, from 1792 to 1815.

33. Item. To Poggi di Talaro, one hundred thousand francs.

34. Item. To Surgeon Emery one hundred thousand francs.

35. These sums will be raised from the six millions which I deposited on leaving Paris in 1815; and from the interest, at the rate of five per cent, since July, 1815. The account will be settled with the banker by Counts Montholon, Bertrand, and Marchand.

36. Whatever that deposit may produce beyond the sum of five million six hundred thousand francs, which have been above disposed of, shall be distributed as a gratuity amongst the wounded at the battle of Waterloo, and amongst the officers and soldiers of the battalion of the Isle of Elba, according to a scale to be determined upon by Montholon, Bertrand, Drouot, Cambrone, and the surgeon Larrey.

37. These legacies, in case of death, shall be paid to the widows and children, and, in default of such, shall revert to the bulk of my property.

III.

1. My private domain being my property, of which no French law deprives me, that I am aware of, an account of it will be required from the Baron de la Bouillerie, the treasurer thereof. It ought to amount to more than 200,000,000 of francs: namely, 1. The portfolio containing the savings which I made during fourteen years out of my civil list, which amounted to more than 12,000,000 per annum, if my memory be good. 2. The produce of this portfolio. 3. The furniture of my palaces, such as it

was in 1814, including the palaces of Rome, Florence, and Turin. All this furniture was purchased with moneys accruing from the civil list. 4. The proceeds of my houses in the kingdom of Italy, such as money, plate, jewels, furniture, equipages; the accounts will be rendered by Prince Eugène, and the steward of the crown, Campagnoni.

NAPOLEON.

2. I bequeath my private domain, one half to the surviving officers and soldiers of the French army who have fought since 1792 to 1815, for the glory and the independence of the nation. The distribution shall be made in proportion to their appointments upon active service. One half to the towns and districts of Alsace, of Lorraine, of Franche-Comté, of Burgundy, of the Isle of France, of Champagne, Forest, Dauphiné, which may have suffered by either of the invasions. There shall be previously deducted from this sum, one million for the town of Brienne, and one million for that of Méry.

I appoint Counts Montholon, Bertrand, and Marchand, the executors of my will.

This present will, wholly written with my own hand, is signed, and sealed with my own arms.

(L. S.)

NAPOLEON.

LIST (A).

Affixed to my Will.

Longwood, Island of St Helena, this 15th April, 1821.

I.

1. The consecrated vessels which have been in use at my chapel at Longwood.

2. I enjoin the Abbé Vignali to preserve them, and to deliver them to my son, when he shall reach the age of sixteen years.

II.

1. My arms, that is to say, my sword, that which I wore at Austerlitz, the sabre of Sobieski, my dagger, my broadsword, my hanger, my two pairs of Versailles pistols.

2. My gold traveling-box, that of which I made use on the morning of Ulm and of Austerlitz, of Jena, of Eylau, of Friedland, of the Island of Lobau, of the Moskwa, of Montmirail. In this point of view, it is my wish that it may be precious in the eyes of my son. (It has been deposited with Count Bertrand since 1814.)

3. I charge Count Bertrand with the care of preserving these objects, and of conveying them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

III.

1. Three small mahogany-boxes, containing, the first, thirty-three snuff-boxes, or comfit-boxes; the second, twelve boxes with the imperial arms, two small eye-glasses, and four boxes found on the table of Louis XVIII. in the Tuileries, on the 29th of March, 1815; the third, three snuff-boxes, ornamented with silver medals, for the personal uses of the emperor; and sundry articles for the use of the toilet, according to the lists numbered I, II, III.

2. My field-bed, which I used in all my campaigns.
3. My field-telescope.
4. My dressing-box, one of each of my uniforms, a dozen of shirts, and a complete set of each of my dresses, and generally of everything used in my toilet.
5. My wash-hand stand.
6. A small clock which is in my chamber at Longwood.
7. My two watches and the chain of the empress's hair.
8. I charge Marchand, my principal valet-de-chambre, to take care of these articles, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

IV.

1. My cabinet of medals.
2. My plate, and my Sèvres china, which I used at St Helena.
3. I charge Count Montholon to take care of these articles, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

V.

1. My three saddles and bridles, my spurs, which I used at St Helena.
2. My fowling pieces, to the number of five.
3. I charge my huntsman, Noverraz, to take care of these articles, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

VI.

1. Four hundred volumes, selected from those in my library, which I have been accustomed to use the most.
2. I charge St-Denis to take care of them, and to convey them to my son, when he shall attain the age of sixteen years.

LIST (A).

1. None of the articles which have been used by me shall be sold : the residue shall be divided amongst the executors of my will and my brothers.
2. Marchand shall preserve my hair, and cause a bracelet to be made of it, with a gold clasp, to be sent to the Empress Maria Louisa, to my mother, and to each of my brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, the cardinal, and one of larger size for my son.
3. Marchand will send one pair of my gold shoe-buckles to Prince Joseph.
4. A small pair of gold knee-buckles to Prince Lucien.
5. A gold collar-clasp to Prince Jérôme.

LIST I.

Inventory of my effects, which Marchand will take care of, and convey to my son.

1. My silver dressing-box, that which is on my table, furnished with all its utensils, razors, etc.
2. My alarm-clock : it is the alarm-clock of Frederick II. which I took at Potsdam (in box No. III).
3. My two watches with the chain of the empress's hair, and a chain of my own hair for the other watch : Marchand will get it made at Paris.

4. My two seals (one French), contained in box No. III.
5. The small gold clock which is now in my bed-chamber.
6. My wash-stand, its water-jug, etc.
7. My night-table, that which I used in France, and my silver-gilt bidet.
8. My two iron bedsteads, my mattresses, and my coverlets, if they can be preserved.
9. My three silver decanters, which held my eau-de-vie which my chasseurs carried in the field.
10. My French telescope.
11. My spurs, two pair.
12. Three mahogany boxes, Nos. I., II., III., containing my snuff-boxes, and other articles.
13. A silver-gilt perfuming pan.

LIST II.

Body Linen.

- 6 Shirts.
 - 6 Handkerchiefs.
 - 6 Cravats.
 - 6 Napkins.
 - 6 Pair of silk stockings.
 - 6 Black stocks.
 - 6 Pair of under stockings.
 - 2 Pair of cambric sheets.
 - 2 Pillow cases.
 - 2 Dressing gowns.
 - 2 Pair of night drawers.
 - 1 Pair of braces.
 - 4 Pair of white kerseymer breeches and vests.
 - 6 Madras.
 - 6 Flannel waistcoats.
 - 4 Pair of drawers.
 - 6 Pair of gloves.
 - 1 Small box filled with my snuff.
 - 1 Gold neck-buckle.
 - 1 Pair gold knee-buckles.
 - 1 Pair gold shoe-buckles.
- } contained in the little box, No. III.

LIST III.

Clothes.

- 1 Uniform of the Chasseurs.
- 1 Ditto Grenadiers.
- 1 Ditto National Guard.
- 2 Hats.
- 1 Green-and-grey great coat.
- 1 Blue cloak (that which I had at Marengo).
- 1 Sable green pelisse.
- 2 Pair of shoes.
- 2 Pair of boots.
- 2 Pair of slippers.
- 6 Belts.

NAPOLEON.

LIST (B).

Inventory of the effects which I left in possession of Monsieur le Count de Turenne.

- 1 Sabre of Sobieski. It is by mistake inserted in List A. It is the sabre which the emperor wore at Aboukir, which is in the hands of the Count Bertrand.

- 1 Grand collar of the Legion of Honour.
- 1 Sword, of silver gilt.
- 1 Consular sword.
- 1 Sword, of steel.
- 1 Velvet belt.
- 1 Collar of the Golden Fleece.
- 1 Small traveling-box of steel.
- 1 Silver night-lamp.
- 1 Handle of an antique sabre.
- 1 Hat of Henry IV. and a cap. The lace of the emperor.
- 1 Small cabinet of medals.
- 2 Turkey carpets.
- 2 Mantles, of crimson velvet, embroidered, with vest and small-clothes.

I give to my son the sabre of Sobieski.

Do. the collar of the Legion of Honour.

Do. the sword, silver gilt.

Do. the consular sword.

Do. the steel sword.

Do. the collar of the Golden Fleece.

Do. the hat of Henry IV. and the cap.

Do. the golden dressing-box, for the teeth, which is in the hands of the dentist.

To the Empress Maria Louisa, my lace.

To Madame, the silver night lamp.

To the cardinal, the small steel traveling-box.

To Prince Eugène, the wax-candlestick, silver gilt.

To the Princess Pauline, the small cabinet of medals.

To the Queen of Naples, a small Turkey carpet.

To the Queen Hortense, a small Turkey carpet.

To Prince Jérôme, the handle of the antique sabre.

To Prince Joseph, an embroidered mantle, vest, and small-clothes.

To Prince Lucien, an embroidered mantle, vest, and small-clothes.

April 16th, 1821. Longwood.

This is a Codicil to my Will.

1. It is my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people, whom I loved so well.

2. I bequeath to Counts Bertrand, Montholon, and to Marchand, the money, jewels, plate, china, furniture, books, arms, and generally everything that belongs to me in the island of St Helena.

This codicil, entirely written with my own hand, is signed, and sealed with my own arms.

(L. S.)

NAPOLEON.

This 24th April, 1821. Longwood.

This is my Codicil, or Act of my last Will.

Out of the settlement of my civil list of Italy, such as money, jewels, plate, linen, equipages, of which the viceroy is the depository, and which belonged to me, I dispose of two millions, which I bequeath to my most faithful servants. I hope that, without acting upon the credit of any account, my son Eugène Napoleon will pay them faithfully. He cannot forget the forty millions which I gave him either in

Italy or at the distribution of the inheritance of his mother.

1. Out of these two millions, I bequeath to Count Bertrand 300,000 francs, of which he will deposit 100,000 in the treasurer's chest, to be disposed of according to my dispositions in payment of legacies of conscience.

2. To Count Montholon, 200,000 francs, of which he will deposit 100,000 in the chest, for the same purpose as above-mentioned.

3. To Count Las Cases, 200,000, of which he will deposit 100,000 in the chest, for the same purpose as above-mentioned.

4. To Marchand, 100,000, of which he will deposit 50,000 in the chest, for the same purpose as above mentioned.

5. To Count Lavalette, 100,000.

6. To General Hogendorf, of Holland, my aide-de-camp, who has retired to the Brazils, 100,000.

7. To my aide-de-camp, Corbineau, 50,000.

8. To my aide-de-camp, Caffarelli, fifty thousand francs.

9. To my aide-de-camp, Dejean, 50,000.

10. To Percy, surgeon-in-chief at Waterloo, 50,000.

11. 50,000: that is to say, 10,000 to Pierron, my maître-d'hôtel; 10,000 to St-Denis, my head chamberlain; 10,000 to Noverraz; 10,000 to Cursor, my clerk of the kitchen; 10,000 to Archambault, my overseer.

12. To Baron Menneval, 50,000.

13. To the Duke d'Istria, son of Bessières, fifty thousand francs.

14. To the daughter of Duroc, fifty thousand francs.

15. To the children of Labédoyère, 50,000.

16. To the children of Mouton Duvernet, 50,000.

17. To the children of the brave and virtuous general Travost, 50,000.

18. To the children of Chartrand, 50,000.

19. To General Cambrone, 50,000.

20. To General Lefebvre Desnouettes, 50,000.

21. To be distributed amongst such proscribed persons as wander in foreign countries, whether they may be French, or Italian, or Belgians, or Dutch, or Spanish, or inhabitants of the departments of the Rhine, at the disposal of my executors, 100,000.

22. To be distributed amongst those who suffered amputation, or were severely wounded at Ligny, or Waterloo, who may be still living, according to lists drawn up by my executors, to whom shall be added, Cambrone, Larrey, Percy, and Emery. The Guard shall be paid double; those of the island of Elba, quadruple; two hundred thousand francs.

This codicil is written entirely with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.

NAPOLEON.

This 24th April, 1821, at Longwood.

This is a third Codicil to my Will of the 15th of April.

1. Amongst the diamonds of the crown which were delivered up in 1814, there were some to the value of five or six hundred thousand francs not belonging to it, but which formed part of my private

property; repossession shall be obtained of them, in order to discharge my legacies.

2. I had in the hands of the banker Torlonia, at Rome, bills of exchange to the amount of two or three hundred thousand francs, the produce of my revenues of the island of Elba, since 1815. The Sieur de Peyrusse, although no longer my treasurer, and not invested with any character, possessed himself of this sum. He shall be compelled to restore it.

3. I bequeath to the Duke of Istria three hundred thousand francs, of which only one hundred thousand francs shall be reversible to his widow, should the duke be dead at the payment of the legacy. It is my wish, should there be no inconvenience in it, that the duke may marry Duroc's daughter.

4. I bequeath to the Duchess of Frioul, the daughter of Duroc, two hundred thousand francs: should she be dead at the payment of this legacy, none of it shall be given to the mother.

5. I bequeath to General Rigaud (to him who was proscribed), one hundred thousand francs.

6. I bequeath to Boissod, the intendant commissary, one hundred thousand francs.

7. I bequeath to the children of General Letort, who was killed in the campaign of 1815, one hundred thousand francs.

8. These eight hundred thousand francs of legacies shall be considered as if inserted at the end of Article 36 of my testament, which will make the legacies which I have disposed of, by my will, amount to the sum of six million four hundred thousand francs, without comprising the donations which I have made by my second codicil.

This is written with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.

(L. S.)

NAPOLÉON.

(On the outside, nearly at the centre, is written:)

This is my third codicil to my will, entirely written with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.

(The words are intermixed with the signatures of Bertrand, Montholon, Marchand, Vignali, with their respective seals, and a piece of green silk runs through the centre. On the upper left corner are the following directions:)

To be opened the same day, and immediately after the opening of my will.

NAPOLÉON.

(With some fragments of the signatures of the above-named witnesses.)

This 24th of April, 1821. Longwood.

This is a fourth Codicil to my Testament.

By the dispositions which we have heretofore made, we have not fulfilled all our obligations; which has decided us to make this fourth codicil.

1. We bequeath to the son or grandson of Baron Dutheil, lieutenant-general of artillery, and formerly lord of St-André, who commanded the school of Auxonne before the Revolution, the sum of one hundred thousand francs, as a memento of gratitude

for the care which that brave general took of us when we were lieutenant and captain under his orders.

2. Item. To the son or grandson of General Dugommier, who commanded in chief the army of Toulon, the sum of one hundred thousand francs. We under his orders directed that siege, and commanded the artillery: it is a testimonial of remembrance for the marks of esteem, of affection, and of friendship, which that brave and intrepid general gave us.

3. Item. We bequeath one hundred thousand francs to the son or grandson of the deputy of the Convention Gasparin, representative of the people at the army of Toulon, for having protected and sanctioned with his authority, the plan which we had given, which procured the capture of that city, and which was contrary to that sent by the Committee of Public Safety. Gasparin placed us, by his protection, under shelter from the persecution and ignorance of the general officers who commanded the army before the arrival of my friend Dugommier.

4. Item. We bequeath one hundred thousand francs to the widow, son, or grandson, of our aide-de-camp, Maïron, killed at our side at Arcola, covering us with his body.

5. Item. Ten thousand francs to the subaltern officer Cantillon, who has undergone a trial, upon the charge of having endeavoured to assassinate Lord Wellington, of which he was pronounced innocent. Cantillon had as much right to assassinate that *oligarchist*, as the latter had to send me to perish upon the rock of St Helena. Wellington, who proposed this outrage, attempted to justify himself by pleading the interest of Great Britain. Cantillon, if he had really assassinated that lord, would have excused himself, and have been justified by the same motives, the interest of France, to get rid of a general, who, moreover, had violated the capitulation of Paris, and by that had rendered himself responsible for the blood of the martyrs Ney, Lahédoyère, etc.; and for the crime of having pillaged the museums, contrary to the text of the treaties.

6. These four hundred and ten thousand francs shall be added to the six million four hundred thousand of which we have disposed, and will make our legacies amount to six million eight hundred and ten thousand francs; these four hundred and ten thousand are to be considered as forming part of our testament, article 36; and to follow in everything the same course as the other legacies.

7. The nine thousand pounds sterling which we gave to Count and Countess Montholon, should, if they have been paid, be deducted and carried to the account of the legacies which we have given to him by our testament. If they have not been paid, our notes of hand shall be annulled.

8. In consideration of the legacy given by our will to Count Montholon, the pension of twenty thousand francs granted to his wife, is annulled. Count Montholon is charged to pay it to her.

9. The administration of such an inheritance, until its final liquidation, requiring expenses of offices, of journeys, of missions, of consultations, and of lawsuits, we expect that our testamentary exe-

cutors shall retain three per cent upon all the legacies, as well upon the six million eight hundred and ten thousand francs, as upon the sums contained in the codicils, and upon the two hundred millions of the private domain.

10. The amount of the same thus retained, shall be deposited in the hands of a treasurer, and disbursed by drafts from our testamentary executors.

11. If the sums arising from the aforesaid deductions be not sufficient to defray the expenses, provision shall be made to that effect, at the expense of the three testamentary executors and the treasurer, each in proportion to the legacy which we have bequeathed to them in our will and codicils.

12. Should the sums arising from the before-mentioned subtractions be more than necessary, the surplus shall be divided amongst our three testamentary executors and the treasurer, in the proportion of their respective legacies.

13. We nominate Count Las Cases, and in default of him, his son, and in default of the latter, General Drouot, to be treasurer.

This present codicil is entirely written with our hand, signed, and sealed with our arms.

NAPOLEON.

This 24th April, 1821. Longwood.

This is my Codicil or Act of my Last Will.

Upon the funds remitted in gold to the Empress Maria Louisa, my very dear and well beloved spouse, at Orleans, in 1814, she remains in my debt two millions, of which I dispose by the present codicil, for the purpose of recompensing my most faithful servants, whom moreover I recommend to the protection of my dear Maria Louisa.

1. I recommend to the empress to cause the income of thirty thousand francs, which Count Bertrand possessed in the Duchy of Parma, and upon the Mont Napoleon at Milan, to be restored to him, as well as the arrears due.

2. I make the same recommendation to her with regard to the Duke of Istria, Duroc's daughter, and others of my servants who have continued faithful to me, and who are always dear to me: she knows them.

3. Out of the above-mentioned two millions, I bequeath three hundred thousand francs to Count Bertrand, of which he will lodge one hundred thousand in the treasurer's chest, to be employed in legacies of conscience, according to my dispositions.

4. I bequeath two hundred thousand to Count Montholon, of which he will lodge one hundred thousand in the treasurer's chest, for the same purpose as above-mentioned.

5. Item. Two hundred thousand to Count Las Cases, of which he will lodge one hundred thousand in the treasurer's chest, for the same purpose as above-mentioned.

6. Item. To Marchand one hundred thousand, of which he will place fifty thousand in the treasurer's chest, for the same purpose as above-mentioned.

7. To Jean Jerome Levis, the mayor of Ajaccio at the commencement of the Revolution, or to his

widow, children, or grandchildren, one hundred thousand francs.

8. To Duroc's daughter, one hundred thousand.

9. To the son of Bessières, Duke of Istria, one hundred thousand.

10. To General Drouot, one hundred thousand.

11. To Count Lavalette, one hundred thousand.

12. Item. One hundred thousand; that is to say, twenty-five thousand to Pierron, my maitre-d'hôtel; twenty-five thousand to Noverraz, my huntsman; twenty-five thousand to St-Denis, the keeper of my books; twenty-five thousand to Santini, my former door-keeper.

13. Item. One hundred thousand; that is to say, forty thousand to Planta, my orderly officer; twenty thousand to Hébert, lately housekeeper of Rambouillet, and who belonged to my chamber in Egypt; twenty thousand to Lavigné, who was lately keeper of one of my stables, and who was my jockey in Egypt; twenty thousand to Jeanet Derrière, who was overseer of the stables, and served in Egypt with me.

14. Two hundred thousand francs shall be distributed in alms to the inhabitants of Brienne-le-Château, who have suffered most.

15. The three hundred thousand francs remaining, shall be distributed to the officers and soldiers of my guard at the island of Elba, who may be now alive, or to their widows or children, in proportion to their appointments; and according to an estimate which shall be fixed by my testamentary executors: those who have suffered amputation, or have been severely wounded, shall receive double: the estimate of it to be fixed by Larrey and Emery.

This codicil is written entirely with my own hand, signed, and sealed with my arms.

NAPOLEON.

(On the back of the Codicil is written:)

This is my codicil, or act of my last will, the execution of which I recommend to my dearest wife, the Empress Maria Louisa.

(L. s.)

NAPOLEON.

(Attested by the following witnesses, whose seals are respectively affixed:)

MONTHOLON,
BERTRAND,
MARCHAND,
VIGNALL.

} A piece of green silk.

6th Codicil.

Monsieur Lafitte, I remitted to you, in 1815, at the moment of my departure from Paris, a sum of near six millions, for which you have given me a receipt in duplicate. I have canceled one of the receipts, and I charge Count Montholon to present you with the other receipt, in order that you may pay to him, after my death, the said sum, with interest at the rate of five per cent. from the 1st of July, 1815, deducting the payments which you have been instructed to make by virtue of my orders.

It is my wish that the settlement of your account may be agreed upon between you, Count Montholon, Count Bertrand, and the Sieur Marchand; and this

settlement being made, I give you, by these presents, a complete and absolute discharge from the said sum.

I also, at that time, placed in your hands a box, containing my cabinet of medals. I beg you will give it to Count Montholon.

This letter having no other object, I pray God, Monsieur Lafitte, to have you in his holy and good keeping.

NAPOLEON.

Longwood, Island of St Helena,
the 25th April, 1821.

7th Codicil.

Monsieur le Baron la Bouillerie, treasurer of my private domain, I beg you to deliver the account and the balance, after my death, to Count Montholon, whom I have charged with the execution of my will.

This letter having no other object, I pray God, Monsieur le Baron la Bouillerie, to have you in his holy and good keeping.

NAPOLEON.

Longwood, Island of St Helena,
the 25th April, 1821.

No. 14.

INTERVIEW BETWEEN BONAPARTE AND THE WIDOW OF THEOBALD WOLFE TONE.

Page 792.

In vindication of what we have said in the text respecting the ready access afforded by Napoleon, when emperor, we may refer to the following interesting extract from the *Memoirs of Theobald Wolfe Tone*, already quoted. It is the account given by his widow of an interview with the emperor, and it is only necessary to add, by way of introduction, that Mrs Tone having received a pension from the French government after her husband's catastrophe, became desirous, in addition, to have her son admitted into the military school at St-Germain. Being discountenanced in her pretensions by the minister at war, she was advised to present her memorial to the emperor himself. The following is a very pleasing account of the scene that took place betwixt them, in which we give Napoleon full credit for acting from his feelings of generosity towards the widow and orphan of a man who had died in his service:—

"Very soon, the carriage with the emperor and empress drove into the circle; the horses were changed as quick as thought, but I stepped up, and presented the book and memorial. He took them, and, handing the book to his *écuyer*, opened the paper. I have said it commenced by recalling Tone to his memory. When he began, he said 'Tone!' with an expressive accent—'I remember well' (*Je m'en souviens bien*). He read it all through, and two or three times stopped, looked at me, and bowed, in reading it. When he had finished, he said to me, 'Now, speak to me of yourself' (*Main-*

tenant, parlez-moi de vous). I hesitated, for I was not prepared for that question, and took small interest in the subject. He proceeded, 'Have you a pension?' I said I had. 'Is it sufficient? Do you want any extraordinary succour?'—By this time I had recovered myself, and said, 'That his majesty's goodness left me no personal want; that all my cares, all my interest in life, were centered in my child, whom I now gave up to his majesty's service.' He answered, 'Be tranquil then on his account—he perfectly tranquil concerning him' (*Soyez donc tranquille sur son compte—soyez parfaitement tranquille sur lui*). I perceived a little half smile when I said 'my child,' (*mon enfant*); I should have said 'my son.' I knew it, but forgot.—He had stopped so long, that a crowd had gathered, and were crushing on, crying *Vive l'empereur!* They drove in the guard, and there came a horse very close to me. I was frightened, and retiring; but he called to stay where I was—'*Restez, restez là.*' Whether it was for my safety, or that he wanted to say more, I cannot tell; but more it was impossible to say, for the noise. I was close to the carriage door, and the guards on horseback close behind me, and indeed I was trembling. He saluted the people, and directed that two Napoleons a-piece should be given to the old women, and women with little children, who were holding out their hands. He then drove on, and, in going, nodded to me two or three times with affectionate familiarity, saying, 'Your child shall be well naturalized,' (*Votre enfant sera bien naturalisé*), with a playful emphasis on the words *votre enfant*.

The youth was admitted to the cavalry school of St-Germain, and the following is an account of Napoleon visiting that seminary:—

"The emperor frequently visited the school of infantry at St-Germain, reviewed the cadets, and gave them cold collations in the park. But he had never visited the school of cavalry since its establishment, of which we were very jealous, and did all in our power to attract him. Whenever he hunted, the cadets were in grand parade on the parterre, crying, *Vive l'empereur*, with all their young energies; he held his hat raised as he passed them; but that was all we could gain. Wise people whispered that he never would go whilst they were so evidently expecting him; that he liked to keep them always on the alert; it was good for discipline. The general took another plan, and once allowed no sign of life about the castle when the emperor passed—it was like a deserted place. But it did not take neither; he passed, as if there was no castle there. It was *désespérant*. When, lo! the next day but one after I had spoken to him, he suddenly galloped into the court of the castle, and the cry of the sentinel, *L'empereur!* was the first notice they had of it. He examined into everything. All were in undress, all at work, and this was what he wanted. In the military schools, the cadets got ammunition-bread, and lived like well-fed soldiers; but there was great outcry in the circles of Paris against the breed of the school of St-Germain. Ladies complained that their sons were poisoned by it; the emperor thought it was all nicety, and said no man was fit to be an

officer who could not eat ammunition bread. However, being there, he asked for a loaf, which was brought, and he saw it was villainous trash composed of pease, beans, rye, potatoes, and everything that would make flour or meal, instead of good brown wheaten flour. He tore the loaf in two in a rage, and dashed it against the wall, and there it stuck like a piece of mortar, to the great annoyance of those whose duty it was to have attended to this. He ordered the baker to be called, and made him look at it *sticking*. The man was in great terror first at the emperor's anger, but, taking heart, he begged his

majesty not to take his contract from him, and he would give good bread in future; at which the emperor broke into a royal and imperial passion, and threatened to send him to the galleys; but, suddenly turning round, he said, 'Yes, he would allow him to keep his contract, on condition that, as long as it lasted, he should furnish the school with good white household bread (*pain de ménage*), such as was sold in the bakers' shops in Paris;—that he might choose that, or lose his contract;' and the baker thankfully promised to furnish good white bread in future, at the same price."



THE END.





